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Sample records for safety basis controls

  1. Advanced Test Reactor Safety Basis Upgrade Lessons Learned Relative to Design Basis Verification and Safety Basis Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    G. L. Sharp; R. T. McCracken

    2004-01-01

    The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a pressurized light-water reactor with a design thermal power of 250 MW. The principal function of the ATR is to provide a high neutron flux for testing reactor fuels and other materials. The reactor also provides other irradiation services such as radioisotope production. The ATR and its support facilities are located at the Test Reactor Area of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). An audit conducted by the Department of Energy's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (DOE OA) raised concerns that design conditions at the ATR were not adequately analyzed in the safety analysis and that legacy design basis management practices had the potential to further impact safe operation of the facility.1 The concerns identified by the audit team, and issues raised during additional reviews performed by ATR safety analysts, were evaluated through the unreviewed safety question process resulting in shutdown of the ATR for more than three months while these concerns were resolved. Past management of the ATR safety basis, relative to facility design basis management and change control, led to concerns that discrepancies in the safety basis may have developed. Although not required by DOE orders or regulations, not performing design basis verification in conjunction with development of the 10 CFR 830 Subpart B upgraded safety basis allowed these potential weaknesses to be carried forward. Configuration management and a clear definition of the existing facility design basis have a direct relation to developing and maintaining a high quality safety basis which properly identifies and mitigates all hazards and postulated accident conditions. These relations and the impact of past safety basis management practices have been reviewed in order to identify lessons learned from the safety basis upgrade process and appropriate actions to resolve possible concerns with respect to the current ATR safety

  2. Safety Basis Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    R.J. Garrett

    2002-01-01

    As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the implementation of the requirements identified in the Standards/Requirements Identification Document. The Standards/Requirements Identification Documents commit a facility to compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 5480.19) and the Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program. In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design and operation of the YMP site characterization activities

  3. Safety Basis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R.J. Garrett

    2002-01-14

    As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the implementation of the requirements identified in the Standards/Requirements Identification Document. The Standards/Requirements Identification Documents commit a facility to compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 5480.19) and the Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program. In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design and operation of the YMP site characterization activities.

  4. Materials Safety Data Sheets: the basis for control of toxic chemicals

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ketchen, E.E.; Porter, W.E.

    1979-09-01

    The Material Safety Data Sheets contained in this volume are the basis for the Toxic Chemical Control Program developed by the Industrial Hygiene Department, Health Division, ORNL. The three volumes are the update and expansion of ORNL/TM-5721 and ORNL/TM-5722 Material Safety Data Sheets: The Basis for Control of Toxic Chemicals, Volume I and Volume II. As such, they are a valuable adjunct to the data cards issued with specific chemicals. The chemicals are identified by name, stores catalog number where appropriate, and sequence numbers from the NIOSH Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, 1977 Edition, if available. The data sheets were developed and compiled to aid in apprising the employees of hazards peculiar to the handling and/or use of specific toxic chemicals. Space limitation necessitate the use of descriptive medical terms and toxicological abbreviations. A glossary and an abbreviation list were developed to define some of those sometimes unfamiliar terms and abbreviations. The page numbers are keyed to the catalog number in the chemical stores at ORNL.

  5. Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lavender, J.C.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports

  6. Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lavender, J.C.

    1994-09-09

    The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

  7. 10 CFR 830.202 - Safety basis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety basis. 830.202 Section 830.202 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT Safety Basis Requirements § 830.202 Safety basis. (a) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis...

  8. Interim safety basis compliance matrix for Trenches 31 and 34

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ames, R.R.

    1994-01-01

    The tables provided in this document identify the specific requirements and basis for the administrative controls established in the Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) Solid Waste Burial Ground (SWBG) Interim Safety Basis (ISB) for operation of the Project W-025, Mixed Waste Lined Landfill (Trenches 31 and 34). The tables document the necessary controls and implementing procedures to ensure compliance with the requirements of the ISB. These requirements provide a basis for future Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQ) screening of applicable procedure changes, proposed physical modifications, tests, experiments, and occurrences. Table 1 provides the SWBG interim Operational Safety Requirements administrative controls matrix. The specific assumptions and commitments used in the safety analysis documents applicable to disposal of mixed wastes in Trenches 31 and 34 are provided in Table 2. Table 3 is provided to document the potential engineered and administrative mitigating features identified in the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for disposal of mixed waste

  9. System Design and the Safety Basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellingson, Darrel

    2008-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to present the Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC (BJC) Lessons Learned for system design as it relates to safety basis documentation. BJC has had to reconcile incomplete or outdated system description information with current facility safety basis for a number of situations in recent months. This paper has relevance in multiple topical areas including documented safety analysis, decontamination and decommissioning (D and D), safety basis (SB) implementation, safety and design integration, potential inadequacy of the safety analysis (PISA), technical safety requirements (TSR), and unreviewed safety questions. BJC learned that nuclear safety compliance relies on adequate and well documented system design information. A number of PIS As and TSR violations occurred due to inadequate or erroneous system design information. As a corrective action, BJC assessed the occurrences caused by systems design-safety basis interface problems. Safety systems reviewed included the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) Fluorination System, K-1065 fire alarm system, and the K-25 Radiation Criticality Accident Alarm System. The conclusion was that an inadequate knowledge of system design could result in continuous non-compliance issues relating to nuclear safety. This was especially true with older facilities that lacked current as-built drawings coupled with the loss of 'historical knowledge' as personnel retired or moved on in their careers. Walkdown of systems and the updating of drawings are imperative for nuclear safety compliance. System design integration with safety basis has relevance in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. This paper presents the BJC Lessons Learned in this area. It will be of benefit to DOE contractors that manage and operate an aging population of nuclear facilities

  10. SAFETY BASIS DESIGN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IMECE2007-42747

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    RYAN GW

    2007-09-24

    'Designing in Safety' is a desired part of the development of any new potentially hazardous system, process, or facility. It is a required part of nuclear safety activities as specified in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 420.B, Facility Safety. This order addresses the design of nuclear related facilities developed under federal regulation IOCFR830, Nuclear Safety Management. IOCFR830 requires that safety basis documentation be provided to identify how nuclear safety is being adequately addressed as a condition for system operation (e.g., the safety basis). To support the development of the safety basis, a safety analysis is performed. Although the concept of developing a design that addresses 'Safety is simple, the execution can be complex and challenging. This paper addresses those complexities and challenges for the design activity of a system to treat sludge, a corrosion product of spent nuclear fuel, at DOE's Hanford Site in Washington State. The system being developed is referred to as the Sludge Treatment Project (STP). This paper describes the portion of the safety analysis that addresses the selection of design basis events using the experience gained from the STP and the development of design requirements for safety features associated with those events. Specifically, the paper describes the safety design process and the application of the process for two types of potential design basis accidents associated with the operation of the system, (1) flashing spray leaks and (2) splash and splatter leaks. Also presented are the technical challenges that are being addressed to develop effective safety features to deal with these design basis accidents.

  11. SAFETY BASIS DESIGN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IMECE2007-42747

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    RYAN GW

    2007-01-01

    'Designing in Safety' is a desired part of the development of any new potentially hazardous system, process, or facility. It is a required part of nuclear safety activities as specified in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 420.B, Facility Safety. This order addresses the design of nuclear related facilities developed under federal regulation IOCFR830, Nuclear Safety Management. IOCFR830 requires that safety basis documentation be provided to identify how nuclear safety is being adequately addressed as a condition for system operation (e.g., the safety basis). To support the development of the safety basis, a safety analysis is performed. Although the concept of developing a design that addresses 'Safety is simple, the execution can be complex and challenging. This paper addresses those complexities and challenges for the design activity of a system to treat sludge, a corrosion product of spent nuclear fuel, at DOE's Hanford Site in Washington State. The system being developed is referred to as the Sludge Treatment Project (STP). This paper describes the portion of the safety analysis that addresses the selection of design basis events using the experience gained from the STP and the development of design requirements for safety features associated with those events. Specifically, the paper describes the safety design process and the application of the process for two types of potential design basis accidents associated with the operation of the system, (1) flashing spray leaks and (2) splash and splatter leaks. Also presented are the technical challenges that are being addressed to develop effective safety features to deal with these design basis accidents

  12. Central waste complex interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cain, F.G.

    1995-01-01

    This interim safety basis provides the necessary information to conclude that hazards at the Central Waste Complex are controlled and that current and planned activities at the CWC can be conducted safely. CWC is a multi-facility complex within the Solid Waste Management Complex that receives and stores most of the solid wastes generated and received at the Hanford Site. The solid wastes that will be handled at CWC include both currently stored and newly generated low-level waste, low-level mixed waste, contact-handled transuranic, and contact-handled TRU mixed waste

  13. FLIGHT SAFETY CONTROL OF THE BASIS OF UNCERTAIN RISK EVALUATION WITH NON-ROUTINE FLIGHT CONDITIONS INVOLVED

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with methods of forecasting the level of aviation safety operation of aircraft systems on the basis of methods of evaluation the risks of negative situations as a consequence of a functional loss of initial properties of the system with critical violations of standard modes of the aircraft. Mathematical Models of Risks as a Danger Measure of Discrete Random Events in Aviation Systems are presented. Technological Schemes and Structure of Risk Control Proce- dures without the Probability are illustrated as Methods of Risk Management System in Civil Aviation. The assessment of the level of safety and quality and management of aircraft, made not only from the standpoint of reliability (quality and consumer properties, but also from the position of ICAO on the basis of a risk-based approach. According to ICAO, the security assessment is performed by comparing the calculated risk with an acceptable level. The approach justifies the use of qualitative evaluation techniques safety in the forms of proactive forecasted and predictive risk management adverse impacts to aviation operations of various kinds, including the space sector and nuclear energy. However, for the events such as accidents and disasters, accidents with the aircraft, fighters in a training flight, during the preparation of the pilots on the training aircraft, etc. there is no required statistics. Density of probability distribution (p. d. f. of these events are only hypothetical, unknown with "hard tails" that completely eliminates the application of methods of confidence intervals in the traditional approaches to the assessment of safety in the form of the probability analysis.

  14. 340 Waste Handling Facility interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bendixsen, R.B.

    1995-01-01

    This document establishes the interim safety basis (ISB) for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility). An ISB is a documented safety basis that provides a justification for the continued operation of the facility until an upgraded final safety analysis report is prepared that complies with US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The ISB for the 340 Facility documents the current design and operation of the facility. The 340 Facility ISB (ISB-003) is based on a facility walkdown and review of the design and operation of the facility, as described in the existing safety documentation. The safety documents reviewed, to develop ISB-003, include the following: OSD-SW-153-0001, Operating Specification Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1990); OSR-SW-152-00003, Operating Limits for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1989); SD-RE-SAP-013, Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Railroad Liquid Waste Tank Cars (Mercado 1993); SD-WM-TM-001, Safety Assessment Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (Berneski 1994a); SD-WM-SEL-016, 340 Facility Safety Equipment List (Berneski 1992); and 340 Complex Fire Hazard Analysis, Draft (Hughes Assoc. Inc. 1994)

  15. Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Safety Basis Implementation Strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TRAWINSKI, B.J.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the Safety Basis Implementation is to ensure that implementation of activities is accomplished in order to support readiness to move spent fuel from K West Basin. Activities may be performed directly by the Safety Basis Implementation Team or they may be performed by other organizations and tracked by the Team. This strategy will focus on five key elements, (1) Administration of Safety Basis Implementation (general items), (2) Implementing documents, (3) Implementing equipment (including verification of operability), (4) Training, (5) SNF Project Technical Requirements (STRS) database system

  16. Evolution of Safety Basis Documentation for the Fernald Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, T.; Kohler, S.; Fisk, P.; Krach, F.; Klein, B.

    2004-01-01

    The objective of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Fernald Closure Project (FCP), in suburban Cincinnati, Ohio, is to safely complete the environmental restoration of the Fernald site by 2006. Over 200 out of 220 total structures, at this DOE plant site which processed uranium ore concentrates into high-purity uranium metal products, have been safely demolished, including eight of the nine major production plants. Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) for these facilities have gone through a process of simplification, from individual operating Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) to a single site-wide Authorization Basis containing nuclear facility Bases for Interim Operations (BIOs) to individual project Auditable Safety Records (ASRs). The final stage in DSA simplification consists of project-specific Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs) and Nuclear Health and Safety Plans (N-HASPs) that address all aspects of safety, from the worker in the field to the safety basis requirements preserving the facility/activity hazard categorization. This paper addresses the evolution of Safety Basis Documentation (SBD), as DSAs, from production through site closure

  17. Safety basis for selected activities in single-shell tanks with flammable gas concerns. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schlosser, R.L.

    1996-01-01

    This is full revision to Revision 0 of this report. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of analyses done to support activities performed for single-shell tanks. These activities are encompassed by the flammable gas Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). The basic controls required to perform these activities involve the identification, elimination and/or control of ignition sources and monitoring for flammable gases. Controls are implemented through the Interim Safety Basis (ISB), IOSRs, and OSDs. Since this report only provides a historical compendium of issues and activities, it is not to be used as a basis to perform USQ screenings and evaluations. Furthermore, these analyses and others in process will be used as the basis for developing the Flammable Gas Topical Report for the ISB Upgrade

  18. Knowledge basis in safety culture for researchers and practitioners

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vieira Neto, Antonio S.; Barroso, Antonio C.O.; Goncalves, Adriana

    2009-01-01

    This paper presents the main characteristics of the knowledge basis in safety culture which is being developed at the IPEN-CNEN/SP, one of the Brazilian nuclear institutes of research. The main objective of this basis is to organize the information about safety culture found in the literature and to make it available to researchers and practitioners. The first stage of the development of this basis is already finished being the subject of this work. (author)

  19. 340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-04-01

    This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people.

