Mixing of incompatible materials in waste tanks technical basis document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SANDGREN, K.R.

2003-01-01

This technical basis document was developed to support the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and describes the risk binning process, the technical basis for assigning risk bins, and the controls selected for the mixing of incompatible materials representative accident and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and/or technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the FR-equency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR level controls. Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'', as described in this report

Cold Vacuum Drying facility design basis accident analysis documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

CROWE, R.D.

2000-01-01

This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR. The calculations in this document address the design basis accidents (DBAs) selected for analysis in HNF-3553, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report'', Annex B, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' The objective is to determine the quantity of radioactive particulate available for release at any point during processing at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and to use that quantity to determine the amount of radioactive material released during the DBAs. The radioactive material released is used to determine dose consequences to receptors at four locations, and the dose consequences are compared with the appropriate evaluation guidelines and release limits to ascertain the need for preventive and mitigative controls

Cold Vacuum Drying facility design basis accident analysis documentation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

CROWE, R.D.

2000-08-08

This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR. The calculations in this document address the design basis accidents (DBAs) selected for analysis in HNF-3553, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report'', Annex B, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' The objective is to determine the quantity of radioactive particulate available for release at any point during processing at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and to use that quantity to determine the amount of radioactive material released during the DBAs. The radioactive material released is used to determine dose consequences to receptors at four locations, and the dose consequences are compared with the appropriate evaluation guidelines and release limits to ascertain the need for preventive and mitigative controls.

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

PIEPHO, M.G.

1999-10-20

This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).'' All assumptions, parameters and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR.

Interim safety basis compliance matrix for Trenches 31 and 34

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ames, R.R.

1994-01-01

The tables provided in this document identify the specific requirements and basis for the administrative controls established in the Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) Solid Waste Burial Ground (SWBG) Interim Safety Basis (ISB) for operation of the Project W-025, Mixed Waste Lined Landfill (Trenches 31 and 34). The tables document the necessary controls and implementing procedures to ensure compliance with the requirements of the ISB. These requirements provide a basis for future Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQ) screening of applicable procedure changes, proposed physical modifications, tests, experiments, and occurrences. Table 1 provides the SWBG interim Operational Safety Requirements administrative controls matrix. The specific assumptions and commitments used in the safety analysis documents applicable to disposal of mixed wastes in Trenches 31 and 34 are provided in Table 2. Table 3 is provided to document the potential engineered and administrative mitigating features identified in the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for disposal of mixed waste

Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lavender, J.C.

1994-01-01

The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports

Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lavender, J.C.

1994-09-09

The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

VAIL, T.S.

1999-04-01

This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people.

340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

VAIL, T.S.

1999-01-01

This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people

Documents pertaining to safety control of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) controls the safety of nuclear facilities in Finland. This control encompasses on one hand the evaluation of plant safety on the basis of plans and analyses pertaining to the plant and on the other hand the inspection of plant structures, systems and components as well as of operational activity. STUK also monitors plants operational experience feedback and technical developments in the field, as well as the development of safety research and takes the necessary measures on their basis. Guide YVL 1.1 describes how STUK controls the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The documents to be submitted to STUK are described in the nuclear energy legislation and YVL guides. This guide presents the mode of delivery, quality, contents and number of documents to be submitted to STUK

Transuranic waste storage and assay facility (TRUSAF) interim safety basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gibson, K.D.

1995-09-01

The TRUSAF ISB is based upon current facility configuration and procedures. The purpose of the document is to provide the basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and the authorization basis for the TRUSAF at the Hanford Site. The previous safety analysis document TRUSAF hazards Identification and Evaluation (WHC 1977) is superseded by this document

Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Safety Basis Implementation Strategy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

TRAWINSKI, B.J.

2000-01-01

The objective of the Safety Basis Implementation is to ensure that implementation of activities is accomplished in order to support readiness to move spent fuel from K West Basin. Activities may be performed directly by the Safety Basis Implementation Team or they may be performed by other organizations and tracked by the Team. This strategy will focus on five key elements, (1) Administration of Safety Basis Implementation (general items), (2) Implementing documents, (3) Implementing equipment (including verification of operability), (4) Training, (5) SNF Project Technical Requirements (STRS) database system

Basis Document for Sludge Stabilization

CERN Document Server

Risenmay, H R

2001-01-01

DOE-RL recently issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER) amendments to the PFP Final Safety Analysis Report, HNF-SD-CP-SAR-021 Rev. 2. The Justification for Continued Operations for 2736-ZB and plutonium oxides in BTCs Safety Basis change (letter DOE-RL ABD-074) was approved by one of the SERs. Also approved by SER was the revised accident analysis for Magnesium Hydroxide Precipitation Process (MHPP) gloveboxes HC-230C-3 and HC-230C-5 containing increased glovebox inventories and corresponding increases in seismic release consequence. Numerous implementing documents require revision and issuance to implement the SER approvals. The SER plutonium oxides into BTCs specifically limited the SER scope to ''pure or clean oxides, i.e., 85 wt% or grater Pu, in this feed change'' (SER Section 3.0 Base Information paragraph 4 [page 11]). Comprehensive USQ Evaluation PFP-2001-12 addressed the packaging of Pu alloy metals into BTCs, and the packaging of Pu alloy oxides (powders) into food pack cans and determined that the ac...

Design basis document open-item resolution and reportability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gambhir, S.K.; Livingston, B.R.; Purcell, J.J.; Erickson, E.A.

1989-01-01

In the process of reconstituting the design bases for older nuclear power plants, information or references may not be available to fully define the design requirements or to document and verify the adequacy of the design. Also, information that is in conflict with other data is identified. The missing and conflicting information must be reconstituted in order to adequately document the design bases of the plant. For these operating facilities, the identification, tracking, and resolution of missing or conflicting information is very important when the reporting requirements stipulated by 10CFR21, 10CFR50.72, and 10CFR50.73 are considered. Additionally, controlled documentation (calculations, drawings, etc.) used to develop the design basis documents may contain conflicting data. In some cases, conflicts between the as-built design and licensing or design basis requirements established in specific commitments to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission may be identified. Furthermore, concerns regarding the adequacy of safety-related systems or components to perform their required function may be identified that would warrant prompt action by the licensee. The approach discussed in this paper was used by Omaha Public Power District for the ongoing design basis reconstitution effort at the Fort Calhoun nuclear plant

Generic safety documentation model

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mahn, J.A.

1994-04-01

This document is intended to be a resource for preparers of safety documentation for Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico facilities. It provides standardized discussions of some topics that are generic to most, if not all, Sandia/NM facilities safety documents. The material provides a ''core'' upon which to develop facility-specific safety documentation. The use of the information in this document will reduce the cost of safety document preparation and improve consistency of information

SAFETY BASIS DESIGN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IMECE2007-42747

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

RYAN GW

2007-09-24

'Designing in Safety' is a desired part of the development of any new potentially hazardous system, process, or facility. It is a required part of nuclear safety activities as specified in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 420.B, Facility Safety. This order addresses the design of nuclear related facilities developed under federal regulation IOCFR830, Nuclear Safety Management. IOCFR830 requires that safety basis documentation be provided to identify how nuclear safety is being adequately addressed as a condition for system operation (e.g., the safety basis). To support the development of the safety basis, a safety analysis is performed. Although the concept of developing a design that addresses 'Safety is simple, the execution can be complex and challenging. This paper addresses those complexities and challenges for the design activity of a system to treat sludge, a corrosion product of spent nuclear fuel, at DOE's Hanford Site in Washington State. The system being developed is referred to as the Sludge Treatment Project (STP). This paper describes the portion of the safety analysis that addresses the selection of design basis events using the experience gained from the STP and the development of design requirements for safety features associated with those events. Specifically, the paper describes the safety design process and the application of the process for two types of potential design basis accidents associated with the operation of the system, (1) flashing spray leaks and (2) splash and splatter leaks. Also presented are the technical challenges that are being addressed to develop effective safety features to deal with these design basis accidents.

SAFETY BASIS DESIGN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IMECE2007-42747

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

RYAN GW

2007-01-01

'Designing in Safety' is a desired part of the development of any new potentially hazardous system, process, or facility. It is a required part of nuclear safety activities as specified in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 420.B, Facility Safety. This order addresses the design of nuclear related facilities developed under federal regulation IOCFR830, Nuclear Safety Management. IOCFR830 requires that safety basis documentation be provided to identify how nuclear safety is being adequately addressed as a condition for system operation (e.g., the safety basis). To support the development of the safety basis, a safety analysis is performed. Although the concept of developing a design that addresses 'Safety is simple, the execution can be complex and challenging. This paper addresses those complexities and challenges for the design activity of a system to treat sludge, a corrosion product of spent nuclear fuel, at DOE's Hanford Site in Washington State. The system being developed is referred to as the Sludge Treatment Project (STP). This paper describes the portion of the safety analysis that addresses the selection of design basis events using the experience gained from the STP and the development of design requirements for safety features associated with those events. Specifically, the paper describes the safety design process and the application of the process for two types of potential design basis accidents associated with the operation of the system, (1) flashing spray leaks and (2) splash and splatter leaks. Also presented are the technical challenges that are being addressed to develop effective safety features to deal with these design basis accidents

Just in Time DSA-The Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Olinger, S. J.; Buhl, A. R.

2002-02-26

The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 imposed the requirement that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSA that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: compliance with the Rule; a ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD&D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD&D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex.

Just in Time DSA-The Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olinger, S. J.; Buhl, A. R.

2002-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 imposed the requirement that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSA that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: compliance with the Rule; a ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD and D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD and D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex

Just in Time DSA the Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

JACKSON, M.W.

2002-06-01

The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford, Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safely Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 requires that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSAs that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long-term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: Compliance with the Rule; A ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and Consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD&D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD&D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex.

Just in Time DSA the Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

JACKSON, M.W.

2002-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford, Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safely Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 requires that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSAs that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long-term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: Compliance with the Rule; A ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and Consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD and D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD and D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex

Advanced Test Reactor Safety Basis Upgrade Lessons Learned Relative to Design Basis Verification and Safety Basis Management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

G. L. Sharp; R. T. McCracken

2004-01-01

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a pressurized light-water reactor with a design thermal power of 250 MW. The principal function of the ATR is to provide a high neutron flux for testing reactor fuels and other materials. The reactor also provides other irradiation services such as radioisotope production. The ATR and its support facilities are located at the Test Reactor Area of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). An audit conducted by the Department of Energy's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (DOE OA) raised concerns that design conditions at the ATR were not adequately analyzed in the safety analysis and that legacy design basis management practices had the potential to further impact safe operation of the facility.1 The concerns identified by the audit team, and issues raised during additional reviews performed by ATR safety analysts, were evaluated through the unreviewed safety question process resulting in shutdown of the ATR for more than three months while these concerns were resolved. Past management of the ATR safety basis, relative to facility design basis management and change control, led to concerns that discrepancies in the safety basis may have developed. Although not required by DOE orders or regulations, not performing design basis verification in conjunction with development of the 10 CFR 830 Subpart B upgraded safety basis allowed these potential weaknesses to be carried forward. Configuration management and a clear definition of the existing facility design basis have a direct relation to developing and maintaining a high quality safety basis which properly identifies and mitigates all hazards and postulated accident conditions. These relations and the impact of past safety basis management practices have been reviewed in order to identify lessons learned from the safety basis upgrade process and appropriate actions to resolve possible concerns with respect to the current ATR safety

System requirements and design description for the document basis database interface (DocBasis)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lehman, W.J.

1997-01-01

This document describes system requirements and the design description for the Document Basis Database Interface (DocBasis). The DocBasis application is used to manage procedures used within the tank farms. The application maintains information in a small database to track the document basis for a procedure, as well as the current version/modification level and the basis for the procedure. The basis for each procedure is substantiated by Administrative, Technical, Procedural, and Regulatory requirements. The DocBasis user interface was developed by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)

Using resources for scientific-driven pharmacovigilance: from many product safety documents to one product safety master file.

Science.gov (United States)

Furlan, Giovanni

2012-08-01

required by other documents. The author has identified signal detection (intended not only as adverse event disproportionate reporting, but including non-clinical, laboratory, clinical analysis data and literature screening) and characterization as the basis for the preparation of all drug safety documents, which can be viewed as different ways of presenting the results of this activity. Therefore, the author proposes to merge all the aggregate reports required by current regulations into a single document - the Drug Safety Master File. This report should contain all the available information, from any source, regarding the potential and identified risks of a drug. It should be a living document updated and submitted to regulatory authorities on an ongoing basis.

DARHT: INTEGRATION OF AUTHORIZATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND WORKER SAFETY

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MC CLURE, D. A.; NELSON, C. A.; BOUDRIE, R. L.

2001-01-01

This document describes the results of consensus agreements reached by the DARHT Safety Planning Team during the development of the update of the DARHT Safety Analysis Document (SAD). The SAD is one of the Authorization Basis (AB) Documents required by the Department prior to granting approval to operate the DARHT Facility. The DARHT Safety Planning Team is lead by Mr. Joel A. Baca of the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE/AL). Team membership is drawn from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy Los Alamos Area Office (DOE/LAAO), and several divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Revision 1 of the DARHT SAD had been written as part of the process for gaining approval to operate the Phase 1 (First Axis) Accelerator. Early in the planning stage for the required update of the SAD for the approval to operate both Phase 1 and Phase 2 (First Axis and Second Axis) DARHT Accelerator, it was discovered that a conflict existed between the Laboratory approach to describing the management of facility and worker safety

10 CFR 830.202 - Safety basis.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety basis. 830.202 Section 830.202 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT Safety Basis Requirements § 830.202 Safety basis. (a) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis...

Model review and evaluation for application in DOE safety basis documentation of chemical accidents - modeling guidance for atmospheric dispersion and consequence assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lazaro, M. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Woodarad, K. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Hanna, S. R. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Hesse, D. J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Huang, J. -C. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Lewis, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Mazzola, C. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

1997-09-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through its Defense Programs (DP), Office of Engineering and Operations Suppon, established the Accident Phenomenology and Consequence (AP AC) Methodology Evaluation Program to identify and evaluate methodologies and computer codes to support accident phenomenological and consequence calculations for both radiological and nonradiological materials at DOE facilities and to identify development needs. The program is also intended to define and recommend "best or good engineering/safety analysis practices" to be followed in preparing ''design or beyond design basis" assessments to be included in DOE nuclear and nonnuclear facility safety documents. The AP AC effort is intended to provide scientifically sound and more consistent analytical approaches, by identifying model selection procedures and application methodologies, in order to enhance safety analysis activities throughout the DOE complex.

Transient and accident analyses topical design basis documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chi, Larry; Eckert, Eugene; Grim, Brit

2004-01-01

The designers and operators of nuclear power plants have extensively documented system functions, licensing performance, and operating procedures for all conditions. This paper presents a complementary, systematic approach for the documentation of all requirements that are based on the analysis of operational transients, abnormal transients, accidents, and other events which are included in the design and licensing basis for the plant. Up to now, application of the approach has focused on required mitigation actions (automatic or manual). All mitigation actions are directly identified with all applicable reactor events, as well as the plant-unique systems that work together to perform each function. The approach is also applicable to all operational functions. The approach makes extensive use of data base methods, thereby providing effective ways to interrogate the information for the varied users of this information. Examples of use include: evaluations of system design changes and equipment modifications, safety evaluations of any plant change (e.g., USNRC 10CFR50.59 review), plant operations (e.g., manual actions during unplanned events), system interactions, classification of safety-related equipment, environmental qualification of equipment, and mitigation requirements for different reactor operating states. This approach has been applied in customized ways to several boiling water reactor (BWR) units, based on the desires and needs of the specific utility. (author)

Transportation Safety Excellence in Operations Through Improved Transportation Safety Document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dr. Michael A. Lehto; MAL

2007-01-01

A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC. This accomplishment supported excellence in operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport costs; and making facility operations more efficient. The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers. Previously, the TSD did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums. Previous practice was to package the waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations. This practice allowed operations to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations friendly. An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were used effectively to directly support excellence in operations. Several factors contributed to the success of MFC's effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities. (1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to better integrate nuclear safety

Hanford Site Wide Transportation Safety Document [SEC 1 Thru 3

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MCCALL, D L

2002-06-01

This safety evaluation report (SER) documents the basis for the US Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL) to approve the Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document (TSD) for onsite Transportation and Packaging (T&P) at Hanford. Hanford contractors, on behalf of DOE-RL, prepared and submitted the Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document, DOE/RL-2001-0036, Revision 0, (DOE/RL 2001), dated October 4, 2001, which is referred to throughout this report as the TSD. In the context of the TSD, Hanford onsite shipments are the activities of moving hazardous materials, substances, and wastes between DOE facilities and over roadways where public access is controlled or restricted and includes intra-area and inter-area movements. The TSD sets forth requirements and standards for onsite shipment of radioactive and hazardous materials and wastes within the confines of the Hanford Site on roadways where public access is restricted by signs, barricades, fences, or other means including road closures and moving convoys controlled by Hanford Site security forces.

IMPLEMENTING CHANGES TO AN APPROVED AND IN-USE DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

KING JP

2008-01-01

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) has refined a process to ensure a comprehensive and complete DSA/TSR change implementation. Successful Nuclear Facility Safety Basis implementation is essential to avoid creating a Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA) situation, or implementing a facility into a non-compliance that can result in a TSR violation. Once past initial implementation, additional changes to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are often needed due to needed requirement clarifications, operating experience indicating that Conditions/Required Actions/Surveillance Requirements could be improved, changes in facility conditions, or changes in facility mission etc. An effective change implementation process is essential to ensuring compliance with 10 CFR 830.202(a), 'The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1,2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis for the facility'

Authorization Basis Safety Classification of Transfer Bay Bridge Crane at the 105-K Basins

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

CHAFFEE, G.A.

2000-01-01

This supporting document provides the bases for the safety classification for the K Basin transfer bay bridge crane and the bases for the Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) safety classification. A table is presented that delineates the safety significant components. This safety classification is based on a review of the Authorization Basis (AB). This Authorization Basis review was performed regarding AB and design baseline issues. The primary issues are: (1) What is the AB for the safety classification of the transfer bay bridge crane? (2) What does the SSC safety classification ''Safety Significant'' or ''Safety Significant for Design Only'' mean for design requirements and quality requirements for procurement, installation and maintenance (including replacement of parts) activities for the crane during its expected life time? The AB information on the crane was identified based on review of Department of Energy--Richland Office (RL) and Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project correspondence, K Basin Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and RL Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) of SNF Project SAR submittals. The relevant correspondence, actions and activities taken and substantive directions or conclusions of these documents are provided in Appendix A

DART - for design basis justification and safety related information management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Billington, A.; Blondiaux, P.; Boucau, J.; Cantineau, B.; Doumont, C.; Mared, A.

2000-01-01

DART is the acronym for Design Analysis Re-engineering Tool. It embodies a systematic and integrated approach to NPP safety re-assessment and configuration management, that makes use of Reverse Failure Mode and Effect Analysis in conjunction with a state-of-the-art relational database and a standardized data format, to permit long-term management of plant safety related information. The plant design is reviewed in a step-by-step logical fashion by constructing fault trees that identify the link between undesired consequences and their causes. Each failure cause identified in a fault tree is addressed by defining functional requirements, which are in turn addressed by documenting the specific manner in which the plant complies with the requirement. The database can be used to generate up-to-date plant safety related documents, including: SAR, Systems Descriptions, Technical Specifications and plant procedures. The approach is open-minded by nature and therefore is not regulatory driven, however the plant licensing basis will also be reviewed and documented within the same database such that a Regulatory Conformance Program may be integrated with the other safety documentation. This methodology can thus reconstitute the plant design bases in a comprehensive and systematic way, while allowing to uncover weaknesses in design. The original feature of the DART methodology is that it links all the safety related documents together, facilitating the evaluation of the safety impact resulting from any plant modification. Due to its capability to retrieve the basic justifications of the plant design, it is also a useful tool for training the young generation of plant personnel. The DART methodology has been developed for application to units 2, 3 and 4 at Vattenfall's Ringhals site in Sweden. It may be applied to any nuclear power plant or industrial facility where public safety is a concern. (author)

DART - for design basis justification and safety related information management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Billington, A.; Blondiaux, B.; Boucau, J.; Cantineau, B.; Mared, A.

2001-01-01

DART is the acronym for Design Analysis Re-Engineering Tool. It embodies a systematic and integrated approach to NPP safety re-assessment and configuration management, that makes use of Reverse Failure Mode and Effect Analysis in conjunction with a state-of-the-art relational database and a standardized data format, to permit long-term management of plant safety related information. The plant design is reviewed in a step-by-step logical fashion by constructing fault trees that identify the link between undesired consequences and their causes. Each failure cause identified in a fault tree is addressed by defining functional requirements, which are in turn addressed by documenting the specific manner in which the plant complies with the requirement. The database can then be used to generate up-to-date plant safety related documents, including: SAR, Systems Descriptions, Technical Specifications and plant procedures. The approach is open-minded by nature and therefore is not regulatory driven, however the plant licensing basis will also be reviewed and documented within the same database such that a Regulatory Conformance Program may be integrated with the other safety documentation. This methodology can thus reconstitute the plant design bases in a comprehensive and systematic way, while allowing to uncover weaknesses in design. The original feature of the DART methodology is that it links all the safety related documents together, facilitating the evaluation of the safety impact resulting from any plant modification. Due to its capability to retrieve the basic justifications of the plant design, it is also a useful tool for training the young generation of plant personnel. The DART methodology has been developed for application to units 2, 3 and 4 at Vattenfall's Ringhals site in Sweden. It may be applied to any nuclear power plant or industrial facility where public safety is a concern. (author)

LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE HANFORD SWOC MASTER DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS (MDSA) and IMPLEMENTATION VALIDATION REVIEW (IVR)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MORENO, M.R.

2004-01-01

DOE set clear expectations on a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (20 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule), which ensured long-term benefit to Hanford, via issuance of a nuclear safety strategy in February 2003. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development with the goal of a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was approved to standardize methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was approved for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated at Hanford. Standard safety management program chapters were approved for use as a means of compliance with the programmatic chapters of DOE-STD-3009, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports''. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. The new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) developed to address the operations of four facilities within the Solid Waste Operations Complex (SWOC) necessitated development of an Implementation Validation Review (IVR) process. The IVR process encompasses the following objectives: safety basis controls and requirements are adequately incorporated into appropriate facility documents and work instructions, facility personnel are knowledgeable of controls and requirements, and the DSA/TSR controls have been implemented. Based on DOE direction and safety analysis tools, four waste management nuclear facilities were integrated into one safety basis document. With successful completion of implementation of this safety document, lessons-learned from the in-process review, safety analysis tools and IVR process were documented for future action

Technical basis document for internal dosimetry

CERN Document Server

Hickman, D P

1991-01-01

This document provides the technical basis for the Chem-Nuclear Geotech (Geotech) internal dosimetry program. Geotech policy describes the intentions of the company in complying with radiation protection standards and the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) program. It uses this policy and applicable protection standards to derive acceptable methods and levels of bioassay to assure compliance. The models and computational methods used are described in detail within this document. FR-om these models, dose- conversion factors and derived limits are computed. These computations are then verified using existing documentation and verification information or by demonstration of the calculations used to obtain the dose-conversion factors and derived limits. Recommendations for methods of optimizing the internal dosimetry program to provide effective monitoring and dose assessment for workers are provided in the last section of this document. This document is intended to be used in establishing an accredited dosi...

Setting clear expectations for safety basis development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MORENO, M.R.

2003-01-01

DOE-RL has set clear expectations for a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule) which will ensure long-term benefit to Hanford. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development resulting in a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was issued to standardized methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was issued for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated for Hanford. A standard Site Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) detailing the safety management programs was issued for use as a means of compliance with a majority of 3009 Standard chapters. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. As a result of setting expectations and providing safety analysis tools, the four Hanford Site waste management nuclear facilities were able to integrate into one Master Waste Management Documented Safety Analysis (WM-DSA)

TECHNICAL BASIS FOR VENTILATION REQUIREMENTS IN TANK FARMS OPERATING SPECIFICATIONS DOCUMENTS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BERGLIN, E J

2003-06-23

This report provides the technical basis for high efficiency particulate air filter (HEPA) for Hanford tank farm ventilation systems (sometimes known as heating, ventilation and air conditioning [HVAC]) to support limits defined in Process Engineering Operating Specification Documents (OSDs). This technical basis included a review of older technical basis and provides clarifications, as necessary, to technical basis limit revisions or justification. This document provides an updated technical basis for tank farm ventilation systems related to Operation Specification Documents (OSDs) for double-shell tanks (DSTs), single-shell tanks (SSTs), double-contained receiver tanks (DCRTs), catch tanks, and various other miscellaneous facilities.

Technical basis document for internal dosimetry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hickman, D.P.

1991-01-01

This document provides the technical basis for the Chem-Nuclear Geotech (Geotech) internal dosimetry program. Geotech policy describes the intentions of the company in complying with radiation protection standards and the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) program. It uses this policy and applicable protection standards to derive acceptable methods and levels of bioassay to assure compliance. The models and computational methods used are described in detail within this document. FR-om these models, dose- conversion factors and derived limits are computed. These computations are then verified using existing documentation and verification information or by demonstration of the calculations used to obtain the dose-conversion factors and derived limits. Recommendations for methods of optimizing the internal dosimetry program to provide effective monitoring and dose assessment for workers are provided in the last section of this document. This document is intended to be used in establishing an accredited dosimetry program in accordance with expected Department of Energy Laboratory Accreditation Program (DOELAP) requirements for the selected radionuclides provided in this document, including uranium mill tailing mixtures. Additions and modifications to this document and procedures derived FR-om this document are expected in the future according to changes in standards and changes in programmatic mission

General safety basis development guidance for environmental restoration decontamination and decommissioning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ellingson, D.R.; Kerr, N.; Bohlander, K.; Hansen, J.; Crowley, W.

1994-02-01

Safety analyses have the objective of contributing to two essential ingredients of a successful operation. The first is promoting the safety of the operation through worker involvement in information development (safety basis). The second is obtaining approval to conduct the operation (authorization). Typically these ingredients are assembled under separate programs covered by separate DOE requirements. DOE authorization relies on successful development of a document containing up to 21 topics written in terms and language suited to reviewers and approvers. Safety relies on successful training and procedures that convert the technical documented information into terms and language understandable to the worker. This separation can lead to successful incorporation of one ingredient independent of the other. At best, this separation may result in a safe but unauthorized operation; at worst, the separation may result in an unsafe operation authorized to proceed. This guide is based on experiences gained by contractors who have integrated rather than separated the safety and authorization. The short duration of ER/D ampersand D activities, the uncertainties of hazards, and the publicly expressed desire for demonstrable progress in cleanup activities add emphasis to the need to integrate rather than separate and develop new programs. Experience-based information has been useful to workers, safety analysis practitioners, and reviewers in the following ways: (1) Acquiring or developing the needed information in a useful form; (2) Managing the uncertainties during activity development and operation; (3) Identifying the subset of applicable requirements for an activity; (4) Developing the appropriate level of documentation detail for a specific activity; and (5) Increasing the usefulness and use of safety analysis (ownership)

System Documentation AS Basis For Company Business Process Improvement

OpenAIRE

Pelawi, Dewan

2012-01-01

Business process is an activity performed together to achieve business goals. Good business process will support the achievement of the organization’s plan to make profit for the company. In order to understand the business process, the business process needs to be documented and analyzed. The purpose of research is to make the system documentation as a basis to improve or complete the ongoing business process. The research method is system documentation. System documentation is a way to desc...

Environment, Health, and Safety - Construction Subcontractors Documents |

Science.gov (United States)

NREL Environment, Health, and Safety - Construction Subcontractors Documents Environment Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) requirements are understood by construction subcontractors and with these requirements before submitting proposals and/or environment, health and safety plans for the

PUREX Deactivation Health and Safety documentation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dodd, E.N. III

1995-01-01

The purpose of the PUREX Deactivation Project is to establish a passively safe and environmentally secure configuration of PUREX at the Hanford Site, and to preserve that configuration for a 10-year horizon. The 10-year horizon is used to predict future maintenance requirements and represents they typical time duration expended to define, authorize, and initiate the follow-on Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities. This document was prepared to increase attention to worker safety issues during the deactivation project and, as such, identifies the documentation and programs associated with PUREX Deactivation Health and Safety.

SNF fuel retrieval sub project safety analysis document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BERGMANN, D.W.

1999-01-01

This safety analysis is for the SNF Fuel Retrieval (FRS) Sub Project. The FRS equipment will be added to K West and K East Basins to facilitate retrieval, cleaning and repackaging the spent nuclear fuel into Multi-Canister Overpack baskets. The document includes a hazard evaluation, identifies bounding accidents, documents analyses of the accidents and establishes safety class or safety significant equipment to mitigate accidents as needed

SNF fuel retrieval sub project safety analysis document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BERGMANN, D.W.

1999-02-24

This safety analysis is for the SNF Fuel Retrieval (FRS) Sub Project. The FRS equipment will be added to K West and K East Basins to facilitate retrieval, cleaning and repackaging the spent nuclear fuel into Multi-Canister Overpack baskets. The document includes a hazard evaluation, identifies bounding accidents, documents analyses of the accidents and establishes safety class or safety significant equipment to mitigate accidents as needed.

PUREX Deactivation Health and Safety documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dodd, E.N. III.

1995-01-01

The purpose of the PUREX Deactivation Project is to establish a passively safe and environmentally secure configuration of PUREX at the Hanford Site, and to preserve that configuration for a 10-year horizon. The 10-year horizon is used to predict future maintenance requirements and represents they typical time duration expended to define, authorize, and initiate the follow-on Decontamination and Decommissioning (D ampersand D) activities. This document was prepared to increase attention to worker safety issues during the deactivation project and, as such, identifies the documentation and programs associated with PUREX Deactivation Health and Safety

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D

2008-06-16

This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

Technical Basis Document (TBD) and user guides

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chiaro, P.J. Jr.

1998-09-01

A Technical Basis Document (TBD) should provide the background information for establishment of an instrument's operational requirements. Due to the amount and location of DOE facilities, no one set of requirements is possible. Operational requirements will vary based on the local environments and missions at each facility. Environmental conditions that can affect an instrument's operations are ambient temperature, humidity, and radio frequency, and to a lesser extent, magnetic fields, and interfering ionizing radiations. Consideration should also be made regarding how an instrument is to be used. If an instrument will be transported around the facility, vibration and shock can cause problems if they are not addressed in the TBD. This document provides guidance for the development of a TBD. This document applies to radiation instruments used for personnel and equipment contamination monitoring, dose rate monitoring, and air monitoring

Solar Power Tower Design Basis Document, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

ZAVOICO,ALEXIS B.

2001-07-01

This report contains the design basis for a generic molten-salt solar power tower. A solar power tower uses a field of tracking mirrors (heliostats) that redirect sunlight on to a centrally located receiver mounted on top a tower, which absorbs the concentrated sunlight. Molten nitrate salt, pumped from a tank at ground level, absorbs the sunlight, heating it up to 565 C. The heated salt flows back to ground level into another tank where it is stored, then pumped through a steam generator to produce steam and make electricity. This report establishes a set of criteria upon which the next generation of solar power towers will be designed. The report contains detailed criteria for each of the major systems: Collector System, Receiver System, Thermal Storage System, Steam Generator System, Master Control System, and Electric Heat Tracing System. The Electric Power Generation System and Balance of Plant discussions are limited to interface requirements. This design basis builds on the extensive experience gained from the Solar Two project and includes potential design innovations that will improve reliability and lower technical risk. This design basis document is a living document and contains several areas that require trade-studies and design analysis to fully complete the design basis. Project- and site-specific conditions and requirements will also resolve open To Be Determined issues.

Flammable gas tank safety program: Technical basis for gas analysis and monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Estey, S.D.

1998-01-01

Several Hanford waste tanks have been observed to exhibit periodic releases of significant quantities of flammable gases. Because potential safety issues have been identified with this type of waste behavior, applicable tanks were equipped with instrumentation offering the capability to continuously monitor gases released from them. This document was written to cover three primary areas: (1) describe the current technical basis for requiring flammable gas monitoring, (2) update the technical basis to include knowledge gained from monitoring the tanks over the last three years, (3) provide the criteria for removal of Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System(s) (SHMS) from a waste tank or termination of other flammable gas monitoring activities in the Hanford Tank farms

Environmental restoration and decontamination and decommissioning safety documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hansen, J.L.; Frauenholz, L.H.; Kerr, N.R.

1993-01-01

This document presents recommendations of a working group designated by the Environmental Restoration and Remediation (ER) and Decontamination and Decommissioning (D ampersand D) subcommittees of the Westinghouse M ampersand O (Management and Operation) Nuclear Facility Safety Committee. A commonalty of approach to safety documentation specific to ER and D ampersand D activities was developed and is summarized below. Allowance for interpretative tolerance and documentation flexibility appropriate to the activity, graded for hazard category, duration, and complexity, was a primary consideration in development of this guidance

Reactor operation safety information document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1990-01-01

The report contains a reactor facility description which includes K, P, and L reactor sites, structures, operating systems, engineered safety systems, support systems, and process and effluent monitoring systems; an accident analysis section which includes cooling system anomalies, radioactive materials releases, and anticipated transients without scram; a summary of onsite doses from design basis accidents; severe accident analysis (reactor core disruption); a description of operating contractor organization and emergency planning; and a summary of reactor safety evolution. (MB)

Safety evaluation report of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant safety analysis report: Contact-handled transuranic waste disposal operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-02-01

DOE 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, requires that the US Department of Energy conduct an independent, defensible, review in order to approve a Safety Analysis Report (SAR). That review and the SAR approval basis is documented in this formal Safety Evaluation Report (SER). This SER documents the DOE's review of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant SAR and provides the Carlsbad Area Office Manager, the WIPP SAR approval authority, with the basis for approving the safety document. It concludes that the safety basis documented in the WIPP SAR is comprehensive, correct, and commensurate with hazards associated with planned waste disposal operations

Prototype Hanford Surface Barrier: Design basis document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Myers, D.R.; Duranceau, D.A.

1994-11-01

The Hanford Site Surface Barrier Development Program (BDP) was organized in 1985 to develop the technology needed to provide a long-term surface barrier capability for the Hanford Site and other arid sites. This document provides the basis of the prototype barrier. Engineers and scientists have momentarily frozen evolving barrier designs and incorporated the latest findings from BDP tasks. The design and construction of the prototype barrier has required that all of the various components of the barrier be brought together into an integrated system. This integration is particularly important because some of the components of the protective barreir have been developed independently of other barreir components. This document serves as the baseline by which future modifications or other barrier designs can be compared. Also, this document contains the minutes of meeting convened during the definitive design process in which critical decisions affecting the prototype barrier's design were made and the construction drawings

Upgrading safety documentation for exported nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rosen, M.

1978-01-01

In view of the generally small regulatory staffs of importing countries, suggestions are given for upgrading the ''export edition'' of the traditionally supplied safety documentation by use of a Supplementary Information Report, written specifically for the needs of a smaller and/or less technically qualified staff, which would highlight the differences that exist between the facility to be constructed and the supposedly similar reference plant of the supplier country; by improvement of supporting safety documentation to allow for adequate understanding of significant safety parameters; and by attention to the needs of smaller countries in the critical operating regulations (Technical Specifications for Operation). (author)

Technical Basis Document for PFP Area Monitoring Dosimetry Program

CERN Document Server

Cooper, J R

2000-01-01

This document describes the phantom dosimetry used for the PFP Area Monitoring program and establishes the basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) area monitoring dosimetry program in accordance with the following requirements: Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 835, ''Occupational Radiation Protection'' Part 835.403; Hanford Site Radiological Control Manual (HSRCM-1), Part 514; HNF-PRO-382, Area Dosimetry Program; and PNL-MA-842, Hanford External Dosimetry Technical Basis Manual.

