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Sample records for safety basis implementation

  1. Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Safety Basis Implementation Strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TRAWINSKI, B.J.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the Safety Basis Implementation is to ensure that implementation of activities is accomplished in order to support readiness to move spent fuel from K West Basin. Activities may be performed directly by the Safety Basis Implementation Team or they may be performed by other organizations and tracked by the Team. This strategy will focus on five key elements, (1) Administration of Safety Basis Implementation (general items), (2) Implementing documents, (3) Implementing equipment (including verification of operability), (4) Training, (5) SNF Project Technical Requirements (STRS) database system

  2. Safety Basis Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    R.J. Garrett

    2002-01-01

    As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the implementation of the requirements identified in the Standards/Requirements Identification Document. The Standards/Requirements Identification Documents commit a facility to compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 5480.19) and the Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program. In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design and operation of the YMP site characterization activities

  3. Safety Basis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R.J. Garrett

    2002-01-14

    As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the implementation of the requirements identified in the Standards/Requirements Identification Document. The Standards/Requirements Identification Documents commit a facility to compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 5480.19) and the Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program. In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design and operation of the YMP site characterization activities.

  4. Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lavender, J.C.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports

  5. Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lavender, J.C.

    1994-09-09

    The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

  6. System Design and the Safety Basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellingson, Darrel

    2008-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to present the Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC (BJC) Lessons Learned for system design as it relates to safety basis documentation. BJC has had to reconcile incomplete or outdated system description information with current facility safety basis for a number of situations in recent months. This paper has relevance in multiple topical areas including documented safety analysis, decontamination and decommissioning (D and D), safety basis (SB) implementation, safety and design integration, potential inadequacy of the safety analysis (PISA), technical safety requirements (TSR), and unreviewed safety questions. BJC learned that nuclear safety compliance relies on adequate and well documented system design information. A number of PIS As and TSR violations occurred due to inadequate or erroneous system design information. As a corrective action, BJC assessed the occurrences caused by systems design-safety basis interface problems. Safety systems reviewed included the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) Fluorination System, K-1065 fire alarm system, and the K-25 Radiation Criticality Accident Alarm System. The conclusion was that an inadequate knowledge of system design could result in continuous non-compliance issues relating to nuclear safety. This was especially true with older facilities that lacked current as-built drawings coupled with the loss of 'historical knowledge' as personnel retired or moved on in their careers. Walkdown of systems and the updating of drawings are imperative for nuclear safety compliance. System design integration with safety basis has relevance in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. This paper presents the BJC Lessons Learned in this area. It will be of benefit to DOE contractors that manage and operate an aging population of nuclear facilities

  7. Advanced Test Reactor Safety Basis Upgrade Lessons Learned Relative to Design Basis Verification and Safety Basis Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    G. L. Sharp; R. T. McCracken

    2004-01-01

    The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a pressurized light-water reactor with a design thermal power of 250 MW. The principal function of the ATR is to provide a high neutron flux for testing reactor fuels and other materials. The reactor also provides other irradiation services such as radioisotope production. The ATR and its support facilities are located at the Test Reactor Area of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). An audit conducted by the Department of Energy's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (DOE OA) raised concerns that design conditions at the ATR were not adequately analyzed in the safety analysis and that legacy design basis management practices had the potential to further impact safe operation of the facility.1 The concerns identified by the audit team, and issues raised during additional reviews performed by ATR safety analysts, were evaluated through the unreviewed safety question process resulting in shutdown of the ATR for more than three months while these concerns were resolved. Past management of the ATR safety basis, relative to facility design basis management and change control, led to concerns that discrepancies in the safety basis may have developed. Although not required by DOE orders or regulations, not performing design basis verification in conjunction with development of the 10 CFR 830 Subpart B upgraded safety basis allowed these potential weaknesses to be carried forward. Configuration management and a clear definition of the existing facility design basis have a direct relation to developing and maintaining a high quality safety basis which properly identifies and mitigates all hazards and postulated accident conditions. These relations and the impact of past safety basis management practices have been reviewed in order to identify lessons learned from the safety basis upgrade process and appropriate actions to resolve possible concerns with respect to the current ATR safety

  8. 10 CFR 830.202 - Safety basis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety basis. 830.202 Section 830.202 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT Safety Basis Requirements § 830.202 Safety basis. (a) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis...

  9. IMPLEMENTING CHANGES TO AN APPROVED AND IN-USE DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KING JP

    2008-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) has refined a process to ensure a comprehensive and complete DSA/TSR change implementation. Successful Nuclear Facility Safety Basis implementation is essential to avoid creating a Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA) situation, or implementing a facility into a non-compliance that can result in a TSR violation. Once past initial implementation, additional changes to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are often needed due to needed requirement clarifications, operating experience indicating that Conditions/Required Actions/Surveillance Requirements could be improved, changes in facility conditions, or changes in facility mission etc. An effective change implementation process is essential to ensuring compliance with 10 CFR 830.202(a), 'The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1,2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis for the facility'

  10. Interim safety basis compliance matrix for Trenches 31 and 34

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ames, R.R.

    1994-01-01

    The tables provided in this document identify the specific requirements and basis for the administrative controls established in the Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) Solid Waste Burial Ground (SWBG) Interim Safety Basis (ISB) for operation of the Project W-025, Mixed Waste Lined Landfill (Trenches 31 and 34). The tables document the necessary controls and implementing procedures to ensure compliance with the requirements of the ISB. These requirements provide a basis for future Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQ) screening of applicable procedure changes, proposed physical modifications, tests, experiments, and occurrences. Table 1 provides the SWBG interim Operational Safety Requirements administrative controls matrix. The specific assumptions and commitments used in the safety analysis documents applicable to disposal of mixed wastes in Trenches 31 and 34 are provided in Table 2. Table 3 is provided to document the potential engineered and administrative mitigating features identified in the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for disposal of mixed waste

  11. SAFETY BASIS DESIGN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IMECE2007-42747

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    RYAN GW

    2007-09-24

    'Designing in Safety' is a desired part of the development of any new potentially hazardous system, process, or facility. It is a required part of nuclear safety activities as specified in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 420.B, Facility Safety. This order addresses the design of nuclear related facilities developed under federal regulation IOCFR830, Nuclear Safety Management. IOCFR830 requires that safety basis documentation be provided to identify how nuclear safety is being adequately addressed as a condition for system operation (e.g., the safety basis). To support the development of the safety basis, a safety analysis is performed. Although the concept of developing a design that addresses 'Safety is simple, the execution can be complex and challenging. This paper addresses those complexities and challenges for the design activity of a system to treat sludge, a corrosion product of spent nuclear fuel, at DOE's Hanford Site in Washington State. The system being developed is referred to as the Sludge Treatment Project (STP). This paper describes the portion of the safety analysis that addresses the selection of design basis events using the experience gained from the STP and the development of design requirements for safety features associated with those events. Specifically, the paper describes the safety design process and the application of the process for two types of potential design basis accidents associated with the operation of the system, (1) flashing spray leaks and (2) splash and splatter leaks. Also presented are the technical challenges that are being addressed to develop effective safety features to deal with these design basis accidents.

  12. SAFETY BASIS DESIGN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IMECE2007-42747

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    RYAN GW

    2007-01-01

    'Designing in Safety' is a desired part of the development of any new potentially hazardous system, process, or facility. It is a required part of nuclear safety activities as specified in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 420.B, Facility Safety. This order addresses the design of nuclear related facilities developed under federal regulation IOCFR830, Nuclear Safety Management. IOCFR830 requires that safety basis documentation be provided to identify how nuclear safety is being adequately addressed as a condition for system operation (e.g., the safety basis). To support the development of the safety basis, a safety analysis is performed. Although the concept of developing a design that addresses 'Safety is simple, the execution can be complex and challenging. This paper addresses those complexities and challenges for the design activity of a system to treat sludge, a corrosion product of spent nuclear fuel, at DOE's Hanford Site in Washington State. The system being developed is referred to as the Sludge Treatment Project (STP). This paper describes the portion of the safety analysis that addresses the selection of design basis events using the experience gained from the STP and the development of design requirements for safety features associated with those events. Specifically, the paper describes the safety design process and the application of the process for two types of potential design basis accidents associated with the operation of the system, (1) flashing spray leaks and (2) splash and splatter leaks. Also presented are the technical challenges that are being addressed to develop effective safety features to deal with these design basis accidents

  13. Working group 1A - basis for the standard-safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whipple, C.

    1993-01-01

    This paper presents a summary of the progress made by working group 1A (Basis for the Safety Standard) during the Electric Power Research Institute's EPRI Workshop on the technical basis of EPA HLW Disposal Criteria, March 1993. This group discussed the semantics of terms within the standard 40 CFR Part 191, the implementation of this standard, the advanced notice of rulemaking, the issue of emitting carbon-14 through a gaseous pathway, the strategy of dealing with standards for contamination of drinking water and groundwater, the 100,000 year time frame, and the analysis of specific comments. The specific comments dealt with the cost effectiveness of the standard, the dose histogram for populations and individuals, groundwater definition and the underlying technology driver for this standard

  14. 340 Waste Handling Facility interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bendixsen, R.B.

    1995-01-01

    This document establishes the interim safety basis (ISB) for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility). An ISB is a documented safety basis that provides a justification for the continued operation of the facility until an upgraded final safety analysis report is prepared that complies with US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The ISB for the 340 Facility documents the current design and operation of the facility. The 340 Facility ISB (ISB-003) is based on a facility walkdown and review of the design and operation of the facility, as described in the existing safety documentation. The safety documents reviewed, to develop ISB-003, include the following: OSD-SW-153-0001, Operating Specification Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1990); OSR-SW-152-00003, Operating Limits for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1989); SD-RE-SAP-013, Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Railroad Liquid Waste Tank Cars (Mercado 1993); SD-WM-TM-001, Safety Assessment Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (Berneski 1994a); SD-WM-SEL-016, 340 Facility Safety Equipment List (Berneski 1992); and 340 Complex Fire Hazard Analysis, Draft (Hughes Assoc. Inc. 1994)

  15. Evolution of Safety Basis Documentation for the Fernald Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, T.; Kohler, S.; Fisk, P.; Krach, F.; Klein, B.

    2004-01-01

    The objective of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Fernald Closure Project (FCP), in suburban Cincinnati, Ohio, is to safely complete the environmental restoration of the Fernald site by 2006. Over 200 out of 220 total structures, at this DOE plant site which processed uranium ore concentrates into high-purity uranium metal products, have been safely demolished, including eight of the nine major production plants. Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) for these facilities have gone through a process of simplification, from individual operating Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) to a single site-wide Authorization Basis containing nuclear facility Bases for Interim Operations (BIOs) to individual project Auditable Safety Records (ASRs). The final stage in DSA simplification consists of project-specific Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs) and Nuclear Health and Safety Plans (N-HASPs) that address all aspects of safety, from the worker in the field to the safety basis requirements preserving the facility/activity hazard categorization. This paper addresses the evolution of Safety Basis Documentation (SBD), as DSAs, from production through site closure

  16. Safety basis for selected activities in single-shell tanks with flammable gas concerns. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schlosser, R.L.

    1996-01-01

    This is full revision to Revision 0 of this report. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of analyses done to support activities performed for single-shell tanks. These activities are encompassed by the flammable gas Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). The basic controls required to perform these activities involve the identification, elimination and/or control of ignition sources and monitoring for flammable gases. Controls are implemented through the Interim Safety Basis (ISB), IOSRs, and OSDs. Since this report only provides a historical compendium of issues and activities, it is not to be used as a basis to perform USQ screenings and evaluations. Furthermore, these analyses and others in process will be used as the basis for developing the Flammable Gas Topical Report for the ISB Upgrade

  17. Implementation of safety parameter display system at VVER-440 NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manninen, T.

    1997-01-01

    Furnishing WWER-440 nuclear power plant units with a safety parameter display system (SPDS) fulfilling the requirements of internationally recognized standards and guidelines has been ranked high on the lists of proposed safety improvement projects. Technically such an SPDS system can be implemented either as a separate stand-alone system or as a more or less closely integrated part of a process information system of the plant unit. In the paper examples of these approaches are presented. Functionally all these examples include the well proven SPDS concept developed by IVO Power Engineering Ltd, Finland. The functional design basis, the general requirements for the system platform, experience with implementation and expansion possibilities of the systems are discussed. (author)

  18. Reactor safety under design basis flood condition for inland sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hajela, S.; Bajaj, S.S.; Samota, A.; Verma, U.S.P.; Warudkar, A.S.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In June 1994, there was an incident of flooding at Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) due to combination of heavy rains and mechanical failure in the operation of gates at the adjoining weir. An indepth review of the incident was carried out and a number of flood protection measures were recommended and were implemented at site. As part of this review, a safety analysis was also done to demonstrate reactor safety with a series of failures considered in the flood protection features. For each inland NPP site, as part of design, different flood scenarios are analysed to arrive at design basis flood (DBF) level. This level is estimated based on worst combination of heavy local precipitation, flooding in river, failure of upstream/downstream water control structures

  19. Knowledge basis in safety culture for researchers and practitioners

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vieira Neto, Antonio S.; Barroso, Antonio C.O.; Goncalves, Adriana

    2009-01-01

    This paper presents the main characteristics of the knowledge basis in safety culture which is being developed at the IPEN-CNEN/SP, one of the Brazilian nuclear institutes of research. The main objective of this basis is to organize the information about safety culture found in the literature and to make it available to researchers and practitioners. The first stage of the development of this basis is already finished being the subject of this work. (author)

  20. 340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-04-01

    This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people.

  1. 340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-01-01

    This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people

  2. Quality and Safety Assurance - Priority Task at Nuclear Power Projects Implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nenkova, B.; Manchev, B.; Tomov, E.

    2010-01-01

    Quality and safety assurance at implementation of nuclear power engineering projects is important and difficult task for realization. Many problems arise during this process, when many companies from different countries participate, with various kinds of activities and services provided. The scope of activities necessary for quality and safety assurance is therefore quite expanded and diverse. In order to increase the safety and reliability of Kozloduy NPP Plc (KNPP) Units 5 and 6, as well as to bring the units in conformity with the newest international requirements for quality and safety in the field of nuclear energy, a program for their modernization on the basis of different technical studies and assessments was implemented. The Units 5 and 6 Modernization Program of Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant was composed of 212 modifications aimed to improve the safety, operability, and reliability of the Units. The Program was realized by stages during yearly planned outages since year 2002 to 2007, without additional outages. A major Program Objective was to extend the Units Life Time in at least 15 Years, under a continuous, safe, and reliable operation. The Modernization Program of Units 5 and 6 of the Bulgarian Nuclear Power Plant in Kozloduy was the first and for the time being the only one in the world, program in the field of nuclear power engineering, by which the full scope of recommendations for improvement of the Kozloduy NPP units was applied. The main goal of the National Electric Company, which is the Employer for the construction of new nuclear facility in Bulgaria, is after completion of all activities regarding construction of Belene NPP the plant to meet or exceed the requirements of the respective national and international quality and safety codes and standards, as well as the IAEA guidelines, as they are established. The objective of this report is to describe different aspects of the quality assurance according to the requirements of quality and

  3. TreeBASIS Feature Descriptor and Its Hardware Implementation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Spencer Fowers

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper presents a novel feature descriptor called TreeBASIS that provides improvements in descriptor size, computation time, matching speed, and accuracy. This new descriptor uses a binary vocabulary tree that is computed using basis dictionary images and a test set of feature region images. To facilitate real-time implementation, a feature region image is binary quantized and the resulting quantized vector is passed into the BASIS vocabulary tree. A Hamming distance is then computed between the feature region image and the effectively descriptive basis dictionary image at a node to determine the branch taken and the path the feature region image takes is saved as a descriptor. The TreeBASIS feature descriptor is an excellent candidate for hardware implementation because of its reduced descriptor size and the fact that descriptors can be created and features matched without the use of floating point operations. The TreeBASIS descriptor is more computationally and space efficient than other descriptors such as BASIS, SIFT, and SURF. Moreover, it can be computed entirely in hardware without the support of a CPU for additional software-based computations. Experimental results and a hardware implementation show that the TreeBASIS descriptor compares well with other descriptors for frame-to-frame homography computation while requiring fewer hardware resources.

  4. Implementation of Recommendations from the One System Comparative Evaluation of the Hanford Tank Farms and Waste Treatment Plant Safety Bases

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garrett, Richard L.; Niemi, Belinda J.; Paik, Ingle K.; Buczek, Jeffrey A.; Lietzow, J.; McCoy, F.; Beranek, F.; Gupta, M.

    2013-01-01

    A Comparative Evaluation was conducted for One System Integrated Project Team to compare the safety bases for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project (WTP) and Tank Operations Contract (TOC) (i.e., Tank Farms) by an Expert Review Team. The evaluation had an overarching purpose to facilitate effective integration between WTP and TOC safety bases. It was to provide One System management with an objective evaluation of identified differences in safety basis process requirements, guidance, direction, procedures, and products (including safety controls, key safety basis inputs and assumptions, and consequence calculation methodologies) between WTP and TOC. The evaluation identified 25 recommendations (Opportunities for Integration). The resolution of these recommendations resulted in 16 implementation plans. The completion of these implementation plans will help ensure consistent safety bases for WTP and TOC along with consistent safety basis processes. procedures, and analyses. and should increase the likelihood of a successful startup of the WTP. This early integration will result in long-term cost savings and significant operational improvements. In addition, the implementation plans lead to the development of eight new safety analysis methodologies that can be used at other U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) complex sites where URS Corporation is involved

  5. Evaluating safety management system implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preuss, M.

    2009-01-01

    Canada is committed to not only maintaining, but also improving upon our record of having one of the safest aviation systems in the world. The development, implementation and maintenance of safety management systems is a significant step towards improving safety performance. Canada is considered a world leader in this area and we are fully engaged in implementation. By integrating risk management systems and business practices, the aviation industry stands to gain better safety performance with less regulatory intervention. These are important steps towards improving safety and enhancing the public's confidence in the safety of Canada's aviation system. (author)

  6. Criteria Document for B-plant's Surveillance and Maintenance Phase Safety Basis Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SCHWEHR, B.A.

    1999-01-01

    This document is required by the Project Hanford Managing Contractor (PHMC) procedure, HNF-PRO-705, Safety Basis Planning, Documentation, Review, and Approval. This document specifies the criteria that shall be in the B Plant surveillance and maintenance phase safety basis in order to obtain approval of the DOE-RL. This CD describes the criteria to be addressed in the S and M Phase safety basis for the deactivated Waste Fractionization Facility (B Plant) on the Hanford Site in Washington state. This criteria document describes: the document type and format that will be used for the S and M Phase safety basis, the requirements documents that will be invoked for the document development, the deactivated condition of the B Plant facility, and the scope of issues to be addressed in the S and M Phase safety basis document

  7. Implementation of the INEEL safety analyst training standard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hochhalter, E. E.

    2000-01-01

    The Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) safety analysis units at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) are in the process of implementing the recently issued INEEL Safety Analyst Training Standard (STD-1107). Safety analyst training and qualifications are integral to the development and maintenance of core safety analysis capabilities. The INEEL Safety Analyst Training Standard (STD-1107) was developed directly from EFCOG Training Subgroup draft safety analyst training plan template, but has been adapted to the needs and requirements of the INEEL safety analysis community. The implementation of this Safety Analyst Training Standard is part of the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Phase II Implementation currently underway at the INEEL. The objective of this paper is to discuss (1) the INEEL Safety Analyst Training Standard, (2) the development of the safety analyst individual training plans, (3) the implementation issues encountered during this initial phase of implementation, (4) the solutions developed, and (5) the implementation activities remaining to be completed

  8. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO Safety Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which the management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of the safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi-purpose research reactor and achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation like the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops, the development of safety culture indicators, the survey on the attitude of safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e-Learning program for safety education. (author)

  9. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2008-11-15

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose.

  10. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose

  11. Requirement analysis of the safety-critical software implementation for the nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Hoon Seon; Jung, Jae Cheon; Kim, Jae Hack; Nam, Sang Ku; Kim, Hang Bae

    2005-01-01

    The safety critical software shall be implemented under the strict regulation and standards along with hardware qualification. In general, the safety critical software has been implemented using functional block language (FBL) and structured language like C in the real project. Software design shall comply with such characteristics as; modularity, simplicity, minimizing the use of sub-routine, and excluding the interrupt logic. To meet these prerequisites, we used the computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tool to substantiate the requirements traceability matrix that were manually developed using Word processors or Spreadsheets. And the coding standard and manual have been developed to confirm the quality of software development process, such as; readability, consistency, and maintainability in compliance with NUREG/CR-6463. System level preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is performed by analyzing preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) and FMEA document. The modularity concept is effectively implemented for the overall module configurations and functions using RTP software development tool. The response time imposed on the basis of the deterministic structure of the safety-critical software was measured

  12. LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE HANFORD SWOC MASTER DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS (MDSA) and IMPLEMENTATION VALIDATION REVIEW (IVR)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MORENO, M.R.

    2004-01-01

    DOE set clear expectations on a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (20 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule), which ensured long-term benefit to Hanford, via issuance of a nuclear safety strategy in February 2003. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development with the goal of a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was approved to standardize methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was approved for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated at Hanford. Standard safety management program chapters were approved for use as a means of compliance with the programmatic chapters of DOE-STD-3009, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports''. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. The new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) developed to address the operations of four facilities within the Solid Waste Operations Complex (SWOC) necessitated development of an Implementation Validation Review (IVR) process. The IVR process encompasses the following objectives: safety basis controls and requirements are adequately incorporated into appropriate facility documents and work instructions, facility personnel are knowledgeable of controls and requirements, and the DSA/TSR controls have been implemented. Based on DOE direction and safety analysis tools, four waste management nuclear facilities were integrated into one safety basis document. With successful completion of implementation of this safety document, lessons-learned from the in-process review, safety analysis tools and IVR process were documented for future action

  13. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2008-11-15

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose.

  14. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose

  15. Development and implementation of setpoint tolerances for special safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliva, A.F.; Balog, G.; Parkinson, D.G.; Archinoff, G.H.

    1991-01-01

    The establishment of tolerances and impairment limits for special safety system setpoints is part of the process whereby the plant operator demonstrates to the regulatory authority that the plant operates safely and within the defined plant licensing envelope. The licensing envelope represents the set of limits and plant operating state and for which acceptably safe plant operation has been demonstrated by the safety analysis. By definition, operation beyond this envelope contributes to overall safety system unavailability. Definition of the licensing envelope is provided in a wide range of documents including the plant operating licence, the safety report, and the plant operating policies and principles documents. As part of the safety analysis, limits are derived for each special safety system initiating parameter such that the relevant safety design objectives are achieved for all design basis events. If initiation on a given parameter occurs at a level beyond its limit, there is a potential reduction in safety system effectiveness relative to the performance credited in the plant safety analysis. These safety system parameter limits, when corrected for random and systematic instrument errors and other errors inherent in the process of periodic testing or calibration, are then used to derive parameter impairment levels and setpoint tolerances. This paper describes the methodology that has evolved at Ontario Hydro for developing and implementing tolerances for special safety system parameters (i.e., the shutdown systems, emergency coolant injection system and containment system). Tolerances for special safety system initiation setpoints are addressed specifically, although many of the considerations discussed here will apply to performance limits for other safety system components. The first part of the paper deals with the approach that has been adopted for defining and establishing setpoint limits and tolerances. The remainder of the paper addresses operational

  16. The practical implementation of safety culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Touzet, Rodolfo [Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica, Buenos Aires. (Argentina)

    2008-07-01

    When, during the review of the Chernobyl accident, the INSAG Committee introduced the term 'Safety Culture', it spread very quickly. Later on, as a result of activities sponsored by the IAEA, the original Safety Culture concept was extended to include a large number of issues that are typical requirements of Quality Assurance Unfortunately, the way in which certain organizations approached this subject has not helped to find the right way for it to be implemented. Safety Culture is not mentioned at all in ICRP-60 and in the new recommendations of 2005 it does not even appear in the principal body and only a minor reference exists. The IAEA's Basic Safety Standards deal with the requirements for Safety Culture and for Quality Assurance as absolutely individual issues; however, Safety Culture should be considered as a part of the Quality System. Very recently the situation was strongly improved by the release of the new standard 'The Management System for Facilities and Activities' Safety Requirements GS-R-3. The EURATOM 97/43 Directive, used in the European Community for the preparation of regulations for medical practice, which, while inspired by ICRP-73, does not even mention Safety Culture. Increasing personnel training is not enough if, at the same time, there are no activities aimed at improving their attitude towards quality and safety. To achieve a change in Culture in the organization or to implant the new concept, there must be a suitable supporting Methodology to allow it to be put into practice. If not, the Safety Culture will only be a simple expression of wishes without any chance of success. Criteria, methodology and effective practical tools must be available. Two basic principles for the management system (GSR-3): a) All the tasks may be considered as 'a system of interactive processes'; b) All persons must take part in order to achieve safety and quality. These two principles are the basis of the strategy for the development of a Safety Culture

  17. The practical implementation of safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Touzet, Rodolfo

    2008-01-01

    When, during the review of the Chernobyl accident, the INSAG Committee introduced the term 'Safety Culture', it spread very quickly. Later on, as a result of activities sponsored by the IAEA, the original Safety Culture concept was extended to include a large number of issues that are typical requirements of Quality Assurance Unfortunately, the way in which certain organizations approached this subject has not helped to find the right way for it to be implemented. Safety Culture is not mentioned at all in ICRP-60 and in the new recommendations of 2005 it does not even appear in the principal body and only a minor reference exists. The IAEA's Basic Safety Standards deal with the requirements for Safety Culture and for Quality Assurance as absolutely individual issues; however, Safety Culture should be considered as a part of the Quality System. Very recently the situation was strongly improved by the release of the new standard 'The Management System for Facilities and Activities' Safety Requirements GS-R-3. The EURATOM 97/43 Directive, used in the European Community for the preparation of regulations for medical practice, which, while inspired by ICRP-73, does not even mention Safety Culture. Increasing personnel training is not enough if, at the same time, there are no activities aimed at improving their attitude towards quality and safety. To achieve a change in Culture in the organization or to implant the new concept, there must be a suitable supporting Methodology to allow it to be put into practice. If not, the Safety Culture will only be a simple expression of wishes without any chance of success. Criteria, methodology and effective practical tools must be available. Two basic principles for the management system (GSR-3): a) All the tasks may be considered as 'a system of interactive processes'; b) All persons must take part in order to achieve safety and quality. These two principles are the basis of the strategy for the development of a Safety Culture

  18. Evaluation of Safety Culture Implementation and Socialization Results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Situmorang, Johnny

    2003-01-01

    Evaluation of safety culture implementation and socialization results has been perform. Evaluation is carried out with specifying safety culture indicators, namely: Meeting between management and employee, system for incidents analysis, training activities related to improving safety, meeting with regulator, contractors, surveys on behavioural attitudes, and resources allocated to promote safety culture. Evaluation is based on observation and visiting the facilities to show the compliance indicator in term of good practices in the frame of safety culture implementation. For three facilities of research reactors, Kartini Yogyakarta, TRIGA Mark II Bandung and MPR-GAS Serpong, implementation of safety culture is considered good enough and progressive. Furthermore some indicator should be considered more intensive, for example the allocated resources, self assesment based on own questionnaire in the frame of improving the safety culture implementation. (author)

  19. Setting clear expectations for safety basis development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MORENO, M.R.

    2003-01-01

    DOE-RL has set clear expectations for a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule) which will ensure long-term benefit to Hanford. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development resulting in a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was issued to standardized methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was issued for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated for Hanford. A standard Site Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) detailing the safety management programs was issued for use as a means of compliance with a majority of 3009 Standard chapters. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. As a result of setting expectations and providing safety analysis tools, the four Hanford Site waste management nuclear facilities were able to integrate into one Master Waste Management Documented Safety Analysis (WM-DSA)

  20. Nuclear criticality safety department training implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1996-01-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Department (NCSD) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. The NCSD Qualification Program is described in Y/DD-694, Qualification Program, Nuclear Criticality Safety Department This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSD personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This document supersedes Y/DD-696, Revision 2, dated 3/27/96, Training Implementation, Nuclear Criticality Safety Department. There are no backfit requirements associated with revisions to this document

  1. Just in Time DSA-The Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Olinger, S. J.; Buhl, A. R.

    2002-02-26

    The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 imposed the requirement that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSA that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: compliance with the Rule; a ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD&D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD&D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex.

  2. Just in Time DSA-The Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olinger, S. J.; Buhl, A. R.

    2002-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 imposed the requirement that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSA that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: compliance with the Rule; a ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD and D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD and D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex

  3. Job safety and awareness analysis of safety implementation among electrical workers in airport service company

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Putra Perdana Suteja

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Electrical is a fundamental process in the company that has high risk and responsibility especially in public service company such as an airport. Hence, the company that operates activities in the airport has to identify and control the safety activities of workers. On the safety implementation, the lack of workers’ awareness is fundamental aspects to the safety failure. Therefore, this study aimed to analyse the safety awareness and identify risk in the electrical workplace. Safety awareness questionnaires are distributed to ten workers in order to analyse their awareness. Job safety analysis method used to identify the risk in the electrical workplace. The preliminary study stated that workers were not aware of personal protective equipment usage so that the awareness and behavioural need to be analysed. The result is the hazard was found such as electrical shock and noise for various intensity in the workplace. While electrical workers were aware of safety implementation but less of safety behaviour. Furthermore, the recommendation can be implemented are the implementation of behaviour-based safety (BBS, 5S implementation and accident report list.

  4. Implementation of patient safety strategies in European hospitals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suñol, R; Vallejo, P; Groene, O; Escaramis, G; Thompson, A; Kutryba, B; Garel, P

    2009-02-01

    This study is part of the Methods of Assessing Response to Quality Improvement Strategies (MARQuIS) research project on cross-border care, investigating quality improvement strategies in healthcare systems across the European Union (EU). To explore to what extent a sample of acute care European hospitals have implemented patient safety strategies and mechanisms and whether the implementation is related to the type of hospital. Data were collected on patient safety structures and mechanisms in 389 acute care hospitals in eight EU countries using a web-based questionnaire. Subsequently, an on-site audit was carried out by independent surveyors in 89 of these hospitals to assess patient safety outputs. This paper presents univariate and bivariate statistics on the implementation and explores the associations between implementation of patient safety strategies and hospital type using the chi(2) test and Fisher exact test. Structures and plans for safety (including responsibilities regarding patient safety management) are well developed in most of the hospitals that participated in this study. The study found greater variation regarding the implementation of mechanisms or activities to promote patient safety, such as electronic drug prescription systems, guidelines for prevention of wrong patient, wrong site and wrong surgical procedure, and adverse events reporting systems. In the sample of hospitals that underwent audit, a considerable proportion do not comply with basic patient safety strategies--for example, using bracelets for adult patient identification and correct labelling of medication.

  5. Implementation of safety management systems in Hong Kong construction industry - A safety practitioner's perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yiu, Nicole S N; Sze, N N; Chan, Daniel W M

    2018-02-01

    In the 1980s, the safety management system (SMS) was introduced in the construction industry to mitigate against workplaces hazards, reduce the risk of injuries, and minimize property damage. Also, the Factories and Industrial Undertakings (Safety Management) Regulation was introduced on 24 November 1999 in Hong Kong to empower the mandatory implementation of a SMS in certain industries including building construction. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in improving construction safety and identify the factors that influence its implementation in Hong Kong. A review of the current state-of-the-practice helped to establish the critical success factors (CSFs), benefits, and difficulties of implementing the SMS in the construction industry, while structured interviews were used to establish the key factors of the SMS implementation. Results of the state-of-the-practice review and structured interviews indicated that visible senior commitment, in terms of manpower and cost allocation, and competency of safety manager as key drivers for the SMS implementation. More so, reduced accident rates and accident costs, improved organization framework, and increased safety audit ratings were identified as core benefits of implementing the SMS. Meanwhile, factors such as insufficient resources, tight working schedule, and high labor turnover rate were the key challenges to the effective SMS implementation in Hong Kong. The findings of the study were consistent and indicative of the future development of safety management practice and the sustainable safety improvement of Hong Kong construction industry in the long run. Copyright © 2018 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  6. The establishment and implementation of safety culture policy in Indonesia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Antariksawan, A.R.; Suharno; Arbie, B.

    2001-01-01

    This paper describes the progress in the establishment and implementation of safety culture in Indonesia, especially in BATAN, with special attention given to the development of safety culture indicators. The spirit of safety culture implementation is marked firstly by declaration of Policy Statement by the Head of BATAN. In order to monitor the implementation of safety culture, six indicators are established. Based on those indicators, it is seemed that at present the progress of implementation of safety culture is quite good enough. (author)

  7. Consensus standards utilized and implemented for nuclear criticality safety in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, Yasushi; Okuno, Hiroshi; Naito, Yoshitaka

    1996-01-01

    The fundamental framework for the criticality safety of nuclear fuel facilities regulations is, in many advanced countries, generally formulated so that technical standards or handbook data are utilized to support the licensing safety review and to implement its guidelines. In Japan also, adequacy of the safety design of nuclear fuel facilities is checked and reviewed on the basis of licensing safety review guides. These guides are, first, open-quotes The Basic Guides for Licensing Safety Review of Nuclear Fuel Facilities,close quotes and as its subsidiaries, open-quotes The Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facility Licensing Safety Review Guidesclose quotes and open-quotes The Reprocessing Facility Licensing Safety Review Guides.close quotes The open-quotes Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook close-quote of Japan and the Technical Data Collection are published and utilized to supply related data and information for the licensing safety review, such as for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The well-established technical standards and data abroad such as those by the American Nuclear Society and the American National Standards Institute are also utilized to complement the standards in Japan. The basic principles of criticality safety control for nuclear fuel facilities in Japan are duly stipulated in the aforementioned basic guides as follows: 1. Guide 10: Criticality control for a single unit; 2. Guide 11: Criticality control for multiple units; 3. Guide 12: Consideration for a criticality accident

  8. Implementation of a Radiological Safety Coach program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Konzen, K.K. [Safe Sites of Colorado, Golden, CO (United States). Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site; Langsted, J.M. [M.H. Chew and Associates, Golden, CO (United States)

    1998-02-01

    The Safe Sites of Colorado Radiological Safety program has implemented a Safety Coach position, responsible for mentoring workers and line management by providing effective on-the-job radiological skills training and explanation of the rational for radiological safety requirements. This position is significantly different from a traditional classroom instructor or a facility health physicist, and provides workers with a level of radiological safety guidance not routinely provided by typical training programs. Implementation of this position presents a challenge in providing effective instruction, requiring rapport with the radiological worker not typically developed in the routine radiological training environment. The value of this unique training is discussed in perspective with cost-savings through better radiological control. Measures of success were developed to quantify program performance and providing a realistic picture of the benefits of providing one-on-one or small group training. This paper provides a description of the unique features of the program, measures of success for the program, a formula for implementing this program at other facilities, and a strong argument for the success (or failure) of the program in a time of increased radiological safety emphasis and reduced radiological safety budgets.

  9. Implementation of a Radiological Safety Coach program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konzen, K.K.

    1998-01-01

    The Safe Sites of Colorado Radiological Safety program has implemented a Safety Coach position, responsible for mentoring workers and line management by providing effective on-the-job radiological skills training and explanation of the rational for radiological safety requirements. This position is significantly different from a traditional classroom instructor or a facility health physicist, and provides workers with a level of radiological safety guidance not routinely provided by typical training programs. Implementation of this position presents a challenge in providing effective instruction, requiring rapport with the radiological worker not typically developed in the routine radiological training environment. The value of this unique training is discussed in perspective with cost-savings through better radiological control. Measures of success were developed to quantify program performance and providing a realistic picture of the benefits of providing one-on-one or small group training. This paper provides a description of the unique features of the program, measures of success for the program, a formula for implementing this program at other facilities, and a strong argument for the success (or failure) of the program in a time of increased radiological safety emphasis and reduced radiological safety budgets

  10. Just in Time DSA the Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    JACKSON, M.W.

    2002-06-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford, Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safely Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 requires that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSAs that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long-term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: Compliance with the Rule; A ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and Consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD&D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD&D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex.

  11. Just in Time DSA the Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JACKSON, M.W.

    2002-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford, Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safely Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 requires that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSAs that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long-term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: Compliance with the Rule; A ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and Consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD and D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD and D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex

  12. Safety basis for the 241-AN-107 mixer pump installation and caustic addition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Vleet, R.J.

    1994-01-01

    This safety Basis was prepared to determine whether or not the proposed activities of installing a 76 HP jet mixer pump and the addition of approximately 50,000 gallons of 19 M (50:50 wt %) aqueous caustic are within the safety envelope as described by Tank Farms (chapter six of WHC-SD-WM-ISB-001, Rev. 0). The safety basis covers the components, structures and systems for the caustic addition and mixer pump installation. These include: installation of the mixer pump and monitoring equipment; operation of the mixer pump, process monitoring equipment and caustic addition; the pump stand, caustic addition skid, the electrical skid, the video camera system and the two densitometers. Also covered is the removal and decontamination of the mixer pump and process monitoring system. Authority for this safety basis is WHC-IP-0842 (Waste Tank Administration). Section 15.9, Rev. 2 (Unreviewed Safety Questions) of WHC-IP-0842 requires that an evaluation be performed for all physical modifications

  13. Pressure Safety Program Implementation at ORNL

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lower, Mark [ORNL; Etheridge, Tom [ORNL; Oland, C. Barry [XCEL Engineering, Inc.

    2013-01-01

    The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a US Department of Energy (DOE) facility that is managed by UT-Battelle, LLC. In February 2006, DOE promulgated worker safety and health regulations to govern contractor activities at DOE sites. These regulations, which are provided in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program, establish requirements for worker safety and health program that reduce or prevent occupational injuries, illnesses, and accidental losses by providing DOE contractors and their workers with safe and healthful workplaces at DOE sites. The regulations state that contractors must achieve compliance no later than May 25, 2007. According to 10 CFR 851, Subpart C, Specific Program Requirements, contractors must have a structured approach to their worker safety and health programs that at a minimum includes provisions for pressure safety. In implementing the structured approach for pressure safety, contractors must establish safety policies and procedures to ensure that pressure systems are designed, fabricated, tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, and operated by trained, qualified personnel in accordance with applicable sound engineering principles. In addition, contractors must ensure that all pressure vessels, boilers, air receivers, and supporting piping systems conform to (1) applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (2004) Sections I through XII, including applicable code cases; (2) applicable ASME B31 piping codes; and (3) the strictest applicable state and local codes. When national consensus codes are not applicable because of pressure range, vessel geometry, use of special materials, etc., contractors must implement measures to provide equivalent protection and ensure a level of safety greater than or equal to the level of protection afforded by the ASME or applicable state or local codes. This report documents the work performed to address legacy pressure vessel deficiencies and comply

  14. Transuranic waste storage and assay facility (TRUSAF) interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibson, K.D.

    1995-09-01

    The TRUSAF ISB is based upon current facility configuration and procedures. The purpose of the document is to provide the basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and the authorization basis for the TRUSAF at the Hanford Site. The previous safety analysis document TRUSAF hazards Identification and Evaluation (WHC 1977) is superseded by this document

  15. Central waste complex interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cain, F.G.

    1995-01-01

    This interim safety basis provides the necessary information to conclude that hazards at the Central Waste Complex are controlled and that current and planned activities at the CWC can be conducted safely. CWC is a multi-facility complex within the Solid Waste Management Complex that receives and stores most of the solid wastes generated and received at the Hanford Site. The solid wastes that will be handled at CWC include both currently stored and newly generated low-level waste, low-level mixed waste, contact-handled transuranic, and contact-handled TRU mixed waste

  16. Implementing Patient Safety Initiatives in Rural Hospitals

    Science.gov (United States)

    Klingner, Jill; Moscovice, Ira; Tupper, Judith; Coburn, Andrew; Wakefield, Mary

    2009-01-01

    Implementation of patient safety initiatives can be costly in time and energy. Because of small volumes and limited resources, rural hospitals often are not included in nationally driven patient safety initiatives. This article describes the Tennessee Rural Hospital Patient Safety Demonstration project, whose goal was to strengthen capacity for…

  17. Towards a Formal Basis for Modular Safety Cases

    Science.gov (United States)

    Denney, Ewen; Pai, Ganesh

    2015-01-01

    Safety assurance using argument-based safety cases is an accepted best-practice in many safety-critical sectors. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), which is widely used for presenting safety arguments graphically, provides a notion of modular arguments to support the goal of incremental certification. Despite the efforts at standardization, GSN remains an informal notation whereas the GSN standard contains appreciable ambiguity especially concerning modular extensions. This, in turn, presents challenges when developing tools and methods to intelligently manipulate modular GSN arguments. This paper develops the elements of a theory of modular safety cases, leveraging our previous work on formalizing GSN arguments. Using example argument structures we highlight some ambiguities arising through the existing guidance, present the intuition underlying the theory, clarify syntax, and address modular arguments, contracts, well-formedness and well-scopedness of modules. Based on this theory, we have a preliminary implementation of modular arguments in our toolset, AdvoCATE.

  18. The practical implementation of integrated safety management for nuclear safety analysis and fire hazards analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    COLLOPY, M.T.

    1999-01-01

    the integrated safety management system approach for having a uniform and consistent process: a method has been suggested by the U S . Department of Energy at Richland and the Project Hanford Procedures when fire hazard analyses and safety analyses are required. This process provides for a common basis approach in the development of the fire hazard analysis and the safety analysis. This process permits the preparers of both documents to jointly participate in the development of the hazard analysis process. This paper presents this method to implement the integrated safety management approach in the development of the fire hazard analysis and safety analysis that provides consistency of assumptions. consequences, design considerations, and other controls necessarily to protect workers, the public. and the environment

  19. Regulatory standpoints on the design-basis capability of safety-related motor-operated valves(MOVs) and power-operated gate valves(POGVs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, W. T.; Kum, O. H.

    1999-01-01

    The weakness in the design-basis capability of Motor-Operated Valves(MOVs) and the susceptibility to Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding phenomena of Power-Operated Gate Valves(POGVs) have been major concerns to be resolved in the nuclear society in and abroad since Three Mile Island accident occurred in the USA in 1979. Through detailed analysis of operating experience and regulatory activities, some MOVs and POGVs have been found to be unreliable in performing their safety functions when they are required to do so under certain conditions, especially under design-basis accident conditions. Further, it is well understood that these safety problems may not be identified by the typical valve in-service testing(IST). USNRC has published three Generic Letters, GL 89-10, GL 95-07, and GL 96-05, requiring nuclear plant licensees to take appropriate actions to resolve the problems mentioned above. Korean nuclear regulatory body has made public an administration measure called 'Regulatory recommendation to verify safety functions of the safety-related MOVs and POGVs' on June 13, 1997, and in this administration measure Korean utility is asked to submit written documents to show how it assure design-basis capability of these valves. The following are among the major concerns being considered from a regulation standpoint. Program scope and implementation priority, dynamic tests under differential pressure conditions, accuracy of diagnostic equipment, torque switch setting and torque bypass percentage, weak link analysis, motor actuator sizing, corrective actions taken to resolve pressure locking and thermal binding susceptibility, and a periodic verification program for the valves once design-basis capability has been verified

  20. Organizational factors affecting safety implementation in food companies in Thailand.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chinda, Thanwadee

    2014-01-01

    Thai food industry employs a massive number of skilled and unskilled workers. This may result in an industry with high incidences and accident rates. To improve safety and reduce the accident figures, this paper investigates factors influencing safety implementation in small, medium, and large food companies in Thailand. Five factors, i.e., management commitment, stakeholders' role, safety information and communication, supportive environment, and risk, are found important in helping to improve safety implementation. The statistical analyses also reveal that small, medium, and large food companies hold similar opinions on the risk factor, but bear different perceptions on the other 4 factors. It is also found that to improve safety implementation, the perceptions of safety goals, communication, feedback, safety resources, and supervision should be aligned in small, medium, and large companies.

  1. Safety goals and safety culture opening plenary. 2. Safety Regulation Implemented by Gosatomnadzor of Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutsalov, A.T.; Bukrinsky, A.M.

    2001-01-01

    This paper describes principles and approaches used by Gosatomnadzor of Russia in establishing safety goals. The link between safety goals and safety culture is demonstrated. The paper also contains information on nuclear regulatory activities in Russia. Regulatory documents of Gosatomnadzor of Russia do not provide precise definitions of safety goals as IAEA documents INSAG-3 or INSAG-12 do. However, overall activities of Gosatomnadzor of Russia are directed to the achievement of these safety goals, as Gosatomnadzor of Russia is a federal executive authority responsible for the regulation of nuclear and radiation safety in accordance with the Russian Federal Law 'On the Use of Nuclear Energy'. Thus, in the Statement of the Policy of the Russian Regulatory Authority, enacted in 1992, it was established that the overall activities of Gosatomnadzor of Russia are directed to the achievement of the main goal. This goal is to establish conditions that ensure that personnel, the public, and the environment are protected from unacceptable radiation and nonproliferation of nuclear materials. The practical application of such a method as given by the publication of Statements of Policy of Gosatomnadzor of Russia may be considered as a safety culture element. 'General Provisions of NPP Safety Ensuring' (OPB-88/ 97) is a regulatory document of the highest level in the hierarchy of regulatory documents of Gosatomnadzor of Russia. It establishes quantitative values of safety goals as do the foregoing IAEA documents. Thus, this regulatory document sets up the following: 1. The estimated total probability of severe accidents should not exceed 10 5 /reactor.yr. 2. The estimated probability of the worst possible radioactive release to the environment specified in the standards should not exceed 10 -7 /reactor.yr in the case of severe beyond-design-basis accidents. 3. The probability of a reactor vessel failure should not exceed 10 -7 /reactor.yr. The foregoing values are somehow

  2. Evaluation of Influence Factors within Implementing of Nuclear Safety Culture in Embarking Countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Situmorang, J.

    2016-01-01

    The evaluation of the implementation nuclear safety culture at BATAN has been performed. BATAN is Indonesia’s national nuclear energy agency. Nowadays, BATAN is planning to develop an experimental power reactor. To implement the nuclear safety culture BATAN has issued BATAN chairman regulation (Perka BATAN 200). Perka BATAN is the reference for individuals and organizations to implement nuclear safety culture which includes basic principles, mechanisms, assessment, as well as the implementation of the application of safety culture. It covers the establishment of safety policies, program development, program implementation, development and measurement of safety culture. Each facilities within BATAN is expected to well implement a safety culture. The implementation of safety culture is developed by considering the characteristics, attributes and indicators. The characteristics, attributes and indicators referenced are elaborated from the IAEA. The activities to strengthen safety culture are monthly workshop with participants is head of every facilities, safety leadership training and workshop for safety division manager in every facilities. It is also issued a handbook of safety that is distributed to all employees BATAN.

  3. NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 2: System Safety Concepts, Guidelines, and Implementation Examples

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dezfuli, Homayoon; Benjamin, Allan; Everett, Christopher; Feather, Martin; Rutledge, Peter; Sen, Dev; Youngblood, Robert

    2015-01-01

    This is the second of two volumes that collectively comprise the NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1 (NASASP-210-580) was prepared for the purpose of presenting the overall framework for System Safety and for providing the general concepts needed to implement the framework. Volume 2 provides guidance for implementing these concepts as an integral part of systems engineering and risk management. This guidance addresses the following functional areas: 1.The development of objectives that collectively define adequate safety for a system, and the safety requirements derived from these objectives that are levied on the system. 2.The conduct of system safety activities, performed to meet the safety requirements, with specific emphasis on the conduct of integrated safety analysis (ISA) as a fundamental means by which systems engineering and risk management decisions are risk-informed. 3.The development of a risk-informed safety case (RISC) at major milestone reviews to argue that the systems safety objectives are satisfied (and therefore that the system is adequately safe). 4.The evaluation of the RISC (including supporting evidence) using a defined set of evaluation criteria, to assess the veracity of the claims made therein in order to support risk acceptance decisions.

  4. Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Safety Basis and Approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    David Petti; Jim Kinsey; Dave Alberstein

    2014-01-01

    Various international efforts are underway to assess the safety of advanced nuclear reactor designs. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency has recently held its first Consultancy Meeting on a new cooperative research program on high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) safety. Furthermore, the Generation IV International Forum Reactor Safety Working Group has recently developed a methodology, called the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology, for use in Generation IV advanced reactor technology development, design, and design review. A risk and safety assessment white paper is under development with respect to the Very High Temperature Reactor to pilot the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology and to demonstrate its validity and feasibility. To support such efforts, this information paper on the modular HTGR safety basis and approach has been prepared. The paper provides a summary level introduction to HTGR history, public safety objectives, inherent and passive safety features, radionuclide release barriers, functional safety approach, and risk-informed safety approach. The information in this paper is intended to further the understanding of the modular HTGR safety approach. The paper gives those involved in the assessment of advanced reactor designs an opportunity to assess an advanced design that has already received extensive review by regulatory authorities and to judge the utility of recently proposed new methods for advanced reactor safety assessment such as the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology.

  5. University building safety index measurement using risk and implementation matrix

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rahman, A.; Arumsari, F.; Maryani, A.

    2018-04-01

    Many high rise building constructed in several universities in Indonesia. The high-rise building management must provide the safety planning and proper safety equipment in each part of the building. Unfortunately, most of the university in Indonesia have not been applying safety policy yet and less awareness on treating safety facilities. Several fire accidents in university showed that some significant risk should be managed by the building management. This research developed a framework for measuring the high rise building safety index in university The framework is not only assessed the risk magnitude but also designed modular building safety checklist for measuring the safety implementation level. The safety checklist has been developed for 8 types of the university rooms, i.e.: office, classroom, 4 type of laboratories, canteen, and library. University building safety index determined using risk-implementation matrix by measuring the risk magnitude and assessing the safety implementation level. Building Safety Index measurement has been applied in 4 high rise buildings in ITS Campus. The building assessment showed that the rectorate building in secure condition and chemical department building in beware condition. While the library and administration center building was in less secure condition.

  6. DEVELOPING SAFETY INDICATORS ON THE BASIS OF THE ICAO RECOMMENDATIONS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    V. D. Sharov

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available The article offers direct use of the recommendations of SMM ICAO Doc.9859, 3rd ed. 2013, for calculation the target and alert levels of safety indicators. Examples of calculation based on data of 2011 and monitoring of the current indicators during 2012 are presented. Safety indicators for airlines in terms of “numbers of incidents per 1000 flight hours” could be calculated on the basis of the state values through the «coefficient of conformity».

  7. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ''Unreviewed Safety Questions,'' DOE 5480.22, ''Technical Safety Requirements,'' and DOE 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.'' WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ''Safety Basis'' for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules

  8. Application of safety standards and rules in the Shelter Implementation Plan at the destroyed power unit of Chernobyl NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berthold, A.; Bogorinski, P.; Bykov, V.; Redko, V.; Erickson, L.; Kadkin, Ye.; Kondratiev, S.; Simonov, I.; Smyshliaieva, S.; Yesipenko, Yu.

    2002-01-01

    This report deals with the application of safety standards and rules to the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) measures. Since 1998 this plan is being implemented at the Chornobyl NPP destroyed unit (which is now known as the Shelter). It includes a set of various tasks whose performance will help partially achieve the established safety objectives. The Regulatory Authority should establish for the Shelter safety goals, principles, and criteria in general, while the Operator of the Shelter is free to independently select the optimum method for their implementation. The Operator of the Shelter must demonstrate (in safety analysis report) that established safety goals are achieved and safety principles and criteria are met. Safety goals, principles, and criteria established for radioactive waste management are reasonable to apply in measures provided for by SIP. However, due to the unique nature of the Shelter, some criteria should not be applied directly and in full scope. Norms and rules on radiation protection should be applied in full scope. The specifics of radiation protection during each Shelter-related activity are considered individually. Safety standards and rules related to technical aspects are reasonable only as a basis. Effective resolution of specific technical issues associated with safety assurance is achieved through interaction between the Operator and the Regulatory Authority during design of SIP structures and systems. Hence, effectiveness of the licensing process plays an important role in the success of the SIP.(author)

  9. Authorization Basis Safety Classification of Transfer Bay Bridge Crane at the 105-K Basins

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CHAFFEE, G.A.

    2000-01-01

    This supporting document provides the bases for the safety classification for the K Basin transfer bay bridge crane and the bases for the Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) safety classification. A table is presented that delineates the safety significant components. This safety classification is based on a review of the Authorization Basis (AB). This Authorization Basis review was performed regarding AB and design baseline issues. The primary issues are: (1) What is the AB for the safety classification of the transfer bay bridge crane? (2) What does the SSC safety classification ''Safety Significant'' or ''Safety Significant for Design Only'' mean for design requirements and quality requirements for procurement, installation and maintenance (including replacement of parts) activities for the crane during its expected life time? The AB information on the crane was identified based on review of Department of Energy--Richland Office (RL) and Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project correspondence, K Basin Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and RL Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) of SNF Project SAR submittals. The relevant correspondence, actions and activities taken and substantive directions or conclusions of these documents are provided in Appendix A

  10. Contribution of Rostechnadzor in Implementing the State Nuclear Safety Policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferapontov, A.

    2016-01-01

    The report considers major areas of Rostechnadzor activities on implementation of the state policy in the area of nuclear safety, including actions to be implemented. Ensuring nuclear and radiation safety in the use of atomic energy is one of the most important components of the national security of the Russian Federation. On March 1, 2012, the President of the Russian Federation approved the Basics of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear and Radiation Safety aimed at consistent reduction of risks associated with man-made impact on the public and the environment in using atomic energy, as well as at prevention of emergencies and accidents in nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities. Rostechnadzor is an authorized body for state safety regulation in the use of atomic energy, which implements functions of regulatory and legal control, licensing of various types of activity and federal state supervision of the atomic energy facilities. The activity in the area of regulatory and legal control is implemented in compliance with the Concept of Enhancement of Regulatory and Legal Control of Safety and Standardization in the Area of the Use of Atomic Energy and the Plan of Implementation of this Concept, which envisages the completion of reviewing the regulatory and legal documents by 2023. Corresponding to the Basics of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Russian Federation for the Period of 2025, Rostechnadzor successfully implemented the actions of the Federal Target Programme of Nuclear and Radiation Safety up to 2015, creating all conditions for phased reduction of the amounts of nuclear legacy and ensuring radical increase in their level of nuclear and radiation safety. In 2016, Rostechnadzor embarked on implementation of the Federal Target Programme of Nuclear and Radiation Safety up to 2030, with creation of infrastructure facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management and definitive response to the challenges of nuclear

  11. Implementation of the safety assessment in the practice of industrial radiography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alfonso Pallarés, C.; Pérez Reyes, Y.

    2015-01-01

    The CNSN as regulatory authority has regulatory control processes based on regulations, permits, inspections and limitation to ensure the supervision and control of the practice of industrial radiography. On the other hand in the light of the new regulations approved and being implemented such as: Resolution 334/2011 CITMA 'Regulation on Notification and authorization of practices and activities associated with the use of ionizing radiation sources' and Resolution 17 / 2012, Security Guide: Security Assessment Practices and Activities associated with the use of ionizing radiation (recommendatory), it is necessary for compliance with regulatory requirements concerning the safety assessment. Since 2009 it has been applied this experience in different medical practices and industry, providing a systematic and consistent basis, to the safety assessment of all facilities and activities, which has helped increase the confidence that has been achieved an adequate level of security. The work was able to identify that there is a group of barriers operating in the risk reduction in various accident sequences and therefore have a relative importance in risk reduction, recommendations in this regard to improve the program management of safety in the practice of industrial radiography. [es

  12. DARHT: INTEGRATION OF AUTHORIZATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND WORKER SAFETY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MC CLURE, D. A.; NELSON, C. A.; BOUDRIE, R. L.