  20. 340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-01-01

    This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people

  1. Documents pertaining to safety control of nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) controls the safety of nuclear facilities in Finland. This control encompasses on one hand the evaluation of plant safety on the basis of plans and analyses pertaining to the plant and on the other hand the inspection of plant structures, systems and components as well as of operational activity. STUK also monitors plants operational experience feedback and technical developments in the field, as well as the development of safety research and takes the necessary measures on their basis. Guide YVL 1.1 describes how STUK controls the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The documents to be submitted to STUK are described in the nuclear energy legislation and YVL guides. This guide presents the mode of delivery, quality, contents and number of documents to be submitted to STUK

  2. Criteria Document for B-plant's Surveillance and Maintenance Phase Safety Basis Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SCHWEHR, B.A.

    1999-01-01

    This document is required by the Project Hanford Managing Contractor (PHMC) procedure, HNF-PRO-705, Safety Basis Planning, Documentation, Review, and Approval. This document specifies the criteria that shall be in the B Plant surveillance and maintenance phase safety basis in order to obtain approval of the DOE-RL. This CD describes the criteria to be addressed in the S and M Phase safety basis for the deactivated Waste Fractionization Facility (B Plant) on the Hanford Site in Washington state. This criteria document describes: the document type and format that will be used for the S and M Phase safety basis, the requirements documents that will be invoked for the document development, the deactivated condition of the B Plant facility, and the scope of issues to be addressed in the S and M Phase safety basis document

  3. Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Facility 10CFR830 Safety Basis Related to Facility Experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tomberlin, T.A.

    2002-01-01

    The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), a DOE Category A reactor, was designed to provide an irradiation test environment for conducting a variety of experiments. The ATR Safety Analysis Report, determined by DOE to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, provides versatility in types of experiments that may be conducted. This paper addresses two general types of experiments in the ATR facility and how safety analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore this type of experiment is addressed with more detail in the safety basis. This allows individual safety analyses for these experiments to be more routine and repetitive. The second type of experiment is less defined and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, individual safety analyses for the second type of experiment tend to be more unique from experiment to experiment. Experiments are also discussed relative to ''major modifications'' and DOE-STD-1027-92. Application of the USQ process to ATR experiments is also discussed

  4. Reactor safety under design basis flood condition for inland sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hajela, S.; Bajaj, S.S.; Samota, A.; Verma, U.S.P.; Warudkar, A.S.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In June 1994, there was an incident of flooding at Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) due to combination of heavy rains and mechanical failure in the operation of gates at the adjoining weir. An indepth review of the incident was carried out and a number of flood protection measures were recommended and were implemented at site. As part of this review, a safety analysis was also done to demonstrate reactor safety with a series of failures considered in the flood protection features. For each inland NPP site, as part of design, different flood scenarios are analysed to arrive at design basis flood (DBF) level. This level is estimated based on worst combination of heavy local precipitation, flooding in river, failure of upstream/downstream water control structures

  5. Just in Time DSA-The Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Olinger, S. J.; Buhl, A. R.

    2002-02-26

    The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 imposed the requirement that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSA that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: compliance with the Rule; a ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD&D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD&D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex.

  6. Just in Time DSA-The Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olinger, S. J.; Buhl, A. R.

    2002-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 imposed the requirement that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSA that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: compliance with the Rule; a ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD and D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD and D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex

  7. Just in Time DSA the Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    JACKSON, M.W.

    2002-06-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford, Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safely Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 requires that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSAs that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long-term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: Compliance with the Rule; A ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and Consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD&D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD&D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex.

  8. Just in Time DSA the Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JACKSON, M.W.

    2002-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) is responsible for 30 hazard category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities that are operated by its prime contractors, Fluor Hanford, Incorporated (FHI), Bechtel Hanford, Incorporated (BHI) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The publication of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, Safely Basis Requirements (the Rule) in January 2001 requires that the Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) for these facilities be reviewed against the requirements of the Rule. Those DSAs that do not meet the requirements must either be upgraded to satisfy the Rule, or an exemption must be obtained. RL and its prime contractors have developed a Nuclear Safety Strategy that provides a comprehensive approach for supporting RL's efforts to meet its long-term objectives for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities while also meeting the requirements of the Rule. This approach will result in a reduction of the total number of safety basis documents that must be developed and maintained to support the remaining mission and closure of the Hanford Site and ensure that the documentation that must be developed will support: Compliance with the Rule; A ''Just-In-Time'' approach to development of Rule-compliant safety bases supported by temporary exemptions; and Consolidation of safety basis documents that support multiple facilities with a common mission (e.g. decontamination, decommissioning and demolition [DD and D], waste management, surveillance and maintenance). This strategy provides a clear path to transition the safety bases for the various Hanford facilities from support of operation and stabilization missions through DD and D to accelerate closure. This ''Just-In-Time'' Strategy can also be tailored for other DOE Sites, creating the potential for large cost savings and schedule reductions throughout the DOE complex

  9. Safety basis for the 241-AN-107 mixer pump installation and caustic addition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Vleet, R.J.

    1994-01-01

    This safety Basis was prepared to determine whether or not the proposed activities of installing a 76 HP jet mixer pump and the addition of approximately 50,000 gallons of 19 M (50:50 wt %) aqueous caustic are within the safety envelope as described by Tank Farms (chapter six of WHC-SD-WM-ISB-001, Rev. 0). The safety basis covers the components, structures and systems for the caustic addition and mixer pump installation. These include: installation of the mixer pump and monitoring equipment; operation of the mixer pump, process monitoring equipment and caustic addition; the pump stand, caustic addition skid, the electrical skid, the video camera system and the two densitometers. Also covered is the removal and decontamination of the mixer pump and process monitoring system. Authority for this safety basis is WHC-IP-0842 (Waste Tank Administration). Section 15.9, Rev. 2 (Unreviewed Safety Questions) of WHC-IP-0842 requires that an evaluation be performed for all physical modifications

  10. Transuranic waste storage and assay facility (TRUSAF) interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibson, K.D.

    1995-09-01

    The TRUSAF ISB is based upon current facility configuration and procedures. The purpose of the document is to provide the basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and the authorization basis for the TRUSAF at the Hanford Site. The previous safety analysis document TRUSAF hazards Identification and Evaluation (WHC 1977) is superseded by this document

  11. Concept for creating program-technical complex of safety monitoring with system of safety parameters presentation functions on the basis of routine WWER-1000 systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunaev, V.G.; Tarasov, M. V.; Povarov, P.V.

    2005-01-01

    Prerequisites of creating the software-hardware complex for reactor safety monitoring on the Volgodonsk NPP are analyzed and generalized. The concept of this complex is based on functions of the safety parameters presentation system. It will serve as an interface between operator and technological process and give to operator a possibility to estimate quickly the state of the safety of the nuclear power unit. The complex will be created on the basis of routine reactor monitoring and control systems intended for the WWER-1000 reactor. In addition to existing soft- and hard-wares for reactor monitoring and for analysis of technological archive, it is proposed to create and connect in parallel the new software-hardware complex which ensures calculation and presentation of generalized factors of reactor safety [ru

  12. Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Safety Basis and Approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    David Petti; Jim Kinsey; Dave Alberstein

    2014-01-01

    Various international efforts are underway to assess the safety of advanced nuclear reactor designs. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency has recently held its first Consultancy Meeting on a new cooperative research program on high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) safety. Furthermore, the Generation IV International Forum Reactor Safety Working Group has recently developed a methodology, called the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology, for use in Generation IV advanced reactor technology development, design, and design review. A risk and safety assessment white paper is under development with respect to the Very High Temperature Reactor to pilot the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology and to demonstrate its validity and feasibility. To support such efforts, this information paper on the modular HTGR safety basis and approach has been prepared. The paper provides a summary level introduction to HTGR history, public safety objectives, inherent and passive safety features, radionuclide release barriers, functional safety approach, and risk-informed safety approach. The information in this paper is intended to further the understanding of the modular HTGR safety approach. The paper gives those involved in the assessment of advanced reactor designs an opportunity to assess an advanced design that has already received extensive review by regulatory authorities and to judge the utility of recently proposed new methods for advanced reactor safety assessment such as the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology.

  13. DEVELOPING SAFETY INDICATORS ON THE BASIS OF THE ICAO RECOMMENDATIONS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    V. D. Sharov

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available The article offers direct use of the recommendations of SMM ICAO Doc.9859, 3rd ed. 2013, for calculation the target and alert levels of safety indicators. Examples of calculation based on data of 2011 and monitoring of the current indicators during 2012 are presented. Safety indicators for airlines in terms of “numbers of incidents per 1000 flight hours” could be calculated on the basis of the state values through the «coefficient of conformity».

  14. Safety assessment for the above ground storage of Cadmium Safety and Control Rods at the Solid Waste Management Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shaw, K.W.

    1993-11-01

    The mission of the Savannah River Site is changing from radioisotope production to waste management and environmental restoration. As such, Reactor Engineering has recently developed a plan to transfer the safety and control rods from the C, K, L, and P reactor disassembly basin areas to the Transuranic (TRU) Waste Storage Pads for long-term, retrievable storage. The TRU pads are located within the Solid Waste Management Facilities at the Savannah River Site. An Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Safety Evaluation has been performed for the proposed disassembly basin operations phase of the Cadmium Safety and Control Rod Project. The USQ screening identified a required change to the authorization basis; however, the Proposed Activity does not involve a positive USQ Safety Evaluation. A Hazard Assessment for the Cadmium Safety and Control Rod Project determined that the above-ground storage of the cadmium rods results in no change in hazard level at the TRU pads. A Safety Assessment that specifically addresses the storage (at the TRU pads) phase of the Cadmium Safety and Control Rod Project has been performed. Results of the Safety Assessment support the conclusion that a positive USQ is not involved as a result of the Proposed Activity

  15. TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT FOR NATURAL EVENT HAZARDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRIPPS, L.J.

    2006-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support the documented safety analysis (DSA) and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for natural event hazard (NEH)-initiated accidents. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls

  16. Authorization Basis Safety Classification of Transfer Bay Bridge Crane at the 105-K Basins

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CHAFFEE, G.A.

    2000-01-01

    This supporting document provides the bases for the safety classification for the K Basin transfer bay bridge crane and the bases for the Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) safety classification. A table is presented that delineates the safety significant components. This safety classification is based on a review of the Authorization Basis (AB). This Authorization Basis review was performed regarding AB and design baseline issues. The primary issues are: (1) What is the AB for the safety classification of the transfer bay bridge crane? (2) What does the SSC safety classification ''Safety Significant'' or ''Safety Significant for Design Only'' mean for design requirements and quality requirements for procurement, installation and maintenance (including replacement of parts) activities for the crane during its expected life time? The AB information on the crane was identified based on review of Department of Energy--Richland Office (RL) and Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project correspondence, K Basin Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and RL Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) of SNF Project SAR submittals. The relevant correspondence, actions and activities taken and substantive directions or conclusions of these documents are provided in Appendix A

  17. Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources. Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This Safety Guide is intended to assist States in implementing the requirements established in Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1, Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, for a national regulatory infrastructure to regulate any practice involving radiation sources in medicine, industry, research, agriculture and education. The Safety Guide provides advice on the legislative basis for establishing regulatory bodies, including the effective independence of the regulatory body. It also provides guidance on implementing the functions and activities of regulatory bodies: the development of regulations and guides on radiation safety; implementation of a system for notification and authorization; carrying out regulatory inspections; taking necessary enforcement actions; and investigating accidents and circumstances potentially giving rise to accidents. The various aspects relating to the regulatory control of consumer products are explained, including justification, optimization of exposure, safety assessment and authorization. Guidance is also provided on the organization and staffing of regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Legal framework for a regulatory infrastructure; 3. Principal functions and activities of the regulatory body; 4. Regulatory control of the supply of consumer products; 5. Functions of the regulatory body shared with other governmental agencies; 6. Organization and staffing of the regulatory body; 7. Documentation of the functions and activities of the regulatory body; 8. Support services; 9. Quality management for the regulatory system.

  18. Safety of Research Reactors. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to provide a basis for safety and a basis for safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Another objective is to establish requirements on aspects relating to regulatory control, the management of safety, site evaluation, design, operation and decommissioning. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives. This Safety Requirements publication is intended for use by organizations engaged in the site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, operation and decommissioning of research reactors as well as by regulatory bodies

  19. DARHT: INTEGRATION OF AUTHORIZATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND WORKER SAFETY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MC CLURE, D. A.; NELSON, C. A.; BOUDRIE, R. L.

    2001-01-01

    This document describes the results of consensus agreements reached by the DARHT Safety Planning Team during the development of the update of the DARHT Safety Analysis Document (SAD). The SAD is one of the Authorization Basis (AB) Documents required by the Department prior to granting approval to operate the DARHT Facility. The DARHT Safety Planning Team is lead by Mr. Joel A. Baca of the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE/AL). Team membership is drawn from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy Los Alamos Area Office (DOE/LAAO), and several divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Revision 1 of the DARHT SAD had been written as part of the process for gaining approval to operate the Phase 1 (First Axis) Accelerator. Early in the planning stage for the required update of the SAD for the approval to operate both Phase 1 and Phase 2 (First Axis and Second Axis) DARHT Accelerator, it was discovered that a conflict existed between the Laboratory approach to describing the management of facility and worker safety

  20. Technical safety requirements control level verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    concluded that the TSR control level verification process is clear and logically based upon DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements, and other TSR control selection guidelines. The process provides a documented, traceable basis for TSR level decisions and is a valid reference for preparation of new TSRs

  1. 10 CFR Appendix A to Subpart B of... - General Statement of Safety Basis Policy

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... at all levels. Performing work in accordance with the safety basis for a nuclear facility is the..., safety, and health into work planning and execution (48 CFR 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety and Health into Work Planning and Execution) and the DEAR clause on laws, regulations, and DOE...