Technical Basis Document for PFP Area Monitoring Dosimetry Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

COOPER, J.R.

2000-01-01

This document describes the phantom dosimetry used for the PFP Area Monitoring program and establishes the basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) area monitoring dosimetry program in accordance with the following requirements: Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 835, ''Occupational Radiation Protection'' Part 835.403; Hanford Site Radiological Control Manual (HSRCM-1), Part 514; HNF-PRO-382, Area Dosimetry Program; and PNL-MA-842, Hanford External Dosimetry Technical Basis Manual

Technical Basis Document for PFP Area Monitoring Dosimetry Program

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

COOPER, J.R.

2000-04-17

This document describes the phantom dosimetry used for the PFP Area Monitoring program and establishes the basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) area monitoring dosimetry program in accordance with the following requirements: Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 835, ''Occupational Radiation Protection'' Part 835.403; Hanford Site Radiological Control Manual (HSRCM-1), Part 514; HNF-PRO-382, Area Dosimetry Program; and PNL-MA-842, Hanford External Dosimetry Technical Basis Manual.

Knowledge basis in safety culture for researchers and practitioners

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vieira Neto, Antonio S.; Barroso, Antonio C.O.; Goncalves, Adriana

2009-01-01

This paper presents the main characteristics of the knowledge basis in safety culture which is being developed at the IPEN-CNEN/SP, one of the Brazilian nuclear institutes of research. The main objective of this basis is to organize the information about safety culture found in the literature and to make it available to researchers and practitioners. The first stage of the development of this basis is already finished being the subject of this work. (author)

A graded approach to safety documentation at processing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cowen, M.L.

1992-01-01

Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) has over 40 major Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) in preparation for non-reactor facilities. These facilities include nuclear material production facilities, waste management facilities, support laboratories and environmental remediation facilities. The SARs for these various projects encompass hazard levels from High to Low, and mission times from startup, through operation, to shutdown. All of these efforts are competing for scarce resources, and therefore some mechanism is required for balancing the documentation requirements. Three of the key variables useful for the decision making process are Depth of Safety Analysis, Urgency of Safety Analysis, and Resource Availability. This report discusses safety documentation at processing facilities

Intranet-based safety documentation in management of major hazards and occupational health and safety.

Science.gov (United States)

Leino, Antti

2002-01-01

In the European Union, Council Directive 96/82/EC requires operators producing, using, or handling significant amounts of dangerous substances to improve their safety management systems in order to better manage the major accident potentials deriving from human error. A new safety management system for the Viikinmäki wastewater treatment plant in Helsinki, Finland, was implemented in this study. The system was designed to comply with both the new safety liabilities and the requirements of OHSAS 18001 (British Standards Institute, 1999). During the implementation phase experiences were gathered from the development processes in this small organisation. The complete documentation was placed in the intranet of the plant. Hyperlinks between documents were created to ensure convenience of use. Documentation was made accessible for all workers from every workstation.

Advanced Photon Source experimental beamline Safety Assessment Document: Addendum to the Advanced Photon Source Accelerator Systems Safety Assessment Document (APS-3.2.2.1.0)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

This Safety Assessment Document (SAD) addresses commissioning and operation of the experimental beamlines at the Advanced Photon Source (APS). Purpose of this document is to identify and describe the hazards associated with commissioning and operation of these beamlines and to document the measures taken to minimize these hazards and mitigate the hazard consequences. The potential hazards associated with the commissioning and operation of the APS facility have been identified and analyzed. Physical and administrative controls mitigate identified hazards. No hazard exists in this facility that has not been previously encountered and successfully mitigated in other accelerator and synchrotron radiation research facilities. This document is an updated version of the APS Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). During the review of the PSAR in February 1990, the APS was determined to be a Low Hazard Facility. On June 14, 1993, the Acting Director of the Office of Energy Research endorsed the designation of the APS as a Low Hazard Facility, and this Safety Assessment Document supports that designation

Synthesis of the IRSN report on its analysis of the safety guidance package (DOrS) of the ASTRID reactor project. Safety guidance document for the ASTRID prototype: Referral to the GPR. Opinion related to the safety guidance document of the ASTRID reactor project. ASTRID prototype: Safety guidance document for the ASTRID prototype

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lachaume, Jean-Luc; Niel, Jean-Christophe

2013-01-01

A first document indicates the improvement guidelines for the ASTRID project based on the French experience in the field of sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors, addresses the safety objectives as they are presented for the ASTRID project, discusses how the project includes a regulation and design referential, and how it addresses various aspects of the design approach (ranking and analysis of operation situations, defence in depth, use of probabilistic studies, safety classification and qualification to accidental situations, taking internal and external aggressions into account and taking severe accidents into account at the design level). It comments the guidelines related to the first two barriers, to main safety functions (control of reactivity and of reactor cooling, containment of radioactive and toxic materials), to dismantling, to R and D for safety support. A second document is a letter sent by the ASN to the GPR (permanent group of experts in charge of nuclear reactors) about the safety guidance document for the ASTRID prototype. The third document is the answer and contains comments and recommendations by this group about the content of this document, and therefore addresses the same topics as the first document. The last document defines the framework of the approach to this document

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D T

2010-03-05

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS & RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

EVANS, C B

2004-12-21

The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S&M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard.

Technical basis for environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Korsah, K.; Wood, R.T.; Hassan, M.; Tanaka, T.J.

1998-01-01

This document presents the results of studies sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide the technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety equipment in nuclear power plants. The studies were conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The studies address the following: (1) adequacy of the present test methods for qualification of digital I and C systems; (2) preferred (i.e., Regulatory Guide-endorsed) standards; (3) recommended stressors to be included in the qualification process during type testing; (4) resolution of need for accelerated aging for equipment to be located in a benign environment; and (5) determination of an appropriate approach for addressing the impact of smoke in digital equipment qualification programs. Significant findings from the studies form the technical basis for a recommended approach to the environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants

Technical basis for environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Korsah, K.; Wood, R.T. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Hassan, M. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Tanaka, T.J. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

1998-01-01

This document presents the results of studies sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide the technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety equipment in nuclear power plants. The studies were conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The studies address the following: (1) adequacy of the present test methods for qualification of digital I and C systems; (2) preferred (i.e., Regulatory Guide-endorsed) standards; (3) recommended stressors to be included in the qualification process during type testing; (4) resolution of need for accelerated aging for equipment to be located in a benign environment; and (5) determination of an appropriate approach for addressing the impact of smoke in digital equipment qualification programs. Significant findings from the studies form the technical basis for a recommended approach to the environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants.

Technical basis for the aboveground structure failure and associated represented hazardous conditions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

GOETZ, T.G.

2003-01-01

This technical basis document describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for the aboveground structure failure representative accident and associated represented hazardous conditions. This document was developed to support the documented safety analysis

HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS and RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

EVANS, C.B.

2004-01-01

The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S and M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard

Preparation of safety and regulatory document for BARC Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prasad, S.S.; Jayarajan, K.

2017-01-01

In India, the necessary codes and safety guidelines for achieving the safety objectives are provided by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which are in conformity with the principles of radiation protection as formulated by the International Council of Radiation Protection (ICRP) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The same is followed by BARC Safety Council (BSC), which is the regulatory body for the BARC facilities. In addition to all types of fuel cycle facilities, BSC regulates safety of many types of conventional facilities. Many such types of facilities and projects are not under the regulatory purview of AERB. Therefore, the Council has also initiated a programme for development and publication of safety documents for installations in BARC in the fields/ topics yet not addressed by IAEA or AERB. This makes the task pioneering, as some of the areas taken up for defining the regulatory requirements are new, where standard regulatory documents are not available

Safety equipment list for the 241-SY-101 RAPID mitigation project

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MORRIS, K.L.

1999-06-29

This document provides the safety classification for the safety (safety class and safety RAPID Mitigation Project. This document is being issued as the project SEL until the supporting authorization basis documentation, this document will be superseded by the TWRS SEL (LMHC 1999), documentation istlralized. Upon implementation of the authorization basis significant) structures, systems, and components (SSCS) associated with the 241-SY-1O1 which will be updated to include the information contained herein.

Safety equipment list for the 241-SY-101 RAPID mitigation project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morris, K.L.

1999-01-01

This document provides the safety classification for the safety (safety class and safety RAPID Mitigation Project. This document is being issued as the project SEL until the supporting authorization basis documentation, this document will be superseded by the TWRS SEL (LMHC 1999), documentation istlralized. Upon implementation of the authorization basis significant) structures, systems, and components (SSCS) associated with the 241-SY-1O1 which will be updated to include the information contained herein

IAEA activities in preparation of reglamentary documents on nuclear power plant safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konstantinov, L.V.

1976-01-01

The activities of the IAEA in the field of working out practical rules and recommendations ensuring the nuclear power plant safety are discussed. The practical rules will establish the aims and the minimum of requirements, that must be carried out to ensure the necessary safety of systems, components and equipment of the nuclear power plant throughout the whole period of its exploitation. Described is the procedure of the document preparation, consisting of the collection of documents, edited in different countries, the integration of documents by the IAEA Secretariat, the consideratiom of documents by the Group of senior advisers, the preparation of the draft document, the additional wort at the document in accordaqce with the remarks of the IAEA member-countries, the edition and dissemination of documents. The necessity for the active participation of the CMEA member-countries in the development and discussion of documents concerning the nuclear power plant safety is stated [ru

Using Addenda in Documented Safety Analysis Reports

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swanson, D.S.; Thieme, M.A.

2003-01-01

This paper discusses the use of addenda to the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Addenda were prepared for several systems and processes at the facility that lacked adequate descriptive information and hazard analysis in the DSA. They were also prepared for several new activities involving unreviewed safety questions (USQs). Ten addenda to the RWMC DSA have been prepared since the last annual update

Authorization basis requirements comparison report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brantley, W.M.

1997-08-18

The TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) consists of a set of documents identified by TWRS management with the concurrence of DOE-RL. Upon implementation of the TWRS Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), the AB list will be revised to include the BIO and TSRs. Some documents that currently form part of the AB will be removed from the list. This SD identifies each - requirement from those documents, and recommends a disposition for each to ensure that necessary requirements are retained when the AB is revised to incorporate the BIO and TSRs. This SD also identifies documents that will remain part of the AB after the BIO and TSRs are implemented. This document does not change the AB, but provides guidance for the preparation of change documentation.

Authorization basis requirements comparison report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brantley, W.M.

1997-01-01

The TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) consists of a set of documents identified by TWRS management with the concurrence of DOE-RL. Upon implementation of the TWRS Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), the AB list will be revised to include the BIO and TSRs. Some documents that currently form part of the AB will be removed from the list. This SD identifies each - requirement from those documents, and recommends a disposition for each to ensure that necessary requirements are retained when the AB is revised to incorporate the BIO and TSRs. This SD also identifies documents that will remain part of the AB after the BIO and TSRs are implemented. This document does not change the AB, but provides guidance for the preparation of change documentation

Technical Details on Beyond Design Basis Event Pilot Evaluations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None, None

2013-01-01

The primary focus of the BDBE pilot project was the review of BDBE analysis and mitigation features at four DOE nuclear facilities representing a range of DOE sites, nuclear facility types/activities, and responsible program offices. The pilots looked at (1) how beyond design basis accidents were evaluated and documented in the facility Documented Safety Analysis, (2) potential BDBE vulnerabilities and margins to failure of facility safety features as obtained from general area and specific system walkdowns and design documents reviews, and (3) preparations made in facility and site emergency management programs to respond to severe accidents. It also evaluated whether draft BDBE guidance on safety analysis and emergency management could be used to improve the analysis of and preparations for mitigating severe and beyond design basis accidents. The details of these activities are organized in this report as described below.

Electronic Medical Record Documentation of Driving Safety for Veterans with Diagnosed Dementia.

Science.gov (United States)

Vair, Christina L; King, Paul R; Gass, Julie; Eaker, April; Kusche, Anna; Wray, Laura O

2018-01-01

Many older adults continue to drive following dementia diagnosis, with medical providers increasingly likely to be involved in addressing such safety concerns. This study examined electronic medical record (EMR) documentation of driving safety for veterans with dementia (N = 118) seen in Veterans Affairs primary care and interdisciplinary geriatrics clinics in one geographic region over a 10-year period. Qualitative directed content analysis of retrospective EMR data. Assessment of known risk factors or subjective concerns for unsafe driving were documented in fewer than half of observed cases; specific recommendations for driving safety were evident for a minority of patients, with formal driving evaluation the most frequently documented recommendation by providers. Utilizing data from actual clinical encounters provides a unique snapshot of how driving risk and safety concerns are addressed for veterans with dementia. This information provides a meaningful frame of reference for understanding potential strengths and possible gaps in how this important topic area is being addressed in the course of clinical care. The EMR is an important forum for interprofessional communication, with documentation of driving risk and safety concerns an essential element for continuity of care and ensuring consistency of information delivered to patients and caregivers.

From Medieval Philosophy to the Virtual Library: a descriptive framework for scientific knowledge and documentation as basis for document retrieval

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Frances Morrissey

2001-11-01

Full Text Available This paper examines the conceptual basis of document retrieval systems for the Virtual Library in science and technology. It does so through analysing some cognitive models for scientific knowledge, drawing on philosophy, sociology and linguistics. It is important to consider improvements in search/ retrieval functionalities for scientific documents because knowledge creation and transfer are integral to the functioning of scientific communities, and on a larger scale, science and technology are central to the knowledge economy. This paper proposes four new and innovative understandings. Firstly, it is proposed that formal scientific communication constitutes the documentation and dissemination of concepts, and that conceptualism is a useful philosophical basis for study. Second, it is proposed that the scientific document is a dyadic con-struct, being both the physical manifestation as an encoded medium, and also being the associated knowledge, or intangible ideation, that is carried within the document. Third, it is shown that major philosophers of science divide science into three main activities, dealing with data, derived or inferred laws, and the axioms or the paradigm. Fourth, it is demonstrated that the data, information and conceptual frameworks carried by a scientific document, as different levels of signification or semiotic systems, can each be characterised in ways assisting in search and retrieval functionalities for the Virtual Library.

Operating experience and systems analysis at Trillo NPP: A program intended for systematic review of plant safety systems to assess design basis requirements compliance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vega, R. de la

1996-01-01

The program was defined to apply to all plant safety systems and/or systems included in plant Technical Specifications. The goal of the program was to ensure, by systematic design, construction, and commissioning review, the adequacy of safety systems, structures and components to fulfill their safety functions. Also, as a result of the program, it was established that a complete, unambiguous, systematic, design basis definition shall take place. And finally, a complete documental review of the plant design shall result from the program execution

FLUOR HANFORD SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

GARVIN, L. J.; JENSEN, M. A.

2004-04-13

This document summarizes safety management programs used within the scope of the ''Project Hanford Management Contract''. The document has been developed to meet the format and content requirements of DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses''. This document provides summary descriptions of Fluor Hanford safety management programs, which Fluor Hanford nuclear facilities may reference and incorporate into their safety basis when producing facility- or activity-specific documented safety analyses (DSA). Facility- or activity-specific DSAs will identify any variances to the safety management programs described in this document and any specific attributes of these safety management programs that are important for controlling potentially hazardous conditions. In addition, facility- or activity-specific DSAs may identify unique additions to the safety management programs that are needed to control potentially hazardous conditions.

Fiscal Year 2001 Tank Characterization Technical Sampling Basis and Waste Information Requirements Document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ADAMS, M.R.

2000-01-01

The Fiscal Year 2001 Tank Characterization Technical Sampling Basis and Waste Information Requirements Document (TSB-WIRD) has the following purposes: (1) To identify and integrate sampling and analysis needs for fiscal year (FY) 2001 and beyond. (2) To describe the overall drivers that require characterization information and to document their source. (3) To describe the process for identifying, prioritizing, and weighting issues that require characterization information to resolve. (4) To define the method for determining sampling priorities and to present the sampling priorities on a tank-by-tank basis. (5) To define how the characterization program is going to satisfy the drivers, close issues, and report progress. (6)To describe deliverables and acceptance criteria for characterization deliverables

Process Technical Basis Documentation Diagram for a solid-waste processing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benar, C.J.; Petersen, C.A.

1994-02-01

The Process Technical Basis Documentation Diagram is for a solid-waste processing facility that could be designed to treat, package, and certify contact-handled mixed low-level waste for permanent disposal. The treatment processes include stabilization using cementitious materials and immobilization using a polymer material. The Diagram identifies several engineering/demonstration activities that would confirm the process selection and process design. An independent peer review was conducted at the request of Westinghouse Hanford Company to determine the technical adequacy of the technical approach for waste form development. The peer review panel provided comments and identified documents that it felt were needed in the Diagram as precedence for Title I design. The Diagram is a visual tool to identify traceable documentation of key activities, including those documents suggested by the peer review, and to show how they relate to each other. The Diagram is divided into three sections: (1) the Facility section, which contains documents pertaining to the facility design, (2) the Process Demonstration section, which contains documents pertaining to the process engineering/demonstration work, and 3) the Regulatory section, which contains documents describing the compliance strategy for each acceptance requirement for each feed type, and how this strategy will be implemented

The practical implementation of integrated safety management for nuclear safety analysis and fire hazards analysis documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

COLLOPY, M.T.

1999-01-01

the integrated safety management system approach for having a uniform and consistent process: a method has been suggested by the U S . Department of Energy at Richland and the Project Hanford Procedures when fire hazard analyses and safety analyses are required. This process provides for a common basis approach in the development of the fire hazard analysis and the safety analysis. This process permits the preparers of both documents to jointly participate in the development of the hazard analysis process. This paper presents this method to implement the integrated safety management approach in the development of the fire hazard analysis and safety analysis that provides consistency of assumptions. consequences, design considerations, and other controls necessarily to protect workers, the public. and the environment

Regulatory standpoints on the design-basis capability of safety-related motor-operated valves(MOVs) and power-operated gate valves(POGVs)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, W. T.; Kum, O. H.

1999-01-01

The weakness in the design-basis capability of Motor-Operated Valves(MOVs) and the susceptibility to Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding phenomena of Power-Operated Gate Valves(POGVs) have been major concerns to be resolved in the nuclear society in and abroad since Three Mile Island accident occurred in the USA in 1979. Through detailed analysis of operating experience and regulatory activities, some MOVs and POGVs have been found to be unreliable in performing their safety functions when they are required to do so under certain conditions, especially under design-basis accident conditions. Further, it is well understood that these safety problems may not be identified by the typical valve in-service testing(IST). USNRC has published three Generic Letters, GL 89-10, GL 95-07, and GL 96-05, requiring nuclear plant licensees to take appropriate actions to resolve the problems mentioned above. Korean nuclear regulatory body has made public an administration measure called 'Regulatory recommendation to verify safety functions of the safety-related MOVs and POGVs' on June 13, 1997, and in this administration measure Korean utility is asked to submit written documents to show how it assure design-basis capability of these valves. The following are among the major concerns being considered from a regulation standpoint. Program scope and implementation priority, dynamic tests under differential pressure conditions, accuracy of diagnostic equipment, torque switch setting and torque bypass percentage, weak link analysis, motor actuator sizing, corrective actions taken to resolve pressure locking and thermal binding susceptibility, and a periodic verification program for the valves once design-basis capability has been verified

Safety basis for the 241-AN-107 mixer pump installation and caustic addition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Van Vleet, R.J.

1994-01-01

This safety Basis was prepared to determine whether or not the proposed activities of installing a 76 HP jet mixer pump and the addition of approximately 50,000 gallons of 19 M (50:50 wt %) aqueous caustic are within the safety envelope as described by Tank Farms (chapter six of WHC-SD-WM-ISB-001, Rev. 0). The safety basis covers the components, structures and systems for the caustic addition and mixer pump installation. These include: installation of the mixer pump and monitoring equipment; operation of the mixer pump, process monitoring equipment and caustic addition; the pump stand, caustic addition skid, the electrical skid, the video camera system and the two densitometers. Also covered is the removal and decontamination of the mixer pump and process monitoring system. Authority for this safety basis is WHC-IP-0842 (Waste Tank Administration). Section 15.9, Rev. 2 (Unreviewed Safety Questions) of WHC-IP-0842 requires that an evaluation be performed for all physical modifications

Development of Onsite Transportation Safety Documents for Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frank Hand; Willard Thomas; Frank Sciacca; Manny Negrete; Susan Kelley

2008-01-01

Department of Energy (DOE) Orders require each DOE site to develop onsite transportation safety documents (OTSDs). The Nevada Test Site approach divided all onsite transfers into two groups with each group covered by a standalone OTSD identified as Non-Nuclear and Nuclear. The Non-Nuclear transfers involve all radioactive hazardous material in less than Hazard Category (HC)-3 quantities and all chemically hazardous materials. The Nuclear transfers involve all radioactive material equal to or greater than HC-3 quantities and radioactive material mated with high explosives regardless of quantity. Both OTSDs comply with DOE O 460.1B requirements. The Nuclear OTSD also complies with DOE O 461.1A requirements and includes a DOE-STD-3009 approach to hazard analysis (HA) and accident analysis as needed. All Nuclear OTSD proposed transfers were determined to be non-equivalent and a methodology was developed to determine if 'equivalent safety' to a fully compliant Department of Transportation (DOT) transfer was achieved. For each HA scenario, three hypothetical transfers were evaluated: a DOT-compliant, uncontrolled, and controlled transfer. Equivalent safety is demonstrated when the risk level for each controlled transfer is equal to or less than the corresponding DOT-compliant transfer risk level. In this comparison the typical DOE-STD-3009 risk matrix was modified to reflect transportation requirements. Design basis conditions (DBCs) were developed for each non-equivalent transfer. Initial DBCs were based solely upon the amount of material present. Route-, transfer-, and site-specific conditions were evaluated and the initial DBCs revised as needed. Final DBCs were evaluated for each transfer's packaging and its contents

Central waste complex interim safety basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cain, F.G.

1995-01-01

This interim safety basis provides the necessary information to conclude that hazards at the Central Waste Complex are controlled and that current and planned activities at the CWC can be conducted safely. CWC is a multi-facility complex within the Solid Waste Management Complex that receives and stores most of the solid wastes generated and received at the Hanford Site. The solid wastes that will be handled at CWC include both currently stored and newly generated low-level waste, low-level mixed waste, contact-handled transuranic, and contact-handled TRU mixed waste

Technical basis to describe and document the use of the E-600 and SHP-380 detector

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hensley, J.R.

1997-06-01

This technical basis document describes and documents the parameters under which the Eberline E-600 ratemeter and the associated SHP-380 detector can be operated to quantify alpha and beta contamination levels. 3 refs., 3 tabs

The Safety Case and Safety Assessment for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2012-09-15

This Safety Guide provides guidance and recommendations on meeting the safety requirements in respect of the safety case and supporting safety assessment for the disposal of radioactive waste. The safety case and supporting safety assessment provide the basis for demonstration of safety and for licensing of radioactive waste disposal facilities and assist and guide decisions on siting, design and operations. The safety case is also the main basis on which dialogue with interested parties is conducted and on which confidence in the safety of the disposal facility is developed. This Safety Guide is relevant for operating organizations preparing the safety case as well as for the regulatory body responsible for developing the regulations and regulatory guidance that determine the basis and scope of the safety case. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Demonstrating the safety of radioactive waste disposal; 3. Safety principles and safety requirements; 4. The safety case for disposal of radioactive waste; 5. Radiological impact assessment for the period after closure; 6. Specific issues; 7. Documentation and use of the safety case; 8. Regulatory review process.

BWR NSSS design basis documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vij, R.S.; Bates, R.E.

2004-01-01

In 1985 an incident at Toledo Edison's Davis Besse plant caused the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to re-evaluate the technical information that the utilities had readily available to support the design of their plants. The Design Basis programs, currently on going in most U.S. utilities, have been the nuclear industry's response to the needs identified by this re-evaluation. In order to understand the Design Basis programs which have been implemented by the U.S. nuclear utilities, it is necessary to understand the problem as it was perceived by the nuclear industry (the utilities, the original NSSS designers and the regulators) after the Davis-Besse incident, the subsequent programs undertaken by the industry under the leadership of INPO and NUMARC, the NRC's actions, and the overall evolution of the industry's vision in relation to this problem. This paper presents the history of the design basis efforts from the first recognition of the problem by the NRC after the Davis-Besse incident, describes the actions taken by the NRC, INPO, NUMARC, the U.S. utilities and the NSSS designers, and brings the problem statement up-to-date in relation to the vision presently held by the U.S. nuclear industry. It then presents a technical discussion to develop a detailed definition of design basis information to support the problem statement. The information originally supplied by the NSSS designers during the plant design and construction is discussed as well as its relationship to the previously defined design basis information. This section of the paper concludes by defining the additional information needed by nuclear utilities to satisfy the requirements developed from the problem statement. Having developed a definition of the additional information (i.e., information not originally supplied during design and construction) required to solve the design basis problem as it is presently perceived by the U.S. nuclear industry, the paper then discusses design basis

Scientific basis for a safety case of deep geological repositories

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Noseck, Ulrich; Becker, Dirk-Alexander; Brasser, Thomas [and others

2012-11-15

Within this project strategies and methods to build a safety case for deep geological repositories are further developed. This includes also the scientific fundamentals as a basis of the safety case. In the international framework the methodology of the Safety Case is frequently applied and continuously improved. According to definitions from IAEA and NEA the Safety Case is a compilation of arguments and facts, which describe, quantify and support the safety and the degree of confidence in the safety of the geological repository. The safety of the geological repository should be demonstrated by the safety case. The safety case is the basis for essential decisions during a repository programme. It comprises the results of safety assessments in combination with additional information like multiple lines of evidence and a discussion of robustness and quality of the repository, its design and the quality of all safety assessments including the basic assumptions. A crucial element of the Safety Case is the long-term safety analysis, i.e. the systematic analysis of the hazards connected with the facility and the capability of site and repository design to ensure the required safety functions and to fulfill the technical claims. Long-term safety analysis requires a powerful and qualified programme package, which contains appropriate hardware and software as well as well trained and experienced modellers performing the model calculations. The calculation tools used within safety cases need to be checked and verified and continuously adapted to the state-of-the-art science and technology. Especially it needs to be applicable to a real repository system. For the assessment of safety a deep process understanding is necessary. The R and D work performed within this project will contribute to the improvement of process and system understanding as well as to the further development of methods and strategies applied in the safety case. Emphasis was put on the following aspects

Scientific basis for a safety case of deep geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Noseck, Ulrich; Becker, Dirk-Alexander; Brasser, Thomas

2012-11-01

Within this project strategies and methods to build a safety case for deep geological repositories are further developed. This includes also the scientific fundamentals as a basis of the safety case. In the international framework the methodology of the Safety Case is frequently applied and continuously improved. According to definitions from IAEA and NEA the Safety Case is a compilation of arguments and facts, which describe, quantify and support the safety and the degree of confidence in the safety of the geological repository. The safety of the geological repository should be demonstrated by the safety case. The safety case is the basis for essential decisions during a repository programme. It comprises the results of safety assessments in combination with additional information like multiple lines of evidence and a discussion of robustness and quality of the repository, its design and the quality of all safety assessments including the basic assumptions. A crucial element of the Safety Case is the long-term safety analysis, i.e. the systematic analysis of the hazards connected with the facility and the capability of site and repository design to ensure the required safety functions and to fulfill the technical claims. Long-term safety analysis requires a powerful and qualified programme package, which contains appropriate hardware and software as well as well trained and experienced modellers performing the model calculations. The calculation tools used within safety cases need to be checked and verified and continuously adapted to the state-of-the-art science and technology. Especially it needs to be applicable to a real repository system. For the assessment of safety a deep process understanding is necessary. The R and D work performed within this project will contribute to the improvement of process and system understanding as well as to the further development of methods and strategies applied in the safety case. Emphasis was put on the following aspects

Implementing 10 CFR 830 at the FEMP Silos: Nuclear Health and Safety Plans as Documented Safety Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fisk, Patricia; Rutherford, Lavon

2003-01-01

The objective of the Silos Project at the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) is to safely remediate high-grade uranium ore residues (Silos 1 and 2) and metal oxide residues (Silo 3). The evolution of Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) for these facilities has reflected the changes in remediation processes. The final stage in silos DSAs is an interpretation of 10 CFR 830 Safe Harbor Requirements that combines a Health and Safety Plan with nuclear safety requirements. This paper will address the development of a Nuclear Health and Safety Plan, or N-HASP

Melter Disposal Strategic Planning Document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BURBANK, D.A.

2000-09-25

This document describes the proposed strategy for disposal of spent and failed melters from the tank waste treatment plant to be built by the Office of River Protection at the Hanford site in Washington. It describes program management activities, disposal and transportation systems, leachate management, permitting, and safety authorization basis approvals needed to execute the strategy.

Review of Policy Documents for Nuclear Safety and Regulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Woong Sik; Choi, Kwang Sik; Choi, Young Sung; Kim, Hho Jung; Kim, Ho Ki

2006-01-01

The goal of regulation is to protect public health and safety as well as environment from radiological hazards that may occur as a result of the use of atomic energy. In September 1994, the Korean government issued the Nuclear Safety Policy Statement (NSPS) to establish policy goals of maintaining and achieving high-level of nuclear safety and also help the public understand the national policy and a strong will of the government toward nuclear safety. It declares the importance of establishing safety culture in nuclear community and also specifies five nuclear regulatory principles (Independence, Openness, Clarity, Efficiency and Reliability) and provides the eleven regulatory policy directions. In 2001, the Nuclear Safety Charter was declared to make the highest goal of safety in driving nuclear business clearer; to encourage atomic energy- related institutions and workers to keep in mind the mission and responsibility for assuring safety; to guarantee public confidence in related organizations. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) also issues Yearly Regulatory Policy Directions at the beginning of every year. Recently, the third Atomic Energy Promotion Plan (2007-2011) has been established. It becomes necessary for the relevant organizations to prepare the detailed plans on such areas as nuclear development, safety management, regulation, etc. This paper introduces a multi-level structure of nuclear safety and regulation policy documents in Korea and presents some improvements necessary for better application of the policies

Review of Policy Documents for Nuclear Safety and Regulation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Woong Sik; Choi, Kwang Sik; Choi, Young Sung; Kim, Hho Jung; Kim, Ho Ki [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

2006-07-01

The goal of regulation is to protect public health and safety as well as environment from radiological hazards that may occur as a result of the use of atomic energy. In September 1994, the Korean government issued the Nuclear Safety Policy Statement (NSPS) to establish policy goals of maintaining and achieving high-level of nuclear safety and also help the public understand the national policy and a strong will of the government toward nuclear safety. It declares the importance of establishing safety culture in nuclear community and also specifies five nuclear regulatory principles (Independence, Openness, Clarity, Efficiency and Reliability) and provides the eleven regulatory policy directions. In 2001, the Nuclear Safety Charter was declared to make the highest goal of safety in driving nuclear business clearer; to encourage atomic energy- related institutions and workers to keep in mind the mission and responsibility for assuring safety; to guarantee public confidence in related organizations. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) also issues Yearly Regulatory Policy Directions at the beginning of every year. Recently, the third Atomic Energy Promotion Plan (2007-2011) has been established. It becomes necessary for the relevant organizations to prepare the detailed plans on such areas as nuclear development, safety management, regulation, etc. This paper introduces a multi-level structure of nuclear safety and regulation policy documents in Korea and presents some improvements necessary for better application of the policies.

33 CFR 96.250 - What documents and reports must a safety management system have?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... safety management system have? 96.250 Section 96.250 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.250 What documents and...

Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Safety Basis and Approach

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David Petti; Jim Kinsey; Dave Alberstein

2014-01-01

Various international efforts are underway to assess the safety of advanced nuclear reactor designs. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency has recently held its first Consultancy Meeting on a new cooperative research program on high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) safety. Furthermore, the Generation IV International Forum Reactor Safety Working Group has recently developed a methodology, called the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology, for use in Generation IV advanced reactor technology development, design, and design review. A risk and safety assessment white paper is under development with respect to the Very High Temperature Reactor to pilot the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology and to demonstrate its validity and feasibility. To support such efforts, this information paper on the modular HTGR safety basis and approach has been prepared. The paper provides a summary level introduction to HTGR history, public safety objectives, inherent and passive safety features, radionuclide release barriers, functional safety approach, and risk-informed safety approach. The information in this paper is intended to further the understanding of the modular HTGR safety approach. The paper gives those involved in the assessment of advanced reactor designs an opportunity to assess an advanced design that has already received extensive review by regulatory authorities and to judge the utility of recently proposed new methods for advanced reactor safety assessment such as the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology.

DEVELOPING SAFETY INDICATORS ON THE BASIS OF THE ICAO RECOMMENDATIONS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

V. D. Sharov

2014-01-01

Full Text Available The article offers direct use of the recommendations of SMM ICAO Doc.9859, 3rd ed. 2013, for calculation the target and alert levels of safety indicators. Examples of calculation based on data of 2011 and monitoring of the current indicators during 2012 are presented. Safety indicators for airlines in terms of “numbers of incidents per 1000 flight hours” could be calculated on the basis of the state values through the «coefficient of conformity».

Safety analysis and risk assessment handbook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Peterson, V.L.; Colwell, R.G.; Dickey, R.L.

1997-01-01

This Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) provides guidance to the safety analyst at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) in the preparation of safety analyses and risk assessments. Although the older guidance (the Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide) continues to be used for updating the Final Safety Analysis Reports developed in the mid-1980s, this new guidance is used with all new authorization basis documents. With the mission change at RFETS came the need to establish new authorization basis documents for its facilities, whose functions had changed. The methodology and databases for performing the evaluations that support the new authorization basis documents had to be standardized, to avoid the use of different approaches and/or databases for similar accidents in different facilities. This handbook presents this new standardized approach. The handbook begins with a discussion of the requirements of the different types of authorization basis documents and how to choose the one appropriate for the facility to be evaluated. It then walks the analyst through the process of identifying all the potential hazards in the facility, classifying them, and choosing the ones that need to be analyzed further. It then discusses the methods for evaluating accident initiation and progression and covers the basic steps in a safety analysis, including consequence and frequency binning and risk ranking. The handbook lays out standardized approaches for determining the source terms of the various accidents (including airborne release fractions, leakpath factors, etc.), the atmospheric dispersion factors appropriate for Rocky Flats, and the methods for radiological and chemical consequence assessments. The radiological assessments use a radiological open-quotes templateclose quotes, a spreadsheet that incorporates the standard values of parameters, whereas the chemical assessments use the standard codes ARCHIE and ALOHA

Flammable gas deflagration consequence calculations for the tank waste remediation system basis for interim operation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Van Vleet, R.J., Westinghouse Hanford

1996-08-13

This paper calculates the radiological dose consequences and the toxic exposures for deflagration accidents at various Tank Waste Remediation System facilities. These will be used in support of the Tank Waste Remediation System Basis for Interim Operation.The attached SD documents the originator`s analysis only. It shall not be used as the final or sole document for effecting changes to an authorization basis or safety basis for a facility or activity.

Upgraded safety analysis document including operations policies, operational safety limits and policy changes. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batchelor, K.