    2001-01-01

    This document describes the results of consensus agreements reached by the DARHT Safety Planning Team during the development of the update of the DARHT Safety Analysis Document (SAD). The SAD is one of the Authorization Basis (AB) Documents required by the Department prior to granting approval to operate the DARHT Facility. The DARHT Safety Planning Team is lead by Mr. Joel A. Baca of the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE/AL). Team membership is drawn from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy Los Alamos Area Office (DOE/LAAO), and several divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Revision 1 of the DARHT SAD had been written as part of the process for gaining approval to operate the Phase 1 (First Axis) Accelerator. Early in the planning stage for the required update of the SAD for the approval to operate both Phase 1 and Phase 2 (First Axis and Second Axis) DARHT Accelerator, it was discovered that a conflict existed between the Laboratory approach to describing the management of facility and worker safety

  13. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: Implementing inherent safety perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-01-01

    Layout planning plays a key role in the inherent safety performance of process plants since this design feature controls the possibility of accidental chain-events and the magnitude of possible consequences. A lack of suitable methods to promote the effective implementation of inherent safety in layout design calls for the development of new techniques and methods. In the present paper, a safety assessment approach suitable for layout design in the critical early phase is proposed. The concept of inherent safety is implemented within this safety assessment; the approach is based on an integrated assessment of inherent safety guideword applicability within the constraints typically present in layout design. Application of these guidewords is evaluated along with unit hazards and control devices to quantitatively map the safety performance of different layout options. Moreover, the economic aspects related to safety and inherent safety are evaluated by the method. Specific sub-indices are developed within the integrated safety assessment system to analyze and quantify the hazard related to domino effects. The proposed approach is quick in application, auditable and shares a common framework applicable in other phases of the design lifecycle (e.g. process design). The present work is divided in two parts: Part 1 (current paper) presents the application of inherent safety guidelines in layout design and the index method for safety assessment; Part 2 (accompanying paper) describes the domino hazard sub-index and demonstrates the proposed approach with a case study, thus evidencing the introduction of inherent safety features in layout design

  14. Price anderson nuclear safety rules: Impacts of implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varchol, B.D.; Alhadeff, N.

    1995-01-01

    New nuclear safety rules are being implemented at Department of Energy sites. This paper examines the impacts of these rules as each site decides where rules will be implemented, whether implementation activities will be centralized, and how the site management and staff will be introduced to the new rules

  15. 10 CFR Appendix A to Subpart B of... - General Statement of Safety Basis Policy

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... at all levels. Performing work in accordance with the safety basis for a nuclear facility is the..., safety, and health into work planning and execution (48 CFR 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety and Health into Work Planning and Execution) and the DEAR clause on laws, regulations, and DOE...

  16. Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Facility 10CFR830 Safety Basis Related to Facility Experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tomberlin, T.A.

    2002-01-01

    The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), a DOE Category A reactor, was designed to provide an irradiation test environment for conducting a variety of experiments. The ATR Safety Analysis Report, determined by DOE to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, provides versatility in types of experiments that may be conducted. This paper addresses two general types of experiments in the ATR facility and how safety analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore this type of experiment is addressed with more detail in the safety basis. This allows individual safety analyses for these experiments to be more routine and repetitive. The second type of experiment is less defined and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, individual safety analyses for the second type of experiment tend to be more unique from experiment to experiment. Experiments are also discussed relative to ''major modifications'' and DOE-STD-1027-92. Application of the USQ process to ATR experiments is also discussed

  17. Implementation of radiation safety program in a medical institution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palanca, Elena D.

    1999-01-01

    A medical institution that utilizes radiation for the diagnosis and treatment of diseases of malignancies develops and implements a radiation safety program to keep occupational exposures of radiation workers and exposures of non-radiation workers and the public to the achievable and a more achievable minimum, to optimize the use of radiation, and to prevent misadministration. The hospital radiation safety program is established by a core medical radiation committee composed of trained radiation safety officers and head of authorized users of radioactive materials and radiation machines from the different departments. The radiation safety program sets up procedural guidelines of the safe use of radioactive material and of radiation equipment. It offers regular training to radiation workers and radiation safety awareness courses to hospital staff. The program has a comprehensive radiation safety information system or radsis that circularizes the radiation safety program in the hospital. The radsis keeps the drafted and updated records of safety guides and policies, radioactive material and equipment inventory, personnel dosimetry reports, administrative, regulatory and licensing activity document, laboratory procedures, emergency procedures, quality assurance and quality control program process, physics and dosimetry procedures and reports, personnel and hospital staff training program. The medical radiation protection committee is tasked to oversee the actual implementation of the radiation safety guidelines in the different radiation facilities in the hospital, to review personnel exposures, incident reports and ALARA actions, operating procedures, facility inspections and audit reports, to evaluate the existing radiation safety procedures, to make necessary changes to these procedures, and make modifications of course content of the training program. The effective implementation of the radiation safety program provides increased confidence that the physician and

  18. A desktop 3D printer in safety-critical Java

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Strøm, Tórur Biskopstø; Schoeberl, Martin

    2012-01-01

    there exist several safety-critical Java framework implementations, there is a lack of safety-critical use cases implemented according to the specification. In this paper we present a 3D printer and its safety-critical Java level 1 implementation as a use case. With basis in the implementation we evaluate......It is desirable to bring Java technology to safety-critical systems. To this end The Open Group has created the safety-critical Java specification, which will allow Java applications, written according to the specification, to be certifiable in accordance with safety-critical standards. Although...

  19. Implementing the Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program (CUSP) to Improve Patient Safety in an Academic Primary Care Practice.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pitts, Samantha I; Maruthur, Nisa M; Luu, Ngoc-Phuong; Curreri, Kimberly; Grimes, Renee; Nigrin, Candace; Sateia, Heather F; Sawyer, Melinda D; Pronovost, Peter J; Clark, Jeanne M; Peairs, Kimberly S

    2017-11-01

    While there is growing awareness of the risk of harm in ambulatory health care, most patient safety efforts have focused on the inpatient setting. The Comprehensive Unit-based Safety Program (CUSP) has been an integral part of highly successful safety efforts in inpatient settings. In 2014 CUSP was implemented in an academic primary care practice. As part of CUSP implementation, staff and clinicians underwent training on the science of safety and completed a two-question safety assessment survey to identify safety concerns in the practice. The concerns identified by team members were used to select two initial safety priorities. The impact of CUSP on safety climate and teamwork was assessed through a pre-post comparison of results on the validated Safety Attitudes Questionnaire. Ninety-six percent of staff completed science of safety training as part of CUSP implementation, and 100% of staff completed the two-question safety assessment. The most frequently identified safety concerns were related to medications (n = 11, 28.2), diagnostic testing (n = 9, 25), and communication (n = 5, 14). The CUSP team initially prioritized communication and infection control, which led to standardization of work flows within the practice. Six months following CUSP implementation, large but nonstatistically significant increases were found for the percentage of survey respondents who reported knowledge of the proper channels for questions about patient safety, felt encouraged to report safety concerns, and believed that the work setting made it easy to learn from the errors of others. CUSP is a promising tool to improve safety climate and to identify and address safety concerns within ambulatory health care. Copyright © 2017 The Joint Commission. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  20. Implementation of a patient safety program at a tertiary health system: A longitudinal analysis of interventions and serious safety events.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cropper, Douglas P; Harb, Nidal H; Said, Patricia A; Lemke, Jon H; Shammas, Nicolas W

    2018-04-01

    We hypothesize that implementation of a safety program based on high reliability organization principles will reduce serious safety events (SSE). The safety program focused on 7 essential elements: (a) safety rounding, (b) safety oversight teams, (c) safety huddles, (d) safety coaches, (e) good catches/safety heroes, (f) safety education, and (g) red rule. An educational curriculum was implemented focusing on changing high-risk behaviors and implementing critical safety policies. All unusual occurrences were captured in the Midas system and investigated by risk specialists, the safety officer, and the chief medical officer. A multidepartmental committee evaluated these events, and a root cause analysis (RCA) was performed. Events were tabulated and serious safety event (SSE) recorded and plotted over time. Safety success stories (SSSs) were also evaluated over time. A steady drop in SSEs was seen over 9 years. Also a rise in SSSs was evident, reflecting on staff engagement in the program. The parallel change in SSEs, SSSs, and the implementation of various safety interventions highly suggest that the program was successful in achieving its goals. A safety program based on high-reliability organization principles and made a core value of the institution can have a significant positive impact on reducing SSEs. © 2018 American Society for Healthcare Risk Management of the American Hospital Association.

  1. Analysis of Correlations between the Level of Partnering Relations and their Influence on the Time, Cost, Quality and Safety of Implementation of Construction Projects

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Radziszewska-Zielina Elżbieta

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available The present paper uses the developed model of the influence of partnering relations on the time, cost, quality and safety of implementation of construction projects. On its basis, a questionnaire has been created and a preliminary survey has been conducted. The paper presents an analysis of correlations between the level of partnering relations in the context of the partnering measures indicated in the model and their influence on the time, cost, quality and safety of implementation of construction projects. The analysis was conducted based on the data collected in 52 construction projects. The values of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient and the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient have been calculated for the examined relations. The analysis allowed for indicating the measures of partnering whose improvement most often brings benefits with regard to the time, cost, quality and safety of implementation of construction projects. Among the 80 analysed correlations, the ones identified as strong were: 15 relations connected with the time, 8 with the cost, 5 with the quality and 1 with the safety of implementation of construction projects.

  2. [How patient safety programmes can be successfully implemented - an example from Switzerland].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kobler, Irene; Mascherek, Anna; Bezzola, Paula

    2015-01-01

    Internationally, the implementation of patient safety programmes poses a major challenge. In the first part, we will demonstrate that various measures have been found to be effective in the literature but that they often do not reach the patient because their implementation proves difficult. Difficulties arise from both the complexity of the interventions themselves and from different organisational settings in individual hospitals. The second part specifically describes the implementation of patient safety improvement programmes in Switzerland and discusses measures intended to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of implementation in Switzerland. Then, the national pilot programme to improve patient safety in surgery is presented, which was launched by the federal Swiss government and has been implemented by the patient safety foundation. Procedures, challenges and highlights in implementing the programme in Switzerland on a national level are outlined. Finally, first (preliminary) results are presented and critically discussed. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier GmbH.

  3. Discussion on the Criterion for the Safety Certification Basis Compilation - Brazilian Space Program Case

    Science.gov (United States)

    Niwa, M.; Alves, N. C.; Caetano, A. O.; Andrade, N. S. O.

    2012-01-01

    The recent advent of the commercial launch and re- entry activities, for promoting the expansion of human access to space for tourism and hypersonic travel, in the already complex ambience of the global space activities, brought additional difficulties over the development of a harmonized framework of international safety rules. In the present work, with the purpose of providing some complementary elements for global safety rule development, the certification-related activities conducted in the Brazilian space program are depicted and discussed, focusing mainly on the criterion for certification basis compilation. The results suggest that the composition of a certification basis with the preferential use of internationally-recognized standards, as is the case of ISO standards, can be a first step toward the development of an international safety regulation for commercial space activities.

  4. Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization training implementation. Revision 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1997-01-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization (NCSO) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSO personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This Training Implementation document is applicable to all technical and managerial NCSO personnel, including temporary personnel, sub-contractors and/or LMES employees on loan to the NCSO, who are in a qualification program

  5. Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization training implementation. Revision 4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carroll, K.J.; Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

    1997-05-19

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Organization (NCSO) is committed to developing and maintaining a staff of qualified personnel to meet the current and anticipated needs in Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This document provides a listing of the roles and responsibilities of NCSO personnel with respect to training and details of the Training Management System (TMS) programs, Mentoring Checklists and Checksheets, as well as other documentation utilized to implement the program. This Training Implementation document is applicable to all technical and managerial NCSO personnel, including temporary personnel, sub-contractors and/or LMES employees on loan to the NCSO, who are in a qualification program.

  6. Authorization basis requirements comparison report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brantley, W.M.

    1997-08-18

    The TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) consists of a set of documents identified by TWRS management with the concurrence of DOE-RL. Upon implementation of the TWRS Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), the AB list will be revised to include the BIO and TSRs. Some documents that currently form part of the AB will be removed from the list. This SD identifies each - requirement from those documents, and recommends a disposition for each to ensure that necessary requirements are retained when the AB is revised to incorporate the BIO and TSRs. This SD also identifies documents that will remain part of the AB after the BIO and TSRs are implemented. This document does not change the AB, but provides guidance for the preparation of change documentation.

  7. Authorization basis requirements comparison report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brantley, W.M.

    1997-01-01

    The TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) consists of a set of documents identified by TWRS management with the concurrence of DOE-RL. Upon implementation of the TWRS Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), the AB list will be revised to include the BIO and TSRs. Some documents that currently form part of the AB will be removed from the list. This SD identifies each - requirement from those documents, and recommends a disposition for each to ensure that necessary requirements are retained when the AB is revised to incorporate the BIO and TSRs. This SD also identifies documents that will remain part of the AB after the BIO and TSRs are implemented. This document does not change the AB, but provides guidance for the preparation of change documentation

  8. What do implementers need in terms of regulatory safety criteria for the post-closure phase?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cahen, B.

    2010-01-01

    Bruno Cahen, Director Safety Division (ANDRA) presented the point of view of the NEA Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) on 'What do implementers need in terms of regulatory safety criteria for the post-closure phase?' B. Cahen acknowledged that the national experience in siting and developing conceptual designs of geological disposal is growing rapidly. It implies increasing opportunities for interactions between implementers and regulators. There has been large development of international guidance in the recent years. Many regulators have already developed a regulatory framework. The implementers need practical, transparent and deliverable regulations. These regulations should draw on experiences gained from development of geological disposal projects. The IGSC has identified five key questions that the RF may focus on: 1. Over what time frame are the waste deemed to present a hazard? 2. Over what time frames are regulatory criteria applied and do they change over time? 3. Over what time frame(s) are safety assessments required to be conducted? 4. How do implementers have to address uncertainties in the long time frames? 5. What happens after cut-offs: are additional analyses needed? What types of arguments are to be used? Stable, understandable and practical criteria mean, namely, that they need to be developed on a strong scientific and societal basis, that there is consistency of safety options and requirements for different types of waste, that, in the longer time frames, the emphasis is given to robust systems, passive safety and multiple safety functions and that the criteria should fit the various phases of the project (siting, designing, operating, closure and post-closure). Experience feedback from safety cases shows that safety priorities depend very much on time frames. The derived safety criteria for the individual components should lead to measurable, verifiable specifications. The assessment of geological repository post-closure safety

  9. The Implementation and Maintenance of a Behavioral Safety Process in a Petroleum Refinery

    Science.gov (United States)

    Myers, Wanda V.; McSween, Terry E.; Medina, Rixio E.; Rost, Kristen; Alvero, Alicia M.

    2010-01-01

    A values-centered and team-based behavioral safety process was implemented in a petroleum oil refinery. Employee teams defined the refinery's safety values and related practices, which were used to guide the process design and implementation. The process included (a) a safety assessment; (b) the clarification of safety-related values and related…

  10. Materials Safety Data Sheets: the basis for control of toxic chemicals

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ketchen, E.E.; Porter, W.E.

    1979-09-01

    The Material Safety Data Sheets contained in this volume are the basis for the Toxic Chemical Control Program developed by the Industrial Hygiene Department, Health Division, ORNL. The three volumes are the update and expansion of ORNL/TM-5721 and ORNL/TM-5722 Material Safety Data Sheets: The Basis for Control of Toxic Chemicals, Volume I and Volume II. As such, they are a valuable adjunct to the data cards issued with specific chemicals. The chemicals are identified by name, stores catalog number where appropriate, and sequence numbers from the NIOSH Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, 1977 Edition, if available. The data sheets were developed and compiled to aid in apprising the employees of hazards peculiar to the handling and/or use of specific toxic chemicals. Space limitation necessitate the use of descriptive medical terms and toxicological abbreviations. A glossary and an abbreviation list were developed to define some of those sometimes unfamiliar terms and abbreviations. The page numbers are keyed to the catalog number in the chemical stores at ORNL.

  11. PATIENT SAFETY IN SURGERY: THE QUALITY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PATIENT SAFETY CHECKLISTS IN A REGIONAL HOSPITAL

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    V. Karyadinata

    2012-09-01

    Full Text Available Introduction. Patient safety and the avoidance of inhospital adverse events is a key focus of clinical practice and medical audit. A large of proportion of medical errors affect surgical patients in the peri-operative setting. Safety checklists have been adopted by the medical profession from the aviation industry as a cheap and reliable method of avoiding errors which arise from complex or stressful situations. Current evidence suggests that the use of periooperative checklists has led to a decrease in surgical morbidity and hospital costs. Aim. To assess the quality of implementation of a modified patient safety checklist in a UK district general hospital. Methods. An observational tool was designed to assess in real time the peri-operative performance of the surgical safety checklist in patients undergoing general surgical, urological or orthopaedic procedures. Initiation of the checklist, duration of performance and staff participation were audited in real time. Results. 338 cases were monitored. Nurses were most active in initiating the safety checklist. The checklist was performed successfully in less than a minute in most cases. 11-24% of staff (according to professional group present in the operating room did not participate in the checklist. Critical safety checks (patient identity and procedure name were performed in all cases across all specialties. Variations were noted in checking other categories, such as deep vein thrombosis (DVT prophylaxis or patient warming. Conclusions. There is still a potential for improving the practice and culture of surgical patient safety activities. Staff training and designation of patient safety leadership roles is needed in increasing compliance and implementation of patient safety mechanism, such as peri-operative checklists. There is significant data to advocate the need to implement patient safety surgical checklists internationally

  12. Regulating nuclear and radiation safety in the frame of the Chernobyl shelter Implementation Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bykov, V.; Demchyuk, A.; Kilochitska, T.; Redko, V. [State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine, SNRCU, Arsenalna St. 9/11, Kyiv (Ukraine); Bogorinski, P. [GRS/IPSN-RISKAUDIT, Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Koeln (Germany); Vasilchenko, V.; Erickson, L.; Kadkin, E.; Kondratyev, S.; Kutina, L.; Smyshliaeva, S. [SSTC NRS, Stusa St. 35-37, 03142, Kyiv (Ukraine)

    2003-07-01

    Since 1998 the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) has been carried out on the Chernobyl NPP Unit 4 (the object Shelter - OS). The State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU) recognizes the exceptional importance of successful and efficient SIP implementation and acts accordingly in regulation, licensing, and inspection. Technical support of the SNRCU in SIP licensing are provided by the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC) and the SIP Licensing Consultant (LC) representing RISKAUDIT IPSN/GRS International and SCIENTECH, Inc. Support of the SNRCU is also provided by the International Consultative Committee of Regulatory Bodies (ICCRB). ICCRB members represent regulatory authorities from nine European countries, Canada and the U.S. Summarizing the information above, it can be stated that a sound basis has been created for the licensing process for SIP. The approach for using the regulatory base has been determined. It ensures the establishment of safety objectives and gives ChNPP the freedom of optimal choice of specific technical decisions. The License has been issued for OS-related activities and a number of documents have been developed to conduct an effective and high quality authorization process: the Licensing Process; Recommendations on single SSR, Licensing Plan for SIP. The Order of State Safety Supervision for SIP has been approved. Working groups are functioning, whose purposes are to coordinate actions of participants in authorization activities, including ChNPP, SNRCU, and other RA.

  13. Regulating nuclear and radiation safety in the frame of the Chernobyl shelter Implementation Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bykov, V.; Demchyuk, A.; Kilochitska, T.; Redko, V.; Bogorinski, P.; Vasilchenko, V.; Erickson, L.; Kadkin, E.; Kondratyev, S.; Kutina, L.; Smyshliaeva, S.

    2003-01-01

    Since 1998 the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) has been carried out on the Chernobyl NPP Unit 4 (the object Shelter - OS). The State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU) recognizes the exceptional importance of successful and efficient SIP implementation and acts accordingly in regulation, licensing, and inspection. Technical support of the SNRCU in SIP licensing are provided by the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC) and the SIP Licensing Consultant (LC) representing RISKAUDIT IPSN/GRS International and SCIENTECH, Inc. Support of the SNRCU is also provided by the International Consultative Committee of Regulatory Bodies (ICCRB). ICCRB members represent regulatory authorities from nine European countries, Canada and the U.S. Summarizing the information above, it can be stated that a sound basis has been created for the licensing process for SIP. The approach for using the regulatory base has been determined. It ensures the establishment of safety objectives and gives ChNPP the freedom of optimal choice of specific technical decisions. The License has been issued for OS-related activities and a number of documents have been developed to conduct an effective and high quality authorization process: the Licensing Process; Recommendations on single SSR, Licensing Plan for SIP. The Order of State Safety Supervision for SIP has been approved. Working groups are functioning, whose purposes are to coordinate actions of participants in authorization activities, including ChNPP, SNRCU, and other RA

  14. Safety culture enhancement through the implementation of IAEA guidelines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mengolini, A.; Debarberis, L.

    2007-01-01

    This paper presents the methodology applied and the results achieved in adapting and implementing the IAEA guidelines on safety culture to a research reactor as a step towards supporting its Life Management Program. The background is presented together with the effort undertaken to develop awareness on safety culture and the enhancement programme hereafter developed. The present study shows how issues of safety culture, management awareness and commitment deserve attention and can be of fundamental relevance also for research reactors. The study presents how guidelines developed specifically for nuclear power installations (NPPs) can be adapted to meet the needs and peculiarities of other nuclear installations. Moreover, the difficulties met during the implementation of the guidelines are discussed and important information and lessons can be learnt for the nuclear industry in general

  15. Technical Basis for Implementation of the PCM-1B for Personnel Release at Tank Farms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BROWN, R.L.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to define the technical basis and implementing guidelines for using automated personnel contamination monitors, such as the PCM-1B, at the River Protection Project (RPP) in lieu of performing a hand-held instrument followed by a PCM-1B survey for personnel release from contamination areas requiring a beta-gamma whole body survey. This document provides the basis for full implementation of the PCM-1B release survey, without the supplemental hand and foot survey, as currently implemented at RPP. This document applies only to RPP facilities. This document does not provide the technical basis for determining the equivalency of an automated system to hand-held instruments, or to the effective counting capability of automated systems as such technical determinations are contained in TBTN: GDGH-9604-RLS-0015

  16. Safety Assurance Process for FRMS : EJcase Implementation

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Stewart, S.; Koornneef, F.; Akselsson, R.; Barton, P.

    2009-01-01

    Chapter 6: Safety Assurance Process for FRMS - eJcase Implementation The European Commission HILAS project (Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems - a project supported by the European Commission’s 6th Framework between 2005-2009) was focused on using human factors knowledge and

  17. Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huls, Dale Thomas; Meehan, Kevin

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Colimbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational

  18. Basis Document for Sludge Stabilization

    CERN Document Server

    Risenmay, H R

    2001-01-01

    DOE-RL recently issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER) amendments to the PFP Final Safety Analysis Report, HNF-SD-CP-SAR-021 Rev. 2. The Justification for Continued Operations for 2736-ZB and plutonium oxides in BTCs Safety Basis change (letter DOE-RL ABD-074) was approved by one of the SERs. Also approved by SER was the revised accident analysis for Magnesium Hydroxide Precipitation Process (MHPP) gloveboxes HC-230C-3 and HC-230C-5 containing increased glovebox inventories and corresponding increases in seismic release consequence. Numerous implementing documents require revision and issuance to implement the SER approvals. The SER plutonium oxides into BTCs specifically limited the SER scope to ''pure or clean oxides, i.e., 85 wt% or grater Pu, in this feed change'' (SER Section 3.0 Base Information paragraph 4 [page 11]). Comprehensive USQ Evaluation PFP-2001-12 addressed the packaging of Pu alloy metals into BTCs, and the packaging of Pu alloy oxides (powders) into food pack cans and determined that the ac...

  19. Implementing evidence-based policy in a network setting: road safety policy in the Netherlands.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bax, Charlotte; de Jong, Martin; Koppenjan, Joop

    2010-01-01

    In the early 1990s, in order to improve road safety in The Netherlands, the Institute for Road Safety Research (SWOV) developed an evidence-based "Sustainable Safety" concept. Based on this concept, Dutch road safety policy, was seen as successful and as a best practice in Europe. In The Netherlands, the policy context has now changed from a sectoral policy setting towards a fragmented network in which safety is a facet of other transport-related policies. In this contribution, it is argued that the implementation strategy underlying Sustainable Safety should be aligned with the changed context. In order to explore the adjustments needed, two perspectives of policy implementation are discussed: (1) national evidence-based policies with sectoral implementation; and (2) decentralized negotiation on transport policy in which road safety is but one aspect. We argue that the latter approach matches the characteristics of the newly evolved policy context best, and conclude with recommendations for reformulating the implementation strategy.

  20. Understanding middle managers' influence in implementing patient safety culture.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gutberg, Jennifer; Berta, Whitney

    2017-08-22

    The past fifteen years have been marked by large-scale change efforts undertaken by healthcare organizations to improve patient safety and patient-centered care. Despite substantial investment of effort and resources, many of these large-scale or "radical change" initiatives, like those in other industries, have enjoyed limited success - with practice and behavioural changes neither fully adopted nor ultimately sustained - which has in large part been ascribed to inadequate implementation efforts. Culture change to "patient safety culture" (PSC) is among these radical change initiatives, where results to date have been mixed at best. This paper responds to calls for research that focus on explicating factors that affect efforts to implement radical change in healthcare contexts, and focuses on PSC as the radical change implementation. Specifically, this paper offers a novel conceptual model based on Organizational Learning Theory to explain the ability of middle managers in healthcare organizations to influence patient safety culture change. We propose that middle managers can capitalize on their unique position between upper and lower levels in the organization and engage in 'ambidextrous' learning that is critical to implementing and sustaining radical change. This organizational learning perspective offers an innovative way of framing the mid-level managers' role, through both explorative and exploitative activities, which further considers the necessary organizational context in which they operate.

  1. Scientific and technical basis of safety increase measures at NPPs with WWER

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skalozubov, V.I.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Komarov, Yu.A.; Shavlakov, A.V.

    2010-01-01

    This monograph presents the original development of the authors on scientific and technical substantiation of foreground modern measures on safety increase at nuclear power plants with water-water reactors: development and implementation of operative diagnostic system for thermo acoustical instability of reactor core, substantituation of performance capacity and reliability of fast-acting reducing units systems and regulation systems of reactor emergency cooling at control of dominant for safety accidents.

  2. radiation safety culture for developing country: Basis for s minimum operational radiation protection programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rozental, J. J.

    1997-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to present a methodology for an integrated strategy aiming at establishing an adequate radiation Safety infrastructure for developing countries, non major power reactor programme. Its implementation will allow these countries, about 50% of the IAEA's Member States, to improve marginal radiation safety, specially to those recipients of technical assistance and do not meet the Minimum radiation Safety Requirements of the IAEA's Basic Safety Standards for radiation protection Progress in the implementation of safety regulations depends on the priority of the government and its understanding and conviction about the basic requirements for protection against the risks associated with exposure to ionizing radiation. There is no doubt to conclude that the reasons for the deficiency of sources control and dose limitation are related to the lack of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework, specially considering the establishment of an adequate legislation; A minimum legal infrastructure; A minimum operational radiation safety programme; Alternatives for a Point of Optimum Contact, to avoid overlap and conflict, that is: A 'Memorandum of Understanding' among Regulatory Authorities in the Country, dealing with similar type of licensing and inspection

  3. 77 FR 64564 - Implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.221 on Design-Basis Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-22

    ...-Basis Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Proposed interim...-ISG-024, ``Implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.221 on Design-Basis Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles....221, ``Design-Basis Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants.'' DATES: Submit...

  4. DART - for design basis justification and safety related information management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Billington, A.; Blondiaux, P.; Boucau, J.; Cantineau, B.; Doumont, C.; Mared, A.

    2000-01-01

    DART is the acronym for Design Analysis Re-engineering Tool. It embodies a systematic and integrated approach to NPP safety re-assessment and configuration management, that makes use of Reverse Failure Mode and Effect Analysis in conjunction with a state-of-the-art relational database and a standardized data format, to permit long-term management of plant safety related information. The plant design is reviewed in a step-by-step logical fashion by constructing fault trees that identify the link between undesired consequences and their causes. Each failure cause identified in a fault tree is addressed by defining functional requirements, which are in turn addressed by documenting the specific manner in which the plant complies with the requirement. The database can be used to generate up-to-date plant safety related documents, including: SAR, Systems Descriptions, Technical Specifications and plant procedures. The approach is open-minded by nature and therefore is not regulatory driven, however the plant licensing basis will also be reviewed and documented within the same database such that a Regulatory Conformance Program may be integrated with the other safety documentation. This methodology can thus reconstitute the plant design bases in a comprehensive and systematic way, while allowing to uncover weaknesses in design. The original feature of the DART methodology is that it links all the safety related documents together, facilitating the evaluation of the safety impact resulting from any plant modification. Due to its capability to retrieve the basic justifications of the plant design, it is also a useful tool for training the young generation of plant personnel. The DART methodology has been developed for application to units 2, 3 and 4 at Vattenfall's Ringhals site in Sweden. It may be applied to any nuclear power plant or industrial facility where public safety is a concern. (author)

  5. DART - for design basis justification and safety related information management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Billington, A.; Blondiaux, B.; Boucau, J.; Cantineau, B.; Mared, A.

    2001-01-01

    DART is the acronym for Design Analysis Re-Engineering Tool. It embodies a systematic and integrated approach to NPP safety re-assessment and configuration management, that makes use of Reverse Failure Mode and Effect Analysis in conjunction with a state-of-the-art relational database and a standardized data format, to permit long-term management of plant safety related information. The plant design is reviewed in a step-by-step logical fashion by constructing fault trees that identify the link between undesired consequences and their causes. Each failure cause identified in a fault tree is addressed by defining functional requirements, which are in turn addressed by documenting the specific manner in which the plant complies with the requirement. The database can then be used to generate up-to-date plant safety related documents, including: SAR, Systems Descriptions, Technical Specifications and plant procedures. The approach is open-minded by nature and therefore is not regulatory driven, however the plant licensing basis will also be reviewed and documented within the same database such that a Regulatory Conformance Program may be integrated with the other safety documentation. This methodology can thus reconstitute the plant design bases in a comprehensive and systematic way, while allowing to uncover weaknesses in design. The original feature of the DART methodology is that it links all the safety related documents together, facilitating the evaluation of the safety impact resulting from any plant modification. Due to its capability to retrieve the basic justifications of the plant design, it is also a useful tool for training the young generation of plant personnel. The DART methodology has been developed for application to units 2, 3 and 4 at Vattenfall's Ringhals site in Sweden. It may be applied to any nuclear power plant or industrial facility where public safety is a concern. (author)

  6. Scientific basis for a safety case of deep geological repositories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Noseck, Ulrich; Becker, Dirk-Alexander; Brasser, Thomas [and others

    2012-11-15

    Within this project strategies and methods to build a safety case for deep geological repositories are further developed. This includes also the scientific fundamentals as a basis of the safety case. In the international framework the methodology of the Safety Case is frequently applied and continuously improved. According to definitions from IAEA and NEA the Safety Case is a compilation of arguments and facts, which describe, quantify and support the safety and the degree of confidence in the safety of the geological repository. The safety of the geological repository should be demonstrated by the safety case. The safety case is the basis for essential decisions during a repository programme. It comprises the results of safety assessments in combination with additional information like multiple lines of evidence and a discussion of robustness and quality of the repository, its design and the quality of all safety assessments including the basic assumptions. A crucial element of the Safety Case is the long-term safety analysis, i.e. the systematic analysis of the hazards connected with the facility and the capability of site and repository design to ensure the required safety functions and to fulfill the technical claims. Long-term safety analysis requires a powerful and qualified programme package, which contains appropriate hardware and software as well as well trained and experienced modellers performing the model calculations. The calculation tools used within safety cases need to be checked and verified and continuously adapted to the state-of-the-art science and technology. Especially it needs to be applicable to a real repository system. For the assessment of safety a deep process understanding is necessary. The R and D work performed within this project will contribute to the improvement of process and system understanding as well as to the further development of methods and strategies applied in the safety case. Emphasis was put on the following aspects

  7. Scientific basis for a safety case of deep geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noseck, Ulrich; Becker, Dirk-Alexander; Brasser, Thomas

    2012-11-01

    Within this project strategies and methods to build a safety case for deep geological repositories are further developed. This includes also the scientific fundamentals as a basis of the safety case. In the international framework the methodology of the Safety Case is frequently applied and continuously improved. According to definitions from IAEA and NEA the Safety Case is a compilation of arguments and facts, which describe, quantify and support the safety and the degree of confidence in the safety of the geological repository. The safety of the geological repository should be demonstrated by the safety case. The safety case is the basis for essential decisions during a repository programme. It comprises the results of safety assessments in combination with additional information like multiple lines of evidence and a discussion of robustness and quality of the repository, its design and the quality of all safety assessments including the basic assumptions. A crucial element of the Safety Case is the long-term safety analysis, i.e. the systematic analysis of the hazards connected with the facility and the capability of site and repository design to ensure the required safety functions and to fulfill the technical claims. Long-term safety analysis requires a powerful and qualified programme package, which contains appropriate hardware and software as well as well trained and experienced modellers performing the model calculations. The calculation tools used within safety cases need to be checked and verified and continuously adapted to the state-of-the-art science and technology. Especially it needs to be applicable to a real repository system. For the assessment of safety a deep process understanding is necessary. The R and D work performed within this project will contribute to the improvement of process and system understanding as well as to the further development of methods and strategies applied in the safety case. Emphasis was put on the following aspects

  8. APPROVAL OF WASTE TREATMENT AND IMMOBILIZATION PLANT CONTRACTOR-INITIATED AUTHORIZATION BASIS AMENDMENT REQUESTS (ABAR)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JONES GL

    2008-01-01

    The objective is to describe the process used by the Office of River Protection (ORP) for evaluating and implementing Contractor-initiated changes to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Authorization Basis (AB). The WTP Project's history has provided a unique challenge for establishing and maintaining an ORP-approved AB during design and construction. Until operations begin, the project cannot implement the classic Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to determine when ORP approval of Contractor-initiated changes is required. A 'quasiUSQ' process has been implemented that defines when AB changes could occur. The three types of AB changes are (1) Limited Scope Changes, (2) Authorization Basis Deviations, and (3) Authorization Basis Amendment Request (ABAR). DOE RL/REG 97-13, 'Office of River Protection Position on Contractor-Initiated Changes to the Authorization Basis', describes the process the WTP Contractor must follow to make changes to the AB, with and without ORP approval. The process uses a 'safety evaluation' process that is similar to the USQ process but at a more qualitative level. The maturation of the WTP Contractor's facility design and activities, and other changing conditions, resulted in a process that allows the Contractor to make changes to the AB without ORP approval; however, those changes that may significantly affect nuclear safety do require ORP approval. This process balances the WTP regulatory principle of efficiency with assurance that adequate safety will not be compromised. The process has reduced the number of ABARs requiring ORP approval and reduced the potential for delays in design and procurement activities

  9. Integrated Safety Culture Model and Application

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    汪磊; 孙瑞山; 刘汉辉

    2009-01-01

    A new safety culture model is constructed and is applied to analyze the correlations between safety culture and SMS. On the basis of previous typical definitions, models and theories of safety culture, an in-depth analysis on safety culture's structure, composing elements and their correlations was conducted. A new definition of safety culture was proposed from the perspective of sub-cuhure. 7 types of safety sub-culture, which are safety priority culture, standardizing culture, flexible culture, learning culture, teamwork culture, reporting culture and justice culture were defined later. Then integrated safety culture model (ISCM) was put forward based on the definition. The model divided safety culture into intrinsic latency level and extrinsic indication level and explained the potential relationship between safety sub-culture and all safety culture dimensions. Finally in the analyzing of safety culture and SMS, it concluded that positive safety culture is the basis of im-plementing SMS effectively and an advanced SMS will improve safety culture from all around.

  10. Lean Six-Sigma in Aviation Safety: An implementation guide for measuring aviation system’s safety performance

    OpenAIRE

    Panagopoulos, I.; Atkin, C.J.; Sikora, I.

    2016-01-01

    The paper introduces a conceptual framework that could improve the safety performance measurement process and ultimately the aviation system safety performance. The framework provides an implementation guide on how organisations could design and develop a proactive, measurement tool for assessing and measuring the Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP) at sigma (σ) level, a statistical measurement unit. In fact, the methodology adapts and combines quality management tools, a leading i...

  11. Safety equipment list for the 241-SY-101 RAPID mitigation project

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MORRIS, K.L.

    1999-06-29

    This document provides the safety classification for the safety (safety class and safety RAPID Mitigation Project. This document is being issued as the project SEL until the supporting authorization basis documentation, this document will be superseded by the TWRS SEL (LMHC 1999), documentation istlralized. Upon implementation of the authorization basis significant) structures, systems, and components (SSCS) associated with the 241-SY-1O1 which will be updated to include the information contained herein.

  12. Safety equipment list for the 241-SY-101 RAPID mitigation project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris, K.L.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the safety classification for the safety (safety class and safety RAPID Mitigation Project. This document is being issued as the project SEL until the supporting authorization basis documentation, this document will be superseded by the TWRS SEL (LMHC 1999), documentation istlralized. Upon implementation of the authorization basis significant) structures, systems, and components (SSCS) associated with the 241-SY-1O1 which will be updated to include the information contained herein

  13. 14 CFR 60.37 - FSTD qualification on the basis of a Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA). 60.37 Section 60.37 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION... CONTINUING QUALIFICATION AND USE § 60.37 FSTD qualification on the basis of a Bilateral Aviation Safety... on International Civil Aviation for the sponsor of an FSTD located in that contracting State may be...

  14. Implementation of probabilistic safety concepts in international codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borges, J.F.

    1977-01-01

    Recent progress in the implementation of safety concepts in international structure codes is briefly presented. Special attention is paid to the work of the Joint-Committee on Structural Safety. The discussion is centered on some problems such as: safety differentiation, definition and combination of actions, spaces for checking safety and non-linear structural behaviour. When discussing safety differentiation it should be considered that the total probability of failure derives from a theoretical probability of failure and a probability of failure due to error and gross negligence. Optimization of design criteria should take into account both causes of failure. The quantification of reliability implies a probabilistic idealization of all basic variables. Steps taken to obtain an improved definition of different types of actions and rules for their combination are described. Safety checking can be carried out in terms of basic variables, action-effects, or any other suitable variable. However, the advantages and disadvantages of the different types of formulation should be discussed, particularly in the case of non-linear structural behaviour. (orig.) [de

  15. Implementation of safety goals in NRC's regulatory process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murley, T.E.

    1985-01-01

    In May 1983 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a policy statement on Safety Goals For Nuclear Power Plant Operation. The Commission at the same time judged that a two-year evaluation period was necessary to judge the effectiveness of the goals and design objectives, and directed the staff to develop information and understanding as to how to further define and use the design objectives and the cost-benefit guidelines. In carrying out the Commission's mandate, the staff framed three major questions to be addressed during the safety goal evaluation period. These three questions are: 1) to what extent is it practical to use safety goals in the regulatory process. 2) Should the quantitative design objectives be modified or supplemented. If so, how. 3) How should the safety goals be implemented at the end of the evaluation period. The staff's conclusions are discussed

  16. NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1; System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dezfuli, Homayoon; Benjamin, Allan; Everett, Christopher; Smith, Curtis; Stamatelatos, Michael; Youngblood, Robert

    2011-01-01

    System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual

  17. Evolving US Food Safety Regulations and International Competitors: Implementation Dynamics

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tekuni Nakuja

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available The 2011 US Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA represents a major initiative to improve food safety. The legislation mandates the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA with developing a regulatory system to implement the Act. Both domestic and foreign firms that wish to supply US consumers with food will face a considerable increase in regulatory costs. Implementation has proved challenging for the FDA leading to delays which increase investment risks for foreign suppliers, particulalry from developing countries. This paper sets out the major FSMA requirements and examines how the regulatory burden may fall on foreign versus US suppliers.

  18. Is road safety management linked to road safety performance?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Papadimitriou, Eleonora; Yannis, George

    2013-10-01

    This research aims to explore the relationship between road safety management and road safety performance at country level. For that purpose, an appropriate theoretical framework is selected, namely the 'SUNflower' pyramid, which describes road safety management systems in terms of a five-level hierarchy: (i) structure and culture, (ii) programmes and measures, (iii) 'intermediate' outcomes'--safety performance indicators (SPIs), (iv) final outcomes--fatalities and injuries, and (v) social costs. For each layer of the pyramid, a composite indicator is implemented, on the basis of data for 30 European countries. Especially as regards road safety management indicators, these are estimated on the basis of Categorical Principal Component Analysis upon the responses of a dedicated road safety management questionnaire, jointly created and dispatched by the ETSC/PIN group and the 'DaCoTA' research project. Then, quasi-Poisson models and Beta regression models are developed for linking road safety management indicators and other indicators (i.e. background characteristics, SPIs) with road safety performance. In this context, different indicators of road safety performance are explored: mortality and fatality rates, percentage reduction in fatalities over a given period, a composite indicator of road safety final outcomes, and a composite indicator of 'intermediate' outcomes (SPIs). The results of the analyses suggest that road safety management can be described on the basis of three composite indicators: "vision and strategy", "budget, evaluation and reporting", and "measurement of road user attitudes and behaviours". Moreover, no direct statistical relationship could be established between road safety management indicators and final outcomes. However, a statistical relationship was found between road safety management and 'intermediate' outcomes, which were in turn found to affect 'final' outcomes, confirming the SUNflower approach on the consecutive effect of each layer

  19. Recommendations to Improve the Implementation Compliance of Surgical Safety Checklist in Surgery Rooms

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Juliana Sandrawati

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available Background: Surgical Safety Checklist has been adopted in surgery room as a tool to improve safe surgery. Its implementation during 2012 was low (33.9% so was the completeness of filling it (57.3%. Objective: To increase the implementation of Surgical Safety Checklist (SSC through analyzing the effect of policy, procedures, patient safety culture, and individual factors on compliance SSC implementation in the surgery room. Methods: Cross-sectional study with descriptive observational approach was done to find influencing factors of health care personnels’ compliance to fill SSC. Sample consisted of all surgery room nurses (45 nurses, 10 surgeons and 4 anesthesists. Data collection was made use of questionnaires, surgical medical records and SSC form. Results:The compliance to fill SSC in April 2013 was still low (55.9%. Written policy on patient safety was absent and awareness of respondents about the procedure was low. Respondents’ assessment showed that patient safety culture in surgery room was good, except management and stress recognition dimensions. Likewise, the respondents’ knowledge about SSC was low (61.0%. Conclusion: The study conclude that influencing factors of compliance implementation SSC is absence of the written policy in patient safety, lack of socialization of Standar Prosedur Operasional to health care personnels, lack of knowledge about SSC, lack awareness about the importance of SSC, shortage of surgery room nurses, and innappropriate perception about filling SSC as workload. Recomendation:The study will be making of written policy in patient safety and SSC, followed by socialization to health care personnels, training about SSC implementation, empowering and advocating surgery room nurses and use of reminders.

  20. EUROSAFE Forum for nuclear safety. Towards Convergence of Technical Nuclear Safety Practices in Europe. Safety Improvements - Reasons, Strategies, Implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erven, Ulrich (ed.) [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 50667 Koeln (Germany); Cherie, Jean-Bernard (ed.) [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, IRSN, BP 17, 92262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex (France); Boeck, Benoit De (ed.) [Association Vincotte Nuclear, AVN, Rue Walcourt 148, 1070 Bruxelles (Belgium)

    2005-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum for Nuclear Safety is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE Web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety. The goal is to share experiences, to exchange technical and scientific opinions, and to conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum on 2005 focused on Safety Improvements, Reasons - Strategies - Implementation, from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry. Latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe are presented. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for the countries of Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining

  1. EUROSAFE Forum for nuclear safety. Towards Convergence of Technical Nuclear Safety Practices in Europe. Safety Improvements - Reasons, Strategies, Implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erven, Ulrich [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 50667 Koeln (Germany); Cherie, Jean-Bernard [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, IRSN, BP 17, 92262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex (France); Boeck, Benoit De [Association Vincotte Nuclear, AVN, Rue Walcourt 148, 1070 Bruxelles (Belgium)

    2005-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum for Nuclear Safety is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE Web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety. The goal is to share experiences, to exchange technical and scientific opinions, and to conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum on 2005 focused on Safety Improvements, Reasons - Strategies - Implementation, from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry. Latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe are presented. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for the countries of Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining

  2. General safety basis development guidance for environmental restoration decontamination and decommissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellingson, D.R.; Kerr, N.; Bohlander, K.; Hansen, J.; Crowley, W.

    1994-02-01

    Safety analyses have the objective of contributing to two essential ingredients of a successful operation. The first is promoting the safety of the operation through worker involvement in information development (safety basis). The second is obtaining approval to conduct the operation (authorization). Typically these ingredients are assembled under separate programs covered by separate DOE requirements. DOE authorization relies on successful development of a document containing up to 21 topics written in terms and language suited to reviewers and approvers. Safety relies on successful training and procedures that convert the technical documented information into terms and language understandable to the worker. This separation can lead to successful incorporation of one ingredient independent of the other. At best, this separation may result in a safe but unauthorized operation; at worst, the separation may result in an unsafe operation authorized to proceed. This guide is based on experiences gained by contractors who have integrated rather than separated the safety and authorization. The short duration of ER/D ampersand D activities, the uncertainties of hazards, and the publicly expressed desire for demonstrable progress in cleanup activities add emphasis to the need to integrate rather than separate and develop new programs. Experience-based information has been useful to workers, safety analysis practitioners, and reviewers in the following ways: (1) Acquiring or developing the needed information in a useful form; (2) Managing the uncertainties during activity development and operation; (3) Identifying the subset of applicable requirements for an activity; (4) Developing the appropriate level of documentation detail for a specific activity; and (5) Increasing the usefulness and use of safety analysis (ownership)

  3. Implementing process safety management in gas processing operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodman, D.L.

    1992-01-01

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard entitled Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents was finalized February 24, 1992. The purpose of the standard is to prevent or minimize consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals. OSHA believes that its rule will accomplish this goal by requiring a comprehensive management program that integrates technologies, procedures, and management practices. Gas Processors Association (GPA) member companies are significantly impacted by this major standard, the requirements of which are extensive and complex. The purpose of this paper is to review the requirements of the standard and to discuss the elements to consider in developing and implementing a viable long term Process Safety Management Program

  4. Improved safety at CERN

    CERN Multimedia

    2006-01-01

    As announced in Weekly Bulletin No. 43/2006, a new approach to the implementation of Safety at CERN has been decided, which required taking some managerial decisions. The guidelines of the new approach are described in the document 'New approach to Safety implementation at CERN', which also summarizes the main managerial decisions I have taken to strengthen compliance with the CERN Safety policy and Rules. To this end I have also reviewed the mandates of the Safety Commission and the Safety Policy Committee (SAPOCO). Some details of the document 'Safety Policy at CERN' (also known as SAPOCO42) have been modified accordingly; its essential principles, unchanged, remain the basis for the safety policy of the Organisation. I would also like to inform you that I have appointed Dr M. Bona as the new Head of the Safety Commission until 31.12.2008, and that I will proceed soon to the appointment of the members of the new Safety Policy Committee. All members of the personnel are deemed to have taken note of the d...

  5. Flammable gas tank safety program: Technical basis for gas analysis and monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estey, S.D.

    1998-01-01

    Several Hanford waste tanks have been observed to exhibit periodic releases of significant quantities of flammable gases. Because potential safety issues have been identified with this type of waste behavior, applicable tanks were equipped with instrumentation offering the capability to continuously monitor gases released from them. This document was written to cover three primary areas: (1) describe the current technical basis for requiring flammable gas monitoring, (2) update the technical basis to include knowledge gained from monitoring the tanks over the last three years, (3) provide the criteria for removal of Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System(s) (SHMS) from a waste tank or termination of other flammable gas monitoring activities in the Hanford Tank farms

  6. Implementation of safety parameter display system on Russian NPPs with WWER reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dounaev, V.G.; Neboyan, V.T.

    1996-01-01

    This report gives a short overview of the status of safety parameter display systems (SPDS) implementation on Russian NPPs with WWER reactors and also discusses the SPDS, which is being developed for Kalinin NPP. The assessment of the safety status of the plant is done by the continuous monitoring of six critical safety functions and the corresponding status trees. Besides, a number of additional functions are realized within the scope of KlnNPP, aimed at providing the operator and the safety engineer in the main control room with more detailed information in accidental situation as well as during the normal operation. In particular, these functions are: archiving, data logs and alarm handling, safety actions monitoring, mnemonic diagrams indicating the state of main technological equipment and basic plant parameters, reference data, etc. Also, the operator support function ''computerized procedures'' is included in the scope of SPDS. The basic SPDS implementation platform is ADACS of SEMA GROUP design. The system architecture includes two workstations in the main control room: one is for reactor operator and the other one for safety engineer. Every station has two CRT screens which ensures computerized procedures implementation and provides for extra services for the operator. Also, the information from the SPDS is transmitted to the local crisis centre and to the crisis centre of the State utility organization concern ''Rosenergoatom''. (author). 3 refs

  7. Optimization of the nuclear power engineering safety on the basis of social and economic parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kozlov, V.F.; Kuz'min, I.I.; Lystsov, V.N.; Amosova, T.V.; Makhutov, N.A.; Men'shikov, V.F.

    1995-01-01

    Principle of optimization of nuclear power engineering safety is presented on the basis of estimating the risks to the man's health with an account of peculiarities of socio-economic system and other types of economic activities in the region. Average expected duration of forthcoming life and costs of its prolongation serve as a unit for measuring the man's safety. It is shown that if the expenditures on NPP technical safety exceed the scientifically substantiated costs for this region with application of the above principle, than the risk for population will exceed the minimum achievable level. 8 refs., 2 figs., 1 tab

  8. What stage are low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) at with patient safety curriculum implementation and what are the barriers to implementation? A two-stage cross-sectional study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ginsburg, Liane R; Dhingra-Kumar, Neelam; Donaldson, Liam J

    2017-01-01

    Objectives The improvement of safety in healthcare worldwide depends in part on the knowledge, skills and attitudes of staff providing care. Greater patient safety content in health professional education and training programmes has been advocated internationally. While WHO Patient Safety Curriculum Guides (for Medical Schools and Multi-Professional Curricula) have been widely disseminated in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) over the last several years, little is known about patient safety curriculum implementation beyond high-income countries. The present study examines patient safety curriculum implementation in LMICs. Methods Two cross-sectional surveys were carried out. First, 88 technical officers in Ministries of Health and WHO country offices were surveyed to identify the pattern of patient safety curricula at country level. A second survey followed that gathered information from 71 people in a position to provide institution-level perspectives on patient safety curriculum implementation. Results The majority, 69% (30/44), of the countries were either considering whether to implement a patient safety curriculum or actively planning, rather than actually implementing, or embedding one. Most organisations recognised the need for patient safety education and training and felt a safety curriculum was compatible with the values of their organisation; however, important faculty-level barriers to patient safety curriculum implementation were identified. Key structural markers, such as dedicated financial resources and relevant assessment tools to evaluate trainees’ patient safety knowledge and skills, were in place in fewer than half of organisations studied. Conclusions Greater attention to patient safety curriculum implementation is needed. The barriers to patient safety curriculum implementation we identified in LMICs are not unique to these regions. We propose a framework to act as a global standard for patient safety curriculum implementation

  9. To the problem of the statistical basis of evaluation of the mechanical safety factor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsyganov, S.V.

    2009-01-01

    The methodology applied for the safety factor assessment of the WWER fuel cycles uses methods and terms of statistics. Value of the factor is calculated on the basis of estimation of probability to meet predefined limits. Such approach demands the special attention to the statistical properties of parameters of interest. Considering the mechanical constituents of the engineering factor it is assumed uncertainty factors of safety parameters are stochastic values. It characterized by probabilistic distributions that can be unknown. Traditionally in the safety factor assessment process the unknown parameters are estimated from the conservative points of view. This paper analyses how the refinement of the factors distribution parameters is important for the assessment of the mechanical safety factor. For the analysis the statistical approach is applied for modelling of different type of factor probabilistic distributions. It is shown the significant influence of the shape and parameters of distributions for some factors on the value of mechanical safety factor. (Authors)

  10. To the problem of the statistical basis of evaluation of the mechanical safety factor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsyganov, S.

    2009-01-01

    The methodology applied for the safety factor assessment of the VVER fuel cycles uses methods and terms of statistics. Value of the factor is calculated on the basis of estimation of probability to meet predefined limits. Such approach demands the special attention to the statistical properties of parameters of interest. Considering the mechanical constituents of the engineering factor it is assumed uncertainty factors of safety parameters are stochastic values. It characterized by probabilistic distributions that can be unknown. Traditionally in the safety factor assessment process the unknown parameters are estimated from the conservative points of view. This paper analyses how the refinement of the factors distribution parameters is important for the assessment of the mechanical safety factor. For the analysis the statistical approach is applied for modelling of different type of factor probabilistic distributions. It is shown the significant influence of the shape and parameters of distributions for some factors on the value of mechanical safety factor. (author)

  11. Implementation of the new regulation on radiological safety in Peru

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Medina Gironzini, E.

    1997-01-01

    Since its creation in 1975, the Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy (IPEN) has enacted three regulations of national importance on the norms of protection against ionizing radiation. The first regulation, which is called regulation of radiological protection (1980) approved by a resolution of IPEN, is the result of the work of a committee constituted by IPEN and the Ministry of Health. Its implementation caused some problems as result of which, in 1989, a new regulation on radiological protection was enacted through a supreme decree. Taking into account the new recommendation of the International Commission on Radiological Protection and the International Basic Safety Standard for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, approved in May 1997, the regulation of radiological safety also considers evolving aspects in the Project ARCAL XVII/IAEA. This regulation includes various topics such as exclusions, requirements of protection (medical exposure, occupational exposure, public exposure, chronic exposure), requirements of source safety, interventions and emergencies, control of sources and practices (exemptions, authorizations, inspections) etc. The implementation of this regulation at the national level falls to IPEN, the unique authority commissioned to control nuclear installations, radioactivity and x ray facilities in medicine, industry and research

  12. Exploring the Effects of Cultural Variables in the Implementation of Behavior-Based Safety in Two Organizations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bumstead, Alaina; Boyce, Thomas E.