  2. Instrumentation and control systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    principles should be applied, on the basis of a method of classifying systems by their importance to safety. I and C systems important to safety are I and C systems that are part of a safety group and I and C systems whose malfunction or failure could lead to radiation exposure of site personnel or members of the public. Examples of such systems are: the reactor protection system, reactor control systems, systems to monitor and control normal reactor cooling, systems to monitor and control emergency power supplies, containment isolation systems. The IAEA's Technical Reports Series No. 387 presents an overview of concepts and examples of systems discussed in this Safety Guide and may provide useful background material for some users

  3. Technical basis document for natural event hazards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CARSON, D.M.

    2003-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for natural event hazards (NEH)-initiated representative accident and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls. Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'', as described in this report

  4. Working group 1A - basis for the standard-safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whipple, C.

    1993-01-01

    This paper presents a summary of the progress made by working group 1A (Basis for the Safety Standard) during the Electric Power Research Institute's EPRI Workshop on the technical basis of EPA HLW Disposal Criteria, March 1993. This group discussed the semantics of terms within the standard 40 CFR Part 191, the implementation of this standard, the advanced notice of rulemaking, the issue of emitting carbon-14 through a gaseous pathway, the strategy of dealing with standards for contamination of drinking water and groundwater, the 100,000 year time frame, and the analysis of specific comments. The specific comments dealt with the cost effectiveness of the standard, the dose histogram for populations and individuals, groundwater definition and the underlying technology driver for this standard

  5. Technical basis for evaluating electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference in safety-related I ampersand C systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, P.D.; Korsah, K.

    1994-04-01

    This report discusses the development of the technical basis for the control of upsets and malfunctions in safety-related instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems caused by electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference (EMI/RFI) and power surges. The research was performed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and was sponsored by the USNRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). The motivation for research stems from the safety-related issues that need to be addressed with the application of advanced I ampersand C systems to nuclear power plants. Development of the technical basis centered around establishing good engineering practices to ensure that sufficient levels of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) are maintained between the nuclear power plant's electronic and electromechanical systems known to be the source(s) of EMI/RFI and power surges. First, good EMC design and installation practices need to be established to control the impact of interference sources on nearby circuits and systems. These EMC good practices include circuit layouts, terminations, filtering, grounding, bonding, shielding, and adequate physical separation. Second, an EMI/RFI test and evaluation program needs to be established to outline the tests to be performed, the associated test methods to be followed, and carefully formulated acceptance criteria based on the intended environment to ensure that the circuit or system under test meets the recommended guidelines. Third, a program needs to be developed to perform confirmatory tests and evaluate the surge withstand capability (SWC) and of I ampersand C equipment connected to or installed in the vicinity of power circuits within the nuclear power plant. By following these three steps, the design and operability of safety-related I ampersand C systems against EMI/RFI and power surges can be evaluated, acceptance criteria can be developed, and appropriate regulatory guidance can be provided

  6. Nuclear safety risk control in the outage of CANDU unit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu Mingliang; Zheng Jianhua

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear fuel remains in the core during the outage of CANDU unit, but there are still nuclear safety risks such as reactor accidental criticality, fuel element failure due to inability to properly remove residual heat. Furthermore, these risks are aggravated by the weakening plant system configuration and multiple cross operations during the outage. This paper analyzes the phases where there are potential nuclear safety risks on the basis of the typical critical path arrangement of the outage of Qinshan NPP 3 and introduces a series of CANDU-specific risk control measures taken during the past plant outages to ensure nuclear safety during the unit outage. (authors)

  7. Discussion on the Criterion for the Safety Certification Basis Compilation - Brazilian Space Program Case

    Science.gov (United States)

    Niwa, M.; Alves, N. C.; Caetano, A. O.; Andrade, N. S. O.

    2012-01-01

    The recent advent of the commercial launch and re- entry activities, for promoting the expansion of human access to space for tourism and hypersonic travel, in the already complex ambience of the global space activities, brought additional difficulties over the development of a harmonized framework of international safety rules. In the present work, with the purpose of providing some complementary elements for global safety rule development, the certification-related activities conducted in the Brazilian space program are depicted and discussed, focusing mainly on the criterion for certification basis compilation. The results suggest that the composition of a certification basis with the preferential use of internationally-recognized standards, as is the case of ISO standards, can be a first step toward the development of an international safety regulation for commercial space activities.

  8. Technical safety requirements control level verification; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    concluded that the TSR control level verification process is clear and logically based upon DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements, and other TSR control selection guidelines. The process provides a documented, traceable basis for TSR level decisions and is a valid reference for preparation of new TSRs

  9. FLAMMABLE GAS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    KRIPPS, L.J.

    2005-03-03

    This document describes the qualitative evaluation of frequency and consequences for DST and SST representative flammable gas accidents and associated hazardous conditions without controls. The evaluation indicated that safety-significant structures, systems and components (SSCs) and/or technical safety requirements (TSRs) were required to prevent or mitigate flammable gas accidents. Discussion on the resulting control decisions is included. This technical basis document was developed to support WP-13033, Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), and describes the risk binning process for the flammable gas representative accidents and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition based on an evaluation of the event frequency and consequence.

  10. Design and construction of safety devices utilizing methods of measurement and control engineering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greiner, B; Weidlich, S

    1982-08-01

    This article considers a proposed concept for the design and construction of measurement and control devices for the safety of chemical plants with the aim of preventing danger to persons and the environment and damage. Such measurement and control devices are generally employed when primary measures adopted for plant safety, such as safety valves, collection vessels, etc. are not applicable or insufficient by themselves. The concept regards the new sheet no. 3 of the VDI/VDE code draft 2180 ''Safety of chemical engineering plant'' and proposes a further subdivision of class A into safety classes A0, A1, and A2. Overall, it is possible, on the basis of the measures for raising the availability of measurement and control equipment which are presented in this article, to make selection appropriate to the potential danger involved. The proposed procedure should not, however, be regarded as a rigid scheme but rather as leading to a systematic view and supporting decisions resting on sound operating experience.

  11. Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources. Safety Guide (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide is intended to assist States in implementing the requirements established in Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1, Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, for a national regulatory infrastructure to regulate any practice involving radiation sources in medicine, industry, research, agriculture and education. The Safety Guide provides advice on the legislative basis for establishing regulatory bodies, including the effective independence of the regulatory body. It also provides guidance on implementing the functions and activities of regulatory bodies: the development of regulations and guides on radiation safety; implementation of a system for notification and authorization; carrying out regulatory inspections; taking necessary enforcement actions; and investigating accidents and circumstances potentially giving rise to accidents. The various aspects relating to the regulatory control of consumer products are explained, including justification, optimization of exposure, safety assessment and authorization. Guidance is also provided on the organization and staffing of regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Legal framework for a regulatory infrastructure; 3. Principal functions and activities of the regulatory body; 4. Regulatory control of the supply of consumer products; 5. Functions of the regulatory body shared with other governmental agencies; 6. Organization and staffing of the regulatory body; 7. Documentation of the functions and activities of the regulatory body; 8. Support services; 9. Quality management for the regulatory system.

  12. Technical basis for instrumentation and control design improvements in WWER-440/230 nuclear power plants. A publication of the extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER and RBMK nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    Instrumentation and control (I and C) has been recognized as an area which requires substantial improvements in WWER NNPs, particularly for model 230 plants. Under contract with the IAEA the Spanish company Empresarios Agrupados (EA) developed a basic document proposing a technical basis for improvements related to the following most significant aspects of I and C: criteria for safety classification; remote shutdown panel; I and C support to operation and control room design; instrumentation set point margins; accident monitoring instrumentation. This publication is derived from the original report of EA which was circulated by the IAEA for review by staff members and experts from various Member States. It was finally agreed upon at a Consultants' meeting convened by the IAEA in Vienna in May 1994 with the participation of experts from France, Germany and Spain. The guidance expressed in this report is based on the IAEA/NUSS standards, safety guides and practices, and on regulations in use in various Member States. It is proposed as a way of carrying out the necessary studies to improve safety by upgrading the vital part of instrumentation an control in WWER-440 model 230 nuclear power plants. 28 refs, 3 figs

  13. Mixing of incompatible materials in waste tanks technical basis document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SANDGREN, K.R.

    2003-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and describes the risk binning process, the technical basis for assigning risk bins, and the controls selected for the mixing of incompatible materials representative accident and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and/or technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the FR-equency and consequence. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR level controls. Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'', as described in this report

  14. FLAMMABLE GAS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    KRIPPS, L.J.

    2005-02-18

    This document describes the qualitative evaluation of frequency and consequences for double shell tank (DST) and single shell tank (SST) representative flammable gas accidents and associated hazardous conditions without controls. The evaluation indicated that safety-significant SSCs and/or TSRS were required to prevent or mitigate flammable gas accidents. Discussion on the resulting control decisions is included. This technical basis document was developed to support of the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and describes the risk binning process for the flammable gas representative accidents and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition based on an evaluation of the event frequency and consequence.

  15. Safety control and risk management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rasmussen, J.

    1987-01-01

    The acceptable probability of major accidents in nuclear power is very small, and can not be determined from direct empirical evidence. Therefore, control of the level of safety is a complex problem. The difficulty is related to the fact that a variable, 'safety', which is not accessible to direct measurement, is to be tightly controlled. Control, therefore, depends on a systematic, analytical prediction of the target state, i.e., the level of safety, from indirect evidence. From a control theoretic point of view this means that safety is controlled by a system which includes openloop as well as closed loop control paths. The aim of the paper is to take a general systems view on the complex mechanisms involved in the control of safety of industrial installations like nuclear power. From this, the role of probabilistic risk analysis is evaluated and needs for further development discussed. (author)

  16. ACCIDENT ANALYSES & CONTROL OPTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE SLUDGE WATER SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    WILLIAMS, J.C.

    2003-11-15

    This report documents the accident analyses and nuclear safety control options for use in Revision 7 of HNF-SD-WM-SAR-062, ''K Basins Safety Analysis Report'' and Revision 4 of HNF-SD-SNF-TSR-001, ''Technical Safety Requirements - 100 KE and 100 KW Fuel Storage Basins''. These documents will define the authorization basis for Sludge Water System (SWS) operations. This report follows the guidance of DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports'', for calculating onsite and offsite consequences. The accident analysis summary is shown in Table ES-1 below. While this document describes and discusses potential control options to either mitigate or prevent the accidents discussed herein, it should be made clear that the final control selection for any accident is determined and presented in HNF-SD-WM-SAR-062.

  17. TWRS authorization basis configuration control summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mendoza, D.P.

    1997-01-01

    This document was developed to define the Authorization Basis management functional requirements for configuration control, to evaluate the management control systems currently in place, and identify any additional controls that may be required until the TWRS [Tank Waste Remediation System] Configuration Management system is fully in place

  18. Design of the Control System for Engineered Safety Features of KIJANG Research Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hagtae; Kim, Jun-Yeon; Chae, Hee-Taek

    2015-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to design an effective control system for the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) of KJRR such as the Safety Residual Heat Removal System (SRHRS) pumps and Siphon Break Valve (SBV) without an Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (ESF-CCS). This control system is called a 'local motor starter', because this system controls motors in the SRHRS pumps and SBVs by receiving the signal from Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Alternate Protection System (APS) when the differential pressure or pool level reach the set points. In this paper, the design concepts and requirements of the local motor starter based on the design features of KJRR is proposed. An ESF is a safety system that mitigates consequences of the Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO) and Design Basis Accident (DBA). The results of this paper are able to be used for the development of control systems for research reactors similar to KJRR. The precondition for such application is to have a few ESFs and conduct simple logic. The proposed control system called a local motor starter is being designed, and a manufacture of the actual systems is expected in the foreseeable future

  19. Analysis approach for common cause failure on non-safety digital control system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eungse [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. Ltd., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    The effects of common cause failure (CCF) on safety digital instrumentation and control (I and C) system had been considered in defense in depth and diversity coping analysis with safety analysis method. For the non-safety system, single failure had been considered for safety analysis. IEEE Std. 603-1991, Clause 5.6.3.1(2), 'Isolation' states that no credible failure on the non-safety side of an isolation device shall prevent any portion of a safety system from meeting its minimum performance requirements during and following any design basis event requiring that safety function. The software CCF is one of the credible failure on the non-safety side. In advanced digital I and C system, same hardware component is used for different control system and the defect in manufacture or common external event can generate CCF. Moreover, the non-safety I and C system uses complex software for its various function and software quality assurance for the development process is less severe than safety software for the cost effective design. Therefore the potential defects in software cannot be ignored and the effect of software CCF on non-safety I and C system is needed to be evaluated. This paper proposes the general process and considerations for the analysis of CCF on non-safety I and C system.

  20. FOOD SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM IN CHINA

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Liu Wei-jun; Wei Yi-min; Han Jun; Luo Dan; Pan Jia-rong

    2007-01-01

    Most countries have expended much effort to develop food safety control systems to ensure safe food supplies within their borders. China, as one of the world's largest food producers and consumers,pays a lot of attention to food safety issues. In recent years, China has taken actions and implemented a series of plans in respect to food safety. Food safety control systems including regulatory, supervisory,and science and technology systems, have begun to be established in China. Using, as a base, an analysis of the current Chinese food safety control system as measured against international standards, this paper discusses the need for China to standardize its food safety control system. We then suggest some policies and measures to improve the Chinese food safety control system.

  1. DART - for design basis justification and safety related information management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Billington, A.; Blondiaux, P.; Boucau, J.; Cantineau, B.; Doumont, C.; Mared, A.