1996-03-01

The National Synchrotron Light Source Safety Analysis Reports (1), (2), (3), BNL reports number-sign 51584, number-sign 52205 and number-sign 52205 (addendum) describe the basic Environmental Safety and Health issues associated with the department's operations. They include the operating envelope for the Storage Rings and also the rest of the facility. These documents contain the operational limits as perceived prior or during construction of the facility, much of which still are appropriate for current operations. However, as the machine has matured, the experimental program has grown in size, requiring more supervision in that area. Also, machine studies have either verified or modified knowledge of beam loss modes and/or radiation loss patterns around the facility. This document is written to allow for these changes in procedure or standards resulting from their current mode of operation and shall be used in conjunction with the above reports. These changes have been reviewed by NSLS and BNL ES and H committee and approved by BNL management

CP-50 calibration facility radiological safety assessment document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chilton, M.W.; Hill, R.L.; Eubank, B.F.

1980-03-01

The CP-50 Calibration Facility Radiological Safety Assessment document, prepared at the request of the Nevada Operations Office of the US Department of Energy to satisfy provisions of ERDA Manual Chapter 0531, presents design features, systems controls, and procedures used in the operation of the calibration facility. Site and facility characteristics and routine and non-routine operations, including hypothetical incidents or accidents are discussed and design factors, source control systems, and radiation monitoring considerations are described

Complete CRM documentation as a basis for successfull Churn Management; Wie aus Rueckholung Vorbeugung wird. Vollstaendige Kundenkontakthistorie als Basis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Johannssen, T. [ConTakt GmbH, Itzehoe (Germany)

2002-09-09

The contribution explains modern customer relationship management strategies for electric utilities. The role of a complete and detailed documentation of the CRM history is explained as a basis for establishing reliable customer loyalty, winning back lost customers, or preventing customers from changing their power service. (orig./CB) [German] Erkenntnisse aus der Kundenrueckgewinnung sind eine wertvolle Grundlage fuer Kuendigungspraevention. Bei durchdachtem Vorgehen koennen sie mit den gesammelten Erfahrungen sogar schon im Vorfeld Kuendigungen verhindern. (orig./CB)

IAEA safety fundamentals: the safety of nuclear installations and the defence in depth concept

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aro, I.

2005-01-01

This presentation is a replica of the similar presentation provided by the IAEA Basic Professional Training Course on Nuclear Safety. The presentation utilizes the IAEA Safety Series document No. 110, Safety Fundamentals: the Safety of Nuclear Installations. The objective of the presentation is to provide the basic rationale for actions in provision of nuclear safety. The presentation also provides basis to understand national nuclear safety requirements. There are three Safety Fundamentals documents in the IAEA Safety Series: one for nuclear safety, one for radiation safety and one for waste safety. The IAEA is currently revising its Safety Fundamentals by combining them into one general Safety Fundamentals document. The IAEA Safety Fundamentals are not binding requirements to the Member States. But, a very similar text has been provided in the Convention on Nuclear Safety which is legally binding for the Member State after ratification by the Parliament. This presentation concentrates on nuclear safety. The Safety Fundamentals documents are the 'policy documents' of the IAEA Safety Standards Series. They state the basic objectives, concepts and principles involved in ensuring protection and safety in the development and application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. They will state - without providing technical details and without going into the application of principles - the rationale for actions necessary in meeting Safety Requirements. Chapter 7 of this presentation describes the basic features of defence in depth concept which is referred to in the Safety Fundamentals document. The defence in depth concept is a key issue in reaching high level of safety specifically at the design stage but as the reader can see the extended concept also refers to the operational stage. The appendix has been taken directly from the IAEA Basic Professional Training Course on Nuclear Safety and applied to the Finnish conditions. The text originates from the references

Safety Design Criteria of Indian Sodium Cooled Fast Reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillai, P.; Chellapandi, P.; Chetal, S.C.; Vasudeva Rao, P.R.

2013-01-01

• Important feedback has been gained through the design and safety review of PFBR. • The safety criteria document prepared by AERB and IGCAR would provide important input to prepare the dedicated document for the Sodium cooled Fast Reactors at the national and international level. • A common approach with regard to safety, among countries pursuing fast reactor program, is desirable. • Sharing knowledge and experimental facilities on collaborative basis. • Evolution of strong safety criteria – fundamental to assure safety

Health Information Technology, Patient Safety, and Professional Nursing Care Documentation in Acute Care Settings.

Science.gov (United States)

Lavin, Mary Ann; Harper, Ellen; Barr, Nancy

2015-04-14

The electronic health record (EHR) is a documentation tool that yields data useful in enhancing patient safety, evaluating care quality, maximizing efficiency, and measuring staffing needs. Although nurses applaud the EHR, they also indicate dissatisfaction with its design and cumbersome electronic processes. This article describes the views of nurses shared by members of the Nursing Practice Committee of the Missouri Nurses Association; it encourages nurses to share their EHR concerns with Information Technology (IT) staff and vendors and to take their place at the table when nursing-related IT decisions are made. In this article, we describe the experiential-reflective reasoning and action model used to understand staff nurses' perspectives, share committee reflections and recommendations for improving both documentation and documentation technology, and conclude by encouraging nurses to develop their documentation and informatics skills. Nursing issues include medication safety, documentation and standards of practice, and EHR efficiency. IT concerns include interoperability, vendors, innovation, nursing voice, education, and collaboration.

ESRS guidelines for software safety reviews. Reference document for the organization and conduct of Engineering Safety Review Services (ESRS) on software important to safety in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The IAEA provides safety review services to assist Member States in the application of safety standards and, in particular, to evaluate and facilitate improvements in nuclear power plant safety performance. Complementary to the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) and the International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) services are the Engineering Safety Review Services (ESRS), which include reviews of siting, external events and structural safety, design safety, fire safety, ageing management and software safety. Software is of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as the use of computer based equipment and systems, controlled by software, is increasing in new and older plants. Computer based devices are used in both safety related applications (such as process control and monitoring) and safety critical applications (such as reactor protection). Their dependability can only be ensured if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is used. The ESRS on software safety are designed to assist a nuclear power plant or a regulatory body of a Member State in the review of documentation relating to the development, application and safety assessment of software embedded in computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. The software safety reviews can be tailored to the specific needs of the requesting organization. Examples of such reviews are: project planning reviews, reviews of specific issues and reviews prior final acceptance. This report gives information on the possible scope of ESRS software safety reviews and guidance on the organization and conduct of the reviews. It is aimed at Member States considering these reviews and IAEA staff and external experts performing the reviews. The ESRS software safety reviews evaluate the degree to which software documents show that the development process and the final product conform to international standards, guidelines and current practices. Recommendations are

10 CFR Appendix A to Subpart B of... - General Statement of Safety Basis Policy

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... at all levels. Performing work in accordance with the safety basis for a nuclear facility is the..., safety, and health into work planning and execution (48 CFR 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety and Health into Work Planning and Execution) and the DEAR clause on laws, regulations, and DOE...

Documented Safety Analysis for the B695 Segment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D

2008-09-11

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was prepared for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 695 (B695) Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF). The report provides comprehensive information on design and operations, including safety programs and safety structures, systems and components to address the potential process-related hazards, natural phenomena, and external hazards that can affect the public, facility workers, and the environment. Consideration is given to all modes of operation, including the potential for both equipment failure and human error. The facilities known collectively as the DWTF are used by LLNL's Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division to store and treat regulated wastes generated at LLNL. RHWM generally processes low-level radioactive waste with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (e.g., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., {sup 90}Sr, {sup 137}Cs, or {sup 3}H. The mission of the B695 Segment centers on container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. The B695 Segment is used for storage of radioactive waste (including transuranic and low-level), hazardous, nonhazardous, mixed, and other waste. Storage of hazardous and mixed waste in B695 Segment facilities is in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LLNL is operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the Department of Energy (DOE). The B695 Segment is operated by the RHWM Division of LLNL. Many operations in the B695 Segment are performed under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operation plan, similar to commercial treatment operations with best demonstrated available technologies. The buildings of the B695 Segment were designed and built considering such operations, using proven building

Documented Safety Analysis for the B695 Segment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laycak, D.

2008-01-01

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was prepared for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 695 (B695) Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF). The report provides comprehensive information on design and operations, including safety programs and safety structures, systems and components to address the potential process-related hazards, natural phenomena, and external hazards that can affect the public, facility workers, and the environment. Consideration is given to all modes of operation, including the potential for both equipment failure and human error. The facilities known collectively as the DWTF are used by LLNL's Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division to store and treat regulated wastes generated at LLNL. RHWM generally processes low-level radioactive waste with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (e.g., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., 90 Sr, 137 Cs, or 3 H. The mission of the B695 Segment centers on container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. The B695 Segment is used for storage of radioactive waste (including transuranic and low-level), hazardous, nonhazardous, mixed, and other waste. Storage of hazardous and mixed waste in B695 Segment facilities is in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LLNL is operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the Department of Energy (DOE). The B695 Segment is operated by the RHWM Division of LLNL. Many operations in the B695 Segment are performed under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operation plan, similar to commercial treatment operations with best demonstrated available technologies. The buildings of the B695 Segment were designed and built considering such operations, using proven building systems, and keeping

Water Resistant Container Technical Basis Document for the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, Paul Herrick [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Teague, Jonathan Gayle [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2015-04-30

Criticality safety at TA-55 relies on nuclear material containers that are water resistant to prevent significant amounts of water from coming into contact with fissile material in the event of a fire that causes a breach of glovevbox confinement and subsequent fire water ingress. A “water tight container” is a container that will not allow more than 50ml of water ingress when fully submerged, except when under sufficient pressure to produce structural discontinuity. There are many types of containers, welded containers, hermetically sealed containers, filtered containers, etc.

Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Facility 10CFR830 Safety Basis Related to Facility Experiments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tomberlin, T.A.

2002-01-01

The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), a DOE Category A reactor, was designed to provide an irradiation test environment for conducting a variety of experiments. The ATR Safety Analysis Report, determined by DOE to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, provides versatility in types of experiments that may be conducted. This paper addresses two general types of experiments in the ATR facility and how safety analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore this type of experiment is addressed with more detail in the safety basis. This allows individual safety analyses for these experiments to be more routine and repetitive. The second type of experiment is less defined and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, individual safety analyses for the second type of experiment tend to be more unique from experiment to experiment. Experiments are also discussed relative to ''major modifications'' and DOE-STD-1027-92. Application of the USQ process to ATR experiments is also discussed

Working group 1A - basis for the standard-safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whipple, C.

1993-01-01

This paper presents a summary of the progress made by working group 1A (Basis for the Safety Standard) during the Electric Power Research Institute's EPRI Workshop on the technical basis of EPA HLW Disposal Criteria, March 1993. This group discussed the semantics of terms within the standard 40 CFR Part 191, the implementation of this standard, the advanced notice of rulemaking, the issue of emitting carbon-14 through a gaseous pathway, the strategy of dealing with standards for contamination of drinking water and groundwater, the 100,000 year time frame, and the analysis of specific comments. The specific comments dealt with the cost effectiveness of the standard, the dose histogram for populations and individuals, groundwater definition and the underlying technology driver for this standard

Environmental Restoration Remedial Action quality assurance requirements document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

This document defines the quality assurance requirements for the US Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office Environmental Restoration Remedial Action program at the Hanford Site. The Environmental Restoration Remedial Action program implements significant commitments made by the US Department of Energy in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order entered into with the Washington State Department of Ecology and the US Environmental Protection Agency. This document combines quality assurance requirements from various source documents into one set of requirements for use by the US Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office and other Environmental Restoration Remedial Action program participants. This document will serve as the basis for developing Quality Assurance Program Plans and implementing procedures by the participants. The requirements of this document will be applied to activities affecting quality, using a graded approach based on the importance of the item, service, or activity to the program objectives. The Quality Assurance Program that will be established using this document as the basis, together with other program and technical documents, form an integrated management control system for conducting the Environmental Restoration Remedial Action program activities in a manner that provides safety and protects the environment and public health

Status of High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) post-restart safety analysis and documentation upgrades

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cook, D.H.; Radcliff, T.D.; Rothrock, R.B.; Schreiber, R.E.

1990-01-01

The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), an experimental reactor located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and operated for the US Department of Energy by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, was shut down in November, 1986 after the discovery of unexpected neutron embrittlement of the reactor vessel. The reactor was restarted in April, 1989, following an extensive review by DOE and ORNL of the HFIR design, safety, operation, maintenance and management, and the implementation of several upgrades to HFIR safety-related hardware, analyses, documents and procedures. This included establishing new operating conditions to provide added margin against pressure vessel failure, as well as the addition, or upgrading, of specific safety-related hardware. This paper summarizes the status of some of the follow-on (post-restart) activities which are currently in progress, and which will result in a comprehensive set of safety analyses and documentation for the HFIR, comparable with current practice in commercial nuclear power plants. 8 refs

Analysis of compatibility of current Czech initial documentation in the area of technical assurance of nuclear safety with the requirements of the EUR document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zdebor, J.; Zdebor, R.; Kratochvil, L.

2001-11-01

The publication is structured as follows: Description of existing documentation. General requirements, goals, principles and design principles: Documents being compared; Method of comparison; Results and partial evaluation of comparison of requirements between EUR and Czech regulations (basic goals and safety philosophy; quantitative safety objectives; basic design requirements; extended design requirements; external and internal threats; technical requirements; site conditions); Summary of the comparison of safety requirements. Comparison of requirements for the systems: Requirements for the nuclear reactor unit systems; Barrier systems (fuel system; reactor cooling system; containment system); Remaining systems (control systems; protection systems; coolant makeup and purification system; residual heat removal system; emergency cooling system; power systems); Common technical requirements for systems (technical requirements for systems; internal and external events). (P.A.)

THE FORMATION OF THE CONTOUR OF THE DOCUMENTED AND REAL FLIGHT SAFETY IN THE SYSTEM OF THE INFORMATION PROVISION OF SAFETY OF FLIGHTS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

B. I. Bachkalo

2015-01-01

Full Text Available The article discusses the principles and mechanisms of formation of the contour of the real safety of flights and contour of the documented safety, allowing us to obtain information to control fligh safety. The proposed approach can be used in the algorithms of active on-board flight safety management system for the implementation of information support to the crew in flight and automatic control of flight safety.

The Algorithm Theoretical Basis Document for Tidal Corrections

Science.gov (United States)

Fricker, Helen A.; Ridgway, Jeff R.; Minster, Jean-Bernard; Yi, Donghui; Bentley, Charles R.`

2012-01-01

This Algorithm Theoretical Basis Document deals with the tidal corrections that need to be applied to range measurements made by the Geoscience Laser Altimeter System (GLAS). These corrections result from the action of ocean tides and Earth tides which lead to deviations from an equilibrium surface. Since the effect of tides is dependent of the time of measurement, it is necessary to remove the instantaneous tide components when processing altimeter data, so that all measurements are made to the equilibrium surface. The three main tide components to consider are the ocean tide, the solid-earth tide and the ocean loading tide. There are also long period ocean tides and the pole tide. The approximate magnitudes of these components are illustrated in Table 1, together with estimates of their uncertainties (i.e. the residual error after correction). All of these components are important for GLAS measurements over the ice sheets since centimeter-level accuracy for surface elevation change detection is required. The effect of each tidal component is to be removed by approximating their magnitude using tidal prediction models. Conversely, assimilation of GLAS measurements into tidal models will help to improve them, especially at high latitudes.

High-level waste tank farm set point document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anthony, J.A. III.

1995-01-01

Setpoints for nuclear safety-related instrumentation are required for actions determined by the design authorization basis. Minimum requirements need to be established for assuring that setpoints are established and held within specified limits. This document establishes the controlling methodology for changing setpoints of all classifications. The instrumentation under consideration involve the transfer, storage, and volume reduction of radioactive liquid waste in the F- and H-Area High-Level Radioactive Waste Tank Farms. The setpoint document will encompass the PROCESS AREA listed in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) (DPSTSA-200-10 Sup 18) which includes the diversion box HDB-8 facility. In addition to the PROCESS AREAS listed in the SAR, Building 299-H and the Effluent Transfer Facility (ETF) are also included in the scope

High-level waste tank farm set point document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Anthony, J.A. III

1995-01-15

Setpoints for nuclear safety-related instrumentation are required for actions determined by the design authorization basis. Minimum requirements need to be established for assuring that setpoints are established and held within specified limits. This document establishes the controlling methodology for changing setpoints of all classifications. The instrumentation under consideration involve the transfer, storage, and volume reduction of radioactive liquid waste in the F- and H-Area High-Level Radioactive Waste Tank Farms. The setpoint document will encompass the PROCESS AREA listed in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) (DPSTSA-200-10 Sup 18) which includes the diversion box HDB-8 facility. In addition to the PROCESS AREAS listed in the SAR, Building 299-H and the Effluent Transfer Facility (ETF) are also included in the scope.

TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT FOR AT-POWER SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS (SDP) NOTEBOOKS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

AZARM, M.A.; SMANTA, P.K.; MARTINEZ-GURIDI, G.; HIGGINS, J.

2004-01-01

To support the assessment of inspection findings as part of the risk-informed inspection in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (USNRC's) Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), risk inspection notebooks, also called significance determination process (SDP) notebooks, have been developed for each of the operating plants in the United States. These notebooks serve as a tool for assessing risk significance of inspection findings along with providing an engineering understanding of the significance. Plant-specific notebooks are developed to capture plant-specific features, characteristics, and analyses that influence the risk profile of the plant. At the same time, the notebooks follow a consistent set of assumptions and guidelines to assure consistent treatment of inspection findings across the plants. To achieve these objectives, notebooks are designed to provide specific information that are unique both in the manner in which the information is provided and in the way the screening risk assessment is carried out using the information provided. The unique features of the SDP notebooks, the approaches used to present the information for assessment of inspection findings, the assumptions used in consistent modeling across different plants with due credit to plant-specific features and analyses form the technical basis of the SDP notebooks. In this document, the unique features and the technical basis for the notebooks are presented. The types of information that are included and the reasoning/basis for including that information are discussed. The rules and basis for developing the worksheets that are used by the inspectors in the assessment of inspection findings are presented. The approach to modeling plants' responses to different initiating events and specific assumptions/considerations used for each of the reactor types are also discussed

Discussion on the Criterion for the Safety Certification Basis Compilation - Brazilian Space Program Case

Science.gov (United States)

Niwa, M.; Alves, N. C.; Caetano, A. O.; Andrade, N. S. O.

2012-01-01

The recent advent of the commercial launch and re- entry activities, for promoting the expansion of human access to space for tourism and hypersonic travel, in the already complex ambience of the global space activities, brought additional difficulties over the development of a harmonized framework of international safety rules. In the present work, with the purpose of providing some complementary elements for global safety rule development, the certification-related activities conducted in the Brazilian space program are depicted and discussed, focusing mainly on the criterion for certification basis compilation. The results suggest that the composition of a certification basis with the preferential use of internationally-recognized standards, as is the case of ISO standards, can be a first step toward the development of an international safety regulation for commercial space activities.

Planning Document for an NBSR Conversion Safety Analysis Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Diamond D. J.; Baek J.; Hanson, A.L.; Cheng, L-Y.; Brown, N.; Cuadra, A.

2013-09-25

The NIST Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) is a reactor-laboratory complex providing the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the nation with a world-class facility for the performance of neutron-based research. The heart of this facility is the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR). The NBSR is a heavy water moderated and cooled reactor operating at 20 MW. It is fueled with high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements. A Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program is underway to convert the reactor to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This program includes the qualification of the proposed fuel, uranium and molybdenum alloy foil clad in an aluminum alloy, and the development of the fabrication techniques. This report is a planning document for the conversion Safety Analysis Report (SAR) that would be submitted to, and approved by, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) before the reactor could be converted.This report follows the recommended format and content from the NRC codified in NUREG-1537, “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-power Reactors,” Chapter 18, “Highly Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium Conversions.” The emphasis herein is on the SAR chapters that require significant changes as a result of conversion, primarily Chapter 4, Reactor Description, and Chapter 13, Safety Analysis. The document provides information on the proposed design for the LEU fuel elements and identifies what information is still missing. This document is intended to assist ongoing fuel development efforts, and to provide a platform for the development of the final conversion SAR. This report contributes directly to the reactor conversion pillar of the GTRI program, but also acts as a boundary condition for the fuel development and fuel fabrication pillars.

Computerising documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1992-01-01

The nuclear power generation industry is faced with public concern and government pressures over safety, efficiency and risk. Operators throughout the industry are addressing these issues with the aid of a new technology - technical document management systems (TDMS). Used for strategic and tactical advantage, the systems enable users to scan, archive, retrieve, store, edit, distribute worldwide and manage the huge volume of documentation (paper drawings, CAD data and film-based information) generated in building, maintaining and ensuring safety in the UK's power plants. The power generation industry has recognized that the management and modification of operation critical information is vital to the safety and efficiency of its power plants. Regulatory pressure from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) to operate within strict safety margins or lose Site Licences has prompted the need for accurate, up-to-data documentation. A document capture and management retrieval system provides a powerful cost-effective solution, giving rapid access to documentation in a tightly controlled environment. The computerisation of documents and plans is discussed in this article. (Author)

A refined safety analysis approach for closure of the Hanford Site flammable gas unreviewed safety question

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bratzel, D.R.

1997-01-01

Following a 1990 investigation into flammable gas generation, retention, and release mechanisms within the Hanford Site high-level waste tanks, personnel concluded that the existing Authorization Basis documentation did not adequately evaluate flammable gas hazards. This declaration was based primarily on the fact that personnel did not adequately consider hydrogen and nitrous oxide evolution within the material in certain waste tanks and subsequent hypothetical ignition in the development of safety documentation for the waste tanks. The US Department of Energy-Headquarters subsequently declared an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). Although work scope has been focused on closure of the USQ since 1990, the DOE has yet to close the USQ because of considerable uncertainty regarding essential technical parameters and associated risk. The DOE recently approved a Basis for Interim Operation to revise the Authorization Basis for managing the tank farms, however, the USQ remains open. The two fundamental requirements for closure of the flammable gas USQ are as follows: development of a defensible technical basis for existing controls; development of a process to assess the adequacy of controls as the waste tank mission progresses

Improved safety at CERN

CERN Multimedia

2006-01-01

As announced in Weekly Bulletin No. 43/2006, a new approach to the implementation of Safety at CERN has been decided, which required taking some managerial decisions. The guidelines of the new approach are described in the document 'New approach to Safety implementation at CERN', which also summarizes the main managerial decisions I have taken to strengthen compliance with the CERN Safety policy and Rules. To this end I have also reviewed the mandates of the Safety Commission and the Safety Policy Committee (SAPOCO). Some details of the document 'Safety Policy at CERN' (also known as SAPOCO42) have been modified accordingly; its essential principles, unchanged, remain the basis for the safety policy of the Organisation. I would also like to inform you that I have appointed Dr M. Bona as the new Head of the Safety Commission until 31.12.2008, and that I will proceed soon to the appointment of the members of the new Safety Policy Committee. All members of the personnel are deemed to have taken note of the d...

Environmental restoration value engineering guidance document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-07-01

This document provides guidance on Value Engineering (VE). VE is an organized team effort led by a person trained in the methodology to analyze the functions of projects, systems, equipment, facilities, services, and processes for achieving the essential functions at the lowest life cycle cost while maintaining required performance, reliability, availability, quality, and safety. VE has proven to be a superior tool to improve up-front project planning, cut costs, and create a better value for each dollar spent. This document forms the basis for the Environmental Restoration VE Program, describes the VE process, and provides recommendations on when it can be most useful on ER projects

Solid waste burial grounds interim safety analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Saito, G.H.

1994-01-01

This Interim Safety Analysis document supports the authorization basis for the interim operation and restrictions on interim operations for the near-surface land disposal of solid waste in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. The Solid Waste Burial Grounds Interim Safety Basis supports the upgrade progress for the safety analysis report and the technical safety requirements for the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. Accident safety analysis scenarios have been analyzed based on the significant events identified in the preliminary hazards analysis. The interim safety analysis provides an evaluation of the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds to determine if the radiological and hazardous material exposures will be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint to the worker, the onsite personnel, the public, and the environment

Solid waste burial grounds interim safety analysis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Saito, G.H.

1994-10-01

This Interim Safety Analysis document supports the authorization basis for the interim operation and restrictions on interim operations for the near-surface land disposal of solid waste in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. The Solid Waste Burial Grounds Interim Safety Basis supports the upgrade progress for the safety analysis report and the technical safety requirements for the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. Accident safety analysis scenarios have been analyzed based on the significant events identified in the preliminary hazards analysis. The interim safety analysis provides an evaluation of the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds to determine if the radiological and hazardous material exposures will be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint to the worker, the onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

Design-Load Basis for LANL Structures, Systems, and Components

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

I. Cuesta

2004-09-01

This document supports the recommendations in the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Engineering Standard Manual (ESM), Chapter 5--Structural providing the basis for the loads, analysis procedures, and codes to be used in the ESM. It also provides the justification for eliminating the loads to be considered in design, and evidence that the design basis loads are appropriate and consistent with the graded approach required by the Department of Energy (DOE) Code of Federal Regulation Nuclear Safety Management, 10, Part 830. This document focuses on (1) the primary and secondary natural phenomena hazards listed in DOE-G-420.1-2, Appendix C, (2) additional loads not related to natural phenomena hazards, and (3) the design loads on structures during construction.

Materials Safety Data Sheets: the basis for control of toxic chemicals

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ketchen, E.E.; Porter, W.E.

1979-09-01

The Material Safety Data Sheets contained in this volume are the basis for the Toxic Chemical Control Program developed by the Industrial Hygiene Department, Health Division, ORNL. The three volumes are the update and expansion of ORNL/TM-5721 and ORNL/TM-5722 Material Safety Data Sheets: The Basis for Control of Toxic Chemicals, Volume I and Volume II. As such, they are a valuable adjunct to the data cards issued with specific chemicals. The chemicals are identified by name, stores catalog number where appropriate, and sequence numbers from the NIOSH Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, 1977 Edition, if available. The data sheets were developed and compiled to aid in apprising the employees of hazards peculiar to the handling and/or use of specific toxic chemicals. Space limitation necessitate the use of descriptive medical terms and toxicological abbreviations. A glossary and an abbreviation list were developed to define some of those sometimes unfamiliar terms and abbreviations. The page numbers are keyed to the catalog number in the chemical stores at ORNL.

Safety analysis report for the Waste Storage Facility. Revision 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bengston, S.J.

1994-05-01

This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Storage Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Storage Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume.

Safety basis for selected activities in single-shell tanks with flammable gas concerns. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schlosser, R.L.

1996-01-01

This is full revision to Revision 0 of this report. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of analyses done to support activities performed for single-shell tanks. These activities are encompassed by the flammable gas Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). The basic controls required to perform these activities involve the identification, elimination and/or control of ignition sources and monitoring for flammable gases. Controls are implemented through the Interim Safety Basis (ISB), IOSRs, and OSDs. Since this report only provides a historical compendium of issues and activities, it is not to be used as a basis to perform USQ screenings and evaluations. Furthermore, these analyses and others in process will be used as the basis for developing the Flammable Gas Topical Report for the ISB Upgrade

Existing and future international standards for the safety of radioactive waste disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Linsley, G.

1999-01-01

In this paper the essential features of the current international safety standards are summarised and the issues being raised for inclusion in future standards are discussed. The safety standards of the IAEA are used as the basis for the review and discussion. The IAEA has established a process for establishing international standards of safety for radioactive waste management through its Radioactive Waste Safety Standards (RADWASS) programme. The RADWASS documents are approved by a comprehensive process involving regulatory and other experts from all concerned IAEA Member States. A system of committees for approving the IAEAs safety standards has been established. For radioactive waste safety the committee for review and approval is the Waste Safety Standards Advisory Committee (WASSAC). In 1995 the IAEA published 'The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management' as the top level document in the RADWASS programme. The report sets out the basis principles which most experts believe are fundamental to the safe management of radioactive wastes

Comparative analysis of safety related site characteristics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersson, Johan

2010-12-01

This document presents a comparative analysis of site characteristics related to long-term safety for the two candidate sites for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel in Forsmark (municipality of Oesthammar) and in Laxemar (municipality of Oskarshamn) from the point of view of site selection. The analyses are based on the updated site descriptions of Forsmark /SKB 2008a/ and Laxemar /SKB 2009a/, together with associated updated repository layouts and designs /SKB 2008b and SKB 2009b/. The basis for the comparison is thus two equally and thoroughly assessed sites. However, the analyses presented here are focussed on differences between the sites rather than evaluating them in absolute terms. The document serves as a basis for the site selection, from the perspective of long-term safety, in SKB's application for a final repository. A full evaluation of safety is made for a repository at the selected site in the safety assessment SR-Site /SKB 2011/, referred to as SR-Site main report in the following

Comparative analysis of safety related site characteristics

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Andersson, Johan (ed.)

2010-12-15

This document presents a comparative analysis of site characteristics related to long-term safety for the two candidate sites for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel in Forsmark (municipality of Oesthammar) and in Laxemar (municipality of Oskarshamn) from the point of view of site selection. The analyses are based on the updated site descriptions of Forsmark /SKB 2008a/ and Laxemar /SKB 2009a/, together with associated updated repository layouts and designs /SKB 2008b and SKB 2009b/. The basis for the comparison is thus two equally and thoroughly assessed sites. However, the analyses presented here are focussed on differences between the sites rather than evaluating them in absolute terms. The document serves as a basis for the site selection, from the perspective of long-term safety, in SKB's application for a final repository. A full evaluation of safety is made for a repository at the selected site in the safety assessment SR-Site /SKB 2011/, referred to as SR-Site main report in the following

Preliminary safety analysis report for the Waste Characterization Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-10-01

This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Characterization Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are to: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Characterization Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume. 142 refs., 38 figs., 39 tabs

Reactor safety under design basis flood condition for inland sites

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hajela, S.; Bajaj, S.S.; Samota, A.; Verma, U.S.P.; Warudkar, A.S.

2002-01-01

Full text: In June 1994, there was an incident of flooding at Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) due to combination of heavy rains and mechanical failure in the operation of gates at the adjoining weir. An indepth review of the incident was carried out and a number of flood protection measures were recommended and were implemented at site. As part of this review, a safety analysis was also done to demonstrate reactor safety with a series of failures considered in the flood protection features. For each inland NPP site, as part of design, different flood scenarios are analysed to arrive at design basis flood (DBF) level. This level is estimated based on worst combination of heavy local precipitation, flooding in river, failure of upstream/downstream water control structures

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Armstrong, D.L.

1994-08-01

This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Armstrong, D.L.

1994-08-01

This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

SAFETY EVALUATION OF OXALIC ACID WASTE RETRIEVAL IN SINGLE SHELL TANK (SST) 241-C-106

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SHULTZ, M.V.

2003-01-01

This report documents the safety evaluation of the process of retrieving sludge waste from single-shell tank 241-C-106 using oxalic acid. The results of the HAZOP, safety evaluation, and control allocation/decision are part of the report. This safety evaluation considers the use of oxalic acid to recover residual waste in single-shell tank (SST) 241-C-106. This is an activity not addressed in the current tank farm safety basis. This evaluation has five specific purposes: (1) Identifying the key configuration and operating assumptions needed to evaluate oxalic acid dissolution in SST 241-C-106. (2) Documenting the hazardous conditions identified during the oxalic acid dissolution hazard and operability study (HAZOP). (3) Documenting the comparison of the HAZOP results to the hazardous conditions and associated analyzed accident currently included in the safety basis, as documented in HNF-SD-WM-TI-764, Hazard Analysis Database Report. (4) Documenting the evaluation of the oxalic acid dissolution activity with respect to: (A) Accident analyses described in HNF-SD-WM-SAR-067, Tank Farms Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and (B) Controls specified in HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements (TSR). (5) Documenting the process and results of control decisions as well as the applicability of preventive and/or mitigative controls to each oxalic acid addition hazardous condition. This safety evaluation is not intended to be a request to authorize the activity. Authorization issues are addressed by the unreviewed safety question (USQ) evaluation process. This report constitutes an accident analysis

Strategy for resolution of the flammable gas safety issue

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, G.D.

1997-01-01

This document provides a strategy for resolution of the Flammable Gas Safety Issue. It defines the key elements required for the following: Closing the Flammable Gas Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ); Providing the administrative basis for resolving the safety issue; Defining the data needed to support these activities; and Providing the technical and administrative path for removing tanks from the Watch List

Strategy for resolution of the flammable gas safety issue

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Johnson, G.D.

1997-05-23

This document provides a strategy for resolution of the Flammable Gas Safety Issue. It defines the key elements required for the following: Closing the Flammable Gas Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ); Providing the administrative basis for resolving the safety issue; Defining the data needed to support these activities; and Providing the technical and administrative path for removing tanks from the Watch List.

75 FR 69648 - Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers

Science.gov (United States)

2010-11-15

... interpretative posture weakens the safety structure the rule is designed to hold firmly in place. 10 CFR Part 830... Basis Documents, and notes that the Safety Basis Approval Authority may prescribe interim controls and... managers ``are expected to carefully evaluate situations that fall short of expectations and only provide...

75 FR 74022 - Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers

Science.gov (United States)

2010-11-30

... posture weakens the safety structure the rule is designed to hold firmly in place. 10 CFR Part 830 imposes... Basis Documents, and notes that the Safety Basis Approval Authority may prescribe interim controls and... managers ``are expected to carefully evaluate situations that fall short of expectations and only provide...

Overview of the fundamental safety principles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chishinga, Milton Mulenga

2015-02-01

The primary objective of this work was to provide an overview of the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) document; 'Fundamental Safety principles, SF.1'. The document outlines ten (10) fundamental principles which provide the basis for an effective the radiation protection framework. The document is the topmost in the hierarchy of the IAEA Safety Standards Series. These principles are the foundation of the nuclear safety put stringent obligations on Parties under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The fundamental Safety objective of protecting people individually and collectively and the environment has to be achieved without unduly limiting the operation of facilities or the conduct of activities that give rise to risks. The thematic areas covered are; responsibility for safety, role of government, leadership and management for safety, justification of facilities and activities, optimization of protection, limitation of risks to individuals, protection of present and future generations, prevention of accidents, emergency preparedness and response and protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks. Appropriate recommendations have been provided for effective application of the principles by Governments, Regulatory Bodies and Operating Organizations of facilities and Nuclear Installations the give rise to radiation risks. (au)

ITER final design report, cost review and safety analysis (FDR) and relevant documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This volume contains the fourth major milestone report and documents associated with its acceptance, review and approval. This ITER Final Design Report, Cost Review and Safety Analysis was presented to the ITER Council at its 13th meeting in February 1998 and was approved at its extraordinary meeting on 25 June 1998. The contents include an outline of the ITER objectives, the ITER parameters and design overview as well as operating scenarios and plasma performance. Furthermore, design features, safety and environmental characteristics and schedule and cost estimates are given

14 CFR 60.37 - FSTD qualification on the basis of a Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA).

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA). 60.37 Section 60.37 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION... CONTINUING QUALIFICATION AND USE § 60.37 FSTD qualification on the basis of a Bilateral Aviation Safety... on International Civil Aviation for the sponsor of an FSTD located in that contracting State may be...

The Swedish Utilities joint approach to form common basis for design requirements for the future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hansson, B.

1998-01-01

The Owners of the Swedish Nuclear Power Plants have decided to form a document that should state the design principals and requirement for cost-effective and continuous development of the reactor safety in the future. The development of this document will be a part of the modernization and development of the Swedish Nuclear Power Plants. The basis for this document is an evaluation of Swedish and International standards and regulations as IAEA/INSAG, US-regulations, EUR etc. (author)

A rock characterisation facility consultative document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-10-01

This U.K. Nirex Ltd., consultative document describes a proposed underground rock characterisation facility, east of Sellafield, for conducting geophysical surveys as a basis for refining long-term safety analysis of an underground repository for intermediate-level and low-level radioactive wastes. Planning application will be submitted in 1993. The construction of shafts and galleries is described and the site's geologic, topographical, climatic and archaeological features discussed. The effects to the local environment and on local populations and other socio-economic factors are discussed. (UK)

Documents preparation and review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

Ignalina Safety Analysis Group takes active role in assisting regulatory body VATESI to prepare various regulatory documents and reviewing safety reports and other documentation presented by Ignalina NPP in the process of licensing of unit 1. The list of main documents prepared and reviewed is presented

Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Busche, D.M.