    2005-01-01

    The present case study examines how culture can influence behavior-based safety in different organizational settings and how behavior-based safety can impact different organizational cultures. Behavior-based safety processes implemented in two culturally diverse work settings are described. Specifically, despite identical implementation plans,…

  13. Guidance on the Implementation of Modifications to Mitigate Beyond Design Basis Accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dermarkar, F.; Marczak, J.; O’Neill, M., E-mail: fred.dermarkar@opg.com [Ontario Power Generation, Pickering, Ontario (Canada)

    2014-10-15

    Following the events at Fukushima, Canadian Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) procured equipment and initiated modifications to improve response capability for Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA). These changes were not typical of other design modifications to the nuclear power plants and reinforced the need for additional guidance for modifications to address BDBA. This paper describes the guidance that was developed to guide the design, procurement, installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment and modifications to mitigate BDBAs. The guidance developed prescribes a graded approach based on a categorization of the nature of the modification. Four categories of modifications are introduced, with the distinction being the degree of interface with existing design basis systems, structures and components (SSCs). This has resulted in a cost-effective means of implementing additional capability to mitigate BDBA conditions, and yet ensure the design basis capability of SSCs is maintained. (author)

  14. What stage are low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) at with patient safety curriculum implementation and what are the barriers to implementation? A two-stage cross-sectional study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ginsburg, Liane R; Dhingra-Kumar, Neelam; Donaldson, Liam J

    2017-06-15

    The improvement of safety in healthcare worldwide depends in part on the knowledge, skills and attitudes of staff providing care. Greater patient safety content in health professional education and training programmes has been advocated internationally. While WHO Patient Safety Curriculum Guides (for Medical Schools and Multi-Professional Curricula) have been widely disseminated in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) over the last several years, little is known about patient safety curriculum implementation beyond high-income countries. The present study examines patient safety curriculum implementation in LMICs. Two cross-sectional surveys were carried out. First, 88 technical officers in Ministries of Health and WHO country offices were surveyed to identify the pattern of patient safety curricula at country level. A second survey followed that gathered information from 71 people in a position to provide institution-level perspectives on patient safety curriculum implementation. The majority, 69% (30/44), of the countries were either considering whether to implement a patient safety curriculum or actively planning, rather than actually implementing, or embedding one. Most organisations recognised the need for patient safety education and training and felt a safety curriculum was compatible with the values of their organisation; however, important faculty-level barriers to patient safety curriculum implementation were identified. Key structural markers, such as dedicated financial resources and relevant assessment tools to evaluate trainees' patient safety knowledge and skills, were in place in fewer than half of organisations studied. Greater attention to patient safety curriculum implementation is needed. The barriers to patient safety curriculum implementation we identified in LMICs are not unique to these regions. We propose a framework to act as a global standard for patient safety curriculum implementation. Educating leaders through the system in

  15. ITER safety task NID-5a: ITER tritium environmental source terms - safety analysis basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Natalizio, A.; Kalyanam, K.M.

    1994-09-01

    The Canadian Fusion Fuels Technology Project's (CFFTP) is part of the contribution to ITER task NID-5a, Initial Tritium Source Term. This safety analysis basis constitutes the first part of the work for establishing tritium source terms and is intended to solicit comments and obtain agreement. The analysis objective is to provide an early estimate of tritium environmental source terms for the events to be analyzed. Events that would result in the loss of tritium are: a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), a vacuum vessel boundary breach. a torus exhaust line failure, a fuelling machine process boundary failure, a fuel processing system process boundary failure, a water detritiation system process boundary failure and an isotope separation system process boundary failure. 9 figs

  16. Treaty implementation applied to conventions on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montjoie, Michel

    2015-01-01

    Given that safety is the number one priority for the nuclear industry, it would seem normal that procedures exist to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the conventions on nuclear safety, as already exist for numerous international treaties. Unfortunately, these procedures are either weak or even nonexistent. Therefore, consideration must be given to whether this weakness represents a genuine deficiency in ensuring the main objective of these conventions, which is to achieve a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. But, before one can even address that issue, a prior question must be answered: does the specific nature of the international legal framework on nuclear safety automatically result in a lack of non-compliance procedures in international conventions on the subject? If so, the lack of procedures is justified, despite the drawbacks. The specific nature of the international law on nuclear safety, which in 1994 shaped the content of the CNS by notably not 'allowing' (even today) the incorporation of precise international rules have been taken into account. The next step is to examine whether the absence of non-compliance procedures (which could have been integrated into the text) is a hindrance in ensuring the objectives of the conventions on nuclear safety, and to examine the procedures that could have been used, based on existing provisions in other areas of international law (environmental law, financial law, disarmament law, human rights, etc.). International environmental law will be the main source of this study, as it has certain similarities with the international law on nuclear safety due to the sometimes vague nature of its obligations and irrespective of the fact that one of the purposes of nuclear safety is in particular to protect the environment from radiological hazards. Indeed, the provisions of the law on nuclear safety are mainly technical and designed to guarantee the normal operation of nuclear facilities

  17. Implementation Science: New Approaches to Integrating Quality and Safety Education for Nurses Competencies in Nursing Education.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dolansky, Mary A; Schexnayder, Julie; Patrician, Patricia A; Sales, Anne

    Although quality and safety competencies were developed and disseminated nearly a decade ago by the Quality and Safety Education for Nurses (QSEN) project, the uptake in schools of nursing has been slow. The use of implementation science methods may be useful to accelerate quality and safety competency integration in nursing education. The article includes a definition and description of implementation science methods and practical implementation strategies for nurse educators to consider when integrating the QSEN competencies into nursing curriculum.

  18. Harnessing implementation science to improve care quality and patient safety: a systematic review of targeted literature.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Braithwaite, Jeffrey; Marks, Danielle; Taylor, Natalie

    2014-06-01

    Getting greater levels of evidence into practice is a key problem for health systems, compounded by the volume of research produced. Implementation science aims to improve the adoption and spread of research evidence. A linked problem is how to enhance quality of care and patient safety based on evidence when care settings are complex adaptive systems. Our research question was: according to the implementation science literature, which common implementation factors are associated with improving the quality and safety of care for patients? We conducted a targeted search of key journals to examine implementation science in the quality and safety domain applying PRISMA procedures. Fifty-seven out of 466 references retrieved were considered relevant following the application of exclusion criteria. Included articles were subjected to content analysis. Three reviewers extracted and documented key characteristics of the papers. Grounded theory was used to distil key features of the literature to derive emergent success factors. Eight success factors of implementation emerged: preparing for change, capacity for implementation-people, capacity for implementation-setting, types of implementation, resources, leverage, desirable implementation enabling features, and sustainability. Obstacles in implementation are the mirror image of these: for example, when people fail to prepare, have insufficient capacity for implementation or when the setting is resistant to change, then care quality is at risk, and patient safety can be compromised. This review of key studies in the quality and safety literature discusses the current state-of-play of implementation science applied to these domains. © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved.

  19. Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    In execution of the new Atomic Energy Act the Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection was put into force on 1 February 1985. It takes into account all forms of peaceful nuclear energy and ionizing radiation uses in nuclear installations, irradiation facilities and devices in research, industries, and health services, and in radioactive isotope production and laboratories. It covers all aspects of safety and protection and defines atomic safety as nuclear safety and nuclear safeguards and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, whereas radiation protection includes the total of requirements, measures, means and methods necessary to protect man and the environment from the detrimental effects of ionizing radiation. It has been based on ICRP Recommendation No. 26 and the IAEA's Basic Safety Standards and supersedes the Radiation Protection Ordinance of 1969

  20. Implementation of health and safety management system to reduce hazardous potential in PT.XYZ Indonesia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Widodo, L.; Adianto; Sartika, D. I.

    2017-12-01

    PT. XYZ is a large automotive manufacturing company that manufacture, assemble as well as a car exporter. The other products are spare parts, jig and dies. PT. XYZ has long been implementing the Occupational Safety and Health Management System (OSHMS) to reduce the potential hazards that cause work accidents. However, this does not mean that OSHMS that has been implemented does not need to be upgraded and improved. This is due to the potential danger caused by work is quite high. This research was conducted in Sunter 2 Plant where its production activities have a high level of potential hazard. Based on Hazard Identification risk assessment, Risk Assessment, and Risk Control (HIRARC) found 10 potential hazards in Plant Stamping Production, consisting of 4 very high risk potential hazards (E), 5 high risk potential hazards (H), and 1 moderate risk potential hazard (M). While in Plant Casting Production found 22 potential hazards findings consist of 7 very high risk potential hazards (E), 12 high risk potential hazards (H), and 3 medium risk potential hazards (M). Based on the result of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), the main priority is the high risk potential hazards (H) and very high risk potential hazards (E). The proposed improvement are to make the visual display of the importance of always using the correct Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), establishing good working procedures, conducting OSH training for workers on a regular basis, and continuing to conduct safety campaigns.

  1. Food Safety Programs Based on HACCP Principles in School Nutrition Programs: Implementation Status and Factors Related to Implementation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stinson, Wendy Bounds; Carr, Deborah; Nettles, Mary Frances; Johnson, James T.

    2011-01-01

    Purpose/Objectives: The objectives of this study were to assess the extent to which school nutrition (SN) programs have implemented food safety programs based on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles, as well as factors, barriers, and practices related to implementation of these programs. Methods: An online survey was…

  2. Guidance on the implementation of modifications to mitigate beyond design basis accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harris, S.; Marczak, J.; O' Neill, M. [Ontario Power Generation, Pickering, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    Following the events at Fukushima, Canadian Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) procured equipment and initiated modifications to improve response capability for Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA). These changes were not typical of other design modifications to the nuclear power plants and reinforced the need for additional guidance for modifications to address BDBA. This paper describes the guidance that was developed to guide the design, procurement, installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment and modifications to mitigate BDBAs. The guidance developed prescribes a graded approach based on a categorization of the nature of the modification. Four categories of modifications are introduced, with the distinction being the degree of interface with existing design basis systems, structures and components (SSCs). This has resulted in a cost-effective means of implementing additional capability to mitigate BDBA conditions, and yet ensure the design basis capability of SSCs is maintained. Operating experience with use of the guidance is also discussed. (author)

  3. Guidance on the implementation of modifications to mitigate beyond design basis accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, S.; Marczak, J.; O'Neill, M.

    2014-01-01

    Following the events at Fukushima, Canadian Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) procured equipment and initiated modifications to improve response capability for Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA). These changes were not typical of other design modifications to the nuclear power plants and reinforced the need for additional guidance for modifications to address BDBA. This paper describes the guidance that was developed to guide the design, procurement, installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment and modifications to mitigate BDBAs. The guidance developed prescribes a graded approach based on a categorization of the nature of the modification. Four categories of modifications are introduced, with the distinction being the degree of interface with existing design basis systems, structures and components (SSCs). This has resulted in a cost-effective means of implementing additional capability to mitigate BDBA conditions, and yet ensure the design basis capability of SSCs is maintained. Operating experience with use of the guidance is also discussed. (author)

  4. Improvement of Managers’ Safety Knowledge through Scientifically Reasonable Interviews

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Paas Õnnela

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available The safety management system has been analysed in 16 Estonian enterprises using the MISHA method (Method for Industrial Safety and Health Activity Assessment. The factor analysis (principal component analysis and varimax with Kaiser analysis has been implemented for the interpretation of the results on safety performance at the enterprises implementing OHSAS 18001 and the ones that do not implement OHSAS 18001. The division of the safety areas into four parts for a better understanding of the safety level and its improvement possibilities has been proven through the statistical analysis. The connections between the questions aimed to clarify the safety level and performance at the enterprises have been set based on the statistics. New learning package “training through the questionnaires” has been worked out in the current paper for the top and middle-level managers to improve their safety knowledge, where the MISHA questionnaire has been taken as the basis.

  5. A Step Toward High Reliability: Implementation of a Daily Safety Brief in a Children's Hospital.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saysana, Michele; McCaskey, Marjorie; Cox, Elaine; Thompson, Rachel; Tuttle, Lora K; Haut, Paul R

    2017-09-01

    Health care is a high-risk industry. To improve communication about daily events and begin the journey toward a high reliability organization, the Riley Hospital for Children at Indiana University Health implemented a daily safety brief. Various departments in our children's hospital were asked to participate in a daily safety brief, reporting daily events and unexpected outcomes within their scope of responsibility. Participants were surveyed before and after implementation of the safety brief about communication and awareness of events in the hospital. The length of the brief and percentage of departments reporting unexpected outcomes were measured. The analysis of the presurvey and the postsurvey showed a statistically significant improvement in the questions related to the awareness of daily events as well as communication and relationships between departments. The monthly mean length of time for the brief was 15 minutes or less. Unexpected outcomes were reported by 50% of the departments for 8 months. A daily safety brief can be successfully implemented in a children's hospital. Communication between departments and awareness of daily events were improved. Implementation of a daily safety brief is a step toward becoming a high reliability organization.

  6. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: implementing inherent safety perspective. Part 1 - guideword applicability and method description.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-12-15

    Layout planning plays a key role in the inherent safety performance of process plants since this design feature controls the possibility of accidental chain-events and the magnitude of possible consequences. A lack of suitable methods to promote the effective implementation of inherent safety in layout design calls for the development of new techniques and methods. In the present paper, a safety assessment approach suitable for layout design in the critical early phase is proposed. The concept of inherent safety is implemented within this safety assessment; the approach is based on an integrated assessment of inherent safety guideword applicability within the constraints typically present in layout design. Application of these guidewords is evaluated along with unit hazards and control devices to quantitatively map the safety performance of different layout options. Moreover, the economic aspects related to safety and inherent safety are evaluated by the method. Specific sub-indices are developed within the integrated safety assessment system to analyze and quantify the hazard related to domino effects. The proposed approach is quick in application, auditable and shares a common framework applicable in other phases of the design lifecycle (e.g. process design). The present work is divided in two parts: Part 1 (current paper) presents the application of inherent safety guidelines in layout design and the index method for safety assessment; Part 2 (accompanying paper) describes the domino hazard sub-index and demonstrates the proposed approach with a case study, thus evidencing the introduction of inherent safety features in layout design.

  7. Technical basis for environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korsah, K.; Wood, R.T.; Hassan, M.; Tanaka, T.J.

    1998-01-01

    This document presents the results of studies sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide the technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety equipment in nuclear power plants. The studies were conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The studies address the following: (1) adequacy of the present test methods for qualification of digital I and C systems; (2) preferred (i.e., Regulatory Guide-endorsed) standards; (3) recommended stressors to be included in the qualification process during type testing; (4) resolution of need for accelerated aging for equipment to be located in a benign environment; and (5) determination of an appropriate approach for addressing the impact of smoke in digital equipment qualification programs. Significant findings from the studies form the technical basis for a recommended approach to the environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants

  8. Technical basis for environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Korsah, K.; Wood, R.T. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Hassan, M. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Tanaka, T.J. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1998-01-01

    This document presents the results of studies sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide the technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety equipment in nuclear power plants. The studies were conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The studies address the following: (1) adequacy of the present test methods for qualification of digital I and C systems; (2) preferred (i.e., Regulatory Guide-endorsed) standards; (3) recommended stressors to be included in the qualification process during type testing; (4) resolution of need for accelerated aging for equipment to be located in a benign environment; and (5) determination of an appropriate approach for addressing the impact of smoke in digital equipment qualification programs. Significant findings from the studies form the technical basis for a recommended approach to the environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants.

  9. Safety first!

    CERN Multimedia

    2016-01-01

    Among the many duties I assumed at the beginning of the year was the ultimate responsibility for Safety at CERN: the responsibility for the physical safety of the personnel, the responsibility for the safe operation of the facilities, and the responsibility to ensure that CERN acts in accordance with the highest standards of radiation and environmental protection.   The Safety Policy document drawn up in September 2014 is an excellent basis for the implementation of Safety in all areas of CERN’s work. I am happy to commit during my mandate to help meet its objectives, not least by ensuring the Organization makes available the necessary means to achieve its Safety objectives. One of the main objectives of the HSE (Occupational Health and Safety and Environmental Protection) unit in the coming months is to enhance the measures to minimise CERN’s impact on the environment. I believe CERN should become a role model for an environmentally-aware scientific research laboratory. Risk ...

  10. Implementing electronic handover: interventions to improve efficiency, safety and sustainability.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alhamid, Sharifah Munirah; Lee, Desmond Xue-Yuan; Wong, Hei Man; Chuah, Matthew Bingfeng; Wong, Yu Jun; Narasimhalu, Kaavya; Tan, Thuan Tong; Low, Su Ying

    2016-10-01

    Effective handovers are critical for patient care and safety. Electronic handover tools are increasingly used today to provide an effective and standardized platform for information exchange. The implementation of an electronic handover system in tertiary hospitals can be a major challenge. Previous efforts in implementing an electronic handover tool failed due to poor compliance and buy-in from end-users. A new electronic handover tool was developed and incorporated into the existing electronic medical records (EMRs) for medical patients in Singapore General Hospital (SGH). There was poor compliance by on-call doctors in acknowledging electronic handovers, and lack of adherence to safety rules, raising concerns about the safety and efficiency of the electronic handover tool. Urgent measures were needed to ensure its safe and sustained use. A quality improvement group comprising stakeholders, including end-users, developed multi-faceted interventions using rapid PDSA (P-Plan, D-Do, S-Study, A-Act ) cycles to address these issues. Innovative solutions using media and online software provided cost-efficient measures to improve compliance. The percentage of unacknowledged handovers per day was used as the main outcome measure throughout all PDSA cycles. Doctors were also assessed for improvement in their knowledge of safety rules and their perception of the electronic handover tool. An electronic handover tool complementing daily clinical practice can be successfully implemented using solutions devised through close collaboration with end-users supported by the senior leadership. A combined 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' approach with regular process evaluations is crucial for its long-term sustainability. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  11. Integrated Environment and Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MITCHELL, R.L.

    2000-01-10

    The Integrated Environment, Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan serves as the project document to guide the Fluor Hanford, Inc (FHI) and Major Subcontractor (MSC) participants through the steps necessary to complete the integration of environment, safety, and health into management and work practices at all levels.

  12. Integrated Environment and Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MITCHELL, R.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Integrated Environment, Safety and Health Management System (ISMS) Implementation Project Plan serves as the project document to guide the Fluor Hanford, Inc (FHI) and Major Subcontractor (MSC) participants through the steps necessary to complete the integration of environment, safety, and health into management and work practices at all levels

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  15. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  16. Food suppliers' perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations in Taiwan

    OpenAIRE

    Ko, Wen-Hwa

    2015-01-01

    The relationships between the perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations by food suppliers in Taiwan were evaluated. A questionnaire survey was used to identify individuals who were full-time employees of the food supply industry with at least 3 months of experience. Dimensions of perceptions of food safety regulations were classified using the constructs of attitude of employees and corporate concern attitude for food safety regulation. The behavior dimension was cla...

  17. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fourth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    conducted at regular intervals. The international alerting system is also in a mature stage. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The supervisory authority conducts inspections and technical discussions with the utilities to ensure that operators assume full responsibility for the safety of their installations. All NPPs have implemented programmes to improve their safety culture. Plant-specific full scope replica simulators are operating at all Swiss NPPs. The Inspectorate's organisation includes staff members dealing with human aspects, NPP organisation, and safety culture. Considerable attention is paid to human factor aspects of operator support systems, including procedures, guidelines and checklists. The review and assessment procedure includes an evaluation of the safety analysis report, safety-relevant systems, design-basis accident analyses, probabilistic safety analysis and reports on ageing surveillance programmes. An Ageing Surveillance Programme is in place for all NPPs in order to maintain safety margins and safety functions of structures, systems and components throughout the plant lifetime. Concerning the radiation protection, the supervisory and control methods currently applied by the inspectorate are in compliance with the Convention's requirement to keep radioactive doses to the public and the environment as low as reasonably achievable and also

  18. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fourth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-07-15

    . Emergency drills are conducted at regular intervals. The international alerting system is also in a mature stage. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The supervisory authority conducts inspections and technical discussions with the utilities to ensure that operators assume full responsibility for the safety of their installations. All NPPs have implemented programmes to improve their safety culture. Plant-specific full scope replica simulators are operating at all Swiss NPPs. The Inspectorate's organisation includes staff members dealing with human aspects, NPP organisation, and safety culture. Considerable attention is paid to human factor aspects of operator support systems, including procedures, guidelines and checklists. The review and assessment procedure includes an evaluation of the safety analysis report, safety-relevant systems, design-basis accident analyses, probabilistic safety analysis and reports on ageing surveillance programmes. An Ageing Surveillance Programme is in place for all NPPs in order to maintain safety margins and safety functions of structures, systems and components throughout the plant lifetime. Concerning the radiation protection, the supervisory and control methods currently applied by the inspectorate are in compliance with the Convention's requirement to keep radioactive doses to the public and the environment as low as

  19. Beyond usability: designing effective technology implementation systems to promote patient safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Karsh, B-T

    2004-10-01

    Evidence is emerging that certain technologies such as computerized provider order entry may reduce the likelihood of patient harm. However, many technologies that should reduce medical errors have been abandoned because of problems with their design, their impact on workflow, and general dissatisfaction with them by end users. Patient safety researchers have therefore looked to human factors engineering for guidance on how to design technologies to be usable (easy to use) and useful (improving job performance, efficiency, and/or quality). While this is a necessary step towards improving the likelihood of end user satisfaction, it is still not sufficient. Human factors engineering research has shown that the manner in which technologies are implemented also needs to be designed carefully if benefits are to be realized. This paper reviews the theoretical knowledge on what leads to successful technology implementation and how this can be translated into specifically designed processes for successful technology change. The literature on diffusion of innovations, technology acceptance, organisational justice, participative decision making, and organisational change is reviewed and strategies for promoting successful implementation are provided. Given the rapid and ever increasing pace of technology implementation in health care, it is critical for the science of technology implementation to be understood and incorporated into efforts to improve patient safety.

  20. Neuromorphic elements and systems as the basis for the physical implementation of artificial intelligence technologies

    Science.gov (United States)

    Demin, V. A.; Emelyanov, A. V.; Lapkin, D. A.; Erokhin, V. V.; Kashkarov, P. K.; Kovalchuk, M. V.

    2016-11-01

    The instrumental realization of neuromorphic systems may form the basis of a radically new social and economic setup, redistributing roles between humans and complex technical aggregates. The basic elements of any neuromorphic system are neurons and synapses. New memristive elements based on both organic (polymer) and inorganic materials have been formed, and the possibilities of instrumental implementation of very simple neuromorphic systems with different architectures on the basis of these elements have been demonstrated.

  1. Safety design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kunitomi, Kazuhiko; Shiozawa, Shusaku

    2004-01-01

    JAERI established the safety design philosophy of the HTTR based on that of current reactors such as LWR in Japan, considering inherent safety features of the HTTR. The strategy of defense in depth was implemented so that the safety engineering functions such as control of reactivity, removal of residual heat and confinement of fission products shall be well performed to ensure safety. However, unlike the LWR, the inherent design features of the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) enables the HTTR meet stringent regulatory criteria without much dependence on active safety systems. On the other hand, the safety in an accident typical to the HTGR such as the depressurization accident initiated by a primary pipe rupture shall be ensured. The safety design philosophy of the HTTR considers these unique features appropriately and is expected to be the basis for future Japanese HTGRs. This paper describes the safety design philosophy and safety evaluation procedure of the HTTR especially focusing on unique considerations to the HTTR. Also, experiences obtained from an HTTR safety review and R and D needs for establishing the safety philosophy for the future HTGRs are reported

  2. Parallel Fixed Point Implementation of a Radial Basis Function Network in an FPGA

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alisson C. D. de Souza

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available This paper proposes a parallel fixed point radial basis function (RBF artificial neural network (ANN, implemented in a field programmable gate array (FPGA trained online with a least mean square (LMS algorithm. The processing time and occupied area were analyzed for various fixed point formats. The problems of precision of the ANN response for nonlinear classification using the XOR gate and interpolation using the sine function were also analyzed in a hardware implementation. The entire project was developed using the System Generator platform (Xilinx, with a Virtex-6 xc6vcx240t-1ff1156 as the target FPGA.

  3. Pickering seismic safety margin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ghobarah, A.; Heidebrecht, A.C.; Tso, W.K.

    1992-06-01

    A study was conducted to recommend a methodology for the seismic safety margin review of existing Canadian CANDU nuclear generating stations such as Pickering A. The purpose of the seismic safety margin review is to determine whether the nuclear plant has sufficient seismic safety margin over its design basis to assure plant safety. In this review process, it is possible to identify the weak links which might limit the seismic performance of critical structures, systems and components. The proposed methodology is a modification the EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) approach. The methodology includes: the characterization of the site margin earthquake, the definition of the performance criteria for the elements of a success path, and the determination of the seismic withstand capacity. It is proposed that the margin earthquake be established on the basis of using historical records and the regional seismo-tectonic and site specific evaluations. The ability of the components and systems to withstand the margin earthquake is determined by database comparisons, inspection, analysis or testing. An implementation plan for the application of the methodology to the Pickering A NGS is prepared

  4. Approaching the basis set limit for DFT calculations using an environment-adapted minimal basis with perturbation theory: Formulation, proof of concept, and a pilot implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mao, Yuezhi; Horn, Paul R.; Mardirossian, Narbe; Head-Gordon, Teresa; Skylaris, Chris-Kriton; Head-Gordon, Martin

    2016-01-01

    Recently developed density functionals have good accuracy for both thermochemistry (TC) and non-covalent interactions (NC) if very large atomic orbital basis sets are used. To approach the basis set limit with potentially lower computational cost, a new self-consistent field (SCF) scheme is presented that employs minimal adaptive basis (MAB) functions. The MAB functions are optimized on each atomic site by minimizing a surrogate function. High accuracy is obtained by applying a perturbative correction (PC) to the MAB calculation, similar to dual basis approaches. Compared to exact SCF results, using this MAB-SCF (PC) approach with the same large target basis set produces <0.15 kcal/mol root-mean-square deviations for most of the tested TC datasets, and <0.1 kcal/mol for most of the NC datasets. The performance of density functionals near the basis set limit can be even better reproduced. With further improvement to its implementation, MAB-SCF (PC) is a promising lower-cost substitute for conventional large-basis calculations as a method to approach the basis set limit of modern density functionals.

  5. Preparation, review, and approval of implementation plans for nuclear safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    This standard describes an acceptable method to prepare, review, and approve implementation plans for DOE Nuclear Safety requirements. DOE requirements are identified in DOE Rules, Orders, Notices, Immediate Action Directives, and Manuals

  6. Extreme load alleviation using industrial implementation of active trailing edge flaps in a full design load basis

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Barlas, Athanasios; Pettas, Vasilis; Gertz, Drew Patrick

    2016-01-01

    The application of active trailing edge flaps in an industrial oriented implementation is evaluated in terms of capability of alleviating design extreme loads. A flap system with basic control functionality is implemented and tested in a realistic full Design Load Basis (DLB) for the DTU 10MW...

  7. Management implementation plan for a safety analysis and review system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hulburt, D.A.; Berkey, B.D.

    1981-04-01

    The US Department of Energy has issued an Order, DOE 5481.1, which establishes uniform requirements for the preparation and review of Safety Analysis for DOE Operations. The Management Implementation Plan specified herein establishes the administrative procedures and technical requirements for implementing DOE 5481.1 to Operations under the cognizance of the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center. This Implementation Plan is applicable to all present and future Operations under the cognizance of PETC. The Plan identifies those Operations for which DOE 5481.1 is applicable and those Operations for which no further analysis is required because the initial determination and review has concluded that DOE 5481.1 does not apply

  8. Implementation of Safety and Security Issues in the Transport of Radioactive Material in Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    López Vietri, J.; Elechosa, C.; Gerez Miranda, C.; Menossi, S.; Rodríguez Roldán, M.S.; Fernández, A.

    2016-01-01

    This paper is intended to describe implementation of safety and security issues in the transport of radioactive material by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (in Spanish Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, ARN), which is the Competent Authority of Argentina in Safety, Security and Safeguards of radioactive and nuclear material. There are depicted main regulatory activities dealing with the mentioned issues, and relevant milestones of national regulatory standards and guidance applied, that are based on requirements and guides from IAEA. Interfaces between Safety and Security sections are most of the times complementary but sometimes conflictive, therefore the resolution of such conflicts and goals achieved during their implementation are also commented; as well as future joint planned activities between both sections of ARN as a way to provide safety and security without compromising one or the other. (author)

  9. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fifth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-07-15

    in 2005. Switzerland has signed bilateral agreements on the exchange of information on nuclear safety and radiation protection issues with ENSI counterparts in Germany, France, Italy and Austria. ENSI conducts inspections and technical discussions with the utilities to ensure that operators assume full responsibility for the safety of their installations. All NPPs have implemented programmes to improve their safety culture. ENSI has a team of specialists in human factors, including organisation, training, qualification, human-system interface, safety culture and the investigation of human and organisational factors related to NPP events. The review and assessment procedure includes an evaluation of the safety analysis report, safety-relevant systems, design-basis accident analyses, probabilistic safety analysis and reports on ageing surveillance programmes. An annual systematic assessment of nuclear safety is conducted for each NPP based on event analyses, inspection results, operator licensing reviews, safety-indicator data and information in the periodic licensee reports. An Ageing Surveillance Programme is in place for all NPPs. The low annual individual and collective doses prove the effectiveness of measures taken in response to the most recent recommendations of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP). There is an automatic dose rate monitoring and emergency response data system in and around all NPPs in Switzerland. The system provides ENSI with online access to measurement data for approximately 25 important plant parameters. Exercises are conducted regularly to test emergency preparedness and plans. The effectiveness of ENSI's re-evaluation process has been demonstrated by the probabilistic re-assessment of seismic hazards at Swiss NPP sites. All Swiss NPPs have a special independent, bunkered system for shutdown and residual heat removal. The various levels of defence that exist ensure that safety limits and individual dose limits

  10. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fifth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-07-01

    . Switzerland has signed bilateral agreements on the exchange of information on nuclear safety and radiation protection issues with ENSI counterparts in Germany, France, Italy and Austria. ENSI conducts inspections and technical discussions with the utilities to ensure that operators assume full responsibility for the safety of their installations. All NPPs have implemented programmes to improve their safety culture. ENSI has a team of specialists in human factors, including organisation, training, qualification, human-system interface, safety culture and the investigation of human and organisational factors related to NPP events. The review and assessment procedure includes an evaluation of the safety analysis report, safety-relevant systems, design-basis accident analyses, probabilistic safety analysis and reports on ageing surveillance programmes. An annual systematic assessment of nuclear safety is conducted for each NPP based on event analyses, inspection results, operator licensing reviews, safety-indicator data and information in the periodic licensee reports. An Ageing Surveillance Programme is in place for all NPPs. The low annual individual and collective doses prove the effectiveness of measures taken in response to the most recent recommendations of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP). There is an automatic dose rate monitoring and emergency response data system in and around all NPPs in Switzerland. The system provides ENSI with online access to measurement data for approximately 25 important plant parameters. Exercises are conducted regularly to test emergency preparedness and plans. The effectiveness of ENSI's re-evaluation process has been demonstrated by the probabilistic re-assessment of seismic hazards at Swiss NPP sites. All Swiss NPPs have a special independent, bunkered system for shutdown and residual heat removal. The various levels of defence that exist ensure that safety limits and individual dose limits for the public are met

  11. Food suppliers' perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations in Taiwan

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wen-Hwa Ko

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available The relationships between the perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations by food suppliers in Taiwan were evaluated. A questionnaire survey was used to identify individuals who were full-time employees of the food supply industry with at least 3 months of experience. Dimensions of perceptions of food safety regulations were classified using the constructs of attitude of employees and corporate concern attitude for food safety regulation. The behavior dimension was classified into employee behavior and corporate practice. Food suppliers with training in food safety were significantly better than those without training with respect to the constructs of perception dimension of employee attitude, and the constructs of employee behavior and corporate practice associated with the behavior dimension. Older employees were superior in perception and practice. Employee attitude, employee behavior, and corporate practice were significantly correlated with each other. Satisfaction with governmental management was not significantly related to corporate practice. The corporate implementation of food safety regulations by suppliers was affected by employees' attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, employees' attitudes and behaviors explain 35.3% of corporate practice. Employee behavior mediates employees' attitudes and corporate practices. The results of this study may serve as a reference for governmental supervision and provide training guidelines for workers in the food supply industry.

  12. Concept for creating program-technical complex of safety monitoring with system of safety parameters presentation functions on the basis of routine WWER-1000 systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunaev, V.G.; Tarasov, M. V.; Povarov, P.V.

    2005-01-01

    Prerequisites of creating the software-hardware complex for reactor safety monitoring on the Volgodonsk NPP are analyzed and generalized. The concept of this complex is based on functions of the safety parameters presentation system. It will serve as an interface between operator and technological process and give to operator a possibility to estimate quickly the state of the safety of the nuclear power unit. The complex will be created on the basis of routine reactor monitoring and control systems intended for the WWER-1000 reactor. In addition to existing soft- and hard-wares for reactor monitoring and for analysis of technological archive, it is proposed to create and connect in parallel the new software-hardware complex which ensures calculation and presentation of generalized factors of reactor safety [ru

  13. Electronic health records and patient safety: co-occurrence of early EHR implementation with patient safety practices in primary care settings.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tanner, C; Gans, D; White, J; Nath, R; Pohl, J

    2015-01-01

    The role of electronic health records (EHR) in enhancing patient safety, while substantiated in many studies, is still debated. This paper examines early EHR adopters in primary care to understand the extent to which EHR implementation is associated with the workflows, policies and practices that promote patient safety, as compared to practices with paper records. Early adoption is defined as those who were using EHR prior to implementation of the Meaningful Use program. We utilized the Physician Practice Patient Safety Assessment (PPPSA) to compare primary care practices with fully implemented EHR to those utilizing paper records. The PPPSA measures the extent of adoption of patient safety practices in the domains: medication management, handoffs and transition, personnel qualifications and competencies, practice management and culture, and patient communication. Data from 209 primary care practices responding between 2006-2010 were included in the analysis: 117 practices used paper medical records and 92 used an EHR. Results showed that, within all domains, EHR settings showed significantly higher rates of having workflows, policies and practices that promote patient safety than paper record settings. While these results were expected in the area of medication management, EHR use was also associated with adoption of patient safety practices in areas in which the researchers had no a priori expectations of association. Sociotechnical models of EHR use point to complex interactions between technology and other aspects of the environment related to human resources, workflow, policy, culture, among others. This study identifies that among primary care practices in the national PPPSA database, having an EHR was strongly empirically associated with the workflow, policy, communication and cultural practices recommended for safe patient care in ambulatory settings.

  14. Basis for the implementation of digital signature in Argentine's health environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Escobar, P P; Formica, M

    2007-01-01

    The growth of telemedical applications and electronic transactions in health environments is paced by the constant technology evolution. This implies a big cultural change in traditional medicine and in hospital information systems' users which arrival is delayed, basically, by the lack of solid laws and a well defined role-based infrastructure. The use of digital signature as a mean of identification, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation is the most suitable tool for assuring the electronic transactions and patient's data protection. The implementation of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in health environment allows for authentication, encryption and use of digital signature for assuring confidentiality and control of the movement of sensitive information. This work defines the minimum technological, legal and procedural basis for a successful PKI implementation and establishes the roles for the different actors in the chain of confidence in the public health environment of Argentine

  15. Verification of implementation of the radiological safety standards through the regulatory inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perez Gonzalez, Francisco; Fornet Rodriguez, Ofelia M.

    2008-01-01

    Full text: As an element of the updating process of the legal framework on radiological safety in Cuba, a new rule was put into force; the Radiological Basic Safety Standards (RBSS) in January 2002. Five years after the application of these new safety requirements, it was considered appropriate to assess the effectiveness of its implementation. Therefore, in this work the authors analysed the outcomes of the regulatory inspections conducted in this period upon medical and industrial practices in a sample of facilities representative of those with the highest radiological risks in the territory under supervision of a Territorial Delegation of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority. For better understanding of this presentation, a summary explanation of the structure of the rule is given in its introduction. The work was to identify for each deficiency, or finding, or counter-measure; out of the relevant inspections; the corresponding requirement/Article of the RBSS that shows difficulties in implementation. For each installation an analysis is made with regard to the relevant articles difficult to implement. Finally, the appraisal is shown separately for the medical practice, and for the industrial practice, and also in general for the whole sample of installations under review. The study showed that the implementation of the Standards has been satisfactory and uniform in the practices under review. So far it seems that there have not been major difficulties with the implementation of the Titles; III On Intervention, IV Dose Limits, as well as with the Especial, Final, and Transitory Dispositions. On the other hand, it is shown there is a need for continued work only with regard to the implementation of the requirements in Section IV Verification of Safety and in Section V On the responsibilities with regard to occupational exposure in Chapter III Title I, and correspondingly in Chapter II Occupational Exposure in Title II. It is recommended to conduct this kind of

  16. Verification of Overall Safety Factors In Deterministic Design Of Model Tested Breakwaters

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Burcharth, H. F.

    2001-01-01

    The paper deals with concepts of safety implementation in design. An overall safety factor concept is evaluated on the basis of a reliability analysis of a model tested rubble mound breakwater with monolithic super structure. Also discussed are design load identification and failure mode limit...

  17. An overview of the UK regulatory expectation for design basis accident analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trimble, Andy

    2013-01-01

    The UK Health and Safety Executive published its most recent regulatory expectations in the 2006 version of it's safety assessment principles (SAPs). This built on experience regulating the full range of facilities for which it is responsible. Thus the principles underpinning all regulatory safety case assessment are the same but the implementation differs depending on the application. This paper will describe the published design basis accident analysis (DBAA) logic in context with other technical aspects of the regulatory expectation for safety cases. It will further illustrate the DBAA methodology with practical examples from actual experience on reprocessing plant gained over the last 15 years or so. Among the examples will be the relevance of conventional safety fault initiators to nuclear safety assessment. It will further demonstrate the derivation of facility limits and conditions necessary for nuclear safety. (authors)

  18. Development and implementation of a hospital-based patient safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frush, Karen S.; Alton, Michael; Frush, Donald P.

    2006-01-01

    Evidence from numerous studies indicates that large numbers of patients are harmed by medical errors while receiving health-care services in the United States today. The 1999 Institute of Medicine report on medical errors recommended that hospitals and health-care agencies ''establish safety programs to act as a catalyst for the development of a culture of safety'' [1]. In this article, we describe one approach to successful implementation of a hospital-based patient safety program. Although our experience at Duke University Health System will be used as an example, the needs, principles, and solutions can apply to a variety of other health-care practices. Key components include the development of safety teams, provision of tools that teams can use to support an environment of safety, and ongoing program modification to meet patient and staff needs and respond to changing priorities. By moving patient safety to the forefront of all that we do as health-care providers, we can continue to improve our delivery of health care to children and adults alike. This improvement is fostered when we enhance the culture of safety, develop a constant awareness of the possibility of human and system errors in the delivery of care, and establish additional safeguards to intercept medical errors in order to prevent harm to patients. (orig.)

  19. Nuclear Safety R&D for the Knowledge-Based Implementation of Defence in Depth

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baek, W-P., E-mail: wpbaek@kaeri.re.kr [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Department of Nuclear Safety Research, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Assuring a high level of safety is a pre-requisite for the development and utilization of nuclear technology. The most fundamental approach for nuclear power plant (NPP) safety is “defence in depth (DiD),” which is a combination of multiple physical barriers and multiple (generally 5) levels of protection, with the aim of accident prevention and mitigation. NPPs around the world have shown excellent safety records for over 14,500 cumulative reactor years, compared with other electricity sources, by properly implementing DiD. However, the occurrence and severe consequences of the Fukushima accident have provoked controversy on the completeness of the DiD concept. There have been active discussions on DiD with respect to the Fukushima accident. A general consensus has been arrived that the concept of DiD is still valid but its implementation was incomplete for the Fukushima NPP. Had DiD been properly implemented during the design, construction and operation, much better provisioning against the extreme earthquake and tsunami would have been available and the accident consequences would not have been so disastrous.

  20. Basis for the safety approach for design and assessment of Generation IV nuclear systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiorini, G.L.; Leahy, T.

    2009-01-01

    The primary objective of the RSWG is the implementation of a harmonized approach on long-term safety, and to address risk and regulatory issues in development of the next generation of nuclear systems. To this end, the group is proposing safety goals and evaluation methodology applicable for the design and assessment of future systems. The paper resumes the content of the first RSWG report which provides insights for the safety approach and assists the GIF Systems Steering Committee as well as the GIF Experts Group and the GIF Policy Group for the definition of the most adequate safety related Gen IV R and D. The document is also an essential contributor to help identifying the needed supportive crosscut R and D effort (i.e. applicable to all the innovative nuclear technologies). Although the report presents a number of thoughts and recommendations, it really represents only the start of the efforts for the RSWG. (author)

  1. The Conceptual Framework for Ensuring Economic Safety of Corporate Integration Processes

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gutsaliuk Oleksii M.

    2016-08-01

    Full Text Available The objective growth of the number of displays and influence of negative factors of threats from the environment actualizes the issue of ensuring economic safety of national economic entities. The article notes that simultaneously with counteracting threats enterprises are working for development, one form of which is the establishment of corporate structures and implementation of integration processes. It is proposed to ensure achieving the desired level of the corporate structure economic safety through optimizing the correlation of resources and competencies, skills and technologies for their use within the integrated logistics value chain. In this case it is the implementation of the integration process that serves as an instrument for achieving this optimal correlation, and the level of economic safety is considered as one of the optimization criteria. The system of authors’ hypotheses is taken as the basis for ensuring economic safety of the corporate integration process. Each of the hypotheses corresponds to a set of conceptual principles aimed at practical implementation of the proposed approaches. Within these conceptual principles the relationship between incentives and benefits of integration and the basis for ensuring their safety is presented, the differences between safety of functioning and safety of development are studied, the use of the methodology of logistics to harmonize the interests of participants of the corporate structure is justified, the relevance of applying the resource approach to manage the integration and development safety is proved. The graphical representation of causal relationships between the proposed conceptual principles allowed formalizing the subject area of studying corporate integration safety

  2. Path to development of quantitative safety goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joksimovic, V.; Houghton, W.J.

    1980-04-01

    There is a growing interest in defining numerical safety goals for nuclear power plants as exemplified by an ACRS recommendation. This paper proposes a lower frequency limit of approximately 10 -4 /reactor-year for design basis events. Below this frequency, down, to a small frequency such as 10 -5 /reactor-year, safety margin can be provided by, say, site emergency plans. Accident sequences below 10 -5 should not impact public safety, but it is prudent that safety research programs examine sequences with significant consequences. Once tentatively agreed upon, quantitative safety goals together with associated implementation tools would be factored into regulatory and design processes

  3. Food suppliers' perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations in Taiwan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ko, Wen-Hwa

    2015-12-01

    The relationships between the perceptions and practical implementation of food safety regulations by food suppliers in Taiwan were evaluated. A questionnaire survey was used to identify individuals who were full-time employees of the food supply industry with at least 3 months of experience. Dimensions of perceptions of food safety regulations were classified using the constructs of attitude of employees and corporate concern attitude for food safety regulation. The behavior dimension was classified into employee behavior and corporate practice. Food suppliers with training in food safety were significantly better than those without training with respect to the constructs of perception dimension of employee attitude, and the constructs of employee behavior and corporate practice associated with the behavior dimension. Older employees were superior in perception and practice. Employee attitude, employee behavior, and corporate practice were significantly correlated with each other. Satisfaction with governmental management was not significantly related to corporate practice. The corporate implementation of food safety regulations by suppliers was affected by employees' attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, employees' attitudes and behaviors explain 35.3% of corporate practice. Employee behavior mediates employees' attitudes and corporate practices. The results of this study may serve as a reference for governmental supervision and provide training guidelines for workers in the food supply industry. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier B.V.

  4. Development of methodology for the analysis of fuel behavior in light water reactor in design basis accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salatov, A. A.; Goncharov, A. A.; Eremenko, A. S.; Kuznetsov, V. I.; Bolnov, V. A.; Gusev, A. S.; Dolgov, A. B.; Ugryumov, A. V.

    2013-01-01

    The report attempts to analyze the current experience of the safety fuel for light-water reactors (LWRs) under design-basis accident conditions in terms of its compliance with international requirements for licensing nuclear power plants. The components of fuel behavior analysis methodology in design basis accidents in LWRs were considered, such as classification of design basis accidents, phenomenology of fuel behavior in design basis accidents, system of fuel safety criteria and their experimental support, applicability of used computer codes and input data for computational analysis of the fuel behavior in accidents, way of accounting for the uncertainty of calculation models and the input data. A brief history of the development of probabilistic safety analysis methodology for nuclear power plants abroad is considered. The examples of a conservative approach to safety analysis of VVER fuel and probabilistic approach to safety analysis of fuel TVS-K are performed. Actual problems in development of the methodology of analyzing the behavior of VVER fuel at the design basis accident conditions consist, according to the authors opinion, in following: 1) Development of a common methodology for analyzing the behavior of VVER fuel in the design basis accidents, implementing a realistic approach to the analysis of uncertainty - in the future it is necessary for the licensing of operating VVER fuel abroad; 2) Experimental and analytical support to the methodology: experimental studies to identify and study the characteristics of the key uncertainties of computational models of fuel and the cladding, development of computational models of key events in codes, validation code on the basis of integral experiments

  5. The Implementation of Transportation and Transit Projects on the Basis of Public-Private Partnership in Russia

    OpenAIRE

    Valery Anatolyevich Tsevtkov; Kobilzhon Khodzhievich Zoidov; Alexey Anatolyevich Medkov

    2016-01-01

    The article considers the main directions of the implementation of the current transportation and transit projects on the basis of the institution of public-private partnership in Russia. This work is a continuation of the study of the theory and practice of the application of public-private partnership in the investment projects aimed at the development and realization of the transportation and transit potential of the country. On the methodological basis of evolutionary and institu...

  6. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety CNS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-05-01

    plants has been confirmed as high, being based on particularly robust plant designs and numerous provisions in the beyond design basis domain. The plants have been retrofitted in an extensive manner in the course of the years, especially the older units which started operation 40 years ago. Additionally, the plants go through a comprehensive check at least every ten years during the so called periodic safety review. Nonetheless improvements are always possible and the process of reassessing and reanalysing in the light of new knowledge does not ever reach a final answer. This holds true also for the regulators' own supervision processes as well as for the emergency preparedness and the nuclear safety regime at national level. The constant questioning attitude and search for improvements are fundamental factors for a good safety culture. In its response to the Fukushima accident ENSI has chosen a stepwise approach. This allows the incorporation of new lessons as soon as they become available from further accident investigations in Japan which will certainly take some more years to be completed. ENSI requested the Swiss operators to address topics such as protection against earthquakes and flooding within increased hazard assumptions, design of spent fuel pools and availability of the ultimate heat sink, but also availability and transport of accident management equipment from offsite locations. This was accompanied by topical inspections and resulted in improvement measures ordered by ENSI. Examples of such measures are: additional level and temperature instrumentation for the spent fuel pools, redundant pool cooling systems, various improvement measures for protection against flooding, the implementation of an alternate ultimate heat sink, and the storage of accident management equipment in an external dedicated storage facility. The response program launched by ENSI aims at covering all areas identified to have played a role in the accident in Japan. While the design

  7. Barriers and limitations during implementation of the surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rosa Amalia Arboleda

    2014-04-01

    Full Text Available Introduction: The surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization (WHO is a tool that checks and evaluates each procedure in the operating room. Despite its demonstrated effectiveness, it has many limitations and barriers to its implementation. The aim of this article was to present the current evidence regarding limitations and barriers to achieve a successful implementation of the surgical safety WHO checklist. Methods: A narrative review was designed. We performed a systematic literature search in PubMed/MEDLINE. Articles that describe or present as primary or secondary endpoints barriers or limitations during the implementation of the checklist WHO were selected. Observational or experimental articles were included from the date of the official launch of the WHO list. To describe the data a summary table was designed. Detailed results were organized qualitatively extracting the most prevalent limitations. Results: 17 studies were included in the final review process. The main findings were: 1 a large number of constraints reported in the literature that hinder the implementation process, 2 limitations were grouped into 9 categories according to their similarities and 3 the most frequently reported category was “knowledge”. Discussion: There are several factors that limit the proper implementation of the surgical safety checklist WHO. Among these, cultural factors, knowledge, indifference and / or relevance, communication, filling completeness, among others. Effective implementation strategies would reach its successful implementation.

  8. Implementation of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, L.; Tonkay, D.

    2004-01-01

    This paper discusses the implementation of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Joint Convention: establishes a commitment with respect to safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste; requires the Parties to ''take appropriate steps'' to ensure the safety of their spent fuel and waste management activities, but does not delineate standards the Parties must meet; and seeks to attain, through its Contracting Parties, a higher level of safety with respect to management of their spent nuclear fuel, disused sealed sources, and radioactive waste

  9. Health risk from radioactive and chemical environmental contamination: common basis for assessment and safety decision making

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Demin, V.

    2004-01-01

    To meet the growing practical need in risk analysis in Russia health risk assessment tools and regulations have been developed in the frame of few federal research programs. RRC Kurchatov Institute is involved in R and D on risk analysis activity in these programs. One of the objectives of this development is to produce a common, unified basis of health risk analysis for different sources of risk. Current specific and different approaches in risk assessment and establishing safety standards developed for chemicals and ionising radiation are analysed. Some recommendations are given to produce the common approach. A specific risk index R has been proposed for safety decision-making (establishing safety standards and other levels of protective actions, comparison of various sources of risk, etc.). The index R is defined as the partial mathematical expectation of lost years of healthy life (LLE) due to exposure during a year to a risk source considered. The more concrete determinations of this index for different risk sources derived from the common definition of R are given. Generic safety standards (GSS) for the public and occupational workers have been suggested in terms of this index. Secondary specific safety standards have been derived from GSS for ionizing radiation and a number of other risk sources including environmental chemical pollutants. Other general and derived levels for decision-making have also been proposed including the e-minimum level. Their possible dependence on the national or regional health-demographic data is shortly considered. Recommendations are given on methods and criteria for comparison of various sources of risk. Some examples of risk comparison are demonstrated in the frame of different comparison tasks. The paper has been prepared on the basis of the research work supported by International Science and Technology Centre, Moscow (project no. 2558). (author)

  10. FLIGHT SAFETY CONTROL OF THE BASIS OF UNCERTAIN RISK EVALUATION WITH NON-ROUTINE FLIGHT CONDITIONS INVOLVED

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with methods of forecasting the level of aviation safety operation of aircraft systems on the basis of methods of evaluation the risks of negative situations as a consequence of a functional loss of initial properties of the system with critical violations of standard modes of the aircraft. Mathematical Models of Risks as a Danger Measure of Discrete Random Events in Aviation Systems are presented. Technological Schemes and Structure of Risk Control Proce- dures without the Probability are illustrated as Methods of Risk Management System in Civil Aviation. The assessment of the level of safety and quality and management of aircraft, made not only from the standpoint of reliability (quality and consumer properties, but also from the position of ICAO on the basis of a risk-based approach. According to ICAO, the security assessment is performed by comparing the calculated risk with an acceptable level. The approach justifies the use of qualitative evaluation techniques safety in the forms of proactive forecasted and predictive risk management adverse impacts to aviation operations of various kinds, including the space sector and nuclear energy. However, for the events such as accidents and disasters, accidents with the aircraft, fighters in a training flight, during the preparation of the pilots on the training aircraft, etc. there is no required statistics. Density of probability distribution (p. d. f. of these events are only hypothetical, unknown with "hard tails" that completely eliminates the application of methods of confidence intervals in the traditional approaches to the assessment of safety in the form of the probability analysis.

  11. [Implementation of a safety and health planning system in a teaching hospital].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mariani, F; Bravi, C; Dolcetti, L; Moretto, A; Palermo, A; Ronchin, M; Tonelli, F; Carrer, P

    2007-01-01

    University Hospital "L. Sacco" had started in 2006 a two-year project in order to set up a "Health and Safety Management System (HSMS)" referring to the technical guideline OHSAS 18001:1999 and the UNI and INAIL "Guidelines for a health and safety management system at workplace". So far, the following operations had been implemented: Setting up of a specific Commission within the Risk Management Committee; Identification and appointment of Departmental Representatives of HSMS; Carrying out of a training course addressed to Workers Representatives for Safety and Departmental Representatives of HSMS; Development of an Integrated Informative System for Prevention and Safety; Auditors qualification; Inspection of the Occupational Health Unit and the Prevention and Safety Service: reporting of critical situations and monitoring solutions adopted. Short term objectives are: Self-evaluation through check-lists of each department; Sharing of the Improvement Plan among the departments of the hospital; Planning of Health and Safety training activities in the framework of the Hospital Training Plan; Safety audit.

  12. Barriers and limitations during implementation of the surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization

    OpenAIRE

    Rosa Amalia Arboleda; Andrés Felipe Ausenón; Jairo Alberto Ayala; Diana Carolina Cabezas; Lina Gissella Calvache; Juan Pablo Caicedo; Jose Andres Calvache

    2014-01-01

    Introduction: The surgical safety checklist of the World Health Organization (WHO) is a tool that checks and evaluates each procedure in the operating room. Despite its demonstrated effectiveness, it has many limitations and barriers to its implementation. The aim of this article was to present the current evidence regarding limitations and barriers to achieve a successful implementation of the surgical safety WHO checklist. Methods: A narrative review was designed. We performed a systematic ...

  13. Developing and implementing safety culture in the uses of radiation sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rojkind, R.H.

    1998-01-01

    This paper presents an approach to develop and implement safety culture in the uses of radiation sources in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and teaching, and makes reference to the experience gained by the industries where that culture has been developed and improved, i.e. the nuclear industry. Suggestions to assist progress toward safety culture are here described for regulators, organisations using those sources, and professional associations. Even though emphasis is given to small organisations or teams of workers, this approach may be also useful to greater organisations like industrial irradiation companies or governmental research laboratories. In each case, parties being the principal focus of the learning process toward a progressive safety culture should be identified. (author)

  14. Extreme load alleviation using industrial implementation of active trailing edge flaps in a full design load basis

    OpenAIRE

    Barlas, Athanasios; Pettas, Vasilis; Gertz, Drew Patrick; Aagaard Madsen , Helge

    2016-01-01

    The application of active trailing edge flaps in an industrial oriented implementation is evaluated in terms of capability of alleviating design extreme loads. A flap system with basic control functionality is implemented and tested in a realistic full Design Load Basis (DLB) for the DTU 10MW Reference Wind Turbine (RWT) model and for an upscaled rotor version in DTU's aeroelastic code HAWC2. The flap system implementation shows considerable potential in reducing extreme loads in components o...

  15. The Agency's Safety Standards and Measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-04-01

    The Agency's Health and Safety Measures were first, approved by the Board of Governors on 31 March 1960 in implementation of Articles III.A.6 and XII of the Statute of the Agency. On the basis of the experience gained from applying those measures to projects carried out by Members under agreements concluded with the Agency, the Agency's Health and Safety Measures were revised in 1975 and approved by the Board of Governors on 25 February 1976. The Agency's Safety Standards and Measures as revised are reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  16. Multi-dimensional database design and implementation of dam safety monitoring system

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zhao Erfeng

    2008-09-01

    Full Text Available To improve the effectiveness of dam safety monitoring database systems, the development process of a multi-dimensional conceptual data model was analyzed and a logic design was achieved in multi-dimensional database mode. The optimal data model was confirmed by identifying data objects, defining relations and reviewing entities. The conversion of relations among entities to external keys and entities and physical attributes to tables and fields was interpreted completely. On this basis, a multi-dimensional database that reflects the management and analysis of a dam safety monitoring system on monitoring data information has been established, for which factual tables and dimensional tables have been designed. Finally, based on service design and user interface design, the dam safety monitoring system has been developed with Delphi as the development tool. This development project shows that the multi-dimensional database can simplify the development process and minimize hidden dangers in the database structure design. It is superior to other dam safety monitoring system development models and can provide a new research direction for system developers.