    2000-01-01

    DART is the acronym for Design Analysis Re-engineering Tool. It embodies a systematic and integrated approach to NPP safety re-assessment and configuration management, that makes use of Reverse Failure Mode and Effect Analysis in conjunction with a state-of-the-art relational database and a standardized data format, to permit long-term management of plant safety related information. The plant design is reviewed in a step-by-step logical fashion by constructing fault trees that identify the link between undesired consequences and their causes. Each failure cause identified in a fault tree is addressed by defining functional requirements, which are in turn addressed by documenting the specific manner in which the plant complies with the requirement. The database can be used to generate up-to-date plant safety related documents, including: SAR, Systems Descriptions, Technical Specifications and plant procedures. The approach is open-minded by nature and therefore is not regulatory driven, however the plant licensing basis will also be reviewed and documented within the same database such that a Regulatory Conformance Program may be integrated with the other safety documentation. This methodology can thus reconstitute the plant design bases in a comprehensive and systematic way, while allowing to uncover weaknesses in design. The original feature of the DART methodology is that it links all the safety related documents together, facilitating the evaluation of the safety impact resulting from any plant modification. Due to its capability to retrieve the basic justifications of the plant design, it is also a useful tool for training the young generation of plant personnel. The DART methodology has been developed for application to units 2, 3 and 4 at Vattenfall's Ringhals site in Sweden. It may be applied to any nuclear power plant or industrial facility where public safety is a concern. (author)

  2. DART - for design basis justification and safety related information management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Billington, A.; Blondiaux, B.; Boucau, J.; Cantineau, B.; Mared, A.

    2001-01-01

    DART is the acronym for Design Analysis Re-Engineering Tool. It embodies a systematic and integrated approach to NPP safety re-assessment and configuration management, that makes use of Reverse Failure Mode and Effect Analysis in conjunction with a state-of-the-art relational database and a standardized data format, to permit long-term management of plant safety related information. The plant design is reviewed in a step-by-step logical fashion by constructing fault trees that identify the link between undesired consequences and their causes. Each failure cause identified in a fault tree is addressed by defining functional requirements, which are in turn addressed by documenting the specific manner in which the plant complies with the requirement. The database can then be used to generate up-to-date plant safety related documents, including: SAR, Systems Descriptions, Technical Specifications and plant procedures. The approach is open-minded by nature and therefore is not regulatory driven, however the plant licensing basis will also be reviewed and documented within the same database such that a Regulatory Conformance Program may be integrated with the other safety documentation. This methodology can thus reconstitute the plant design bases in a comprehensive and systematic way, while allowing to uncover weaknesses in design. The original feature of the DART methodology is that it links all the safety related documents together, facilitating the evaluation of the safety impact resulting from any plant modification. Due to its capability to retrieve the basic justifications of the plant design, it is also a useful tool for training the young generation of plant personnel. The DART methodology has been developed for application to units 2, 3 and 4 at Vattenfall's Ringhals site in Sweden. It may be applied to any nuclear power plant or industrial facility where public safety is a concern. (author)

  3. Scientific basis for a safety case of deep geological repositories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Noseck, Ulrich; Becker, Dirk-Alexander; Brasser, Thomas [and others

    2012-11-15

    Within this project strategies and methods to build a safety case for deep geological repositories are further developed. This includes also the scientific fundamentals as a basis of the safety case. In the international framework the methodology of the Safety Case is frequently applied and continuously improved. According to definitions from IAEA and NEA the Safety Case is a compilation of arguments and facts, which describe, quantify and support the safety and the degree of confidence in the safety of the geological repository. The safety of the geological repository should be demonstrated by the safety case. The safety case is the basis for essential decisions during a repository programme. It comprises the results of safety assessments in combination with additional information like multiple lines of evidence and a discussion of robustness and quality of the repository, its design and the quality of all safety assessments including the basic assumptions. A crucial element of the Safety Case is the long-term safety analysis, i.e. the systematic analysis of the hazards connected with the facility and the capability of site and repository design to ensure the required safety functions and to fulfill the technical claims. Long-term safety analysis requires a powerful and qualified programme package, which contains appropriate hardware and software as well as well trained and experienced modellers performing the model calculations. The calculation tools used within safety cases need to be checked and verified and continuously adapted to the state-of-the-art science and technology. Especially it needs to be applicable to a real repository system. For the assessment of safety a deep process understanding is necessary. The R and D work performed within this project will contribute to the improvement of process and system understanding as well as to the further development of methods and strategies applied in the safety case. Emphasis was put on the following aspects

  4. Scientific basis for a safety case of deep geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noseck, Ulrich; Becker, Dirk-Alexander; Brasser, Thomas

    2012-11-01

    Within this project strategies and methods to build a safety case for deep geological repositories are further developed. This includes also the scientific fundamentals as a basis of the safety case. In the international framework the methodology of the Safety Case is frequently applied and continuously improved. According to definitions from IAEA and NEA the Safety Case is a compilation of arguments and facts, which describe, quantify and support the safety and the degree of confidence in the safety of the geological repository. The safety of the geological repository should be demonstrated by the safety case. The safety case is the basis for essential decisions during a repository programme. It comprises the results of safety assessments in combination with additional information like multiple lines of evidence and a discussion of robustness and quality of the repository, its design and the quality of all safety assessments including the basic assumptions. A crucial element of the Safety Case is the long-term safety analysis, i.e. the systematic analysis of the hazards connected with the facility and the capability of site and repository design to ensure the required safety functions and to fulfill the technical claims. Long-term safety analysis requires a powerful and qualified programme package, which contains appropriate hardware and software as well as well trained and experienced modellers performing the model calculations. The calculation tools used within safety cases need to be checked and verified and continuously adapted to the state-of-the-art science and technology. Especially it needs to be applicable to a real repository system. For the assessment of safety a deep process understanding is necessary. The R and D work performed within this project will contribute to the improvement of process and system understanding as well as to the further development of methods and strategies applied in the safety case. Emphasis was put on the following aspects

  5. Reliability Analysis on NPP's Safety-Related Control Module with Field Data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sang Yong; Jung, Jae Hyun; Kim, Seong Hun

    2006-01-01

    The automatic control systems used in nuclear power plant (NPP) consists of numerous control modules that can be considered to be a network of components various complex ways. The control modules require relatively high reliability than industrial electronic products. Reliability prediction provides the rational basis of system designs and also provides the safety significance of system operations. The aim of this paper is to minimize the deficiencies of the traditional reliability prediction method calculation using the available field return data. This way is possible to do more realistic reliability assessment. SAMCHANG Enterprise Company (SEC) has established database containing high quality data at the module and component level from module maintenance in NPP. On the basis of these, this paper compares results that add failure record (field data) to Telcordia-SR-332 reliability prediction model with MIL-HDBK-217F prediction results

  6. Compositional Synthesis of Safety Controllers

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kuijper, W.

    2012-01-01

    In my thesis I investigate compositional techniques for synthesis of safety controllers. A safety controller, in this context, is a state machine that gives the set of safe control outputs for every possible sequence of observations from the plant under control. Compositionality, in this context,

  7. 14 CFR 60.37 - FSTD qualification on the basis of a Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA). 60.37 Section 60.37 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION... CONTINUING QUALIFICATION AND USE § 60.37 FSTD qualification on the basis of a Bilateral Aviation Safety... on International Civil Aviation for the sponsor of an FSTD located in that contracting State may be...

  8. General safety basis development guidance for environmental restoration decontamination and decommissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellingson, D.R.; Kerr, N.; Bohlander, K.; Hansen, J.; Crowley, W.

    1994-02-01

    Safety analyses have the objective of contributing to two essential ingredients of a successful operation. The first is promoting the safety of the operation through worker involvement in information development (safety basis). The second is obtaining approval to conduct the operation (authorization). Typically these ingredients are assembled under separate programs covered by separate DOE requirements. DOE authorization relies on successful development of a document containing up to 21 topics written in terms and language suited to reviewers and approvers. Safety relies on successful training and procedures that convert the technical documented information into terms and language understandable to the worker. This separation can lead to successful incorporation of one ingredient independent of the other. At best, this separation may result in a safe but unauthorized operation; at worst, the separation may result in an unsafe operation authorized to proceed. This guide is based on experiences gained by contractors who have integrated rather than separated the safety and authorization. The short duration of ER/D ampersand D activities, the uncertainties of hazards, and the publicly expressed desire for demonstrable progress in cleanup activities add emphasis to the need to integrate rather than separate and develop new programs. Experience-based information has been useful to workers, safety analysis practitioners, and reviewers in the following ways: (1) Acquiring or developing the needed information in a useful form; (2) Managing the uncertainties during activity development and operation; (3) Identifying the subset of applicable requirements for an activity; (4) Developing the appropriate level of documentation detail for a specific activity; and (5) Increasing the usefulness and use of safety analysis (ownership)

  9. Seismic analysis of control and safety rod drive mechanism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meher Prasad, A.; Jaya, K.P.; Chellapandi, P.; Rajan Babu, V.; Selvaraj, T.

    2003-01-01

    Control rod and its driving mechanism for a Fast Breeder Reactor is to facilitate safe shutdown of the reactor in case of emergency. A theoretical study on the seismic qualification of control and safety rod driving mechanism is carried out. Earthquake excitations under Operational Basis (ORE) and Safe Shutdown condition (SSE) are considered. The time required for the control rod to reach the bottom position in order to shut down the reaction under excited condition is traced out. The maximum displaced positions and extreme stresses in various parts of the system under excitations are evaluated. The system modeled using beam elements. The connections between different parts are modeled through rigid elements. The interaction between various parts are modeled using GAP elements. (author)

  10. RELEASE OF DRIED RADIOACTIVE WASTE MATERIALS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KOZLOWSKI, S.D.

    2007-01-01

    This technical basis document was developed to support RPP-23429, Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis for the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System (PDSA) and RPP-23479, Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis for the Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed (CH-TRUM) Waste Facility. The main document describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins to the representative accidents involving the release of dried radioactive waste materials from the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System (DBVS) and to the associated represented hazardous conditions. Appendices D through F provide the technical basis for assigning risk bins to the representative dried waste release accident and associated represented hazardous conditions for the Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed (CH-TRUM) Waste Packaging Unit (WPU). The risk binning process uses an evaluation of the frequency and consequence of a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition to determine the need for safety structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls. A representative accident or a represented hazardous condition is assigned to a risk bin based on the potential radiological and toxicological consequences to the public and the collocated worker. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers because credible hazardous conditions with the potential for significant facility worker consequences are considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls regardless of their estimated frequency. The controls for protection of the facility workers are described in RPP-23429 and RPP-23479. Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, as described below

  11. Flammable gas tank safety program: Technical basis for gas analysis and monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estey, S.D.

    1998-01-01

    Several Hanford waste tanks have been observed to exhibit periodic releases of significant quantities of flammable gases. Because potential safety issues have been identified with this type of waste behavior, applicable tanks were equipped with instrumentation offering the capability to continuously monitor gases released from them. This document was written to cover three primary areas: (1) describe the current technical basis for requiring flammable gas monitoring, (2) update the technical basis to include knowledge gained from monitoring the tanks over the last three years, (3) provide the criteria for removal of Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System(s) (SHMS) from a waste tank or termination of other flammable gas monitoring activities in the Hanford Tank farms

  12. Optimization of the nuclear power engineering safety on the basis of social and economic parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kozlov, V.F.; Kuz'min, I.I.; Lystsov, V.N.; Amosova, T.V.; Makhutov, N.A.; Men'shikov, V.F.

    1995-01-01

    Principle of optimization of nuclear power engineering safety is presented on the basis of estimating the risks to the man's health with an account of peculiarities of socio-economic system and other types of economic activities in the region. Average expected duration of forthcoming life and costs of its prolongation serve as a unit for measuring the man's safety. It is shown that if the expenditures on NPP technical safety exceed the scientifically substantiated costs for this region with application of the above principle, than the risk for population will exceed the minimum achievable level. 8 refs., 2 figs., 1 tab

  13. To the problem of the statistical basis of evaluation of the mechanical safety factor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsyganov, S.V.

    2009-01-01

    The methodology applied for the safety factor assessment of the WWER fuel cycles uses methods and terms of statistics. Value of the factor is calculated on the basis of estimation of probability to meet predefined limits. Such approach demands the special attention to the statistical properties of parameters of interest. Considering the mechanical constituents of the engineering factor it is assumed uncertainty factors of safety parameters are stochastic values. It characterized by probabilistic distributions that can be unknown. Traditionally in the safety factor assessment process the unknown parameters are estimated from the conservative points of view. This paper analyses how the refinement of the factors distribution parameters is important for the assessment of the mechanical safety factor. For the analysis the statistical approach is applied for modelling of different type of factor probabilistic distributions. It is shown the significant influence of the shape and parameters of distributions for some factors on the value of mechanical safety factor. (Authors)

  14. To the problem of the statistical basis of evaluation of the mechanical safety factor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsyganov, S.

    2009-01-01

    The methodology applied for the safety factor assessment of the VVER fuel cycles uses methods and terms of statistics. Value of the factor is calculated on the basis of estimation of probability to meet predefined limits. Such approach demands the special attention to the statistical properties of parameters of interest. Considering the mechanical constituents of the engineering factor it is assumed uncertainty factors of safety parameters are stochastic values. It characterized by probabilistic distributions that can be unknown. Traditionally in the safety factor assessment process the unknown parameters are estimated from the conservative points of view. This paper analyses how the refinement of the factors distribution parameters is important for the assessment of the mechanical safety factor. For the analysis the statistical approach is applied for modelling of different type of factor probabilistic distributions. It is shown the significant influence of the shape and parameters of distributions for some factors on the value of mechanical safety factor. (author)

  15. Safety control and minimization of radioactive wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Jinming; Rong Feng; Li Jinyan; Wang Xin

    2010-01-01

    Compared with the developed countries, the safety control and minimization of the radwastes in China are under-developed. The research of measures for the safety control and minimization of the radwastes is very important for the safety control of the radwastes, and the reduction of the treatment and disposal cost and environment radiation hazards. This paper has systematically discussed the safety control and the minimization of the radwastes produced in the nuclear fuel circulation, nuclear technology applications and the process of decommission of nuclear facilities, and has provided some measures and methods for the safety control and minimization of the radwastes. (authors)

  16. Organic reactivity analysis in Hanford single-shell tanks: Experimental and modeling basis for an expanded safety criterion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fauske, H.; Grigsby, J.M.; Turner, D.A.; Babad, H.; Meacham, J.E.