1995-09-01

During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ''Unreviewed Safety Questions,'' DOE 5480.22, ''Technical Safety Requirements,'' and DOE 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.'' WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ''Safety Basis'' for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules

Technical Basis for Electromagnetic Compatibility Regulatory Guidance Update

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ewing, Paul D. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Korsah, Kofi [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Harrison, Thomas J. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wood, Richard Thomas [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Mays, Gary T. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2016-03-01

The objective of this report is to serve as the technical basis document for the next, planned revision of this RG that highlights and provides the rationale for the recommended changes. The structure of this document follows and summarizes the several assessment activities undertaken during the course of this project to evaluate new and updated electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) standards, testing methods and limits, and relevant technology developments being incorporated into plant activities that may have EMI/RFI implications, as well as other specific issues, including impacts of electrostatic discharge (ESD) on safety equipment and impacts on increased usage of wireless devices in nuclear power plants.

Supporting documents for LLL area 27 (410 area) safety analysis reports, Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Odell, B. N. [comp.

1977-02-01

The following appendices are common to the LLL Safety Analysis Reports Nevada Test Site and are included here as supporting documents to those reports: Environmental Monitoring Report for the Nevada Test Site and Other Test Areas Used for Underground Nuclear Detonations, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Las Vegas, Rept. EMSL-LV-539-4 (1976); Selected Census Information Around the Nevada Test Site, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Las Vegas, Rept. NERC-LV-539-8 (1973); W. J. Hannon and H. L. McKague, An Examination of the Geology and Seismology Associated with Area 410 at the Nevada Test Site, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Livermore, Rept. UCRL-51830 (1975); K. R. Peterson, Diffusion Climatology for Hypothetical Accidents in Area 410 of the Nevada Test Site, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Livermore, Rept. UCRL-52074 (1976); J. R. McDonald, J. E. Minor, and K. C. Mehta, Development of a Design Basis Tornado and Structural Design Criteria for the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Livermore, Rept. UCRL-13668 (1975); A. E. Stevenson, Impact Tests of Wind-Borne Wooden Missiles, Sandia Laboratories, Tonopah, Rept. SAND 76-0407 (1976); and Hydrology of the 410 Area (Area 27) at the Nevada Test Site.

Safety first!

CERN Multimedia

2016-01-01

Among the many duties I assumed at the beginning of the year was the ultimate responsibility for Safety at CERN: the responsibility for the physical safety of the personnel, the responsibility for the safe operation of the facilities, and the responsibility to ensure that CERN acts in accordance with the highest standards of radiation and environmental protection.   The Safety Policy document drawn up in September 2014 is an excellent basis for the implementation of Safety in all areas of CERN’s work. I am happy to commit during my mandate to help meet its objectives, not least by ensuring the Organization makes available the necessary means to achieve its Safety objectives. One of the main objectives of the HSE (Occupational Health and Safety and Environmental Protection) unit in the coming months is to enhance the measures to minimise CERN’s impact on the environment. I believe CERN should become a role model for an environmentally-aware scientific research laboratory. Risk ...

ITER technical basis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-01-01

Following on from the Final Report of the EDA(DS/21), and the summary of the ITER Final Design report(DS/22), the technical basis gives further details of the design of ITER. It is in two parts. The first, the Plant Design specification, summarises the main constraints on the plant design and operation from the viewpoint of engineering and physics assumptions, compliance with safety regulations, and siting requirements and assumptions. The second, the Plant Description Document, describes the physics performance and engineering characteristics of the plant design, illustrates the potential operational consequences foe the locality of a generic site, gives the construction, commissioning, exploitation and decommissioning schedule, and reports the estimated lifetime costing based on data from the industry of the EDA parties.

ITER technical basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Following on from the Final Report of the EDA(DS/21), and the summary of the ITER Final Design report(DS/22), the technical basis gives further details of the design of ITER. It is in two parts. The first, the Plant Design specification, summarises the main constraints on the plant design and operation from the viewpoint of engineering and physics assumptions, compliance with safety regulations, and siting requirements and assumptions. The second, the Plant Description Document, describes the physics performance and engineering characteristics of the plant design, illustrates the potential operational consequences foe the locality of a generic site, gives the construction, commissioning, exploitation and decommissioning schedule, and reports the estimated lifetime costing based on data from the industry of the EDA parties

Occupational Safety Review of High Technology Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee Cadwallader

2005-01-31

This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators. These data are useful to form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known sets of safety rules and regulations. Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other industrial hazards. Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for comparison.

RBMK safety issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Weber, J.P.; Reichenbach, D.; Tscherkashow, J.M.

1995-01-01

On the basis of information and documents from the RBMK operation countries, the Western consortium mainly examined the two most modern plants, Ignalin-2 and Smolensk-3. The identification of numerous shortcomings, some of which had already been recongized by the participating Eastern organizations, resulted in some 300 specific recommendations to reactor designers, operators and licensing authorities. These recommendations are to be acted upon at once; only a small number did not meet with the approval of the Eastern partners. The safety review provided the Western consotrium with a profound insight into the design and safety of third-generation RBMK reactors; the Eastern partners were able to accumulate experience in working with Western safety philosophy. (orig.) [de

Tank waste remediation system retrieval authorization basis amendment task plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goetz, T.G.

1998-01-01

This task plan is a documented agreement between Nuclear Safety and Licensing and the Process Development group within the Waste Feed Delivery organization. The purpose of this task plan is to identify the scope of work, tasks and deliverables, responsibilities, manpower, and schedules associated with an authorization basis amendment as a result of the Waste Feed Waste Delivery Program, Project W-211, and Project W-TBD

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards and recommendations on radioactive waste and transport safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Warnecke, E.; Rawl, R.

1996-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publishes standards and recommendations on all aspects of nuclear safety in its Safety Series, which includes radioactive waste management and transport of radioactive materials. Safety Series documents may be adopted by a State into its national legal framework. Most of the States used the IAEA transport regulations (Safety Series No. 6) as a basis for their national regulation. The two highest ranking documents of the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards (RADWASS) programme, the Safety Fundamentals and the Safety Standard on the national waste management system, have been published. Both provide impetus into the waste management safety convention, a legally binding document for signatory states, which is being drafted. The already existing Convention on Nuclear Safety covers the management of radioactive waste at land-based civil nuclear power plants. (author) 1 fig., 18 refs

Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Retrieval Authorization Basis Amendment Task Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

HARRIS, J.P.

1999-01-01

This task plan is a documented agreement between Nuclear Safety and Licensing and Retrieval Engineering. The purpose of this task plan is to identify the scope of work, tasks and deliverables, responsibilities, manpower, and schedules associated with an authorization basis amendment as a result of the Waste Feed Delivery Program, Project W-211, Project W-521, and Project W-522

ITER interim design report package and relevant documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

This publication documents the technical basis which underlay the Interim Design Report, Cost Review and Safety Analysis submitted to the ITER Councils (IC-8 and IC-9) Records of decisions and the ''ITER Interim Design Report Package''. This publication contains ITER Site Requirements and ITER Site Design Assumptions, TAC-8 Report, SRG Report, CP's Report on Tentative Sequence of Events and Parties' Views on the IDR Package and Parties' Technical Comments on the IDR Package. Figs, tabs

Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Environmental Information Document - Volume II

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

GUERRERO, JOSEPH V.; KUZIO, KENNETH A.; JOHNS, WILLIAM H.; BAYLISS, LINDA S.; BAILEY-WHITE, BRENDA E.

1999-09-01

This Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Environmental Information Document (EID) compiles information on the existing environment, or environmental baseline, for SNUNM. Much of the information is drawn from existing reports and databases supplemented by new research and data. The SNL/NM EID, together with the Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Facilities and Safety Information Document, provide a basis for assessing the environment, safety, and health aspects of operating selected facilities at SNL/NM. The environmental baseline provides a record of the existing physical, biological, and socioeconomic environment at SNL/NLM prior to being altered (beneficially or adversely) by proposed programs or projects. More specifically, the EID provides information on the following topics: Geology; Land Use; Hydrology and Water Resources; Air Quality and Meteorology; Ecology; Noise and Vibration; Cultural Resources; Visual Resources; Socioeconomic and Community Services; Transportation; Material Management; Waste Management; and Regulatory Requirements.

Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Environmental Information Document - Volume 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BAYLISS, LINDA S.; GUERRERO, JOSEPH V.; JOHNS, WILLIAM H.; KUZIO, KENNETH A.; BAILEY-WHITE, BRENDA E.

1999-09-01

This Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Environmental Information Document (EID) compiles information on the existing environment, or environmental baseline, for SNUNM. Much of the information is drawn from existing reports and databases supplemented by new research and data. The SNL/NM EID, together with the Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Facilities and Safety Information Document, provide a basis for assessing the environment, safety, and health aspects of operating selected facilities at SNL/NM. The environmental baseline provides a record of the existing physical, biological, and socioeconomic environment at SNL/NLM prior to being altered (beneficially or adversely) by proposed programs or projects. More specifically, the EID provides information on the following topics: Geology; Land Use; Hydrology and Water Resources; Air Quality and Meteorology; Ecology; Noise and Vibration; Cultural Resources; Visual Resources; Socioeconomic and Community Services; Transportation; Material Management; Waste Management; and Regulatory Requirements.

Optimization of the nuclear power engineering safety on the basis of social and economic parameters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kozlov, V.F.; Kuz'min, I.I.; Lystsov, V.N.; Amosova, T.V.; Makhutov, N.A.; Men'shikov, V.F.

1995-01-01

Principle of optimization of nuclear power engineering safety is presented on the basis of estimating the risks to the man's health with an account of peculiarities of socio-economic system and other types of economic activities in the region. Average expected duration of forthcoming life and costs of its prolongation serve as a unit for measuring the man's safety. It is shown that if the expenditures on NPP technical safety exceed the scientifically substantiated costs for this region with application of the above principle, than the risk for population will exceed the minimum achievable level. 8 refs., 2 figs., 1 tab

To the problem of the statistical basis of evaluation of the mechanical safety factor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tsyganov, S.V.

2009-01-01

The methodology applied for the safety factor assessment of the WWER fuel cycles uses methods and terms of statistics. Value of the factor is calculated on the basis of estimation of probability to meet predefined limits. Such approach demands the special attention to the statistical properties of parameters of interest. Considering the mechanical constituents of the engineering factor it is assumed uncertainty factors of safety parameters are stochastic values. It characterized by probabilistic distributions that can be unknown. Traditionally in the safety factor assessment process the unknown parameters are estimated from the conservative points of view. This paper analyses how the refinement of the factors distribution parameters is important for the assessment of the mechanical safety factor. For the analysis the statistical approach is applied for modelling of different type of factor probabilistic distributions. It is shown the significant influence of the shape and parameters of distributions for some factors on the value of mechanical safety factor. (Authors)

To the problem of the statistical basis of evaluation of the mechanical safety factor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tsyganov, S.

2009-01-01

The methodology applied for the safety factor assessment of the VVER fuel cycles uses methods and terms of statistics. Value of the factor is calculated on the basis of estimation of probability to meet predefined limits. Such approach demands the special attention to the statistical properties of parameters of interest. Considering the mechanical constituents of the engineering factor it is assumed uncertainty factors of safety parameters are stochastic values. It characterized by probabilistic distributions that can be unknown. Traditionally in the safety factor assessment process the unknown parameters are estimated from the conservative points of view. This paper analyses how the refinement of the factors distribution parameters is important for the assessment of the mechanical safety factor. For the analysis the statistical approach is applied for modelling of different type of factor probabilistic distributions. It is shown the significant influence of the shape and parameters of distributions for some factors on the value of mechanical safety factor. (author)

Basis Selectie Document voor de taakgebieden Volksgezondheid en Milieu en Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene RIV(M) 1940-1995

NARCIS (Netherlands)

BDA/RIVM; BDA; Rijksarchiefdienst/Pivot

1998-01-01

As laid down by Dutch national law the fundamental selection instrument (Basis Selectie Document, BSD) is to be used in national and regional government archives to separate records that should be preserved from records for which destruction is warranted. New archival legislation promulgated in 1995

radiation safety culture for developing country: Basis for s minimum operational radiation protection programme

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rozental, J. J.

1997-01-01

The purpose of this document is to present a methodology for an integrated strategy aiming at establishing an adequate radiation Safety infrastructure for developing countries, non major power reactor programme. Its implementation will allow these countries, about 50% of the IAEA's Member States, to improve marginal radiation safety, specially to those recipients of technical assistance and do not meet the Minimum radiation Safety Requirements of the IAEA's Basic Safety Standards for radiation protection Progress in the implementation of safety regulations depends on the priority of the government and its understanding and conviction about the basic requirements for protection against the risks associated with exposure to ionizing radiation. There is no doubt to conclude that the reasons for the deficiency of sources control and dose limitation are related to the lack of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework, specially considering the establishment of an adequate legislation; A minimum legal infrastructure; A minimum operational radiation safety programme; Alternatives for a Point of Optimum Contact, to avoid overlap and conflict, that is: A 'Memorandum of Understanding' among Regulatory Authorities in the Country, dealing with similar type of licensing and inspection

Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dr. Michael A. Lehto; Kevin J. Carroll; Dr. Robert Lowrie

2007-01-01

Earlier this year, the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) was asked to assist in developing options related to acceleration deployment of new security-related technologies to assist meeting design base threat (DBT) needs while also addressing the requirements of 10 CFR 830. NNSA NA-70, one of the working group participants, designated this effort the Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative (SSIT). Relationship to Workshop Theme. ''Supporting Excellence in Operations Through Safety Analysis'', (workshop theme) includes security and safety personnel working together to ensure effective and efficient operations. One of the specific workshop elements listed in the call for papers is ''Safeguards/Security Integration with Safety''. This paper speaks directly to this theme. Description of Work. The EFCOG Safety Analysis Working Group (SAWG) and the EFCOG Security Working Group formed a core team to develop an integrated process involving both safety basis and security needs allowing achievement of the DBT objectives while ensuring safety is appropriately considered. This effort garnered significant interest, starting with a two day breakout session of 30 experts at the 2006 Safety Basis Workshop. A core team was formed, and a series of meetings were held to develop that process, including safety and security professionals, both contractor and federal personnel. A pilot exercise held at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in mid-July 2006 was conducted as a feasibility of concept review. Work Results. The SSIT efforts resulted in a topical report transmitted from EFCOG to DOE/NNSA in August 2006. Elements of the report included: Drivers and Endstate, Control Selections Alternative Analysis Process, Terminology Crosswalk, Safety Basis/Security Documentation Integration, Configuration Control, and development of a shared ''tool box'' of information/successes. Specific Benefits. The expectation or end state resulting from the topical report and associated

River Protection Double-Shell Tank Waste Retrieval Authorization Basis Amendment Task Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

HARRIS, J.P.

2000-01-01

This task plan is a documented agreement between Nuclear Safety and Licensing and Retrieval Engineering. The purpose of this task plan is to identify the scope of work, tasks and deliverables, responsibilities, manpower, and schedules associated with an authorization basis amendment as a result of the Waste Feed Delivery Program, Project W-211, Project W-521, and Project W-522

ITER safety task NID-5a: ITER tritium environmental source terms - safety analysis basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Natalizio, A.; Kalyanam, K.M.

1994-09-01

The Canadian Fusion Fuels Technology Project's (CFFTP) is part of the contribution to ITER task NID-5a, Initial Tritium Source Term. This safety analysis basis constitutes the first part of the work for establishing tritium source terms and is intended to solicit comments and obtain agreement. The analysis objective is to provide an early estimate of tritium environmental source terms for the events to be analyzed. Events that would result in the loss of tritium are: a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), a vacuum vessel boundary breach. a torus exhaust line failure, a fuelling machine process boundary failure, a fuel processing system process boundary failure, a water detritiation system process boundary failure and an isotope separation system process boundary failure. 9 figs

Basis for the safety approach for design and assessment of Generation IV nuclear systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fiorini, G.L.; Leahy, T.

2009-01-01

The primary objective of the RSWG is the implementation of a harmonized approach on long-term safety, and to address risk and regulatory issues in development of the next generation of nuclear systems. To this end, the group is proposing safety goals and evaluation methodology applicable for the design and assessment of future systems. The paper resumes the content of the first RSWG report which provides insights for the safety approach and assists the GIF Systems Steering Committee as well as the GIF Experts Group and the GIF Policy Group for the definition of the most adequate safety related Gen IV R and D. The document is also an essential contributor to help identifying the needed supportive crosscut R and D effort (i.e. applicable to all the innovative nuclear technologies). Although the report presents a number of thoughts and recommendations, it really represents only the start of the efforts for the RSWG. (author)

The Agency's Safety Standards and Measures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-04-01

The Agency's Health and Safety Measures were first, approved by the Board of Governors on 31 March 1960 in implementation of Articles III.A.6 and XII of the Statute of the Agency. On the basis of the experience gained from applying those measures to projects carried out by Members under agreements concluded with the Agency, the Agency's Health and Safety Measures were revised in 1975 and approved by the Board of Governors on 25 February 1976. The Agency's Safety Standards and Measures as revised are reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Tank safety screening data quality objective. Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hunt, J.W.

1995-04-27

The Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO) will be used to classify 149 single shell tanks and 28 double shell tanks containing high-level radioactive waste into safety categories for safety issues dealing with the presence of ferrocyanide, organics, flammable gases, and criticality. Decision rules used to classify a tank as ``safe`` or ``not safe`` are presented. Primary and secondary decision variables used for safety status classification are discussed. The number and type of samples required are presented. A tabular identification of each analyte to be measured to support the safety classification, the analytical method to be used, the type of sample, the decision threshold for each analyte that would, if violated, place the tank on the safety issue watch list, and the assumed (desired) analytical uncertainty are provided. This is a living document that should be evaluated for updates on a semiannual basis. Evaluation areas consist of: identification of tanks that have been added or deleted from the specific safety issue watch lists, changes in primary and secondary decision variables, changes in decision rules used for the safety status classification, and changes in analytical requirements. This document directly supports all safety issue specific DQOs and additional characterization DQO efforts associated with pretreatment and retrieval. Additionally, information obtained during implementation can assist in resolving assumptions for revised safety strategies, and in addition, obtaining information which will support the determination of error tolerances, confidence levels, and optimization schemes for later revised safety strategy documentation.

Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Treatment Building Safety Information Document (SID)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fatell, L.B.; Woolsey, G.B.

1993-01-01

This Safety Information Document (SID) provides a description and analysis of operations for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Disposal Facility Treatment Building (the Treatment Building). The Treatment Building has been classified as a moderate hazard facility, and the level of analysis performed and the methodology used are based on that classification. Preliminary design of the Treatment Building has identified the need for two separate buildings for waste treatment processes. The term Treatment Building applies to all these facilities. The evaluation of safety for the Treatment Building is accomplished in part by the identification of hazards associated with the facility and the analysis of the facility's response to postulated events involving those hazards. The events are analyzed in terms of the facility features that minimize the causes of such events, the quantitative determination of the consequences, and the ability of the facility to cope with each event should it occur. The SID presents the methodology, assumptions, and results of the systematic evaluation of hazards associated with operation of the Treatment Building. The SID also addresses the spectrum of postulated credible events, involving those hazards, that could occur. Facility features important to safety are identified and discussed in the SID. The SID identifies hazards and reports the analysis of the spectrum of credible postulated events that can result in the following consequences: Personnel exposure to radiation; Radioactive material release to the environment; Personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals; Hazardous chemical release to the environment; Events leading to an onsite/offsite fatality; and Significant damage to government property. The SID addresses the consequences to the onsite and offsite populations resulting from postulated credible events and the safety features in place to control and mitigate the consequences

Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Treatment Building Safety Information Document (SID)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fatell, L.B.; Woolsey, G.B.

1993-04-15

This Safety Information Document (SID) provides a description and analysis of operations for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Disposal Facility Treatment Building (the Treatment Building). The Treatment Building has been classified as a moderate hazard facility, and the level of analysis performed and the methodology used are based on that classification. Preliminary design of the Treatment Building has identified the need for two separate buildings for waste treatment processes. The term Treatment Building applies to all these facilities. The evaluation of safety for the Treatment Building is accomplished in part by the identification of hazards associated with the facility and the analysis of the facility`s response to postulated events involving those hazards. The events are analyzed in terms of the facility features that minimize the causes of such events, the quantitative determination of the consequences, and the ability of the facility to cope with each event should it occur. The SID presents the methodology, assumptions, and results of the systematic evaluation of hazards associated with operation of the Treatment Building. The SID also addresses the spectrum of postulated credible events, involving those hazards, that could occur. Facility features important to safety are identified and discussed in the SID. The SID identifies hazards and reports the analysis of the spectrum of credible postulated events that can result in the following consequences: Personnel exposure to radiation; Radioactive material release to the environment; Personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals; Hazardous chemical release to the environment; Events leading to an onsite/offsite fatality; and Significant damage to government property. The SID addresses the consequences to the onsite and offsite populations resulting from postulated credible events and the safety features in place to control and mitigate the consequences.

Safety assessment of discharge chute isolation barrier preparation and installation activities. Revision 3

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meichle, R.H.

1994-01-01

This revision adds a section addressing impacts of dropping surfacing tool and rack cutter on the basin floor, and corrects typographical errors. The safety assessment is made for the activities for the preparation and installation of the discharge chute isolation barriers. The safety assessment includes a hazard assessment and comparisons of potential accidents/events to those addressed by the current safety basis documentation. No significant hazards were identified. An evaluation against the USQ evaluation questions was made and the determination made that the activities do not represent a USQ. Hazard categorization techniques were used to provide a basis for readiness review classifications

System Safety Program Plan for Project W-314, tank farm restoration and safe operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boos, K.A.

1996-01-01

This System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) outlines the safety analysis strategy for project W-314, ''Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operations.'' Project W-314 will provide capital improvements to Hanford's existing Tank Farm facilities, with particular emphasis on infrastructure systems supporting safe operation of the double-shell activities related to the project's conceptual Design Phase, but is planned to be updated and maintained as a ''living document'' throughout the life of the project to reflect the current safety analysis planning for the Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operations upgrades. This approved W-314 SSPP provides the basis for preparation/approval of all safety analysis documentation needed to support the project

Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site Safety Assessment Document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Horton, K.K.; Kendall, E.W.; Brown, J.J.

1980-02-01

The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Safety Assessment Document evaluates site characteristics, facilities and operating practices which contribute to the safe handling and storage/disposal of radioactive wastes at the Nevada Test Site. Physical geography, cultural factors, climate and meteorology, geology, hydrology (with emphasis on radionuclide migration), ecology, natural phenomena, and natural resources are discussed and determined to be suitable for effective containment of radionuclides. Also considered, as a separate section, are facilities and operating practices such as monitoring; storage/disposal criteria; site maintenance, equipment, and support; transportation and waste handling; and others which are adequate for the safe handling and storage/disposal of radioactive wastes. In conclusion, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site is suitable for radioactive waste handling and storage/disposal for a maximum of twenty more years at the present rate of utilization

Concepts and examples of safety analyses for radioactive waste repositories in continental geological formations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-01-01

This document is addressed to authorities and specialists responsible for or involved in planning, performing and/or reviewing safety assessments of underground radioactive waste repositories. It is a companion to a general introductory document on the subject ''Safety Assessment for the Underground Disposal of Radioactive Wastes'', IAEA Safety Series No. 56, 1981, and reference to this earlier document will facilitate the reader's understanding of the present report. Since examples of safety analyses are summarized here, it is hoped that this document will contribute to providing a basis for a common understanding among authorities and specialists concerned with the numerous studies involving a variety of scientific disciplines. While providing technical information, this document is also intended to stimulate further international discussion. The purposes of this report are: a) to identify the factors to be taken into account in radiological safety analyses of deep geological repositories, indicating as far as possible their relative importance during the various phases of system development; b) to show how these factors have been analysed in various safety assessment studies; and c) to comment on the merits of the selected and alternative approaches

Concepts and examples of safety analyses for radioactive waste repositories in continental geological formations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1983-01-01

This document is addressed to authorities and specialists responsible for or involved in planning, performing and/or reviewing safety assessments of underground radioactive waste repositories. It is a companion to a general introductory document on the subject ''Safety Assessment for the Underground Disposal of Radioactive Wastes'', IAEA Safety Series No. 56, 1981, and reference to this earlier document will facilitate the reader's understanding of the present report. Since examples of safety analyses are summarized here, it is hoped that this document will contribute to providing a basis for a common understanding among authorities and specialists concerned with the numerous studies involving a variety of scientific disciplines. While providing technical information, this document is also intended to stimulate further international discussion. The purposes of this report are: a) to identify the factors to be taken into account in radiological safety analyses of deep geological repositories, indicating as far as possible their relative importance during the various phases of system development; b) to show how these factors have been analysed in various safety assessment studies; and c) to comment on the merits of the selected and alternative approaches.

Guidance for the definition and application of probabilistic safety criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holmberg, J.-E.; Knochenhauer, M.

2011-05-01

The project 'The Validity of Safety Goals' has been financed jointly by NKS (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research), SSM (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority) and the Swedish and Finnish nuclear utilities. The national financing went through NPSAG, the Nordic PSA Group (Swedish contributions) and SAFIR2010, the Finnish research programme on NPP safety (Finnish contributions). The project has been performed in four phases during 2006-2010. This guidance document aims at describing, on the basis of the work performed throughout the project, issues to consider when defining, applying and interpreting probabilistic safety criteria. Thus, the basic aim of the document is to serve as a checklist and toolbox for the definition and application of probabilistic safety criteria. The document describes the terminology and concepts involved, the levels of criteria and relations between these, how to define a probabilistic safety criterion, how to apply a probabilistic safety criterion, on what to apply the probabilistic safety criterion, and how to interpret the result of the application. The document specifically deals with what makes up a probabilistic safety criterion, i.e., the risk metric, the frequency criterion, the PSA used for assessing compliance and the application procedure for the criterion. It also discusses the concept of subsidiary criteria, i.e., different levels of safety goals. The results from the project can be used as a platform for discussions at the utilities on how to define and use quantitative safety goals. The results can also be used by safety authorities as a reference for risk-informed regulation. The outcome can have an impact on the requirements on PSA, e.g., regarding quality, scope, level of detail, and documentation. Finally, the results can be expected to support on-going activities concerning risk-informed applications. (Author)

Guidance for the definition and application of probabilistic safety criteria

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Holmberg, J.-E. (VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (Finland)); Knochenhauer, M. (Scandpower AB (Sweden))

2011-05-15

The project 'The Validity of Safety Goals' has been financed jointly by NKS (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research), SSM (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority) and the Swedish and Finnish nuclear utilities. The national financing went through NPSAG, the Nordic PSA Group (Swedish contributions) and SAFIR2010, the Finnish research programme on NPP safety (Finnish contributions). The project has been performed in four phases during 2006-2010. This guidance document aims at describing, on the basis of the work performed throughout the project, issues to consider when defining, applying and interpreting probabilistic safety criteria. Thus, the basic aim of the document is to serve as a checklist and toolbox for the definition and application of probabilistic safety criteria. The document describes the terminology and concepts involved, the levels of criteria and relations between these, how to define a probabilistic safety criterion, how to apply a probabilistic safety criterion, on what to apply the probabilistic safety criterion, and how to interpret the result of the application. The document specifically deals with what makes up a probabilistic safety criterion, i.e., the risk metric, the frequency criterion, the PSA used for assessing compliance and the application procedure for the criterion. It also discusses the concept of subsidiary criteria, i.e., different levels of safety goals. The results from the project can be used as a platform for discussions at the utilities on how to define and use quantitative safety goals. The results can also be used by safety authorities as a reference for risk-informed regulation. The outcome can have an impact on the requirements on PSA, e.g., regarding quality, scope, level of detail, and documentation. Finally, the results can be expected to support on-going activities concerning risk-informed applications. (Author)

Documenting Quality Improvement and Patient Safety Efforts: The Quality Portfolio. A Statement from the Academic Hospitalist Taskforce

OpenAIRE

Taylor, Benjamin B.; Parekh, Vikas; Estrada, Carlos A.; Schleyer, Anneliese; Sharpe, Bradley

2013-01-01

Physicians increasingly investigate, work, and teach to improve the quality of care and safety of care delivery. The Society of General Internal Medicine Academic Hospitalist Task Force sought to develop a practical tool, the quality portfolio, to systematically document quality and safety achievements. The quality portfolio was vetted with internal and external stakeholders including national leaders in academic medicine. The portfolio was refined for implementation to include an outlined fr...

Accident consequence calculations for project W-058 safety analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Van Keuren, J.C.

1997-01-01

This document describes the calculations performed to determine the accident consequences for the W-058 safety analysis. Project W-058 is the replacement cross site transfer system (RCSTS), which is designed to transort liquid waste between the 200 W and 200 E areas. Calculations for RCSTS safety analyses used the same methods as the calculations for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) and its supporting calculation notes. Revised analyses were performed for the spray and pool leak accidents since the RCSTS flows and pressures differ from those assumed in the TWRS BIO. Revision 1 of the document incorporates review comments

Third Joint GIF–IAEA Workshop on Safety Design Criteria for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors, 26-27 February 2013, Vienna, Austria. Summary Report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The main objectives of the meeting were to: • Present and share information on the work carried out by GIF, the IAEA and the Member States on the definition of safety design criteria for SFR, including safety approach and requirements on general plant design; • Present the document prepared by the GIF-SFR Task Force on Safety Design Criteria; • Present and discuss safety design concepts of SFRs under development in Member States, with particular emphasis on design measures against Design Basis Accidents and Design Extended Conditions, as well as the associated safety evaluations and supporting R&D; • Draft a room document which should be the basis of the discussion for the Panel on Safety Design Criteria of the FR13 Conference in Paris. • Discuss the results and agree on the future actions of the 3rd Joint GIF-IAEA Workshop on Safety of Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors

Safety assessment of discharge chute isolation barrier preparation and installation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meichle, R.H.

1994-01-01

This analysis examines activities associated with the installation of isolation barriers in the K Basins at the Hanford Reservation. This revision adds evaluation of barrier drops on stored fuel and basin floor, identifies fuel which will be moved and addresses criticality issues with sludge. The safety assessment is made for the activities for the preparation and installation of the discharge chute isolation barriers. The safety assessment includes a hazard assessment and comparisons of potential accidents/events to those addressed by the current safety basis documentation. No significant hazards were identified. An evaluation against the USQ evaluation questions was made and the determination made that the activities do not represent a USQ. Hazard categorization techniques were used to provide a basis for readiness review classifications

Spent nuclear fuel project cold vacuum drying facility safety equipment list

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

IRWIN, J.J.

1999-01-01

This document provides the safety equipment list (SEL) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF). The SEL was prepared in accordance with the procedure for safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in HNF-PRO-516, ''Safety Structures, Systems, and Components,'' Revision 0 and HNF-PRO-097, Engineering Design and Evaluation, Revision 0. The SEL was developed in conjunction with HNF-SO-SNF-SAR-O02, Safety Analysis Report for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility, Phase 2, Supporting Installation of Processing Systems (Garvin 1998). The SEL identifies the SSCs and their safety functions, the design basis accidents for which they are required to perform, the design criteria, codes and standards, and quality assurance requirements that are required for establishing the safety design basis of the SSCs. This SEL has been developed for the CVDF Phase 2 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and shall be updated, expanded, and revised in accordance with future phases of the CVDF SAR until the CVDF final SAR is approved

A safety equipment list for rotary mode core sampling systems operation in single shell flammable gas tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SMALLEY, J.L.

1999-01-01

This document identifies all interim safety equipment to be used for rotary mode core sampling of single-shell flammable gas tanks utilizing Rotary Mode Core Sampling systems (RMCS). This document provides the safety equipment for RMCS trucks HO-68K-4600, HO-68K-4647, trucks three and four respectively, and associated equipment. It is not intended to replace or supersede WHC-SD-WM-SEL-023, (Kelly 1991), or WHC-SD-WM-SEL-032, (Corbett 1994), which classifies 80-68K-4344 and HO-68K-4345 respectively. The term ''safety equipment'' refers to safety class (SC) and safety significant (SS) equipment, where equipment refers to structures, systems and components (SSC's). The identification of safety equipment in this document is based on the credited design safety features and analysis contained in the Authorization Basis (AB) for rotary mode core sampling operations in single-shell flammable gas tanks. This is an interim safety classification since the AB is interim. This document will be updated to reflect the final RMCS equipment safety classification designations upon completion of a final AB which will be implemented with the release of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

Technical basis for exemption from alpha surveys for personnel, material, and equipment in the 324 facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

RIDDELLE, J.G.

1998-01-01

The purpose of this document is to establish the technical basis for characterizing grouted B-Cell waste for disposal at the Hanford Burial Grounds using the 3-82B shipping cask. The scope of this document includes establishing the technical basis for loading the shipping package, an HN-200 Grout Container, to ensure that: (1) the amount of material in the grout container does not exceed the 100 nCl alpha/g limit that would cause the waste to be designated as ''greater that Category 3'' (GC3) or transuranic (TRU) waste (2) the amount of heat generated by the waste in the grout container does not exceed the 60 Watt heat generation limit established in the 3-82B shipping cask Safety Analysis Report (SAR); and (3) the dose rate on the surface of the shipping cask after loading does not exceed the 200 mrem/h limit established in the cask SAR. This document establishes the technical basis for performing measurements and analyses that will ensure that none of these three limits are exceeded

The Algorithm Theoretical Basis Document for Level 1A Processing

Science.gov (United States)

Jester, Peggy L.; Hancock, David W., III

2012-01-01

The first process of the Geoscience Laser Altimeter System (GLAS) Science Algorithm Software converts the Level 0 data into the Level 1A Data Products. The Level 1A Data Products are the time ordered instrument data converted from counts to engineering units. This document defines the equations that convert the raw instrument data into engineering units. Required scale factors, bias values, and coefficients are defined in this document. Additionally, required quality assurance and browse products are defined in this document.

Safety study application guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-07-01

Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., (Energy Systems) is committed to performing and documenting safety analyses for facilities it manages for the Department of Energy (DOE). Included are analyses of existing facilities done under the aegis of the Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program, and analyses of new and modified facilities. A graded approach is used wherein the level of analysis and documentation for each facility is commensurate with the magnitude of the hazard(s), the complexity of the facility and the stage of the facility life cycle. Safety analysis reports (SARs) for hazard Category 1 and 2 facilities are usually detailed and extensive because these categories are associated with public health and safety risk. SARs for Category 3 are normally much less extensive because the risk to public health and safety is slight. At Energy Systems, safety studies are the name given to SARs for Category 3 (formerly open-quotes lowclose quotes) facilities. Safety studies are the appropriate instrument when on-site risks are limited to irreversible consequences to a few people, and off-site consequences are limited to reversible consequences to a few people. This application guide provides detailed instructions for performing safety studies that meet the requirements of DOE Orders 5480.22, open-quotes Technical Safety Requirements,close quotes and 5480.23, open-quotes Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.close quotes A seven-chapter format has been adopted for safety studies. This format allows for discussion of all the items required by DOE Order 5480.23 and for the discussions to be readily traceable to the listing in the order. The chapter titles are: (1) Introduction and Summary, (2) Site, (3) Facility Description, (4) Safety Basis, (5) Hazardous Material Management, (6) Management, Organization, and Institutional Safety Provisions, and (7) Accident Analysis

Accelerated safety analyses - structural analyses Phase I - structural sensitivity evaluation of single- and double-shell waste storage tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Becker, D.L.