  17. The current CEA/DRN safety approach for the design and the assessment of future nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiorini, G.L.; Pinto, P.L.; Costa, M.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of the document is to present the basis of the safety approach currently implemented by the CEA/DRN, both for the design and the assessment of innovative systems and future nuclear installations. This approach is the result of the experience maturated, within the context of the CEA/DRN Innovative Programme through practical applications over several future concepts, both for fission and fusion reactors, as well as for waste disposal. The background of this experience is structured coherently with the European Safety Authorities recommendations and the European Utilities Requirements (EUR). The Defence In Depth principle and its application, by means, among others, of the barrier concept, remains the basis of the safety design process of future nuclear installations. Its adequacy is checked through the safety assessment. The methodology for Lines Of Defence (LOD) implementation as well as the one for the LOD architecture assessment is shown and motivated. The document shows that the clear and unambiguous definition of the safety approach provides an essential base for the organisation of the design tasks, being sure that the safety aspects are correctly taken into account and implemented, and for an adequate safety assessment of the final design, both from qualitative point of view as well as for the quantitative safety analysis. (author)

  18. Analysis respons to the implementation of nuclear installations safety culture using AHP-TOPSIS

    Science.gov (United States)

    Situmorang, J.; Kuntoro, I.; Santoso, S.; Subekti, M.; Sunaryo, G. R.

    2018-02-01

    An analysis of responses to the implementation of nuclear installations safety culture has been done using AHP (Analitic Hierarchy Process) - TOPSIS (Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution). Safety culture is considered as collective commitments of the decision-making level, management level, and individual level. Thus each level will provide a subjective perspective as an alternative approach to implementation. Furthermore safety culture is considered by the statement of five characteristics which in more detail form consist of 37 attributes, and therefore can be expressed as multi-attribute state. Those characteristics and or attributes will be a criterion and its value is difficult to determine. Those criteria of course, will determine and strongly influence the implementation of the corresponding safety culture. To determine the pattern and magnitude of the influence is done by using a TOPSIS that is based on decision matrix approach and is composed of alternatives and criteria. The weight of each criterion is determined by AHP technique. The data used are data collected through questionnaires at the workshop on safety and health in 2015. .Reliability test of data gives Cronbah Alpha value of 95.5% which according to the criteria is stated reliable. Validity test using bivariate correlation analysis technique between each attribute give Pearson correlation for all attribute is significant at level 0,01. Using confirmatory factor analysis gives Kaise-Meyer-Olkin of sampling Adequacy (KMO) is 0.719 and it is greater than the acceptance criterion 0.5 as well as the 0.000 significance level much smaller than 0.05 and stated that further analysis could be performed. As a result of the analysis it is found that responses from the level of decision maker (second echelon) dominate the best order preference rank to be the best solution in strengthening the nuclear installation safety culture, except for the first characteristics, safety is a

  19. Report of the working group 'Regulatory requirements on AM - Concept of nuclear and radiation safety during beyond-design-basis accidents'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bobaly, P.

    2001-01-01

    The developed working group report contains the following main paragraphs: legal basis and basis for regulatory requirements for on-site and off-site Accident Management (AM), regulatory requirements or recommendations for on-site AM and for emergency preparedness, background information concerning the implementation and review of an AM program as a basis for an AM guideline. Overview about AM/SAM implementation in member countries of the SAMINE project; measure and candidates for high level actions based upon US SAMG; interactions of severe accident research and the regulatory positions, relationship between different components of an accident management programme are also given

  20. Implementation of patient safety and patient-centeredness strategies in Iranian hospitals

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Aghaei Hashjin, Asgar; Kringos, Dionne S.; Manoochehri, Jila; Ravaghi, Hamid; Klazinga, Niek S.

    2014-01-01

    To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS) and patient-centeredness (PC) strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade) in Iran. A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS

  1. Experiences with the implementation of measures and tools for road safety improvement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mikusova, M.

    2016-07-01

    The paper presents an overview on the road safety measures implemented in the framework of the “SOL – Save our lives” project. It contains summarization of general knowledge regarding the efficiency of the measures applied and conclusions from the analyses of developed strategies and action plans, including common issues, strengths and weaknesses of developed tools and puts these in the context of wider European Road Safety strategies. The purpose of the paper is to provide recommendations for an effective professional development of road safety programs at community level in the context of sustainable mobility. (Author)

  2. Guidelines for implementation of RCM on safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Tae Woon; Brijendra Singh.

    1996-04-01

    Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) methodology was originally developed by the commercial airlines industry in the early 1960s for identifying applicable and effective preventive maintenance tasks and as currently used in nuclear power industry. Effective maintenance of the systems at a nuclear power plant (NPP) is essential for its safe and reliable operation. Reliability Centered Maintenance at NPP is the program to assure that plant systems remain within an original design criteria and are not adversely affected during the plant life time. The aim of this report is to provide the guidelines to implement the RCM approach on NPP safety systems. Safety systems are usually standby and therefore, we need to periodically detect and repair failures that may have occurred since the previous activation or inspection the equipment. The RCM guidelines are intended to help identify the failure modes and related root causes and then decide the maintenance policies to achieve the high level of safety and reliability. The RCM is intended to improve or maintain high levels of system reliability and plant availability. Since the reliability of plant systems will be improved, the plant safety correspondingly will be increased. Another goal of RCM is to optimize the maintenance and surveillance tasks such that the overall level of resources required to accomplish essential tasks is kept to minimum. RCM also strives to eliminate unnecessary corrective maintenance and to select yet most cost-effective approach to maintenance, testing and inspection for system components. 9 refs. (Author) .new

  3. A Checklist to Improve Patient Safety in Interventional Radiology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koetser, Inge C. J.; Vries, Eefje N. de; Delden, Otto M. van; Smorenburg, Susanne M.; Boermeester, Marja A.; Lienden, Krijn P. van

    2013-01-01

    To develop a specific RADiological Patient Safety System (RADPASS) checklist for interventional radiology and to assess the effect of this checklist on health care processes of radiological interventions. On the basis of available literature and expert opinion, a prototype checklist was developed. The checklist was adapted on the basis of observation of daily practice in a tertiary referral centre and evaluation by users. To assess the effect of RADPASS, in a series of radiological interventions, all deviations from optimal care were registered before and after implementation of the checklist. In addition, the checklist and its use were evaluated by interviewing all users. The RADPASS checklist has two parts: A (Planning and Preparation) and B (Procedure). The latter part comprises checks just before starting a procedure (B1) and checks concerning the postprocedural care immediately after completion of the procedure (B2). Two cohorts of, respectively, 94 and 101 radiological interventions were observed; the mean percentage of deviations of the optimal process per intervention decreased from 24 % before implementation to 5 % after implementation (p < 0.001). Postponements and cancellations of interventions decreased from 10 % before implementation to 0 % after implementation. Most users agreed that the checklist was user-friendly and increased patient safety awareness and efficiency. The first validated patient safety checklist for interventional radiology was developed. The use of the RADPASS checklist reduced deviations from the optimal process by three quarters and was associated with less procedure postponements.

  4. Implementation of Patient Safety and Patient-Centeredness Strategies in Iranian Hospitals

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aghaei Hashjin, Asgar; Kringos, Dionne S.; Manoochehri, Jila; Ravaghi, Hamid; Klazinga, Niek S.

    2014-01-01

    Objective To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS) and patient-centeredness (PC) strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade) in Iran. Methods A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS questionnaire, eliciting information from hospital and nursing managers in 84 Iranian hospitals on the implementation of PS and PC strategies in 2009–2010. Results The majority of hospitals reported to have implemented 84% of the PS and 72% of the PC strategies. In general, implementation of PS strategies was unrelated to the type of hospital, with the exception of health promotion reports, which were more common in the Social Security Organization (SSO), and MRSA testing, which was reported more often in nonprofit hospitals. MRSA testing was also more common among teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals. The higher grade hospitals reported PS strategies significantly more frequently than lower grade hospitals. Overall, there was no significant difference in the reported implementation of PC strategies across general and specialized hospitals; except for the provision of information in different languages and recording of patient’s diet which were reported significantly more often by general than specialized hospitals. Moreover, patient hotel services were more common in private compared to public hospitals. Conclusions Despite substantial reporting of PS and PC strategies, there is still room for strengthening standard setting on safety, patient services and patient-centered information strategies in Iranian hospitals. To assure effective implementation of PS and PC strategies, enforcing standards, creating a PS and PC culture, increasing organizational responsiveness, and partnering with patients and their families need more attention. PMID:25268797

  5. Implementation of patient safety and patient-centeredness strategies in Iranian hospitals.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Asgar Aghaei Hashjin

    Full Text Available OBJECTIVE: To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS and patient-centeredness (PC strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade in Iran. METHODS: A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS questionnaire, eliciting information from hospital and nursing managers in 84 Iranian hospitals on the implementation of PS and PC strategies in 2009-2010. RESULTS: The majority of hospitals reported to have implemented 84% of the PS and 72% of the PC strategies. In general, implementation of PS strategies was unrelated to the type of hospital, with the exception of health promotion reports, which were more common in the Social Security Organization (SSO, and MRSA testing, which was reported more often in nonprofit hospitals. MRSA testing was also more common among teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals. The higher grade hospitals reported PS strategies significantly more frequently than lower grade hospitals. Overall, there was no significant difference in the reported implementation of PC strategies across general and specialized hospitals; except for the provision of information in different languages and recording of patient's diet which were reported significantly more often by general than specialized hospitals. Moreover, patient hotel services were more common in private compared to public hospitals. CONCLUSIONS: Despite substantial reporting of PS and PC strategies, there is still room for strengthening standard setting on safety, patient services and patient-centered information strategies in Iranian hospitals. To assure effective implementation of PS and PC strategies, enforcing standards, creating a PS and PC culture, increasing organizational responsiveness, and partnering with patients and their families need more attention.

  6. Implementation of patient safety and patient-centeredness strategies in Iranian hospitals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aghaei Hashjin, Asgar; Kringos, Dionne S; Manoochehri, Jila; Ravaghi, Hamid; Klazinga, Niek S

    2014-01-01

    To examine the extent of implementation for patient safety (PS) and patient-centeredness (PC) strategies and their association with hospital characteristics (type, ownership, teaching status, annual evaluation grade) in Iran. A cross-sectional study through an adapted version of the MARQuIS questionnaire, eliciting information from hospital and nursing managers in 84 Iranian hospitals on the implementation of PS and PC strategies in 2009-2010. The majority of hospitals reported to have implemented 84% of the PS and 72% of the PC strategies. In general, implementation of PS strategies was unrelated to the type of hospital, with the exception of health promotion reports, which were more common in the Social Security Organization (SSO), and MRSA testing, which was reported more often in nonprofit hospitals. MRSA testing was also more common among teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching hospitals. The higher grade hospitals reported PS strategies significantly more frequently than lower grade hospitals. Overall, there was no significant difference in the reported implementation of PC strategies across general and specialized hospitals; except for the provision of information in different languages and recording of patient's diet which were reported significantly more often by general than specialized hospitals. Moreover, patient hotel services were more common in private compared to public hospitals. Despite substantial reporting of PS and PC strategies, there is still room for strengthening standard setting on safety, patient services and patient-centered information strategies in Iranian hospitals. To assure effective implementation of PS and PC strategies, enforcing standards, creating a PS and PC culture, increasing organizational responsiveness, and partnering with patients and their families need more attention.

  7. Safety Culture Implementation in Indonesian Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nurwidi Astuti, Y.H.; Dewanto, P.

    2016-01-01

    The Indonesia Nuclear Energy Act no. 10 of 1997 clearly stated that Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN) is the Nuclear Regulatory Body. This is the legal basis of BAPETEN to perform regulatory functions on the use of nuclear energy in Indonesia, including regulation, authorisation, inspection and enforcement. The Independent regulatory functions are stipulated in Article 4 and Article 14 of the Nuclear Energy Act no. 10 (1997) which require the government to establish regulatory body that is reporting directly to the president and has responsibility to control of the use of nuclear energy. BAPETEN has been start fully its functioning on January 4, 1999. In it roles as a regulatory body, the main aspect that continues and always to be developed is the safety culture. One of the objectives of regulatory functions is “to increase legal awareness of nuclear energy of the user to develop safety culture” (Article 15, point d), while in the elucidation of article 15 it is stipulated that “safety culture is that of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individual that emphasise the importance of safety”.

  8. IMPLEMENTATION OF A SAFETY PROGRAM FOR THE WORK ACCIDENTS’ CONTROL. A CASE STUDY IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Edison Cesar de Faria Nogueira

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available This article presents a case study related to the implementation of a Work Safety Program in a chemical industry, based on the Process Safety Program, PSP, of a huge energy company. The research was applied, exploratory, qualitative and with and data collection method through documentary and bibliographical research. There will be presented the main practices adopted in order to make the Safety Program a reality inside a chemical industry, its results and contributions for its better development. This paper proposes the implementation of a Safety Program must be preceded by a diagnosis of occupational safety and health management system and with constant critical analysis in order to make the necessary adjustments.

  9. Behavioral Emergency Response Team: Implementation Improves Patient Safety, Staff Safety, and Staff Collaboration.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zicko, Cdr Jennifer M; Schroeder, Lcdr Rebecca A; Byers, Cdr William S; Taylor, Lt Adam M; Spence, Cdr Dennis L

    2017-10-01

    Staff members working on our nonmental health (non-MH) units (i.e., medical-surgical [MS] units) were not educated in recognizing or deescalating behavioral emergencies. Published evidence suggests a behavioral emergency response team (BERT) composed of MH experts who assist with deescalating behavioral emergencies may be beneficial in these situations. Therefore, we sought to implement a BERT on the inpatient non-MH units at our military treatment facility. The objectives of this evidence-based practice process improvement project were to determine how implementation of a BERT affects staff and patient safety and to examine nursing staffs' level of knowledge, confidence, and support in caring for psychiatric patients and patients exhibiting behavioral emergencies. A BERT was piloted on one MS unit for 5 months and expanded to two additional units for 3 months. Pre- and postimplementation staff surveys were conducted, and the number of staff assaults and injuries, restraint usage, and security intervention were compared. The BERT responded to 17 behavioral emergencies. The number of assaults decreased from 10 (pre) to 1 (post); security intervention decreased from 14 to 1; and restraint use decreased from 8 to 1. MS staffs' level of BERT knowledge and rating of support between MH staff and their staff significantly increased. Both MS and MH nurses rated the BERT as supportive and effective. A BERT can assist with deescalating behavioral emergencies, and improve staff collaboration and patient and staff safety. © 2017 Sigma Theta Tau International.

  10. Legal basis for risk analysis methodology while ensuring food safety in the Eurasian Economic union and the Republic of Belarus

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    E.V. Fedorenko

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available Health risk analysis methodology is an internationally recognized tool for ensuring food safety. Three main elements of risk analysis are risk assessment, risk management and risk communication to inform the interested parties on the risk, are legislated and implemented in the Eurasian Economic Union and the Republic of Belarus. There is a corresponding organizational and functional framework for the application of risk analysis methodology as in the justification of production safety indicators and the implementation of public health surveillance. Common methodological approaches and criteria for evaluating public health risk are determined, which are used in the development and application of food safety requirements. Risk assessment can be used in justifying the indicators of safety (contaminants, food additives, and evaluating the effectiveness of programs on enrichment of food with micronutrients.

  11. Lessons Learned from Implementing National Nuclear Safety Knowledge Platforms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simo, A.

    2016-01-01

    The Integrated Nuclear Security Advisory Services (INSServ) took place in Cameroon from 21st to 25th April 2014 and the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) from 12th to 21st October 2014. This was after the government requested the Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through an official correspondence on 11th June 2013, for these missions. The main objective was to further improve the effectiveness of the Cameroon governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety and security. Revision of the legal and regulatory framework so that all international safety and security standards are addressed in laws and statutes have been done with documents downloaded from Nuclear portal sites found in GNSSN. Establishment and implementation of integrated management systems by NRPA is being done with documentation under the National Nuclear Portal with lessons learned from the IAEA review missions. The regulatory documents have been uploaded on the platform and can be accessed through FNRBA and NRPA website (www.anrp.cm). UN organizations implementing projects in Cameroon are also linked to the platform. The action plans and progress reports for IAEA/AFRA projects are also available. Moreover, NRPA regulatory activities and licensing sources are available on this platform.

  12. Implementation plan for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borsheim, G.L.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1992-12-01

    This document revises the original plan submitted in March 1991 for implementing the recommendations made by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in their Recommendation 90-7 to the US Department of Energy. Recommendation 90-7 addresses safety issues of concern for 24 single-shell, high-level radioactive waste tanks containing ferrocyanide compounds at the Hanford Site. The waste in these tanks is a potential safety concern because, under certain conditions involving elevated temperatures and low concentrations of nonparticipating diluents, ferrocyanide compounds in the presence of oxidizing materials can undergo a runaway (propagating) chemical reaction. This document describes those activities underway by the Hanford Site contractor responsible for waste tank safety that address each of the six parts of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7. This document also identifies the progress made on these activities since the beginning of the ferrocyanide safety program in September 1990. Revised schedules for planned activities are also included

  13. Food Safety and Sanitary Practices of Selected Hotels in Batangas Province, Philippines: Basis of Proposed Enhancement Measures

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    April M. Perez

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available This study assessed the extent of food safety and sanitary practices of selected hotels in Batangas province as basis of proposed enhancement measures. The study utilized descriptive method to describe food safety and sanitary practices of selected hotels in Batangas province with a total of 8 hotels (256 respondents. Purposive sampling was used in the study. The questionnaires were designed using the provision of the Sanitation Code of the Philippines, validated and finalized to come up with legitimate results. The study showed that there were eight (8 hotel respondents classified as two, three, four star with considerable years of experience and adequate number of employees. The hotels demonstrated the food safety and sanitary practices always in the areas of restaurant, bar service, catering and banquet and room service. The significant pair-wise comparison for restaurant, bar service, catering and banquet and room service shows that 2 star hotels greatly differs. The researcher recommends that the management should maintain high standard of food safety and sanitary practices among its staff, upgrade the food safety and sanitary practices for food safety accreditation, continuous training of the hotel managers/employees on food safety and sanitary practices.

  14. Design and implementation of a radiotherapy programme: Clinical, medical physics, radiation protection and safety aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-09-01

    It is widely acknowledged that the clinical aspects (diagnosis, decision, indication for treatment, follow-up) as well as the procedures related to the physical and technical aspects of patient treatment must be subjected to careful control and planning in order to ensure safe, high quality radiotherapy. Whilst it has long been recognized that the physical aspects of quality assurance in radiotherapy are vital to achieve and effective and safe treatment, it has been increasingly acknowledged only recently that a systematic approach is absolutely necessary to all steps within clinical and technical aspects of a radiotherapy programme as well. The need to establish general guidelines at the IAEA, taking into account clinical medical physics, radiation protection and safety considerations, for designing and implementing radiotherapy programmes in Member States has been identified through the Member States' increased interest in the efficient and safe application of radiation in health care. Several consultants and advisory group meetings were convened to prepare a report providing a basis for establishing a programme in radiotherapy. The present TECDOC is addressed to all professionals and administrators involved in the development, implementation and management of a radiotherapy programme in order to establish a common and consistent framework where all steps and procedures in radiotherapy are taken into account

  15. A new safety approach in the design of fast reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neuhold, R.J.; Marchaterre, J.F.; Waltar, A.E.

    1987-01-01

    A new approach to achieving fast reactor safety goals is becoming really apparent in the US Fast Reactor Program. Whereas the ''defense is best'' philosophy still prevails, there has been a tangible shift toward emphasizing passive mechanisms to protect the reactor and provide public safety---rather than relying on add-on active, engineered safety systems. This paper reviews the technical basis for this new safety approach and provides discussion on its implementation in current US liquid metal-cooled reactor designs. 4 refs., 4 figs

  16. Safety of Research Reactors. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to provide a basis for safety and a basis for safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Another objective is to establish requirements on aspects relating to regulatory control, the management of safety, site evaluation, design, operation and decommissioning. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives. This Safety Requirements publication is intended for use by organizations engaged in the site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, operation and decommissioning of research reactors as well as by regulatory bodies

  17. Nuclear safety policy statement in korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, W.S.; Kim, H.J.; Choi, K.S.; Choi, Y.S.; Park, D.K.

    2006-01-01

    fixed. It includes 5 regulatory principles such as Independence, Openness, Clarity, Efficiency and Reliability. It also stipulates 14 safety policy directions in the areas such as maintaining highest nuclear safety level, consistent development of safety standards. improving regulatory competence, promoting safety culture, etc. The government's declaration of this new statement will show the strong commitment of nuclear safety and for enhancing transparency of safety regulation and also establishing public trust and confidence in nuclear safety. Incorporating safety policy directions suggested in this new statement, measures for safety enhancement in nuclear and radiation related facilities could be effectively implemented. As this safety policy statement embraces major safety policy directions for at least next 10 years, it will be used as a good basis of enhancing nuclear safety by regulator and licensees in the future

  18. The role of theory in research to develop and evaluate the implementation of patient safety practices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Foy, Robbie; Ovretveit, John; Shekelle, Paul G; Pronovost, Peter J; Taylor, Stephanie L; Dy, Sydney; Hempel, Susanne; McDonald, Kathryn M; Rubenstein, Lisa V; Wachter, Robert M

    2011-05-01

    Theories provide a way of understanding and predicting the effects of patient safety practices (PSPs), interventions intended to prevent or mitigate harm caused by healthcare or risks of such harm. Yet most published evaluations make little or no explicit reference to theory, thereby hindering efforts to generalise findings from one context to another. Theories from a wide range of disciplines are potentially relevant to research on PSPs. Theory can be used in research to explain clinical and organisational behaviour, to guide the development and selection of PSPs, and in evaluating their implementation and mechanisms of action. One key recommendation from an expert consensus process is that researchers should describe the theoretical basis for chosen intervention components or provide an explicit logic model for 'why this PSP should work.' Future theory-driven evaluations would enhance generalisability and help build a cumulative understanding of the nature of change.

  19. Improving safety culture in hospitals: Facilitators and barriers to implementation of Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zecevic, Aleksandra A; Li, Alvin Ho-Ting; Ngo, Charity; Halligan, Michelle; Kothari, Anita

    2017-06-01

    The purpose of this study was to assess the facilitators and barriers to implementation of the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM) on selected hospital units. A cross-sectional explanatory mixed methods design was used to converge results from a standardized safety culture survey with themes that emerged from interviews and focus groups. Findings were organized by six elements of the Ottawa Model of Research Use framework. A geriatric rehabilitation unit of an acute care hospital and a neurological unit of a rehabilitation hospital were selected purposefully due to the high frequency of falls. Hospital staff who took part in: surveys (n = 39), interviews (n = 10) and focus groups (n = 12), and 38 people who were interviewed during falls investigations: fallers, family, unit staff and hospital management. Implementation of the SFIM to investigate fall occurrences. Percent of positive responses on the Modified Stanford Patient Safety Culture Survey Instrument converged with qualitative themes on facilitators and barriers for intervention implementation. Both hospital units had an overall poor safety culture which hindered intervention implementation. Facilitators were hospital accreditation, strong emphasis on patient safety, infrastructure and dedicated champions. Barriers included heavy workloads, lack of time, lack of resources and poor communication. Successful implementation of SFIM requires regulatory and organizational support, committed frontline staff and allocation of resources to identify active causes and latent contributing factors to falls. System-wide adjustments show promise for promotion of safety culture in hospitals where falls happen regularly. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

  20. The impact of cardinal rules on employee safety behaviour at power stations in Mpumalanga / Chauke, T.L.

    OpenAIRE

    Chauke, Tinyiko Lourence

    2011-01-01

    Occupational risk management can be a catalyst in generating superior returns for all stakeholders on a sustainable basis. A number of companies in South Africa have implemented Cardinal Rules of Safety adopted from international companies to ensure the safety of their employees. The purpose of this study was to measure the impact of the cardinal rules on employee safety behaviour implemented at power stations in Mpumalanga. The empirical study was done by using a questionnaire as measurin...

  1. Steps to Ensure a Successful Implementation of Occupational Health and Safety Interventions at an Organizational Level

    Science.gov (United States)

    Herrera-Sánchez, Isabel M.; León-Pérez, José M.; León-Rubio, José M.

    2017-01-01

    There is increasing meta-analytic evidence that addresses the positive impact of evidence-based occupational health and safety interventions on employee health and well-being. However, such evidence is less clear when interventions are approached at an organizational level and are aimed at changing organizational policies and processes. Given that occupational health and safety interventions are usually tailored to specific organizational contexts, generalizing and transferring such interventions to other organizations is a complex endeavor. In response, several authors have argued that an evaluation of the implementation process is crucial for assessing the intervention’s effectiveness and for understanding how and why the intervention has been (un)successful. Thus, this paper focuses on the implementation process and attempts to move this field forward by identifying the main factors that contribute toward ensuring a greater success of occupational health and safety interventions conducted at the organizational level. In doing so, we propose some steps that can guide a successful implementation. These implementation steps are illustrated using examples of evidence-based best practices reported in the literature that have described and systematically evaluated the implementation process behind their interventions during the last decade. PMID:29375413

  2. Steps to Ensure a Successful Implementation of Occupational Health and Safety Interventions at an Organizational Level

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Isabel M. Herrera-Sánchez

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available There is increasing meta-analytic evidence that addresses the positive impact of evidence-based occupational health and safety interventions on employee health and well-being. However, such evidence is less clear when interventions are approached at an organizational level and are aimed at changing organizational policies and processes. Given that occupational health and safety interventions are usually tailored to specific organizational contexts, generalizing and transferring such interventions to other organizations is a complex endeavor. In response, several authors have argued that an evaluation of the implementation process is crucial for assessing the intervention’s effectiveness and for understanding how and why the intervention has been (unsuccessful. Thus, this paper focuses on the implementation process and attempts to move this field forward by identifying the main factors that contribute toward ensuring a greater success of occupational health and safety interventions conducted at the organizational level. In doing so, we propose some steps that can guide a successful implementation. These implementation steps are illustrated using examples of evidence-based best practices reported in the literature that have described and systematically evaluated the implementation process behind their interventions during the last decade.

  3. Technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety systems in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korsah, K.; Wood, R.T.; Tanaka, T.J.; Antonescu, C.E.

    1997-01-01

    This paper summarizes the results of research sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide the technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety equipment in nuclear power plants. This research was conducted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). ORNL investigated potential failure modes and vulnerabilities of microprocessor-based technologies to environmental stressors, including electromagnetic/radio-frequency interference, temperature, humidity, and smoke exposure. An experimental digital safety channel (EDSC) was constructed for the tests. SNL performed smoke exposure tests on digital components and circuit boards to determine failure mechanisms and the effect of different packaging techniques on smoke susceptibility. These studies are expected to provide recommendations for environmental qualification of digital safety systems by addressing the following: (1) adequacy of the present preferred test methods for qualification of digital I and C systems; (2) preferred standards; (3) recommended stressors to be included in the qualification process during type testing; (4) resolution of need for accelerated aging in qualification testing for equipment that is to be located in mild environments; and (5) determination of an appropriate approach to address smoke in a qualification program

  4. Implementation of an Enhanced Measurement Control Program for handling nuclear safety samples at WSRC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boler-Melton, C.; Holland, M.K.

    1991-01-01

    In the separation and purification of nuclear material, nuclear criticality safety (NCS) is of primary concern. The primary nuclear criticality safety controls utilized by the Savannah River Site (SRS) Separations Facilities involve administrative and process equipment controls. Additional assurance of NCS is obtained by identifying key process hold points where sampling is used to independently verify the effectiveness of production control. Nuclear safety measurements of samples from these key process locations provide a high degree of assurance that processing conditions are within administrative and procedural nuclear safety controls. An enhanced procedure management system aimed at making improvements in the quality, safety, and conduct of operation was implemented for Nuclear Safety Sample (NSS) receipt, analysis, and reporting. All procedures with nuclear safety implications were reviewed for accuracy and adequate detail to perform the analytical measurements safely, efficiently, and with the utmost quality. Laboratory personnel worked in a ''Deliberate Operating'' mode (a systematic process requiring continuous expert oversight during all phases of training, testing, and implementation) to initiate the upgrades. Thus, the effort to revise and review nuclear safety sample procedures involved a team comprised of a supervisor, chemist, and two technicians for each procedure. Each NSS procedure was upgraded to a ''Use Every Time'' (UET) procedure with sign-off steps to ensure compliance with each step for every nuclear safety sample analyzed. The upgrade program met and exceeded both the long and short term customer needs by improving measurement reliability, providing objective evidence of rigid adherence to program principles and requirements, and enhancing the system for independent verification of representative sampling from designated NCS points

  5. A Qualitative Assessment of Current CCF Guidance Based on a Review of Safety System Digital Implementation Changes with Evolving Technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Korsah, Kofi [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Muhlheim, Michael David [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wood, Richard [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2016-04-01

    The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is initiating a new rulemaking project to develop a digital system common-cause failure (CCF) rule. This rulemaking will review and modify or affirm the NRC's current digital system CCF policy as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Controls, in NRC Regulatory Guide (NUREG)-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (ML033580677). The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is providing technical support to the NRC staff on the CCF rulemaking, and this report is one of several providing the technical basis to inform NRC staff members. For the task described in this report, ORNL examined instrumentation and controls (I&C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF is adequate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed.

  6. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  7. Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources. Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This Safety Guide is intended to assist States in implementing the requirements established in Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1, Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, for a national regulatory infrastructure to regulate any practice involving radiation sources in medicine, industry, research, agriculture and education. The Safety Guide provides advice on the legislative basis for establishing regulatory bodies, including the effective independence of the regulatory body. It also provides guidance on implementing the functions and activities of regulatory bodies: the development of regulations and guides on radiation safety; implementation of a system for notification and authorization; carrying out regulatory inspections; taking necessary enforcement actions; and investigating accidents and circumstances potentially giving rise to accidents. The various aspects relating to the regulatory control of consumer products are explained, including justification, optimization of exposure, safety assessment and authorization. Guidance is also provided on the organization and staffing of regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Legal framework for a regulatory infrastructure; 3. Principal functions and activities of the regulatory body; 4. Regulatory control of the supply of consumer products; 5. Functions of the regulatory body shared with other governmental agencies; 6. Organization and staffing of the regulatory body; 7. Documentation of the functions and activities of the regulatory body; 8. Support services; 9. Quality management for the regulatory system.

  8. Developing implementation strategies for firearm safety promotion in paediatric primary care for suicide prevention in two large US health systems: a study protocol for a mixed-methods implementation study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wolk, Courtney Benjamin; Jager-Hyman, Shari; Marcus, Steven C; Ahmedani, Brian K; Zeber, John E; Fein, Joel A; Brown, Gregory K; Lieberman, Adina; Beidas, Rinad S

    2017-06-24

    The promotion of safe firearm practices, or firearms means restriction, is a promising but infrequently used suicide prevention strategy in the USA. Safety Check is an evidence-based practice for improving parental firearm safety behaviour in paediatric primary care. However, providers rarely discuss firearm safety during visits, suggesting the need to better understand barriers and facilitators to promoting this approach. This study, Adolescent Suicide Prevention In Routine clinical Encounters, aims to engender a better understanding of how to implement the three firearm components of Safety Check as a suicide prevention strategy in paediatric primary care. The National Institute of Mental Health-funded Mental Health Research Network (MHRN), a consortium of 13 healthcare systems across the USA, affords a unique opportunity to better understand how to implement a firearm safety intervention in paediatric primary care from a system-level perspective. We will collaboratively develop implementation strategies in partnership with MHRN stakeholders. First, we will survey leadership of 82 primary care practices (ie, practices serving children, adolescents and young adults) within two MHRN systems to understand acceptability and use of the three firearm components of Safety Check (ie, screening, brief counselling around firearm safety and provision of firearm locks). Then, in collaboration with MHRN stakeholders, we will use intervention mapping and the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research to systematically develop and evaluate a multilevel menu of implementation strategies for promoting firearm safety as a suicide prevention strategy in paediatric primary care. Study procedures have been approved by the University of Pennsylvania. Henry Ford Health System and Baylor Scott & White institutional review boards (IRBs) have ceded IRB review to the University of Pennsylvania IRB. Results will be submitted for publication in peer-reviewed journals. © Article

  9. Safety performance monitoring of autonomous marine systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thieme, Christoph A.; Utne, Ingrid B.

    2017-01-01

    The marine environment is vast, harsh, and challenging. Unanticipated faults and events might lead to loss of vessels, transported goods, collected scientific data, and business reputation. Hence, systems have to be in place that monitor the safety performance of operation and indicate if it drifts into an intolerable safety level. This article proposes a process for developing safety indicators for the operation of autonomous marine systems (AMS). The condition of safety barriers and resilience engineering form the basis for the development of safety indicators, synthesizing and further adjusting the dual assurance and the resilience based early warning indicator (REWI) approaches. The article locates the process for developing safety indicators in the system life cycle emphasizing a timely implementation of the safety indicators. The resulting safety indicators reflect safety in AMS operation and can assist in planning of operations, in daily operational decision-making, and identification of improvements. Operation of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) exemplifies the process for developing safety indicators and their implementation. The case study shows that the proposed process leads to a comprehensive set of safety indicators. It is expected that application of the resulting safety indicators consequently will contribute to safer operation of current and future AMS. - Highlights: • Process for developing safety indicators for autonomous marine systems. • Safety indicators based on safety barriers and resilience thinking. • Location of the development process in the system lifecycle. • Case study on AUV demonstrating applicability of the process.

  10. Experience of implementation of systems of management of professional health and production safety at the Russian entities

    OpenAIRE

    Shmeleva E.; Bylinkina A.

    2016-01-01

    This article is devoted to the study of experience in implementation of management systems, occupational health and safety at Russian enterprises. Concretized the benefits and advantages that the company obtained through the implementation of OHSAS methodology. Authors specify that system approach to management of professional safety on modern industrial enterprise can significantly reduce the probability of emergence of risks of occupational accidents, accidents, and emergencies. In the conc...

  11. Plasma-safety assessment model and safety analyses of ITER

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Honda, T.; Okazaki, T.; Bartels, H.-H.; Uckan, N.A.; Sugihara, M.; Seki, Y.

    2001-01-01

    A plasma-safety assessment model has been provided on the basis of the plasma physics database of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) to analyze events including plasma behavior. The model was implemented in a safety analysis code (SAFALY), which consists of a 0-D dynamic plasma model and a 1-D thermal behavior model of the in-vessel components. Unusual plasma events of ITER, e.g., overfueling, were calculated using the code and plasma burning is found to be self-bounded by operation limits or passively shut down due to impurity ingress from overheated divertor targets. Sudden transition of divertor plasma might lead to failure of the divertor target because of a sharp increase of the heat flux. However, the effects of the aggravating failure can be safely handled by the confinement boundaries. (author)

  12. Methods of checking general safety criteria in UML statechart specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pap, Zsigmond; Majzik, Istvan; Pataricza, Andras; Szegi, Andras

    2005-01-01

    This paper describes methods and tools for safety analysis of UML statechart specifications. A comprehensive set of general safety criteria including completeness and consistency is applied in automated analysis. Analysis techniques are based on OCL expressions, graph transformations and reachability analysis. Two canonical intermediate representations of the statechart specification are introduced. They are suitable for straightforward implementation of checker methods and for the support of the proof of the correctness and soundness of the applied analysis. One of them also serves as a basis of the metamodel of a variant of UML statecharts proposed for the specification of safety-critical control systems. The analysis is extended to object-oriented specifications. Examples illustrate the application of the checker methods implemented by an automated tool-set

  13. Pilot Study on Harmonisation of Reactor Safety in WENRA Countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-03-01

    Most of the objectives, set for the Pilot Study, were met. It can be concluded that the methodology was adequate for its purpose. National requirements on selected safety issues have been systematically compared and the major gaps and differences have been identified. Convenient overviews have been provided of differences and similarities between the countries. Furthermore, the conclusions are based on a safety justification and are detailed enough to provide input to a further more detailed analysis on the national level. It was not possible, however, to provide fully verified conclusions about the implementation of the reference levels in the different countries. This has to do with the following constraints on the study: In line with the Terms of Reference, the comparison of formal requirements did not address the more detailed use of criteria and methods to verify compliance. The same requirement could be enforced differently in different regulatory systems, and hence lead to different implementation. The Pilot Study also assessed the implementation, but it was not possible to do this in sufficient detail to identify such differences. The implementation was assessed on the basis of current knowledge of the respective regulatory body, but it was not possible to provide the panels with evidence of the implementation. For these reasons, conclusions about implemented safety provisions in the different countries should be drawn with precaution. The introduction of the panel assessments greatly improved the quality and consistency of the comparison assessments. Uncertainties in the assessments are mainly connected with lack of time to make a detailed analysis in some cases. The reliability of the assessments seems to be sufficient for the objectives of the Pilot Study. The introduction of the IAEA safety standards in the study proved to be helpful and provided confidence in the scope and strictness of the reference levels. This Pilot Study has contributed to

  14. Knowledge and perceived implementation of food safety risk analysis framework in Latin America and the Caribbean region.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cherry, C; Mohr, A Hofelich; Lindsay, T; Diez-Gonzalez, F; Hueston, W; Sampedro, F

    2014-12-01

    Risk analysis is increasingly promoted as a tool to support science-based decisions regarding food safety. An online survey comprising 45 questions was used to gather information on the implementation of food safety risk analysis within the Latin American and Caribbean regions. Professionals working in food safety in academia, government, and private sectors in Latin American and Caribbean countries were contacted by email and surveyed to assess their individual knowledge of risk analysis and perceptions of its implementation in the region. From a total of 279 participants, 97% reported a familiarity with risk analysis concepts; however, fewer than 25% were able to correctly identify its key principles. The reported implementation of risk analysis among the different professional sectors was relatively low (46%). Participants from industries in countries with a long history of trade with the United States and the European Union, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Chile, reported perceptions of a higher degree of risk analysis implementation (56, 50, and 20%, respectively) than those from the rest of the countries, suggesting that commerce may be a driver for achieving higher food safety standards. Disagreement among respondents on the extent of the use of risk analysis in national food safety regulations was common, illustrating a systematic lack of understanding of the current regulatory status of the country. The results of this survey can be used to target further risk analysis training on selected sectors and countries.

  15. Design and implementation of a safety health and environment management system in BHP Petroleum

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mattes, B.W.; Walters, C. [BHP Petroleum, Melbourne, VIC (Australia)

    1995-12-31

    The Australian/Asian operations group within BHP Petroleum (BHPP) is implementing and integrated management system with safety, occupational health and environmental elements as crucial components of all BHPP operations. Responsibility for the development, implementation and maintenance of the management system, and compliance with its provisions, rests with line management, a logical extension of the accountability and responsibility for safety, health and environment matters that rests with line managers within BHPP. Contractors are scrutinized to assess their safety, health and environmental performance and failure to meet minimal standards will result in their disqualification. The effectiveness of the BHPP Management System is yet to be fully determined, however, it will be measured against the performance of the company in the areas of zero lost time due to injuries, a drop in incidences requiring medical treatment or first aid, lower absenteeism and workers compensation bills, no oil spills, less car accidents, less back pain and RSI, better management of waste emissions to air, land and sea, and less equipment breakdowns. The trend in improved safety, health and environment performance are already apparent and auger well for the Company as it moves towards the new millennium. 7 figs., 2 photos., 4 refs.

  16. IGSC - Integration Group for the Safety Case

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Countries that rely on nuclear energy and materials have an ethical obligation to manage radioactive waste in a safe and environmentally responsible manner. For society to support the sustainable solutions envisaged, disposal concepts must be technologically sound and the safety of these concepts must be convincingly demonstrated. The Nuclear Energy Agency's Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) establishes and documents the technical and scientific basis for developing and reviewing safety cases as a platform for dialogue among technical experts and as a tool for decision making. The IGSC addresses various strategic and policy aspects of radioactive waste management as the technical advisory body to the NEA Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC) for all issues related to repository development. For more than two decades, the IGSC and its predecessor technical groups have promoted the exchange of national experience in evaluating and implementing geological repositories. IGSC activities foster consensus on best practices and encourage the development of innovative, advanced approaches covering the technical aspects at all stages of repository implementation, including: - strategies to characterise and evaluate potential disposal sites; - methods to design and test engineered barrier systems; - priorities for research and development programmes to improve the understanding of important processes and interactions; - tools for safety assessments; - techniques for the effective presentation and communication of the results of safety cases and other factors that provide the basis for increased confidence in the safety of geological disposal facilities. The IGSC has been instrumental in further developing the 'modern safety case', a concept that originally emerged from NEA work in the 1990's. Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission (EC) has led to the worldwide adoption of this safety

  17. Kozloduy nuclear power plant. Units 1-4. Status of safety assessment activities. Rev. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    This paper presents the results of the status of safety assessment activities carried out by the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) in order to evaluate the current status of the safety of its reactor units 1-4. The steam supply system of this units is based of the reactor WWER-440/ B-230, which is a PWR of Russian design developed according to the safety standards in force in USSR in late 60-s. Now a days 10 reactor units of this type are in operation in four NPPs. Despite of efforts of the different plants to implement safety improvements measures during first 10-15 years of operation of this type of reactor its major safety problems were not eliminated and were a subject of international concern. The systematic evaluation of the deficiencies of the original design of this type of reactors have been initiated by IAEA in the beginning of 1990 and brought to developing a comprehensive list of safety problems which required urgent implementation of safety measures in all plants. To solve this problems in 1991 KNPP initiated implementation of so called 'short term' safety improvement program, developed with the help of WANO under agreement with Bulgarian Nuclear Safety Authority (BNSA) and consortium RISKAUDIT. The program was based on a stage approach and was foreseen to be implemented by tree stages in very tight time schedule in order to achieve significant and rapid improvements of the level of safety in operation of the units. The Short Tenn Program was implemented between the years 1991 and 1997 thanks of the strong safety commitment of NEK and KNPP staff and the broad international cooperation and financial support. Important part of resources were supplied under PHARE program of CEC, EBRD grant agreement and EDF support. The plant current safety level analysis has been performed using IAEA analytical methodology according to 50-SG-O12 standard 'Periodic safety review of operational nuclear power plants'. The approach and criteria for acceptable safety level

  18. Safety Culture as a Pillar of Defense-in-Depth Implementation at the Experimental Fuel Element Installation, Batan Indonesia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hardiyanti, H.; Herutomo, B.; Suryaman, G.K., E-mail: hrdyanti@batan.go.id [Center for Nuclear Fuel Technology – National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) Tangerang (Indonesia)

    2014-10-15

    Defence-in-depth (DID) needs to be implemented not only in a nuclear power plant, but also in a non-reactor nuclear facility. The application of safety culture in a nuclear facility is one way of DID implementation. Safety culture aims at the performance of safe works, the prevention of deviation, and the accomplishment of quality operation. It is in accordance with the first level of DID concept which is the prevention of abnormal operation and failures that is done through conservative design and high quality in construction and operation. Experimental Fuel Element Installation (EFEI) is a nonreactor nuclear facility that belongs to BATAN (the National Nuclear Energy Agency of the Republic of Indonesia) that functions as its research and development facility on power reactor fuel production. The objective of safety culture implementation in the EFEI is to encourage workers to have a stronger sense of responsibility on safety and to contribute actively for its development. The enhancement of safety culture in the EFEI refers to the attributes of a strong safety culture listed in the IAEA Safety Standard Series No.GS-G-3.5 (The Management System for Nuclear Installations Safety Guide). The strategies performed were: a) Internalization of safety values through activities such as briefings, “coffee morning”, visual management, workshops, and training; b) Enhancement of leadership effectiveness through activities such as senior management visits, safety leadership training, and personnel qualification training; c) Integration of safety into all work processes through activities such as setting up HIRADC (hazard identification, risk assessment, and determining controls) documents, setting up WHA (workplace hazard assessment), and routine housekeeping; d) Learning about safety through activities such as occupational health and safety inspections, safety self-assessments, open reporting on safety incidents, and participation in the FINAS (fuel incident notification

  19. On the development of an International Curriculum on Hydrogen Safety Engineering and its Implementation into Educational Programmes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dahoe, A.E.; Molkov, V.V.

    2006-01-01

    The present paper provides an overview of the development of an International Curriculum on Hydrogen Safety Engineering and its implementation into new educational programmes. The curriculum has a modular structure, and consists of five basic, six fundamental and four applied modules. The reasons for this particular structure are explained. To accelerate the development of teaching materials and their implementation in training/educational programmes, an annual European Summer School on Hydrogen Safety will be held (the first Summer School is from 15-24 Aug 2006, Belfast, UK), where leading experts deliver keynote lectures to an audience of researchers on topics covering the state-of-the-art in Hydrogen Safety Science and Engineering. The establishment of a Postgraduate Certificate course in Hydrogen Safety Engineering at the University of Ulster (starting in September 2006) as a first step in the development of a worldwide system of Hydrogen Safety education and training is described. (authors)

  20. TYPICAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AN OPERATOR IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alexander Michaylovich Lushkin

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available In order to implement the concept of acceptable risk all airlines should have the Safety Management System (SMS from 01.01.2009 - at the request of ICAO and from 01.01.2010 - at the request of the Federal Air Transport Agen- cy. State requirements for SMS have not been formulated clearly. Leading airlines, in an effort to meet international stand- ards, develop and implement SMS on their own. So the implemented SMS differ in control settings (level of safety, proce- dures and methodological support of the processes of safety management. The summary of the best experience in develop- ment, implementation and improvement of SMS in leading airlines, allows to create a standard SMS to the airline, where the basic procedures required by the standards are systematized. The standard SMS is formed on experience in design, implementation and development of corporate SMS in three leading Russian airlines, in which the author worked in 2006-2015, and can be the basis of an SMS of the airlines operat- ing the planes and helicopters. Taken into account in a typical SMS requirements of international and national standards, research results, developed and implemented methodical maintenance of management procedures level of safety, contribut- ed to the successful passage of IATA periodic audits on developing standards of operational safety IOSA by the airline members and achieve the best level of safety not only in Russia but also in the world.

  1. Overall risk estimation for nonreactor nuclear facilities and implementation of safety goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Kyo S.; Bradley, R.F.

    1992-01-01

    A typical safety analysis report (SAR) contains estimated frequencies and consequences of various design basis accident (DBA) analyses. However, the results are organized and presented in such a way that they are not conducive for summing up with mathematical rigor to give total or overall risk. This paper describes a simple protocol and mathematical formalism to derive overall risk indicators. These indicators provide some insight into the capability of confinement barriers with characteristics of source terms, and provide comparison to the Safety Goals. The protocol makes maximum use of the results of DBA analyses typically available from an SAR. The mathematical formalism is based on the cumulative complementary distribution function (CCDF) or exceedance probability of radioactivity release fraction and individual radiation dose. An example case analysis is presented to illustrate how to use the proposed protocol and mathematical formalism. A discussion of the result is also presented in terms of confinement characteristic and compliance to Safety Goals

  2. Implementing a pediatric surgical safety checklist in the OR and beyond.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Norton, Elizabeth K; Rangel, Shawn J

    2010-07-01

    An international study about implementation of the World Health Organization Surgical Safety Checklist showed that use of the checklist reduced complication and death rates in adult surgical patients. Clinicians at Children's Hospital Boston, Massachusetts, modified the Surgical Safety Checklist for pediatric populations. We pilot tested the Pediatric Surgical Safety Checklist and created a large checklist poster for each OR to allow the entire surgical team to view the checklist simultaneously and to promote shared responsibility for conducting the time out. Results of the pilot test showed improvements in teamwork, communication, and adherence to process measures. Parallel efforts were made in other areas of the hospital where invasive procedures are performed. Compliance with the checklist at our facility has been good, and team members have expressed satisfaction with the flow and content of the checklist. Copyright (c) 2010 AORN, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  3. Evaluation on safety issues of SMART

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, W. S.; Seol, K. W.; Yoon, Y. K.; Lee, J. H.

    2001-01-01

    Safety issues on the SMART were evaluated in the light of the compliance with the Ministerial Ordinance of Technical Requirements applying to Nuclear Installations, which was recently revised. Evaluation concludes that regulatory requirements associated with following items have to be developed as the licensing criteria for the SMART: (1) proving the safety of design or materials different form existing reactors; (2) coping with beyond design basis accidents; (3) rulemaking on the safety of reactor safeguard vessel ; (4) ensuring integrity of steam generator tubes; and (5) classifying equipment based on their safety significance. Appropriate actions including implementation of new requirements under development should be taken for safety issues such as diversity of reactivity control and in-service inspection of steam generator tubes that are not complied with the current Technical Requirements. Safety level of the SMART design will be evaluated further by the more detailed assessment according to the Technical Requirements, and additional safety issues will be identified and resolved, if it necessary

  4. The deep geologic repository technology programme: toward a geoscience basis for understanding repository safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jensen, M.R.

    2007-01-01

    Within the Deep Geologic Repository Technology Programme (DGRTP) several Geoscience activities are focused on advancing the understanding of groundwater flow system evolution and geochemical stability in a Canadian Shield setting as affected by long-term climate change. A key aspect is developing confidence in predictions of groundwater flow patterns and residence times as they relate to the safety of a deep geologic repository for used nuclear fuel waste. This is being achieved through a coordinated multi-disciplinary approach intent on: i) demonstrating coincidence between independent geo-scientific data; ii) improving the traceability of geo-scientific data and its interpretation within a conceptual descriptive model(s); iii) improving upon methods to assess and demonstrate robustness in flow domain prediction(s) given inherent flow domain uncertainties (i.e. spatial chemical/physical property distributions, boundary conditions) in time and space; and iv) improving awareness amongst geo-scientists as to the utility of various geo-scientific data in supporting a safety case for a deep geologic repository. This multi-disciplinary DGRTP approach is yielding an improved understanding of groundwater flow system evolution and stability in Canadian Shield settings that is further contributing to the geo-scientific basis for understanding and communicating aspects of DGR safety. (author)

  5. Implementing an interprofessional patient safety learning initiative: insights from participants, project leads and steering committee members.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jeffs, Lianne; Abramovich, Ilona Alex; Hayes, Chris; Smith, Orla; Tregunno, Deborah; Chan, Wai-Hin; Reeves, Scott

    2013-11-01

    Effective teamwork and interprofessional collaboration are vital for healthcare quality and safety; however, challenges persist in creating interprofessional teamwork and resilient professional teams. A study was undertaken to delineate perceptions of individuals involved with the implementation of an interprofessional patient safety competency-based intervention and intervention participants. The study employed a qualitative study design that triangulated data from interviews with six steering committee members and five members of the project team who developed and monitored the intervention and six focus groups with clinical team members who participated in the intervention and implemented local patient safety projects within a large teaching hospital in Canada. Our study findings reveal that healthcare professionals and support staff acquired patient safety competencies in an interprofessional context that can result in improved patient and work flow processes. However, key challenges exist including managing projects amidst competing priorities, lacking physician engagement and sustaining projects. Our findings point to leaders to provide opportunities for healthcare teams to engage in interprofessional teamwork and patient safety projects to improve quality of patient care. Further research efforts should examine the sustainability of interprofessional safety projects and how leaders can more fully engage the participation of all professions, specifically physicians.

  6. Experience in the implementation of quality assurance program and safety culture assessment of research reactor operation and maintenance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syarip; Suryopratomo, K.

    2001-01-01

    The implementation of quality assurance program and safety culture for research reactor operation are of importance to assure its safety status. It comprises an assessment of the quality of both technical and organizational aspects involved in safety. The method for the assessment is based on judging the quality of fulfillment of a number of essential issues for safety i.e. through audit, interview and/or discussions with personnel and management in plant. However, special consideration should be given to the data processing regarding the fuzzy nature of the data i.e. in answering the questionnaire. To accommodate this situation, the SCAP, a computer program based on fuzzy logic for assessing plant safety status, has been developed. As a case study, the experience in the assessment of Kartini research reactor safety status shows that it is strongly related to the implementation of quality assurance program in reactor operation and awareness of reactor operation staffs to safety culture practice. It is also shown that the application of the fuzzy rule in assessing reactor safety status gives a more realistic result than the traditional approach. (author)

  7. The biological basis of plutonium safety standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mole, R.H.

    1976-01-01

    Since no radiation injury or cancer in man can, as yet, be directly attributed to Pu, all safety standards for Pu must be determined by reference to other safety standards, development of which is discussed. A system of safety standards must be based on links with real damage, such as the requirement for 226 Ra in bone. The type of biological information required for making standards realistic is considered in relation to Pu and Ra in bone. Also considered are the possible effects of Pu in soft tissue such as bone marrow. Not only dose, but also the number of cells exposed to the dose are important biologically and cellular aspects are examined. Since there is no positive evidence of Pu toxicity relevant information on other α emitters must be examined. The observed effectiveness of Ra, daughters of 222 Ra and 232 Th in causing mutations and cancer, is surveyed. Reference is made to the necessity of improving the ICRP system, currently based on the critical organ concept, by recognising the need for summation of risks in other organs where exposure to Pu is concerned. Improved biological understanding particularly that of hereditary damage, in recent years leads to less pessimistic thinking on the effects of ionizing radiations. The immediate need appears to be for consistency in safety standards. (U.K.)

  8. Cost basis for implementing ALARA programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kent, C.E.

    1985-01-01

    A method of implementing effective ALARA programs is discussed. A basic element of the cost benefit methodology is the valuation of a man-rem. In the program, this is derived from an assessment of radiation exposure risk and societal valuation of harmful effects. The man-rem value is used as an element in the cost benefit analysis. The analysis includes an assessment of the differential man-rem resulting from the action, implementation cost, and operational savings

  9. Supporting Fernald Site Closure with Integrated Health and Safety Plans as Documented Safety Analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kohler, S.; Brown, T.; Fisk, P.; Krach, F.; Klein, B.

    2004-01-01

    At the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) near Cincinnati, Ohio, environmental restoration activities are supported by Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) that combine the required project-specific Health and Safety Plans, Safety Basis Requirements (SBRs), and Process Requirements (PRs) into single Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs). These integrated DSAs employ Integrated Safety Management methodology in support of simplified restoration and remediation activities that, so far, have resulted in the decontamination and demolition (D and D) of over 200 structures, including eight major nuclear production plants. There is one of twelve nuclear facilities still remaining (Silos containing uranium ore residues) with its own safety basis documentation. This paper presents the status of the FCP's safety basis documentation program, illustrating that all of the former nuclear facilities and activities have now replaced. Basis of Interim Operations (BIOs) with I-HASPs as their safety basis during the closure process

  10. Safety critical FPGA-based NPP instrumentation and control systems: assessment, development and implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bakhmach, E. S.; Siora, A. A.; Tokarev, V. I.; Kharchenko, V. S.; Sklyar, V. V.; Andrashov, A. A.