    1996-01-01

    De-spite demonstrated safe storage in terms of chemical stability of the Hanford high level waste for many decades, including decreasing waste temperatures and continuing aging of chemicals to less energetic states, concerns continue relative to assurance of long-term safe storage. Review of potential chemical safety hazards has been of particular recent interest in response to serious incidents within the Nuclear Weapons Complexes in the former Soviet Union (the 1957 Kyshtym and the 1993 Tomsk-7 incidents). Based upon an evaluation of the extensive new information and understanding that have developed over the last few years, it is concluded that the Hanford waste is stored safely and that concerns related to potential chemical safety hazards are not warranted. Spontaneous bulk runaway reactions of the Kyshtym incident type and other potential condensed-phase propagating reactions can be ruled out by assuring appropriate tank operating controls are in place and by limiting tank intrusive activities. This paper summarizes the technical basis for this position

  17. Railing for safety: job demands, job control, and safety citizenship role definition.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Turner, Nick; Chmiel, Nik; Walls, Melanie

    2005-10-01

    This study investigated job demands and job control as predictors of safety citizenship role definition, that is, employees' role orientation toward improving workplace safety. Data from a survey of 334 trackside workers were framed in the context of R. A. Karasek's (1979) job demands-control model. High job demands were negatively related to safety citizenship role definition, whereas high job control was positively related to this construct. Safety citizenship role definition of employees with high job control was buffered from the influence of high job demands, unlike that of employees with low job control, for whom high job demands were related to lower levels of the construct. Employees facing both high job demands and low job control were less likely than other employees to view improving safety as part of their role orientation. Copyright (c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved.

  18. ITER safety task NID-5a: ITER tritium environmental source terms - safety analysis basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Natalizio, A.; Kalyanam, K.M.

    1994-09-01

    The Canadian Fusion Fuels Technology Project's (CFFTP) is part of the contribution to ITER task NID-5a, Initial Tritium Source Term. This safety analysis basis constitutes the first part of the work for establishing tritium source terms and is intended to solicit comments and obtain agreement. The analysis objective is to provide an early estimate of tritium environmental source terms for the events to be analyzed. Events that would result in the loss of tritium are: a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), a vacuum vessel boundary breach. a torus exhaust line failure, a fuelling machine process boundary failure, a fuel processing system process boundary failure, a water detritiation system process boundary failure and an isotope separation system process boundary failure. 9 figs

  19. Safety-related control air systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    This Standard applies to those portions of the control air system that furnish air required to support, control, or operate systems or portions of systems that are safety related in nuclear power plants. This Standard relates only to the air supply system(s) for safety-related air operated devices and does not apply to the safety-related air operated device or to air operated actuators for such devices. The objectives of this Standard are to provide (1) minimum system design requirements for equipment, piping, instruments, controls, and wiring that constitute the air supply system; and (2) the system and component testing and maintenance requirements

  20. Sizewell B nuclear power station: the basis for the decision by the Health and Safety Executive to grant consent to load fuel into the reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The licensing and consent process and the basis for granting a consent for Nuclear Electric to load fuel into the Sizewell B reactor in the United Kingdom are explained. Consent was granted by the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive on satisfactory completion of construction and those commissioning stages needed to proceed safely, and the production of a satisfactory safety case. A summary of the assessment of the safety case is appended. It covers the reactor core, coolant system structural integrity, engineered safety features, main and essential electrical system, control and instrumentation, radioactive waste management, radiological protection, fuel storage and handling, civil works and structures, fault analysis, human factors, hazard analysis, quality assurance, and decommissioning. (UK)

  1. New design of engineered safety features-component control system to improve performance and reliability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, S.T.; Jung, H.W.; Lee, S.J.; Cho, C.H.; Kim, D.H.; Kim, H.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Full text: The Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) controls the engineered safety features of a Nuclear Power Plant such as Solenoid Operated Valves (SOV), Motor Operated Valves (MOV), pumps, dampers, etc. to mitigate the effects of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or an abnormal operation. ESF-CCS serves as an interface system between the Plant Protection System (PPS) and remote actuation devices. ESF-CCS is composed of fault tolerant Group Controllers GC, Loop Controllers (LC), ESF-CCS Test and Interface Processor (ETIP) and Cabinet Operator Module (COM) and Control Channel Gateway (CCG) etc. GCs in each division are designed to be fully independent triple configuration, which perform system level NSSS and BOP ESFAS logic (2-out-of-4 logic and l-out-of-2 logic, respectively) making it possible to test each GC individually during normal operation. In the existing configuration, the safety-related plant component control is part of the Plant Control System (PCS) non-safety system. For increased safety and reliability, this design change incorporates this part into the LCs, and is therefore designed according to the safety-critical system procedures. The test and diagnosis capabilities of ETIP and COM are reinforced. By means of an automatic periodic test for all main functions of the system, it is possible to quickly determine an abnormal status of the system, and to decrease the elapsed time for tests, thus effectively increasing availability. ESF-CCS consists of four independent divisions (A, B, C, and D) in the Advanced Power Reactor 1400 (APR1400). One prototype division is being manufactured and will be tested

  2. Setting clear expectations for safety basis development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MORENO, M.R.

    2003-01-01

    DOE-RL has set clear expectations for a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule) which will ensure long-term benefit to Hanford. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development resulting in a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was issued to standardized methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was issued for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated for Hanford. A standard Site Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) detailing the safety management programs was issued for use as a means of compliance with a majority of 3009 Standard chapters. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. As a result of setting expectations and providing safety analysis tools, the four Hanford Site waste management nuclear facilities were able to integrate into one Master Waste Management Documented Safety Analysis (WM-DSA)

  3. Configuration control during maintenance of safety related equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irish, C.S.

    2001-01-01

    Possibly the most important aspect of performing maintenance of safety related equipment is maintaining the component's original design basis. Assuring that the repaired item will perform the same safety function within the original performance and equipment qualification parameters is commonly referred to as configuration control. Maintaining configuration control of a technologically current well documented item is easy. Unfortunately, this does not describe most safety related items requiring maintenance within the global nuclear industry. Items such as motors, transformers, metal clad switchgear (low and medium voltage circuit breakers), refrigeration compressors, and electronic components (i.e. circuit boards, power supplies, regulators, etc.) which routinely require repair have been in service for twenty plus years. As a result, finding replacement parts and or material to repair the items to the original condition is becoming more and more difficult. An added difficulty is the lack of original technical documentation available on the item which is being repaired. The lack of technical documentation makes it difficult to identify replacement material and parts when the original part or material is not available. The lack of documentation also makes it difficult to test the repaired item to make sure that the original configuration has been maintained after the repair. The presentation will discuss the details of repairing various items including motors, metal clad switchgear, refrigeration compressors and power supplies and the controls which are necessary to maintain the configuration of the original item. The discussion will include the Quality Assurance and engineering necessary to identify and evaluate replacement material and parts necessary to perform repairs on safety related equipment when the original material or part is not available. Examples of repairs which required different parts or materials than the original to be used in the repair will be

  4. Configuration control during maintenance of safety related equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irish, C.S.

    2003-01-01

    Possibly the most important aspect of performing maintenance of safety related equipment is maintaining the component's original design basis. Assuring that the repaired item will perform the same safety function within the original performance and equipment qualification parameters is commonly referred to as configuration control. Maintaining configuration control of a technologically current well documented item is easy. Unfortunately, this does not describe most safety related items requiring maintenance within the global nuclear industry. Items such as motors, transformers, metal clad switchgear (low and medium voltage circuit breakers), refrigeration compressors, and electronic components (i.e. circuit boards, power supplies, regulators, etc.) which routinely require repair have been in service for twenty plus years. As a result, finding replacement parts and or material to repair the items to the original condition is becoming more and more difficult. An added difficulty is the lack of original technical documentation available on the item which is being repaired. The lack of technical documentation makes it difficult to identify replacement material and parts when the original part or material is not available. The lack of documentation also makes it difficult to test the repaired item to make sure that the original configuration has been maintained after the repair. The presentation will discuss the details of repairing various items including motors, metal clad switchgear, refrigeration compressors and power supplies and the controls which are necessary to maintain the configuration of the original item. The discussion will include the Quality Assurance and engineering necessary to identify and evaluate replacement material and parts necessary to perform repairs on safety related equipment when the original material or part is not available. Examples of repairs which required different parts or materials than the original to be used in the repair will be

  5. Technical basis for environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korsah, K.; Wood, R.T.; Hassan, M.; Tanaka, T.J.

    1998-01-01

    This document presents the results of studies sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide the technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety equipment in nuclear power plants. The studies were conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The studies address the following: (1) adequacy of the present test methods for qualification of digital I and C systems; (2) preferred (i.e., Regulatory Guide-endorsed) standards; (3) recommended stressors to be included in the qualification process during type testing; (4) resolution of need for accelerated aging for equipment to be located in a benign environment; and (5) determination of an appropriate approach for addressing the impact of smoke in digital equipment qualification programs. Significant findings from the studies form the technical basis for a recommended approach to the environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants

  6. Technical basis for environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Korsah, K.; Wood, R.T. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Hassan, M. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Tanaka, T.J. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1998-01-01

    This document presents the results of studies sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide the technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety equipment in nuclear power plants. The studies were conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The studies address the following: (1) adequacy of the present test methods for qualification of digital I and C systems; (2) preferred (i.e., Regulatory Guide-endorsed) standards; (3) recommended stressors to be included in the qualification process during type testing; (4) resolution of need for accelerated aging for equipment to be located in a benign environment; and (5) determination of an appropriate approach for addressing the impact of smoke in digital equipment qualification programs. Significant findings from the studies form the technical basis for a recommended approach to the environmental qualification of microprocessor-based safety-related equipment in nuclear power plants.

  7. Interim Safety Basis for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    This ISB, in conjunction with the IOSR, provides the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements or the facility is shut down. It is concluded that the risks associated with tha current and anticipated mode of the facility, uranium disposition, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within risk guidelines

  8. Quantitative safety assessment of air traffic control systems through system control capacity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Guo, Jingjing

    Quantitative Safety Assessments (QSA) are essential to safety benefit verification and regulations of developmental changes in safety critical systems like the Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems. Effectiveness of the assessments is particularly desirable today in the safe implementations of revolutionary ATC overhauls like NextGen and SESAR. QSA of ATC systems are however challenged by system complexity and lack of accident data. Extending from the idea "safety is a control problem" in the literature, this research proposes to assess system safety from the control perspective, through quantifying a system's "control capacity". A system's safety performance correlates to this "control capacity" in the control of "safety critical processes". To examine this idea in QSA of the ATC systems, a Control-capacity Based Safety Assessment Framework (CBSAF) is developed which includes two control capacity metrics and a procedural method. The two metrics are Probabilistic System Control-capacity (PSC) and Temporal System Control-capacity (TSC); each addresses an aspect of a system's control capacity. And the procedural method consists three general stages: I) identification of safety critical processes, II) development of system control models and III) evaluation of system control capacity. The CBSAF was tested in two case studies. The first one assesses an en-route collision avoidance scenario and compares three hypothetical configurations. The CBSAF was able to capture the uncoordinated behavior between two means of control, as was observed in a historic midair collision accident. The second case study compares CBSAF with an existing risk based QSA method in assessing the safety benefits of introducing a runway incursion alert system. Similar conclusions are reached between the two methods, while the CBSAF has the advantage of simplicity and provides a new control-based perspective and interpretation to the assessments. The case studies are intended to investigate the

  9. Review of safety related control room function research based on experience from nuclear power plants in Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Juslin, K.; Wahlstroem, B.; Rinttilae, E.

    1985-01-01

    A comprehensive human engineering research programme was established in the second half of the 1970's at the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). The research is performed in cooperation with the utility companies Imatran Voima Oy (IVO) and Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) and includes topics such as Handling of alarm information, Disturbance analysis systems, Assessment of control rooms and Validation of safety parameter display systems. Reference is also made to the Finnish contribution to the OECD Halden Reactor Project (Halden) and the Nordic Liaison Committee for Atomic Energy (NKA) research projects. In this paper feasible realization alternatives of safety related control room functions are discussed on the basis of experience from the nuclear power plants in Finland, which at present are equipped with extensive process computer systems. A proposal for future power plant information systems is described. It is intended that this proposal will serve as the basis for future computer systems at nuclear power plants in Finland. (author)

  10. A comparison of the difference of requirements between functional safety and nuclear safety controllers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chen, C.K.; Lee, C.L.; Shyu, S.S. [Inst. of Nuclear Energy Research, Taoyuan, Taiwan (China)

    2014-07-01

    In order to establish self-reliant capabilities of nuclear I&C systems in Taiwan, Taiwan's Nuclear I&C System (TNICS) project had been established by Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER). A Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) safety controller (SCS-2000) has been completed and gone through the IEC 61508 Safety Integrity Level 3 (SIL3) certification of Functional Safety for industries. Based on the certification processes, the difference of requirements between Functional Safety and Nuclear Safety controllers in term of hardware and software are addressed in this study. Besides, the measures used to determine and verify the reliability of the safety control system design are presented. (author)

  11. Regulatory standpoints on the design-basis capability of safety-related motor-operated valves(MOVs) and power-operated gate valves(POGVs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, W. T.; Kum, O. H.