1994-11-01

Accelerated Safety Analyses - Phase I (ASA-Phase I) have been conducted to assess the appropriateness of existing tank farm operational controls and/or limits as now stipulated in the Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs) and Operating Specification Documents, and to establish a technical basis for the waste tank operating safety envelope. Structural sensitivity analyses were performed to assess the response of the different waste tank configurations to variations in loading conditions, uncertainties in loading parameters, and uncertainties in material characteristics. Extensive documentation of the sensitivity analyses conducted and results obtained are provided in the detailed ASA-Phase I report, Structural Sensitivity Evaluation of Single- and Double-Shell Waste Tanks for Accelerated Safety Analysis - Phase I. This document provides a summary of the accelerated safety analyses sensitivity evaluations and the resulting findings

K Basin safety analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Porten, D.R.; Crowe, R.D.

1994-01-01

The purpose of this accident safety analysis is to document in detail, analyses whose results were reported in summary form in the K Basins Safety Analysis Report WHC-SD-SNF-SAR-001. The safety analysis addressed the potential for release of radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous material located in the K Basins and their supporting facilities. The safety analysis covers the hazards associated with normal K Basin fuel storage and handling operations, fuel encapsulation, sludge encapsulation, and canister clean-up and disposal. After a review of the Criticality Safety Evaluation of the K Basin activities, the following postulated events were evaluated: Crane failure and casks dropped into loadout pit; Design basis earthquake; Hypothetical loss of basin water accident analysis; Combustion of uranium fuel following dryout; Crane failure and cask dropped onto floor of transfer area; Spent ion exchange shipment for burial; Hydrogen deflagration in ion exchange modules and filters; Release of Chlorine; Power availability and reliability; and Ashfall

Concept for creating program-technical complex of safety monitoring with system of safety parameters presentation functions on the basis of routine WWER-1000 systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dunaev, V.G.; Tarasov, M. V.; Povarov, P.V.

2005-01-01

Prerequisites of creating the software-hardware complex for reactor safety monitoring on the Volgodonsk NPP are analyzed and generalized. The concept of this complex is based on functions of the safety parameters presentation system. It will serve as an interface between operator and technological process and give to operator a possibility to estimate quickly the state of the safety of the nuclear power unit. The complex will be created on the basis of routine reactor monitoring and control systems intended for the WWER-1000 reactor. In addition to existing soft- and hard-wares for reactor monitoring and for analysis of technological archive, it is proposed to create and connect in parallel the new software-hardware complex which ensures calculation and presentation of generalized factors of reactor safety [ru

CERN's new safety policy

CERN Multimedia

2014-01-01

The documents below, published on 29 September 2014 on the HSE website, together replace the document SAPOCO 42 as well as Safety Codes A1, A5, A9, A10, which are no longer in force. As from the publication date of these documents any reference made to the document SAPOCO 42 or to Safety Codes A1, A5, A9 and A10 in contractual documents or CERN rules and regulations shall be deemed to constitute a reference to the corresponding provisions of the documents listed below.   "The CERN Safety Policy" "Safety Regulation SR-SO - Responsibilities and organisational structure in matters of Safety at CERN" "General Safety Instruction GSI-SO-1 - Departmental Safety Officer (DSO)" "General Safety Instruction GSI-SO-2 - Territorial Safety Officer (TSO)" "General Safety Instruction GSI-SO-3 - Safety Linkperson (SLP)" "General Safety Instruction GSI-SO-4 - Large Experiment Group Leader In Matters of Safety (LEXGLI...

AEC sets five year nuclear safety research program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1976-01-01

The research by the government for the establishment of means of judging the adequacy of safety measures incorporated in nuclear facilities, including setting safety standards and collecting documents of general criteria, and the research by the industry on safety measures and the promotion of safety-related technique are stated in the five year program for 1976-80 reported by subcommittees, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Four considerations on the research items incorporated in the program are 1) technical programs relating to the safety of nuclear facilities and the necessary criteria, 2) priority of the relevant items decided according to their impact on circumstances, urgency, the defence-indepth concept and so on, 3) consideration of all relevant data and documents collected, and research subjects necessary to quantify safety measurement, and 4) consideration of technological actualization, the capability of each research body, the budget and the time schedule. In addition, seven major themes decided on the basis of these points are 1) reactivity-initiated accident, 2) LOCA, 3) fuel behavior, 4) structural safety, 5) radioactive release, 6) statistical method of safety evaluation, and 7) seismic characteristics. The committee has deliberated the appropriate division of researches between the government and the industry. A set of tables showing the nuclear safety research plan for 1976-80 are attached. (Iwakiri, K.)

Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dr. Michael A. Lehto; Kevin J. Carroll; Dr. Robert Lowrie

2007-05-01

/Security Documentation Integration, Configuration Control, and development of a shared ‘tool box’ of information/successes. Specific Benefits. The expectation or end state resulting from the topical report and associated implementation plan includes: (1) A recommended process for handling the documentation of the security and safety disciplines, including an appropriate change control process and participation by all stakeholders. (2) A means to package security systems with sufficient information to help expedite the flow of that system through the process. In addition, a means to share successes among sites, to include information and safety basis to the extent such information is transportable. (3) Identification of key security systems and associated essential security elements being installed and an arrangement for the sites installing these systems to host an appropriate team to review a specific system and determine what information is exportable. (4) Identification of the security systems’ essential elements and appropriate controls required for testing of these essential elements in the facility. (5) The ability to help refine and improve an agreed to control set at the manufacture stage.

A safety equipment list for rotary mode core sampling systems operation in single shell flammable gas tanks; TOPICAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SMALLEY, J.L.

1999-01-01

This document identifies all interim safety equipment to be used for rotary mode core sampling of single-shell flammable gas tanks utilizing Rotary Mode Core Sampling systems (RMCS). This document provides the safety equipment for RMCS trucks HO-68K-4600, HO-68K-4647, trucks three and four respectively, and associated equipment. It is not intended to replace or supersede WHC-SD-WM-SEL-023, (Kelly 1991), or WHC-SD-WM-SEL-032, (Corbett 1994), which classifies 80-68K-4344 and HO-68K-4345 respectively. The term ''safety equipment'' refers to safety class (SC) and safety significant (SS) equipment, where equipment refers to structures, systems and components (SSC's). The identification of safety equipment in this document is based on the credited design safety features and analysis contained in the Authorization Basis (AB) for rotary mode core sampling operations in single-shell flammable gas tanks. This is an interim safety classification since the AB is interim. This document will be updated to reflect the final RMCS equipment safety classification designations upon completion of a final AB which will be implemented with the release of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) 2000 Public-Use Data Files, User's Manual, and Detailed Data Documentation. [CD-ROM].

Science.gov (United States)

National Center for Education Statistics (ED), Washington, DC.

This CD-ROM contains the raw, public-use data from the 2000 School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) along with a User's Manual and Detailed Data Documentation. The data are provided in SAS, SPSS, STATA, and ASCII formats. The User's Manual and the Detailed Data Documentation are provided as .pdf files. (Author)

Using the safety/security interface to the security manager's advantage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stapleton, B.W.

1993-01-01

Two aspects of the safety/security interface are discussed: (1) the personal safety of nuclear security officers; and (2) how the security manager can effectively deal with the safety/security interface in solving today's requirements yet supporting the overall mission of the facility. The basis of this presentation is the result of interviews, document analyses, and observations. The conclusion is that proper planning and communication between the players involved in the security/safety interface can benefit the two programs and help achieve overall system integration, ultimately contributing to the bottom line. This is especially important in today's cost conscious environment

A document-driven method for certifying scientific computing software for use in nuclear safety analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, W. Spencer; Koothoor, Mimitha

2016-01-01

This paper presents a documentation and development method to facilitate the certification of scientific computing software used in the safety analysis of nuclear facilities. To study the problems faced during quality assurance and certification activities, a case study was performed on legacy software used for thermal analysis of a fuel pin in a nuclear reactor. Although no errors were uncovered in the code, 27 issues of incompleteness and inconsistency were found with the documentation. This work proposes that software documentation follow a rational process, which includes a software requirements specification following a template that is reusable, maintainable, and understandable. To develop the design and implementation, this paper suggests literate programming as an alternative to traditional structured programming. Literate programming allows for documenting of numerical algorithms and code together in what is termed the literate programmer's manual. This manual is developed with explicit traceability to the software requirements specification. The traceability between the theory, numerical algorithms, and implementation facilitates achieving completeness and consistency, as well as simplifies the process of verification and the associated certification

A document-driven method for certifying scientific computing software for use in nuclear safety analysis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, W. Spencer; Koothoor, Mimitha [Computing and Software Department, McMaster University, Hamilton (Canada)

2016-04-15

This paper presents a documentation and development method to facilitate the certification of scientific computing software used in the safety analysis of nuclear facilities. To study the problems faced during quality assurance and certification activities, a case study was performed on legacy software used for thermal analysis of a fuel pin in a nuclear reactor. Although no errors were uncovered in the code, 27 issues of incompleteness and inconsistency were found with the documentation. This work proposes that software documentation follow a rational process, which includes a software requirements specification following a template that is reusable, maintainable, and understandable. To develop the design and implementation, this paper suggests literate programming as an alternative to traditional structured programming. Literate programming allows for documenting of numerical algorithms and code together in what is termed the literate programmer's manual. This manual is developed with explicit traceability to the software requirements specification. The traceability between the theory, numerical algorithms, and implementation facilitates achieving completeness and consistency, as well as simplifies the process of verification and the associated certification.

Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

Gas-cooled breeder reactor safety

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chermanne, J.; Burgsmueller, P. [Societe Belge pour l' Industrie Nucleaire, Brussels

1981-01-15

The European Association for the Gas-cooled Breeder Reactor (G B R A), set-up in 1969 prepared between 1972 and 1974 a 1200 MWe Gas-cooled Breeder Reactor (G B R) commercial reference design G B R 4. It was then found necessary that a sound and neutral appraisal of the G B R licenseability be carried out. The Commission of the European Communities (C E C) accepted to sponsor this exercise. At the beginning of 1974, the C E C convened a group of experts to examine on a Community level, the safety documents prepared by the G B R A. A working party was set-up for that purpose. The experts examined a ''Preliminary Safety Working Document'' on which written questions and comments were presented. A ''Supplement'' containing the answers to all the questions plus a detailed fault tree and reliability analysis was then prepared. After a final study of this document and a last series of discussions with G B R A representatives, the experts concluded that on the basis of the evidence presented to the Working Party, no fundamental reasons were identified which would prevent a Gas-cooled Breeder Reactor of the kind proposed by the G B R A achieving a satisfactory safety status. Further work carried out on ultimate accident have confirmed this conclusion. One can therefore claim that the overall safety risk associated with G B R s compares favourably with that of any other reactor system.

Nuclear criticality safety basics for personnel working with nuclear fissionable materials. Phase I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vausher, A.L.

1984-10-01

DOE order 5480.1A, Chapter V, ''Safety of Nuclear Facilities,'' establishes safety procedures and requirements for DOE nuclear facilities. The ''Nuclear Criticality Safety Basic Program - Phase I'' is documented in this report. The revised program has been developed to clearly illustrate the concept of nuclear safety and to help the individual employee incorporate safe behavior in his daily work performance. Because of this, the subject of safety has been approached through its three fundamentals: scientific basis, engineering criteria, and administrative controls. Only basics of these three elements were presented. 5 refs

ACCIDENT ANALYSES & CONTROL OPTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE SLUDGE WATER SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

WILLIAMS, J.C.

2003-11-15

This report documents the accident analyses and nuclear safety control options for use in Revision 7 of HNF-SD-WM-SAR-062, ''K Basins Safety Analysis Report'' and Revision 4 of HNF-SD-SNF-TSR-001, ''Technical Safety Requirements - 100 KE and 100 KW Fuel Storage Basins''. These documents will define the authorization basis for Sludge Water System (SWS) operations. This report follows the guidance of DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports'', for calculating onsite and offsite consequences. The accident analysis summary is shown in Table ES-1 below. While this document describes and discusses potential control options to either mitigate or prevent the accidents discussed herein, it should be made clear that the final control selection for any accident is determined and presented in HNF-SD-WM-SAR-062.

The current CEA/DRN safety approach for the design and the assessment of future nuclear installations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fiorini, G.L.; Pinto, P.L.; Costa, M.

1999-01-01

The purpose of the document is to present the basis of the safety approach currently implemented by the CEA/DRN, both for the design and the assessment of innovative systems and future nuclear installations. This approach is the result of the experience maturated, within the context of the CEA/DRN Innovative Programme through practical applications over several future concepts, both for fission and fusion reactors, as well as for waste disposal. The background of this experience is structured coherently with the European Safety Authorities recommendations and the European Utilities Requirements (EUR). The Defence In Depth principle and its application, by means, among others, of the barrier concept, remains the basis of the safety design process of future nuclear installations. Its adequacy is checked through the safety assessment. The methodology for Lines Of Defence (LOD) implementation as well as the one for the LOD architecture assessment is shown and motivated. The document shows that the clear and unambiguous definition of the safety approach provides an essential base for the organisation of the design tasks, being sure that the safety aspects are correctly taken into account and implemented, and for an adequate safety assessment of the final design, both from qualitative point of view as well as for the quantitative safety analysis. (author)

Lifecycle management for nuclear engineering project documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Li; Zhang Ming; Zhang Ling

2010-01-01

The nuclear engineering project documents with great quantity and various types of data, in which the relationships of each document are complex, the edition of document update frequently, are managed difficultly. While the safety of project even the nuclear safety is threatened seriously by the false documents and mistakes. In order to ensure the integrality, veracity and validity of project documents, the lifecycle theory of document is applied to build documents center, record center, structure and database of document lifecycle management system. And the lifecycle management is used to the documents of nuclear engineering projects from the production to pigeonhole, to satisfy the quality requirement of nuclear engineering projects. (authors)

Final Safety Analysis Document for Building 693 Chemical Waste Storage Building at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Salazar, R.J.; Lane, S.

1992-02-01

This Safety Analysis Document (SAD) for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 693, Chemical Waste Storage Building (desipated as Building 693 Container Storage Unit in the Laboratory's RCRA Part B permit application), provides the necessary information and analyses to conclude that Building 693 can be operated at low risk without unduly endangering the safety of the building operating personnel or adversely affecting the public or the environment. This Building 693 SAD consists of eight sections and supporting appendices. Section 1 presents a summary of the facility designs and operations and Section 2 summarizes the safety analysis method and results. Section 3 describes the site, the facility desip, operations and management structure. Sections 4 and 5 present the safety analysis and operational safety requirements (OSRs). Section 6 reviews Hazardous Waste Management's (HWM) Quality Assurance (QA) program. Section 7 lists the references and background material used in the preparation of this report Section 8 lists acronyms, abbreviations and symbols. Appendices contain supporting analyses, definitions, and descriptions that are referenced in the body of this report

Health risk from radioactive and chemical environmental contamination: common basis for assessment and safety decision making

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Demin, V.

2004-01-01

To meet the growing practical need in risk analysis in Russia health risk assessment tools and regulations have been developed in the frame of few federal research programs. RRC Kurchatov Institute is involved in R and D on risk analysis activity in these programs. One of the objectives of this development is to produce a common, unified basis of health risk analysis for different sources of risk. Current specific and different approaches in risk assessment and establishing safety standards developed for chemicals and ionising radiation are analysed. Some recommendations are given to produce the common approach. A specific risk index R has been proposed for safety decision-making (establishing safety standards and other levels of protective actions, comparison of various sources of risk, etc.). The index R is defined as the partial mathematical expectation of lost years of healthy life (LLE) due to exposure during a year to a risk source considered. The more concrete determinations of this index for different risk sources derived from the common definition of R are given. Generic safety standards (GSS) for the public and occupational workers have been suggested in terms of this index. Secondary specific safety standards have been derived from GSS for ionizing radiation and a number of other risk sources including environmental chemical pollutants. Other general and derived levels for decision-making have also been proposed including the e-minimum level. Their possible dependence on the national or regional health-demographic data is shortly considered. Recommendations are given on methods and criteria for comparison of various sources of risk. Some examples of risk comparison are demonstrated in the frame of different comparison tasks. The paper has been prepared on the basis of the research work supported by International Science and Technology Centre, Moscow (project no. 2558). (author)

FLIGHT SAFETY CONTROL OF THE BASIS OF UNCERTAIN RISK EVALUATION WITH NON-ROUTINE FLIGHT CONDITIONS INVOLVED

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

2016-01-01

Full Text Available The article deals with methods of forecasting the level of aviation safety operation of aircraft systems on the basis of methods of evaluation the risks of negative situations as a consequence of a functional loss of initial properties of the system with critical violations of standard modes of the aircraft. Mathematical Models of Risks as a Danger Measure of Discrete Random Events in Aviation Systems are presented. Technological Schemes and Structure of Risk Control Proce- dures without the Probability are illustrated as Methods of Risk Management System in Civil Aviation. The assessment of the level of safety and quality and management of aircraft, made not only from the standpoint of reliability (quality and consumer properties, but also from the position of ICAO on the basis of a risk-based approach. According to ICAO, the security assessment is performed by comparing the calculated risk with an acceptable level. The approach justifies the use of qualitative evaluation techniques safety in the forms of proactive forecasted and predictive risk management adverse impacts to aviation operations of various kinds, including the space sector and nuclear energy. However, for the events such as accidents and disasters, accidents with the aircraft, fighters in a training flight, during the preparation of the pilots on the training aircraft, etc. there is no required statistics. Density of probability distribution (p. d. f. of these events are only hypothetical, unknown with "hard tails" that completely eliminates the application of methods of confidence intervals in the traditional approaches to the assessment of safety in the form of the probability analysis.

Applications for electronic documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beitel, G.A.

1995-01-01

This paper discusses the application of electronic media to documents, specifically Safety Analysis Reports (SARs), prepared for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (ER ampersand WM) programs being conducted for the Department of Energy (DOE) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). Efforts are underway to upgrade our document system using electronic format. To satisfy external requirements (DOE, State, and Federal), ER ampersand WM programs generate a complement of internal requirements documents including a SAR and Technical Safety Requirements along with procedures and training materials. Of interest, is the volume of information and the difficulty in handling it. A recently prepared ER ampersand WM SAR consists of 1,000 pages of text and graphics; supporting references add 10,000 pages. Other programmatic requirements documents consist of an estimated 5,000 pages plus references

Implementation in Russia and the European Union of International Safety Standards of Identity Documents with Biometric Data: Legal Regulation and Perspectives

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alexander Grigoryevich Volevodz

2015-01-01

Full Text Available The article contains the findings of a research into particular aspects of use of identity documents with personal biometric data. It considers the international safety standards of documents with biometric data worked out by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, pursuant to which those data should be included into machine-readable documents used by their holders for travel to various states. It contains the information on the implementation of these international standards in Russian and European Union law. The author has substantiated a conclusion to the effect that the procedure established in Russia for production and issuance, as well as for use of international, diplomatic and service passports identifying the Russian Federation citizen outside the Russian Federation territory, containing electronic information carriers with personal and biometric personal data, currently conforms to the international safety standards of documents with biometric data. The article surveys the experience of introducing domestic biometric identity documents - electronic passports in various countries of the world, and the problems arising therefrom. It substantiates the advantages and disadvantages of determining a passport of the Russian Federation citizen issued in the form of an identity card with an electronic information carrier, as the main document of the Russian Federation citizen identifying him domestically within the country's territory.

Fiscal year 1997-1998 waste information requirements document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poppiti, J.A.

1997-01-01

The Waste Information Requirements Document describes the activities of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Characterization Project that provide characterization information on Hanford Site waste tanks. The characterization information is required to perform operations and meet the commitments of TWRS end users. These commitments are derived from the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, also known as the Tri-Party Agreement; the Recommendation 93-5 Implementation Plan to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB); and other directives as listed in Section 4.0. This Waste Information Requirement Document applies to Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998 activities. Its contents are based on the best information available in August 1997. The format and content are based on the directions of DOE-RL (Sieracki, 1997) and Fluor Daniel Hanford Incorporated (Umek, 1997). Activities, such as the revision of the Tank Characterization Technical Sampling Basis (Brown et al. 1997), the revision of the data quality objectives (DQOs), issue closures, discussions with Ecology, and management decisions may cause subsequent updates to the Waste Information Requirements Document

System and software safety analysis for the ERA control computer

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beerthuizen, P.G.; Kruidhof, W.

2001-01-01

The European Robotic Arm (ERA) is a seven degrees of freedom relocatable anthropomorphic robotic manipulator system, to be used in manned space operation on the International Space Station, supporting the assembly and external servicing of the Russian segment. The safety design concept and implementation of the ERA is described, in particular with respect to the central computer's software design. A top-down analysis and specification process is used to down flow the safety aspects of the ERA system towards the subsystems, which are produced by a consortium of companies in many countries. The user requirements documents and the critical function list are the key documents in this process. Bottom-up analysis (FMECA) and test, on both subsystem and system level, are the basis for safety verification. A number of examples show the use of the approach and methods used

Environmental qualification - walkdowns: The documentation of configuration information for safety related components, equipment and systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Melmer, J.; Waters, M.

1995-01-01

Environmental Qualification walkdowns are conducted to collect field data to verify/validate/document configurations of safety related equipment and systems. This paper describes the process for conducting walkdowns and the justification for using an electronic format. The following are described: a) Background; b) Preparing, executing and processing walkdowns; c) Hardware/software; d) Impact of a paperless system on walkdown execution, maintenance and work planning; e) Other applications for the technology

Application of Microprocessor-Based Equipment in Nuclear Power Plants - Technical Basis for a Qualification Methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Korsah, K.

2001-01-01

This document (1) summarizes the most significant findings of the ''Qualification of Advanced Instrumentation and Control (I and C) Systems'' program initiated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); (2) documents a comparative analysis of U.S. and European qualification standards; and (3) provides recommendations for enhancing regulatory guidance for environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related systems. Safety-related I and C system upgrades of present-day nuclear power plants, as well as I and C systems of Advanced Light-Water Reactors (ALWRs), are expected to make increasing use of microprocessor-based technology. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognized that the use of such technology may pose environmental qualification challenges different from current, analog-based I and C systems. Hence, it initiated the ''Qualification of Advanced Instrumentation and Control Systems'' program. The objectives of this confirmatory research project are to (1) identify any unique environmental-stress-related failure modes posed by digital technologies and their potential impact on the safety systems and (2) develop the technical basis for regulatory guidance using these findings. Previous findings from this study have been documented in several technical reports. This final report in the series documents a comparative analysis of two environmental qualification standards--Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std 323-1983 and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60780 (1998)--and provides recommendations for environmental qualification of microprocessor-based systems based on this analysis as well as on the findings documented in the previous reports. The two standards were chosen for this analysis because IEEE 323 is the standard used in the U.S. for the qualification of safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants, and IEC 60780 is its European counterpart. In addition, the IEC document was published in

Technical basis for external dosimetry at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bradley, E.W.; Wu, C.F.; Goff, T.E.

1993-01-01

The WIPP External Dosimetry Program, administered by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Waste Isolation Division, for the US Department of Energy (DOE), provides external dosimetry support services for operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site. These operations include the receipt, experimentation with, storage, and disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes. This document describes the technical basis for the WIPP External Radiation Dosimetry Program. The purposes of this document are to: (1) provide assurance that the WIPP External Radiation Dosimetry Program is in compliance with all regulatory requirements, (2) provide assurance that the WIPP External Radiation Dosimetry Program is derived from a sound technical base, (3) serve as a technical reference for radiation protection personnel, and (4) aid in identifying and planning for future needs. The external radiation exposure fields are those that are documented in the WIPP Final Safety Analysis Report

Food Safety and Sanitary Practices of Selected Hotels in Batangas Province, Philippines: Basis of Proposed Enhancement Measures

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

April M. Perez

2017-02-01

Full Text Available This study assessed the extent of food safety and sanitary practices of selected hotels in Batangas province as basis of proposed enhancement measures. The study utilized descriptive method to describe food safety and sanitary practices of selected hotels in Batangas province with a total of 8 hotels (256 respondents. Purposive sampling was used in the study. The questionnaires were designed using the provision of the Sanitation Code of the Philippines, validated and finalized to come up with legitimate results. The study showed that there were eight (8 hotel respondents classified as two, three, four star with considerable years of experience and adequate number of employees. The hotels demonstrated the food safety and sanitary practices always in the areas of restaurant, bar service, catering and banquet and room service. The significant pair-wise comparison for restaurant, bar service, catering and banquet and room service shows that 2 star hotels greatly differs. The researcher recommends that the management should maintain high standard of food safety and sanitary practices among its staff, upgrade the food safety and sanitary practices for food safety accreditation, continuous training of the hotel managers/employees on food safety and sanitary practices.

Safety regulation for the design approval of special form radioactive sources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cho, Woon-Kap

2009-01-01

Several kinds of special form radioactive sources for industrial, medical applications are being produced in Korea. Special form radioactive sources should meet strict safety requirements specified in the domestic safety regulations and the design of the sources should be certified by the regulatory authority, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). Several safety tests such as impact, percussion, heating, and leak tests are performed on the sources according to the domestic regulations and the international safety standards such as ANSI N542-1977 and ISO 2919-1999(E). As a regulatory expert body, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) assesses various types of application documents, such as safety analysis report, quality assurance program, and other documents evidencing fulfillment of requirements for design approval of the special form radioactive sources, submitted by a legal person who intends to produce special form radioactive sources and then reports the assessment result to MEST. A design approval certificate is issued to the applicant by MEST on the basis of a technical evaluation report presented by KINS.

Cultural diversity: blind spot in medical curriculum documents, a document analysis.

Science.gov (United States)

Paternotte, Emma; Fokkema, Joanne P I; van Loon, Karsten A; van Dulmen, Sandra; Scheele, Fedde

2014-08-22

Cultural diversity among patients presents specific challenges to physicians. Therefore, cultural diversity training is needed in medical education. In cases where strategic curriculum documents form the basis of medical training it is expected that the topic of cultural diversity is included in these documents, especially if these have been recently updated. The aim of this study was to assess the current formal status of cultural diversity training in the Netherlands, which is a multi-ethnic country with recently updated medical curriculum documents. In February and March 2013, a document analysis was performed of strategic curriculum documents for undergraduate and postgraduate medical education in the Netherlands. All text phrases that referred to cultural diversity were extracted from these documents. Subsequently, these phrases were sorted into objectives, training methods or evaluation tools to assess how they contributed to adequate curriculum design. Of a total of 52 documents, 33 documents contained phrases with information about cultural diversity training. Cultural diversity aspects were more prominently described in the curriculum documents for undergraduate education than in those for postgraduate education. The most specific information about cultural diversity was found in the blueprint for undergraduate medical education. In the postgraduate curriculum documents, attention to cultural diversity differed among specialties and was mainly superficial. Cultural diversity is an underrepresented topic in the Dutch documents that form the basis for actual medical training, although the documents have been updated recently. Attention to the topic is thus unwarranted. This situation does not fit the demand of a multi-ethnic society for doctors with cultural diversity competences. Multi-ethnic countries should be critical on the content of the bases for their medical educational curricula.

Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE's independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91

Technical basis for the ITER detailed design report, cost review and safety analysis (DDR)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

The ITER Detailed Design Report (DDR), Cost Review and Safety Analysis is the 3rd major milestone representing the progress made in the ITER Engineering Design Activities. With the approval of the Interim Design Report (IDR), it has been possible to freeze the main concepts and system approaches for ITER and to develop the design in more detail for the individual components and sub-systems. This report, although designed to be fully understandable as a separate document, focusses particularly on the main changes since the IDR

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program: Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Docket No. 50-29)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-10-01

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared Supplement 1 to the final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR) (NUREG-0825), under the scope of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), for Yankee Atomic Electric Company's Yankee Nuclear Power Station located in Rowe, Massachusetts. The SEP was initiated by the NRC to review the design of older operating nuclear power plants to reconfirm and document their safety. This report documents the review completed under the SEP for those issues that required refined engineering evaluations or the continuation of ongoing evaluations after the Final IPSAR for the Yankee plant was issued. The review has provided for (1) an assessment of the significance of differences between current technical positions on selected safety issues and those that existed when Yankee was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. 2 tabs

Safety of Research Reactors. Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The main objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to provide a basis for safety and a basis for safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Another objective is to establish requirements on aspects relating to regulatory control, the management of safety, site evaluation, design, operation and decommissioning. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives. This Safety Requirements publication is intended for use by organizations engaged in the site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, operation and decommissioning of research reactors as well as by regulatory bodies

Hanford surplus facilities hazards identification document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Egge, R.G.

1997-01-01

This document provides general safety information needed by personnel who enter and work in surplus facilities managed by Bechtel Hanford, Inc. The purpose of the document is to enhance access control of surplus facilities, educate personnel on the potential hazards associated with these facilities prior to entry, and ensure that safety precautions are taken while in the facility

Safety Case Development as an Information Modelling Problem

Science.gov (United States)

Lewis, Robert

This paper considers the benefits from applying information modelling as the basis for creating an electronically-based safety case. It highlights the current difficulties of developing and managing large document-based safety cases for complex systems such as those found in Air Traffic Control systems. After a review of current tools and related literature on this subject, the paper proceeds to examine the many relationships between entities that can exist within a large safety case. The paper considers the benefits to both safety case writers and readers from the future development of an ideal safety case tool that is able to exploit these information models. The paper also introduces the idea that the safety case has formal relationships between entities that directly support the safety case argument using a methodology such as GSN, and informal relationships that provide links to direct and backing evidence and to supporting information.

1E Qualification of Electrical Equipment - Requirement for Safety Nuclear Power Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geambasu, C.; Segarceanu, D.; Albu, J.

2002-01-01

The paper presents the qualification methods of the safety related equipment according to the safety class 1E. There are presented the qualification principles, procedure and documents, emphasis being laid on the qualification approach by type tests. This approach assumes the equipment test under both normal and accident conditions (design basis events) simulating the operational conditions and covers the largest part of electrical equipment from a nuclear power plant.The safety related equipment is to be qualified is subjected to a sequential test that will be detailed in the paper. (author)

Technical basis for the ITER detailed design report, cost review and safety analysis (DDR)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-12-01

The ITER Detailed Design Report (DDR), Cost Review and Safety Analysis is the 3rd major milestone representing the progress made in the ITER Engineering Design Activities. With the approval of the Interim Design Report (IDR), it has been possible to freeze the main concepts and system approaches for ITER and to develop the design in more detail for the individual components and sub-systems. This report, although designed to be fully understandable as a separate document, focusses particularly on the main changes since the IDR. Refs, figs, tabs

Safety goals and safety culture opening plenary. 2. Safety Regulation Implemented by Gosatomnadzor of Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gutsalov, A.T.; Bukrinsky, A.M.

2001-01-01

This paper describes principles and approaches used by Gosatomnadzor of Russia in establishing safety goals. The link between safety goals and safety culture is demonstrated. The paper also contains information on nuclear regulatory activities in Russia. Regulatory documents of Gosatomnadzor of Russia do not provide precise definitions of safety goals as IAEA documents INSAG-3 or INSAG-12 do. However, overall activities of Gosatomnadzor of Russia are directed to the achievement of these safety goals, as Gosatomnadzor of Russia is a federal executive authority responsible for the regulation of nuclear and radiation safety in accordance with the Russian Federal Law 'On the Use of Nuclear Energy'. Thus, in the Statement of the Policy of the Russian Regulatory Authority, enacted in 1992, it was established that the overall activities of Gosatomnadzor of Russia are directed to the achievement of the main goal. This goal is to establish conditions that ensure that personnel, the public, and the environment are protected from unacceptable radiation and nonproliferation of nuclear materials. The practical application of such a method as given by the publication of Statements of Policy of Gosatomnadzor of Russia may be considered as a safety culture element. 'General Provisions of NPP Safety Ensuring' (OPB-88/ 97) is a regulatory document of the highest level in the hierarchy of regulatory documents of Gosatomnadzor of Russia. It establishes quantitative values of safety goals as do the foregoing IAEA documents. Thus, this regulatory document sets up the following: 1. The estimated total probability of severe accidents should not exceed 10 5 /reactor.yr. 2. The estimated probability of the worst possible radioactive release to the environment specified in the standards should not exceed 10 -7 /reactor.yr in the case of severe beyond-design-basis accidents. 3. The probability of a reactor vessel failure should not exceed 10 -7 /reactor.yr. The foregoing values are somehow

A prioritization of generic safety issues. Supplement 19, Revision insertion instructions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-11-01

The report presents the safety priority ranking for generic safety issues related to nuclear power plants. The purpose of these rankings is to assist in the timely and efficient allocation of NRC resources for the resolution of those safety issues that have a significant potential for reducing risk. The safety priority rankings are HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, and DROP, and have been assigned on the basis of risk significance estimates, the ratio of risk to costs and other impacts estimated to result if resolution of the safety issues were implemented, and the consideration of uncertainties and other quantitative or qualitative factors. To the extent practical, estimates are quantitative. This document provides revisions and amendments to the report

A prioritization of generic safety issues. Supplement 19, Revision insertion instructions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

1995-11-01

The report presents the safety priority ranking for generic safety issues related to nuclear power plants. The purpose of these rankings is to assist in the timely and efficient allocation of NRC resources for the resolution of those safety issues that have a significant potential for reducing risk. The safety priority rankings are HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, and DROP, and have been assigned on the basis of risk significance estimates, the ratio of risk to costs and other impacts estimated to result if resolution of the safety issues were implemented, and the consideration of uncertainties and other quantitative or qualitative factors. To the extent practical, estimates are quantitative. This document provides revisions and amendments to the report.