    2010-10-01

    The stages of development, production, verification, licensing and implementation methods and technologies of safety critical instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants (NPP) based on FPGA (Field Programmable Gates Arrays) technologies are described. A life cycle model and multi-version technologies of dependability and safety assurance of FPGA-based instrumentation and control systems are discussed. An analysis of NPP instrumentation and control systems construction principles developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy using FPGA-technologies and results of these systems implementation and operation at Ukrainian and Bulgarian NPP are presented. The RADIY TM platform has been designed and developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy, Ukraine. The main peculiarity of the RADIY TM platform is the use of FPGA as programmable components for logic control operation. The FPGA-based RADIY TM platform used for NPP instrumentation and control systems development ensures sca lability of system functions types, volume and peculiarities (by changing quantity and quality of sensors, actuators, input/output signals and control algorithms); sca lability of dependability (safety integrity) (by changing a number of redundant channel, tiers, diagnostic and reconfiguration procedures); sca lability of diversity (by changing types, depth and method of diversity selection). (Author)

  11. Implementation of the surgical safety checklist in Switzerland and perceptions of its benefits: cross-sectional survey.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stéphane Cullati

    Full Text Available OBJECTIVES: To examine the implementation of the Surgical Safety Checklist (SSC among surgeons and anaesthetists working in Swiss hospitals and clinics and their perceptions of the SSC. METHODS: Cross-sectional survey at the 97th Annual Meeting of the Swiss Society of Surgery, Switzerland, 2010. Opinions of the SSC were assessed with a 6-item questionnaire. RESULTS: 152 respondents answered the questionnaire (participation rate 35.1%. 64.7% respondents acknowledged having a checklist in their hospital or their clinic. Median implementation year was 2009. More than 8 out of 10 respondents reported their team applied the Sign In and the Time Out very often or quasi systematically, whereas almost half of respondents acknowledged the Sign Out was applied never or rarely. The majority of respondents agreed that the checklist improves safety and team communication, and helps to develop a safety culture. However, they were less supportive about the opinion that the checklist facilitates teamwork and eliminates social hierarchy between caregivers. CONCLUSIONS: This survey indicates that the SSC has been largely implemented in many Swiss hospitals and clinics. Both surgeons and anaesthetists perceived the SSC as a valuable tool in improving intraoperative patient safety and communication among health care professionals, with lesser importance in facilitating teamwork (and eliminating hierarchical categories.

  12. How Talisman Energy implemented oilfield fleet safety using event driven AVL technologies from TELUS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Munroe, D. [Telus Energy Sector Organization, Calgary, AB (Canada)

    2006-07-01

    This conference presentation provided information on how Talisman Energy implemented oilfield fleet safety using event driven automated vehicle location (AVL) technologies from TELUS. Background information on Telus in the energy sector, Telus geomatics, Telus mobile resource management (MRM) application modules, as well as Talisman Energy was first provided. Talisman looked to Telus for AVL technologies because it had a need to identify where employees were working, when they arrived and how long they were there. Prior to meeting with TELUS, Talisman Energy had implemented a system consisting of a trunk radio network to transmit data to the control room on the employee's location, however, it was unable to use the radio network to dispatch orders and communicate on an as-needed basis. TELUS had implemented a customized solution that tracks vehicles and provides an easy method of communication for employees to track how long they are working at a site. The service provides the control centre with the tools to monitor the location of the vehicles on a map, and communicate to the employee via a horn when their time has expired at the site. If the employee does not respond, the control room can call the nearest personnel to check on the worker's status. The integrated TELUS solutions uses Global Positioning System (GPS), Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Wireless communication over the Internet. The presentation provided numerous Talisman specific maps. It concluded with several issues to consider such as cross platform cellular communications supported on a single hardware platform; additional support for Satellite communications utilizing the same GIS platform; the need for extensive support for peripheral devices; and, the need for extensive roaming capabilities. tabs., figs.

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  15. Joint nuclear safety research projects between the US and Russian Federation International Nuclear Safety Centers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bougaenko, S.E.; Kraev, A.E.; Hill, D.L.; Braun, J.C.; Klickman, A.E.

    1998-01-01

    The Russian Federation Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the US Department of Energy (USDOE) formed international Nuclear Safety Centers in October 1995 and July 1996, respectively, to collaborate on nuclear safety research. Since January 1997, the two centers have initiated the following nine joint research projects: (1) INSC web servers and databases; (2) Material properties measurement and assessment; (3) Coupled codes: Neutronic, thermal-hydraulic, mechanical and other; (4) Severe accident management for Soviet-designed reactors; (5) Transient management and advanced control; (6) Survey of relevant nuclear safety research facilities in the Russian Federation; (8) Advanced structural analysis; and (9) Development of a nuclear safety research and development plan for MINATOM. The joint projects were selected on the basis of recommendations from two groups of experts convened by NEA and from evaluations of safety impact, cost, and deployment potential. The paper summarizes the projects, including the long-term goals, the implementing strategy and some recent accomplishments for each project

  16. Implementing and measuring safety goals and safety culture. 4. Utility's Activities for Better Safety Culture After the JCO Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omoto, Akira

    2001-01-01

    three activities described below. As a part of self-diagnosis of organizational behavior and an individual's factors influencing safety, measurement was carried out by asking questions to every employee at the station, i.e., 21 questions asking if we are appropriately implementing safety culture 'standards' as set forth in INSAG-4 (Ref. 2). The purpose was twofold: to educate about INSAG-4 and to find areas for improvement. The results indicated that employees want to learn more about (a) the background for the specific actions required/prescribed in the procedures/guidelines and (b) how things go wrong if they do not strictly follow the procedures/guidelines. These were important findings, which led to the reconstruction of the on-site education and training. Considering that employees should be well informed on safety culture; management's policy; and lessons learned from incidents, domestic or international, we started the bimonthly magazine Safety Culture. The first publication included articles on 'Lessons Learned from JCO', 'The Results from the Self- Diagnosis', 'Lessons from an Incident at Hunterston NPS (LOOP Followed by Operator Actions for Safe Shutdown)', and others. The on-site training system has two elements: on-the-job training and off-the-job study with classroom and hands-on training. Most of the employees are trained at the On-Site Training Center with equipment and are qualified for specific job categories. Training of operators has its own lengthy program. Given the foregoing findings, we (a) started lectures on JCO lessons learned, (b) modified the educational system at the On-Site Training Center to nurture the employees with well-balanced knowledge and thinking (Fig. 1), and (c) prepared documents that describe the background and reasons for the actions required/prescribed in the procedures/guidelines for use in on-the-job training. The important point to be remembered about the JCO accident is that the criticality safety at this facility

  17. Risk management for drinking water safety in low and middle income countries - cultural influences on water safety plan (WSP) implementation in urban water utilities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Omar, Yahya Y; Parker, Alison; Smith, Jennifer A; Pollard, Simon J T

    2017-01-15

    We investigated cultural influences on the implementation of water safety plans (WSPs) using case studies from WSP pilots in India, Uganda and Jamaica. A comprehensive thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews (n=150 utility customers, n=32 WSP 'implementers' and n=9 WSP 'promoters'), field observations and related documents revealed 12 cultural themes, offered as 'enabling', 'limiting', or 'neutral', that influence WSP implementation in urban water utilities to varying extents. Aspects such as a 'deliver first, safety later' mind set; supply system knowledge management and storage practices; and non-compliance are deemed influential. Emergent themes of cultural influence (ET1 to ET12) are discussed by reference to the risk management, development studies and institutional culture literatures; by reference to their positive, negative or neutral influence on WSP implementation. The results have implications for the utility endorsement of WSPs, for the impact of organisational cultures on WSP implementation; for the scale-up of pilot studies; and they support repeated calls from practitioner communities for cultural attentiveness during WSP design. Findings on organisational cultures mirror those from utilities in higher income nations implementing WSPs - leadership, advocacy among promoters and customers (not just implementers) and purposeful knowledge management are critical to WSP success. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  18. Selection of design basis event for modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Hiroyuki; Nakagawa, Shigeaki; Ohashi, Hirofumi

    2016-06-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been investigating safety requirements and basic approach of safety guidelines for modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) aiming to increase internarial contribution for nuclear safety by developing an international HTGR safety standard under International Atomic Energy Agency. In this study, we investigate a deterministic approach to select design basis events utilizing information obtained from probabilistic approach. In addition, selections of design basis events are conducted for commercial HTGR designed by JAEA. As a result, an approach for selecting design basis event considering multiple failures of safety systems is established which has not been considered as design basis in the safety guideline for existing nuclear facility. Furthermore, selection of design basis events for commercial HTGR has completed. This report provides an approach and procedure for selecting design basis events of modular HTGR as well as selected events for the commercial HTGR, GTHTR300. (author)

  19. DS424: A Roadmap for the Implementation of the IAEA Safety Standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yllera, Javier

    2010-01-01

    Many countries interested in developing nuclear power programmes for the first time need to have experience in using and regulating radioactive source materials. They need to have experience in building and operating large non-nuclear construction projects. Nuclear power has unique attributes and commitments associated with it that other industries do not. Although undertaken as a national endeavour with many national implications, building and operating a nuclear facility also has global implications (financial, political, safety, etc.). DG’s 2008 General Conference speech: “Every country has the right to introduce nuclear power, as well as the responsibility to do it right.”. The development of IAEA Safety Standards is an statutory function of the IAEA (article III of the IAEA Statute): “The Agency is authorized to establish or adopt… standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property…”. New guide (DS 424) constitutes a “Road-map” to apply the entire suite of IAEA Safety Standards progressively during the early phases of the implementation of a nuclear power programme. IAEA safety review missions based on internationally agreed safety standards are well established and are the best tools to build up confidence on the capacity of a country to develop nuclear energy in a safe way

  20. The End-To-End Safety Verification Process Implemented to Ensure Safe Operations of the Columbus Research Module

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arndt, J.; Kreimer, J.

    2010-09-01

    The European Space Laboratory COLUMBUS was launched in February 2008 with NASA Space Shuttle Atlantis. Since successful docking and activation this manned laboratory forms part of the International Space Station(ISS). Depending on the objectives of the Mission Increments the on-orbit configuration of the COLUMBUS Module varies with each increment. This paper describes the end-to-end verification which has been implemented to ensure safe operations under the condition of a changing on-orbit configuration. That verification process has to cover not only the configuration changes as foreseen by the Mission Increment planning but also those configuration changes on short notice which become necessary due to near real-time requests initiated by crew or Flight Control, and changes - most challenging since unpredictable - due to on-orbit anomalies. Subject of the safety verification is on one hand the on orbit configuration itself including the hardware and software products, on the other hand the related Ground facilities needed for commanding of and communication to the on-orbit System. But also the operational products, e.g. the procedures prepared for crew and ground control in accordance to increment planning, are subject of the overall safety verification. In order to analyse the on-orbit configuration for potential hazards and to verify the implementation of the related Safety required hazard controls, a hierarchical approach is applied. The key element of the analytical safety integration of the whole COLUMBUS Payload Complement including hardware owned by International Partners is the Integrated Experiment Hazard Assessment(IEHA). The IEHA especially identifies those hazardous scenarios which could potentially arise through physical and operational interaction of experiments. A major challenge is the implementation of a Safety process which owns quite some rigidity in order to provide reliable verification of on-board Safety and which likewise provides enough

  1. A prioritization of generic safety issues. Supplement 21, Revision insertion instructions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    1996-12-31

    The report presents the safety priority ranking for generic safety issues related to nuclear power plants. The purpose of these rankings is to assist in the timely and efficient allocation of NRC resources for the resolution of those safety issues that have a significant potential for reducing risk. The safety priority rankings are HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, and DROP, and have been assigned on the basis of risk significance estimates, the ratio of risk to costs and other impacts estimated to result if resolution of the safety issues were implemented, and the consideration of uncertainties and other quantitative or qualitative factors. To the extent practical, estimates are quantitative.

  2. A prioritization of generic safety issues. Supplement 21, Revision insertion instructions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The report presents the safety priority ranking for generic safety issues related to nuclear power plants. The purpose of these rankings is to assist in the timely and efficient allocation of NRC resources for the resolution of those safety issues that have a significant potential for reducing risk. The safety priority rankings are HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, and DROP, and have been assigned on the basis of risk significance estimates, the ratio of risk to costs and other impacts estimated to result if resolution of the safety issues were implemented, and the consideration of uncertainties and other quantitative or qualitative factors. To the extent practical, estimates are quantitative.

  3. Design a Smart Control Strategy to Implement an Intelligent Energy Safety and Management System

    OpenAIRE

    Jing-Min Wang; Ming-Ta Yang

    2014-01-01

    The energy saving and electricity safety are today a cause for increasing concern for homes and buildings. Integrating the radio frequency identification (RFID) and ZigBee wireless sensor network (WSN) mature technologies, the paper designs a smart control strategy to implement an intelligent energy safety and management system (IESMS) which performs energy measuring, controlling, monitoring, and saving of the power outlet system. The presented RFID and billing module is used to identify user...

  4. TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT FOR NATURAL EVENT HAZARDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRIPPS, L.J.

    2006-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support the documented safety analysis (DSA) and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for natural event hazard (NEH)-initiated accidents. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls

  5. Charged-particle beam: a safety mandate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Young, K.C.

    1983-01-01

    The Advanced Test Accelerator (ATA) is a recent development in the field of charged particle beam research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. With this experimental apparatus, researchers will characterize intense pulses of electron beams propagated through air. Inherent with the ATA concept was the potential for exposure to hazards, such as high radiation levels and hostile breathing atmospheres. The need for a comprehensive safety program was mandated; a formal system safety program was implemented during the project's conceptual phase. A project staff position was created for a safety analyst who would act as a liaison between the project staff and the safety department. Additionally, the safety analyst would be responsible for compiling various hazards analyses reports, which formed the basis of th project's Safety Analysis Report. Recommendations for safety features from the hazards analysis reports were incorporated as necessary at appropriate phases in project development rather than adding features afterwards. The safety program established for the ATA project faciliated in controlling losses and in achieving a low-level of acceptable risk

  6. Challenges in strengthening radiation safety and security programme in Malaysia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noriah, M.A.

    2010-01-01

    This paper illustrates the Malaysian experience in implementing steps in strengthening radiation safety and security through certification of radiation safety personnel, which is dedicated to meet the current and future needs in sustainability of radiation safety and security systems. Commitment from the workforce to treat safety as a priority and the ability to turn a requirement into a practical language is also important in implementing the radiation safety policy efficiently. Through this effort, we are able to create a basis for adequate protection of workers, the public and the environment and encourage licensees to manage radiation safety and security based on performance, and not on compliance culture, with the final objective of professing a safety culture through self regulation. This will certainly benefit an organisation with ultimate goals are to continuously strive for a healthy, accident free and environmentally sound workplace and community, while providing the technical support needed to meet the national mission. This will strengthen the radiation safety and security programme and could be used to assist in manpower development once Malaysia makes the decision to embark on a nuclear power programme. (author)

  7. The Safety Case and Safety Assessment for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-09-15

    This Safety Guide provides guidance and recommendations on meeting the safety requirements in respect of the safety case and supporting safety assessment for the disposal of radioactive waste. The safety case and supporting safety assessment provide the basis for demonstration of safety and for licensing of radioactive waste disposal facilities and assist and guide decisions on siting, design and operations. The safety case is also the main basis on which dialogue with interested parties is conducted and on which confidence in the safety of the disposal facility is developed. This Safety Guide is relevant for operating organizations preparing the safety case as well as for the regulatory body responsible for developing the regulations and regulatory guidance that determine the basis and scope of the safety case. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Demonstrating the safety of radioactive waste disposal; 3. Safety principles and safety requirements; 4. The safety case for disposal of radioactive waste; 5. Radiological impact assessment for the period after closure; 6. Specific issues; 7. Documentation and use of the safety case; 8. Regulatory review process.

  8. The current CEA/DRN safety approach for the design and the assessment of non-electrical applications of nuclear heat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiorini, G.L.; Costa, M.

    2000-01-01

    This paper presents the basis of the safety approach currently implemented by the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique - Nuclear Reactor Directorate (CEA/DRN), both for the design and the assessment of innovative systems and future nuclear installations. It is considered that the described approach is applicable to the plants built for non-electrical applications of nuclear heat. This is typically the case of Nuclear Desalination Installations. This approach is the result of the experience maturated, within the context of the CEA/DRN Innovative Programme, through practical applications over several future concepts (both fission and fusion plants). The background of this experience is structured coherently with the European Safety Authorities recommendations, the European Utilities Requirements (EUR) and the ''fundamental safety objectives'' defined by the IAEA. The Defence In Depth principle and its application, by means, among others, of the barrier concept, remains the basis of the safety design process of future nuclear installations. Its adequacy is checked through the safety assessment. The methodology for Lines of Defence (LOD) implementation as well as the one for the LOD architecture assessment is shown and motivated. The document shows that the clear and unambiguous definition of the safety approach provides an essential base for the organisation of the design tasks, being sure that the safety aspects are correctly taken into account and implemented, and for an adequate safety assessment of the final design, both from qualitative point of view as well as for the quantitative safety analysis. (author)

  9. The specific tasks of RF TSO - FSUE VO 'Safety', related with Implementation of obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potapov, V.; Kuznetsov, M.; Kapralov, E.

    2010-01-01

    It was more than 20 years ago that IAEA discussed the issue pertaining to the need in scientific and engineering support to the regulatory body. The Convention on Nuclear Safety being the keystone in assurance of the global nuclear safety and security regime was adopted in 1994. It is pointed out that two independent organizations supervised by Rostechnadzor have been established within the Russian TSO system, FSUE VO 'Safety' being one of them. The tasks of the organization comprise obligatory certification of equipment as well as acceptance of equipment before its delivery to the NPP both in Russia and in the countries constructing the power units based on the Russian designs. The acceptance procedure has been set forth in the new Russian document at the level of the federal rules and regulations for nuclear safety assurance. As far as its implementation decision is concerned, a task for selection and training of personnel has been set and allocated on the Training and Methodological Center of Nuclear and Radiation Safety established with the support of FSUE VO 'Safety', which provides training programmes and specific lecture courses in the wide range of the relevant topics. (author)

  10. Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources. Safety Guide (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide is intended to assist States in implementing the requirements established in Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1, Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, for a national regulatory infrastructure to regulate any practice involving radiation sources in medicine, industry, research, agriculture and education. The Safety Guide provides advice on the legislative basis for establishing regulatory bodies, including the effective independence of the regulatory body. It also provides guidance on implementing the functions and activities of regulatory bodies: the development of regulations and guides on radiation safety; implementation of a system for notification and authorization; carrying out regulatory inspections; taking necessary enforcement actions; and investigating accidents and circumstances potentially giving rise to accidents. The various aspects relating to the regulatory control of consumer products are explained, including justification, optimization of exposure, safety assessment and authorization. Guidance is also provided on the organization and staffing of regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Legal framework for a regulatory infrastructure; 3. Principal functions and activities of the regulatory body; 4. Regulatory control of the supply of consumer products; 5. Functions of the regulatory body shared with other governmental agencies; 6. Organization and staffing of the regulatory body; 7. Documentation of the functions and activities of the regulatory body; 8. Support services; 9. Quality management for the regulatory system.

  11. Design and Implementation of the Harvard Fellowship in Patient Safety and Quality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gandhi, Tejal K; Abookire, Susan A; Kachalia, Allen; Sands, Kenneth; Mort, Elizabeth; Bommarito, Grace; Gagne, Jane; Sato, Luke; Weingart, Saul N

    2016-01-01

    The Harvard Fellowship in Patient Safety and Quality is a 2-year physician-oriented training program with a strong operational orientation, embedding trainees in the quality departments of participating hospitals. It also integrates didactic and experiential learning and offers the option of obtaining a master's degree in public health. The program focuses on methodologically rigorous improvement and measurement, with an emphasis on the development and implementation of innovative practice. The operational orientation is intended to foster the professional development of future quality and safety leaders. The purpose of this article is to describe the design and development of the fellowship. © The Author(s) 2014.

  12. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Safety criteria for ferrocyanide watch list tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Postma, A.K.; Meacham, J.E.; Barney, G.S.

    1994-01-01

    This report provides a technical basis for closing the ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) at the Hanford Site. Three work efforts were performed in developing this technical basis. The efforts described herein are: 1. The formulation of criteria for ranking the relative safety of waste in each ferrocyanide tank. 2. The current classification of tanks into safety categories by comparing available information on tank contents with the safety criteria; 3. The identification of additional information required to resolve the ferrocyanide safety issue

  13. Implementation of a radiological safety management system in a hospital of Mexico City

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martinez V, D.; Rivera M, T.; Velez D, V.

    2007-01-01

    Full text: The reflection of this work is based in some radiological accidents that its have happened in some hospital centers or of research. The over exposure of some people is due to the pursuit of the procedures, the lack of quality assurance of the equipment or the inappropriate actions of the technicians. In Mexico one has seen in several hospitals the lack of existence of a Quality Assurance Program to prevent the accidents, the execution of the same ones and those good practices and the lack of Safety Culture makes that the hospital radiological safety it is faulty. The objective of the present work is the implementation of a radiological safety management in a hospital of Mexico City. (Author)

  14. Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Technical Basis Guide Describing How to Perform Safety Margin Configuration Risk Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Curtis Smith; James Knudsen; Bentley Harwood

    2013-08-01

    The INL has carried out a demonstration of the RISMC approach for the purpose of configuration risk management. We have shown how improved accuracy and realism can be achieved by simulating changes in risk – as a function of different configurations – in order to determine safety margins as the plant is modified. We described the various technical issues that play a role in these configuration-based calculations with the intent that future applications can take advantage of the analysis benefits while avoiding some of the technical pitfalls that are found for these types of calculations. Specific recommendations have been provided on a variety of topics aimed at improving the safety margin analysis and strengthening the technical basis behind the analysis process.

  15. Technical basis for evaluating electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference in safety-related I ampersand C systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, P.D.; Korsah, K.

    1994-04-01

    This report discusses the development of the technical basis for the control of upsets and malfunctions in safety-related instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems caused by electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference (EMI/RFI) and power surges. The research was performed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and was sponsored by the USNRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). The motivation for research stems from the safety-related issues that need to be addressed with the application of advanced I ampersand C systems to nuclear power plants. Development of the technical basis centered around establishing good engineering practices to ensure that sufficient levels of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) are maintained between the nuclear power plant's electronic and electromechanical systems known to be the source(s) of EMI/RFI and power surges. First, good EMC design and installation practices need to be established to control the impact of interference sources on nearby circuits and systems. These EMC good practices include circuit layouts, terminations, filtering, grounding, bonding, shielding, and adequate physical separation. Second, an EMI/RFI test and evaluation program needs to be established to outline the tests to be performed, the associated test methods to be followed, and carefully formulated acceptance criteria based on the intended environment to ensure that the circuit or system under test meets the recommended guidelines. Third, a program needs to be developed to perform confirmatory tests and evaluate the surge withstand capability (SWC) and of I ampersand C equipment connected to or installed in the vicinity of power circuits within the nuclear power plant. By following these three steps, the design and operability of safety-related I ampersand C systems against EMI/RFI and power surges can be evaluated, acceptance criteria can be developed, and appropriate regulatory guidance can be provided

  16. Safety critical FPGA-based NPP instrumentation and control systems: assessment, development and implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bakhmach, E. S.; Siora, A. A.; Tokarev, V. I. [Research and Production Corporation Radiy, 29 Geroev Stalingrada Str., Kirovograd 25006 (Ukraine); Kharchenko, V. S.; Sklyar, V. V.; Andrashov, A. A., E-mail: marketing@radiy.co [Center for Safety Infrastructure-Oriented Research and Analysis, 37 Astronomicheskaya Str., Kharkiv 61085 (Ukraine)

    2010-10-15

    The stages of development, production, verification, licensing and implementation methods and technologies of safety critical instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants (NPP) based on FPGA (Field Programmable Gates Arrays) technologies are described. A life cycle model and multi-version technologies of dependability and safety assurance of FPGA-based instrumentation and control systems are discussed. An analysis of NPP instrumentation and control systems construction principles developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy using FPGA-technologies and results of these systems implementation and operation at Ukrainian and Bulgarian NPP are presented. The RADIY{sup TM} platform has been designed and developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy, Ukraine. The main peculiarity of the RADIY{sup TM} platform is the use of FPGA as programmable components for logic control operation. The FPGA-based RADIY{sup TM} platform used for NPP instrumentation and control systems development ensures sca lability of system functions types, volume and peculiarities (by changing quantity and quality of sensors, actuators, input/output signals and control algorithms); sca lability of dependability (safety integrity) (by changing a number of redundant channel, tiers, diagnostic and reconfiguration procedures); sca lability of diversity (by changing types, depth and method of diversity selection). (Author)

  17. Safety assessment as basis for the decision making process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilie, P.; Didita, L.; Danchiv, A.

    2005-01-01

    This paper deals with the safety assessment for a new near surface repository, particularly for the early stage of repository development using ISAM (Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities) safety assessment methodology. In this stage of the repository life cycle the main purpose of the safety assessment is to demonstrate that the plant is capable to be constructed and operated safely. The paper is based on development of the ASAM (Application of the Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near-Surface Disposal Facilities) Decision Support Subgroup of the Common Aspects Working Group. The implications of decision making for the application of the ISAM methodology on post-closure safety assessment are analysed. Some important elements of the decision-making process with impact on key components of the ISAM process are described. Following the development of Decision Support Subgroup of the ASAM Common Aspects Working Group the proposed change of ISAM methodology is analysed. This approach puts all activities in a decision context where the first iteration of the safety assessment is based on the existing state of knowledge and the initial engineering design. Confidence in the process is accomplished through the direct inclusion of all decision makers and stakeholders in the formulation of decisions, the definition of the state of knowledge, and decision making activities. The decision process is developed in context of undertaking assessments with little site-specific information, this situation is specifically for new planned repository. Limited site-specific information can result in a high degree of uncertainty, therefore it is important first of all to identify the sources of uncertainty arising from the limited nature of the site-specific information and then to apply appropriate approaches to manage the uncertainties and to determine whether the uncertainties are important to the overall safety of the disposal facility

  18. Implementing national nuclear safety plan at the preliminary stage of nuclear power project development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xue Yabin; Cui Shaozhang; Pan Fengguo; Zhang Lizhen; Shi Yonggang

    2014-01-01

    This study discusses the importance of nuclear power project design and engineering methods at the preliminary stage of its development on nuclear power plant's operational safety from the professional view. Specifically, we share our understanding of national nuclear safety plan's requirement on new reactor accident probability, technology, site selection, as well as building and improving nuclear safety culture and strengthening public participation, with a focus on plan's implications on preliminary stage of nuclear power project development. Last, we introduce China Huaneng Group's work on nuclear power project preliminary development and the experience accumulated during the process. By analyzing the siting philosophy of nuclear power plant and the necessity of building nuclear safety culture at the preliminary stage of nuclear power project development, this study explicates how to fully implement the nuclear safety plan's requirements at the preliminary stage of nuclear power project development. (authors)

  19. A strategic approach for Water Safety Plans implementation in Portugal.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vieira, Jose M P

    2011-03-01

    Effective risk assessment and risk management approaches in public drinking water systems can benefit from a systematic process for hazards identification and effective management control based on the Water Safety Plan (WSP) concept. Good results from WSP development and implementation in a small number of Portuguese water utilities have shown that a more ambitious nationwide strategic approach to disseminate this methodology is needed. However, the establishment of strategic frameworks for systematic and organic scaling-up of WSP implementation at a national level requires major constraints to be overcome: lack of legislation and policies and the need for appropriate monitoring tools. This study presents a framework to inform future policy making by understanding the key constraints and needs related to institutional, organizational and research issues for WSP development and implementation in Portugal. This methodological contribution for WSP implementation can be replicated at a global scale. National health authorities and the Regulator may promote changes in legislation and policies. Independent global monitoring and benchmarking are adequate tools for measuring the progress over time and for comparing the performance of water utilities. Water utilities self-assessment must include performance improvement, operational monitoring and verification. Research and education and resources dissemination ensure knowledge acquisition and transfer.

  20. Nuclear safety and security culture - an integrated approach to regulatory oversight

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tronea, M.; Ciurea Ercau, C.

    2013-01-01

    The paper presents the development and implementation of regulatory guidelines for the oversight of safety and security culture within licensees organizations. CNCAN (the National Commission for Nuclear Activities of Romania) has used the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attributes for a strong safety culture as the basis for its regulatory guidelines providing support to the reviewers and inspectors for recognizing and gathering information relevant to safety culture. These guidelines are in process of being extended to address also security culture, based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7 document Nuclear Security Culture: Implementing Guide. Recognizing that safety and security cultures coexist and need to reinforce each other because they share the common objective of limiting risk and that similar regulatory review and inspection processes are in place for nuclear security oversight, an integrated approach is considered justified, moreover since the common elements of these cultures outweigh the differences. (authors)

  1. Evaluation and review of the safety management system implementation in the Royal Thai Air Force

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chaiwan, Sakkarin

    This study was designed to determine situation and effectiveness of the safety management system currently implemented in the Royal Thai Air Force. Reviewing the ICAO's SMS and the RTAF's SMS was conducted to identify similarities and differences between the two safety management systems. Later, the researcher acquired safety statistics from the RTAF Safety Center to investigate effectiveness of its safety system. The researcher also collected data to identify other factors affecting effectiveness of the safety system during conducting in-depth interviews. Findings and Conclusions: The study shows that the Royal Thai Air Force has never applied the International Civil Aviation Organization's Safety management System to its safety system. However, the RTAF's SMS and the ICAO's SMS have been developed based on the same concepts. These concepts are from Richard H. Woods's book, Aviation safety programs: A management handbook. However, the effectiveness of the Royal Thai Air Force's safety system is in good stance. An accident rate has been decreasing regularly but there are no known factors to describe the increasing rate, according to the participants' opinion. The participants have informed that there are many issues to be resolved to improve the RTAF's safety system. Those issues are cooperation among safety center's staffs, attitude toward safety of the RTAF senior commanders, and safety standards.

  2. Integrated safety assessment report, Haddam Neck Plant (Docket No. 50-213): Integrated Safety Assessment Program: Draft report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-07-01

    The integrated assessment is conducted on a plant-specific basis to evaluate all licensing actions, licensee initiated plant improvements and selected unresolved generic/safety issues to establish implementation schedules for each item. Procedures allow for a periodic updating of the schedules to account for licensing issues that arise in the future. The Haddam Neck Plant is one of two plants being reviewed under the pilot program. This report indicates how 82 topics selected for review were addressed, and presents the staff's recommendations regarding the corrective actions to resolve the 82 topics and other actions to enhance plant safety. 135 refs., 4 figs., 5 tabs

  3. What are occupational safety and health management systems and why do companies implement them?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Zwetsloot, G.I.J.M.

    2014-01-01

    In company practice and in governmental legislation, it is increasingly acknowledged that occupational safety and health (OSH) management should be performed systematically and continually. Implementing an OSH Management System (OSH MS) is the major strategy to achieve this.

  4. CNS Orientations, Safety Objectives and Implementation of the Defence in Depth Concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lacoste, A.C., E-mail: Andre-Claude.LACOSTE@asn.fr [Autorité de Sureté Nucléaire, Montrouge (France)

    2014-10-15

    Full text: The 6th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) is convened in Vienna next year for two weeks from Monday March 24{sup th} to Friday April 4{sup th} 2014. The consequences and the lessons learnt from the accident that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant will be a major issue. The 2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS in August 2012 was totally devoted to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. One of its main conclusions was Conclusion 17 included in the summary report which says: ''Nuclear power plants should be designed, constructed and operated with the objectives of preventing accidents and, should an accident occur, mitigating its effects and avoiding off-site contamination. The Contracting Parties also noted that regulatory authorities should ensure that these objectives are applied in order to identify and implement appropriate safety improvements at existing plants''. The wording of the sentences of Conclusion 17 dedicated, the first one to new built reactors, the second one to existing plants, can be improved and clarified. But obviously the issue of the off-site consequences of an accident is fundamental. So the in-depth question comes: what can and should be done to achieve these safety objectives? And in particular how to improve the definition and then the implementation of the Defence in Depth Concept? From my point of view, this is clearly the main issue of this Conference. (author)

  5. Emergency procedures beyond design basis ''Feed and Bleed''

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dominguez Bautista, M.T.; Campuzano Pena, F.

    1994-01-01

    The incorporation of Beyond-Design-Basis Emergency Procedures, also called the Emergency Manual or Severe Accident Manual, has been an important step forward in nuclear power plant safety. These procedures cover situations in which the deterministic criteria used in plant design have been contravened. In such situations new accident scenarios, unforeseen system actions or a combination of both, need to be considered. Establishing these procedures is actually the last in a sequence of activities the sequence includes definition of scenarios, study of their phenomena, analysis of optional system actions, verification of their effectiveness and finally, implementation of the procedure. The systematization of these new strategies is supported by the results of the probabilistic analyses which serve in this case to pinpoint the objectives of these strategies. This paper describes the application of this methodology in the definition of a procedure for heat sink recovery on the secondary side (feed and bleed) if this has been totally or partially lost in a beyond-design-basis event. (Author)

  6. [Design, implementation and evaluation of a management model of patient safety in hospitals in Catalonia, Spain].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saura, Rosa Maria; Moreno, Pilar; Vallejo, Paula; Oliva, Glòria; Alava, Fernando; Esquerra, Miquel; Davins, Josep; Vallès, Roser; Bañeres, Joaquim

    2014-07-01

    Since its inception in 2006, the Alliance for Patient Safety in Catalonia has played a major role in promoting and shaping a series of projects related to the strategy of the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality, for improving patient safety. One such project was the creation of functional units or committees of safety in hospitals in order to facilitate the management of patient safety. The strategy has been implemented in hospitals in Catalonia which were selected based on criteria of representativeness. The intervention was based on two lines of action, one to develop the model framework and the other for its development. Firstly the strategy for safety management based on EFQM (European Foundation for Quality Management) was defined with the development of standards, targets and indicators to implement security while the second part involved the introduction of tools, methodologies and knowledge to the management support of patient safety and risk prevention. The project was developed in four hospital areas considered higher risk, each assuming six goals for safety management. Some of these targets such as the security control panel or system of adverse event reporting were shared. 23 hospitals joined the project in Catalonia. Despite the different situations in each centre, high compliance was achieved in the development of the objectives. In each of the participating areas the security control panel was developed. Stable structures for safety management were established or strengthened. Training in patient safety played and important role, 1415 professionals participated. Through these kind of projects not only have been introduced programs of proven effectiveness in reducing risks, but they also provide to the facilities a work system that allows autonomy in diagnosis and analysis of the different risk situations or centre specific safety issues. Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier Espana.

  7. Radiation Safety Analysis In The NFEC For Assessing Possible Implementation Of The ICRP-60 Standard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yowono, I.

    1998-01-01

    Radiation safety analysis of the 3 facilities in the nuclear fuel element center (NFEC) for assessing possible implementation of the ICRP-60 standard has been done. The analysis has covered the radiation dose received by workers, dose rate in the working area, surface contamination level, air contamination level and the level of radioactive gas release to the environment. The analysis has been based on BATAN regulation and ICRP-60 standard. The result of the analysis has showed that the highest radiation dose received has been found to be only around 15% of the set value in the ICRP-60 standard and only 6% of the set value in the BATAN regulation. Thus the ICRP-60 as radiation safety standard could be implemented without changing the laboratory design

  8. Common basis of establishing safety standards and other safety decision-making levels for different sources of health risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Demin, V.F.

    2002-01-01

    Current approaches in establishing safety standards and other decision-making levels for different sources of health risk are critically analysed. To have a common basis for this decision-making a specific risk index R is recommended. In the common sense R is quantitatively defined as LLE caused by the annual exposure to the risk source considered: R = annual exposure, damage (LLE) from the exposure unit. This common definition is also rewritten in specific forms for a set of different risk sources (ionising radiation, chemical pollutants, etc): for different risk sources the exposure can be measured with different quantities (the probability of death, the exposure dose, etc.). R is relative LLE: LLE in years referred to 1 year under the risk. The dimension of this value is [year/year]. In the statistical sense R is conditionally the share of the year, which is lost due to exposure to a risk source during this year. In this sense R can be called as the relative damage. Really lifetime years are lost after the exposure. R can be in some conditional sense considered as a dimensionless quantity. General safety standards R n for the public and occupational workers have been suggested in terms of this index: R n = 0.0007 and 0.01 accordingly. Secondary safety standards are derived for a number of risk sources (ionising radiation, environmental chemical pollutants, etc). Values of R n are chosen in such a way that to have the secondary radiation BSS being equivalent to the current one's. Other general and derived levels for safety decision-making are also proposed including the de-minimus levels. Their possible dependence on the national or regional health-demographic data (HDD) is considered. Such issues as the ways of the integration and averaging of risk indices considered through the national or regional HDD for different risk sources and the use of non-threshold linear exposure - response relationships for ionising radiation and chemical pollutants are analysed

  9. Technical basis document for natural event hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CARSON, D.M.

    2003-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for natural event hazards (NEH)-initiated representative accident and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls. Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'', as described in this report

  10. Prioritization of generic safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Emrit, R.; Minners, W.; VanderMolen, H.

    1983-12-01

    This report presents the priority rankings for generic safety issues related to nuclear power plants. The purpose of these rankings is to assist in the timely and efficient allocation of NRC resources for the resolution of those safety issues that have a significant potential for reducing risk. The report focuses on the prioritization of generic safety issues. Issues primarily concerned with the licensing process or environmental protection and not directly related to safety have been excluded from prioritization. The prioritized issues include: TMI Action Plan items under development; previously proposed issues covered by Task Action Plans, except issues designated at Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs) which had already been assigned high priority; and newly-proposed issues. Future supplements to this report will include the prioritization of additional issues. The safety priority rankings are HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, and DROP and have been assigned on the basis of risk significance estimates, the ratio of risk to costs and other impacts estimated to result if resolutions of the safety issues were implemented, and the consideration of uncertainties and other quantitative or qualitative factors. To the extent practical, estimates are quantitative

  11. Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; Kevin J. Carroll; Dr. Robert Lowrie

    2007-01-01

    implementation plan includes: (1) A recommended process for handling the documentation of the security and safety disciplines, including an appropriate change control process and participation by all stakeholders. (2) A means to package security systems with sufficient information to help expedite the flow of that system through the process. In addition, a means to share successes among sites, to include information and safety basis to the extent such information is transportable. (3) Identification of key security systems and associated essential security elements being installed and an arrangement for the sites installing these systems to host an appropriate team to review a specific system and determine what information is exportable. (4) Identification of the security systems essential elements and appropriate controls required for testing of these essential elements in the facility. (5) The ability to help refine and improve an agreed to control set at the manufacture stage

  12. A prioritization of generic safety issues. Supplement 19, Revision insertion instructions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-11-01

    The report presents the safety priority ranking for generic safety issues related to nuclear power plants. The purpose of these rankings is to assist in the timely and efficient allocation of NRC resources for the resolution of those safety issues that have a significant potential for reducing risk. The safety priority rankings are HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, and DROP, and have been assigned on the basis of risk significance estimates, the ratio of risk to costs and other impacts estimated to result if resolution of the safety issues were implemented, and the consideration of uncertainties and other quantitative or qualitative factors. To the extent practical, estimates are quantitative. This document provides revisions and amendments to the report

  13. A prioritization of generic safety issues. Supplement 19, Revision insertion instructions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1995-11-01

    The report presents the safety priority ranking for generic safety issues related to nuclear power plants. The purpose of these rankings is to assist in the timely and efficient allocation of NRC resources for the resolution of those safety issues that have a significant potential for reducing risk. The safety priority rankings are HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, and DROP, and have been assigned on the basis of risk significance estimates, the ratio of risk to costs and other impacts estimated to result if resolution of the safety issues were implemented, and the consideration of uncertainties and other quantitative or qualitative factors. To the extent practical, estimates are quantitative. This document provides revisions and amendments to the report.

  14. Assessment of the long-term safety of repositories. Scientific basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noseck, Ulrich; Becker, Dirk; Fahrenholz, Christine

    2008-12-01

    The project contributed to increase the scientific knowledge on the long-term safety assessment and the safety cases of a radioactive waste repository. International guidelines and more recent safety cases from other countries were evaluated. The feasibility study of the three safety indicators ''individual dose rate'', ''radiotoxicity concentration in the biosphere water'' and ''radiotoxicity flux from the geosphere'' showed that due to the independently derived corresponding reference values these indicators describe three different safety statements. The combination of the three values can give a stronger argument for the safety of the repository system. Another important methodological aspect of the safety cases is the definition and selection of scenarios, one of these the human intrusion scenario. Various human intrusion scenarios are considered in the different nations, which differ significantly with respect to type and time scale, the exposition type and exposition pathway. Further progress has been achieved in how to treat human intrusion scenarios in a German post-closure safety case. Another port of the project dealt with the impact of specific geochemical processes on the long-term safety of the repository. The impact of climate changes on the long-term safety of a radioactive waste repository in rock salt was investigated with respect to processes in the overburden and the biosphere where highest impact is expected. Sofa simplified models and only discrete climate estates have been considered

  15. Integrating evidence-based practices for increasing cancer screenings in safety net health systems: a multiple case study using the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liang, Shuting; Kegler, Michelle C; Cotter, Megan; Emily, Phillips; Beasley, Derrick; Hermstad, April; Morton, Rentonia; Martinez, Jeremy; Riehman, Kara

    2016-08-02

    Implementing evidence-based practices (EBPs) to increase cancer screenings in safety net primary care systems has great potential for reducing cancer disparities. Yet there is a gap in understanding the factors and mechanisms that influence EBP implementation within these high-priority systems. Guided by the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR), our study aims to fill this gap with a multiple case study of health care safety net systems that were funded by an American Cancer Society (ACS) grants program to increase breast and colorectal cancer screening rates. The initiative funded 68 safety net systems to increase cancer screening through implementation of evidence-based provider and client-oriented strategies. Data are from a mixed-methods evaluation with nine purposively selected safety net systems. Fifty-two interviews were conducted with project leaders, implementers, and ACS staff. Funded safety net systems were categorized into high-, medium-, and low-performing cases based on the level of EBP implementation. Within- and cross-case analyses were performed to identify CFIR constructs that influenced level of EBP implementation. Of 39 CFIR constructs examined, six distinguished levels of implementation. Two constructs were from the intervention characteristics domain: adaptability and trialability. Three were from the inner setting domain: leadership engagement, tension for change, and access to information and knowledge. Engaging formally appointed internal implementation leaders, from the process domain, also distinguished level of implementation. No constructs from the outer setting or individual characteristics domain differentiated systems by level of implementation. Our study identified a number of influential CFIR constructs and illustrated how they impacted EBP implementation across a variety of safety net systems. Findings may inform future dissemination efforts of EBPs for increasing cancer screening in similar settings. Moreover

  16. Swedish REGULATORY APPROACH TO SAFETY Assessment AND SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frid, W.; Sandervaag, O.

    1997-01-01

    The Swedish regulatory approach to safety assessment and severe accident management is briefly described. The safety assessment program, which focuses on prevention of incidents and accidents, has three main components: periodic safety reviews, probabilistic safety analysis, and analysis of postulated disturbances and accident progression sequences. Management and man-technology-organisation issues, as well as inspections, play a key role in safety assessment. Basis for severe accident management were established by the Government decisions in 1981 and 1986. By the end of 1988, the severe accident mitigation systems and emergency operating procedures were implemented at all Swedish reactors. The severe accident research has continued after 1988 for further verification of the protection provided by the systems and reduction of remaining uncertainties in risk dominant phenomena

  17. Safety assessment to support NUE fuel full core implementation in CANDU reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fan, H.Z.; Laurie, T.; Siddiqi, A.; Li, Z.P.; Rouben, D.; Zhu, W.; Lau, V.; Cottrell, C.M. [CANDU Energy Inc., Mississauga, Ontario (Canada)

    2013-07-01

    The Natural Uranium Equivalent (NUE) fuel contains a combination of recycled uranium and depleted uranium, in such a manner that the resulting mixture is similar to the natural uranium currently used in CANDU® reactors. Based on successful preliminary results of 24 bundles of NUE fuel demonstration irradiation in Qinshan CANDU 6 Unit 1, the NUE full core implementation program has been developed in cooperation with the Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Company and Candu Energy Inc, which has recently received Chinese government policy and funding support from their National-Level Energy Innovation program. This paper presents the safety assessment results to technically support NUE fuel full core implementation in CANDU reactors. (author)

  18. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  20. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  1. Promoters and Barriers to Implementation of Tracheal Intubation Airway Safety Bundle: A Mixed-Method Analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Finn Davis, Katherine; Napolitano, Natalie; Li, Simon; Buffman, Hayley; Rehder, Kyle; Pinto, Matthew; Nett, Sholeen; Jarvis, J Dean; Kamat, Pradip; Sanders, Ronald C; Turner, David A; Sullivan, Janice E; Bysani, Kris; Lee, Anthony; Parker, Margaret; Adu-Darko, Michelle; Giuliano, John; Biagas, Katherine; Nadkarni, Vinay; Nishisaki, Akira

    2017-10-01

    To describe promoters and barriers to implementation of an airway safety quality improvement bundle from the perspective of interdisciplinary frontline clinicians and ICU quality improvement leaders. Mixed methods. Thirteen PICUs of the National Emergency Airway Registry for Children network. Remote or on-site focus groups with interdisciplinary ICU staff. Two semistructured interviews with ICU quality improvement leaders with quantitative and qualitative data-based feedbacks. Bundle implementation success (compliance) was defined as greater than or equal to 80% use for tracheal intubations for 3 consecutive months. ICUs were classified as early or late adopters. Focus group discussions concentrated on safety concerns and promoters and barriers to bundle implementation. Initial semistructured quality improvement leader interviews assessed implementation tactics and provided recommendations. Follow-up interviews assessed degree of acceptance and changes made after initial interview. Transcripts were thematically analyzed and contrasted by early versus late adopters. Median duration to achieve success was 502 days (interquartile range, 182-781). Five sites were early (median, 153 d; interquartile range, 146-267) and eight sites were late adopters (median, 783 d; interquartile range, 773-845). Focus groups identified common "promoter" themes-interdisciplinary approach, influential champions, and quality improvement bundle customization-and "barrier" themes-time constraints, competing paperwork and quality improvement activities, and poor engagement. Semistructured interviews with quality improvement leaders identified effective and ineffective tactics implemented by early and late adopters. Effective tactics included interdisciplinary quality improvement team involvement (early adopter: 5/5, 100% vs late adopter: 3/8, 38%; p = 0.08); ineffective tactics included physician-only rollouts, lack of interdisciplinary education, lack of data feedback to frontline clinicians

  2. Radiobiological basis for setting neutron radiation safety standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Straume, T.

    1985-01-01

    Present neutron standards, adopted more than 20 yr ago from a weak radiobiological data base, have been in doubt for a number of years and are currently under challenge. Moreover, recent dosimetric re-evaluations indicate that Hiroshima neutron doses may have been much lower than previously thought, suggesting that direct data for neutron-induced cancer in humans may in fact not be available. These recent developments make it urgent to determine the extent to which neutron cancer risk in man can be estimated from data that are available. Two approaches are proposed here that are anchored in particularly robust epidemiological and experimental data and appear most likely to provide reliable estimates of neutron cancer risk in man. The first approach uses gamma-ray dose-response relationships for human carcinogenesis, available from Nagasaki (Hiroshima data are also considered), together with highly characterized neutron and gamma-ray data for human cytogenetics. When tested against relevant experimental data, this approach either adequately predicts or somewhat overestimates neutron tumorigenesis (and mutagenesis) in animals. The second approach also uses the Nagasaki gamma-ray cancer data, but together with neutron RBEs from animal tumorigenesis studies. Both approaches give similar results and provide a basis for setting neutron radiation safety standards. They appear to be an improvement over previous approaches, including those that rely on highly uncertain maximum neutron RBEs and unnecessary extrapolations of gamma-ray data to very low doses. Results suggest that, at the presently accepted neutron dose limit of 0.5 rad/yr, the cancer mortality risk to radiation workers is not very different from accidental mortality risks to workers in various nonradiation occupations

  3. Analysis of Electrical Safety Conditions Taking into Account Soil Conductivity Determined on the Basis of Fuzzy Logic

    OpenAIRE

    Manusov, V.Z.; Zaytseva, N.M.

    2017-01-01

    The goal of this work is to prove a possibility of determining soil parameters that influence its conductivity being the basis of grounding, step voltage and touch voltage calculation. This in its turn increases the safety level of electric equipment operation. The article is devoted to development of new, no conventional models of soil conductivity using the theory of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic. The description of the solution includes the following sections: fuzzy models of specific electri...

  4. Guidance on the implementation of a risk based safety performance monitoring system for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sewell, R.T.; Kuritzky, A.S.; Khatib-Rahbar, M.

    1997-05-01

    The principal objective of the present study is to review and evaluate existing Performance Indicator (PI) monitoring programs, and to develop and demonstrate an overall PSA-based methodology and framework for the monitoring and use of risk-based PIs and SIs (Safety Indicator), that would enable: Identification of trends and patterns in safety performance at a specific plant and a population of plants; Assessment of the significance of the trends and patterns; Identification of precursors of accident sequences and safety reductions; Identification of the most critical functional areas of concern, especially as they relate to a defense-in-depth safety philosophy; Comparison of safety performance trends at a plant with those at comparable plants; Incorporation of the PIs and SIs into a risk- and performance-based decision process. To support the overall project objective, it is important that information needs and data collection procedures are clearly outlined. Of key significance in this regard is the premise that a performance monitoring system should not be burdened by an excessive number of low-level PIs that may have only a peripheral relationship to safety. Other supporting objectives of the study include: To identify and discuss other issues pertaining to the practical implementation of a safety performance monitoring system (outlining the databases and algorithms needed); and to demonstrate implementation of the preliminary guidance for monitoring and use of the selected set of PIs and SIs, within the proposed framework, via application to the operating history of a NPP having a PSA and readily available event data

  5. OSR encapsulation basis -- 100-KW

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meichle, R.H.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide the basis for a change in the Operations Safety Requirement (OSR) encapsulated fuel storage requirements in the 105 KW fuel storage basin which will permit the handling and storing of encapsulated fuel in canisters which no longer have a water-free space in the top of the canister. The scope of this report is limited to providing the change from the perspective of the safety envelope (bases) of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and Operations Safety Requirements (OSR). It does not change the encapsulation process itself

  6. Approach to developing a ground-motion design basis for facilities important to safety at Yucca Mountain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, J.L.

    1990-01-01

    This paper discusses a methodology for developing a ground-motion design basis for prospective facilities at Yucca Mountain that are important to safety. The methodology utilizes a guasi-deterministic construct called the 10,000-year cumulative-slip earthquake that is designed to provide a conservative, robust, and reproducible estimate of ground motion that has a one-in-ten chance of occurring during the preclosure period. This estimate is intended to define a ground-motion level for which the seismic design would ensure minimal disruption to operations engineering analyses to ensure safe performance are included

  7. Safety management - policy, analysis and implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, F.R.

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear industry is moving towards a period of ever increasing emphasis on business performance and profitability. Safety has, of course, always been a major concern of management in the nuclear industry and elsewhere. The civil aviation industry , for example, has had a similar concern for safety. Other industry sectors are also developing safety management as a response to events within and outside their sectors. In this paper the way that the risk management process as a whole is being addressed is looked at. Can we use risk management, initially a safety-orientated tool, to improve business performance? (author)

  8. [Implementation of good quality and safety practices. Descriptive study in a occupational mutual health centre].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Manzanera, R; Plana, M; Moya, D; Ortner, J; Mira, J J

    2016-01-01

    To describe the level of implementation of quality and safety good practice elements in a Mutual Society health centre. A Cross-sectional study was conducted to assess the level of implementation of good practices using a questionnaire. Some quality dimensions were also assessed (scale 0 to 10) by a set of 87 quality coordinators of health centres and a random sample of 54 healthcare professionals working in small centres. Seventy quality coordinators and 27 professionals replied (response rates 80% and 50%, respectively. There were no differences in the assessment of quality attributes between both groups. They identified as areas for improvement: use of practice guidelines (7.6/10), scientific and technical skills (7.5/10), and patient satisfaction (7.7/10). Availability and accessibility to clinical reports, informed consent, availability of hydro-alcoholic solution, and to record allergies, were considered of high importance to be implemented, with training and research, improvements in equipment and technology plans, adherence to clinical practice guidelines and the preparation of risk maps, being of less importance. The good practices related to equipment and resources have a higher likelihood to be implemented, meanwhile those related to quality and safety attitudes have more barriers before being implemented. The mutual has a similar behaviour than other healthcare institutions. Copyright © 2015 SECA. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.

  9. Negotiation as a means of developing and implementing health and safety policy

    OpenAIRE

    Caldart, Charles C.; Ashford, Nicholas Askounes

    1998-01-01

    In the health, safety, and environmental area, negotiated rulemaking, implementation, and compliance are proposed by their advocates as delivering two primary benefits: reduced rulemaking time and decreased litigation over a final agency rule. The experience to date, however, indicates that negotiated rulemaking cannot be relied upon to deliver either of these benefits. Nonetheless, experience indicates that negotiation can, in appropriate circumstances, facilitate a better understanding of i...

  10. Safety in transport and storage of radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mezrahi, A.; Xavier, A.M.

    1987-01-01

    The increasing utilization of radioisotopes in Industrial, Medical and Research Facilities as well as the processing of Nuclear Materials involve transport activities in a routine basis. The present work has the following main objectives: I) the identification of the safety aspects related to handling, transport and storage of radioactive materials; II) the orientation of the personnel responsible for the radiological safety of Radioactive Installations viewing the elaboration and implementation of procedures to minimize accidents; III) the report of case-examples of accidents that have occured in Brazil due to non-compliance with Transport Regulations. (author) [pt

  11. Dissemination and Implementation Research for Occupational Safety and Health.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dugan, Alicia G; Punnett, Laura

    2017-12-01

    The translation of evidence-based health innovations into real-world practice is both incomplete and exceedingly slow. This represents a poor return on research investment dollars for the general public. U.S. funders of health sciences research (e.g., NIH, CDC, NIOSH) are increasingly calling for dissemination plans, and to a lesser extent for dissemination and implementation (D&I) research, which are studies that examine the effectiveness of D&I efforts and strategies and the predictors of D&I success. For example, rather than merely broadcasting information about a preventable hazard, D&I research in occupational safety and health (OSH) might examine how employers or practitioners are most likely to receive and act upon that information. We propose here that D&I research should be seen as a dedicated and necessary area of study within OSH, as a way to generate new knowledge that can bridge the research-to-practice gap. We present D&I concepts, frameworks, and examples that can increase the capacity of OSH professionals to conduct D&I research and accelerate the translation of research findings into meaningful everyday practice to improve worker safety and health.

  12. 29 CFR 1975.2 - Basis of authority.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... Relating to Labor (Continued) OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (CONTINUED) COVERAGE OF EMPLOYERS UNDER THE WILLIAMS-STEIGER OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 § 1975.2 Basis... Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, is derived mainly from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution...