    1999-01-01

    The weakness in the design-basis capability of Motor-Operated Valves(MOVs) and the susceptibility to Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding phenomena of Power-Operated Gate Valves(POGVs) have been major concerns to be resolved in the nuclear society in and abroad since Three Mile Island accident occurred in the USA in 1979. Through detailed analysis of operating experience and regulatory activities, some MOVs and POGVs have been found to be unreliable in performing their safety functions when they are required to do so under certain conditions, especially under design-basis accident conditions. Further, it is well understood that these safety problems may not be identified by the typical valve in-service testing(IST). USNRC has published three Generic Letters, GL 89-10, GL 95-07, and GL 96-05, requiring nuclear plant licensees to take appropriate actions to resolve the problems mentioned above. Korean nuclear regulatory body has made public an administration measure called 'Regulatory recommendation to verify safety functions of the safety-related MOVs and POGVs' on June 13, 1997, and in this administration measure Korean utility is asked to submit written documents to show how it assure design-basis capability of these valves. The following are among the major concerns being considered from a regulation standpoint. Program scope and implementation priority, dynamic tests under differential pressure conditions, accuracy of diagnostic equipment, torque switch setting and torque bypass percentage, weak link analysis, motor actuator sizing, corrective actions taken to resolve pressure locking and thermal binding susceptibility, and a periodic verification program for the valves once design-basis capability has been verified

  12. Safety critical application of fuzzy control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schildt, G.H.

    1995-01-01

    After an introduction into safety terms a short description of fuzzy logic will be given. Especially, for safety critical applications of fuzzy controllers a possible controller structure will be described. The following items will be discussed: Configuration of fuzzy controllers, design aspects like fuzzfiication, inference strategies, defuzzification and types of membership functions. As an example a typical fuzzy rule set will be presented. Especially, real-time behaviour a fuzzy controllers is mentioned. An example of fuzzy controlling for temperature control purpose within a nuclear reactor together with membership functions and inference strategy of such a fuzzy controller will be presented. (author). 4 refs, 17 figs

  13. Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; Kevin J. Carroll; Dr. Robert Lowrie

    2007-01-01

    Earlier this year, the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) was asked to assist in developing options related to acceleration deployment of new security-related technologies to assist meeting design base threat (DBT) needs while also addressing the requirements of 10 CFR 830. NNSA NA-70, one of the working group participants, designated this effort the Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative (SSIT). Relationship to Workshop Theme. ''Supporting Excellence in Operations Through Safety Analysis'', (workshop theme) includes security and safety personnel working together to ensure effective and efficient operations. One of the specific workshop elements listed in the call for papers is ''Safeguards/Security Integration with Safety''. This paper speaks directly to this theme. Description of Work. The EFCOG Safety Analysis Working Group (SAWG) and the EFCOG Security Working Group formed a core team to develop an integrated process involving both safety basis and security needs allowing achievement of the DBT objectives while ensuring safety is appropriately considered. This effort garnered significant interest, starting with a two day breakout session of 30 experts at the 2006 Safety Basis Workshop. A core team was formed, and a series of meetings were held to develop that process, including safety and security professionals, both contractor and federal personnel. A pilot exercise held at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in mid-July 2006 was conducted as a feasibility of concept review. Work Results. The SSIT efforts resulted in a topical report transmitted from EFCOG to DOE/NNSA in August 2006. Elements of the report included: Drivers and Endstate, Control Selections Alternative Analysis Process, Terminology Crosswalk, Safety Basis/Security Documentation Integration, Configuration Control, and development of a shared ''tool box'' of information/successes. Specific Benefits. The expectation or end state resulting from the topical report and associated

  14. Competition and safety in the law on technical inspection and control - is it a contradiction?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roth, H.A.

    1987-01-01

    For some time now, objections have been raised against the argument that technical inspection and control should indeed remain a task exlusively for the Technical Control Boards and their offices, organisations and employed inspectors, because competition in this very safety-related sector would not be a positive factor of selection but rather a mechanism reducing the inspection quality, resulting in a hazardous lowering of the safety level. The objections are primarily raised by the free-lance technical experts and their organisations who would like to enlarge their field of activity in this direction. The book at hand discusses the question how much free manoeuvering space there is for the legislative body to deal with such demands and reconcile the interests of safety and competition. The problem is discussed with a view to the Basic Law, which is said to create no legal basis for the demand for more competition in this field. The Basic Law leaves this decision to the discretion of the legislature. (orig./HP) [de

  15. Interim safety basis for fuel supply shutdown facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brehm, J.R.; Deobald, T.L.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    This ISB in conjunction with the new TSRs, will provide the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the Facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements. It is concluded that the risk associated with the current operational mode of the Facility, uranium closure, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within Risk Acceptance Guidelines. The Facility is classified as a Moderate Hazard Facility because of the potential for an unmitigated fire associated with the uranium storage buildings

  16. EPRI program in water reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loewenstein, W.B.; Gelhaus, F.; Gopalakrishnan, A.

    1975-01-01

    The basis for EPRI's water reactor safety program is twofold. First is compilation and development of fundamental background data necessary for quantified light-water reactor (LWR) safety assurance appraisals. Second is development of realistic and experimentally bench-marked analytical procedures. The results are expected either to confirm the safety margins in current operating parameters, and to identify overly conservative controls, or, in some cases, to provide a basis for improvements to further minimize uncertainties in expected performance. Achievement of these objectives requires the synthesis of related current and projected experimental-analytical projects toward establishment of an experimentally-based analysis for the assurance of safety for LWRs

  17. Scientific and technical basis of safety increase measures at NPPs with WWER

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skalozubov, V.I.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Komarov, Yu.A.; Shavlakov, A.V.

    2010-01-01

    This monograph presents the original development of the authors on scientific and technical substantiation of foreground modern measures on safety increase at nuclear power plants with water-water reactors: development and implementation of operative diagnostic system for thermo acoustical instability of reactor core, substantituation of performance capacity and reliability of fast-acting reducing units systems and regulation systems of reactor emergency cooling at control of dominant for safety accidents.

  18. Job Demands-Control-Support model and employee safety performance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Turner, Nick; Stride, Chris B; Carter, Angela J; McCaughey, Deirdre; Carroll, Anthony E

    2012-03-01

    The aim of this study was to explore whether work characteristics (job demands, job control, social support) comprising Karasek and Theorell's (1990) Job Demands-Control-Support framework predict employee safety performance (safety compliance and safety participation; Neal and Griffin, 2006). We used cross-sectional data of self-reported work characteristics and employee safety performance from 280 healthcare staff (doctors, nurses, and administrative staff) from Emergency Departments of seven hospitals in the United Kingdom. We analyzed these data using a structural equation model that simultaneously regressed safety compliance and safety participation on the main effects of each of the aforementioned work characteristics, their two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction among them, while controlling for demographic, occupational, and organizational characteristics. Social support was positively related to safety compliance, and both job control and the two-way interaction between job control and social support were positively related to safety participation. How work design is related to employee safety performance remains an important area for research and provides insight into how organizations can improve workplace safety. The current findings emphasize the importance of the co-worker in promoting both safety compliance and safety participation. Crown Copyright © 2011. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. Health risk from radioactive and chemical environmental contamination: common basis for assessment and safety decision making

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Demin, V.

    2004-01-01

    To meet the growing practical need in risk analysis in Russia health risk assessment tools and regulations have been developed in the frame of few federal research programs. RRC Kurchatov Institute is involved in R and D on risk analysis activity in these programs. One of the objectives of this development is to produce a common, unified basis of health risk analysis for different sources of risk. Current specific and different approaches in risk assessment and establishing safety standards developed for chemicals and ionising radiation are analysed. Some recommendations are given to produce the common approach. A specific risk index R has been proposed for safety decision-making (establishing safety standards and other levels of protective actions, comparison of various sources of risk, etc.). The index R is defined as the partial mathematical expectation of lost years of healthy life (LLE) due to exposure during a year to a risk source considered. The more concrete determinations of this index for different risk sources derived from the common definition of R are given. Generic safety standards (GSS) for the public and occupational workers have been suggested in terms of this index. Secondary specific safety standards have been derived from GSS for ionizing radiation and a number of other risk sources including environmental chemical pollutants. Other general and derived levels for decision-making have also been proposed including the e-minimum level. Their possible dependence on the national or regional health-demographic data is shortly considered. Recommendations are given on methods and criteria for comparison of various sources of risk. Some examples of risk comparison are demonstrated in the frame of different comparison tasks. The paper has been prepared on the basis of the research work supported by International Science and Technology Centre, Moscow (project no. 2558). (author)

  20. Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-48, ''Hydrogen control measures and effects of hydrogen burns on safety equipment''

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferrell, C.M.; Soffer, L.

    1989-09-01

    Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-48 arose as a result of the large amount of hydrogen generated and burned within containment during the Three Mile Island accident. This issue covers hydrogen control measures for recoverable degraded-core accidents for all boiling-water reactors (BWRs) and those pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) with ice-condenser containments. The Commission and the nuclear industry have sponsored extensive research in this area, which has led to significant revision of the Commission's hydrogen control regulations, given in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR 50), Section 50.44. BWRs having Mark I and II containments are presently required to operate with inerted containment atmospheres that effectively prevent hydrogen combustion. BWRs with Mark III containments and PWRs with ice-condenser containments are now required to be equipped with hydrogen control systems to protect containment integrity and safety systems inside containment. Industry has chosen to use hydrogen igniter systems to burn hydrogen produced in a controlled fashion to prevent damage. An independent review by a Committee of the National Research Council concluded that, for most accident scenarios, current regulatory requirements make it highly unlikely that hydrogen detonation would be the cause of containment failure. On the basis of the extensive research effort conducted and current regulatory requirements, including their implementation, the staff concludes that no new regulatory guidance on hydrogen control for recoverable degraded-core accidents for these types of plants is necessary and that USI A-48 is resolved

  1. Spallation Neutron Source Accelerator Facility Target Safety and Non-safety Control Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Battle, Ronald E.; DeVan, B.; Munro, John K. Jr.

    2006-01-01

    The Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) is a proton accelerator facility that generates neutrons for scientific researchers by spallation of neutrons from a mercury target. The SNS became operational on April 28, 2006, with first beam on target at approximately 200 W. The SNS accelerator, target, and conventional facilities controls are integrated by standardized hardware and software throughout the facility and were designed and fabricated to SNS conventions to ensure compatibility of systems with Experimental Physics Integrated Control System (EPICS). ControlLogix Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) interface to instruments and actuators, and EPICS performs the high-level integration of the PLCs such that all operator control can be accomplished from the Central Control room using EPICS graphical screens that pass process variables to and from the PLCs. Three active safety systems were designed to industry standards ISA S84.01 and IEEE 603 to meet the desired reliability for these safety systems. The safety systems protect facility workers and the environment from mercury vapor, mercury radiation, and proton beam radiation. The facility operators operated many of the systems prior to beam on target and developed the operating procedures. The safety and non-safety control systems were tested extensively prior to beam on target. This testing was crucial to identify wiring and software errors and failed components, the result of which was few problems during operation with beam on target. The SNS has continued beam on target since April to increase beam power, check out the scientific instruments, and continue testing the operation of facility subsystems

  2. Incorporating Traffic Control and Safety Hardware Performance Functions into Risk-based Highway Safety Analysis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zongzhi Li

    2017-04-01

    Full Text Available Traffic control and safety hardware such as traffic signs, lighting, signals, pavement markings, guardrails, barriers, and crash cushions form an important and inseparable part of highway infrastructure affecting safety performance. Significant progress has been made in recent decades to develop safety performance functions and crash modification factors for site-specific crash predictions. However, the existing models and methods lack rigorous treatments of safety impacts of time-deteriorating conditions of traffic control and safety hardware. This study introduces a refined method for computing the Safety Index (SI as a means of crash predictions for a highway segment that incorporates traffic control and safety hardware performance functions into the analysis. The proposed method is applied in a computation experiment using five-year data on nearly two hundred rural and urban highway segments. The root-mean square error (RMSE, Chi-square, Spearman’s rank correlation, and Mann-Whitney U tests are employed for validation.

  3. Controlled versus automatic processes: which is dominant to safety? The moderating effect of inhibitory control.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yaoshan Xu

    Full Text Available This study explores the precursors of employees' safety behaviors based on a dual-process model, which suggests that human behaviors are determined by both controlled and automatic cognitive processes. Employees' responses to a self-reported survey on safety attitudes capture their controlled cognitive process, while the automatic association concerning safety measured by an Implicit Association Test (IAT reflects employees' automatic cognitive processes about safety. In addition, this study investigates the moderating effects of inhibition on the relationship between self-reported safety attitude and safety behavior, and that between automatic associations towards safety and safety behavior. The results suggest significant main effects of self-reported safety attitude and automatic association on safety behaviors. Further, the interaction between self-reported safety attitude and inhibition and that between automatic association and inhibition each predict unique variances in safety behavior. Specifically, the safety behaviors of employees with lower level of inhibitory control are influenced more by automatic association, whereas those of employees with higher level of inhibitory control are guided more by self-reported safety attitudes. These results suggest that safety behavior is the joint outcome of both controlled and automatic cognitive processes, and the relative importance of these cognitive processes depends on employees' individual differences in inhibitory control. The implications of these findings for theoretical and practical issues are discussed at the end.

  4. Development of digital safety system logic and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nishikawa, H.; Sakamoto, H.

    1995-01-01

    Advanced-BWR (ABWR) uses total digital control and instrumentation (C and I) system. In particular, ABWR adopts a newly developed safety system using advanced digital technology. In the presentation the digital safety system design, manufacturing and factory validation test method are shortly overviewed. The digital safety system consists of micro-processor based digital controllers, data and information transmission by optical fibers and human-machine interface using color flat displays. This new developed safety system meet the nuclear safety requirements such as high reliability, independence of divisions, operability and maintainability. (2 refs., 4 figs., 1 tab.)