Task Group on Safety Margins Action Plan (SMAP). Safety Margins Action Plan - Final Report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hrehor, Miroslav; Gavrilas, Mirela; Belac, Josef; Sairanen, Risto; Bruna, Giovanni; Reocreux, Michel; Touboul, Francoise; Krzykacz-Hausmann, B.; Park, Jong Seuk; Prosek, Andrej; Hortal, Javier; Sandervaag, Odbjoern; Zimmerman, Martin

2007-01-01

The international nuclear community has expressed concern that some changes in existing plants could challenge safety margins while fulfilling all the regulatory requirements. In 1998, NEA published a report by the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities on Future Nuclear Regulatory Challenges. The report recognized 'Safety margins during more exacting operating modes' as a technical issue with potential regulatory impact. Examples of plant changes that can cause such exacting operating modes include power up-rates, life extension or increased fuel burnup. In addition, the community recognized that the cumulative effects of simultaneous changes in a plant could be larger than the accumulation of the individual effects of each change. In response to these concerns, CSNI constituted the safety margins action plan (SMAP) task group with the following objectives: 'To agree on a framework for integrated assessments of the changes to the overall safety of the plant as a result of simultaneous changes in plant operation / condition; To develop a CSNI document which can be used by member countries to assess the effect of plant change on the overall safety of the plant; To share information and experience.' The two approaches to safety analysis, deterministic and probabilistic, use different methods and have been developed mostly independently of each other. This makes it difficult to assure consistency between them. As the trend to use information on risk (where the term risk means results of the PSA/PRA analysis) to support regulatory decisions is growing in many countries, it is necessary to develop a method of evaluating safety margin sufficiency that is applicable to both approaches and, whenever possible, integrated in a consistent way. Chapter 2 elaborates on the traditional view of safety margins and the means by which they are currently treated in deterministic analyses. This chapter also discusses the technical basis for safety limits as they are used today

Unreviewed safety question evaluation of 100 K West fuel canister gas and liquid sampling

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alwardt, L.D.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this report is to provide the basis for answers to an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) safety evaluation for the gas and liquid sampling activities associated with the fuel characterization program at the 100 K West (KW) fuel storage basin. The scope of this safety evaluation is limited to the movement of canisters between the main storage basin, weasel pit, and south loadout pit transfer channel (also known as the decapping station); gas and liquid sampling of fuel canisters in the weasel pit; mobile laboratory preliminary sample analysis in or near the 105 KW basin building; and the placement of sample containers in an approved shipping container. It was concluded that the activities and potential accident consequences associated with the gas and liquid sampling of 100 KW fuel canisters are bounded by the current safety basis documents and do not constitute an Unreviewed Safety Question

Best Estimate plus Uncertainty (BEPU) Analyses in the IAEA Safety Standards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dusic, Milorad; )

2013-01-01

The Safety Standards Series establishes an essential basis for safety and represents the broadest international consensus. Safety Standards Series publications are categorized into: Safety Fundamental (Present the overall objectives, concepts and principles of protection and safety, they are the policy documents of the safety standards), Safety Requirements (Establish requirements that must be met to ensure the protection and safety of people and the environment, both now and in the future), and Safety Guides (Provide guidance, in the form of more detailed actions, conditions or procedures that can be used to comply with the Requirements). The incorporation of more detailed requirements, in accordance with national practice, may still be necessary. There should be only one set of international safety standards. Each safety standard will be reviewed by the relevant committee or by the commission every five years. Best Estimate plus Uncertainty (BEPU) Analyses are approached in the following IAEA Safety Standards: - Safety Requirements SSR 2/1 - Safety of NPPs, Design (Revision of NS-R-1); - General Safety Requirement GSR Part 4: Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities; - Safety Guide SSG-2 Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. NUSSC suggested that new safety guides should be accompanied by documents like TECDOCs or Safety Reports describing in detail their recommendations where appropriate. Special review is currently underway to identify needs for revision in the light of the Fukushima accident. Revision will concern, first, the Safety Requirements, and then, the Selected Safety Guides

Technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety systems in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Korsah, K.; Wood, R.T.; Tanaka, T.J.; Antonescu, C.E.

1997-01-01

This paper summarizes the results of research sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide the technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety equipment in nuclear power plants. This research was conducted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). ORNL investigated potential failure modes and vulnerabilities of microprocessor-based technologies to environmental stressors, including electromagnetic/radio-frequency interference, temperature, humidity, and smoke exposure. An experimental digital safety channel (EDSC) was constructed for the tests. SNL performed smoke exposure tests on digital components and circuit boards to determine failure mechanisms and the effect of different packaging techniques on smoke susceptibility. These studies are expected to provide recommendations for environmental qualification of digital safety systems by addressing the following: (1) adequacy of the present preferred test methods for qualification of digital I and C systems; (2) preferred standards; (3) recommended stressors to be included in the qualification process during type testing; (4) resolution of need for accelerated aging in qualification testing for equipment that is to be located in mild environments; and (5) determination of an appropriate approach to address smoke in a qualification program

High integrity software for nuclear power plants: Candidate guidelines, technical basis and research needs. Main report, Volume 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seth, S.; Bail, W.; Cleaves, D.; Cohen, H.; Hybertson, D.; Schaefer, C.; Stark, G.; Ta, A.; Ulery, B.

1995-06-01

The work documented in this report was performed in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to examine the technical basis for candidate guidelines that could be considered in reviewing and evaluating high integrity computer e following software development and assurance activities: Requirements specification; design; coding; verification and validation, inclukding static analysis and dynamic testing; safety analysis; operation and maintenance; configuration management; quality assurance; and planning and management. Each activity (framework element) was subdivided into technical areas (framework subelements). The report describes the development of approximately 200 candidate guidelines that span the entire ran e identification, categorization and prioritization of technical basis for those candidate guidelines; and the identification, categorization and prioritization of research needs for improving the technical basis. The report has two volumes: Volume 1, Executive Summary includes an overview of the framwork and of each framework element, the complete set of candidate guidelines, the results of the assessment of the technical basis for each candidate guideline, and a discussion of research needs that support the regulatory function; this document, Volume 2, is the main report

High integrity software for nuclear power plants: Candidate guidelines, technical basis and research needs. Main report, Volume 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Seth, S.; Bail, W.; Cleaves, D.; Cohen, H.; Hybertson, D.; Schaefer, C.; Stark, G.; Ta, A.; Ulery, B. [Mitre Corp., McLean, VA (United States)

1995-06-01

The work documented in this report was performed in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to examine the technical basis for candidate guidelines that could be considered in reviewing and evaluating high integrity computer e following software development and assurance activities: Requirements specification; design; coding; verification and validation, inclukding static analysis and dynamic testing; safety analysis; operation and maintenance; configuration management; quality assurance; and planning and management. Each activity (framework element) was subdivided into technical areas (framework subelements). The report describes the development of approximately 200 candidate guidelines that span the entire ran e identification, categorization and prioritization of technical basis for those candidate guidelines; and the identification, categorization and prioritization of research needs for improving the technical basis. The report has two volumes: Volume 1, Executive Summary includes an overview of the framwork and of each framework element, the complete set of candidate guidelines, the results of the assessment of the technical basis for each candidate guideline, and a discussion of research needs that support the regulatory function; this document, Volume 2, is the main report.

Understanding and capturing NSSS design basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palo, W.J.; Miller, B.

1993-01-01

Changes to, and technical evaluations of nuclear generating station designs are often warranted. Comprehensive documentation and understanding of the NSSS Design Basis are essential to support these activities. Effective configuration management tools are also needed to maintain the plant within design basis limits. Efficient design basis reconstitution can be realized via: In-depth understanding of the design process; Utilization of effective data collection methodology; State of the art data basing tools. A database can be created to generate a Design Basis Manual (DBM). This database can communicate electronically with other plant databases. A living document vice a static snapshot of the plant design is the goal. A design basis database can serve as the cornerstone for a global electronic information control system

RELEASE OF DRIED RADIOACTIVE WASTE MATERIALS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

KOZLOWSKI, D.S.

2005-01-01

The body of this document analyzes scenarios involving releases of dried tank waste from the DBVS dried waste transfer system and OGTS HEPA filters. Analyses of dried waste release scenarios from the CH-TRUM WPU are included as Appendix D

Traceability of Software Safety Requirements in Legacy Safety Critical Systems

Science.gov (United States)

Hill, Janice L.

2007-01-01

How can traceability of software safety requirements be created for legacy safety critical systems? Requirements in safety standards are imposed most times during contract negotiations. On the other hand, there are instances where safety standards are levied on legacy safety critical systems, some of which may be considered for reuse for new applications. Safety standards often specify that software development documentation include process-oriented and technical safety requirements, and also require that system and software safety analyses are performed supporting technical safety requirements implementation. So what can be done if the requisite documents for establishing and maintaining safety requirements traceability are not available?

Plutonium air transportable package Model PAT-1. Safety analysis report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-02-01

The document is a Safety Analysis Report for the Plutonium Air Transportable Package, Model PAT-1, which was developed by Sandia Laboratories under contract to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The document describes the engineering tests and evaluations that the NRC staff used as a basis to determine that the package design meets the requirements specified in the NRC ''Qualification Criteria to Certify a Package for Air Transport of Plutonium'' (NUREG-0360). By virtue of its ability to meet the NRC Qualification Criteria, the package design is capable of safely withstanding severe aircraft accidents. The document also includes engineering drawings and specifications for the package. 92 figs, 29 tables

Towards a Formal Basis for Modular Safety Cases

Science.gov (United States)

Denney, Ewen; Pai, Ganesh

2015-01-01

Safety assurance using argument-based safety cases is an accepted best-practice in many safety-critical sectors. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), which is widely used for presenting safety arguments graphically, provides a notion of modular arguments to support the goal of incremental certification. Despite the efforts at standardization, GSN remains an informal notation whereas the GSN standard contains appreciable ambiguity especially concerning modular extensions. This, in turn, presents challenges when developing tools and methods to intelligently manipulate modular GSN arguments. This paper develops the elements of a theory of modular safety cases, leveraging our previous work on formalizing GSN arguments. Using example argument structures we highlight some ambiguities arising through the existing guidance, present the intuition underlying the theory, clarify syntax, and address modular arguments, contracts, well-formedness and well-scopedness of modules. Based on this theory, we have a preliminary implementation of modular arguments in our toolset, AdvoCATE.

Aviation and healthcare: a comparative review with implications for patient safety.

Science.gov (United States)

Kapur, Narinder; Parand, Anam; Soukup, Tayana; Reader, Tom; Sevdalis, Nick

2016-01-01

Safety in aviation has often been compared with safety in healthcare. Following a recent article in this journal, the UK government set up an Independent Patient Safety Investigation Service, to emulate a similar well-established body in aviation. On the basis of a detailed review of relevant publications that examine patient safety in the context of aviation practice, we have drawn up a table of comparative features and a conceptual framework for patient safety. Convergence and divergence of safety-related behaviours across aviation and healthcare were derived and documented. Key safety-related domains that emerged included Checklists, Training, Crew Resource Management, Sterile Cockpit, Investigation and Reporting of Incidents and Organisational Culture. We conclude that whilst healthcare has much to learn from aviation in certain key domains, the transfer of lessons from aviation to healthcare needs to be nuanced, with the specific characteristics and needs of healthcare borne in mind. On the basis of this review, it is recommended that healthcare should emulate aviation in its resourcing of staff who specialise in human factors and related psychological aspects of patient safety and staff wellbeing. Professional and post-qualification staff training could specifically include Cognitive Bias Avoidance Training, as this appears to play a key part in many errors relating to patient safety and staff wellbeing.

Conceptual basis of the master directed diagram

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kelly, M.; Billington, D.

1998-01-01

This document forms part of a suite of documents describing the Nirex model development programme. The programme is designed to provide a clear audit trail from the identification of significant features, events and processes (FEPs) to the models and modelling processes employed within a detailed safety assessment. A five stage approach has been adopted, which provides a systematic framework for addressing uncertainty and for the documentation of all modelling decisions and assumptions. The five stages are as follows: Stage 1: EP analysis - compilation and structuring of a FEP database; Stage 2: Scenario and conceptual model development; Stage 3: mathematical model development; Stage 4: Software development; Stage 5: confidence building. This report describes the work involved in Stage 1 of the Nirex model development programme, FEP analysis. The aim of FEP analysis is to produce a set of FEPs and FEP interactions that form the basis for the scenario and conceptual model development in Stage 2. There are two requirements for the set of FEPs and FEP interactions; first, all aspects material to the performance of the disposal system should be covered, i.e. the set should be comprehensive, and secondly a clear audit trail of decisions, consensus and analysis should be maintained

Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the Transuranic Storage Area Retrieval Enclosure at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-03-01

This Transuranic Storage Area Retrieval Enclosure Preliminary Safety Analysis Report was completed as required by DOE Order 5480.23. The purpose of this document is to construct a safety basis that supports the design and permits construction of the facility. The facility has been designed to the requirements of a Radioactive Solid Waste Facility presented in DOE Order 6430.1A

Review of SKB's Code Documentation and Testing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hicks, T.W.

2005-01-01

SKB is in the process of developing the SR-Can safety assessment for a KBS 3 repository. The assessment will be based on quantitative analyses using a range of computational codes aimed at developing an understanding of how the repository system will evolve. Clear and comprehensive code documentation and testing will engender confidence in the results of the safety assessment calculations. This report presents the results of a review undertaken on behalf of SKI aimed at providing an understanding of how codes used in the SR 97 safety assessment and those planned for use in the SR-Can safety assessment have been documented and tested. Having identified the codes us ed by SKB, several codes were selected for review. Consideration was given to codes used directly in SKB's safety assessment calculations as well as to some of the less visible codes that are important in quantifying the different repository barrier safety functions. SKB's documentation and testing of the following codes were reviewed: COMP23 - a near-field radionuclide transport model developed by SKB for use in safety assessment calculations. FARF31 - a far-field radionuclide transport model developed by SKB for use in safety assessment calculations. PROPER - SKB's harness for executing probabilistic radionuclide transport calculations using COMP23 and FARF31. The integrated analytical radionuclide transport model that SKB has developed to run in parallel with COMP23 and FARF31. CONNECTFLOW - a discrete fracture network model/continuum model developed by Serco Assurance (based on the coupling of NAMMU and NAPSAC), which SKB is using to combine hydrogeological modelling on the site and regional scales in place of the HYDRASTAR code. DarcyTools - a discrete fracture network model coupled to a continuum model, recently developed by SKB for hydrogeological modelling, also in place of HYDRASTAR. ABAQUS - a finite element material model developed by ABAQUS, Inc, which is used by SKB to model repository buffer

Safety Justification and Safety Case for Safety-critical Software in Digital Reactor Protection System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, Kee-Choon; Lee, Jang-Soo; Jee, Eunkyoung

2016-01-01

Nuclear safety-critical software is under strict regulatory requirements and these regulatory requirements are essential for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. The verification & validation (V and V) and hazard analysis of the safety-critical software are required to follow regulatory requirements through the entire software life cycle. In order to obtain a license from the regulatory body through the development and validation of safety-critical software, it is essential to meet the standards which are required by the regulatory body throughout the software development process. Generally, large amounts of documents, which demonstrate safety justification including standard compliance, V and V, hazard analysis, and vulnerability assessment activities, are submitted to the regulatory body during the licensing process. It is not easy to accurately read and evaluate the whole documentation for the development activities, implementation technology, and validation activities. The safety case methodology has been kwon a promising approach to evaluate the level and depth of the development and validation results. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. It is suggested to evaluate the level and depth of the results of development and validation by applying safety case methodology to achieve software safety demonstration. A lot of documents provided as evidence are connected to claim that corresponds to the topic for safety demonstration. We demonstrated a case study in which more systematic safety demonstration for the target system software is performed via safety case construction than simply listing the documents

Safety Justification and Safety Case for Safety-critical Software in Digital Reactor Protection System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kwon, Kee-Choon; Lee, Jang-Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Jee, Eunkyoung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

Nuclear safety-critical software is under strict regulatory requirements and these regulatory requirements are essential for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. The verification & validation (V and V) and hazard analysis of the safety-critical software are required to follow regulatory requirements through the entire software life cycle. In order to obtain a license from the regulatory body through the development and validation of safety-critical software, it is essential to meet the standards which are required by the regulatory body throughout the software development process. Generally, large amounts of documents, which demonstrate safety justification including standard compliance, V and V, hazard analysis, and vulnerability assessment activities, are submitted to the regulatory body during the licensing process. It is not easy to accurately read and evaluate the whole documentation for the development activities, implementation technology, and validation activities. The safety case methodology has been kwon a promising approach to evaluate the level and depth of the development and validation results. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. It is suggested to evaluate the level and depth of the results of development and validation by applying safety case methodology to achieve software safety demonstration. A lot of documents provided as evidence are connected to claim that corresponds to the topic for safety demonstration. We demonstrated a case study in which more systematic safety demonstration for the target system software is performed via safety case construction than simply listing the documents.

Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development (NG-T-3.2). Basis for Evaluation - Legal, safety, security, safeguards issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yllera, Javier

2010-01-01

A framework for achieving high levels of nuclear safety and security worldwide Builds upon: Legal Instruments; Use of IAEA SSs and security guidance; Harmonization of national regulations; Exchange of knowledge, experiences & regulatory practices and Multinational cooperation and safety reviews. The IAEA is the depository of many key international conventions and legal agreements. All countries with operating nuclear power plants are now parties to the Convention. The main objective of Convention on Nuclear Safety is to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international cooperation including, where appropriate, safety related technical co-operation. All practical efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate nuclear or radiation accidents. The primary means of preventing and mitigating the consequences of accidents is “defence in depth”. Safety assessments are to be carried out and documented by the organization responsible for operating the facility, are to be independently verified and are to be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the licensing or authorization process. Licensing process must be well-defined, clear, transparent and traceable. The public should be given an opportunity to provide their views during certain steps of the licensing process

Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 29: Bolting degradation or failure in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, R.E.

1990-06-01

This report describes the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Generic Safety Issue 29, ''Bolting Degradation or Failure in Nuclear Power Plants,'' including the bases for establishing the issue and its historical highlights. The report also describes the activities of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) relevant to this issue, including its cooperation with the Materials Properties Council (MPC) to organize a task group to help resolve the issue. The Electric Power Research Institute, supported by the AIF/MPC task group, prepared and issued a two-volume document that provides, in part, the technical basis for resolving Generic Safety Issue 29. This report presents the NRC's review and evaluation of the two-volume document and NRC's conclusion that this document, in conjunction with other information from both industry and NRC, provides the bases for resolving this issue

Design basis and design features of WWER-440 model 213 nuclear power plants. Reference plant: Bohunice V2 (Slovakia)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-05-01

The prime objective of the IAEA Technical Co-operation Project on Evaluation of Safety Aspects of WWER-440 model 213 NPPs is to co-ordinate and to integrate assistance to national organizations in studying selected aspects of safety for the same type of reactors. Consequently, the study integrated the results generated by national activities carried out in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine and co-ordinated through the IAEA. Valuable assistance in carrying out the tasks was also provided by Bulgaria and Poland. A set of publications is being prepared to present the results of the project. The publications are intended to facilitate the review and utilization of the results of the project. They are also providing assistance in further refinement and/or extension of plant specific safety evaluation of model 213 NPPs. This Technical Document addressing the design basis and safety related design features of WWER-440 model 213 plants is the first of the series to be published. It is hoped that this document will be useful to anyone working in the field of WWER safety, and in particular to experts planning, executing or reviewing studies related to the subject. Refs, 36 figs, tabs

Development of safety principles for the design of future nuclear power plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-06-01

The main purpose of this TECDOC is to propose updates to existing safety principles which could be used as a basis for developing safety principles for the design of future NPPs. Accordingly, this document is intended to be useful to reactor designers, owners, operators, researchers and regulators. It is also expected that this document can contribute to international harmonization of safety approaches, and that it will help ensure that future reactors will be designed worldwide to a high standard of safety. As such, these proposed updates are intended to provide general guidance which, if carefully and properly implemented, will result in reactor designs with enhanced safety characteristics beyond those currently in operation. This enhancement results from the fact that the proposals are derived from the lessons learned from more recent operational experience, R and D, design, testing, and analysis developed over the past decade or so, as well as from attempts to reflect the current trends in reactor design, such as the introduction of new technologies. 8 refs, 3 figs.

Development of safety principles for the design of future nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-06-01

The main purpose of this TECDOC is to propose updates to existing safety principles which could be used as a basis for developing safety principles for the design of future NPPs. Accordingly, this document is intended to be useful to reactor designers, owners, operators, researchers and regulators. It is also expected that this document can contribute to international harmonization of safety approaches, and that it will help ensure that future reactors will be designed worldwide to a high standard of safety. As such, these proposed updates are intended to provide general guidance which, if carefully and properly implemented, will result in reactor designs with enhanced safety characteristics beyond those currently in operation. This enhancement results from the fact that the proposals are derived from the lessons learned from more recent operational experience, R and D, design, testing, and analysis developed over the past decade or so, as well as from attempts to reflect the current trends in reactor design, such as the introduction of new technologies. 8 refs, 3 figs

SAFETY INSTRUCTION AND SAFETY NOTE

CERN Multimedia

TIS Secretariat

2002-01-01

Please note that the SAFETY INSTRUCTION N0 49 (IS 49) and the SAFETY NOTE N0 28 (NS 28) entitled respectively 'AVOIDING CHEMICAL POLLUTION OF WATER' and 'CERN EXHIBITIONS - FIRE PRECAUTIONS' are available on the web at the following urls: http://edms.cern.ch/document/335814 and http://edms.cern.ch/document/335861 Paper copies can also be obtained from the TIS Divisional Secretariat, email: TIS.Secretariat@cern.ch

Safety assessment document for spent fuel handling, packaging, and storage demonstrations at the E-MAD facility on the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-04-01

The objectives for spent fuel handling and packaging demonstration are to develop the capability to satisfactorily encapsulate typical commercial nuclear reactor spent fuel assemblies and to establish the suitability of interim dry surface and near surface storage concepts. To accomplish these objectives, spent fuel assemblies from a pressurized water reactor have been received, encapsulated in steel canisters, and emplaced in on-site storage facilities and subjected to other tests. As an essential element of these demonstrations, a thorough safety assessment of the demonstration activities conducted at the E-MAD facility has been completed. This document describes the site location and characteristics, the existing E-MAD facility, and the facility modifications and equipment additions made specifically for the demonstrations. The document also summarizes the Quality Assurance Program utilized, and specifies the principal design criteria applicable to the facility modifications, equipment additions, and process operations. Evaluations have been made of the radiological impacts of normal operations, abnormal operations, and postulated accidents. Analyses have been performed to determine the affects on nuclear criticality safety of postulated accidents and credible natural phenomena. The consequences of postulated accidents resulting in fission product gas release have also been estimated. This document identifies the engineered safety features, procedures, and site characteristics that (1) prevent the occurrence of potential accidents or (2) assure that the consequences of postulated accidents are either insignificant or adequately mitigated

The deep geologic repository technology programme: toward a geoscience basis for understanding repository safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jensen, M.R.

2007-01-01

Within the Deep Geologic Repository Technology Programme (DGRTP) several Geoscience activities are focused on advancing the understanding of groundwater flow system evolution and geochemical stability in a Canadian Shield setting as affected by long-term climate change. A key aspect is developing confidence in predictions of groundwater flow patterns and residence times as they relate to the safety of a deep geologic repository for used nuclear fuel waste. This is being achieved through a coordinated multi-disciplinary approach intent on: i) demonstrating coincidence between independent geo-scientific data; ii) improving the traceability of geo-scientific data and its interpretation within a conceptual descriptive model(s); iii) improving upon methods to assess and demonstrate robustness in flow domain prediction(s) given inherent flow domain uncertainties (i.e. spatial chemical/physical property distributions, boundary conditions) in time and space; and iv) improving awareness amongst geo-scientists as to the utility of various geo-scientific data in supporting a safety case for a deep geologic repository. This multi-disciplinary DGRTP approach is yielding an improved understanding of groundwater flow system evolution and stability in Canadian Shield settings that is further contributing to the geo-scientific basis for understanding and communicating aspects of DGR safety. (author)

75 FR 75896 - Basis Reporting by Securities Brokers and Basis Determination for Stock

Science.gov (United States)

2010-12-07

... DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Internal Revenue Service 26 CFR 1 [TD 9504] RIN 1545-BI66 Basis Reporting by Securities Brokers and Basis Determination for Stock Correction In rule document 2010-25504 beginning on page 64072 in the issue of Monday, October 18, 2010, make the following corrections: Sec. 1...

General safety considerations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-09-01

This document presents the full filling of the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Chapter 4 of the document contains some details about the priority to safety, financial and human resources, human factors, quality assurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection and emergency preparedness.

General safety considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

This document presents the full filling of the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Chapter 4 of the document contains some details about the priority to safety, financial and human resources, human factors, quality assurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection and emergency preparedness

General safety considerations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-09-01

This document presents the full filling of the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Chapter 4 of the document contains some details about the priority to safety, financial and human resources, human factors, quality assurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection and emergency preparedness.

General safety considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This document presents the full filling of the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Chapter 4 of the document contains some details about the priority to safety, financial and human resources, human factors, quality assurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection and emergency preparedness

Classification of Aeronautics System Health and Safety Documents

Data.gov (United States)

National Aeronautics and Space Administration — Most complex aerospace systems have many text reports on safety, maintenance, and associated issues. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) spans several...

Technical basis for instrumentation and control design improvements in WWER-440/230 nuclear power plants. A publication of the extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER and RBMK nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

Instrumentation and control (I and C) has been recognized as an area which requires substantial improvements in WWER NNPs, particularly for model 230 plants. Under contract with the IAEA the Spanish company Empresarios Agrupados (EA) developed a basic document proposing a technical basis for improvements related to the following most significant aspects of I and C: criteria for safety classification; remote shutdown panel; I and C support to operation and control room design; instrumentation set point margins; accident monitoring instrumentation. This publication is derived from the original report of EA which was circulated by the IAEA for review by staff members and experts from various Member States. It was finally agreed upon at a Consultants' meeting convened by the IAEA in Vienna in May 1994 with the participation of experts from France, Germany and Spain. The guidance expressed in this report is based on the IAEA/NUSS standards, safety guides and practices, and on regulations in use in various Member States. It is proposed as a way of carrying out the necessary studies to improve safety by upgrading the vital part of instrumentation an control in WWER-440 model 230 nuclear power plants. 28 refs, 3 figs

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program, Palisades Plant (Docket No. 50-255)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-11-01

This report documents the review completed under the SEP for those issues that required refined engineering evaluations or the continuation of ongoing evaluations after the Final IPSAR for the Palisades Plant was issued. The review has provided for (1) an assessment of the significance of differences between current technical positions on selected safety issues and those that existed when the Palisades Plant was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety when the supplement to the Final IPSAR and the Safety Evaluation Report for converting the license from a provisional to a full-term license have been issued. The Final IPSAR and its supplement will form part of the bases for considering the conversion of the provisional operating license to a full-term operating license

CASK/MSC/WP PREPARATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION DOCUMENT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

S. Drummond

2005-01-01

The purpose of this system description document (SDD) is to establish requirements that drive the design of the Cask/MSC/WP preparation system and their bases to allow the design effort to proceed to license application. This SDD is a living document that will be revised at strategic points as the design matures over time. This SDD identifies the requirements and describes the system design, as they exist at this time, with emphasis on those attributes of the design provided to meet the requirements. This SDD has been developed to be an engineering tool for design control. Accordingly, the primary audience and users are design engineers. This type of SDD both leads and trails the design process. It leads the design process with regard to the flow down of upper tier requirements onto the system. Knowledge of these requirements is essential in performing the design process. This SDD trails the design with regard to the description of the system. The description provided in the SDD is a reflection of the results of the design process to date. This SDD addresses the ''Project Requirements Document'' (PRD) (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275]) requirements. Additional PRD requirements may be cited, as applicable, to drive the design of specific aspects of the system, with justifications provided in the basis. Functional and operational requirements applicable to this system are obtained from the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' (F and OR) (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557]) document. Other requirements to support the design process have been taken from higher-level requirements documents such as the ''Project Design Criteria Document'' (PDC) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599]) and the preclosure safety analyses

SEISMIC ANALYSIS FOR PRECLOSURE SAFETY

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

E.N. Lindner

2004-12-03

The purpose of this seismic preclosure safety analysis is to identify the potential seismically-initiated event sequences associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca Mountain and assign appropriate design bases to provide assurance of achieving the performance objectives specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR Part 63 for radiological consequences. This seismic preclosure safety analysis is performed in support of the License Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. In more detail, this analysis identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are subject to seismic design bases. This analysis assigns one of two design basis ground motion (DBGM) levels, DBGM-1 or DBGM-2, to SSCs important to safety (ITS) that are credited in the prevention or mitigation of seismically-initiated event sequences. An application of seismic margins approach is also demonstrated for SSCs assigned to DBGM-2 by showing a high confidence of a low probability of failure at a higher ground acceleration value, termed a beyond-design basis ground motion (BDBGM) level. The objective of this analysis is to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 63.111(a) and 10 CFR 63.111(b) for offsite and worker doses. The results of this calculation are used as inputs to the following: (1) A classification analysis of SSCs ITS by identifying potential seismically-initiated failures (loss of safety function) that could lead to undesired consequences; (2) An assignment of either DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 to each SSC ITS credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence; and (3) A nuclear safety design basis report that will state the seismic design requirements that are credited in this analysis. The present analysis reflects the design information available as of October 2004 and is considered preliminary. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically to ensure that seismic hazards are properly

SEISMIC ANALYSIS FOR PRECLOSURE SAFETY

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

E.N. Lindner

2004-01-01

The purpose of this seismic preclosure safety analysis is to identify the potential seismically-initiated event sequences associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca Mountain and assign appropriate design bases to provide assurance of achieving the performance objectives specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR Part 63 for radiological consequences. This seismic preclosure safety analysis is performed in support of the License Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. In more detail, this analysis identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are subject to seismic design bases. This analysis assigns one of two design basis ground motion (DBGM) levels, DBGM-1 or DBGM-2, to SSCs important to safety (ITS) that are credited in the prevention or mitigation of seismically-initiated event sequences. An application of seismic margins approach is also demonstrated for SSCs assigned to DBGM-2 by showing a high confidence of a low probability of failure at a higher ground acceleration value, termed a beyond-design basis ground motion (BDBGM) level. The objective of this analysis is to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 63.111(a) and 10 CFR 63.111(b) for offsite and worker doses. The results of this calculation are used as inputs to the following: (1) A classification analysis of SSCs ITS by identifying potential seismically-initiated failures (loss of safety function) that could lead to undesired consequences; (2) An assignment of either DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 to each SSC ITS credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence; and (3) A nuclear safety design basis report that will state the seismic design requirements that are credited in this analysis. The present analysis reflects the design information available as of October 2004 and is considered preliminary. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically to ensure that seismic hazards are properly

The biological basis of plutonium safety standards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mole, R.H.

1976-01-01

Since no radiation injury or cancer in man can, as yet, be directly attributed to Pu, all safety standards for Pu must be determined by reference to other safety standards, development of which is discussed. A system of safety standards must be based on links with real damage, such as the requirement for 226 Ra in bone. The type of biological information required for making standards realistic is considered in relation to Pu and Ra in bone. Also considered are the possible effects of Pu in soft tissue such as bone marrow. Not only dose, but also the number of cells exposed to the dose are important biologically and cellular aspects are examined. Since there is no positive evidence of Pu toxicity relevant information on other α emitters must be examined. The observed effectiveness of Ra, daughters of 222 Ra and 232 Th in causing mutations and cancer, is surveyed. Reference is made to the necessity of improving the ICRP system, currently based on the critical organ concept, by recognising the need for summation of risks in other organs where exposure to Pu is concerned. Improved biological understanding particularly that of hereditary damage, in recent years leads to less pessimistic thinking on the effects of ionizing radiations. The immediate need appears to be for consistency in safety standards. (U.K.)

Development of safety analysis technology for LMR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hahn, Do Hee; Kwon, Y. M.; Kim, K. D.

2000-05-01

The analysis methodologies as well as the analysis computer code system for the transient, HCDA, and containment performance analyses, which are required for KALIMER safety analyses, have been developed. The SSC-K code has been developed based on SSC-L which is an analysis code for loop type LMR, by improving models necessary for the KALIMER system analysis, and additional models have been added to the code. In addition, HCDA analysis model has been developed and the containment performance analysis code has been also improved. The preliminary basis for the safety analysis has been established, and the preliminary safety analyses for the key design features have been performed. In addition, a state-of-art analysis for LMR PSA and overseas safety and licensing requirements have been reviewed. The design database for the systematic management of the design documents as well as design processes has been established as well

Development of safety analysis technology for LMR

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hahn, Do Hee; Kwon, Y. M.; Kim, K. D. [and others

2000-05-01

The analysis methodologies as well as the analysis computer code system for the transient, HCDA, and containment performance analyses, which are required for KALIMER safety analyses, have been developed. The SSC-K code has been developed based on SSC-L which is an analysis code for loop type LMR, by improving models necessary for the KALIMER system analysis, and additional models have been added to the code. In addition, HCDA analysis model has been developed and the containment performance analysis code has been also improved. The preliminary basis for the safety analysis has been established, and the preliminary safety analyses for the key design features have been performed. In addition, a state-of-art analysis for LMR PSA and overseas safety and licensing requirements have been reviewed. The design database for the systematic management of the design documents as well as design processes has been established as well.

75 FR 6166 - Basis Reporting by Securities Brokers and Basis Determination for Stock

Science.gov (United States)

2010-02-08

... DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Internal Revenue Service 26 CFR Parts, 1, 31, and 301 [REG-101896-09] RIN 1545-Bl66 Basis Reporting by Securities Brokers and Basis Determination for Stock Correction In proposed rule document E9-29855 beginning on page 67010 in the issue of Thursday, December 17, 2009, make...

Monitored Geologic Repository Project Description Document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Curry, P.

2000-01-01

The primary objective of the Monitored Geologic Repository Project Description Document (PDD) is to allocate the functions, requirements, and assumptions to the systems at Level 5 of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) architecture identified in Section 4. It provides traceability of the requirements to those contained in Section 3 of the ''Monitored Geologic Repository Requirements Document'' (MGR RD) (CRWMS M and O 2000b) and other higher-level requirements documents. In addition, the PDD allocates design related assumptions to work products of non-design organizations. The document provides Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) engineering design basis in support of design and performance assessment in preparing for the Site Recommendation (SR) and License Application (LA) milestones. The engineering design basis documented in the PDD is to be captured in the System Description Documents (SDDs) which address each of the systems at Level 5 of the CRWMS architecture. The design engineers obtain the engineering design basis from the SDDs and by reference from the SDDs to the PDD. The design organizations and other organizations will obtain design related assumptions directly from the PDD. These organizations may establish additional assumptions for their individual activities, but such assumptions are not to conflict with the assumptions in the PDD. The PDD will serve as the primary link between the engineering design basis captured in the SDDs and the design requirements captured in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) documents. The approved PDD is placed under Level 3 baseline control by the CRWMS Management and Operating Contractor (M and O) and the following portions of the PDD constitute the Technical Design Baseline for the MGR: the design characteristics listed in Table 2-1, the MGR Architecture (Section 4.1),the Engineering Design Bases (Section 5), and the Controlled Project Assumptions (Section 6)

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

ITER safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Raeder, J.; Piet, S.; Buende, R.

1991-01-01

As part of the series of publications by the IAEA that summarize the results of the Conceptual Design Activities for the ITER project, this document describes the ITER safety analyses. It contains an assessment of normal operation effluents, accident scenarios, plasma chamber safety, tritium system safety, magnet system safety, external loss of coolant and coolant flow problems, and a waste management assessment, while it describes the implementation of the safety approach for ITER. The document ends with a list of major conclusions, a set of topical remarks on technical safety issues, and recommendations for the Engineering Design Activities, safety considerations for siting ITER, and recommendations with regard to the safety issues for the R and D for ITER. Refs, figs and tabs

Selection of design basis event for modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sato, Hiroyuki; Nakagawa, Shigeaki; Ohashi, Hirofumi

2016-06-01

Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been investigating safety requirements and basic approach of safety guidelines for modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) aiming to increase internarial contribution for nuclear safety by developing an international HTGR safety standard under International Atomic Energy Agency. In this study, we investigate a deterministic approach to select design basis events utilizing information obtained from probabilistic approach. In addition, selections of design basis events are conducted for commercial HTGR designed by JAEA. As a result, an approach for selecting design basis event considering multiple failures of safety systems is established which has not been considered as design basis in the safety guideline for existing nuclear facility. Furthermore, selection of design basis events for commercial HTGR has completed. This report provides an approach and procedure for selecting design basis events of modular HTGR as well as selected events for the commercial HTGR, GTHTR300. (author)

High integrity software for nuclear power plants: Candidate guidelines, technical basis and research needs. Executive summary: Volume 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seth, S.; Bail, W.; Cleaves, D.; Cohen, H.; Hybertson, D.; Schaefer, C.; Stark, G.; Ta, A.; Ulery, B.