  13. Technical safety Organisations (TSO) contribute to European Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Repussard, J.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear safety and radiation protection rely on science to achieve high level prevention objectives, through the analysis of safety files proposed by the licensees. The necessary expertise needs to be exercised so as to ensure adequate independence from nuclear operators, appropriate implementation of state of the art knowledge, and a broad spectrum of analysis, adequately ranking the positive and negative points of the safety files. The absence of a Europe-wide nuclear safety regime is extremely costly for an industry which has to cope with a highly competitive and open international environment, but has to comply with fragmented national regulatory systems. Harmonization is therefore critical, but such a goal is difficult to achieve. Only a gradual policy, made up of planned steps in each of the three key dimensions of the problem (energy policy at EU level, regulatory harmonization, consolidation of Europe-wide technical expertise capability) can be successful to achieve the required integration on the basis of the highest safety levels. TSO's contribute to this consolidation, with the support of the EC, in the fields of research (EURATOM-Programmes), of experience feedback analysis (European Clearinghouse), of training and knowledge management (European Training and Tutoring Institute, EUROSAFE). The TSO's network, ETSON, is becoming a formal organisation, able to enter into formal dialogue with EU institutions. However, nuclear safety nevertheless remains a world wide issue, requiring intensive international cooperation, including on TSO issues. (author)

  14. A risk-informed framework for establishing a beyond design basis safety basis for external hazards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Amico, P. [Hughes Associates, Inc, Baltimore, MD (United States); Anoba, R. [Hughes Associates, Inc, Raleigh, NC (United States); Najafi, B. [Hughes Associates, Inc., Los Gatos, CA (United States)

    2014-07-01

    The events at Fukushima Daiichi taught us that meeting a deterministic design basis requirement for external hazards does not assure that the risk is low. As observed at the plant, the two primary reasons for this are failure cliffs above the design basis event and that combined hazard effects are not considered in design. Because the possible combinations of design basis exceedences and external hazard combinations are very large and complex, an approach focusing only on the most important ones is needed. For this reason, a risk informed approach is the most effective approach, which is discussed in this paper. (author)

  15. Status of NDE research in the US-contributions of NDE to reactor safety and implementation of NDE technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ammirato, F. [EPRI, Charlotte, NC (United States)

    1999-08-01

    Power plant designers, plant owners, and regulators have developed inservice inspection (ISI) programs as part of their comprehensive approach to ensuring nuclear safety. This paper examines the role of ISI in reactor safety through several examples drawn from recent industry initiatives to address implementation of effective examination technology for nuclear power plant piping, and BWR and PWR reactor pressure vessels. These examples also illustrate the importance of well designed performance demonstration activities to support application of effective ISI. Finally, the efforts required to implement effective ISI technology for field inspection is addressed. (orig./DGE)

  16. The Argentine Approach to Radiation Safety: Its Ethical Basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gonzalez, A.J.

    2011-01-01

    The ethical bases of Argentina's radiation safety approach are reviewed. The applied principles are those recommended and established internationally, namely: the principle of justification of decisions that alters the radiation exposure situation; the principle of optimization of protection and safety; the principle of individual protection for restricting possible inequitable outcomes of optimized safety; and the implicit principle of inter generational prudence for protection future generations and the habitat. The principles are compared vis-a-vis the prevalent ethical doctrines: justification vis-a-vis teleology; optimization vis-a-vis utilitarianism; individual protection vis-a-vis de ontology; and, inter generational prudence vis-a-vis aretaicism (or virtuosity). The application of the principles and their ethics in Argentina is analysed. These principles are applied to All exposure to radiation harm; namely, to exposures to actual doses and to exposures to actual risk and potential doses, including those related to the safety of nuclear installations, and they are harmonized and applied in conjunction. It is concluded that building a bridge among all available ethical doctrines and applying it to radiation safety against actual doses and actual risk and potential doses is at the roots of the successful nuclear regulatory experience in Argentina.

  17. TH-C-18C-01: MRI Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pooley, R [Mayo Clinic, Jacksonville, FL (United States); Bernstein, M; Shu, Y; Gorny, K; Felmlee, J [Mayo Clinic, Rochester, MN (United States); Panda, A [Mayo Clinic, Arizona, Scottsdale, AZ (United States)

    2014-06-15

    Clinical diagnostic medical physicists may be responsible for implementing and maintaining a comprehensive MR safety program. Accrediting bodies including the ACR, IAC, Radsite and The Joint Commission each include aspects of MR Safety into their imaging accreditation programs; MIPPA regulations further raise the significance of non-compliance. In addition, The Joint Commission recently announced New and Revised Diagnostic Imaging Standards for accredited health care organizations which include aspects of MR Safety. Hospitals and clinics look to the physicist to understand guidelines, regulations and accreditation requirements related to MR safety. The clinical medical physicist plays a significant role in a clinical practice by understanding the physical basis for the risks and acting as a facilitator to successfully implement a safety program that provides well-planned siting, allows for the safe scanning of certain implanted devices, and helps radiologists manage specific patient exams. The MRI scanning of specific devices will be discussed including cardiac pacemakers and neurostimulators such as deep brain stimulators. Furthermore for sites involved in MR guided interventional procedures, the MR physicist plays an essential role to establish safe practices. Creating a framework for a safe MRI practice includes the review of actual safety incidents or close calls to determine methods for prevention in the future. Learning Objectives: Understand the requirements and recommendations related to MR safety from accrediting bodies and federal regulations. Understand the Medical Physicist's roles to ensure MR Safety. Identify best practices for dealing with implanted devices, including pacemakers and deep brain stimulators. Review aspects of MR safety involved in an MR guided interventional environment. Understand the important MR safety aspects in actual safety incidents or near misses.

  18. The Attitude of Construction Workers toward the Implementation of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Widaningsih, L.; Susanti, I.; Chandra, T.

    2018-02-01

    Construction industry refers to one of the industries dealing with high accident rate. Besides its outdoor workplace involving many workers who usually work manually, the workers’ work culture and less awareness of occupational health and safety (OHS) are attributed to the high accident rate. This study explores some construction workers who are involved in some construction projects in big cities such as Bandung and Jakarta. The questionnaire-given to the construction workers focusing on stone construction, wood construction, and finishing session-reveals that the construction workers knowledge and understanding of nine Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) aspects reach above 50%. However, does not appear to reflect their knowledge and understanding of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS). The results of Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and an in-depth interview show that the fallacious implementation of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) is attributed to their traditional “work culture”.

  19. Value-impact assessment of safety-related modifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knowles, W.M.C.; Dinnie, K.S.; Gordon, C.W.

    1992-01-01

    Like other nuclear utilities, Ontario Hydro, as part of its risk management activities, continually assesses the safety of its nuclear operations. In addition, new regulatory requirements are being applied to the older nuclear power plants. Both of these result in proposed plant modifications designed to reduce the risk to the public. However, modifications to an operating plant can have serious economic effects, and the resources, both financial and personnel, required for the implementation of these modifications are limited. Thus, all potential benefits and effects of a proposed modification must be thoroughly investigated to judge whether the modification is beneficial. Ontario Hydro has begun to use comprehensive value-impact assessments, utilizing plant-specific probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), as tools to provide an informed basis for judgments on the benefit of safety-related modifications. The results from value-impact assessments can also be used to prioritize the implementation of these modifications

  20. The power of simplification: Operator interface with the AP1000R during design-basis and beyond design-basis events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, M. G.; Mouser, M. R.; Simon, J. B.

    2012-01-01

    to be reliable in these conditions. The primary goal of any such actions is to maintain or refill the passive inventory available to cool the core, containment and spent fuel pool in the safety-related and seismically qualified Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank (PCCWST). The seismically-qualified, ground-mounted Passive Containment Cooling Ancillary Water Storage Tank (PCCAWST) is also available for this function as appropriate. The primary effect of these actions would be to increase the coping time for the AP1000 during design basis events, as well as events such as those described above, from 72 hours without operator intervention to 7 days with minimal operator actions. These Operator actions necessary to protect the health and safety of the public are addressed in the Post-72 Hour procedures, as well as some EOPs, AOPs, ARPs and the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). Should the event continue to become more severe and plant conditions degrade further with indications of inadequate core cooling, the SAMGs provide guidance for strategies to address these hypothetical severe accident conditions. The AP1000 SAMG diagnoses and actions are prioritized to first utilize the AP1000 features that are expected to retain a damaged core inside the reactor vessel. Only one strategy is undertaken at any time. This strategy will be followed and its effectiveness evaluated before other strategies are undertaken. This is a key feature of both the symptom-oriented AP1000 EOPs and the AP1000 SAMGs which maximizes the probability of retaining a damaged core inside the reactor vessel and containment while minimizing the chances for confusion and human errors during implementation. The AP1000 SAMGs are simple and straight-forward and have been developed with considerable input from human factors and plant operations experts. Most importantly, and different from severe accident management strategies for other plants, the AP1000 SAMGs do not require diagnosis of

  1. Practical auxiliary basis implementation of Rung 3.5 functionals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janesko, Benjamin G.; Scalmani, Giovanni; Frisch, Michael J.

    2014-01-01

    Approximate exchange-correlation functionals for Kohn-Sham density functional theory often benefit from incorporating exact exchange. Exact exchange is constructed from the noninteracting reference system's nonlocal one-particle density matrix γ(r -vector ,r -vector ′). Rung 3.5 functionals attempt to balance the strengths and limitations of exact exchange using a new ingredient, a projection of γ(r -vector ,r -vector ′) onto a semilocal model density matrix γ SL (ρ(r -vector ),∇ρ(r -vector ),r -vector −r -vector ′). γ SL depends on the electron density ρ(r -vector ) at reference point r -vector , and is closely related to semilocal model exchange holes. We present a practical implementation of Rung 3.5 functionals, expanding the r -vector −r -vector ′ dependence of γ SL in an auxiliary basis set. Energies and energy derivatives are obtained from 3D numerical integration as in standard semilocal functionals. We also present numerical tests of a range of properties, including molecular thermochemistry and kinetics, geometries and vibrational frequencies, and bandgaps and excitation energies. Rung 3.5 functionals typically provide accuracy intermediate between semilocal and hybrid approximations. Nonlocal potential contributions from γ SL yield interesting successes and failures for band structures and excitation energies. The results enable and motivate continued exploration of Rung 3.5 functional forms

  2. Implementation of Water Safety Plans (WSPs): A Case Study in the Coastal Area in Semarang City, Indonesia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Budiyono; Ginandjar, P.; Saraswati, L. D.; Pangestuti, D. R.; Martini; Jati, S. P.

    2018-02-01

    An area of 508.28 hectares in North Semarang is flooded by tidal inundation, including Bandarharjo village, which could affect water quality in the area. People in Bandarharjo use safe water from deep groundwater, without disinfection process. More than 90% of water samples in the Bandaharjo village had poor bacteriological quality. The aimed of the research was to describe the implementation of Water Safety Plans (WSPs) program in Bandarharjo village. This was a descriptive study with steps for implementations adopted the guidelines and tools of the World Health Organization. The steps consist of introducing WSPs program, team building, training the team, examination of water safety before risk assessment, risk assessment, minor repair I, examination of water safety risk, minor repair II (after monitoring). Data were analyzed using descriptive methods. WSPs program has been introduced and formed WSPs team, and the training of the team has been conducted. The team was able to conduct risks assessment, planned the activities, examined water quality, conduct minor repair and monitoring at the source, distribution, and households connection. The WSPs program could be implemented in the coastal area in Semarang, however regularly supervision and some adjustment are needed.

  3. Operating experience and systems analysis at Trillo NPP: A program intended for systematic review of plant safety systems to assess design basis requirements compliance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vega, R. de la

    1996-01-01

    The program was defined to apply to all plant safety systems and/or systems included in plant Technical Specifications. The goal of the program was to ensure, by systematic design, construction, and commissioning review, the adequacy of safety systems, structures and components to fulfill their safety functions. Also, as a result of the program, it was established that a complete, unambiguous, systematic, design basis definition shall take place. And finally, a complete documental review of the plant design shall result from the program execution

  4. New safety concept for geological disposal in Japan - -16339

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kitayama, Kazumi

    2009-01-01

    This paper describes a new safety concept for the Japanese geological disposal program, which is a development of the conventional multi-barrier system concept. The Japanese government established the 'Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan' (NUMO) as an implementation body in 2000 based on the 'Final disposal act' following the publication of the 'H-12 Report', which confirmed the scientific and engineering feasibility of HLW geological disposal in Japan. Since then, NUMO has undertaken further technical developments aimed at achieving safe and efficient implementation of final disposal. The safety concept developed in the 'H-12 Report' provides sufficient safety on the basis of site-generic considerations. However, it is considered to be over-conservative and therefore does not represent the most probable performance of the engineered or natural barriers. Recently, concrete measures have been proposed requiring the safety case to be presented in terms of a realistic assessment of the most probable performance. This approach takes into account the safety functions of both engineered and natural barriers as well as the long-term static geochemical equilibrium. In particular, the evolution of the safety performance of engineered and natural barriers can be efficiently augmented by the realistic long-term geochemical equilibrium. (author)

  5. Deepening om Safety culture Auto evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopez Churruca, I.; Buedo Jimenez, J. L.

    2009-01-01

    The concept of safety culture used in nuclear forums refers to the series of actions aimed at guaranteeing that safety issues in nuclear power plants are adequately addressed. The activities to which this concept refers have been gradually extended over the years so that, today, they encompass the whole organizations structure. In other words, the safety culture implies that all positions in the organizational structure perform their tasks with a level of attention such that all their senses are focused on them. And this performance is what leads us to excellence in plant operation. In addition, the implementation of a self-assessment system in the Cofrentes Nuclear Power Plant of its activities and processes has resulted in the identification of expectations on the basis of which we can identify strengths and weaknesses, enabling us to leverage the former and correct the latter. (Author)

  6. ALWR safety approaches and trends. Implementation of passive safety features in the design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ignatiev, V

    1995-11-01

    Reactor vendors world-wide are examining various advanced light water reactors (ALWR) options to reach utility goals. The amount of information available about each design varies essentially depending on its maturity. Some advanced reactor designs are the evolutionary results of combining old structures, systems and components in new ways, others use innovative solutions. A summary review is given for better understanding of new ALWR design trends and approaches in different countries and subsequent R and D activities. An attempt was made to describe and assess specific innovative and passive features implemented in the leading ALWR designs for further plant design safety improvements. The advantages and disadvantages of these innovations in obtaining reliable systems have been considered. Also, this report indicates the importance of uncertainties remaining and identifies the additional work needed. 51 refs, 27 figs, 7 tabs.

  7. ALWR safety approaches and trends. Implementation of passive safety features in the design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ignatiev, V.

    1995-11-01

    Reactor vendors world-wide are examining various advanced light water reactors (ALWR) options to reach utility goals. The amount of information available about each design varies essentially depending on its maturity. Some advanced reactor designs are the evolutionary results of combining old structures, systems and components in new ways, others use innovative solutions. A summary review is given for better understanding of new ALWR design trends and approaches in different countries and subsequent R and D activities. An attempt was made to describe and assess specific innovative and passive features implemented in the leading ALWR designs for further plant design safety improvements. The advantages and disadvantages of these innovations in obtaining reliable systems have been considered. Also, this report indicates the importance of uncertainties remaining and identifies the additional work needed. 51 refs, 27 figs, 7 tabs

  8. A prioritization of generic safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Emrit, R.; Riggs, R.; Milstead, W.; Pittman, J.

    1991-07-01

    This report presents the priority rankings for generic safety issues and related to nuclear power plants. The purpose of these rankings is to assist in the timely and efficient allocation of NRC resources for the resolution of those safety issues that have a significant potential for reducing risk. The report focuses on the prioritization of generic safety issues. Issues primarily concerned with the licensing process or environmental protection and not directly related to safety have been excluded from prioritization. The prioritized issues include: TMI Action Plan items under development; previously proposed issues covered by Task Action Plans, except issues designated as Un-resolved Safety Issues (USIs) which had already been assigned high priority; and newly-proposed issues. Future supplements to this report will include the prioritization of additional issues. The safety priority rankings are High, Medium, Low, and Drop and have been assigned on the basis of risk significance estimates, the ratio of risk to costs and other impacts estimated to result if resolutions of the safety issues were implemented, and the consideration of uncertainties and other quantitative or qualitative factors. To the extent practical, estimates are quantitative. 1310 refs

  9. The Implementation of Transportation and Transit Projects on the Basis of Public-Private Partnership in Russia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Valery Anatolyevich Tsevtkov

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available The article considers the main directions of the implementation of the current transportation and transit projects on the basis of the institution of public-private partnership in Russia. This work is a continuation of the study of the theory and practice of the application of public-private partnership in the investment projects aimed at the development and realization of the transportation and transit potential of the country. On the methodological basis of evolutionary and institutional economics, historical approach, system-oriented analysis and the theory of firms, the main current projects for the development of Russian transportation and transit system using public-private partnership are considered. They are the construction of a high-speed line of Moscow — Kazan with subsequent extension to the Chinese border; functioning of the transport and logistics in the Chelyabinsk region; infrastructure of transit cargo by Northern Sea Route; participation of foreign investors in the development of Russian seaports and sea gates. It is shown that the competitive advantage of transit traffic by a particular route requires more traversing speed of cargo with a minimum of stops, handling and overloads in the way. Revenue from transportation and transit potential implementation can be comparable to the size of the resource rent in the case of the development in Russia of the production and transit sector of the economy, and not only of a transit one . In this regard, the emphasis is placed on the determination of the possibility and necessity of organizational changes associated with the development of a large public-private transportation company, able to compete with global sea container services of the route of Asia — Europe. The main directions and activities under the proposed national project «Development of transit economy in Russia: Uniting Eurasia» and its subprogram «Creation of innovative rolling stock for container and multimodal

  10. Influence of Malfunctions of Selected Bus Subsystems on Bus Transportation Safety

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bojar Piotr

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available This article introduces division of transport systems into land transport systems (road and rail as well as land and water transport systems (inland and sea, depending on the type of environment in which these systems carry out their tasks. Such systems comprise the class of social engineering systems of the Man – Technological Object – Environment (M – TO – E type. Such systems are influenced by forcing factors, leading to changes in their condition. Such factors may be divided into operational, external and anthropotechnical and they cause the degradation of the system on various levels, including a decrease of the degree of its safety. The article attempts to evaluate the safety of the operation of transport systems on the basis of the evaluation of the safety of the transport process carried out over a defined time interval Δt. The evaluation of the safety of the implemented transport process was prepared on the basis of a set of calculated index values determined depending on the type of transport.

  11. Areva - Nuclear Safety Policy 2013-2016

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-03-01

    The objectives of Areva's Nuclear Safety Policy cover three areas: 1 - Safety of facilities: - Establish a group wide process to maintain the regulatory compliance of facilities and to ensure the execution of improvements required by periodic reviews of safety. - Put in place proactive measures to reduce source terms present in facilities, and in particular with regard to fire, operational waste and legacy waste on AREVA sites. - Ensure the performance of arrangements and activities central to risk prevention, in particular in the areas of containment, criticality safety and radiological protection through compliance with the associated safety requirements. - Strengthen the emergency planning arrangements to be implemented in case of accidents and test these through regular exercises. 2 - Operational Safety: - Develop and verify the level of safety culture of our staff and subcontractors and increase the presence of operational managers on the ground. - Improve the requirements and responsibilities within documentation associated with operations and interventions on the basis of a significant involvement of our staff and subcontractors. - Implement robust and formal risk prevention processes to manage temporary or transitional situations, uncommon situations, or specific risks, including but not limited to parallel activities, administrative lockout/tag-out, working with naked flames, gamma radiation, work in a radioactive environment. - Integrate human and organizational factors (HOF) in the analysis of safety-related modifications of facilities; undertake detailed reviews of the causes of all significant events inside the group and improve the communication and implementation of operating experience within all group entities. - 3 Safety Management: - Maintain an organization based on clear principles of shared responsibility and delegation of authority, and have in place a robust process to assess the impact on safety of any organizational change. - Strengthen

  12. The power of simplification: Operator interface with the AP1000{sup R} during design-basis and beyond design-basis events

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, M. G.; Mouser, M. R.; Simon, J. B. [Westinghouse Electric Company, 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (United States)

    2012-07-01

    designed to be reliable in these conditions. The primary goal of any such actions is to maintain or refill the passive inventory available to cool the core, containment and spent fuel pool in the safety-related and seismically qualified Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank (PCCWST). The seismically-qualified, ground-mounted Passive Containment Cooling Ancillary Water Storage Tank (PCCAWST) is also available for this function as appropriate. The primary effect of these actions would be to increase the coping time for the AP1000 during design basis events, as well as events such as those described above, from 72 hours without operator intervention to 7 days with minimal operator actions. These Operator actions necessary to protect the health and safety of the public are addressed in the Post-72 Hour procedures, as well as some EOPs, AOPs, ARPs and the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). Should the event continue to become more severe and plant conditions degrade further with indications of inadequate core cooling, the SAMGs provide guidance for strategies to address these hypothetical severe accident conditions. The AP1000 SAMG diagnoses and actions are prioritized to first utilize the AP1000 features that are expected to retain a damaged core inside the reactor vessel. Only one strategy is undertaken at any time. This strategy will be followed and its effectiveness evaluated before other strategies are undertaken. This is a key feature of both the symptom-oriented AP1000 EOPs and the AP1000 SAMGs which maximizes the probability of retaining a damaged core inside the reactor vessel and containment while minimizing the chances for confusion and human errors during implementation. The AP1000 SAMGs are simple and straight-forward and have been developed with considerable input from human factors and plant operations experts. Most importantly, and different from severe accident management strategies for other plants, the AP1000 SAMGs do not require diagnosis

  13. An overview of FFTF [Fast Flux Test Facility] contributions to Liquid Metal Reactor Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waltar, A.E.; Padilla, A. Jr.

    1990-11-01

    The Fast Flux Test Facility has provided a very useful framework for testing the advances in Liquid Metal Reactor Safety Technology. During the licensing phase, the switch from a nonmechanistic bounding technique to the mechanistic approach was developed and implemented. During the operational phase, the consideration of new tests and core configurations led to use of the anticipated-transients-without-scram approach for beyond design basis events and the move towards passive safety. The future role of the Fast Flux Test Facility may involve additional passive safety and waste transmutation tests. 26 refs

  14. Implementing technology to improve medication safety in healthcare facilities: a literature review.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hidle, Unn

    Medication errors remain one of the most common causes of patient injuries in the United States, with detrimental outcomes including adverse reactions and even death. By developing a better understanding of why and how medication errors occur, preventative measures may be implemented including technological advances. In this literature review, potential methods of reducing medication errors were explored. Furthermore, technology tools available for medication orders and administration are described, including advantages and disadvantages of each system. It was found that technology can be an excellent aid in improving safety of medication administration. However, computer technology cannot replace human intellect and intuition. Nurses should be involved when implementing any new computerized system in order to obtain the most appropriate and user-friendly structure.

  15. Environment, safety, and health regulatory implementation plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    To identify, document, and maintain the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project's environment, safety, and health (ES ampersand H) regulatory requirements, the US Department of Energy (DOE) UMTRA Project Office tasked the Technical Assistance Contractor (TAC) to develop a regulatory operating envelope for the UMTRA Project. The system selected for managing the UMTRA regulatory operating envelope data bass is based on the Integrated Project Control/Regulatory Compliance System (IPC/RCS) developed by WASTREN, Inc. (WASTREN, 1993). The IPC/RCS is a tool used for identifying regulatory and institutional requirements and indexing them to hardware, personnel, and program systems on a project. The IPC/RCS will be customized for the UMTRA Project surface remedial action and groundwater restoration programs. The purpose of this plan is to establish the process for implementing and maintaining the UMTRA Project's regulatory operating envelope, which involves identifying all applicable regulatory and institutional requirements and determining compliance status. The plan describes how the Project will identify ES ampersand H regulatory requirements, analyze applicability to the UMTRA Project, and evaluate UMTRA Project compliance status

  16. Key issues on safety design basis selection and safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An, S.; Togo, Y.

    1976-01-01

    In current fast reactor design in Japan, four design accident conditions and four design seismic conditions are adopted as the design base classifications. These are classified by the considerations on both likelihood of occurrence and the severeness of the consequences. There are several major problem areas in safety design consideration such as core accident problems which include fuel sodium interaction, fuel failure propagation and residual decay heat removal, and decay heat removal systems problems which is more or less the problem of selection of appropriate system and of assurance of high reliability of the system. In view of licensing, two kinds of accidents are postulated in evaluating the adequacy of a reactor site. The one is the ''major accident'' which is the accident to give most severe radiation hazard to the public from technical point of view. The other is the ''hypothetical accident'', induced public accident of which is severer than that of major accident. While the concept of the former is rather unique to Japanese licensing, the latter is almost equivalent to design base hypothetical accident of the US practice. In this paper, design bases selections, key safety issues and some of the licensing considerations in Japan are described

  17. Challenges in Implementing IAEA National Nuclear Safety Knowledge Platforms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Samba, R.N.; Simo, A.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: Integrated Management Systems and human resource development of nuclear knowledge have always been a challenge for developing countries. NRPA staff when trained by IAEA return and restitute with all colleagues the themes acquired in nuclear knowledge. NRPA became a member of Forum for Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA) in 2009. FNRBA organized with IAEA a workshop from 14th to 18th October 2013 in Nairobi, Kenya on Knowledge Safety Network. NRPA of Cameroon created the first National Nuclear Portail under FNRBA. This was linked to other national websites. During the IAEA review missions, most counterparts took opportunity from the thermatic site to share information and develop advance reference materials. The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) team also shared materials that could not be transferred through email with national counterparts using the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network (GNSSN) sharepoint website due to large file sizes.The regulatory documents have been uploaded on the platform and can be accessed through FNRBA and NRPA website (www.anrp.cm). UN organizations implementing projects in Cameroon are also linked to the platform. The action plans and progress reports for IAEA/AFRA projects are also available. Moreover, NRPA regulatory activities and licensing sources are available on this platform. (author

  18. Safety issues and their ranking for WWER-440 model 213 nuclear power plants. A publication of the extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER and RBMK nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-04-01

    The objective of this report is to present a consolidated list of generic safety concerns, called safety issues, ranked according to their safety significance and the corrective measures to improve safety. It is intended for use as a reference to facilitate the development of plant specific safety improvement programmes and to serve as a basis for reviewing their implementation. Section 2 provides and overview of the impact of all relevant issues on the main safety functions and other aspects important to overall plant safety. Section 3 presents safety issues identified in design according to the structure described below. Section 4 presents the safety issues in the area of operation, according to the same structure except that no ranking is given. At the end of Section 2, Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of all safety issues in a tabular form. 138 refs, tabs

  19. Safety Regulation Implemented by Gosatomnadzor of Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutsalov, A.T.; Bukrinsky, A.M.

    2001-01-01

    The principles and approaches used by Gosatomnadzor of Russia in establishing safety goals are described. The link between safety goals and safety culture is demonstrated. Information on nuclear regulatory activities in Russia is also presented

  20. Safety in the Utilization and Modification of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-07-15

    This Safety Guide is a revision of Safety Series No. 35-G2 on safety in the utilization and modification of research reactors. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements for the categorization, safety assessment and approval of research reactor experiments and modification projects. Specific safety considerations in different phases of utilization and modification projects are covered, including the pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation phases. Guidance is also provided on the operational safety of experiments, including in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices. Examples of the application of the safety categorization process for experiments and modification projects and of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment are also provided. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system for the utilization and modification of a research reactor; 3. Categorization, safety assessment and approval of an experiment or modification; 4. Safety considerations for the design of an experiment or modification; 5. Pre-implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 6. Implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 7. Post-implementation phase of a utilization or modification project; 8. Operational safety of experiments at a research reactor; 9. Safety considerations in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices; 10. Safety aspects of out-of-reactor-core installations; Annex I: Example of a checklist for the categorization of an experiment or modification at a research reactor; Annex II: Example of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment at a research reactor; Annex III: Examples of reasons for a modification at a research reactor.

  1. Safety in the Utilization and Modification of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide is a revision of Safety Series No. 35-G2 on safety in the utilization and modification of research reactors. It provides recommendations on meeting the requirements for the categorization, safety assessment and approval of research reactor experiments and modification projects. Specific safety considerations in different phases of utilization and modification projects are covered, including the pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation phases. Guidance is also provided on the operational safety of experiments, including in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices. Examples of the application of the safety categorization process for experiments and modification projects and of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment are also provided. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system for the utilization and modification of a research reactor; 3. Categorization, safety assessment and approval of an experiment or modification; 4. Safety considerations for the design of an experiment or modification; 5. Pre-implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 6. Implementation phase of a modification or utilization project; 7. Post-implementation phase of a utilization or modification project; 8. Operational safety of experiments at a research reactor; 9. Safety considerations in the handling, dismantling, post-irradiation examination and disposal of experimental devices; 10. Safety aspects of out-of-reactor-core installations; Annex I: Example of a checklist for the categorization of an experiment or modification at a research reactor; Annex II: Example of the content of the safety analysis report for an experiment at a research reactor; Annex III: Examples of reasons for a modification at a research reactor.

  2. Talbot's method for the numerical inversion of Laplace transforms: an implementation for personal computers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garratt, T.J.

    1989-05-01

    Safety assessments of radioactive waste disposal require efficient computer models for the important processes. The present paper is based on an efficient computational technique which can be used to solve a wide variety of safety assessment models. It involves the numerical inversion of analytical solutions to the Laplace-transformed differential equations using a method proposed by Talbot. This method has been implemented on a personal computer in a user-friendly manner. The steps required to implement a particular transform and run the program are outlined. Four examples are described which illustrate the flexibility, accuracy and efficiency of the program. The improvements in computational efficiency described in this paper have application to the probabilistic safety assessment codes ESCORT and MASCOT which are currently under development. Also, it is hoped that the present work will form the basis of software for personal computers which could be used to demonstrate safety assessment procedures to a wide audience. (author)

  3. The ISAM Tool “Objective Provision Tree (OPT)”, for the Identification of the Design Basis and he Construction of the Safety Architecture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fiorini, G.L., E-mail: gian-luigi.fiorini@orange.fr; Ammirabile, L., E-mail: luca.ammirabile@ec.europa.eu [European Commission - Joint Research Centre Institute for Energy and Transport (Belgium); Ranguelova, V., E-mail: vesselina.ranguelova@ec.europa.eu [European Commission - Joint Research Centre Headquarters, Brussels (Belgium)

    2014-10-15

    The design of the safety architecture of innovative as well as the assessment of existing nuclear systems needs to integrate the constraints related to the safety principles, requirements and objectives. Among these constraints, the compliance of the installation’s architecture with the principles of Defence in Depth (DiD), and its different levels, is certainly one of the most structuring. Defence in depth is the key to achieve safety robustness, thereby helping to ensure that nuclear systems do not exhibit any particularly dominant risk vulnerability. To help designers of innovative systems to correctly implement the defence-in-depth, or to assess how well the latter has been applied for existing reactor systems, the Objection-Provision Tree (OPT) methodology, which is part of the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM) promoted by the Generation IV Risk and Safety Working Group (GIF/RSWG), is suggested as a useful tool to complement the required traditional deterministic and probabilistic safety assessments. The document recalls the content of the OPT method and gives some details for its implementation, including for the systematic identification of the initiating events to be considered in designing the system. This step is essential especially for new systems for which there is no sufficient operational to support their design. The interactions with other tools (e.g. Failure Mode and Effect Analyses (FMEA) or ISAM Tools) are also commented. (author)

  4. Seismic methodology in determining basis earthquake for nuclear installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ameli Zamani, Sh.

    2008-01-01

    Design basis earthquake ground motions for nuclear installations should be determined to assure the design purpose of reactor safety: that reactors should be built and operated to pose no undue risk to public health and safety from earthquake and other hazards. Regarding the influence of seismic hazard to a site, large numbers of earthquake ground motions can be predicted considering possible variability among the source, path, and site parameters. However, seismic safety design using all predicted ground motions is practically impossible. In the determination of design basis earthquake ground motions it is therefore important to represent the influences of the large numbers of earthquake ground motions derived from the seismic ground motion prediction methods for the surrounding seismic sources. Viewing the relations between current design basis earthquake ground motion determination and modem earthquake ground motion estimation, a development of risk-informed design basis earthquake ground motion methodology is discussed for insight into the on going modernization of the Examination Guide for Seismic Design on NPP

  5. Integrated safety assessment report: Integrated Safety Assessment Program: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (Docket No. 50-245): Draft report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-04-01

    The Integrated Safety Assessment Program (ISAP) was initiated in November 1984, by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct integrated assessments for operating nuclear power reactors. The integrated assessment is conducted in a plant-specific basis to evaluate all licensing actions, licensee initiated plant improvements and selected unresolved generic/safety issues to establish implementation schedules for each item. In addition, procedures will be established to allow for a periodic updating of the schedules to account for licensing issues that arise in the future. This report documents the review of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, operated by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (located in Waterford, Connecticut). Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, is one of two plants being reviewed under the pilot program for ISAP. This report indicates how 85 topics selected for review were addressed. This report presents the staff's recommendations regarding the corrective actions to resolve the 85 topics and other actions to enhance plant safety. The report is being issued in draft form to obtain comments from the licensee, nuclear safety experts, and the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Once those comments have been resolved, the staff will present its positions, along with a long-term implementation schedule from the licensee, in the final version of this report

  6. Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; Kevin J. Carroll; Dr. Robert Lowrie

    2007-05-01

    /Security Documentation Integration, Configuration Control, and development of a shared ‘tool box’ of information/successes. Specific Benefits. The expectation or end state resulting from the topical report and associated implementation plan includes: (1) A recommended process for handling the documentation of the security and safety disciplines, including an appropriate change control process and participation by all stakeholders. (2) A means to package security systems with sufficient information to help expedite the flow of that system through the process. In addition, a means to share successes among sites, to include information and safety basis to the extent such information is transportable. (3) Identification of key security systems and associated essential security elements being installed and an arrangement for the sites installing these systems to host an appropriate team to review a specific system and determine what information is exportable. (4) Identification of the security systems’ essential elements and appropriate controls required for testing of these essential elements in the facility. (5) The ability to help refine and improve an agreed to control set at the manufacture stage.

  7. Improving radiopharmaceutical supply chain safety by implementing bar code technology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Matanza, David; Hallouard, François; Rioufol, Catherine; Fessi, Hatem; Fraysse, Marc

    2014-11-01

    The aim of this study was to describe and evaluate an approach for improving radiopharmaceutical supply chain safety by implementing bar code technology. We first evaluated the current situation of our radiopharmaceutical supply chain and, by means of the ALARM protocol, analysed two dispensing errors that occurred in our department. Thereafter, we implemented a bar code system to secure selected key stages of the radiopharmaceutical supply chain. Finally, we evaluated the cost of this implementation, from overtime, to overheads, to additional radiation exposure to workers. An analysis of the events that occurred revealed a lack of identification of prepared or dispensed drugs. Moreover, the evaluation of the current radiopharmaceutical supply chain showed that the dispensation and injection steps needed to be further secured. The bar code system was used to reinforce product identification at three selected key stages: at usable stock entry; at preparation-dispensation; and during administration, allowing to check conformity between the labelling of the delivered product (identity and activity) and the prescription. The extra time needed for all these steps had no impact on the number and successful conduct of examinations. The investment cost was reduced (2600 euros for new material and 30 euros a year for additional supplies) because of pre-existing computing equipment. With regard to the radiation exposure to workers there was an insignificant overexposure for hands with this new organization because of the labelling and scanning processes of radiolabelled preparation vials. Implementation of bar code technology is now an essential part of a global securing approach towards optimum patient management.

  8. Development of Comprehensive Nuclear Safety Regulation Plan for 2007-2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Young Sung; Kim, Woong Sik; Park, Dong Keuk; Kim, Ho Ki

    2006-01-01

    The Article 8-2 of Atomic Energy Act requires the government to establish Atomic Energy Promotion Plan every five years. It sets out national nuclear energy policies in a systematic and consistent way. The plan presents the goals and basic directions of national nuclear energy policies on the basis of current status and prospects. Both areas of utilization and safety management of nuclear energy are included and various projects and schedules are delineated based on the national policy directions. The safety management area in this plan deals with the overall safety and regulation policy. Its detail projects and schedule should be developed in separate plans by responsible ministries under the mediation of the MOST. As a regulatory authority, MOST is responsible for safety management area and its technical support organization, KINS has developed Comprehensive Nuclear Safety Regulation Plan as an implementation plan of safety area. This paper presents the development process and specific projects contained in the Comprehensive Nuclear Safety Regulation Plan which is under development now

  9. Organic reactivity analysis in Hanford single-shell tanks: Experimental and modeling basis for an expanded safety criterion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fauske, H.; Grigsby, J.M.; Turner, D.A.; Babad, H.; Meacham, J.E.

    1996-01-01

    De-spite demonstrated safe storage in terms of chemical stability of the Hanford high level waste for many decades, including decreasing waste temperatures and continuing aging of chemicals to less energetic states, concerns continue relative to assurance of long-term safe storage. Review of potential chemical safety hazards has been of particular recent interest in response to serious incidents within the Nuclear Weapons Complexes in the former Soviet Union (the 1957 Kyshtym and the 1993 Tomsk-7 incidents). Based upon an evaluation of the extensive new information and understanding that have developed over the last few years, it is concluded that the Hanford waste is stored safely and that concerns related to potential chemical safety hazards are not warranted. Spontaneous bulk runaway reactions of the Kyshtym incident type and other potential condensed-phase propagating reactions can be ruled out by assuring appropriate tank operating controls are in place and by limiting tank intrusive activities. This paper summarizes the technical basis for this position

  10. Implementing a "quality by design" approach to assure the safety and integrity of botanical dietary supplements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Khan, Ikhlas A; Smillie, Troy

    2012-09-28

    Natural products have provided a basis for health care and medicine to humankind since the beginning of civilization. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), approximately 80% of the world population still relies on herbal medicines for health-related benefits. In the United States, over 42% of the population claimed to have used botanical dietary supplements to either augment their current diet or to "treat" or "prevent" a particular health-related issue. This has led to the development of a burgeoning industry in the U.S. ($4.8 billion per year in 2008) to supply dietary supplements to the consumer. However, many commercial botanical products are poorly defined scientifically, and the consumer must take it on faith that the supplement they are ingesting is an accurate representation of what is listed on the label, and that it contains the purportedly "active" constituents they seek. Many dietary supplement manufacturers, academic research groups, and governmental organizations are progressively attempting to construct a better scientific understanding of natural products, herbals, and botanical dietary supplements that have co-evolved with Western-style pharmaceutical medicines. However, a deficiency of knowledge is still evident, and this issue needs to be addressed in order to achieve a significant level of safety, efficacy, and quality for commercial natural products. The authors contend that a "quality by design" approach for botanical dietary supplements should be implemented in order to ensure the safety and integrity of these products. Initiating this approach with the authentication of the starting plant material is an essential first step, and in this review several techniques that can aid in this endeavor are outlined.

  11. Unlocking the “black box” of practice improvement strategies to implement surgical safety checklists: a process evaluation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gillespie BM

    2017-04-01

    Full Text Available Brigid M Gillespie,1–3 Kyra Hamilton,4 Dianne Ball,5 Joanne Lavin,6 Therese Gardiner,6 Teresa K Withers,7 Andrea P Marshall1–3 1School of Nursing & Midwifery, Griffith University, Gold Coast, 2Gold Coast University Hospital and Health Service, Southport, 3Nursing & Midwifery Education & Research Unit (NMERU, National Centre of Research Excellence in Nursing, Menzies Health Institute of Queensland, Griffith University, Gold Coast, 4School of Applied Psychology, Griffith University, Mt Gravatt, 5Communio Pty Ltd, Sydney, 6Nursing & Midwifery Education & Research Unit, 7Surgical and Procedural Services, Gold Coast University Hospital and Health Service, Southport, Australia Background: Compliance with surgical safety checklists (SSCs has been associated with improvements in clinical processes such as antibiotic use, correct site marking, and overall safety processes. Yet, proper execution has been difficult to achieve.Objectives: The objective of this study was to undertake a process evaluation of four knowledge translation (KT strategies used to implement the Pass the Baton (PTB intervention which was designed to improve utilization of the SSC. Methods: As part of the process evaluation, a logic model was generated to explain which KT strategies worked well (or less well in the operating rooms of a tertiary referral hospital in Queensland, Australia. The KT strategies implemented included change champions/opinion leaders, education, audit and feedback, and reminders. In evaluating the implementation of these strategies, this study considered context, intervention and underpinning assumptions, implementation, and mechanism of impact. Observational and interview data were collected to assess implementation of the KT strategies relative to fidelity, feasibility, and acceptability. Results: Findings from 35 structured observations and 15 interviews with 96 intervention participants suggest that all of the KT strategies were consistently

  12. Mind the Gap. A systematic review to identify usability and safety challenges and practices during electronic health record implementation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ratwani, Raj; Fairbanks, Terry; Savage, Erica; Adams, Katie; Wittie, Michael; Boone, Edna; Hayden, Andrew; Barnes, Janey; Hettinger, Zach; Gettinger, Andrew

    2016-11-16

    Decisions made during electronic health record (EHR) implementations profoundly affect usability and safety. This study aims to identify gaps between the current literature and key stakeholders' perceptions of usability and safety practices and the challenges encountered during the implementation of EHRs. Two approaches were used: a literature review and interviews with key stakeholders. We performed a systematic review of the literature to identify usability and safety challenges and best practices during implementation. A total of 55 articles were reviewed through searches of PubMed, Web of Science and Scopus. We used a qualitative approach to identify key stakeholders' perceptions; semi-structured interviews were conducted with a diverse set of health IT stakeholders to understand their current practices and challenges related to usability during implementation. We used a grounded theory approach: data were coded, sorted, and emerging themes were identified. Conclusions from both sources of data were compared to identify areas of misalignment. We identified six emerging themes from the literature and stakeholder interviews: cost and resources, risk assessment, governance and consensus building, customization, clinical workflow and usability testing, and training. Across these themes, there were misalignments between the literature and stakeholder perspectives, indicating major gaps. Major gaps identified from each of six emerging themes are discussed as critical areas for future research, opportunities for new stakeholder initiatives, and opportunities to better disseminate resources to improve the implementation of EHRs. Our analysis identified practices and challenges across six different emerging themes, illustrated important gaps, and results suggest critical areas for future research and dissemination to improve EHR implementation.

  13. 76 FR 22944 - Pipeline Safety: Notice of Public Webinars on Implementation of Distribution Integrity Management...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-04-25

    ... oversight program and operating conditions as well as the evolutionary process that distribution system... 20590. Hand Delivery: Docket Management System, Room W12-140, on the ground floor of the West Building... PHMSA-2011-0084] Pipeline Safety: Notice of Public Webinars on Implementation of Distribution Integrity...

  14. Technical basis, supporting information, and strategy for development and implementation of DOE policy for natural phenomena hazards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Murray, R.C.

    1991-09-01

    Policy for addressing natural phenomenon comprises a hierarchy of interrelated documents. The top level of policy is contained in the code of Federal Regulations which establishes the framework and intent to ensure overall safety of DOE facilities when subjected to the effects of natural phenomena. The natural phenomena to be considered include earthquakes and tsunami, winds, hurricanes and tornadoes, floods, volcano effects and seiches. Natural phenomena criteria have been established for design of new facilities; evaluation of existing facilities; additions, modifications, and upgrades to existing facilities; and evaluation criteria for new or existing sites. Steps needed to implement these four general criteria are described. The intent of these criteria is to identify WHAT needs to be done to ensure adequate protection from natural phenomena. The commentary provides discussion of WHY this is needed for DOE facilities within the complex. Implementing procedures identifying HOW to carry out these criteria are next identified. Finally, short and long term tasks needed to identify the implementing procedure are tabulated. There is an overall need for consistency throughout the DOE complex related to natural phenomena including consistent terminology, policy, and implementation. 1 fig, 6 tabs.

  15. PRELIMINARY SELECTION OF MGR DESIGN BASIS EVENTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kappes, J.A.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this analysis is to identify the preliminary design basis events (DBEs) for consideration in the design of the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). For external events and natural phenomena (e.g., earthquake), the objective is to identify those initiating events that the MGR will be designed to withstand. Design criteria will ensure that radiological release scenarios resulting from these initiating events are beyond design basis (i.e., have a scenario frequency less than once per million years). For internal (i.e., human-induced and random equipment failures) events, the objective is to identify credible event sequences that result in bounding radiological releases. These sequences will be used to establish the design basis criteria for MGR structures, systems, and components (SSCs) design basis criteria in order to prevent or mitigate radiological releases. The safety strategy presented in this analysis for preventing or mitigating DBEs is based on the preclosure safety strategy outlined in ''Strategy to Mitigate Preclosure Offsite Exposure'' (CRWMS M andO 1998f). DBE analysis is necessary to provide feedback and requirements to the design process, and also to demonstrate compliance with proposed 10 CFR 63 (Dyer 1999b) requirements. DBE analysis is also required to identify and classify the SSCs that are important to safety (ITS)

  16. Industry example of how Safety and Security are applied within the Organizations: The Transnubel example

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bairiot, X.

    2016-01-01

    During more than 40 years of transport of radioactive materials, Transnubel noticed the evolution regarding Safety and Security requirements. These requirements have to be met within the frame of commercial activities, with constraints as planning, cost control, availabilities, .... In addition, other requirements issued by customers, eventually linked with Safety and Security, have also to be taken in account. Since many years, the company is therefore organized for all daily activities on basis of a Quality System: this Quality System, based on the ISO 9000, aims to give an answer to the ISO 9000 requirements, but also to the safety requirements, which are integrated at different levels in the Quality System. The trend of the last years concerning Security has an impact on the organization and documentation in the company. Due to the legal requirements, the implementation has not been possible within the same ISO 9000 structure. As a result, a Security system as been created on a similar basis as the ISO 9000: security manual, security procedures and security working instructions. Two systems therefore are existing within our company: a Quality System including Safety, and a Security System. In the frame of our international transports, we need to rely on the flexibility of our Quality System and Security System to allow us to take in account national regulations: the regulations dealing with Security and Safety (and their interpretations) are national competences, and differ once borders are crossed. The presentation will give an overview of the implementation of the Safety and Security aspects in the company: the structure and the implementation. And will try to answer the question: is the increase of the structure / documents always a benefit to the execution of the transports? (author)

  17. The cohort of the atomic bomb survivors major basis of radiation safety regulations

    CERN Document Server

    Rühm, W; Nekolla, E A

    2006-01-01

    Since 1950 about 87 000 A-bomb survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been monitored within the framework of the Life Span Study, to quantify radiation-induced late effects. In terms of incidence and mortality, a statistically significant excess was found for leukemia and solid tumors. In another major international effort, neutron and gamma radiation doses were estimated, for those survivors (Dosimetry System DS02). Both studies combined allow the deduction of risk coefficients that serve as a basis for international safety regulations. As an example, current results on all solid tumors combined suggest an excess relative risk of 0.47 per Sievert for an attained age of 70 years, for those who were exposed at an age of 30 years. After exposure to an effective dose of one Sievert the solid tumor mortality would thus be about 50% larger than that expected for a similar cohort not exposed to any ionizing radiation from the bombs.

  18. Research on integrated managing system based on CIMS for nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhou Gang

    2006-01-01

    In order to improve safety, economy and reliability of operation for nuclear power plant (NPP), a novel integrated managing method was proposed based on the ideas of computer and contemporary integrated manufacturing system (CIMS). The application of CIMS to nuclear power plant safety management was researched. In order to design an integrated managing system to meet the needs of NPP safety management, all work related to nuclear safety is divided into different category according to its characters. On basis of this work, general integrated managing system was designed at first. Then subsystems were designed and every subsystem implements a category of nuclear safety management work. All subsystems are independent relatively on the one hand and are interrelated on other hand by global information system. (authors)

  19. IAEA Safety Standards on Management Systems and Safety Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persson, Kerstin Dahlgren

    2007-01-01

    The IAEA has developed a new set of Safety Standard for applying an integrated Management System for facilities and activities. The objective of the new Safety Standards is to define requirements and provide guidance for establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a Management System that integrates safety, health, environmental, security, quality and economic related elements to ensure that safety is properly taken into account in all the activities of an organization. With an integrated approach to management system it is also necessary to include the aspect of culture, where the organizational culture and safety culture is seen as crucial elements of the successful implementation of this management system and the attainment of all the goals and particularly the safety goals of the organization. The IAEA has developed a set of service aimed at assisting it's Member States in establishing. Implementing, assessing and continually improving an integrated management system. (author)

  20. Implementation and evaluation of a prototype consumer reporting system for patient safety events.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Weingart, Saul N; Weissman, Joel S; Zimmer, Karen P; Giannini, Robert C; Quigley, Denise D; Hunter, Lauren E; Ridgely, M Susan; Schneider, Eric C

    2017-08-01

    No methodologically robust system exists for capturing consumer-generated patient safety reports. To address this challenge, we developed and pilot-tested a prototype consumer reporting system for patient safety, the Health Care Safety Hotline. Mixed methods evaluation. The Hotline was implemented in two US healthcare systems from 1 February 2014 through 30 June 2015. Patients, family members and caregivers associated with two US healthcare systems. A consumer-oriented incident reporting system for telephone or web-based administration was developed to elicit medical mistakes and care-related injuries. Key informant interviews, measurement of website traffic and analysis of completed reports. Key informants indicated that Hotline participation was motivated by senior leaders' support and alignment with existing quality and safety initiatives. During the measurement period from 1 October 2014 through 30 June 2015, the home page had 1530 visitors with a unique IP address. During its 17 months of operation, the Hotline received 37 completed reports including 20 mistakes without harm and 15 mistakes with injury. The largest category of mistake concerned problems with diagnosis or advice from a health practitioner. Hotline reports prompted quality reviews, an education intervention, and patient follow-ups. While generating fewer reports than its capacity to manage, the Health Care Safety Hotline demonstrated the feasibility of consumer-oriented patient safety reporting. Further research is needed to understand how to increase consumers' use of these systems. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

  1. Conception of transport cask with advanced safety, aimed at transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel of power reactors, which meets the requirements of IAEA in terms of safety and increased stability during beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Il'kaev, R.I.; Matveev, V.Z.; Morenko, A.I.; Shapovalov, V.I.; Semenov, A.G.; Sergeyev, V.M.; Orlov, V.K.; Shatalov, V.V.; Gotovchikov, V.T.; Seredenko, V.A.; Haire, Jonathan M.; Forsberg, C.W.

    2004-01-01

    The report is devoted to the problem of creation of a new generation of multi-purpose universal transport cask with advanced safety, aimed at transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of power reactors, which meets all requirements of IAEA in terms of safety and increased stability during beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism. Meeting all IAEA requirements in terms of safety both in normal operation conditions and accidents, as well as increased stability of transport cask (TC) with SNF under the conditions of beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism has been achieved in the design of multi-purpose universal TC due to the use of DU (depleted uranium) in it. At that, it is suggested to use DU in TC, which acts as effective gamma shield and constructional material in the form of both metallic depleted uranium and metal-ceramic mixture (cermet), based on stainless or carbon steel and DU dioxide. The metal in the cermet is chosen to optimize cask performance. The use of DU in the design of multi-purpose universal TC enables getting maximum load of the container for spent nuclear fuel when meeting IAEA requirements in terms of safety and providing increased stability of the container with SNF under conditions of beyond-design-basis accident and acts of terrorism

  2. Conception of transport cask with advanced safety, aimed at transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel of power reactors, which meets the requirements of IAEA in terms of safety and increased stability during beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Il' kaev, R.I.; Matveev, V.Z.; Morenko, A.I.; Shapovalov, V.I. [Russian Federal Nuclear Center - All-Russian Research Inst. of Experimental Physics, Sarov (Russian Federation); Semenov, A.G.; Sergeyev, V.M.; Orlov, V.K. [All-Russian Research Inst. of Inorganic Materials, Moscow (Russian Federation); Shatalov, V.V.; Gotovchikov, V.T.; Seredenko, V.A. [All-Russian Research Inst. of Applied Chemistry, Moscow (Russian Federation); Haire, Jonathan M.; Forsberg, C.W. [Oak Ridge National Lab., Oak Ridge (United States)

    2004-07-01

    The report is devoted to the problem of creation of a new generation of multi-purpose universal transport cask with advanced safety, aimed at transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of power reactors, which meets all requirements of IAEA in terms of safety and increased stability during beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism. Meeting all IAEA requirements in terms of safety both in normal operation conditions and accidents, as well as increased stability of transport cask (TC) with SNF under the conditions of beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism has been achieved in the design of multi-purpose universal TC due to the use of DU (depleted uranium) in it. At that, it is suggested to use DU in TC, which acts as effective gamma shield and constructional material in the form of both metallic depleted uranium and metal-ceramic mixture (cermet), based on stainless or carbon steel and DU dioxide. The metal in the cermet is chosen to optimize cask performance. The use of DU in the design of multi-purpose universal TC enables getting maximum load of the container for spent nuclear fuel when meeting IAEA requirements in terms of safety and providing increased stability of the container with SNF under conditions of beyond-design-basis accident and acts of terrorism.

  3. Guidance for implementing an environmental, safety, and health-assurance program. Volume 15. A model plan for line organization environmental, safety, and health-assurance programs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ellingson, A.C.; Trauth, C.A. Jr.

    1982-01-01

    This is 1 of 15 documents designed to illustrate how an Environmental, Safety and Health (ES and H) Assurance Program may be implemented. The generic definition of ES and H Assurance Programs is given in a companion document entitled An Environmental, Safety and Health Assurance Program Standard. This particular document presents a model operational-level ES and H Assurance Program that may be used as a guide by an operational-level organization in developing its own plan. The model presented here reflects the guidance given in the total series of 15 documents.

  4. Implementing Software Safety in the NASA Environment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wetherholt, Martha S.; Radley, Charles F.

    1994-01-01

    Until recently, NASA did not consider allowing computers total control of flight systems. Human operators, via hardware, have constituted the ultimate safety control. In an attempt to reduce costs, NASA has come to rely more and more heavily on computers and software to control space missions. (For example. software is now planned to control most of the operational functions of the International Space Station.) Thus the need for systematic software safety programs has become crucial for mission success. Concurrent engineering principles dictate that safety should be designed into software up front, not tested into the software after the fact. 'Cost of Quality' studies have statistics and metrics to prove the value of building quality and safety into the development cycle. Unfortunately, most software engineers are not familiar with designing for safety, and most safety engineers are not software experts. Software written to specifications which have not been safety analyzed is a major source of computer related accidents. Safer software is achieved step by step throughout the system and software life cycle. It is a process that includes requirements definition, hazard analyses, formal software inspections, safety analyses, testing, and maintenance. The greatest emphasis is placed on clearly and completely defining system and software requirements, including safety and reliability requirements. Unfortunately, development and review of requirements are the weakest link in the process. While some of the more academic methods, e.g. mathematical models, may help bring about safer software, this paper proposes the use of currently approved software methodologies, and sound software and assurance practices to show how, to a large degree, safety can be designed into software from the start. NASA's approach today is to first conduct a preliminary system hazard analysis (PHA) during the concept and planning phase of a project. This determines the overall hazard potential of

  5. [Patient safety in education and training of healthcare professionals in Germany].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hoffmann, Barbara; Siebert, H; Euteneier, A

    2015-01-01

    In order to improve patient safety, healthcare professionals who care for patients directly or indirectly are required to possess specific knowledge and skills. Patient safety education is not or only poorly represented in education and examination regulations of healthcare professionals in Germany; therefore, it is only practiced rarely and on a voluntary basis. Meanwhile, several training curricula and concepts have been developed in the past 10 years internationally and recently in Germany, too. Based on these concepts the German Coalition for Patient Safety developed a catalogue of core competencies required for safety in patient care. This catalogue will serve as an important orientation when patient safety is to be implemented as a subject of professional education in Germany in the future. Moreover, teaching staff has to be trained and educational and training activities have to be evaluated. Patient safety education and training for (undergraduate) healthcare professional will require capital investment.

  6. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KOPELIC, S.D.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  7. Model-Driven Development of Safety Architectures

    Science.gov (United States)

    Denney, Ewen; Pai, Ganesh; Whiteside, Iain

    2017-01-01

    We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval.