  5. Food Safety and Sanitary Practices of Selected Hotels in Batangas Province, Philippines: Basis of Proposed Enhancement Measures

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    April M. Perez

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available This study assessed the extent of food safety and sanitary practices of selected hotels in Batangas province as basis of proposed enhancement measures. The study utilized descriptive method to describe food safety and sanitary practices of selected hotels in Batangas province with a total of 8 hotels (256 respondents. Purposive sampling was used in the study. The questionnaires were designed using the provision of the Sanitation Code of the Philippines, validated and finalized to come up with legitimate results. The study showed that there were eight (8 hotel respondents classified as two, three, four star with considerable years of experience and adequate number of employees. The hotels demonstrated the food safety and sanitary practices always in the areas of restaurant, bar service, catering and banquet and room service. The significant pair-wise comparison for restaurant, bar service, catering and banquet and room service shows that 2 star hotels greatly differs. The researcher recommends that the management should maintain high standard of food safety and sanitary practices among its staff, upgrade the food safety and sanitary practices for food safety accreditation, continuous training of the hotel managers/employees on food safety and sanitary practices.

  6. An analysis of safety control effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Son, K.S.; Melchers, R.E.; Kal, W.M.

    2000-01-01

    The cost of injuries and 'accidents' to an organisation is very important in establishing how much it should spend on safety control. Despite the usefulness of information about the cost of a company's accidents, it is not customary accounting practice to make these data available. Of the two kinds of costs incurred by a company through occupational injuries and accidents, direct costs and indirect costs; the direct costs are much easier to estimate. However, the uninsured costs are usually more critical and should be estimated by each company. The authors investigate a general model to estimate the above costs and hence to establish efficient safety control. One construction company has been a pilot for this study. By analysing actual company data for three years, it is found that the efficient safety control cost should be 1.2-1.3% of total contract costs

  7. Safety climate and self-reported injury: assessing the mediating role of employee safety control.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Yueng-Hsiang; Ho, Michael; Smith, Gordon S; Chen, Peter Y

    2006-05-01

    To further reduce injuries in the workplace, companies have begun focusing on organizational factors which may contribute to workplace safety. Safety climate is an organizational factor commonly cited as a predictor of injury occurrence. Characterized by the shared perceptions of employees, safety climate can be viewed as a snapshot of the prevailing state of safety in the organization at a discrete point in time. However, few studies have elaborated plausible mechanisms through which safety climate likely influences injury occurrence. A mediating model is proposed to link safety climate (i.e., management commitment to safety, return-to-work policies, post-injury administration, and safety training) with self-reported injury through employees' perceived control on safety. Factorial evidence substantiated that management commitment to safety, return-to-work policies, post-injury administration, and safety training are important dimensions of safety climate. In addition, the data support that safety climate is a critical factor predicting the history of a self-reported occupational injury, and that employee safety control mediates the relationship between safety climate and occupational injury. These findings highlight the importance of incorporating organizational factors and workers' characteristics in efforts to improve organizational safety performance.

  8. Safety-related control air systems - approved 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    This standard applies to those portions of the control air system that furnish air required to support, control, or operate systems or portions of systems that are safety related in nuclear power plants. This standard relates only to the air supply system(s) for safety-related air operated devices and does not apply to the safety-related air operated device or to air operated actuators for such devices. The objectives of this standard are to provide (1) minimum system design requirements for equipment, piping, instruments, controls, and wiring that constitute the air supply system; and (2) the system and component testing and maintenance requirements

  9. Cold Vacuum Drying facility design basis accident analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.

    2000-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR. The calculations in this document address the design basis accidents (DBAs) selected for analysis in HNF-3553, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report'', Annex B, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' The objective is to determine the quantity of radioactive particulate available for release at any point during processing at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and to use that quantity to determine the amount of radioactive material released during the DBAs. The radioactive material released is used to determine dose consequences to receptors at four locations, and the dose consequences are compared with the appropriate evaluation guidelines and release limits to ascertain the need for preventive and mitigative controls

  10. Cold Vacuum Drying facility design basis accident analysis documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CROWE, R.D.

    2000-08-08

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR. The calculations in this document address the design basis accidents (DBAs) selected for analysis in HNF-3553, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report'', Annex B, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report.'' The objective is to determine the quantity of radioactive particulate available for release at any point during processing at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and to use that quantity to determine the amount of radioactive material released during the DBAs. The radioactive material released is used to determine dose consequences to receptors at four locations, and the dose consequences are compared with the appropriate evaluation guidelines and release limits to ascertain the need for preventive and mitigative controls.

  11. Monitoring and evaluation of malaria in pregnancy – developing a rational basis for control

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dellicour Stephanie

    2008-12-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Monitoring and evaluation of malaria control in pregnancy is essential for assessing the efficacy and effectiveness of health interventions aimed at reducing the major burden of this disease on women living in endemic areas. Yet there is no currently integrated strategic approach on how this should be achieved. Malaria control in pregnancy is formulated in relation to epidemiological patterns of exposure. Current emphasis is on intermittent preventive treatment (IPTp during pregnancy with sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine in higher transmission areas, combined with insecticide treated bed nets (ITNs and case management. Emphasis in lower transmission areas is primarily on case management. This paper discusses a rational basis for monitoring and evaluation based on: assessments of therapeutic and prophylactic drug efficacy; proportional reductions in parasite prevalence; seasonal effects; rapid assessment methodologies; birthweight and/or anaemia nomograms; case-coverage methods; maternal mortality indices; operational and programmatic indicators; and safety and pharmacovigilance of antimalarials in pregnancy. These approaches should be incorporated more effectively within National Programmes in order to facilitate surveillance and improve identification of high-risk women. Systems for utilizing routinely collected data should be strengthened, with greater attention to safety and pharmacovigilance with the advent of artemisinin combination therapies, and prospects of inadvertent exposures to artemisinins in the first trimester. Integrating monitoring activities within malaria control, reproductive health and adolescent-friendly services will be critical for implementation. Large-scale operational research is required to further evaluate the validity of currently proposed indicators, and in order to clarify the breadth and scale of implementation to be deployed.

  12. Safety Evaluation Approach with Security Controls for Safety I and C Systems on Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, D. H.; Jeong, S. Y.; Kim, Y. M.; Park, H. S.; Lee, M. S.; Kim, T. H.

    2016-01-01

    This paper addresses concepts of safety and security and relations between them for assessing effects of security features in safety systems. Also, evaluation approach for avoiding confliction with safety requirements and cyber security features which may be adopted in safety-related digital I and C system will be described. In this paper, safety-security life cycle model based confliction avoidance method was proposed to evaluate the effects when the cyber security control features are implemented in the safety I and C system. Also, safety effect evaluation results using the proposed evaluation method were described. In case of technical security controls, many of them are expected to conflict with safety requirements, otherwise operational and managerial controls are not relatively. Safety measures and cyber security measures for nuclear power plants should be implemented not to conflict with one another. Where safety function and security features are both required within the systems, and also where security features are implemented within safety systems, they should be justified

  13. Safety Evaluation Approach with Security Controls for Safety I and C Systems on Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, D. H.; Jeong, S. Y.; Kim, Y. M.; Park, H. S. [KINS, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, M. S.; Kim, T. H. [Formal Works Inc., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    This paper addresses concepts of safety and security and relations between them for assessing effects of security features in safety systems. Also, evaluation approach for avoiding confliction with safety requirements and cyber security features which may be adopted in safety-related digital I and C system will be described. In this paper, safety-security life cycle model based confliction avoidance method was proposed to evaluate the effects when the cyber security control features are implemented in the safety I and C system. Also, safety effect evaluation results using the proposed evaluation method were described. In case of technical security controls, many of them are expected to conflict with safety requirements, otherwise operational and managerial controls are not relatively. Safety measures and cyber security measures for nuclear power plants should be implemented not to conflict with one another. Where safety function and security features are both required within the systems, and also where security features are implemented within safety systems, they should be justified.

  14. Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; Kevin J. Carroll; Dr. Robert Lowrie

    2007-05-01

    Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative Mr. Kevin J. Carroll Dr. Robert Lowrie, Dr. Micheal Lehto BWXT Y12 NSC Oak Ridge, TN 37831 865-576-2289/865-241-2772 carrollkj@y12.doe.gov Work Objective. Earlier this year, the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) was asked to assist in developing options related to acceleration deployment of new security-related technologies to assist meeting design base threat (DBT) needs while also addressing the requirements of 10 CFR 830. NNSA NA-70, one of the working group participants, designated this effort the Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative (SSIT). Relationship to Workshop Theme. “Supporting Excellence in Operations Through Safety Analysis,” (workshop theme) includes security and safety personnel working together to ensure effective and efficient operations. One of the specific workshop elements listed in the call for papers is “Safeguards/Security Integration with Safety.” This paper speaks directly to this theme. Description of Work. The EFCOG Safety Analysis Working Group (SAWG) and the EFCOG Security Working Group formed a core team to develop an integrated process involving both safety basis and security needs allowing achievement of the DBT objectives while ensuring safety is appropriately considered. This effort garnered significant interest, starting with a two day breakout session of 30 experts at the 2006 Safety Basis Workshop. A core team was formed, and a series of meetings were held to develop that process, including safety and security professionals, both contractor and federal personnel. A pilot exercise held at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in mid-July 2006 was conducted as a feasibility of concept review. Work Results. The SSIT efforts resulted in a topical report transmitted from EFCOG to DOE/NNSA in August 2006. Elements of the report included: Drivers and Endstate, Control Selections Alternative Analysis Process, Terminology Crosswalk, Safety Basis

  15. Changing pulse-shape basis for molecular learning control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cardoza, David; Langhojer, Florian; Trallero-Herrero, Carlos; Weinacht, Thomas; Monti, Oliver L.A.

    2004-01-01

    We interpret the results of a molecular fragmentation learning control experiment. We show that in the case of a system where control can be related to the structure of the optimal pulse matching the vibrational dynamics of the molecule, a simple change of pulse-shape basis in which the learning algorithm performs the search can reduce the dimensionality of the search space to one or two degrees of freedom

  16. Problems in Food Safety of Hunan Province and Countermeasures

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Fanfan; OUYANG; Fangming; DENG

    2014-01-01

    In recent years,serious food safety accidents are of frequent occurrence. Although government has taken many practical and feasible measures to contain food safety accidents,new food safety accidents still emerge in large numbers. In this situation,food safety control is a long-term and arduous task to be performed jointly by many government departments. Finally,it presents corresponding countermeasures and recommendations on the basis of current situations of food safety in Hunan Province,problem causes,in combination with control measures related to food safety both at home and abroad.

  17. Technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety systems in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korsah, K.; Wood, R.T.; Tanaka, T.J.; Antonescu, C.E.

    1997-01-01

    This paper summarizes the results of research sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide the technical basis for environmental qualification of computer-based safety equipment in nuclear power plants. This research was conducted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). ORNL investigated potential failure modes and vulnerabilities of microprocessor-based technologies to environmental stressors, including electromagnetic/radio-frequency interference, temperature, humidity, and smoke exposure. An experimental digital safety channel (EDSC) was constructed for the tests. SNL performed smoke exposure tests on digital components and circuit boards to determine failure mechanisms and the effect of different packaging techniques on smoke susceptibility. These studies are expected to provide recommendations for environmental qualification of digital safety systems by addressing the following: (1) adequacy of the present preferred test methods for qualification of digital I and C systems; (2) preferred standards; (3) recommended stressors to be included in the qualification process during type testing; (4) resolution of need for accelerated aging in qualification testing for equipment that is to be located in mild environments; and (5) determination of an appropriate approach to address smoke in a qualification program

  18. Segmentation Scheme for Safety Enhancement of Engineered Safety Features Component Control System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sangseok; Sohn, Kwangyoung; Lee, Junku; Park, Geunok

    2013-01-01

    Common Caused Failure (CCF) or undetectable failure would adversely impact safety functions of ESF-CCS in the existing nuclear power plants. We propose the segmentation scheme to solve these problems. Main function assignment to segments in the proposed segmentation scheme is based on functional dependency and critical function success path by using the dependency depth matrix. The segment has functional independence and physical isolation. The segmentation structure is that prohibit failure propagation to others from undetectable failures. Therefore, the segmentation system structure has robustness to undetectable failures. The segmentation system structure has functional diversity. The specific function in the segment defected by CCF, the specific function could be maintained by diverse control function that assigned to other segments. Device level control signals and system level control signals are separated and also control signal and status signals are separated due to signal transmission paths are allocated independently based on signal type. In this kind of design, single device failure or failures on signal path in the channel couldn't result in the loss of all segmented functions simultaneously. Thus the proposed segmentation function is the design scheme that improves availability of safety functions. In conventional ESF-CCS, the single controller generates the signal to control the multiple safety functions, and the reliability is achieved by multiplication within the channel. This design has a drawback causing the loss of multiple functions due to the CCF (Common Cause Failure) and single failure Heterogeneous controller guarantees the diversity ensuring the execution of safety functions against the CCF and single failure, but requiring a lot of resources like manpower and cost. The segmentation technology based on the compartmentalization and functional diversification decreases the CCF and single failure nonetheless the identical types of controllers

  19. Segmentation Scheme for Safety Enhancement of Engineered Safety Features Component Control System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Sangseok; Sohn, Kwangyoung [Korea Reliability Technology and System, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Junku; Park, Geunok [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-05-15

    Common Caused Failure (CCF) or undetectable failure would adversely impact safety functions of ESF-CCS in the existing nuclear power plants. We propose the segmentation scheme to solve these problems. Main function assignment to segments in the proposed segmentation scheme is based on functional dependency and critical function success path by using the dependency depth matrix. The segment has functional independence and physical isolation. The segmentation structure is that prohibit failure propagation to others from undetectable failures. Therefore, the segmentation system structure has robustness to undetectable failures. The segmentation system structure has functional diversity. The specific function in the segment defected by CCF, the specific function could be maintained by diverse control function that assigned to other segments. Device level control signals and system level control signals are separated and also control signal and status signals are separated due to signal transmission paths are allocated independently based on signal type. In this kind of design, single device failure or failures on signal path in the channel couldn't result in the loss of all segmented functions simultaneously. Thus the proposed segmentation function is the design scheme that improves availability of safety functions. In conventional ESF-CCS, the single controller generates the signal to control the multiple safety functions, and the reliability is achieved by multiplication within the channel. This design has a drawback causing the loss of multiple functions due to the CCF (Common Cause Failure) and single failure Heterogeneous controller guarantees the diversity ensuring the execution of safety functions against the CCF and single failure, but requiring a lot of resources like manpower and cost. The segmentation technology based on the compartmentalization and functional diversification decreases the CCF and single failure nonetheless the identical types of

  20. FLUOR HANFORD SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    GARVIN, L. J.; JENSEN, M. A.

    2004-04-13

    This document summarizes safety management programs used within the scope of the ''Project Hanford Management Contract''. The document has been developed to meet the format and content requirements of DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses''. This document provides summary descriptions of Fluor Hanford safety management programs, which Fluor Hanford nuclear facilities may reference and incorporate into their safety basis when producing facility- or activity-specific documented safety analyses (DSA). Facility- or activity-specific DSAs will identify any variances to the safety management programs described in this document and any specific attributes of these safety management programs that are important for controlling potentially hazardous conditions. In addition, facility- or activity-specific DSAs may identify unique additions to the safety management programs that are needed to control potentially hazardous conditions.