1995-06-01

The work documented in this report was performed in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to examine the technical basis for candidate guidelines that could be considered in reviewing and evaluating high integrity computer software used in the safety systems of nuclear power plants. The framework for the work consisted of the following software development and assurance activities: requirements specification; design; coding; verification and validation, including static analysis and dynamic testing; safety analysis; operation and maintenance; configuration management; quality assurance; and planning and management. Each activity (framework element) was subdivided into technical areas (framework subelements). The report describes the development of approximately 200 candidate guidelines that span the entire range of software life-cycle activities; the assessment of the technical basis for those candidate guidelines; and the identification, categorization and prioritization of research needs for improving the technical basis. The report has two volumes: Volume 1, Executive Summary, includes an overview of the framework and of each framework element, the complete set of candidate guidelines, the results of the assessment of the technical basis for each candidate guideline, and a discussion of research needs that support the regulatory function; Volume 2 is the main report

Integrated plant safety assessment: systematic evaluation program. Haddam Neck Plant, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company. Docket No. 50-213

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-03-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of Haddam Neck Plant, operated by Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company. The Haddam Neck Plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Integrated plant safety assessment: Systematic Evaluation Program. LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor, Dairyland Power Cooperative, Docket No. 50-409

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-04-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, operated by Dairyland Power Cooperative. The La Crosse plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addresed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

An introduction to a new IAEA safety guide: 'ageing management for nuclear power plants'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pachner, J.; Inagaki, T.; Kang, K.S.

2008-01-01

This paper reports on a new IAEA Safety Guide entitled 'Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants' which is currently in an advanced draft form, awaiting approval of publication. The new Safety Guide will be an umbrella document for a comprehensive set of guidance documents on ageing management which have been issued by the IAEA. The Safety Guide first presents basic concepts of ageing management as a common basis for the recommendations on: proactive management of ageing throughout the life cycle of a nuclear power plant (NPP); systematic approach to managing ageing in the operation of NPPs; managing obsolescence; and review of ageing management for long term operation (life extension). The Safety Guide is intended to assist operators in establishing, implementing and improving systematic ageing management programs in NPPs and may be used by regulators in preparing regulatory standards and guides, and in verifying that ageing in nuclear power plants is being effectively managed. (author)

Guidance for identifying, reporting and tracking nuclear safety noncompliances

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-12-01

This document provides Department of Energy (DOE) contractors, subcontractors and suppliers with guidance in the effective use of DOE`s Price-Anderson nuclear safety Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS). Prompt contractor identification, reporting to DOE, and correction of nuclear safety noncompliances provides DOE with a basis to exercise enforcement discretion to mitigate civil penalties, and suspend the issuance of Notices of Violation for certain violations. Use of this reporting methodology is elective by contractors; however, this methodology is intended to reflect DOE`s philosophy on effective identification and reporting of nuclear safety noncompliances. To the extent that these expectations are met for particular noncompliances, DOE intends to appropriately exercise its enforcement discretion in considering whether, and to what extent, to undertake enforcement action.

Preliminary safety evaluation, based on initial site investigation data. Planning document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hedin, Allan

2002-12-01

This report is a planning document for the preliminary safety evaluations (PSE) to be carried out at the end of the initial stage of SKBs ongoing site investigations for a deep repository for spent nuclear fuel. The main purposes of the evaluations are to determine whether earlier judgements of the suitability of the candidate area for a deep repository with respect to long-term safety holds up in the light of borehole data and to provide feed-back to continued site investigations and site specific repository design. The preliminary safety evaluations will be carried out by a safety assessment group, based on a site model, being part of a site description, provided by a site modelling group and a repository layout within that model suggested by a repository engineering group. The site model contains the geometric features of the site as well as properties of the host rock. Several alternative interpretations of the site data will likely be suggested. Also the biosphere is included in the site model. A first task for the PSE will be to compare the rock properties described in the site model to previously established criteria for a suitable host rock. This report gives an example of such a comparison. In order to provide more detailed feedback, a number of thermal, hydrological, mechanical and chemical analyses of the site will also be included in the evaluation. The selection of analyses is derived from the set of geosphere and biosphere analyses preliminarily planned for the comprehensive safety assessment named SR-SITE, which will be based on a complete site investigation. The selection is dictated primarily by the expected feedback to continued site investigations and by the availability of data after the PSE. The repository engineering group will consider several safety related factors in suggesting a repository layout: Thermal calculations will be made to determine a minimum distance between canisters avoiding canister surface temperatures above 100 deg C

Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Safety criteria for ferrocyanide watch list tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Postma, A.K.; Meacham, J.E.; Barney, G.S.

1994-01-01

This report provides a technical basis for closing the ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) at the Hanford Site. Three work efforts were performed in developing this technical basis. The efforts described herein are: 1. The formulation of criteria for ranking the relative safety of waste in each ferrocyanide tank. 2. The current classification of tanks into safety categories by comparing available information on tank contents with the safety criteria; 3. The identification of additional information required to resolve the ferrocyanide safety issue

Nuclear health and safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-08-01

This paper is a review of environmental and safety programs at facilities in the Naval Reactors Program which shows no basis for allegations that unsafe conditions exist there or that the environment is being harmed by activities conducted there. The prototype reactor design provides safety measures that are consistent with commercial nuclear power plants. Minor incidents affecting safety and the environment have occurred, however, and dents affecting safety and the environment have occurred, however, and as with other nuclear facilities, past activities have caused environmental problems that require ongoing monitoring and vigilance. While the program has historically been exempt from most oversight, some federal and state environmental oversight agencies have recently been permitted access to Naval Reactors facilities for oversight purposes. The program voluntarily cooperates with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding reactor modifications, safety improvements, and component reliability. In addition, the program and its contractors have established an extensive internal oversight program that is geared toward reporting the slightest deviations from requirements or procedures. Given the program's classification policies and requirements, it does not appear that the program routinely overclassifies information to prevent its release to the public or to avoid embarrassment. However, GAO did not some instances in which documents were improperly classified

Integrated plant safety assessment. Systematic evaluation program, Big Rock Point Plant (Docket No. 50-155). Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-05-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. The review provides (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety when the supplement to the Final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report has been issued. This report documents the review of the Big Rock Point Plant, which is one of ten plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. It also addresses a majority of the pending licensing actions for Big Rock Point, which include TMI Action Plan requirements and implementation criteria for resolved generic issues. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Management of Documents and Information in BSC Secretariat

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sumathi, E.; Jayarajan, K.

2017-01-01

The regulatory and safety function of BARC facilities is being carried out by BARC Safety Framework with BARC Safety Council as an apex body. Presently, about one hundred safety committees and task forces are functional in the framework. BSC Secretariat (BSCS) provides technical and administrative support to the BARC Safety Framework for the regulatory activities in BARC. Important documents/records related to committee decisions and facilities are maintained in BSCS, through an established documentation and record keeping system. The compliance of regulatory recommendations is verified during regulatory inspections and subsequent submissions made by the facility authority. This supports the effective regulatory decision making of various committees. This article elaborates the maintenance of records and information at BSC

A Generic Software Safety Document Generator

Science.gov (United States)

Denney, Ewen; Venkatesan, Ram Prasad

2004-01-01

Formal certification is based on the idea that a mathematical proof of some property of a piece of software can be regarded as a certificate of correctness which, in principle, can be subjected to external scrutiny. In practice, however, proofs themselves are unlikely to be of much interest to engineers. Nevertheless, it is possible to use the information obtained from a mathematical analysis of software to produce a detailed textual justification of correctness. In this paper, we describe an approach to generating textual explanations from automatically generated proofs of program safety, where the proofs are of compliance with an explicit safety policy that can be varied. Key to this is tracing proof obligations back to the program, and we describe a tool which implements this to certify code auto-generated by AutoBayes and AutoFilter, program synthesis systems under development at the NASA Ames Research Center. Our approach is a step towards combining formal certification with traditional certification methods.

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Technical Basis Guide Describing How to Perform Safety Margin Configuration Risk Management

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Curtis Smith; James Knudsen; Bentley Harwood

2013-08-01

The INL has carried out a demonstration of the RISMC approach for the purpose of configuration risk management. We have shown how improved accuracy and realism can be achieved by simulating changes in risk – as a function of different configurations – in order to determine safety margins as the plant is modified. We described the various technical issues that play a role in these configuration-based calculations with the intent that future applications can take advantage of the analysis benefits while avoiding some of the technical pitfalls that are found for these types of calculations. Specific recommendations have been provided on a variety of topics aimed at improving the safety margin analysis and strengthening the technical basis behind the analysis process.

Nuclear criticality safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pruvost, N.L.; Paxton, H.C.

1996-09-01

This technical reference document cites information related to nuclear criticality safety principles, experience, and practice. The document also provides general guidance for criticality safety personnel and regulators

Nuclear criticality safety guide

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pruvost, N.L.; Paxton, H.C. [eds.

1996-09-01

This technical reference document cites information related to nuclear criticality safety principles, experience, and practice. The document also provides general guidance for criticality safety personnel and regulators.

Technical basis for evaluating electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference in safety-related I ampersand C systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ewing, P.D.; Korsah, K.

1994-04-01

This report discusses the development of the technical basis for the control of upsets and malfunctions in safety-related instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems caused by electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference (EMI/RFI) and power surges. The research was performed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and was sponsored by the USNRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). The motivation for research stems from the safety-related issues that need to be addressed with the application of advanced I ampersand C systems to nuclear power plants. Development of the technical basis centered around establishing good engineering practices to ensure that sufficient levels of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) are maintained between the nuclear power plant's electronic and electromechanical systems known to be the source(s) of EMI/RFI and power surges. First, good EMC design and installation practices need to be established to control the impact of interference sources on nearby circuits and systems. These EMC good practices include circuit layouts, terminations, filtering, grounding, bonding, shielding, and adequate physical separation. Second, an EMI/RFI test and evaluation program needs to be established to outline the tests to be performed, the associated test methods to be followed, and carefully formulated acceptance criteria based on the intended environment to ensure that the circuit or system under test meets the recommended guidelines. Third, a program needs to be developed to perform confirmatory tests and evaluate the surge withstand capability (SWC) and of I ampersand C equipment connected to or installed in the vicinity of power circuits within the nuclear power plant. By following these three steps, the design and operability of safety-related I ampersand C systems against EMI/RFI and power surges can be evaluated, acceptance criteria can be developed, and appropriate regulatory guidance can be provided

Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

A well performed and adequately documented safety assessment of a nuclear facility will serve as a basis to determine whether the facility complies with the safety objectives, principles and criteria as stipulated by the national regulatory body of the country where the facility is in operation. International experience shows that the practices and methodologies used to perform safety assessments and periodic safety re-assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities differ significantly from county to country. Most developing countries do not have methods and guidance for safety assessment that are prescribed by the regulatory body. Typically the safety evaluation for the facility is based on a case by case assessment. Whilst conservative deterministic analyses are predominantly used as a licensing basis in many countries, recently probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques have been applied as a useful complementary tool to support safety decision making. The main benefit of PSA is to provide insights into the safety aspects of facility design and operation. PSA points up the potential environmental impacts of postulated accidents, including the dominant risk contributors, and enables safety analysts to compare options for reducing risk. In order to advise on how to apply PSA methodology for the safety assessment of non-reactor nuclear facilities, the IAEA organized several consultants meetings, which led to the preparation of this TECDOC. This document is intended as guidance for the conduct of PSA in non-nuclear facilities. The main emphasis here is on the general procedural steps of a PSA that is specific for a non-reactor nuclear facility, rather than the details of the specific methods. The report is directed at technical staff managing or performing such probabilistic assessments and to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for these PSAs. It is understood that the level of detail implied in the tasks presented in this

CASK/MSC/WP PREPARATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION DOCUMENT

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

S. Drummond

2005-04-12

The purpose of this system description document (SDD) is to establish requirements that drive the design of the Cask/MSC/WP preparation system and their bases to allow the design effort to proceed to license application. This SDD is a living document that will be revised at strategic points as the design matures over time. This SDD identifies the requirements and describes the system design, as they exist at this time, with emphasis on those attributes of the design provided to meet the requirements. This SDD has been developed to be an engineering tool for design control. Accordingly, the primary audience and users are design engineers. This type of SDD both leads and trails the design process. It leads the design process with regard to the flow down of upper tier requirements onto the system. Knowledge of these requirements is essential in performing the design process. This SDD trails the design with regard to the description of the system. The description provided in the SDD is a reflection of the results of the design process to date. This SDD addresses the ''Project Requirements Document'' (PRD) (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275]) requirements. Additional PRD requirements may be cited, as applicable, to drive the design of specific aspects of the system, with justifications provided in the basis. Functional and operational requirements applicable to this system are obtained from the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' (F&OR) (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557]) document. Other requirements to support the design process have been taken from higher-level requirements documents such as the ''Project Design Criteria Document'' (PDC) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599]) and the preclosure safety analyses.

Safety codes and guides for nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iansiti, E.

1976-01-01

The Codes of Practice and Safety Guides that are being developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency are divided in five topical areas: Governmental Organization, Siting, Design, Operation and Quality Assurance. In each area, a scientific secretary is responsible for developing the documents and five Technical Review Committees composed of 10 to 12 experts from various Members Countries revise the drafts at different stages. A Senior Advisory Group supervises the entire programme and revises the document. A scientific co-ordinator is responsible for the co-ordination within the programme with other sections of the IAEA, and with other international organizations. In preparing a document, information on the practice adopted by Member States is collected, a group of experts is convened for preparing a preliminary draft on the basis of this material and the draft is then reviewed by the appropriate Technical Review Committee. The document is translated into various languages, reviewed by the Senior Advisory Group and sent to Member States for comments. After the comments of Member States have been received, the Technical Review Committee and then the Senior Advisory Group are convened again for the final revision of the document. Some 25 drafts, are in different stages of development. The preparation of a document in its final form takes about two years. The programme started in 1975 and to date most of the safety codes and a few safety guides have been sent to Member States for comments. These documents will have gone through the entire development procedure by early 1977. The Senior Advisory Groups and the Technical Review Committees meet on the average four times a year for a week at a time. Until now these meetings have been mainly concerned with the development of new documents or with that part of the procedure which precedes the transmission of the draft to Member States for comments. The next series of meetings will deal with the revisions needed to

Safety assessment as basis for the decision making process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ilie, P.; Didita, L.; Danchiv, A.

2005-01-01

This paper deals with the safety assessment for a new near surface repository, particularly for the early stage of repository development using ISAM (Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities) safety assessment methodology. In this stage of the repository life cycle the main purpose of the safety assessment is to demonstrate that the plant is capable to be constructed and operated safely. The paper is based on development of the ASAM (Application of the Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near-Surface Disposal Facilities) Decision Support Subgroup of the Common Aspects Working Group. The implications of decision making for the application of the ISAM methodology on post-closure safety assessment are analysed. Some important elements of the decision-making process with impact on key components of the ISAM process are described. Following the development of Decision Support Subgroup of the ASAM Common Aspects Working Group the proposed change of ISAM methodology is analysed. This approach puts all activities in a decision context where the first iteration of the safety assessment is based on the existing state of knowledge and the initial engineering design. Confidence in the process is accomplished through the direct inclusion of all decision makers and stakeholders in the formulation of decisions, the definition of the state of knowledge, and decision making activities. The decision process is developed in context of undertaking assessments with little site-specific information, this situation is specifically for new planned repository. Limited site-specific information can result in a high degree of uncertainty, therefore it is important first of all to identify the sources of uncertainty arising from the limited nature of the site-specific information and then to apply appropriate approaches to manage the uncertainties and to determine whether the uncertainties are important to the overall safety of the disposal facility

NEG and NIOSH basis for an occupational health standard: 2-diethylaminoethanol

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Toren, K.

1996-05-01

Health effects associated with occupational exposure to 2-diethylaminoethanol (DEAE) were reviewed as part of the agreement between NIOSH and the Nordic Expert Group for Criteria Documentation of Health Risks from Chemicals to exchange information and expertise in the area of occupational safety and health to provide a scientific basis for the establishment of recommended occupational exposure limits. The occurrence, use, pharmacokinetics, toxicology, immunotoxicity and organ systems, mutagenic, genotoxic, carcinogenic, and reproductive effects of DEAE were reviewed. Three reports of clusters of cases associated with DEAE exposure were described, as were studies examining the dose response relationship of DEAE in humans and experimental animals.

The power of simplification: Operator interface with the AP1000R during design-basis and beyond design-basis events

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, M. G.; Mouser, M. R.; Simon, J. B.

2012-01-01

The AP1000 R plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and cost. The passive safety features are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC. The AP1000 passive safety features achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of a design-basis accident for 72 hours without need for operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the European Utility Requirements and the Utility Requirement Document for passive plants. Limited operator actions may be required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool (SFP) via passive means. This safety approach therefore minimizes the reliance on operator action for accident mitigation, and this paper examines the operator interaction with the Human-System Interface (HSI) as the severity of an accident increases from an anticipated transient to a design basis accident and finally, to a beyond-design-basis event. The AP1000 Control Room design provides an extremely effective environment for addressing the first 72 hours of design-basis events and transients, providing ease of information dissemination and minimal reliance upon operator actions. Symptom-based procedures including Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) are used to mitigate design basis transients and accidents. Use of the Computerized Procedure System (CPS) aids the operators during mitigation of the event. The CPS provides cues and direction to the operators as the event progresses. If the event becomes progressively worse or lasts longer than 72 hours, and depending upon the nature of failures that may have occurred, minimal operator actions may be required outside of the control room in areas that have been designed to be accessible using components that have been designed

International exchange of safety and licensing information

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lafleur, J.D. Jr.; Hauber, R.D.; Chenier, D.M.

1977-01-01

A network of formal and informal bilateral arrangements for the exchange of nuclear safety information is being established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For developing countries, such arrangements can provide ready access to the extensive, fully documented safety analyses and safety research results that NRC has accumulated. NRC has been receiving foreign visitors at a rate of about 500 per year, largely for discussions of safety and licensing questions related to light water reactors. Exchanges also are taking place on the safety of advanced reactors. A special interest of the NRC is in providing for reciprocal communicaion, at the earliest possible time, of important problems, decisions and other actions on nuclear safety matters. For example, it is essential that a newly-discovered problem in a nuclear reactor be brought immediately to the attention of other governments which are responsible for the safety of similar reactors. Definite progress has been made in the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. Certain exchanges have taken place on this basis. Experience in the establishment and operation of NRC's bilateral exchange arrangements is summarized. A typical exchange with the regulatory authority of country building its first power reactor is described

29 CFR 1905.7 - Form of documents; subscription; copies.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... UNDER THE WILLIAMS-STEIGER OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 General § 1905.7 Form of documents... 29 Labor 5 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Form of documents; subscription; copies. 1905.7 Section 1905.7 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION...

MIXING OF INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS IN WASTE TANKS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SANDGREN, K.R.

2006-01-01

This document presents onsite radiological, onsite toxicological, and offsite toxicological consequences, risk binning, and control decision results for the mixing of incompatible materials in waste tanks representative accident. Revision 4 updates the analysis to consider bulk chemical additions to single shell tanks (SSTs)

Documentation: Records and Reports.

Science.gov (United States)

Akers, Michael J

2017-01-01

This article deals with documentation to include the beginning of documentation, the requirements of Good Manufacturing Practice reports and records, and the steps that can be taken to minimize Good Manufacturing Practice documentation problems. It is important to remember that documentation for 503a compounding involves the Formulation Record, Compounding Record, Standard Operating Procedures, Safety Data Sheets, etc. For 503b outsourcing facilities, compliance with Current Good Manufacturing Practices is required, so this article is applicable to them. For 503a pharmacies, one can see the development and modification of Good Manufacturing Practice and even observe changes as they are occurring in 503a documentation requirements and anticipate that changes will probably continue to occur. Copyright© by International Journal of Pharmaceutical Compounding, Inc.

Nuclear power plants documentation system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schwartz, E.L.

1991-01-01

Since the amount of documents (type and quantity) necessary for the entire design of a NPP is very large, this implies that an overall and detailed identification, filling and retrieval system shall be implemented. This is even more applicable to the FINAL QUALITY DOCUMENTATION of the plant, as stipulated by IAEA Safety Codes and related guides. For such a purpose it was developed a DOCUMENTATION MANUAL, which describes in detail the before mentioned documentation system. Here we present the expected goals and results which we have to reach for Angra 2 and 3 Project. (author)

Integrated plant safety assessment. Systematic Evaluation Program. La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor. Dairyland Power Cooperative, Docket No. 50-409. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-06-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, operated by Dairyland Power Cooperative. The La Crosse plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment: Systematic Evaluation Program. Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Docket No. 50-29. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-06-01

The Systematic Evaluation program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of Yankee Nuclear Power Station, operated by Yankee Atomic Electric Company. The Yankee plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program. Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Docket No. 50-29. Draft report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-02-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of Yankee Nuclear Power Station, operated by Yankee Atomic Electric Company. The Yankee plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment: Systematic Evaluation Program. Haddam Neck Plant, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50-213. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-01-01

The Systematic Evaluation Progam was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with curent licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of Haddam Neck Plant, operated by Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company. The Haddam Neck Plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Preliminary Safety Information Document for the Standard MHTGR. Volume 1, (includes latest Amendments)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

1986-01-01

With NRC concurrence, the Licensing Plan for the Standard HTGR describes an application program consistent with 10CFR50, Appendix O to support a US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review and design certification of an advanced Standard modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MHTGR) design. Consistent with the NRC's Advanced Reactor Policy, the Plan also outlines a series of preapplication activities which have as an objective the early issuance of an NRC Licensability Statement on the Standard MHTGR conceptual design. This Preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID) has been prepared as one of the submittals to the NRC by the US Department of Energy in support of preapplication activities on the Standard MHTGR. Other submittals to be provided include a Probabilistic Risk Assessment, a Regulatory Technology Development Plan, and an Emergency Planning Bases Report.

Common basis of establishing safety standards and other safety decision-making levels for different sources of health risk

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Demin, V.F.

2002-01-01

Current approaches in establishing safety standards and other decision-making levels for different sources of health risk are critically analysed. To have a common basis for this decision-making a specific risk index R is recommended. In the common sense R is quantitatively defined as LLE caused by the annual exposure to the risk source considered: R = annual exposure, damage (LLE) from the exposure unit. This common definition is also rewritten in specific forms for a set of different risk sources (ionising radiation, chemical pollutants, etc): for different risk sources the exposure can be measured with different quantities (the probability of death, the exposure dose, etc.). R is relative LLE: LLE in years referred to 1 year under the risk. The dimension of this value is [year/year]. In the statistical sense R is conditionally the share of the year, which is lost due to exposure to a risk source during this year. In this sense R can be called as the relative damage. Really lifetime years are lost after the exposure. R can be in some conditional sense considered as a dimensionless quantity. General safety standards R n for the public and occupational workers have been suggested in terms of this index: R n = 0.0007 and 0.01 accordingly. Secondary safety standards are derived for a number of risk sources (ionising radiation, environmental chemical pollutants, etc). Values of R n are chosen in such a way that to have the secondary radiation BSS being equivalent to the current one's. Other general and derived levels for safety decision-making are also proposed including the de-minimus levels. Their possible dependence on the national or regional health-demographic data (HDD) is considered. Such issues as the ways of the integration and averaging of risk indices considered through the national or regional HDD for different risk sources and the use of non-threshold linear exposure - response relationships for ionising radiation and chemical pollutants are analysed

[Recommendations for inspections of the French nuclear safety authority].

Science.gov (United States)

Rousse, C; Chauvet, B

2015-10-01

The French nuclear safety authority is responsible for the control of radiation protection in radiotherapy since 2002. Controls are based on the public health and the labour codes and on the procedures defined by the controlled health care facility for its quality and safety management system according to ASN decision No. 2008-DC-0103. Inspectors verify the adequacy of the quality and safety management procedures and their implementation, and select process steps on the basis of feedback from events notified to ASN. Topics of the inspection are communicated to the facility at the launch of a campaign, which enables them to anticipate the inspectors' expectations. In cases where they are not physicians, inspectors are not allowed to access information covered by medical confidentiality. The consulted documents must therefore be expunged of any patient-identifying information. Exchanges before the inspection are intended to facilitate the provision of documents that may be consulted. Finally, exchange slots between inspectors and the local professionals must be organized. Based on improvements achieved by the health care centres and on recommendations from a joint working group of radiotherapy professionals and the nuclear safety authority, changes will be made in the control procedure that will be implemented when developing the inspection program for 2016-2019. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier SAS.

Safety of operations in the manufacture of driver fuel for the first charge of the Dragon Reactor and modifications to the safety document for the Dragon Fuel Element Production Building

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beutler, H.; Cross, J.; Flamm, J.

1965-01-01

The manufacture of the zirconium containing 'driver' fuel and fuel elements for the First Charge of the Dragon Reactor Experiment has been completed without incident. This is a report on the safety of operations in the Dragon Fuel Element Production Building during an approximately six month period when the 'driver' fuel was manufactured and 25 elements containing this fuel were assembled and exported to the Reactor Building. The opportunity is taken to bring the Safety Document up-to-date and to report on any significant operational failures of equipment. (author)

Assessment of the long-term safety of repositories. Scientific basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Noseck, Ulrich; Becker, Dirk; Fahrenholz, Christine

2008-12-01

The project contributed to increase the scientific knowledge on the long-term safety assessment and the safety cases of a radioactive waste repository. International guidelines and more recent safety cases from other countries were evaluated. The feasibility study of the three safety indicators ''individual dose rate'', ''radiotoxicity concentration in the biosphere water'' and ''radiotoxicity flux from the geosphere'' showed that due to the independently derived corresponding reference values these indicators describe three different safety statements. The combination of the three values can give a stronger argument for the safety of the repository system. Another important methodological aspect of the safety cases is the definition and selection of scenarios, one of these the human intrusion scenario. Various human intrusion scenarios are considered in the different nations, which differ significantly with respect to type and time scale, the exposition type and exposition pathway. Further progress has been achieved in how to treat human intrusion scenarios in a German post-closure safety case. Another port of the project dealt with the impact of specific geochemical processes on the long-term safety of the repository. The impact of climate changes on the long-term safety of a radioactive waste repository in rock salt was investigated with respect to processes in the overburden and the biosphere where highest impact is expected. Sofa simplified models and only discrete climate estates have been considered

New set of Chemical Safety rules

CERN Multimedia

HSE Unit

2011-01-01

A new set of four Safety Rules was issued on 28 March 2011: Safety Regulation SR-C ver. 2, Chemical Agents (en); General Safety Instruction GSI-C1, Prevention and Protection Measures (en); General Safety Instruction GSI-C2, Explosive Atmospheres (en); General Safety Instruction GSI-C3, Monitoring of Exposure to Hazardous Chemical Agents in Workplace Atmospheres (en). These documents form part of the CERN Safety Rules and are issued in application of the “Staff Rules and Regulations” and of document SAPOCO 42. These documents set out the minimum requirements for the protection of persons from risks to their occupational safety and health arising, or likely to arise, from the effects of hazardous chemical agents that are present in the workplace or used in any CERN activity. Simultaneously, the HSE Unit has published seven Safety Guidelines and six Safety Forms. These documents are available from the dedicated Web page “Chemical, Cryogenic and Biological Safety&...

Intergrated plant safety assessment. Systematic evaluation program. Palisades plant, Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-255. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-10-01

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has published its Final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR) (NUREG-0820), under the scope of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), for Consumers Power Company's Palisades Plant located in Covert, Van Buren County, Michigan. The SEP was initiated by the NRC to review the design of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. This report documents the review completed under the SEP for the Palisades Plant. The review has provided for (1) as assessment of the significance of differences between current technical positions on selected safety issues and those that existed when the Palisades Plant was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety when all supplements to the Final IPSAR and the Safety Evaluation Report for converting the license from a provisional to a full-term license have been issued. The report also addresses the comments and recommendations made by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in connection with its review of the Draft Report, issued in April 1982

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Ed.)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Ed.)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Ed.)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

Radiobiological basis for setting neutron radiation safety standards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Straume, T.

1985-01-01

Present neutron standards, adopted more than 20 yr ago from a weak radiobiological data base, have been in doubt for a number of years and are currently under challenge. Moreover, recent dosimetric re-evaluations indicate that Hiroshima neutron doses may have been much lower than previously thought, suggesting that direct data for neutron-induced cancer in humans may in fact not be available. These recent developments make it urgent to determine the extent to which neutron cancer risk in man can be estimated from data that are available. Two approaches are proposed here that are anchored in particularly robust epidemiological and experimental data and appear most likely to provide reliable estimates of neutron cancer risk in man. The first approach uses gamma-ray dose-response relationships for human carcinogenesis, available from Nagasaki (Hiroshima data are also considered), together with highly characterized neutron and gamma-ray data for human cytogenetics. When tested against relevant experimental data, this approach either adequately predicts or somewhat overestimates neutron tumorigenesis (and mutagenesis) in animals. The second approach also uses the Nagasaki gamma-ray cancer data, but together with neutron RBEs from animal tumorigenesis studies. Both approaches give similar results and provide a basis for setting neutron radiation safety standards. They appear to be an improvement over previous approaches, including those that rely on highly uncertain maximum neutron RBEs and unnecessary extrapolations of gamma-ray data to very low doses. Results suggest that, at the presently accepted neutron dose limit of 0.5 rad/yr, the cancer mortality risk to radiation workers is not very different from accidental mortality risks to workers in various nonradiation occupations

The power of simplification: Operator interface with the AP1000{sup R} during design-basis and beyond design-basis events

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Williams, M. G.; Mouser, M. R.; Simon, J. B. [Westinghouse Electric Company, 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (United States)

2012-07-01

The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and cost. The passive safety features are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC. The AP1000 passive safety features achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of a design-basis accident for 72 hours without need for operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the European Utility Requirements and the Utility Requirement Document for passive plants. Limited operator actions may be required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool (SFP) via passive means. This safety approach therefore minimizes the reliance on operator action for accident mitigation, and this paper examines the operator interaction with the Human-System Interface (HSI) as the severity of an accident increases from an anticipated transient to a design basis accident and finally, to a beyond-design-basis event. The AP1000 Control Room design provides an extremely effective environment for addressing the first 72 hours of design-basis events and transients, providing ease of information dissemination and minimal reliance upon operator actions. Symptom-based procedures including Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) are used to mitigate design basis transients and accidents. Use of the Computerized Procedure System (CPS) aids the operators during mitigation of the event. The CPS provides cues and direction to the operators as the event progresses. If the event becomes progressively worse or lasts longer than 72 hours, and depending upon the nature of failures that may have occurred, minimal operator actions may be required outside of the control room in areas that have been designed to be accessible using components that have been

Overview of Generation IV (Gen IV) Reactor Designs - Safety and Radiological Protection Considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baudrand, Olivier; Blanc, Daniel; Ivanov, Evgeny; Bonneville, Herve; Clement, Bernard; Kissane, Martin; Meignen, Renaud; Monhardt, Daniel; Nicaise, Gregory; Bourgois, Thierry; Bruna, Giovanni; Hache, Georges; Repussard, Jacques

2012-01-01

The purpose of this document is to provide an updated overview of specific safety and radiological protection issues for all the reactor concepts adopted by the GIF (Generation IV International Forum), independent of their advantages or disadvantages in terms of resource optimization or long-lived-waste reduction. In particular, this new document attempts to bring out the advantages and disadvantages of each concept in terms of safety, taking into account the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) statement concerning safety objectives for new nuclear power plants. Using an identical framework for each reactor concept (sodium-cooled fast reactors or SFR, high / very-high temperature helium-cooled reactors of V/HTR, gas-cooled fast reactors or GFR, lead-or lead / bismuth-cooled fast reactors or LFR, molten salt reactors or MSR, and supercritical-water-cooled reactors or SCWR), this summary report provides some general conclusions regarding their safety and radiological protection issues, inspired by WENRA's safety objectives and on the basis of available information. Initial lessons drawn from the events at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011 have also been taken into account in IRSN's analysis of each reactor concept

Analysis of Electrical Safety Conditions Taking into Account Soil Conductivity Determined on the Basis of Fuzzy Logic

OpenAIRE

Manusov, V.Z.; Zaytseva, N.M.

2017-01-01

The goal of this work is to prove a possibility of determining soil parameters that influence its conductivity being the basis of grounding, step voltage and touch voltage calculation. This in its turn increases the safety level of electric equipment operation. The article is devoted to development of new, no conventional models of soil conductivity using the theory of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic. The description of the solution includes the following sections: fuzzy models of specific electri...

Beyond-design-basis accident management in the RF regulation documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bukrinskij, A.M.

2010-01-01

The article observes the issues of the management of beyond-design-basis accidents (BDBA) in the existing regulations in Russia. The ideology of the approach to the definition of the BDBA list to formulate the management guidelines has been proposed [ru

OSR encapsulation basis -- 100-KW

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meichle, R.H.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this report is to provide the basis for a change in the Operations Safety Requirement (OSR) encapsulated fuel storage requirements in the 105 KW fuel storage basin which will permit the handling and storing of encapsulated fuel in canisters which no longer have a water-free space in the top of the canister. The scope of this report is limited to providing the change from the perspective of the safety envelope (bases) of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and Operations Safety Requirements (OSR). It does not change the encapsulation process itself

Approach to developing a ground-motion design basis for facilities important to safety at Yucca Mountain

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

King, J.L.

1990-01-01

This paper discusses a methodology for developing a ground-motion design basis for prospective facilities at Yucca Mountain that are important to safety. The methodology utilizes a guasi-deterministic construct called the 10,000-year cumulative-slip earthquake that is designed to provide a conservative, robust, and reproducible estimate of ground motion that has a one-in-ten chance of occurring during the preclosure period. This estimate is intended to define a ground-motion level for which the seismic design would ensure minimal disruption to operations engineering analyses to ensure safe performance are included

Increased Efficiencies in the INEEL SAR/TSR/USQ Process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cole, N.E.

2002-01-01

The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) has implemented a number of efficiencies to reduce the time and cost of preparing safety basis documents. The INEEL is continuing to look at other aspects of the safety basis process to identify other efficiencies that can be implemented and remain in compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830. A six-sigma approach is used to identify areas to improve efficiencies and develop the action plan for implementation of the new process, as applicable. Three improvement processes have been implemented: The first was the development of standardized Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and technical safety requirement (TSR) documents that all nuclear facilities use, by adding facility-specific details. The second is a material procurement process, which is based on safety systems specified in the individual safety basis documents. The third is a restructuring of the entire safety basis preparation and approval process. Significant savings in time to prepare safety basis document, cost of materials, and total cost of the documents are currently being realized

The Regulatory Approach for the Assessment of Safety Culture in Germany: A Tool for Practical Use for Inspections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fassmann, W.; Beck, J.; Kopisch, C.

2016-01-01

Need for methods to assess licencees’ safety culture has been recognised since the Chernobyl accident. Several conferences organized by IAEA and OECD-NEA stated the need for regulatory oversight of safety culture and for suitable methods. In 2013, IAEA published a Technical Document (TECDOC 1707) on the process of safety culture oversight by regulatory authorities which leaves much room for regulators’ ways of performing safety culture oversight. In response to these developments, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) as the federal regulatory body commissioned GRS in 2011 to develop a practical guidance for assessing licencees’ safety culture in the process of regulatory oversight. This research and development project was completed just recently. The publicly available documentation comprises a shorter guidance document with the indispensable information for an appropriate, practical application and a report with more detailed information about the scientific basis of this guidance. To achieve best possible adaptation to regulators’ needs, GRS asked members of the regulatory authority of Baden-Wuerttemberg (one of the federal states of Germany) for comments on a draft of the guidance which was then finalised by duly considering this highly valuable and favorable feedback. Decisions regarding future use rest with German regulatory authorities.

IAEA activities to prepare safety codes and guides for thermal neutron nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iansiti, E.