  8. Learning Safety Assessment from Accidents in a University Environment

    OpenAIRE

    Jensen, Niels; Jørgensen, Sten Bay

    2013-01-01

    This contribution describes how a chemical engineering department started learning from accidents during experimental work and ended up implementing an industrially inspired system for risk assessment of new and existing experimental setups as well as a system for assessing potential risk from the chemicals used in the experimental work. These experiences have led to recent developments which focus increasingly on the a theoretical basis for modeling and reasoning on safety as well as operati...

  9. Companies' opinions and acceptance of global food safety initiative benchmarks after implementation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Crandall, Phil; Van Loo, Ellen J; O'Bryan, Corliss A; Mauromoustakos, Andy; Yiannas, Frank; Dyenson, Natalie; Berdnik, Irina

    2012-09-01

    International attention has been focused on minimizing costs that may unnecessarily raise food prices. One important aspect to consider is the redundant and overlapping costs of food safety audits. The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) has devised benchmarked schemes based on existing international food safety standards for use as a unifying standard accepted by many retailers. The present study was conducted to evaluate the impact of the decision made by Walmart Stores (Bentonville, AR) to require their suppliers to become GFSI compliant. An online survey of 174 retail suppliers was conducted to assess food suppliers' opinions of this requirement and the benefits suppliers realized when they transitioned from their previous food safety systems. The most common reason for becoming GFSI compliant was to meet customers' requirements; thus, supplier implementation of the GFSI standards was not entirely voluntary. Other reasons given for compliance were enhancing food safety and remaining competitive. About 54 % of food processing plants using GFSI benchmarked schemes followed the guidelines of Safe Quality Food 2000 and 37 % followed those of the British Retail Consortium. At the supplier level, 58 % followed Safe Quality Food 2000 and 31 % followed the British Retail Consortium. Respondents reported that the certification process took about 10 months. The most common reason for selecting a certain GFSI benchmarked scheme was because it was widely accepted by customers (retailers). Four other common reasons were (i) the standard has a good reputation in the industry, (ii) the standard was recommended by others, (iii) the standard is most often used in the industry, and (iv) the standard was required by one of their customers. Most suppliers agreed that increased safety of their products was required to comply with GFSI benchmarked schemes. They also agreed that the GFSI required a more carefully documented food safety management system, which often required

  10. Model review and evaluation for application in DOE safety basis documentation of chemical accidents - modeling guidance for atmospheric dispersion and consequence assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lazaro, M. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Woodarad, K. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Hanna, S. R. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Hesse, D. J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Huang, J. -C. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Lewis, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Mazzola, C. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through its Defense Programs (DP), Office of Engineering and Operations Suppon, established the Accident Phenomenology and Consequence (AP AC) Methodology Evaluation Program to identify and evaluate methodologies and computer codes to support accident phenomenological and consequence calculations for both radiological and nonradiological materials at DOE facilities and to identify development needs. The program is also intended to define and recommend "best or good engineering/safety analysis practices" to be followed in preparing ''design or beyond design basis" assessments to be included in DOE nuclear and nonnuclear facility safety documents. The AP AC effort is intended to provide scientifically sound and more consistent analytical approaches, by identifying model selection procedures and application methodologies, in order to enhance safety analysis activities throughout the DOE complex.

  11. Safety evaluation report of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant safety analysis report: Contact-handled transuranic waste disposal operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-02-01

    DOE 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, requires that the US Department of Energy conduct an independent, defensible, review in order to approve a Safety Analysis Report (SAR). That review and the SAR approval basis is documented in this formal Safety Evaluation Report (SER). This SER documents the DOE's review of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant SAR and provides the Carlsbad Area Office Manager, the WIPP SAR approval authority, with the basis for approving the safety document. It concludes that the safety basis documented in the WIPP SAR is comprehensive, correct, and commensurate with hazards associated with planned waste disposal operations

  12. Cryogenic safety organisation at CERN

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN. Geneva

    2016-01-01

    With Safety being a top priority of CERN’s general policy, the Organisation defines and implements a Policy that sets out the general principles governing Safety at CERN. To the end of the attainment of said Safety objectives, the organic units (owners/users of the equipment) are assigned the responsibility for the implementation of the CERN Safety Policy at all levels of the organization, whereas the Health and Safety and Environmental Protection Unit (HSE) has the role of providing assistance for the implementation of the Safety Policy, and a monitoring role related to the implementation of continuous improvement of Safety, compliance with the Safety Rules and the handling of emergency situations. This talk will elaborate on the roles, responsibilities and organisational structure of the different stakeholders within the Organization with regards to Safety, and in particular to cryogenic safety. The roles of actors of particular importance such as the Cryogenic Safety Officers (CSOs) and the Cryogenic Sa...

  13. Management of safety, safety culture and self assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.

    2000-01-01

    Safety management is the term used for the measures required to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of an installation, including decommissioning. The safety culture concept and its implementation are described in part one of the paper. The principles of safety are now quite well known and are implemented worldwide. It leads to a situation where harmonization is being achieved as indicated by the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. To go beyond the present nuclear safety levels, management of safety and safety culture will be the means for achieving progress. Recent events which took place in major nuclear power countries have shown the importance of the management and the consequences on safety. At the same time, electricity deregulation is coming and will impact on safety through reductions in staffing and in operation and maintenance cost at nuclear installations. Management of safety as well as its control and monitoring by the safety authorities become a key to the future of nuclear energy.(author)

  14. Reactor safety research - visible demonstrations and credible computations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Loewenstein, W B; Divakaruni, S M

    1985-11-01

    EPRI has been conducting nuclear safety research for a number of years with the primary goal of assuring the safety and reliability of the nuclear plants. The visibility is emphasized by sponsoring or participating in large scale test demonstrations to credibly support the complex computations that are the basis for quantification of safety margins. Recognizing the success of the airline industry in receiving favorable public perception, the authors compare the design and operation practices of the airline industry with those of the nuclear industry practices to identify the elements contributing to public concerns and unfavorable perceptions. In this paper, authors emphasize the importance of proper communications of research results to the public in a manner that non-specialists understand. Further, EPRI supported research and results in the areas of source term, seismic and structural engineering research, analysis using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), quantification of safety margins, digital technology development and implementation, and plant transient and performance evaluations are discussed in the paper. (orig./HP).

  15. Reactor safety research - visible demonstrations and credible computations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loewenstein, W.B.; Divakaruni, S.M.

    1985-01-01

    EPRI has been conducting nuclear safety research for a number of years with the primary goal of assuring the safety and reliability of the nuclear plants. The visibility is emphasized by sponsoring or participating in large scale test demonstrations to credibly support the complex computations that are the basis for quantification of safety margins. Recognizing the success of the airline industry in receiving favorable public perception, the authors compare the design and operation practices of the airline industry with those of the nuclear industry practices to identify the elements contributing to public concerns and unfavorable perceptions. In this paper, authors emphasize the importance of proper communications of research results to the public in a manner that non-specialists understand. Further, EPRI supported research and results in the areas of source term, seismic and structural engineering research, analysis using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), quantification of safety margins, digital technology development and implementation, and plant transient and performance evaluations are discussed in the paper. (orig./HP)

  16. Implementation of an enlarged model of the safety valves and relief in the plant integral model for the code RELAP/SCDAPSIM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amador G, R.; Ortiz V, J.; Castillo D, R.; Hernandez L, E. J.; Galeana R, J. C.; Gutierrez, V. H.

    2013-10-01

    The present work refers to the implementation of a new model on the logic of the safety valves and relief in the integral model of the Nuclear Power Plant of Laguna Verde of the thermal-hydraulic compute code RELAP/SCDAPSIM Mod. 3.4. The new model was developed with the compute package SIMULINK-MATLAB and contemplates all the operation options of the safety valves and relief, besides including the availability options of the valves in all the operation ways and of blockage in the ways of relief and low-low. The implementation means the elimination of the old model of the safety valves and to analyze the group of logical variables, of discharge and available control systems to associate them to the model of package SIMULINK-MATLAB. The implementation has been practically transparent and 27 cases corresponding to a turbine discharge were analyzed with the code RELAP/SCDAPSIM Mod. 3.4. The results were satisfactory. (Author)

  17. FLAMMABLE GAS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    KRIPPS, L.J.

    2005-03-03

    This document describes the qualitative evaluation of frequency and consequences for DST and SST representative flammable gas accidents and associated hazardous conditions without controls. The evaluation indicated that safety-significant structures, systems and components (SSCs) and/or technical safety requirements (TSRs) were required to prevent or mitigate flammable gas accidents. Discussion on the resulting control decisions is included. This technical basis document was developed to support WP-13033, Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), and describes the risk binning process for the flammable gas representative accidents and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition based on an evaluation of the event frequency and consequence.

  18. The basis and safety of food irradiation. Advantages of radiation treatment for food sanitation and storage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ito, Hitoshi [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Takasaki, Gunma (Japan). Takasaki Radiation Chemistry Research Establishment

    2001-09-01

    The food irradiation has the history of more than 60 years in its development. However, its commercial application has not been promoted well in Japan even though the safety of irradiated foods was confirmed. Recently, relevant authorities in 52 countries have given clearance to many commodities, and irradiated foods are commercially distributed in USA and EU countries. The international situation makes some unavoidable circumstances which can not close the commercialization of food irradiation in Japan. The present report contains the basis and application of food irradiation, and history of development in the World and Japan. Moreover, the safety of irradiated foods are demonstrated from many evidences of researches in animal feeding tests, in analysis of radiolytic products, in nutritional evaluations and in microbiological studies of irradiated foods. Especially, it makes obvious from the results of many researches that unique radiolytic products can not be produced by irradiation of foods. Because main radiation effects are induced by oxidation degradation of food components as similar to natural oxidation by heating or UV light. Radiation engineering for commercial process and identification methods of irradiated foods are also presented. (author)

  19. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    KOPELIC, S.D.

    1999-02-25

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  20. Department of Energy's safety and health program for enrichment plant workers is not adequately implemented

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staats, E.B.

    1980-01-01

    The Department of Energy's (DOE's) program to protect the safety and health of employees at its contractor-operated uranium enrichment plants has not been fully implemented by DOE's Oak Ridge Operations Office. Appraisals and inspections of plant conditions are not as frequent and/or as thorough as required. Instead of independently investigating employee complaints, DOE has delegated this responsibility to the contractor. It is recommended that the Secretary of Energy make sure that Oak Ridge properly conducts inspections and appraisals and investigates and follows up on all employee complaints. He should also take steps to provide increased independence and objectivity in the Oak Ridge Operations Office's safety and health program. Furthermore, the Congress should authorize the Secretary of Energy to institute a program of non-reimbursable penalties and fines for violations of safety and health standards and procedures

  1. Safety assessment for facilities and activities. General safety requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    ) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews;(i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived from the

  2. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    ) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews; (i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived from the

  3. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    ) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews; (i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived from the

  4. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    installed; (i) Facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ores (such as ores of uranium and thorium) are carried out. 'Activities' includes: (a) production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research, medical and other purposes; (b) transport of radioactive material; (c) decommissioning and dismantling of facilities and the closure of repositories for radioactive waste; (d) close-out of facilities where the mining and processing of radioactive ore was carried out; (e) activities for radioactive waste management such as the discharge of effluents; (f) remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities. Safety assessment plays an important role throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity whenever decisions on safety issues are made by the designers, the constructors, the manufacturers, the operating organization or the regulatory body. Stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity where a safety assessment is carried out, updated and used by the designers, the operating organization and the regulatory body include: (a) site evaluation for the facility or activity; (b) development of the design; (c) construction of the facility or implementation of the activity; (d) commissioning of the facility or activity; (e) commencement of operation of the facility or conduct of the activity; (f) normal operation of the facility or normal conduct of the activity; (g) modification of the design or operation; (h) periodic safety reviews;(i) life extension of the facility beyond its original design life; (j) changes in ownership or management of the facility; (k) decommissioning and dismantling of a facility; (l) closure of a repository for the disposal of radioactive waste and the post-closure phase; (m) remediation of a site and release from regulatory control. The publication is structured as follows: An introduction is followed by Section 2 which provides the basis for requiring a safety assessment to be carried out, derived

  5. [Recommendations for inspections of the French nuclear safety authority].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rousse, C; Chauvet, B

    2015-10-01

    The French nuclear safety authority is responsible for the control of radiation protection in radiotherapy since 2002. Controls are based on the public health and the labour codes and on the procedures defined by the controlled health care facility for its quality and safety management system according to ASN decision No. 2008-DC-0103. Inspectors verify the adequacy of the quality and safety management procedures and their implementation, and select process steps on the basis of feedback from events notified to ASN. Topics of the inspection are communicated to the facility at the launch of a campaign, which enables them to anticipate the inspectors' expectations. In cases where they are not physicians, inspectors are not allowed to access information covered by medical confidentiality. The consulted documents must therefore be expunged of any patient-identifying information. Exchanges before the inspection are intended to facilitate the provision of documents that may be consulted. Finally, exchange slots between inspectors and the local professionals must be organized. Based on improvements achieved by the health care centres and on recommendations from a joint working group of radiotherapy professionals and the nuclear safety authority, changes will be made in the control procedure that will be implemented when developing the inspection program for 2016-2019. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier SAS.

  6. Safety issues and their ranking for WWER-1000 model 320 nuclear power plants. A publication of the extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER and RBMK nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-03-01

    The objective of this report is to present a consolidated list of safety deficiencies, called safety issues, ranked according to their safety significance and the corrective measures to improve overall safety. It is intended for use as a reference to facilitate the development of plant specific safety improvement programmes and to serve as a basis for reviewing their implementation. To the extent that information was made available to the IAEA, the country/plant specific status with respect to each safety issue is described. Section 2 provides an overview of the impact of the relevant issues on the main safety functions in different operational conditions and other aspects important to overall plant safety. A summary of the safety issues and their respective ranking is given in Tables 1 and 2 at the end of Section 2. Section 3 deals with individual safety issues identified in the design which are presented according to the structure below. Section 4 presents the safety issues related to operational safety according to a similar structure but without the ranking. 73 refs, 3 tabs

  7. Safety issues and their ranking for WWER-1000 model 320 nuclear power plants. A publication of the extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER and RBMK nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-04-01

    The objective of this report is to present a consolidated list of safety deficiencies, called safety issues, ranked according to their safety significance and the corrective measures to improve overall safety. It is intended for use as a reference to facilitate the development of plant specific safety improvement programmes and to serve as a basis for reviewing their implementation. To the extent that information was made available to the IAEA, the country/plant specific status with respect to each safety issue is described. Section 2 provides an overview of the impact of the relevant issues on the main safety functions in different operational conditions and other aspects important to overall plant safety. A summary of the safety issues and their respective ranking is given in Tables 1 and 2 at the end of Section 2. Section 3 deals with individual safety issues identified in the design which are presented according to the structure below. Section 4 presents the safety issues related to operational safety according to a similar structure but without the ranking

  8. Sizewell B nuclear power station: the basis for the decision by the Health and Safety Executive to grant consent to load fuel into the reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The licensing and consent process and the basis for granting a consent for Nuclear Electric to load fuel into the Sizewell B reactor in the United Kingdom are explained. Consent was granted by the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive on satisfactory completion of construction and those commissioning stages needed to proceed safely, and the production of a satisfactory safety case. A summary of the assessment of the safety case is appended. It covers the reactor core, coolant system structural integrity, engineered safety features, main and essential electrical system, control and instrumentation, radioactive waste management, radiological protection, fuel storage and handling, civil works and structures, fault analysis, human factors, hazard analysis, quality assurance, and decommissioning. (UK)

  9. Importance of Decision Support Systems About Food Safety in Raw Milk Production

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ecem Akan

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available In raw milk production decision support systems for control of food safety hazards has not been developed but main points of this system are available. The decision support systems’ elements include data identification at critical points in the milk supply chain, an information management system and data exchange. Decision supports systems has been developed on the basis of these elements. In dairy sector decision support systems are significant for controlling of food safety hazards and preferred by producers. When these systems are implemented in the milk supply chain, it can be prevented unnecessary sampling and analysis. In this article it will be underlined effects of decision support system elements on food safety of raw milk.

  10. Integrated therapy safety management system.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Podtschaske, Beatrice; Fuchs, Daniela; Friesdorf, Wolfgang

    2013-09-01

    The aim is to demonstrate the benefit of the medico-ergonomic approach for the redesign of clinical work systems. Based on the six layer model, a concept for an 'integrated therapy safety management' is drafted. This concept could serve as a basis to improve resilience. The concept is developed through a concept-based approach. The state of the art of safety and complexity research in human factors and ergonomics forms the basis. The findings are synthesized to a concept for 'integrated therapy safety management'. The concept is applied by way of example for the 'medication process' to demonstrate its practical implementation. The 'integrated therapy safety management' is drafted in accordance with the six layer model. This model supports a detailed description of specific work tasks, the corresponding responsibilities and related workflows at different layers by using the concept of 'bridge managers'. 'Bridge managers' anticipate potential errors and monitor the controlled system continuously. If disruptions or disturbances occur, they respond with corrective actions which ensure that no harm results and they initiate preventive measures for future procedures. The concept demonstrates that in a complex work system, the human factor is the key element and final authority to cope with the residual complexity. The expertise of the 'bridge managers' and the recursive hierarchical structure results in highly adaptive clinical work systems and increases their resilience. The medico-ergonomic approach is a highly promising way of coping with two complexities. It offers a systematic framework for comprehensive analyses of clinical work systems and promotes interdisciplinary collaboration. © 2013 The Authors. British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology © 2013 The British Pharmacological Society.

  11. Integrated therapy safety management system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Podtschaske, Beatrice; Fuchs, Daniela; Friesdorf, Wolfgang

    2013-01-01

    Aims The aim is to demonstrate the benefit of the medico-ergonomic approach for the redesign of clinical work systems. Based on the six layer model, a concept for an ‘integrated therapy safety management’ is drafted. This concept could serve as a basis to improve resilience. Methods The concept is developed through a concept-based approach. The state of the art of safety and complexity research in human factors and ergonomics forms the basis. The findings are synthesized to a concept for ‘integrated therapy safety management’. The concept is applied by way of example for the ‘medication process’ to demonstrate its practical implementation. Results The ‘integrated therapy safety management’ is drafted in accordance with the six layer model. This model supports a detailed description of specific work tasks, the corresponding responsibilities and related workflows at different layers by using the concept of ‘bridge managers’. ‘Bridge managers’ anticipate potential errors and monitor the controlled system continuously. If disruptions or disturbances occur, they respond with corrective actions which ensure that no harm results and they initiate preventive measures for future procedures. The concept demonstrates that in a complex work system, the human factor is the key element and final authority to cope with the residual complexity. The expertise of the ‘bridge managers’ and the recursive hierarchical structure results in highly adaptive clinical work systems and increases their resilience. Conclusions The medico-ergonomic approach is a highly promising way of coping with two complexities. It offers a systematic framework for comprehensive analyses of clinical work systems and promotes interdisciplinary collaboration. PMID:24007448

  12. Application of probabilistic safety goals to regulation of nuclear power plants in Canada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rzentkowski, G.; Akl, Y.; Yalaoui, S. [Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada)

    2013-07-01

    In the Canadian nuclear regulatory framework, Safety Goals are formulated in addition to the deterministic design requirements and the dose acceptance criteria so that risk to the public that originates from accidents outside the design basis is considered. In principle, application of the Safety Goals ensures that the likelihood of accidents with serious radiological consequences is extremely low, and the potential radiological consequences from severe accidents are limited as far as practicable. Effectively, the Safety Goals extend the plant design envelope to include not only the capabilities of the plant to successfully cope with various plant states, but also practical measures to halt the progression of severe accidents. This paper describes the general approach to the development of the Safety Goals and their application to the existing nuclear power plants in Canada. This general approach is consistent with the currently accepted international practice and Canadian regulatory experience. The results of probabilistic safety assessments indicate that the Safety Goals meet or exceed international safety objectives due to effective implementation of the defence-in-depth principle in the reactor design and plant operation. At the same time, the application of the Safety Goals reveal that practicable measures exist to further enhance the overall level of reactor safety by focusing on severe accident prevention and mitigation. These measures are being currently implemented through refurbishment projects and feedback on operating experience. (author)

  13. [Implementation of safety devices: biological accident prevention].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Catalán Gómez, M Teresa; Sol Vidiella, Josep; Castellà Castellà, Manel; Castells Bo, Carolina; Losada Pla, Nuria; Espuny, Javier Lluís

    2010-04-01

    Accidental exposures to blood and biological material were the most frequent and potentially serious accidents in healthcare workers, reported in the Prevention of Occupational Risks Unit within 2002. Evaluate the biological percutaneous accidents decrease after a progressive introduction of safety devices. Biological accidents produced between 2.002 and 2.006 were analyzed and reported by the injured healthcare workers to the Level 2b Hospital Prevention of Occupational Risk Unit with 238 beds and 750 employees. The key of the study was the safety devices (peripheral i.v. catheter, needleless i.v. access device and capillary blood collection lancet). Within 2002, 54 percutaneous biological accidents were registered and 19 in 2006, that represents a 64.8% decreased. There has been no safety devices accident reported involving these material. Accidents registered during the implantation period occurred because safety devices were not used at that time. Safety devices have proven to be effective in reducing needle stick percutaneous accidents, so that they are a good choice in the primary prevention of biological accidents contact.

  14. Nuclear Safety Bureau: safety objectives and principles for the proposed ANSTO reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Westall, D.

    1993-01-01

    Siting criteria and safety assessment principles were previously promulgated by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), and have been applied by ANSTO and the Nuclear Safety Bureau (NSB). The NSB is revising these criteria and principles to take account of evolving nuclear safety standards and practices. The NSB Safety and Siting Assessment Principles (SSAP) are presented and it is estimated that it will provide a comprehensive basis for the safety assessment of research reactors in Australia, and be applicable to all stages of a reactor project: siting: design and construction; operation; modification; and decommissioning. The SSAP are similar to the principles promulgated by the AAEC, in that probabilistic safety criteria are set for assessment of design, however these criteria are complimentary to a deterministic design basis approach. This is a similar approach to that recently published by the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 4 . Siting principles are now also included, where they were previously separate, and require a consideration of the consequences of severe accidents which are an extension of accidents catered for by the design of the plant. Criteria for radiation doses due to normal operations and design basis accidents are included in the principles for safety assessment. 9 refs

  15. Ukraine International cooperation in nuclear and radiation safety: public-administrative aspect

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    I. P. Krynychnay

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available The article examines international cooperation of Ukraine with other States in the sphere of ensuring nuclear and radiation safety and highlights the main directions of development and improvement of nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine based on international experience, with the aim of preventing the risks of accidents and contamination areas radiological substances. Illuminated that for more than half a century of experience in the use of nuclear energy by the international community under the auspices of the UN, IAEA and other international organizations initiated and monitored the implementation of key national and international programs on nuclear and radiation safety. Of the Convention in the field of nuclear safety and the related independent peer review, effective national regulatory infrastructures, current nuclear safety standards and policy documents, as well as mechanisms of evaluation in the framework of the IAEA constitute important prerequisites for the creation of a world community, the global regime of nuclear and radiation safety. For analysis of the state of international cooperation of Ukraine with other States in the sphere of nuclear and radiation safety, highlighted the legal substance of nuclear and radiation safety of Ukraine, which is enshrined in the domestic Law of Ukraine «On nuclear energy use and radiation safety». Considered the most relevant legal relations. It is established that, despite the current complex international instruments, existing domestic legislation on nuclear and radiation safety, partly there is a threat of emergency nuclear radiation nature, in connection with the failure of fixed rules and programs, lack of funding from the state is not always on time and in full allows you to perform fixed strategy for overcoming the consequences of radiation accidents, the prevention of the threat of environmental pollution. Found that to improve and further ensuring nuclear and radiation safety of

  16. Safety aspects of nuclear power plant component aging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Conte, M.; Deletre, G.; Henry, J.Y.

    1988-01-01

    The safety of nuclear plants depends on the capacity of the systems they are composed to perform the functions they were designed for. The identification and understanding of phenomena liable to degrade this operational capacity thus constitute one of the safety problems for which allowance must be made at the earliest stage of a project. Aging, a natural and hence unavoidable process affecting all the components of an installation, was identified at a very early stage as being one of these phenomena. The investigation and implementation of solutions to the safety problems associated to aging make it necessary to: defining the domain in which the consequences of aging are to be evaluated, identifying the parameters involved, identifying the components sensitive to these parameters, understanding the mechanisms which govern its evolution. The results of qualification tests, and of tests and checks carried out at different stages of construction and operation, as well as allowance for operating experience, constitute the necessary basis for establishing or improving the regulatory requirements. The procedures for validating components and systems of the installation are also drawn up on the basis of these tests. Finally, the actions initiated within the scope of research and development programmes supply the additional data necessary for such validation, and provide the indispensable support for knowledge improvement

  17. Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-10-15

    This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

  18. Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

  19. 21 CFR 120.9 - Legal basis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... CONSUMPTION HAZARD ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS General Provisions § 120.9 Legal basis. Failure of a processor to have and to implement a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP... implementation of its HACCP system. ...

  20. General safety orientations of the Jules Horowitz Reactor Project (JHRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tremodeux, P.; Fiorini, G.L.

    2000-01-01

    After a brief reminder of the JHR purpose, the document outlines the General Safety related Orientations/Recommendations used for the design and the safety assessment of the facility. As far as the JHR design is new, the safety philosophy adopted for this reactor will be as consistent as possible with that recommended for future (power...) reactors. The general recommendations developed in the paper are: the general nuclear safety approach for the design, operation and analysis with, in particular, the adoption of the Defence In Depth principle; the general safety objectives in terms of radiological consequences; the use of Probabilistic Safety Studies; quality assurance. The 'Defence in Depth' concept using amongst others the 'Barrier' principle remains the basis of the JHR safety. 'Defence In Depth' is applied both to design and operation. Its adequacy is checked during the safety assessment and the paper gives the technical recommendations that should allow the designer to implement this concept into the final design. Built mainly for experimental irradiation the JHR facilities will be handled according to conventional or new operation rules which could put materials under stress and entail handling errors. Specific recommendations are defined to take into account the corresponding peculiarities; they are discussed in the paper. The safety design of the JHR takes into account the experience accumulated through the CEA experimental irradiation programmes, which represents several dozen reactor years; the consultation of CEA reactor facilities operators is ongoing. The corresponding feedback is shortly described. Recommendations related to maintenance and associated operation are indicated as well as those regarding the human factor. Details are given on the JHR safety practical implementation through the CEA/DRN Safety approach. Details of the corresponding Safety Objectives are also discussed. Finally the designer position on the role of probabilistic safety

  1. A tool for safety evaluations of road improvements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peltola, Harri; Rajamäki, Riikka; Luoma, Juha

    2013-11-01

    Road safety impact assessments are requested in general, and the directive on road infrastructure safety management makes them compulsory for Member States of the European Union. However, there is no widely used, science-based safety evaluation tool available. We demonstrate a safety evaluation tool called TARVA. It uses EB safety predictions as the basis for selecting locations for implementing road-safety improvements and provides estimates of safety benefits of selected improvements. Comparing different road accident prediction methods, we demonstrate that the most accurate estimates are produced by EB models, followed by simple accident prediction models, the same average number of accidents for every entity and accident record only. Consequently, advanced model-based estimates should be used. Furthermore, we demonstrate regional comparisons that benefit substantially from such tools. Comparisons between districts have revealed significant differences. However, comparisons like these produce useful improvement ideas only after taking into account the differences in road characteristics between areas. Estimates on crash modification factors can be transferred from other countries but their benefit is greatly limited if the number of target accidents is not properly predicted. Our experience suggests that making predictions and evaluations using the same principle and tools will remarkably improve the quality and comparability of safety estimations. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  2. Implementing partnerships in nonreactor facility safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courtney, J.C.; Perry, W.H.; Phipps, R.D.

    1996-01-01

    Faculty and students from LSU have been participating in nuclear safety analyses and radiation protection projects at ANL-W at INEL since 1973. A mutually beneficial relationship has evolved that has resulted in generation of safety-related studies acceptable to Argonne and DOE, NRC, and state regulatory groups. Most of the safety projects have involved the Hot Fuel Examination Facility or the Fuel Conditioning Facility; both are hot cells that receive spent fuel from EBR-II. A table shows some of the major projects at ANL-W that involved LSU students and faculty

  3. Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. Third national report on the implementation of obligations of the Joint Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-09-01

    This report is published in compliance with the Joint Convention and presents the measures implemented by France to comply with each of the obligations defined by this convention. The structure of the report refers to the articles of the Convention. Therefore, after a presentation of the main evolutions since France's previous report, the following themes are addressed: policies and practices, scope of application, inventories and lists, legislative and regulatory system, other general safety provisions, safety of spent fuel management, trans-boundary movement, disused sealed sources, and planned activities to improve safety

  4. Examination of issues related to the development and implementation of real-time operational safety monitoring tools in the nuclear power industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puglia, William J.; Atefi, Bahman

    1995-01-01

    In recent years, risk and reliability techniques have been increasingly used to optimize deterministic requirements and to improve the operational safety of nuclear power stations. This paper discusses the historical development and current status of implementation of real-time operational safety monitoring tools in the nuclear power industry worldwide. A safety monitor is defined as a PC-based risk management tool, based on a plant specific PSA, which can be used to manage plant safety during the day-to-day operation of a nuclear power plant by planning maintenance activities and providing advisory information to plant operational staff in order to avoid high risk plant configurations. As this technique has only been applied in a few plants worldwide, the technology is still evolving and there are several technical and implementation-related issues which still need to be resolved. This paper attempts to summarize all such issues and describe how they have been addressed in several different applications of this technology around the world

  5. Assessing and implementing training requirements for staff at plants to meet safety, environment and job needs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lagasse, L. (Manitoba Hydro, Winnipeg, MB (Canada))

    1999-01-01

    The rationale for and the process to establish a team to develop a framework for a training plan, determine the cost of such a program for all employees of the Power Supply Division of Manitoba Hydro, and to establish guidelines for implementation of the plan are described. The end result of the process is a job profile and skill and knowledge inventory for some 25 job families within the Power Supply Division; a form to establish training needs for all employees for a three year period which will provide the basis for a three-year training plan and budget; an implementation guide and training plan spreadsheet to facilitate the implementation process; and a series of performance indicators. 4 figs.

  6. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.; PIEPHO, M.G.

    2000-01-01

    This document provided the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report''. All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  7. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support ''HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety, Analysis Report, Annex A,'' ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  8. Implementation of the chemicals regulation REACH : Exploring the impact on occupational health and safety management among Swedish downstream users

    OpenAIRE

    Schenk, Linda; Antonsson, Ann-Beth

    2015-01-01

    In the present study we have examined how the European chemicals regulation Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) has influenced occupational risk management of chemicals at Swedish downstream user companies. The data were collected through interviews with occupational health and safety professionals, safety representatives and authority employees. The results show that most of the informants had scarce knowledge about REACH and that REACH implementation...

  9. Mixing of incompatible materials in waste tanks technical basis document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SANDGREN, K.R.

    2003-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and describes the risk binning process, the technical basis for assigning risk bins, and the controls selected for the mixing of incompatible materials representative accident and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and/or technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the FR-equency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR level controls. Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'', as described in this report

  10. Generic Safety Requirements for Developing Safe Insulin Pump Software

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yi; Jetley, Raoul; Jones, Paul L; Ray, Arnab

    2011-01-01

    Background The authors previously introduced a highly abstract generic insulin infusion pump (GIIP) model that identified common features and hazards shared by most insulin pumps on the market. The aim of this article is to extend our previous work on the GIIP model by articulating safety requirements that address the identified GIIP hazards. These safety requirements can be validated by manufacturers, and may ultimately serve as a safety reference for insulin pump software. Together, these two publications can serve as a basis for discussing insulin pump safety in the diabetes community. Methods In our previous work, we established a generic insulin pump architecture that abstracts functions common to many insulin pumps currently on the market and near-future pump designs. We then carried out a preliminary hazard analysis based on this architecture that included consultations with many domain experts. Further consultation with domain experts resulted in the safety requirements used in the modeling work presented in this article. Results Generic safety requirements for the GIIP model are presented, as appropriate, in parameterized format to accommodate clinical practices or specific insulin pump criteria important to safe device performance. Conclusions We believe that there is considerable value in having the diabetes, academic, and manufacturing communities consider and discuss these generic safety requirements. We hope that the communities will extend and revise them, make them more representative and comprehensive, experiment with them, and use them as a means for assessing the safety of insulin pump software designs. One potential use of these requirements is to integrate them into model-based engineering (MBE) software development methods. We believe, based on our experiences, that implementing safety requirements using MBE methods holds promise in reducing design/implementation flaws in insulin pump development and evolutionary processes, therefore improving

  11. Enhancing the implementation of Occupational Health and Safety interventions through a design of the socio-technical interaction

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Masi, Donato; Cagno, E.; Hasle, Peter

    2014-01-01

    A multitude of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) interventions have proven to be effective under controlled conditions, but their implementation in practice is often difficult and interventions may therefore not work as expected, especially when referring to Small and Medium sized Enterprises...

  12. Safety requirement of the nuclear power plants, after TMI-2 accident and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirhabibi, N.; Tochai, M.T.M.; Ashrafi, A.; Farnoudi, E.

    1985-01-01

    Based on the lessons learned from the TMI-2 accident and other research and developments, many improvements have been required for the design, manufacturing and operation of nuclear power plants in recent years. These requirements have already been implemented to the plants in operation and considered as new safety requirements for new plants. In the present paper these requirements and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP are discussed. (Author)

  13. Radioactive Waste Management Basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perkins, B.K.

    2009-01-01

    The purpose of this Radioactive Waste Management Basis is to describe the systematic approach for planning, executing, and evaluating the management of radioactive waste at LLNL. The implementation of this document will ensure that waste management activities at LLNL are conducted in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, and the Implementation Guide for DOE Manual 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual. Technical justification is provided where methods for meeting the requirements of DOE Order 435.1 deviate from the DOE Manual 435.1-1 and Implementation Guide.

  14. Guidance for implementing an environmental, safety and health assurance program. Volume 2. A model plan for environmental, safety and health staff audits and appraisals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellingson, A.C.

    1980-09-01

    This is 1 of 15 documents designed to illustrate how an Environmental, Safety and Health (ES and H) Assurance Program may be implemented. The generic definition of ES and H Assurance Programs is given in a companion document entitled An Environmental, Safety and Health Assurance Program Standard. This document is concerned with ES and H audit and appraisal activities of an ES and H Staff Organization as they might be performed in an institution whose ES and H program is based upon the ES and H Assurance Program Standard. An annotated model plan for ES and H Staff audits and appraisals is presented and discussed

  15. Guidance for implementing an environmental, safety, and health assurance program. Volume 10. Model guidlines for line organization environmental, safety and health audits and appraisals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellingson, A.C.

    1981-10-01

    This is 1 of 15 documents designed to illustrate how an Environmental, Safety and Health (ES and H) Assurance Program may be implemented. The generic definition of ES and H Assurance Programs is given in a companion document entitled An Environmental, Safety and Health Assurance Program Standard. The Standard specifies that the operational level of an institution must have an internal assurance function, and this document provides guidance for the audit/appraisal portion of the operational level's ES and H program. The appendixes include an ES and H audit checklist, a sample element rating guide, and a sample audit plan for working level line organization internal audits

  16. Operational safety of near surface waste disposal facilities in the Republic of Moldova

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ursulean, I.; Balaban, V.

    2000-01-01

    Over the last few years, the Republic of Moldova, with assistance from the IAEA, undertook the establishment of the legislative and normative basis consisting of a regulatory body infrastructure, including a monitoring optimization strategy concerning radioactive waste management safety. At present the following work is underway: the introduction of a new law 'About Radiation Safety and Population Protection', the re-implementation of a normative base, and the incorporation of the IAEA Basic Safety Standards through the national legislation. Presently in the Republic of Moldova, there exists a system of radioactive waste management, comprising collection, disposal, transportation and storage. This system consists of the radioactive material users, the designated disposal facility and the regulatory bodies. (author)

  17. Safety balance: Analysis of safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delage, M.; Giroux, C.

    1990-12-01

    Safety analysis, and particularly analysis of exploitation of NPPs is constantly affected by EDF and by the safety authorities and their methodologies. Periodic safety reports ensure that important issues are not missed on daily basis, that incidents are identified and that relevant actions are undertaken. French safety analysis method consists of three principal steps. First type of safety balance is analyzed at the normal start-up phase for each unit including the final safety report. This enables analysis of behaviour of units ten years after their licensing. Second type is periodic operational safety analysis performed during a few years. Finally, the third step consists of safety analysis of the oldest units with the aim to improve the safety standards. The three steps of safety analysis are described in this presentation in detail with the aim to present the objectives and principles. Examples of most recent exercises are included in order to illustrate the importance of such analyses

  18. Radioactive Waste Management BasisApril 2006

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Perkins, B K

    2011-08-31

    This Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents radioactive waste management practices adopted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) pursuant to Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. The purpose of this Radioactive Waste Management Basis is to describe the systematic approach for planning, executing, and evaluating the management of radioactive waste at LLNL. The implementation of this document will ensure that waste management activities at LLNL are conducted in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, and the Implementation Guide for DOE Manual 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual. Technical justification is provided where methods for meeting the requirements of DOE Order 435.1 deviate from the DOE Manual 435.1-1 and Implementation Guide.

  19. Safety surveillance of activities on nuclear pressure components in China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Ganjie; Li Tianshu; Yan Tianwen

    2005-01-01

    The nuclear pressure components, which perform the nuclear safety functions, are one of the key physical barriers for nuclear safety. For the national strategy on further development of nuclear power and localization of nuclear pressure components, there still exist some problems in preparedness on the localization. As for the technical basis, what can not be overlooked is the management. Aiming at the current problems, National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) has taken measures to strengthen the propagation and popularization of nuclear safety culture, adjust the review and approval policies for nuclear pressure components qualification license, establish more stringent management requirements, and enhance the surveillance of activities on nuclear pressure equipment. Meanwhile, NNSA has improved the internal management and the regulation efficiency on nuclear pressure components. At the same time, with the development and implementation of 'Rules on the Safety Regulation for Nuclear Safety Important Components' to be promulgated by the State Council of China, NNSA will complete and improve the regulation on nuclear pressure components and other nuclear equipment. (authors)

  20. Determination of Design Basis Earthquake ground motion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kato, Muneaki [Japan Atomic Power Co., Tokyo (Japan)

    1997-03-01

    This paper describes principle of determining of Design Basis Earthquake following the Examination Guide, some examples on actual sites including earthquake sources to be considered, earthquake response spectrum and simulated seismic waves. In sppendix of this paper, furthermore, seismic safety review for N.P.P designed before publication of the Examination Guide was summarized with Check Basis Earthquake. (J.P.N.)

  1. Determination of Design Basis Earthquake ground motion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kato, Muneaki

    1997-01-01

    This paper describes principle of determining of Design Basis Earthquake following the Examination Guide, some examples on actual sites including earthquake sources to be considered, earthquake response spectrum and simulated seismic waves. In sppendix of this paper, furthermore, seismic safety review for N.P.P designed before publication of the Examination Guide was summarized with Check Basis Earthquake. (J.P.N.)

  2. For all the right reasons. Approaching CPOE from a patient safety and care quality perspective is the first critical step toward success.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hagland, Mark

    2009-09-01

    True CPOE success is about facilitating improved patient safety, care quality, and efficiency in a multidisciplinar environment, and on an ongoing basis. CPOE implementation forces clinician leaders to examine and rework long-ingrained care delivery processes, especially as they build or adapt order sets. The likelihood that CPOE will be a requirement of meaningful use could compel a rapid acceleration in implementation.

  3. Effects of Implemented Initiatives on Patient Safety Culture in Fateme Al-zahra Hospital in Najafabad

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ahmadreza Izadi

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Introduction: Patient safety improvement requires ongoing culture. This cultural change is the most important challenge that managers are faced with in creation of a safe system. This study aims to show the results of initiatives to improvement in patient safety culture in Fateme Al-zahra hospital. Method: In the quasi-experimental research, patient safety culture was measured using the Persian questionnaire on adaptation of the hospital survey on patient safety culture in 12 dimensions. The research was conducted before (January 2010 and after (September 2012 the improvement initiatives. In this study, all units were determined and no sampling method was used. Reliability of the questionnaire was tested by Alpha Chronbakh (0.83. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics indices and Independent T-Test by SPSS Software (version 18. Results: 350 questionnaires were distributed in each phaseand overall response rate was 58 and 56 percent, respectively. According to Independent T-test, Management expectations and actions, Organizational learning, Management support, Feedback and communication about error, Communication openness, Overall Perceptions of Safety, Non-punitive Response to Error, Frequency of Event Reporting, and Patient safety culture showed significant differences (P-value0.05. The mean score of Patient safety culture was 2.27 (from 5 and it was increased to 2.46 after initiatives that showed a significant difference (P-value<0.05. Conclusion: Although, improvement in patient safety culture needs teamwork and continuous attempts, the study showed that initiatives implemented in the case hospital had been effective in some dimensions. However, Teamwork within hospital units, Teamwork across units, Hospital handoffs and transitions, and Staffing dimensions were recognized for further intervention. Hospital could improve the patient safety culture with planning and measures in these dimensions.

  4. FLAMMABLE GAS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    KRIPPS, L.J.

    2005-02-18

    This document describes the qualitative evaluation of frequency and consequences for double shell tank (DST) and single shell tank (SST) representative flammable gas accidents and associated hazardous conditions without controls. The evaluation indicated that safety-significant SSCs and/or TSRS were required to prevent or mitigate flammable gas accidents. Discussion on the resulting control decisions is included. This technical basis document was developed to support of the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and describes the risk binning process for the flammable gas representative accidents and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition based on an evaluation of the event frequency and consequence.

  5. Monitoring the Long-Term Effectiveness of Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Implementation Through Use of a Performance Dashboard Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kinney, Michael D.; Barrick, William D.

    2008-01-01

    This session will examine a method developed by Federal and Contractor personnel at the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) to examine long-term maintenance of DOE Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) criteria, including safety culture attributes, as well as identification of process improvement opportunities. This process was initially developed in the summer of 2000 and has since been expanded to recognize the importance of safety culture attributes, and associated safety culture elements, as defined in DOE M 450.4-1, 'Integrated Safety Management System Manual'. This process has proven to significantly enhance collective awareness of the importance of long-term ISMS implementation as well as support commitments by NNSA/NSO personnel to examine the continued effectiveness of ISMS processes

  6. RELEASE OF DRIED RADIOACTIVE WASTE MATERIALS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KOZLOWSKI, S.D.

    2007-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support RPP-23429, Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis for the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System (PDSA) and RPP-23479, Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis for the Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed (CH-TRUM) Waste Facility. The main document describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins to the representative accidents involving the release of dried radioactive waste materials from the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System (DBVS) and to the associated represented hazardous conditions. Appendices D through F provide the technical basis for assigning risk bins to the representative dried waste release accident and associated represented hazardous conditions for the Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed (CH-TRUM) Waste Packaging Unit (WPU). The risk binning process uses an evaluation of the frequency and consequence of a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition to determine the need for safety structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls. A representative accident or a represented hazardous condition is assigned to a risk bin based on the potential radiological and toxicological consequences to the public and the collocated worker. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers because credible hazardous conditions with the potential for significant facility worker consequences are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls regardless of their estimated frequency. The controls for protection of the facility workers are described in RPP-23429 and RPP-23479. Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, as described below

  7. Survey on the implementation of the Occupational Health and Safety Act at an academic hospital in Johannesburg.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Foromo, Muraga R; Chabeli, Mary; Satekge, Mpho M

    2016-09-28

    Despite the available research findings, recommendations and the South African Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) (Act 85 of 1993), there are still challenges with regard to the implementation of selected sections and regulations of the OHSA. This is evidenced by the occupational injuries and illness claims registered with the compensation fund (South Africa, Department of Labour 1993). To determine the extent to which the OHSA was implemented at an academic hospital in Johannesburg, from the senior professional nurses and nursing managers' perspective, and to describe recommendations in order to facilitate the implementation of the Act. A contextual, quantitative, exploratory and descriptive survey was conducted. A purposive sampling method was used to select the participants that met the inclusion criteria. A structured Likert-scale questionnaire was used to collect data (Brink 2011). Stata version 12 was used to analyse the data. Cronbach's alpha, with a cut-off point of 0.7 was used to test for internal consistency. Ethical considerations were strictly adhered to. Results are presented in the form of graphs, frequency distributions and tables. The study revealed that overall there is 93.3% non-implementation of the selected sections and regulations of the OHSA. These results have serious implications on the health and safety of employees in the workplace. The study recommends that the replication of the study should be conducted in order to determine the extent of implementation of the selected sections and regulations of the OHSA in other government institutions.

  8. Fundamental safety principles. Safety fundamentals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This publication states the fundamental safety objective and ten associated safety principles, and briefly describes their intent and purpose. The fundamental safety objective - to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation - applies to all circumstances that give rise to radiation risks. The safety principles are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire lifetime of all facilities and activities - existing and new - utilized for peaceful purposes, and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks. They provide the basis for requirements and measures for the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks and for the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, including, in particular, nuclear installations and uses of radiation and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste

  9. Fundamental safety principles. Safety fundamentals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This publication states the fundamental safety objective and ten associated safety principles, and briefly describes their intent and purpose. The fundamental safety objective - to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation - applies to all circumstances that give rise to radiation risks. The safety principles are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire lifetime of all facilities and activities - existing and new - utilized for peaceful purposes, and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks. They provide the basis for requirements and measures for the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks and for the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, including, in particular, nuclear installations and uses of radiation and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste

  10. Implementation of safety signage to ease transportation system in disaster prone area

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vikneswaran, M.; Raffiee, Rabiatul Adawiyah Ahmad; Yusof, Mohammed Alias; Yahya, Muhamad Azani; Subramaniam, S. Ananthan; Loong, Wong Wai; Othman, Maidiana; Galerial, Jessica

    2018-02-01

    The research is conducted to study the exact need of the signage at disaster prone area. The smart signage is needed to increase the safety, reduce the search and rescue time and finally will ease the help to arrive at the relieve center in any condition at any time without interruption. Signage implementation for disaster relief centers is still a foreign matter in Malaysia. The level of preparedness to the natural disaster mainly flood among our citizens is inadequate. Here the signage which usually used as a tool to help and protect the health and safety of the road users, employees and work place visitors. For many years, the signage has played its part miraculously to provide vivid information to the users in whatever condition. The signage also could be used as an indicator or information provider for the natural disaster victims to move to a safer place on time. Sometimes, the victims would not have sufficient time to safe themselves due to lack of information and time. Thus, it can be concluded that the signage at disaster prone area is vital.

  11. HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS & RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    EVANS, C B

    2004-12-21

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S&M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard.

  12. Evaluation of the safety of the operating nuclear power plants built to earlier standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menteseoglu, S.

    2001-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to provide practical assistance on judging the safety of a nuclear power plant, on the basis of a comparison with current safety standards and operational practices. For nuclear power plants built to earlier standards for which there are questions about the adequacy of the maintenance of the plant design and operational practices, a safety review against current standards and practices can be considered a high priority. The objective of reviewing nuclear power plants built to earlier standards against current standards and practices is to determine whether there are any deviations which would have an impact on plant safety. The safety significance of the issues identified should be judged according to their implications for plant design and operation in terms of basic safety concepts such as defence in depth and safety culture. In addition, this paper provides assistance on the prioritization of corrective measures and their implementation so as to approach an acceptable level of safety

  13. Lessons learned while implementing a safety parameter display system at the Comanche Peak steam electric station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagar, B.

    1987-01-01

    With the completion of site Verification and Validation tests, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) will be fully operational at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. Implementation of the SPDS, which began in 1982, included: modifying generic Safety Assessment System Software; developing site-specific displays and features; installing and integrating system equipment into the plant; modifying station heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems to provide necessary cooling; installing an additional uninterruptible power supply system to provide necessary power; and training station personnel in the operation and use of the system. Lessons learned during this project can be discussed in terms of an ideal SPDS implementation project. Such a project would design and implement an SPDS for a plant that is already under construction or operating, and would progress through a sequence of activities that includes: (1) developing and documenting the system design bases, and including all major design influences; (2) developing a database description and system functional specifications to clarify specific system requirements; (3) developing detailed system hardware and software design specifications to fully describe the system, and to enable identification of necessary site design changes early in the project; (4) implementing the system design; (5) configuring and extensively testing the system prior to routine system operation; and (6) tuning the system after the completion of system installation. The ideal project would include future system users in design development and system testing, and would use Verification and Validation techniques throughout the project to ensure that each sequential step is appropriate and correct

  14. Range and limits of application of Sec.12, Atomic Energy Act, as a legal basis of the nuclear plant safety ordinance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmidt-Preuss, Matthias

    2009-01-01

    Ensuring plant safety is a key purpose of nuclear law. Sec.7 II No.3, Atomic Energy Act, is considered the basic norm of nuclear legislation. The main requirement this embodies is ensuring 'the provisions against damage arising from construction and operation of a plant as required in accordance with the state of the art'. These normative requirements constitute the strictest yardstick existing in legislation about technology. Putting it into effect has always been the purpose of the set of nuclear rules and regulations constituting the next lower level of legislation, which so far have developed by evolution and are now to be updated comprehensively in the format of so-called modules as provided for in the concept of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU). So far, there has not been a nuclear plant safety ordinance. The Atomic Energy Act has always provided a basis for adopting such an ordinance, especially so in Sec.12 I 1 No.1, Atomic Energy Act. No federal government has so far wanted to make use of it. This makes it all the more remarkable that the BMU took up the subject of a nuclear plant safety ordinance as early as in 2006, starting a dialog with the federal states. This dialog meanwhile has come to a halt. The subject seems to be dormant right now, but certainly has not been shelved. Ensuring plant safety is a key purpose of nuclear law. Sec.7 II No.3, Atomic Energy Act, is considered the basic norm of nuclear legislation. The main requirement this embodies is ensuring 'the provisions against damage arising from construction and operation of a plant as required in accordance with the state of the art'. These normative requirements constitute the strictest yardstick existing in legislation about technology. Putting it into effect has always been the purpose of the set of nuclear rules and regulations constituting the next lower level of legislation, which so far have developed by evolution and are now to be

  15. Localized atomic basis set in the projector augmented wave method

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Larsen, Ask Hjorth; Vanin, Marco; Mortensen, Jens Jørgen

    2009-01-01

    We present an implementation of localized atomic-orbital basis sets in the projector augmented wave (PAW) formalism within the density-functional theory. The implementation in the real-space GPAW code provides a complementary basis set to the accurate but computationally more demanding grid...

  16. 76 FR 62073 - Guidance for Industry on Implementation of the Fee Provisions of the FDA Food Safety...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-10-06

    ... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Food and Drug Administration [Docket No. FDA-2011-D-0721] Guidance for Industry on Implementation of the Fee Provisions of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act; Availability AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The Food and Drug...

  17. 76 FR 20686 - Draft Guidance for Industry on Safety Labeling Changes; Implementation of the Federal Food, Drug...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-04-13

    ... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Food and Drug Administration [Docket No. FDA-2011-D-0164] Draft Guidance for Industry on Safety Labeling Changes; Implementation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; Availability AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The Food and...

  18. DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL SAFETY OF THE ENTERPRISE AS A COMPLEX ECONOMIC SECURITY OF THE STATE

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tetiana Ganushchak

    2017-09-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of the paper is to the performance of the evaluation of the financial safety of the enterprise. To achieve the stated aim it has been necessary to solve the following tasks: to use the approaches as to the evaluation of the financial safety of the enterprise, to introduce the analysis system of the financial safety of the enterprise, to consider the structural logical scheme of the analysis procedure of the financial safety of the enterprise, to give the description of the integral indicator of the financial safety of the enterprise; to evaluate and compare companies in the paltry industry according to the level of their financial safety. Methodology. Methodologial basis of the research are the scientific methods, such as : method of logical generalization, dialectical method of recognition of the economic phenomena – to give the definitions of «economic security of the enterprise», «financial security of the enterprise», grouping method, analysis which were used to estimate indicator position of the financial security of the poultry company, graph method which was applied to compare integral estimation of the enterprise;methods of synthesis, deduction, induction, method of the expert estimation to calculate and implement integral marker of the financial security of the poultry company;method of the correlation analysis which was used to identify weight coefficients of the all sided figures of the solvency , business activity, profitability, financial steadiness, pay ability. The priority in methods using was defined by the particular tasks and goals. Results of the research showned into a wide set of the ways of financial enterprise safety as a component of economic security of the state. There is an evaluation of enterprise financial safety on the basis of calculations of integral indicator, including combined indices of profitability (unprofitability, pay ability or the lack of that, business activity (fading, financial

  19. Lessons learned in the implementation of Integrated Safety Management at DOE Order Compliance Sites vs Necessary and Sufficient Sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.L.

    2000-01-01

    This paper summarizes the development and implementation of Integrated Safety Management (ISM) at an Order Compliance Site (Savannah River Site) and a Necessary and Sufficient Site (Nevada Test Site). A discussion of each core safety function of ISM is followed by an example from an Order Compliance Site and a Necessary and Sufficient Site. The Savannah River Site was the first DOE site to have a DOE Headquarters-validated and approved ISM System. The NTS is beginning the process of verification and validation. This paper defines successful strategies for integrating Environment, Safety, and Health management into work under various scenarios

  20. Characterisation of Liquefaction Effects for Beyond-Design Basis Safety Assessment of Nuclear Power Plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bán, Zoltán; Győri, Erzsébet; János Katona, Tamás; Tóth, László

    2015-04-01

    -tree procedure. Earlier studies have shown that the potentially liquefiable layer at Paks Nuclear Power Plant is situated in relatively large depth. Therefore the applicability and adequacy of the methods at high overburden pressure is important. In case of existing facilities, the geotechnical data gained before construction aren't sufficient for the comprehensive liquefaction analysis. Performance of new geotechnical survey is limited. Consequently, the availability of the data has to be accounted while selection the analysis methods. Considerations have to be made for dealing with aleatory uncertainty related to the knowledge of the soil conditions. It is shown in the paper, a careful comparison and analysis of the results obtained by different methodologies provides the basis of the selection of practicable methods for the safety analysis of nuclear power plant for beyond design basis liquefaction hazard.

  1. Selecting of key safety parameters in reactor nuclear safety supervision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    He Fan; Yu Hong

    2014-01-01

    The safety parameters indicate the operational states and safety of research reactor are the basis of nuclear safety supervision institution to carry out effective supervision to nuclear facilities. In this paper, the selecting of key safety parameters presented by the research reactor operating unit to National Nuclear Safety Administration that can express the research reactor operational states and safety when operational occurrence or nuclear accident happens, and the interrelationship between them are discussed. Analysis shows that, the key parameters to nuclear safety supervision of research reactor including design limits, operational limits and conditions, safety system settings, safety limits, acceptable limits and emergency action level etc. (authors)

  2. FY2017 Updates to the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Safety Analysis Code

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fanning, T. H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

    2017-09-30

    The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis software is used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design-basis and beyond-design-basis accidents for advanced fast reactors. It plays a central role in the analysis of U.S. DOE conceptual designs, proposed test and demonstration reactors, and in domestic and international collaborations. This report summarizes the code development activities that have taken place during FY2017. Extensions to the void and cladding reactivity feedback models have been implemented, and Control System capabilities have been improved through a new virtual data acquisition system for plant state variables and an additional Block Signal for a variable lag compensator to represent reactivity feedback for novel shutdown devices. Current code development and maintenance needs are also summarized in three key areas: software quality assurance, modeling improvements, and maintenance of related tools. With ongoing support, SAS4A/SASSYS-1 can continue to fulfill its growing role in fast reactor safety analysis and help solidify DOE’s leadership role in fast reactor safety both domestically and in international collaborations.