1977-01-01

programme is directed towards the safety of thermal nuclear power reactors; however, many of the documents can be very well applied to fast reactors. The first five codes have already completed the procedure and about ten to twelve safety guides will be ready in the course of 1977; the work will proceed then at the rate of about twelve safety guides a year, in the following years. On the basis of the experience gained in the preparation of these documents, and when a substantial part of the documents included in the programme of nuclear power plant safety have been published, it is foreseen that the programme be extended to include other nuclear facilities such as fabrication and reprocessing plants

29 CFR 1975.2 - Basis of authority.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... Relating to Labor (Continued) OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (CONTINUED) COVERAGE OF EMPLOYERS UNDER THE WILLIAMS-STEIGER OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 § 1975.2 Basis... Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, is derived mainly from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution...

Living probabilistic safety assessment (LPSA)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-08-01

Over the past few years many nuclear power plant organizations have performed probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) to identify and understand key plant vulnerabilities. As a result of the availability of these PSA studies, there is a desire to use them to enhance plant safety and to operate the nuclear stations in the most efficient manner. PSA is an effective tool for this purpose as it assists plant management to target resources where the largest benefit to plant safety can be obtained. However, any PSA which is to be used in this way must have a credible and defensible basis. Thus, it is very important to have a high quality 'living PSA' accepted by the plant and the regulator. With this background in mind, the IAEA has prepared this report on Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (LPSA) which addresses the updating, documentation, quality assurance, and management and organizational requirements for LPSA. Deficiencies in the areas addressed in this report would seriously reduce the adequacy of the LPSA as a tool to support decision making at NPPs. This report was reviewed by a working group during a Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications to Improve NPP Safety held in Madrid, Spain, from 23 to 27 February 1998

A risk-informed framework for establishing a beyond design basis safety basis for external hazards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Amico, P. [Hughes Associates, Inc, Baltimore, MD (United States); Anoba, R. [Hughes Associates, Inc, Raleigh, NC (United States); Najafi, B. [Hughes Associates, Inc., Los Gatos, CA (United States)

2014-07-01

The events at Fukushima Daiichi taught us that meeting a deterministic design basis requirement for external hazards does not assure that the risk is low. As observed at the plant, the two primary reasons for this are failure cliffs above the design basis event and that combined hazard effects are not considered in design. Because the possible combinations of design basis exceedences and external hazard combinations are very large and complex, an approach focusing only on the most important ones is needed. For this reason, a risk informed approach is the most effective approach, which is discussed in this paper. (author)

The Argentine Approach to Radiation Safety: Its Ethical Basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gonzalez, A.J.

2011-01-01

The ethical bases of Argentina's radiation safety approach are reviewed. The applied principles are those recommended and established internationally, namely: the principle of justification of decisions that alters the radiation exposure situation; the principle of optimization of protection and safety; the principle of individual protection for restricting possible inequitable outcomes of optimized safety; and the implicit principle of inter generational prudence for protection future generations and the habitat. The principles are compared vis-a-vis the prevalent ethical doctrines: justification vis-a-vis teleology; optimization vis-a-vis utilitarianism; individual protection vis-a-vis de ontology; and, inter generational prudence vis-a-vis aretaicism (or virtuosity). The application of the principles and their ethics in Argentina is analysed. These principles are applied to All exposure to radiation harm; namely, to exposures to actual doses and to exposures to actual risk and potential doses, including those related to the safety of nuclear installations, and they are harmonized and applied in conjunction. It is concluded that building a bridge among all available ethical doctrines and applying it to radiation safety against actual doses and actual risk and potential doses is at the roots of the successful nuclear regulatory experience in Argentina.

Configuration control during maintenance of safety related equipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Irish, C.S.

2001-01-01

Possibly the most important aspect of performing maintenance of safety related equipment is maintaining the component's original design basis. Assuring that the repaired item will perform the same safety function within the original performance and equipment qualification parameters is commonly referred to as configuration control. Maintaining configuration control of a technologically current well documented item is easy. Unfortunately, this does not describe most safety related items requiring maintenance within the global nuclear industry. Items such as motors, transformers, metal clad switchgear (low and medium voltage circuit breakers), refrigeration compressors, and electronic components (i.e. circuit boards, power supplies, regulators, etc.) which routinely require repair have been in service for twenty plus years. As a result, finding replacement parts and or material to repair the items to the original condition is becoming more and more difficult. An added difficulty is the lack of original technical documentation available on the item which is being repaired. The lack of technical documentation makes it difficult to identify replacement material and parts when the original part or material is not available. The lack of documentation also makes it difficult to test the repaired item to make sure that the original configuration has been maintained after the repair. The presentation will discuss the details of repairing various items including motors, metal clad switchgear, refrigeration compressors and power supplies and the controls which are necessary to maintain the configuration of the original item. The discussion will include the Quality Assurance and engineering necessary to identify and evaluate replacement material and parts necessary to perform repairs on safety related equipment when the original material or part is not available. Examples of repairs which required different parts or materials than the original to be used in the repair will be

Configuration control during maintenance of safety related equipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Irish, C.S.

2003-01-01

Possibly the most important aspect of performing maintenance of safety related equipment is maintaining the component's original design basis. Assuring that the repaired item will perform the same safety function within the original performance and equipment qualification parameters is commonly referred to as configuration control. Maintaining configuration control of a technologically current well documented item is easy. Unfortunately, this does not describe most safety related items requiring maintenance within the global nuclear industry. Items such as motors, transformers, metal clad switchgear (low and medium voltage circuit breakers), refrigeration compressors, and electronic components (i.e. circuit boards, power supplies, regulators, etc.) which routinely require repair have been in service for twenty plus years. As a result, finding replacement parts and or material to repair the items to the original condition is becoming more and more difficult. An added difficulty is the lack of original technical documentation available on the item which is being repaired. The lack of technical documentation makes it difficult to identify replacement material and parts when the original part or material is not available. The lack of documentation also makes it difficult to test the repaired item to make sure that the original configuration has been maintained after the repair. The presentation will discuss the details of repairing various items including motors, metal clad switchgear, refrigeration compressors and power supplies and the controls which are necessary to maintain the configuration of the original item. The discussion will include the Quality Assurance and engineering necessary to identify and evaluate replacement material and parts necessary to perform repairs on safety related equipment when the original material or part is not available. Examples of repairs which required different parts or materials than the original to be used in the repair will be

Quality and quantity of information in summary basis of decision documents issued by health Canada.

Science.gov (United States)

Habibi, Roojin; Lexchin, Joel

2014-01-01

Health Canada's Summary Basis of Decision (SBD) documents outline the clinical trial information that was considered in approving a new drug. We examined the ability of SBDs to inform clinician decision-making. We asked if SBDs answered three questions that clinicians might have prior to prescribing a new drug: 1) Do the characteristics of patients enrolled in trials match those of patients in their practice? 2) What are the details concerning the drug's risks and benefits? 3) What are the basic characteristics of trials? 14 items of clinical trial information were identified from all SBDs published on or before April 2012. Each item received a score of 2 (present), 1 (unclear) or 0 (absent). The unit of analysis was the individual SBD, and an overall SBD score was derived based on the sum of points for each item. Scores were expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible points, and then classified into five descriptive categories based on that score. Additionally, three overall 'component' scores were tallied for each SBD: "patient characteristics", "benefit/risk information" and "basic trial characteristics". 161 documents, spanning 456 trials, were analyzed. The majority (126/161) were rated as having information sometimes present (score of >33 to 66%). No SBDs had either no information on any item, or 100% of the information. Items in the patient characteristics component scored poorest (mean component score of 40.4%), while items corresponding to basic trial information were most frequently provided (mean component score of 71%). The significant omissions in the level of clinical trial information in SBDs provide little to aid clinicians in their decision-making. Clinicians' preferred source of information is scientific knowledge, but in Canada, access to such information is limited. Consequently, we believe that clinicians are being denied crucial tools for decision-making.

Draft pilot report - Approaches to the resolution of safety issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The purpose of this report is to present in a concise form how some safety matters associated with currently operating light water reactors have been addressed. The issues discussed in this report are common to member countries with currently operating LWRs (PWR, BWR, VVER) and, as such, have wide interest in the nuclear safety community. Accordingly, this report can serve as a reference for researchers, regulations and others (e.g., industry) interested in understanding the approach and status of issues. This report should also be useful for knowledge transfer by documenting what has been done or is planned regarding selected safety matters and as a source for identifying reference material containing additional detail. The issues addressed in this report should not be viewed as questioning the safety of operating reactors, which have reached very high operational safety record, but rather as areas where uncertainty in knowledge exists, where safety assessment has been based on conservative assumptions, and where regulatory decisions need, or will need to be confirmed. Thus, the development of sound technical bases through continuing research will improve the current knowledge and allow for more realistic safety assessment. The safety issues discussed in this initial version of the report are: - design basis accident spectrum; - severe accident issues; - reactor pressure vessel integrity; - hydrogen control; - containment integrity; - accident management; - station blackout; - high burnup fuel; - power up-rates; - ECCS strainer clogging; - boron dilution. For each issue, the scope of the issue is defined, its status discussed and planned work or research described, including schedule. This pilot version of the report is limited to input from nine countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Sweden and the U.S.). An overview of this information for each issue by country is provided in the table. This document does not contain a

Development and implementation of setpoint tolerances for special safety systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oliva, A.F.; Balog, G.; Parkinson, D.G.; Archinoff, G.H.

1991-01-01

The establishment of tolerances and impairment limits for special safety system setpoints is part of the process whereby the plant operator demonstrates to the regulatory authority that the plant operates safely and within the defined plant licensing envelope. The licensing envelope represents the set of limits and plant operating state and for which acceptably safe plant operation has been demonstrated by the safety analysis. By definition, operation beyond this envelope contributes to overall safety system unavailability. Definition of the licensing envelope is provided in a wide range of documents including the plant operating licence, the safety report, and the plant operating policies and principles documents. As part of the safety analysis, limits are derived for each special safety system initiating parameter such that the relevant safety design objectives are achieved for all design basis events. If initiation on a given parameter occurs at a level beyond its limit, there is a potential reduction in safety system effectiveness relative to the performance credited in the plant safety analysis. These safety system parameter limits, when corrected for random and systematic instrument errors and other errors inherent in the process of periodic testing or calibration, are then used to derive parameter impairment levels and setpoint tolerances. This paper describes the methodology that has evolved at Ontario Hydro for developing and implementing tolerances for special safety system parameters (i.e., the shutdown systems, emergency coolant injection system and containment system). Tolerances for special safety system initiation setpoints are addressed specifically, although many of the considerations discussed here will apply to performance limits for other safety system components. The first part of the paper deals with the approach that has been adopted for defining and establishing setpoint limits and tolerances. The remainder of the paper addresses operational

Fundamentals of a graded approach to safety-related equipment setpoints

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woodruff, B.A.; Cash, J.S. Jr.; Bockhorst, R.M.

1993-01-01

The concept of using a graded approach to reconstitute instrument setpoints associated with safety-related equipment was first presented to the industry by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the 1992 ISA/POWID Symposium in Kansas City, Missouri. The graded approach establishes that the manner in which a utility analyzes and documents setpoints is related to each setpoint's relative importance to safety. This allows a utility to develop separate requirements for setpoints of varying levels of safety significance. A graded approach to setpoints is a viable strategy that minimizes extraneous effort expended in resolving difficult issues that arise when formal setpoint methodology is applied blindly to all setpoints. Close examination of setpoint methodology reveals that the application of a graded approach is fundamentally dependent on the analytical basis of each individual setpoint

49 CFR 591.6 - Documents accompanying declarations.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED) IMPORTATION OF VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO FEDERAL SAFETY, BUMPER AND THEFT PREVENTION STANDARDS § 591.6 Documents accompanying... be accompanied by a statement substantiating that the vehicle was not manufactured for use on the...

Planned activities to improve safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This document presents the fulfilling of the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Chapter 6 of the document contains some details about the planed activities to safety improvements

Guide for the realization of Design Base Documents (DBD)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roca Mallofre, G. la

2010-01-01

Guide for improving the consistency and quality content of the Design Base Documents. It's a short description of how to carry out and complete these Documents but focusing on those aspects that can be more confusing and harder to interpret. This guide aims to clarify the term Design Base distinguishing between production and safety, and it focuses on safety Design Base Documents and their values and references. It also emphasizes the difference between the support system and the interface system when there is a functional connection between different systems.

IGSC - Integration Group for the Safety Case

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

Countries that rely on nuclear energy and materials have an ethical obligation to manage radioactive waste in a safe and environmentally responsible manner. For society to support the sustainable solutions envisaged, disposal concepts must be technologically sound and the safety of these concepts must be convincingly demonstrated. The Nuclear Energy Agency's Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) establishes and documents the technical and scientific basis for developing and reviewing safety cases as a platform for dialogue among technical experts and as a tool for decision making. The IGSC addresses various strategic and policy aspects of radioactive waste management as the technical advisory body to the NEA Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC) for all issues related to repository development. For more than two decades, the IGSC and its predecessor technical groups have promoted the exchange of national experience in evaluating and implementing geological repositories. IGSC activities foster consensus on best practices and encourage the development of innovative, advanced approaches covering the technical aspects at all stages of repository implementation, including: - strategies to characterise and evaluate potential disposal sites; - methods to design and test engineered barrier systems; - priorities for research and development programmes to improve the understanding of important processes and interactions; - tools for safety assessments; - techniques for the effective presentation and communication of the results of safety cases and other factors that provide the basis for increased confidence in the safety of geological disposal facilities. The IGSC has been instrumental in further developing the 'modern safety case', a concept that originally emerged from NEA work in the 1990's. Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission (EC) has led to the worldwide adoption of this safety

Criticality safety evaluation of Rocky Flats Plant one-gallon shipping containers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Briggs, J.B.

1991-02-01

Intraplant shipment of small quantities of plutonium and uranium at the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) are made in one-gallon shipping containers. Criticality safety calculations have been performed to provide an analytical basis upon which handling, storage, and transportation limits on these containers are based. The calculations and results are documented in this report. This analysis was categorized as Quality Level A (according to the EG ampersand G Idaho Quality Manual) in that it is a service whose failure could cause undue risks to employees or public health and safety. It is intended to comply with NQA-1. 7 refs., 7 figs., 12 tabs

Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk. Bulletin no. 8

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Masera, M.; Rasmussen, K.

1993-01-01

The Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the Commission of the European Communities is responsible for the effective and harmonized implementation of the Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities. To this end, the Commission, in collaboration with the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of this Directive in the twelve Member States, carries out a whole range of activities. One of the most essential areas for action identified was the need for a systematic diffusion of information concerning the practical implementation of the Directive in the Member States, including the technical rules and guidelines applied, the safety practices and the lessons learnt from major accidents. Therefore, the Commission decided to set up a Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risks (CDCIR). This Documentation Centre is run by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics (ISEI), at Ispra, Italy, among its support activities on the implementation of the Directive. The Documentation Centre will collect, classify and review technical rules, guidelines and documents concerning the requirements of the Directive, as well as the safety of industrial installations produced by governments, administrative, scientific or technical bodies, national or international organizations and industrial or professional associations. Documents on major accidents in the form of reports, videotapes will also be collected and reviewed. The Centre is accessible to interested visitors, documents which are not covered by copyright and are not restricted can be obtained from the Documentation Centre on request. Periodical volumes which will feature the inventory, including abstracts, of the collected material will be published and made available to all interested parties. The Centre will also publish documents devoted to compare existing

Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk. Bulletin no. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gow, H.B.F.

1991-01-01

The Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the Commission of the European Communities is responsible for the effective and harmonized implementation of the Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities. To this end, the Commission, in collaboration with the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of this Directive in the twelve Member States, carries out a whole range of activities. One of the most essential areas for action identified was the need for a systematic diffusion of information concerning the practical implementation of the Directive in the Member States, including the technical rules and guidelines applied, the safety practices and the lessons learnt from major accidents. Therefore, the Commission decided to set up a Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risks (CDCIR). This Documentation Centre is run by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics (ISEI), at Ispra, Italy, among its support activities on the implementation of the Directive. The Documentation Centre will collect, classify and review technical rules, guidelines and documents concerning the requirements of the Directive, as well as the safety of industrial installations produced by governments, administrative, scientific or technical bodies, national or international organizations and industrial or professional associations. Documents on major accidents in the form of reports, videotapes will also be collected and reviewed. The Centre is accessible to interested visitors, documents which are not covered by copyright and are not restricted can be obtained from the Documentation Centre on request. Periodical volumes which will feature the inventory, including abstracts, of the collected material will be published and made available to all interested parties. The Centre will also publish documents devoted to compare existing

Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk. Bulletin no. 10

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perschke, A.; Kirchsteiger, C.

1996-01-01

The Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the Commission of the European Communities is responsible for the effective and harmonized implementation of the Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities. To this end, the Commission, in collaboration with the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of this Directive in the twelve Member States, carries out a whole range of activities. One of the most essential areas for action identified was the need for a systematic diffusion of information concerning the practical implementation of the Directive in the Member States, including the technical rules and guidelines applied, the safety practices and the lessons learnt from major accidents. Therefore, the Commission decided to set up a Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risks (CDCIR). This Documentation Centre is run by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics (ISEI), at Ispra, Italy, among its support activities on the implementation of the Directive. The Documentation Centre will collect, classify and review technical rules, guidelines and documents concerning the requirements of the Directive, as well as the safety of industrial installations produced by governments, administrative, scientific or technical bodies, national or international organizations and industrial or professional associations. Documents on major accidents in the form of reports, videotapes will also be collected and reviewed. The Centre is accessible to interested visitors, documents which are not covered by copyright and are not restricted can be obtained from the Documentation Centre on request. Periodical volumes which will feature the inventory, including abstracts, of the collected material will be published and made available to all interested parties. The Centre will also publish documents devoted to compare existing

Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk. Bulletin no. 5

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gow, H.B.F.

1991-11-01

The Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the Commission of the European Communities is responsible for the effective and harmonized implementation of the Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities. To this end, the Commission, in collaboration with the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of this Directive in the twelve Member States, carries out a whole range of activities. One of the most essential areas for action identified was the need for a systematic diffusion of information concerning the practical implementation of the Directive in the Member States, including the technical rules and guidelines applied, the safety practices and the lessons learnt from major accidents. Therefore, the Commission decided to set up a Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risks (CDCIR). This Documentation Centre is run by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics (ISEI), at Ispra, Italy, among its support activities on the implementation of the Directive. The Documentation Centre will collect, classify and review technical rules, guidelines and documents concerning the requirements of the Directive, as well as the safety of industrial installations produced by governments, administrative, scientific or technical bodies, national or international organizations and industrial or professional associations. Documents on major accidents in the form of reports, videotapes will also be collected and reviewed. The Centre is accessible to interested visitors, documents which are not covered by copyright and are not restricted can be obtained from the Documentation Centre on request. Periodical volumes which will feature the inventory, including abstracts, of the collected material will be published and made available to all interested parties. The Centre will also publish documents devoted to compare existing

Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk. Bulletin no. 7

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gow, H.B.F.; Carditello, I.

1993-04-01

The Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the Commission of the European Communities is responsible for the effective and harmonized implementation of the Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities. To this end, the Commission, in collaboration with the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of this Directive in the twelve Member States, carries out a whole range of activities. One of the most essential areas for action identified was the need for a systematic diffusion of information concerning the practical implementation of the Directive in the Member States, including the technical rules and guidelines applied, the safety practices and the lessons learnt from major accidents. Therefore, the Commission decided to set up a Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risks (CDCIR). This Documentation Centre is run by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics (ISEI), at Ispra, Italy, among its support activities on the implementation of the Directive. The Documentation Centre will collect, classify and review technical rules, guidelines and documents concerning the requirements of the Directive, as well as the safety of industrial installations produced by governments, administrative, scientific or technical bodies, national or international organizations and industrial or professional associations. Documents on major accidents in the form of reports, videotapes will also be collected and reviewed. The Centre is accessible to interested visitors, documents which are not covered by copyright and are not restricted can be obtained from the Documentation Centre on request. Periodical volumes which will feature the inventory, including abstracts, of the collected material will be published and made available to all interested parties. The Centre will also publish documents devoted to compare existing

Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk. Bulletin no. 9

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perschke, A.

1995-01-01

The Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the Commission of the European Communities is responsible for the effective and harmonized implementation of the Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities. To this end, the Commission, in collaboration with the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of this Directive in the twelve Member States, carries out a whole range of activities. One of the most essential areas for action identified was the need for a systematic diffusion of information concerning the practical implementation of the Directive in the Member States, including the technical rules and guidelines applied, the safety practices and the lessons learnt from major accidents. Therefore, the Commission decided to set up a Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risks (CDCIR). This Documentation Centre is run by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics (ISEI), at Ispra, Italy, among its support activities on the implementation of the Directive. The Documentation Centre will collect, classify and review technical rules, guidelines and documents concerning the requirements of the Directive, as well as the safety of industrial installations produced by governments, administrative, scientific or technical bodies, national or international organizations and industrial or professional associations. Documents on major accidents in the form of reports, videotapes will also be collected and reviewed. The Centre is accessible to interested visitors, documents which are not covered by copyright and are not restricted can be obtained from the Documentation Centre on request. Periodical volumes which will feature the inventory, including abstracts, of the collected material will be published and made available to all interested parties. The Centre will also publish documents devoted to compare existing

Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk. Bulletin no. 6

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gow, H.B.F.

1992-06-01

The Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the Commission of the European Communities is responsible for the effective and harmonized implementation of the Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities. To this end, the Commission, in collaboration with the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of this Directive in the twelve Member States, carries out a whole range of activities. One of the most essential areas for action identified was the need for a systematic diffusion of information concerning the practical implementation of the Directive in the Member States, including the technical rules and guidelines applied, the safety practices and the lessons learnt from major accidents. Therefore, the Commission decided to set up a Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risks (CDCIR). This Documentation Centre is run by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics (ISEI), at Ispra, Italy, among its support activities on the implementation of the Directive. The Documentation Centre will collect, classify and review technical rules, guidelines and documents concerning the requirements of the Directive, as well as the safety of industrial installations produced by governments, administrative, scientific or technical bodies, national or international organizations and industrial or professional associations. Documents on major accidents in the form of reports, videotapes will also be collected and reviewed. The Centre is accessible to interested visitors, documents which are not covered by copyright and are not restricted can be obtained from the Documentation Centre on request. Periodical volumes which will feature the inventory, including abstracts, of the collected material will be published and made available to all interested parties. The Centre will also publish documents devoted to compare existing

Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risk. Bulletin no. 11

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perschke, A.; Kirchsteiger, C.; Carnevali, C.

1997-01-01

The Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the Commission of the European Communities is responsible for the effective and harmonized implementation of the Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities. To this end, the Commission, in collaboration with the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of this Directive in the twelve Member States, carries out a whole range of activities. One of the most essential areas for action identified was the need for a systematic diffusion of information concerning the practical implementation of the Directive in the Member States, including the technical rules and guidelines applied, the safety practices and the lessons learnt from major accidents. Therefore, the Commission decided to set up a Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risks (CDCIR). This Documentation Centre is run by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics (ISEI), at Ispra, Italy, among its support activities on the implementation of the Directive. The Documentation Centre will collect, classify and review technical rules, guidelines and documents concerning the requirements of the Directive, as well as the safety of industrial installations produced by governments, administrative, scientific or technical bodies, national or international organizations and industrial or professional associations. Documents on major accidents in the form of reports, videotapes will also be collected and reviewed. The Centre is accessible to interested visitors, documents which are not covered by copyright and are not restricted can be obtained from the Documentation Centre on request. Periodical volumes which will feature the inventory, including abstracts, of the collected material will be published and made available to all interested parties. The Centre will also publish documents devoted to compare existing

A new era of safety at CERN

CERN Multimedia

CERN Bulletin

2014-01-01

CERN is modernising its safety policy and organisational structure in matters of Safety with the introduction of new reference documents that have come into force on 29 September. These texts adapt the Organization’s safety policy to take account of how the Laboratory has evolved and to include best practice in Safety matters.   Safety is a priority at CERN, so it’s no coincidence that the Organization’s anniversary has been chosen as the time to launch a modernised approach to its Safety policy and how Safety matters are organised. On the day of CERN’s 60th anniversary, the SAPOCO 42 document, which covered both policy and organisational aspects, was replaced by a more concise general policy statement. The organisational structure and responsibilities in matters of Safety are now set out in a Safety Regulation, that is supplemented by subsidiary documents. Together these documents will replace the corresponding parts of the former SAPOCO 42 as well as Saf...

Key issues on safety design basis selection and safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

An, S.; Togo, Y.

1976-01-01

In current fast reactor design in Japan, four design accident conditions and four design seismic conditions are adopted as the design base classifications. These are classified by the considerations on both likelihood of occurrence and the severeness of the consequences. There are several major problem areas in safety design consideration such as core accident problems which include fuel sodium interaction, fuel failure propagation and residual decay heat removal, and decay heat removal systems problems which is more or less the problem of selection of appropriate system and of assurance of high reliability of the system. In view of licensing, two kinds of accidents are postulated in evaluating the adequacy of a reactor site. The one is the ''major accident'' which is the accident to give most severe radiation hazard to the public from technical point of view. The other is the ''hypothetical accident'', induced public accident of which is severer than that of major accident. While the concept of the former is rather unique to Japanese licensing, the latter is almost equivalent to design base hypothetical accident of the US practice. In this paper, design bases selections, key safety issues and some of the licensing considerations in Japan are described

Regulatory guidance document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-05-01

The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) Program Management System Manual requires preparation of the OCRWM Regulatory Guidance Document (RGD) that addresses licensing, environmental compliance, and safety and health compliance. The document provides: regulatory compliance policy; guidance to OCRWM organizational elements to ensure a consistent approach when complying with regulatory requirements; strategies to achieve policy objectives; organizational responsibilities for regulatory compliance; guidance with regard to Program compliance oversight; and guidance on the contents of a project-level Regulatory Compliance Plan. The scope of the RGD includes site suitability evaluation, licensing, environmental compliance, and safety and health compliance, in accordance with the direction provided by Section 4.6.3 of the PMS Manual. Site suitability evaluation and regulatory compliance during site characterization are significant activities, particularly with regard to the YW MSA. OCRWM's evaluation of whether the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for repository development must precede its submittal of a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Accordingly, site suitability evaluation is discussed in Chapter 4, and the general statements of policy regarding site suitability evaluation are discussed in Section 2.1. Although much of the data and analyses may initially be similar, the licensing process is discussed separately in Chapter 5. Environmental compliance is discussed in Chapter 6. Safety and Health compliance is discussed in Chapter 7

Engineering design guidelines for nuclear criticality safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Waltz, W.R.

1988-08-01

This document provides general engineering design guidelines specific to nuclear criticality safety for a facility where the potential for a criticality accident exists. The guide is applicable to the design of new SRP/SRL facilities and to major modifications Of existing facilities. The document is intended an: A guide for persons actively engaged in the design process. A resource document for persons charged with design review for adequacy relative to criticality safety. A resource document for facility operating personnel. The guide defines six basic criticality safety design objectives and provides information to assist in accomplishing each objective. The guide in intended to supplement the design requirements relating to criticality safety contained in applicable Department of Energy (DOE) documents. The scope of the guide is limited to engineering design guidelines associated with criticality safety and does not include other areas of the design process, such as: criticality safety analytical methods and modeling, nor requirements for control of the design process

49 CFR 237.155 - Documents and records.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION BRIDGE SAFETY STANDARDS Documentation, Records, and Audits of Bridge Management Programs § 237.155 Documents and records. Each track owner required to implement a bridge management... protected by a security system that incorporates a user identity and password, or a comparable method, to...

340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodovsky, T.J.

2010-01-01

The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3. The final hazard categorization for the deactivated 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility) is presented in this document. This hazard categorization was prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-1 027-92, Change Notice 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with Doe Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category (HC) 3. Routine nuclear waste receiving, storage, handling, and shipping operations at the 340 Facility have been deactivated, however, the facility contains a small amount of radioactive liquid and/or dry saltcake in two underground vault tanks. A seismic event and hydrogen deflagration were selected as bounding accidents. The generation of hydrogen in the vault tanks without active ventilation was determined to achieve a steady state volume of 0.33%, which is significantly less than the lower flammability limit of 4%. Therefore, a hydrogen deflagration is not possible in these tanks. The unmitigated release from a seismic event was used to categorize the facility consistent with the process defined in Nuclear Safety Technical Position (NSTP) 2002-2. The final sum-of-fractions calculation concluded that the facility is less than HC 3. The analysis did not identify any required engineered controls or design features. The Administrative Controls that were derived from the analysis are: (1) radiological inventory control, (2) facility change control, and (3) Safety Management Programs (SMPs). The facility configuration and radiological inventory shall be controlled to ensure that the assumptions in the analysis remain valid. The facility commitment to SMPs protects the integrity of the facility and environment by ensuring training, emergency response, and radiation protection. The full scale

Is road safety management linked to road safety performance?

Science.gov (United States)

Papadimitriou, Eleonora; Yannis, George

2013-10-01

This research aims to explore the relationship between road safety management and road safety performance at country level. For that purpose, an appropriate theoretical framework is selected, namely the 'SUNflower' pyramid, which describes road safety management systems in terms of a five-level hierarchy: (i) structure and culture, (ii) programmes and measures, (iii) 'intermediate' outcomes'--safety performance indicators (SPIs), (iv) final outcomes--fatalities and injuries, and (v) social costs. For each layer of the pyramid, a composite indicator is implemented, on the basis of data for 30 European countries. Especially as regards road safety management indicators, these are estimated on the basis of Categorical Principal Component Analysis upon the responses of a dedicated road safety management questionnaire, jointly created and dispatched by the ETSC/PIN group and the 'DaCoTA' research project. Then, quasi-Poisson models and Beta regression models are developed for linking road safety management indicators and other indicators (i.e. background characteristics, SPIs) with road safety performance. In this context, different indicators of road safety performance are explored: mortality and fatality rates, percentage reduction in fatalities over a given period, a composite indicator of road safety final outcomes, and a composite indicator of 'intermediate' outcomes (SPIs). The results of the analyses suggest that road safety management can be described on the basis of three composite indicators: "vision and strategy", "budget, evaluation and reporting", and "measurement of road user attitudes and behaviours". Moreover, no direct statistical relationship could be established between road safety management indicators and final outcomes. However, a statistical relationship was found between road safety management and 'intermediate' outcomes, which were in turn found to affect 'final' outcomes, confirming the SUNflower approach on the consecutive effect of each layer

Seismic methodology in determining basis earthquake for nuclear installation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ameli Zamani, Sh.

2008-01-01

Design basis earthquake ground motions for nuclear installations should be determined to assure the design purpose of reactor safety: that reactors should be built and operated to pose no undue risk to public health and safety from earthquake and other hazards. Regarding the influence of seismic hazard to a site, large numbers of earthquake ground motions can be predicted considering possible variability among the source, path, and site parameters. However, seismic safety design using all predicted ground motions is practically impossible. In the determination of design basis earthquake ground motions it is therefore important to represent the influences of the large numbers of earthquake ground motions derived from the seismic ground motion prediction methods for the surrounding seismic sources. Viewing the relations between current design basis earthquake ground motion determination and modem earthquake ground motion estimation, a development of risk-informed design basis earthquake ground motion methodology is discussed for insight into the on going modernization of the Examination Guide for Seismic Design on NPP

Fluor Daniel Hanford contract standards/requirements identification document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bennett, G.L.

1997-04-24

This document, the Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) for the Fluor Daniel Hanford Contract, represents the necessary and sufficient requirements to provide an adequate level of protection of the worker, public health and safety, and the environment.

Fluor Daniel Hanford company standards requirements identification document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, G.L.

1997-01-01

This document, the Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) for the Fluor Daniel Hanford Contract, represents the necessary and sufficient requirements to provide an adequate level of protection of the worker, public health and safety, and the environment

Climate and climate-related issues for the safety assessment SR-Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-12-01

The purpose of this report is to document current scientific knowledge on climate and climate-related conditions, relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository, to a level required for an adequate treatment in the safety assessment SR-Site. The report also presents a number of dedicated studies on climate and selected climate-related processes of relevance for the assessment of long term repository safety. Based on this information, the report presents a number of possible future climate developments for Forsmark, the site selected for building a repository for spent nuclear fuel in Sweden (Figure 1-1). The presented climate developments are used as basis for the selection and analysis of SR-Site safety assessment scenarios in the SR-Site main report /SKB 2011/. The present report is based on research conducted and published by SKB as well as on research reported in the general scientific literature

Nuclear safety and security culture - an integrated approach to regulatory oversight

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tronea, M.; Ciurea Ercau, C.

2013-01-01

The paper presents the development and implementation of regulatory guidelines for the oversight of safety and security culture within licensees organizations. CNCAN (the National Commission for Nuclear Activities of Romania) has used the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attributes for a strong safety culture as the basis for its regulatory guidelines providing support to the reviewers and inspectors for recognizing and gathering information relevant to safety culture. These guidelines are in process of being extended to address also security culture, based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7 document Nuclear Security Culture: Implementing Guide. Recognizing that safety and security cultures coexist and need to reinforce each other because they share the common objective of limiting risk and that similar regulatory review and inspection processes are in place for nuclear security oversight, an integrated approach is considered justified, moreover since the common elements of these cultures outweigh the differences. (authors)

Climate and climate-related issues for the safety assessment SR-Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

2010-12-15

The purpose of this report is to document current scientific knowledge on climate and climate-related conditions, relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository, to a level required for an adequate treatment in the safety assessment SR-Site. The report also presents a number of dedicated studies on climate and selected climate-related processes of relevance for the assessment of long term repository safety. Based on this information, the report presents a number of possible future climate developments for Forsmark, the site selected for building a repository for spent nuclear fuel in Sweden (Figure 1-1). The presented climate developments are used as basis for the selection and analysis of SR-Site safety assessment scenarios in the SR-Site main report /SKB 2011/. The present report is based on research conducted and published by SKB as well as on research reported in the general scientific literature

Geological basis and data set for assessing the long-term safety of the final repository for low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes at the Wellenberg site (Community of Wolfenschiessen, NW)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-09-01

This report forms part of the supporting documentation for the low- and intermediate-level waste repository site selection procedure. The aim of the report is to present the site-specific geological data, and the geosphere database derived therefrom, which were used as a basis for evaluating the long-term safety of a repository at Wellenberg. These data also form a key component of other reports appearing simultaneously with the present one, first on the intercomparison of the four potential sites, (NTB 93-02) and second, on the safety assessment of the Wellenberg site itself (NTB 93-26). The level of detail of the present report is determined by the requirements of the other two reports mentioned, which would include presenting, discussing and justifying the geosphere dataset used in the performance assessment model calculations. The introductory chapter discusses procedures and goals. The second chapter provides an overview of the geographical and geological situation at Wellenberg. Chapter 3 then discusses the planning and progress of the field programme, and the current status of investigations is presented. The fourth chapter presents the geological situation at the Wellenberg site and describes the concept and models formulated on the basis of this information. Chapter 5 derives the performance assessment and engineering datasets, based on the investigations, concepts and modelling exercises described in chapter 4. In summary, it can be said that, to date, the investigation results from Wellenberg have confirmed predictions in all relevant respects and, in some cases, have even exceeded expectations (e.g. in relation to the available volume of host rock). (author) figs., tabs., 141 refs

Integrated plant safety assessment systematic evaluation program. R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, Docket No. 50-244

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-05-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1978 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. The review provides (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (located in Wayne County near Rochester, NY), one of ten plants reviewed under Phase II of this program, and indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review. It is expected that this report will be one of the bases in considering the issuance of a full-term operating license in place of the existing provisional operating license