  3. Implementation of an Industrial-Based Case Study as the Basis for a Design Project in an Introduction to Mechanical Design Course

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lackey, Ellen

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of an industrial-based case study as the basis for a design project for the Spring 2009 Introduction to Mechanical Design Course at the University of Mississippi. Course surveys documented the lack of student exposure in classes to the types of projects typically experienced by engineers…

  4. Safety enhancement concept for NPP of new generation with VVER reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bezlepkin, V.; Kukhtevich, I.; Semashko, S.; Svetlov, S.; Solodovnikov, A.

    2004-01-01

    through a fuel pool during accidents accompanied by leaks of primary coolant. Moreover, if this is a case, no detention of corium within RPV is guaranteed during severe accidents. Anyhow, many of the useful properties of other passive systems adopted for NPP VVER-640 design may be used in high-powered NPP designs. In the course of selecting the configuration of NPP VVER-1500, it is advisable to take the latest NPP VVER-1000 designs as a basis. The design is proposed to be developed on a stage-by-stage scheme. In this context, the first stage would include the elaboration of a design of a prototype power unit on the basis of existing NPP VVER-1000 designs with the supplement of a passive containment heat removal system. Furthermore, the design shall provide for a possibility of implementing additional passive safety systems without drastic changes in the design. During further stages, it is necessary to finalize and approve a technique for assessment of probabilistic safety indices as regards inter-group common cause failures. The next step is a substantiation of implementation of additional passive safety systems and selection of their properties. Despite of the formidability of problems arising in the course of elaborating new NPP VVER-1500 designs, a holistic analysis of such designs which are under elaboration now both in Russia and abroad, as well as consideration of the latest safety requirements will create a sound basis for advanced technical approaches to safety assurance, thus allowing to reach the best safety indices in the world. (author)

  5. Manual of functions, assignments, and responsibilities for nuclear safety: Revision 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-10-15

    The FAR Manual is a convenient easy-to-use collection of the functions, assignments, and responsibilities (FARs) of DOE nuclear safety personnel. Current DOE directives, including Orders, Secretary of Energy Notices, and other assorted policy memoranda, are the source of this information and form the basis of the FAR Manual. Today, the majority of FARs for DOE personnel are contained in DOE`s nuclear safety Orders. As these Orders are converted to rules in the Code of Federal Regulations, the FAR Manual will become the sole source for information relating to the functions, assignments, responsibilities of DOE nuclear safety personnel. The FAR Manual identifies DOE directives that relate to nuclear safety and the specific DOE personnel who are responsible for implementing them. The manual includes only FARs that have been extracted from active directives that have been approved in accordance with the procedures contained in DOE Order 1321.1B.

  6. System and software safety analysis for the ERA control computer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beerthuizen, P.G.; Kruidhof, W.

    2001-01-01

    The European Robotic Arm (ERA) is a seven degrees of freedom relocatable anthropomorphic robotic manipulator system, to be used in manned space operation on the International Space Station, supporting the assembly and external servicing of the Russian segment. The safety design concept and implementation of the ERA is described, in particular with respect to the central computer's software design. A top-down analysis and specification process is used to down flow the safety aspects of the ERA system towards the subsystems, which are produced by a consortium of companies in many countries. The user requirements documents and the critical function list are the key documents in this process. Bottom-up analysis (FMECA) and test, on both subsystem and system level, are the basis for safety verification. A number of examples show the use of the approach and methods used

  7. Transportation Safety Excellence in Operations Through Improved Transportation Safety Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; MAL

    2007-01-01

    A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC. This accomplishment supported excellence in operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport costs; and making facility operations more efficient. The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers. Previously, the TSD did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums. Previous practice was to package the waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations. This practice allowed operations to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations friendly. An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were used effectively to directly support excellence in operations. Several factors contributed to the success of MFC's effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities. (1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to better integrate nuclear safety

  8. Implementation of severe accident management measures - Summary and conclusions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The objectives of the meeting were: 1) to exchange information on activities in the area of SAM implementation and on the rationale for such actions, 2) to monitor progress made, 3) to identify cases of agreement or disagreement, 4) to discuss future orientations of work, 5) to make recommendations to the CSNI. Session summaries prepared by the Chairpersons and discussed by the whole writing group are given in Annex. During the first session, 'SAM Programmes Implementation', papers from one regulator and several utilities and national research institutes were presented to outline the status of implementation of SAM programmes in countries like Switzerland, Russia, Spain, Finland, Belgium and Korea. Also, the contribution of SAM to the safety of Japanese plants (in terms of core damage frequency) was quantified in a paper. One paper gave an overview on the situation regarding SAM implementation in Europe. The second session, 'SAM Approach', provided background and bases for Severe Accident Management in countries like Sweden, Japan, Germany and Switzerland, as well as for hardware features in advanced light water reactor designs, such as the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR), regarding Severe Accident Management. The third session, 'SAM Mitigation Measures', was about hardware measures, in particular those oriented towards hydrogen mitigation where fundamentally different approaches have been taken in Scandinavian countries, France, Germany and Korea. Three papers addressed specific contributions from research to provide a broader basis for the assumptions made in certain computer codes used for the assessment of plant risk arising from beyond-design accident sequences. The fourth session, 'Implementation of SAM Measures on VVER-1000 Reactors', was about the status of work on Severe Accident Management implementation in VVER reactors of existing design and in a new plant currently under construction. The overall picture is that Severe Accident Management has been

  9. Associations between safety climate and safety management practices in the construction industry.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marín, Luz S; Lipscomb, Hester; Cifuentes, Manuel; Punnett, Laura

    2017-06-01

    Safety climate, a group-level measure of workers' perceptions regarding management's safety priorities, has been suggested as a key predictor of safety outcomes. However, its relationship with actual injury rates is inconsistent. We posit that safety climate may instead be a parallel outcome of workplace safety practices, rather than a determinant of workers' safety behaviors or outcomes. Using a sample of 25 commercial construction companies in Colombia, selected by injury rate stratum (high, medium, low), we examined the relationship between workers' safety climate perceptions and safety management practices (SMPs) reported by safety officers. Workers' perceptions of safety climate were independent of their own company's implementation of SMPs, as measured here, and its injury rates. However, injury rates were negatively related to the implementation of SMPs. Safety management practices may be more important than workers' perceptions of safety climate as direct predictors of injury rates. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  10. Current regulatory developments concerning the implementation of probabilistic safety analyses for external hazards in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krauss, Matias; Berg, Heinz-Peter

    2014-01-01

    The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) initiated in September 2003 a comprehensive program for the revision of the national nuclear safety regulations which has been successfully completed in November 2012. These nuclear regulations take into account the current recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA). In this context, the recommendations and guidelines of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) and the technical documents elaborated by the respective expert group on Probabilistic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants (FAK PSA) are being updated or in the final process of completion. A main topic of the revision was the issue external hazards. As part of this process and in the light of the accident at Fukushima and the findings of the related actions resulting in safety reviews of nuclear power plants at national level in Germany and on European level, a revision of all relevant standards and documents has been made, especially the recommendations of KTA and FAK PSA. In that context, not only design issues with respect to events such as earthquakes and floods have been discussed, but also methodological issues regarding the implementation of improved probabilistic safety analyses on this topic. As a result of the revision of the KTA 2201 series 'Design of Nuclear Power Plants against Seismic Events' with their parts 1 to 6, part 1 'Principles' was published as the first standard in November 2011, followed by the revised versions of KTA 2201.2 (soil) and 2201.4 (systems and components) in 2012. The modified the standard KTA 2201.3 (structures) is expected to be issued before the end of 2013. In case of part 5 (seismic instrumentation) and part 6 (post>seismic actions) draft amendments are expected in 2013. The expert group 'Probabilistic Safety Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants' (FAK PSA) is an advisory body of the Federal

  11. Safety strategy and safety analysis of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1976-01-01

    The safety strategy for nuclear power plants is characterized by the fact that the high level of safety was attained not as a result of experience, but on the basis of preventive accident analyses and the finding derived from such analyses. Although, in these accident analyses, the deterministic approach is predominant, it is supplemented by reliability analyses. The accidents analyzed in nuclear licensing procedures cover a wide spectrum from minor incidents to the design basis accidents which determine the design of the safety devices. The initial and boundary conditions, which are essentail for accident analyses, and the determination of the loads occurring in various states during regular operation and in accidents flow into the design of the individual systems and components. The inevitable residual risk and its origins are discussed. (orig.) [de

  12. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CROWE, R.D.

    1999-09-09

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support ''HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety, Analysis Report, Annex A,'' ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  13. Evaluating the implementation of health and safety innovations under a regulatory context: a collective case study of Ontario's safer needle regulation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chambers, Andrea; Mustard, Cameron A; Breslin, Curtis; Holness, Linn; Nichol, Kathryn

    2013-01-22

    Implementation effectiveness models have identified important factors that can promote the successful implementation of an innovation; however, these models have been examined within contexts where innovations are adopted voluntarily and often ignore the socio-political and environmental context. In the field of occupational health and safety, there are circumstances where organizations must adopt innovations to comply with a regulatory standard. Examining how the external environment can facilitate or challenge an organization's change process may add to our understanding of implementation effectiveness. The objective of this study is to describe implementation facilitators and barriers in the context of a regulation designed to promote the uptake of safer engineered medical devices in healthcare. The proposed study will focus on Ontario's safer needle regulation (2007) which requires healthcare organizations to transition to the use of safer engineered medical devices for the prevention of needlestick injuries. A collective case study design will be used to learn from the experiences of three acute care hospitals in the province of Ontario, Canada. Interviews with management and front-line healthcare workers and analysis of supporting documents will be used to describe the implementation experience and examine issues associated with the integration of these devices. The data collection and analysis process will be influenced by a conceptual framework that draws from implementation science and the occupational health and safety literature. The focus of this study in addition to the methodology creates a unique opportunity to contribute to the field of implementation science. First, the study will explore implementation experiences under circumstances where regulatory pressures are influencing the organization's change process. Second, the timing of this study provides an opportunity to focus on issues that arise during later stages of implementation, a phase

  14. Study protocol for "Study of Practices Enabling Implementation and Adaptation in the Safety Net (SPREAD-NET)": a pragmatic trial comparing implementation strategies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gold, Rachel; Hollombe, Celine; Bunce, Arwen; Nelson, Christine; Davis, James V; Cowburn, Stuart; Perrin, Nancy; DeVoe, Jennifer; Mossman, Ned; Boles, Bruce; Horberg, Michael; Dearing, James W; Jaworski, Victoria; Cohen, Deborah; Smith, David

    2015-10-16

    Little research has directly compared the effectiveness of implementation strategies in any setting, and we know of no prior trials directly comparing how effectively different combinations of strategies support implementation in community health centers. This paper outlines the protocol of the Study of Practices Enabling Implementation and Adaptation in the Safety Net (SPREAD-NET), a trial designed to compare the effectiveness of several common strategies for supporting implementation of an intervention and explore contextual factors that impact the strategies' effectiveness in the community health center setting. This cluster-randomized trial compares how three increasingly hands-on implementation strategies support adoption of an evidence-based diabetes quality improvement intervention in 29 community health centers, managed by 12 healthcare organizations. The strategies are as follows: (arm 1) a toolkit, presented in paper and electronic form, which includes a training webinar; (arm 2) toolkit plus in-person training with a focus on practice change and change management strategies; and (arm 3) toolkit, in-person training, plus practice facilitation with on-site visits. We use a mixed methods approach to data collection and analysis: (i) baseline surveys on study clinic characteristics, to explore how these characteristics impact the clinics' ability to implement the tools and the effectiveness of each implementation strategy; (ii) quantitative data on change in rates of guideline-concordant prescribing; and (iii) qualitative data on the "how" and "why" underlying the quantitative results. The outcomes of interest are clinic-level results, categorized using the Reach, Effectiveness, Adoption, Implementation, Maintenance (RE-AIM) framework, within an interrupted time-series design with segmented regression models. This pragmatic trial will compare how well each implementation strategy works in "real-world" practices. Having a better understanding of how different

  15. System theory and safety models in Swedish, UK, Dutch and Australian road safety strategies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hughes, B P; Anund, A; Falkmer, T

    2015-01-01

    Road safety strategies represent interventions on a complex social technical system level. An understanding of a theoretical basis and description is required for strategies to be structured and developed. Road safety strategies are described as systems, but have not been related to the theory, principles and basis by which systems have been developed and analysed. Recently, road safety strategies, which have been employed for many years in different countries, have moved to a 'vision zero', or 'safe system' style. The aim of this study was to analyse the successful Swedish, United Kingdom and Dutch road safety strategies against the older, and newer, Australian road safety strategies, with respect to their foundations in system theory and safety models. Analysis of the strategies against these foundations could indicate potential improvements. The content of four modern cases of road safety strategy was compared against each other, reviewed against scientific systems theory and reviewed against types of safety model. The strategies contained substantial similarities, but were different in terms of fundamental constructs and principles, with limited theoretical basis. The results indicate that the modern strategies do not include essential aspects of systems theory that describe relationships and interdependencies between key components. The description of these strategies as systems is therefore not well founded and deserves further development. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  16. Reactor safety research and development in Chalk River Laboratories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nitheanandan, T. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Chalk River Laboratories provides three different services to stakeholders and customers. The first service provided by the laboratory is the implementation of Research and Development (R&D) programs to provide the underlying technological basis of safe nuclear power reactor designs. A significant portion of the Canadian R&D capability in reactor safety resides at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Chalk River Laboratories, and this capability was instrumental in providing the science and technology required to aid in the safety design of CANDU power reactors. The second role of the laboratory has been in supporting nuclear facility licensees to ensure the continued safe operation of nuclear facilities, and to develop safety cases to justify continued operation. The licensing of plant life extension is a key industry objective, requiring extensive research on degradation mechanisms, such that safety cases are based on the original safety design data and valid and realistic assumptions regarding the effect of ageing and management of plant life. Recently, Chalk River Laboratories has been engaged in a third role in research to provide the technical basis and improved understanding for decision making by regulatory bodies. The state-of-the-art test facilities in Chalk River Laboratories have been contributing to the R&D needs of all three roles, not only in Canada but also in the international community, thorough Canada's participation in cooperative programs lead by International Atomic Energy Agency and the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency. (author)

  17. Tank safety screening data quality objective. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hunt, J.W.

    1995-04-27

    The Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO) will be used to classify 149 single shell tanks and 28 double shell tanks containing high-level radioactive waste into safety categories for safety issues dealing with the presence of ferrocyanide, organics, flammable gases, and criticality. Decision rules used to classify a tank as ``safe`` or ``not safe`` are presented. Primary and secondary decision variables used for safety status classification are discussed. The number and type of samples required are presented. A tabular identification of each analyte to be measured to support the safety classification, the analytical method to be used, the type of sample, the decision threshold for each analyte that would, if violated, place the tank on the safety issue watch list, and the assumed (desired) analytical uncertainty are provided. This is a living document that should be evaluated for updates on a semiannual basis. Evaluation areas consist of: identification of tanks that have been added or deleted from the specific safety issue watch lists, changes in primary and secondary decision variables, changes in decision rules used for the safety status classification, and changes in analytical requirements. This document directly supports all safety issue specific DQOs and additional characterization DQO efforts associated with pretreatment and retrieval. Additionally, information obtained during implementation can assist in resolving assumptions for revised safety strategies, and in addition, obtaining information which will support the determination of error tolerances, confidence levels, and optimization schemes for later revised safety strategy documentation.

  18. HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS and RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    EVANS, C.B.

    2004-01-01

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S and M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard

  19. [Implementation of "5S" methodology in laboratory safety and its effect on employee satisfaction].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dogan, Yavuz; Ozkutuk, Aydan; Dogan, Ozlem

    2014-04-01

    Health institutions use the accreditation process to achieve improvement across the organization and management of the health care system. An ISO 15189 quality and efficiency standard is the recommended standard for medical laboratories qualification. The "safety and accommodation conditions" of this standard covers the requirement to improve working conditions and maintain the necessary safety precautions. The most inevitable precaution for ensuring a safe environment is the creation of a clean and orderly environment to maintain a potentially safe surroundings. In this context, the 5S application which is a superior improvement tool that has been used by the industry, includes some advantages such as encouraging employees to participate in and to help increase the productivity. The main target of this study was to implement 5S methods in a clinical laboratory of a university hospital for evaluating its effect on employees' satisfaction, and correction of non-compliance in terms of the working environment. To start with, first, 5S education was given to management and employees. Secondly, a 5S team was formed and then the main steps of 5S (Seiri: Sort, Seiton: Set in order, Seiso: Shine, Seiketsu: Standardize, and Shitsuke: Systematize) were implemented for a duration of 3 months. A five-point likert scale questionnaire was used in order to determine and assess the impact of 5S on employees' satisfaction considering the areas such as facilitating the job, the job satisfaction, setting up a safe environment, and the effect of participation in management. Questionnaire form was given to 114 employees who actively worked during the 5S implementation period, and the data obtained from 63 (52.3%) participants (16 male, 47 female) were evaluated. The reliability of the questionnaire's Cronbach's alpha value was determined as 0.858 (p5S it was observed and determined that facilitating the job and setting up a safe environment created a statistically significant effect on

  20. WHO Safety Surgical Checklist implementation evaluation in public hospitals in the Brazilian Federal District

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Heiko T. Santana

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available Summary: The World Health Organization (WHO created the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist to prevent adverse events in operating rooms. The aim of this study was to analyze WHO checklist implementation in three operating rooms of public hospitals in the Brazilian Federal District. A prospective cross-sectional study was performed with pre- (Period I and post (Period II-checklist intervention evaluations. A total of 1141 patients and 1052 patients were studied in Periods I and II for a total of 2193 patients. Period I took place from December 2012 to March 2013, and Period II took place from April 2013 to August 2014. Regarding the pre-operatory items, most surgeries were classified as clean-contaminated in both phases, and team attire improved from 19.2% to 71.0% in Period II. Regarding checklist adherence in Period II, “Patient identification” significantly improved in the stage “Before induction of anesthesia”. “Allergy verification”, “Airway obstruction verification”, and “Risk of blood loss assessment” had low adherence in all three hospitals. The items in the stage “Before surgical incision” showed greater than 90.0% adherence with the exception of “Anticipated critical events: Anesthesia team review” (86.7% and “Essential imaging display” (80.0%. Low adherence was noted in “Instrument counts” and “Equipment problems” in the stage “Before patient leaves operating room”. Complications and deaths were low in both periods. Despite the variability in checklist item compliance in the surveyed hospitals, WHO checklist implementation as an intervention tool showed good adherence to the majority of the items on the list. Nevertheless, motivation to use the instrument by the surgical team with the intent of improving surgical patient safety continues to be crucial. Keywords: Surgical checklist, Adverse events, Patient safety, Surgical team, Infection control

  1. Sweden's third national report under the the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The national reports to the review meetings according to Article 5 of the Convention call for a self-assessment of each Contracting Party with regard to compliance with the obligations of the Convention. For Sweden this self-assessment has demonstrated full compliance with all the obligations of the Convention, as shown in detail in part B of this national report. There is an open and constructive dialogue between the regulatory bodies and the licensees. The owner companies are well established with good corporate financial records. They demonstrate a commitment to maintain a high level of safety in their nuclear power plants. Not withstanding the increased competition, the licensees continue to co-operate in solving important safety issues. The regulators in Sweden are assessed as well qualified for their tasks and their resources have been maintained. The international co-operation networks of both regulators and utilities are well developed. From the safety and environmental impact point of view, the Swedish nuclear power plants are competitive internationally. However, Sweden would like to point out the following issues, where further development should be given special attention in relation to the obligations under the Convention: The compatibility of the Act on Nuclear Activities with the Environmental Code needs to be followed up in order to assure that the licensing process is fully consistent. The future supply of radiation protection specialists needs to be further investigated and measures may need to be taken, as has been done to ensure the supply or nuclear safety specialists. The ongoing concentration of vendors and service companies needs to be assessed, from the safety and availability point of view, and the licensees may need to implement their own joint solutions if the market can not supply the necessary services at acceptable conditions. The operating organisations need to assess their consolidation after several organisational changes following

  2. Session 1 theme: Various forms of design basis knowledge and effects of its loss on Safety. Views from EDF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Servière, Georges

    2013-01-01

    Design basis knowledge - What happens or may happen and corresponding required knowledge: • Unexpected events or failures of equipment; • Spare part issues (no longer availaible,…); • Change in applicable regulations / requirements; • Change of operating conditions; • Change of plant performances; • Evolution of external environment and conditions; • Events and accidents on other plants, worldwide; • New knowledge availaible; • Periodic safety reviews and upgrades; • Extension of plant operation life; • Decommissioning and dismantling; • Some of those you may choose not to do, but most of them have to be faced and need appropriate knowledge

  3. The Study of Implement of HCS Program at Hazardous Chemicals Knowledge and Safety performance in Tehran refinery, s laboratory unit

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    N. Hassanzadeh-Rangi

    2008-10-01

    Full Text Available Background and aims   The HCS standard includes listing of chemicals, labeling of chemical  containers, preparation of material safety data sheets, writing plan and employee training  programs. The aim of this study was to determine the influence of implemented program to enhance the knowledge and safety performance level of employees.   Methods   The knowledge level and unsafe act ratio were measured using both questionnaire  and behavior checklist (with safety sampling method before and after enforcing this interface.   Results   In this study, the mean and standard deviation of the knowledge level of employees  related to chemical safety before enforcing the interface was 46% and 14%. However, after  enforcing the interface, mean and standard deviation was 88% and 12%. The paired-t-test result   in this parameter was significant (p-value <0.0001. The mean and standard deviation of  knowledge level of employees related to warning labels before to enforcing the interface was 29%  and 22%. After enforcing the interface, mean and standard deviation was 80% and 16%. The paired-t-test result in this parameter was significant (p-value <0.0001. The mean and standard  deviation of the knowledge level of employees related to hazard communication methods before enforcing the interface was 25% and 11%. After enforcing the interface, mean and standard deviation was 79% and 16%. The paired-t-test result in this parameter was significant (p-value   <0.001.   Conclusion   The obtained result revealed that enhancement of the knowledge related to chemical safety, hazard communication methods and warning labels was significant. Statistical paired-t-test and control chart methods was used to comparison between unsafe act ratio before  and after enforcing the interface. The mean and standard deviation of unsafe act ratio before implementation of HCS program was 23.6% and 5.49%. However, mean and standard deviation of unsafe act ratio

  4. Geo scientific basis for making the safety case for a SF/HL W/IL W repository in Opalinus clay in ne Switzerland (project Entsorgungsnachweis) 1: overview and main conclusions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gautschi, A.; Lambert, A.; Zuidema, P.

    2004-01-01

    This paper provides an overview of the geo-scientific basis and the main conclusions concerning the safety case for Project Entsorgungsnachweis (Nagra, 2002a, see first paper). The key geo-scientific input for the safety case is summarised in the following three papers. The data and arguments are discussed in great detail in Nagra (2002b) and in numerous reference reports cited therein. (author)

  5. B plant/WESF integrated annual safety appraisal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, J.K.

    1990-12-01

    This report provides the results of the Fiscal Year 1990 Annual Integrated Safety Appraisal of the B Plant and Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility in the Hanford Site 200 East Area. The appraisal was conducted in August and September 1990, by the Defense Waste Disposal Safety group, in conjunction with Health Physics and Emergency Preparedness. Reports of these three organizations for their areas of responsibility are presented. The purpose of the appraisal was to determine if the areas being appraised meet US Department of Energy (DOE) and Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) requirements and current industry standards of good practice. A further purpose was to identify areas in which program effectiveness could be improved. In accordance with the guidance of WHC Management Requirements and Procedures 5.6, previously identified deficiencies which are being resolved by line management were not repeated as Findings or Observations unless progress or intended disposition was considered to be unsatisfactory. The overall assessment is that there are no major safety problems associated with current operations. Programs are in place to provide the necessary safety controls, evaluations, overviews, and support. In most respects these programs are being implemented effectively. However, there are a number of deficiencies in details of program design and implementation. The appraisal identified a total of 23 Findings and 27 Observations of deficiencies. All Observations are Seriousness Category 3. Fifteen Findings were Category 2 and 8 were Category 3. Most of the Category 2 Findings were so categorized on the basis of noncompliance with mandatory DOE Orders or WHC policies and procedures, rather than potential risk to personnel

  6. Radioactive waste storage facilities, involvement of AVN in inspection and safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simenon, R.; Smidts, O.

    2006-01-01

    The legislative and regulatory framework in Belgium for the licensing and the operation of radioactive waste storage buildings are defined by the Royal Decree of 20 July 2001 (hereby providing the general regulations regarding to the protection of the population, the workers and the environment against the dangers of ionising radiation). This RD introduces in the Belgian law the radiological protection and ALARA-policy concepts. The licence of each nuclear facility takes the form of a Royal Decree of Authorization. It stipulates that the plant has to be in conformity with its Safety Analysis Report. This report is however not a public document but is legally binding. Up to now, the safety assessment for radioactive waste storage facilities, which is implemented in this Safety Analysis Report, has been judged on a case-by-case basis. AVN is an authorized inspection organisation to carry out the surveillance of the Belgian nuclear installations and performs hereby nuclear safety assessments. AVN has a role in the nuclear safety and radiation protection during all the phases of a nuclear facility: issuance of licenses, during design and construction phase, operation (including reviewing and formal approval of modifications) and finally the decommissioning. Permanent inspections are performed on a regular basis by AVN, this by a dedicated site inspector, who is responsible for a site of an operator with nuclear facilities. Besides the day-to-day inspections during operation there are also the periodic safety reviews. AVN assesses the methodological approaches for the analyses, reviews and approves the final studies and results. The conditioned waste in Belgium is stored on the Belgoprocess' sites (region Mol-Dessel) for an intermediate period (about 80 years). In the meantime, a well-defined inspection programme is being implemented to ensure that the conditioned waste continues to be stored safely during this temporary storage period. This programme was draw up by

  7. Safety Evaluation Approach with Security Controls for Safety I and C Systems on Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, D. H.; Jeong, S. Y.; Kim, Y. M.; Park, H. S.; Lee, M. S.; Kim, T. H.

    2016-01-01

    This paper addresses concepts of safety and security and relations between them for assessing effects of security features in safety systems. Also, evaluation approach for avoiding confliction with safety requirements and cyber security features which may be adopted in safety-related digital I and C system will be described. In this paper, safety-security life cycle model based confliction avoidance method was proposed to evaluate the effects when the cyber security control features are implemented in the safety I and C system. Also, safety effect evaluation results using the proposed evaluation method were described. In case of technical security controls, many of them are expected to conflict with safety requirements, otherwise operational and managerial controls are not relatively. Safety measures and cyber security measures for nuclear power plants should be implemented not to conflict with one another. Where safety function and security features are both required within the systems, and also where security features are implemented within safety systems, they should be justified

  8. Safety Evaluation Approach with Security Controls for Safety I and C Systems on Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, D. H.; Jeong, S. Y.; Kim, Y. M.; Park, H. S. [KINS, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, M. S.; Kim, T. H. [Formal Works Inc., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    This paper addresses concepts of safety and security and relations between them for assessing effects of security features in safety systems. Also, evaluation approach for avoiding confliction with safety requirements and cyber security features which may be adopted in safety-related digital I and C system will be described. In this paper, safety-security life cycle model based confliction avoidance method was proposed to evaluate the effects when the cyber security control features are implemented in the safety I and C system. Also, safety effect evaluation results using the proposed evaluation method were described. In case of technical security controls, many of them are expected to conflict with safety requirements, otherwise operational and managerial controls are not relatively. Safety measures and cyber security measures for nuclear power plants should be implemented not to conflict with one another. Where safety function and security features are both required within the systems, and also where security features are implemented within safety systems, they should be justified.

  9. Organization and implementation of a national regulatory infrastructure governing protection against ionizing radiation and the safety of radiation sources. Interim report for comment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-02-01

    A number of IAEA Member States are undertaking to strengthen their radiation protection and safety infrastructures in order to facilitate the adoption of the requirements established in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (the Standards). In this connection, the IAEA has developed a technical co-operation programme (Model Project on Upgrading Radiation Protection Infrastructure) to improve radiation protection and safety infrastructures in 51 Member States, taking into account national profiles and needs of the individual participating, countries. The present report deals with the elements of a regulatory infrastructure for radiation protection and safety and intends to facilitate the, implementation of the Basic Safety Standards in practice. It takes into account the proposals in an earlier report, IAEA-TECDOC-663, but it has been expanded to include enabling legislation and modified to be more attuned to infrastructure issues related to implementation of the Standards. The orientation is toward infrastructures concerned with protection and safety for radiation sources used in medicine, agriculture, research, industry and education rather than infrastructures for protection and safety for complex nuclear facilities. It also discusses options for enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the infrastructure in accordance with the size and scope of radiation practices and available regulatory resources within a country

  10. Safety improvements at Canadian nuclear power plants in the aftermath of Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rzentkowski, G.; Khouaja, H.

    2014-01-01

    This paper describes the safety review of operating nuclear power plants undertaken by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission in light of the March 11, 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). The review confirmed that the Canadian NPPs are robust and have a strong design relying on multiple layers of defence to protect the public from credible external events. Nevertheless, in the spirit of continuous safety improvements, the review identified a number of recommendations to further strengthen reactor defence-in-depth in preventing and mitigating the consequences of beyond design basis accidents, enhance onsite and offsite emergency response, and improve the CNSC regulatory framework. Progress achieved to date, in implementing these measures, is described in this paper along with a summary of safety benefits for each level of the reactor defence-in-depth. (author)

  11. Safety improvements at Canadian nuclear power plants in the aftermath of Fukushima accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rzentkowski, G.; Khouaja, H. [Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Ottawa, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    This paper describes the safety review of operating nuclear power plants undertaken by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission in light of the March 11, 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). The review confirmed that the Canadian NPPs are robust and have a strong design relying on multiple layers of defence to protect the public from credible external events. Nevertheless, in the spirit of continuous safety improvements, the review identified a number of recommendations to further strengthen reactor defence-in-depth in preventing and mitigating the consequences of beyond design basis accidents, enhance onsite and offsite emergency response, and improve the CNSC regulatory framework. Progress achieved to date, in implementing these measures, is described in this paper along with a summary of safety benefits for each level of the reactor defence-in-depth. (author)

  12. Engineering task plan for the annual revision of the rotary mode core sampling system safety equipment list

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BOGER, R.M.

    1999-01-01

    This Engineering Task Plan addresses an effort to provide an update to the RMCS Systems 3 and 4 SEL and DCM in order to incorporate the changes to the authorization basis implemented by HNF-SD-WM-BIO-001, Rev. 0 (Draft), Addendum 5 , Safety Analysis for Rotary Mode Core Sampling. Responsibilities, task description, cost estimate, and schedule are presented

  13. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI action plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program was established whereby an annual NUREG report would be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was compiled and reported in three NUREG volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). This annual NUREG report combines these volumes into a single report and provides updated information as of September 30, 1991. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan Requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, and GSIs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  14. THE EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTRACTOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CSMS PROGRAM ON TURNAROUND PROJECT (TA AT PT. PUPUK SRIWIDJAJA (PUSRI PALEMBANG

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Muhammad Arif

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available Background :Turnaround is one of the done by contractor in which if it is not managed well, it could cause work accident. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the implementation of contractor safety management system (CSMS program on turnaround project at PT. Pupuk Sriwidjaja Palembang. Method : This study was a qualitative study. The information was obtained from deep interview, observation and the study of document. The data was analyzed by using content analysis. The validity of the instruments was tested through triangulation of sources, method and data Result : The program implementation Contractor Safety Management System (CSMS on a turnaround project is already well underway only on projects in addition to departments turnaround K3 & LH less involved in the risk assessment stage, pre-qualification and selection of contractors. Conclusion : The implementation of the program Contractor Safety Management System (CSMS on a turnaround project at PT. Pupuk Sriwidjaja Palembang are in accordance with the Code of Labor Management Health, Safety and Environmental Protection Contractor BPMIGAS. It is advisable to PT. Pupuk Sriwidjaja Palembang in order to improve communication between departments procure goods and services with K3 and LH-related departments work tendered as the risk assessment stage, pre-qualification and selection on work tendered. Need sanctions against contractors who do not regularly report performance data K3.

  15. Examining the Relationship Between Safety Management System Implementation and Safety Culture in Collegiate Flight Schools

    OpenAIRE

    Robertson, Michael F

    2018-01-01

    Safety management systems (SMS) are becoming the industry standard for safety management throughout the aviation industry. As the Federal Aviation Administration continues to mandate SMS for different segments, the assessment of an organization’s safety culture becomes more important. An SMS can facilitate the development of a strong aviation safety culture. This study describes how safety culture and SMS are integrated. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between an ...

  16. Complementary safety assessments - Report by the French Nuclear Safety Authority

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-12-01

    As an immediate consequence of the Fukushima accident, the French Authority of Nuclear Safety (ASN) launched a campaign of on-site inspections and asked operators (mainly EDF, AREVA and CEA) to make complementary assessments of the safety of the nuclear facilities they manage. The approach defined by ASN for the complementary safety assessments (CSA) is to study the behaviour of nuclear facilities in severe accidents situations caused by an off-site natural hazard according to accident scenarios exceeding the current baseline safety requirements. This approach can be broken into 2 phases: first conformity to current design and secondly an approach to the beyond design-basis scenarios built around the principle of defence in depth. 38 inspections were performed on issues linked to the causes of the Fukushima crisis. It appears that some sites have to reinforce the robustness of the heat sink. The CSA confirmed that the processes put into place at EDF to detect non-conformities were satisfactory. The complementary safety assessments demonstrated that the current seismic margins on the EDF nuclear reactors are satisfactory. With regard to flooding, the complementary safety assessments show that the complete reassessment carried out following the flooding of the Le Blayais nuclear power plant in 1999 offers the installations a high level of protection against the risk of flooding. Concerning the loss of electrical power supplies and the loss of cooling systems, the analysis of EDF's CSA reports showed that certain heat sink and electrical power supply loss scenarios can, if nothing is done, lead to core melt in just a few hours in the most unfavourable circumstances. As for nuclear facilities that are not power or experimental reactors, some difficulties have appeared to implement the CSA approach that was initially devised for reactors. Generally speaking, ASN considers that the safety of nuclear facilities must be made more robust to improbable risks which are not

  17. Key elements on implementing an occupational health and safety management system using ISO 45001 standard

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Darabont Doru Costin

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Occupational health and safety (OHS management system is one of the main elements of the company’s general management system. During last decade, Romanian companies gained a valuable experience on implementing this type of management systems, using OHSAS 18001 referential and standard. However, the projected release of the ISO 45001 represents a new approach which requires the companies to take in consideration new key elements for a successful implementation of the OHS management system. The aim of the paper is to identify and analyse these key elements, by integration of the following issues: standard requirements, Romanian OHS legislation and good practice examples, including the general control measures for new and emerging risks such as psycho-social risks, workforce ageing and new technologies. The study results represent an important work instrument for each company interested to implement or upgrade its OHS management system using ISO 45001 standard and could be used regardless the company size or activity domain.

  18. Project Experiences of the Implementation of the Primary Bleed and Feed System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanz, S.; Lang, J.; Schmid, J.

    2015-01-01

    Modernization activities play a very important role in the enhancement of the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants. The main focus is on increasing the plant availability, the operational flexibility or the integration of new, additional equipment to satisfy safety requirements, as in this case with the implementation of the design modification primary circuit “Primary Bleed & Feed” (PB&F) of the primary circuit, in the consideration of a beyond design basis accident. Primary B&F prevents the high pressure core melt path and allows an additional alternative heat removal by depressurising the primary system and coolant injection with passive and/or active low pressure systems, when the normal core cooling is not available because of loss of water inventory in the steam generators. The goal of this paper is to show some general good practices gained during the implementation of the Primary Bleed and Feed, System from the project conception to the system implementation. Basically, practice shows that some of the crucial factors which contributed to a successful project execution were based on (i) good interface management between the new system and the existing plant components, (ii) a close coordination of the single engineering disciplines and simultaneous activities, (iii) safety culture and quality assurance were set as priority during the entire project development. (author)

  19. Pulse coded safety logic for PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anwer, Md. Najam; Satheesh, N.; Nagaraj, C.P.; Krishnakumar, B.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Reactor safety logic is designed to initiate safety action against design basis events. The reactor is shutdown by de-energizing electromagnets and dropping the absorber rods under gravity. In prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR), shutdown is affected by two independent shutdown systems, viz., control and safety rod drive mechanism (CSRDM) and diverse safety rod drive mechanism (DSRDM). Two separate safety logics are proposed for CSRDM and DSRDM, i.e. solid state logic with on-line fine impulse test (FIT) for CSRDM and pulse coded safety logic (PCSL) for DSRDM. The PCSL primarily utilizes the fact that the vast majority of faults in the logic circuitry result in static conditions at the output. It is arranged such that the presence of pulses are required to hold the shutdown actuators and any DC logic state, either logic 0 or logic 1 releases them. It is a dynamic, self-testing logic and used in a number of reactors. This paper describes the principle of operation of PCSL, its advantages, the concept of guard line logic (GLL), detection of stuck at 0 and stuck at 1 faults, fail safe and diversity features. The implementation of PCSL using Altera Max+Plus II software for PFBR trip signals and the results of simulation are discussed. This paper also describes a test jig using 80186 based system for testing PCSL for various input parameter's combinations and monitoring the outputs

  20. A Technique of Software Safety Analysis in the Design Phase for PLC Based Safety-Critical Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koo, Seo-Ryong; Kim, Chang-Hwoi

    2017-01-01

    The purpose of safety analysis, which is a method of identifying portions of a system that have the potential for unacceptable hazards, is firstly to encourage design changes that will reduce or eliminate hazards and, secondly, to conduct special analyses and tests that can provide increased confidence in especially vulnerable portions of the system. For the design and implementation phase of the PLC based systems, we proposed a technique for software design specification and analysis, and this technique enables us to generate software design specifications (SDSs) in nuclear fields. For the safety analysis in the design phase, we used architecture design blocks of NuFDS to represent the architecture of the software. On the basis of the architecture design specification, we can directly generate the fault tree and then use the fault tree for qualitative analysis. Therefore, we proposed a technique of fault tree synthesis, along with a universal fault tree template for the architecture modules of nuclear software. Through our proposed fault tree synthesis in this work, users can use the architecture specification of the NuFDS approach to intuitively compose fault trees that help analyze the safety design features of software.

  1. Technical Details on Beyond Design Basis Event Pilot Evaluations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    2013-01-01

    The primary focus of the BDBE pilot project was the review of BDBE analysis and mitigation features at four DOE nuclear facilities representing a range of DOE sites, nuclear facility types/activities, and responsible program offices. The pilots looked at (1) how beyond design basis accidents were evaluated and documented in the facility Documented Safety Analysis, (2) potential BDBE vulnerabilities and margins to failure of facility safety features as obtained from general area and specific system walkdowns and design documents reviews, and (3) preparations made in facility and site emergency management programs to respond to severe accidents. It also evaluated whether draft BDBE guidance on safety analysis and emergency management could be used to improve the analysis of and preparations for mitigating severe and beyond design basis accidents. The details of these activities are organized in this report as described below.

  2. Learning Safety Assessment from Accidents in a University Environment

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jensen, Niels; Jørgensen, Sten Bay

    2013-01-01

    This contribution describes how a chemical engineering department started learning from accidents during experimental work and ended up implementing an industrially inspired system for risk assessment of new and existing experimental setups as well as a system for assessing potential risk from...... the chemicals used in the experimental work. These experiences have led to recent developments which focus increasingly on the a theoretical basis for modeling and reasoning on safety as well as operational aspects within a common framework. Presently this framework is being extended with barrier concepts both...

  3. Simplifying documentation while approaching site closure: integrated health and safety plans as documented safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, Tulanda

    2003-01-01

    At the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) near Cincinnati, Ohio, environmental restoration activities are supported by Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) that combine the required project-specific Health and Safety Plans, Safety Basis Requirements (SBRs), and Process Requirements (PRs) into single Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs). By isolating any remediation activities that deal with Enriched Restricted Materials, the SBRs and PRs assure that the hazard categories of former nuclear facilities undergoing remediation remain less than Nuclear. These integrated DSAs employ Integrated Safety Management methodology in support of simplified restoration and remediation activities that, so far, have resulted in the decontamination and demolition (D and D) of over 150 structures, including six major nuclear production plants. This paper presents the FCP method for maintaining safety basis documentation, using the D and D I-HASP as an example

  4. Evaluating the implementation of health and safety innovations under a regulatory context: A collective case study of Ontario’s safer needle regulation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chambers Andrea

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Implementation effectiveness models have identified important factors that can promote the successful implementation of an innovation; however, these models have been examined within contexts where innovations are adopted voluntarily and often ignore the socio-political and environmental context. In the field of occupational health and safety, there are circumstances where organizations must adopt innovations to comply with a regulatory standard. Examining how the external environment can facilitate or challenge an organization’s change process may add to our understanding of implementation effectiveness. The objective of this study is to describe implementation facilitators and barriers in the context of a regulation designed to promote the uptake of safer engineered medical devices in healthcare. Methods The proposed study will focus on Ontario’s safer needle regulation (2007 which requires healthcare organizations to transition to the use of safer engineered medical devices for the prevention of needlestick injuries. A collective case study design will be used to learn from the experiences of three acute care hospitals in the province of Ontario, Canada. Interviews with management and front-line healthcare workers and analysis of supporting documents will be used to describe the implementation experience and examine issues associated with the integration of these devices. The data collection and analysis process will be influenced by a conceptual framework that draws from implementation science and the occupational health and safety literature. Discussion The focus of this study in addition to the methodology creates a unique opportunity to contribute to the field of implementation science. First, the study will explore implementation experiences under circumstances where regulatory pressures are influencing the organization's change process. Second, the timing of this study provides an opportunity to focus on issues

  5. Effects and practices on nuclear safety convention promoting nuclear safety in China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Wei; Cheng Jianxiu; Chen Maosong

    2010-01-01

    By the means of peer review and self-review, the Contracting Parties are reviewed on obligations under the Convention. In order to implementation these, the State Department established the specific group, under the efforts of departments together, the China fulfilled the obligations successfully. The international society affirmed the good practices on nuclear safety in China, at the same time, they pointed out some fields that China pay close attention to. On the basis of analyzing questions, we point out some aspects which are combined the common questions put forward by the International Atomic Energy Agency on the 4th reviewing meeting that the Chinese government pay close attention to on the next review meeting. Meanwhile, we also put forward some suggestions on how to do better on fulfilling the convention. (authors)

  6. Nuclear Safety Charter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The AREVA 'Values Charter' reaffirmed the priority that must be given to the requirement for a very high level of safety, which applies in particular to the nuclear field. The purpose of this Nuclear Safety Charter is to set forth the group's commitments in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection so as to ensure that this requirement is met throughout the life cycle of the facilities. It should enable each of us, in carrying out our duties, to commit to this requirement personally, for the company, and for all stakeholders. These commitments are anchored in organizational and action principles and in complete transparency. They build on a safety culture shared by all personnel and maintained by periodic refresher training. They are implemented through Safety, Health, and Environmental management systems. The purpose of these commitments, beyond strict compliance with the laws and regulations in force in countries in which we operate as a group, is to foster a continuous improvement initiative aimed at continually enhancing our overall performance as a group. Content: 1 - Organization: responsibility of the group's executive management and subsidiaries, prime responsibility of the operator, a system of clearly defined responsibilities that draws on skilled support and on independent control of operating personnel, the general inspectorate: a shared expertise and an independent control of the operating organization, an organization that can be adapted for emergency management. 2 - Action principles: nuclear safety applies to every stage in the plant life cycle, lessons learned are analyzed and capitalized through the continuous improvement initiative, analyzing risks in advance is the basis of Areva's safety culture, employees are empowered to improve nuclear Safety, the group is committed to a voluntary radiation protection initiative And a sustained effort in reducing waste and effluent from facility Operations, employees and subcontractors are treated

  7. Practical implementation of good practice in health, environment and safety management in enterprise in the Lodz region.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Michalak, Jacek

    2002-10-01

    Good practice in health, environment and safety management in enterprise (GP HESME) is the process that aims at continuous improvement in health, environment and safety performance, involving all stakeholders within and outside the enterprise. The GP HESME system is intended to function at different levels: international, national, local community, and enterprise. The most important issues at the first stage of GP HESME implementation in the Lodz region are described. Also, the proposals of future activities in Lodz are presented. Practical implementation of GP HESME requires close co-operation among all stakeholders: local authorities, employers, employees, research institutions, and the state inspectorate. The WHO and the Nofer Institute of Occupational Medicine (NIOM) are initiating implementation, delivering professional consultation, education and training of stakeholders in the NIOM School of Public Health. The implementation of GP HESME in the Lodz region started in 1999 from a WHO meeting on criteria and indicators, followed by close collaboration of NIOM with the city's Department of Public Health. 'Directions of Actions for Health of Lodz Citizens' is now the city's official document that includes GP HESME as an important part of public health policy in Lodz. Several conferences were organized by NIOM together with the Professional Managers' Club, Labor Inspection, and the city's Department of Public Health to assess the most important needs of enterprises. The employers and managerial staff, who predominated among the participants, stated the need for tailored sets of indicators and economic appraisal of GP HESME activities. Special attention is paid to GP HESME in supermarkets and community-owned enterprises, e.g., a local transportation company. A special program for small- and medium-size enterprises will be the next step of GP HESME in the Lodz region. The implementation of GP HESME is possible if the efforts of local authorities; research

  8. Workers' involvement--a missing component in the implementation of occupational safety and health management systems in enterprises.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Podgórski, Daniel

    2005-01-01

    Effective implementation of occupational safety and health (OSH) legislation based on European Union directives requires promotion of OSH management systems (OSH MS). To this end, voluntary Polish standards (PN-N-18000) have been adopted, setting forth OSH MS specifications and guidelines. However, the number of enterprises implementing OSH MS has increased slowly, falling short of expectations, which call for a new national policy on OSH MS promotion. To develop a national policy in this area, a survey was conducted in 40 enterprises with OSH MS in place. The survey was aimed at identifying motivational factors underlying OSH MS implementation decisions. Specifically, workers' and their representatives' involvement in OSH MS implementation was investigated. The results showed that the level of workers' involvement was relatively low, which may result in a low effectiveness of those systems. The same result also applies to the involvement of workers' representatives and that of trade unions.

  9. International Aspects of Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lash, T.R.

    2000-01-01

    Even though not all the world's nations have developed a nuclear power industry, nuclear safety is unquestionably an international issue. Perhaps the most compelling proof is the 1986 accident at Chornobyl nuclear power plant in what is now Ukraine. The U.S. Department of Energy conducts a comprehensive, cooperative effort to reduce risks at Soviet-designed nuclear power plants. In the host countries : Armenia, Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Kazakhstan joint projects are correcting major safety deficiencies and establishing nuclear safety infrastructures that will be self-sustaining.The U.S. effort has six primary goals: 1. Operational Safety - Implement the basic elements of operational safety consistent with internationally accepted practices. 2. Training - Improve operator training to internationally accepted standards. 3. Safety Maintenance - Help establish technically effective maintenance programs that can ensure the reliability of safety-related equipment. 4. Safety Systems - Implement safety system improvements consistent with remaining plant lifetimes. 5. Safety Evaluations - Transfer the capability to conduct in-depth plant safety evaluations using internationally accepted methods. 6. Legal and Regulatory Capabilities - Facilitate host-country implementation of necessary laws and regulatory policies consistent with their international treaty obligations governing the safe use of nuclear power

  10. Basic safety principles of KLT-40C reactor plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beliaev, V.; Polunichev, V.

    2000-01-01

    The KLT-40 NSSS has been developed for a floating power block of a nuclear heat and power station on the basis of ice-breaker-type NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) with application of shipbuilding technologies. Basic reactor plant components are pressurised water reactor, once-through coil-type steam generator, primary coolant pump, emergency protection rod drive mechanisms of compensate group-electromechanical type. Basic RP components are incorporated in a compact steam generating block which is arranged within metal-water shielding tank's caissons. Domestic regulatory documents on safety were used for the NSSS design. IAEA recommendations were also taken into account. Implementation of basic safety principles adopted presently for nuclear power allowed application of the KLT-40C plant for a floating power unit of a nuclear co-generation station. (author)

  11. Interim Safety Basis for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    This ISB, in conjunction with the IOSR, provides the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements or the facility is shut down. It is concluded that the risks associated with tha current and anticipated mode of the facility, uranium disposition, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within risk guidelines

  12. Joint convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. First national report on the implementation by France of the obligations of the Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-03-01

    The Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management is supplementing the Convention of Nuclear Safety. it was approved by France on february 22, 2000 and it entered into force on June 18,2001. Article 32 obliges each contracting Party to present at the review meetings (every three years) a report on the way in which it implements the obligations of the Convention (full text of the Convention and additional information on the web site of the IAEA, its director General being the depository of the Convention. (author)

  13. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PIEPHO, M.G.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).'' All assumptions, parameters and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR

  14. An Investigation of Health and Safety Measures in a Hydroelectric Power Plant.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Acakpovi, Amevi; Dzamikumah, Lucky

    2016-12-01

    Occupational risk management is known as a catalyst in generating superior returns for all stakeholders on a sustainable basis. A number of companies in Ghana implemented health and safety measures adopted from international companies to ensure the safety of their employees. However, there exist great threats to employees' safety in these companies. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the level of compliance of Occupational Health and Safety management systems and standards set by international and local legislation in power producing companies in Ghana. The methodology is conducted by administering questionnaires and in-depth interviews as measuring instruments. A random sampling technique was applied to 60 respondents; only 50 respondents returned their responses. The questionnaire was developed from a literature review and contained questions and items relevant to the initial research problem. A factor analysis was also carried out to investigate the influence of some variables on safety in general. Results showed that the significant factors that influence the safety of employees at the hydroelectric power plant stations are: lack of training and supervision, non-observance of safe work procedures, lack of management commitment, and lack of periodical check on machine operations. The study pointed out the safety loopholes and therefore helped improve the health and safety measures of employees in the selected company by providing effective recommendations. The implementation of the proposed recommendations in this paper, would lead to the prevention of work-related injuries and illnesses of employees as well as property damage and incidents in hydroelectric power plants. The recommendations may equally be considered as benchmark for the Safety and Health Management System with international standards.

  15. From chain liability to chain responsibility: MNE approaches to implement safety and health codes in international supply chains

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Tulder, R.; van Wijk, J.; Kolk, A.

    2009-01-01

    This article examines whether the involvement of stakeholders in the design of corporate codes of conduct leads to a higher implementation likelihood of the code. The empirical focus is on Occupational Safety and Health (OSH). The article compares the inclusion of OSH issues in the codes of conduct

  16. Implementing and measuring safety goals and safety culture. 2. Extensive Efforts to Learn Lessons from Overseas Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maki, Nobuo

    2001-01-01

    The transfer of nuclear power plant (NPP) operating experiences is one of the important measures for the safe operation of NPPs. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO),World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), and Nuclear Information Center of Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry are the organizations providing Japanese utilities with useful information on incidents and accidents that have occurred at foreign NPPs. The Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) has established two organizations to make extensive efforts to learn lessons from overseas NPPs: One is the Nuclear Power Plant Maintenance Training Center (MTC), and the other is the Institute of Nuclear Safety System (INSS). This paper describes the function of these organizations in transferring knowledge and expertise to ensure the safe operation of Japanese NPPs as well as recent outcomes. MTC was set up in October 1983. Before its establishment, expertise on NPP maintenance was mainly transferred on an on-the-job basis through daily maintenance work. However, after various NPP incidents and accidents, the importance of off-site training for maintenance personnel was emphasized. MTC possesses full-sized or nearly full sized mockups of Mihama NPP Unit 3 and Takahama NPP Unit 3. Furthermore, many kinds of mechanical, electrical, and instrumental equipment are furnished for training. In 1999, more than 2400 (man/day) maintenance personnel in total had training at MTC. In the tube rupture accident of a steam generator of KEPCO's Mihama Unit 2 on February 9, 1991, the emergency core cooling system actuated for the first time in the history of NPP operation in Japan. The cause of the accident was a fault in the manufacturing process of the steam generator, which was not detected until the accident. After an in-depth evaluation of the accident, many corrective actions were taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar accident. As a part of the actions, KEPCO established INSS in March

  17. Cold Vacuum Drying facility design basis accident analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.

    2000-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR. The calculations in this document address the design basis accidents (DBAs) selected for analysis in HNF-3553, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report'', Annex B, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' The objective is to determine the quantity of radioactive particulate available for release at any point during processing at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and to use that quantity to determine the amount of radioactive material released during the DBAs. The radioactive material released is used to determine dose consequences to receptors at four locations, and the dose consequences are compared with the appropriate evaluation guidelines and release limits to ascertain the need for preventive and mitigative controls

  18. Cold Vacuum Drying facility design basis accident analysis documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CROWE, R.D.

    2000-08-08

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR. The calculations in this document address the design basis accidents (DBAs) selected for analysis in HNF-3553, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report'', Annex B, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' The objective is to determine the quantity of radioactive particulate available for release at any point during processing at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and to use that quantity to determine the amount of radioactive material released during the DBAs. The radioactive material released is used to determine dose consequences to receptors at four locations, and the dose consequences are compared with the appropriate evaluation guidelines and release limits to ascertain the need for preventive and mitigative controls.

  19. 42 CFR 417.470 - Basis and scope.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ...) MEDICARE PROGRAM HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS, COMPETITIVE MEDICAL PLANS, AND HEALTH CARE PREPAYMENT PLANS Medicare Contract Requirements § 417.470 Basis and scope. (a) Basis. This subpart implements those... section 1876(c), (g), (h), and (i) of the Act that pertain to the contract between CMS and an HMO or CMP...

  20. Industrial implementation issues of Total Site Heat Integration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chew, Kew Hong; Klemeš, Jiří Jaromír; Wan Alwi, Sharifah Rafidah; Abdul Manan, Zainuddin

    2013-01-01

    Heat Integration has been a well-established energy conservation strategy in the industry. Total Site Heat Integration (TSHI) has received growing interest since its inception in the 90s. The methodology has been used with certain simplifications to solve TSHI problems. This paper investigates the main issues that can influence the practical implementation of TSHI in the industry. The main aim is to provide an assessment and possible guidance for future development and extension of the TSHI methodology from the industrial perspective. Several key issues have been identified as being of vital importance for the industries: design, operation, reliability/availability/maintenance, regulatory/policy and economics. Design issues to consider include plant layout, pressure drop, etc. For operation, issues such as startup and shutdown need to be considered. Reliability, availability and maintenance (RAM) are important as they directly affect the production. Relevant government policy and incentives are also important when considering the options for TSHI. Finally, a TSHI system needs to be economically viable. This paper highlights the key issues to be considered for a successful implementation of TSHI. The impacts of these issues on TS integration are summarised in a matrix, which forms a basis for an improved and closer-to-real-life implementation of the TSHI methodology. Highlights: ► Current TSHI methodology has been used for solving models with certain simplifications. ► Several issues that can influence practical implementation of TSHI are identified. ► Impacts of these issues on safety, environment and economics are evaluated. ► The findings form a basis for an improved and practical implementation of TSHI