  1. Safety Management System in Croatia Control Ltd.

    OpenAIRE

    Pavlin, Stanislav; Sorić, Vedran; Bilać, Dragan; Dimnik, Igor; Galić, Daniel

    2009-01-01

    International Civil Aviation Organization and other international aviation organizations regulate the safety in civil aviation. In the recent years the International Civil Aviation Organization has introduced the concept of the safety management system through several documents among which the most important is the 2006 Safety Management Manual. It treats the safety management system in all the segments of civil aviation, from carriers, aerodromes and air traffic control to design, constructi...

  2. 46 CFR 61.30-20 - Automatic control and safety tests.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Automatic control and safety tests. 61.30-20 Section 61... TESTS AND INSPECTIONS Tests and Inspections of Fired Thermal Fluid Heaters § 61.30-20 Automatic control and safety tests. Operational tests and checks of all safety and limit controls, combustion controls...

  3. Safety Assurance for Irradiating Experiments in the Advanced Test Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. A. Tomberlin; S. B. Grover

    2004-11-01

    The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), was specifically designed to provide a high neutron flux test environment for conducting a variety of experiments. This paper addresses the safety assurance process for two general types of experiments conducted in the ATR facility and how the safety analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore, this type of experiment is addressed in more detail in the ATR safety basis. This allows the individual safety analysis for this type of experiment to be more standardized. The second type of experiment is defined in more general terms in the ATR safety basis and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, the individual safety analysis for the second type of experiment tends to be more unique and is tailored to each experiment.

  4. Safety Assurance for Irradiating Experiments in the Advanced Test Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    T. A. Tomberlin; S. B. Grover

    2004-01-01

    The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), was specifically designed to provide a high neutron flux test environment for conducting a variety of experiments. This paper addresses the safety assurance process for two general types of experiments conducted in the ATR facility and how the safety analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore, this type of experiment is addressed in more detail in the ATR safety basis. This allows the individual safety analysis for this type of experiment to be more standardized. The second type of experiment is defined in more general terms in the ATR safety basis and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, the individual safety analysis for the second type of experiment tends to be more unique and is tailored to each experiment

  5. Safety precautions in atomic pile control (1962)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furet, J.

    1962-01-01

    We have been led to study the problem of safety in atomic pile control as a result of our participation on the one hand in the planning of C.E.A. atomic piles, and on the other hand in the pile safety sub omission considering atomic pile safety of operational or planned C.E.A. piles. We have thus had to consider the wishes occurring in piles during their operation and also their behaviour in the dynamic state The present work deals mainly with the importance of intrinsic safety devices, with the influence of reactivity variations on the power fluctuations during accidental operation, and with the development of robust and reliable safety appliances. The starting p accident has been especially studied both for low-flux piles where a compromise is necessary between the response time of the safety appliances and the statistical fluctuations and for high lux piles where xenon poisoning has an effect on the lower limit of the velocity of reactivity liberation. The desirability has been stressed of automation as a safety factor in atomic pile control. The details required for an understanding of the diagrams of the apparatus are given. (author) [fr

  6. A refined safety analysis approach for closure of the Hanford Site flammable gas unreviewed safety question

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bratzel, D.R.

    1997-01-01

    Following a 1990 investigation into flammable gas generation, retention, and release mechanisms within the Hanford Site high-level waste tanks, personnel concluded that the existing Authorization Basis documentation did not adequately evaluate flammable gas hazards. This declaration was based primarily on the fact that personnel did not adequately consider hydrogen and nitrous oxide evolution within the material in certain waste tanks and subsequent hypothetical ignition in the development of safety documentation for the waste tanks. The US Department of Energy-Headquarters subsequently declared an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). Although work scope has been focused on closure of the USQ since 1990, the DOE has yet to close the USQ because of considerable uncertainty regarding essential technical parameters and associated risk. The DOE recently approved a Basis for Interim Operation to revise the Authorization Basis for managing the tank farms, however, the USQ remains open. The two fundamental requirements for closure of the flammable gas USQ are as follows: development of a defensible technical basis for existing controls; development of a process to assess the adequacy of controls as the waste tank mission progresses

  7. Safety management of software-based equipment

    CERN Document Server

    Boulanger, Jean-Louis

    2013-01-01

    A review of the principles of the safety of software-based equipment, this book begins by presenting the definition principles of safety objectives. It then moves on to show how it is possible to define a safety architecture (including redundancy, diversification, error-detection techniques) on the basis of safety objectives and how to identify objectives related to software programs. From software objectives, the authors present the different safety techniques (fault detection, redundancy and quality control). "Certifiable system" aspects are taken into account throughout the book. C

  8. Towards a Formal Basis for Modular Safety Cases

    Science.gov (United States)

    Denney, Ewen; Pai, Ganesh

    2015-01-01

    Safety assurance using argument-based safety cases is an accepted best-practice in many safety-critical sectors. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), which is widely used for presenting safety arguments graphically, provides a notion of modular arguments to support the goal of incremental certification. Despite the efforts at standardization, GSN remains an informal notation whereas the GSN standard contains appreciable ambiguity especially concerning modular extensions. This, in turn, presents challenges when developing tools and methods to intelligently manipulate modular GSN arguments. This paper develops the elements of a theory of modular safety cases, leveraging our previous work on formalizing GSN arguments. Using example argument structures we highlight some ambiguities arising through the existing guidance, present the intuition underlying the theory, clarify syntax, and address modular arguments, contracts, well-formedness and well-scopedness of modules. Based on this theory, we have a preliminary implementation of modular arguments in our toolset, AdvoCATE.

  9. Preventive maintenance basis: Volume 30 -- Relays -- control. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Worledge, D.; Hinchcliffe, G.

    1998-07-01

    US nuclear power plants are implementing preventive maintenance (PM) tasks with little documented basis beyond fundamental vendor information to support the tasks or their intervals. The Preventive Maintenance Basis project provides utilities with the technical basis for PM tasks and task intervals associated with 40 specific components such as valves, electric motors, pumps, and HVAC equipment. This document provides a program of preventive maintenance tasks suitable for application to control relays. The PM tasks that are recommended provide a cost-effective way to intercept the causes and mechanisms that lead to degradation and failure. They can be used in conjunction with material from other sources, to develop a complete PM program or to improve an existing program

  10. Design safety improvements of Kozloduy NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hinovski, I.

    1999-01-01

    Design safety improvements of Kozloduy NPP, discussed in detail, are concerned with: primary circuit integrity; reactor pressure vessel integrity; primary coolant piping integrity; primary coolant overpressure protection; leak before break status; design basis accidents and transients; severe accident analysis; improvements of safety and support systems; containment/confinement leak tightness and strength; seismic safety improvements; WWER-1000 control rod insertion; upgrading and modernization of Units 5 and 6; Year 2000 problem

  11. Safety analysis of control rod drive computers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehrenberger, W.; Rauch, G.; Schmeil, U.; Maertz, J.; Mainka, E.U.; Nordland, O.; Gloee, G.

    1985-01-01

    The analysis of the most significant user programmes revealed no errors in these programmes. The evaluation of approximately 82 cumulated years of operation demonstrated that the operating system of the control rod positioning processor has a reliability that is sufficiently good for the tasks this computer has to fulfil. Computers can be used for safety relevant tasks. The experience gained with the control rod positioning processor confirms that computers are not less reliable than conventional instrumentation and control system for comparable tasks. The examination and evaluation of computers for safety relevant tasks can be done with programme analysis or statistical evaluation of the operating experience. Programme analysis is recommended for seldom used and well structured programmes. For programmes with a long, cumulated operating time a statistical evaluation is more advisable. The effort for examination and evaluation is not greater than the corresponding effort for conventional instrumentation and control systems. This project has also revealed that, where it is technologically sensible, process controlling computers or microprocessors can be qualified for safety relevant tasks without undue effort. (orig./HP) [de

  12. The Health and Safety Executive's regulatory framework for control of nuclear criticality safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, K.; Simister, D.N.

    1991-01-01

    In the United Kingdom the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 is the main legal instrument under which risks to people from work activities are controlled. Certain sections of the Nuclear Installations Act, 1965 which deal with the licensing of nuclear sites and the regulatory control of risks arising from them, including the risk from accidental criticality, are relevant statutory provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act. The responsibility for safety rests with the operator who has to make and implement arrangements to prevent accidental criticality. The adequacy of these arrangements must be demonstrated in a safety case to the regulatory authorities. Operators are encouraged to treat each plant on its own merits and develop the safety case accordingly. The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), for its part, assesses the adequacy of the operator's safety case against the industry's own standards and criteria, but more particularly against the NII's safety assessment principles and guides, and international standards. Risks should be made as low as reasonably practicable. Generally, the NII seeks improvements in safety using an enforcement policy which operates at a number of levels, ranging from persuasion through discussion to the ultimate deterrent of withdrawal of a site licence. This paper describes the role of the NII, which includes a specialist criticality expertise, within the Health and Safety Executive, in regulating the nuclear sites from the criticality safety viewpoint. (Author)

  13. The deep geologic repository technology programme: toward a geoscience basis for understanding repository safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jensen, M.R.

    2007-01-01

    Within the Deep Geologic Repository Technology Programme (DGRTP) several Geoscience activities are focused on advancing the understanding of groundwater flow system evolution and geochemical stability in a Canadian Shield setting as affected by long-term climate change. A key aspect is developing confidence in predictions of groundwater flow patterns and residence times as they relate to the safety of a deep geologic repository for used nuclear fuel waste. This is being achieved through a coordinated multi-disciplinary approach intent on: i) demonstrating coincidence between independent geo-scientific data; ii) improving the traceability of geo-scientific data and its interpretation within a conceptual descriptive model(s); iii) improving upon methods to assess and demonstrate robustness in flow domain prediction(s) given inherent flow domain uncertainties (i.e. spatial chemical/physical property distributions, boundary conditions) in time and space; and iv) improving awareness amongst geo-scientists as to the utility of various geo-scientific data in supporting a safety case for a deep geologic repository. This multi-disciplinary DGRTP approach is yielding an improved understanding of groundwater flow system evolution and stability in Canadian Shield settings that is further contributing to the geo-scientific basis for understanding and communicating aspects of DGR safety. (author)

  14. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements. Volume 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

  15. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements [VOL 1 and 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-12-28

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

  16. Safety implications of control systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, O.L.

    1983-01-01

    The Safety Implications of Control Systems Program has three major activities in support of USI-A47. The first task is a failure mode and effects analysis of all plant systems which may potentially induce control system disturbance that have safety implications. This task has made a preliminary study of overfill events and recommended cases for further analysis on the hybrid simulator. Work continues on overcooling and undercooling. A detailed investigation of electric power network is in progress. LERs are providing guidance on important failure modes that will provide initial conditions for further simulator studies. The simulator taks is generating a detailed model of the control system supported by appropriate neutronics, hydraulics, and thermodynamics submodels of all other principal plant components. The simulator is in the last stages of development. Checkout calculations are in progress to establish model stability, robustness, and qualitative credibility. Verification against benchmark codes and plant data will follow

  17. Safety Impacts of the Actuated Signal Control at Urban Intersections

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sang Hyuk Lee

    2016-02-01

    Full Text Available To reduce travel time, the actuated signal controls have been implemented at urban intersections. However, the safety impacts of actuated signal controls thus far have rarely been examined. In this assessment of the safety impact of urban intersections with semi-actuated signal controls, the safety performance functions and EB approaches were applied. The semi-actuated signal controls have increased injuries and total crashes in all crash types by around 5.9% and 3.8%, respectively. Regarding the most common crash types, such as angle, sideswipe & rear-end, and head-on crashes, semi-actuated signal controls have been seen to decrease injuries by 7.7%. Total crashes have been reduced by over 9.2% through the use of semi-actuated signal controls. This may be result of optimal signal timings considering traffic conditions during peak time periods. In conclusion, safety impact factors which have been established in this study can be used to improve safety and minimize travel times using semi-actuated signal controls.

  18. Radiation safety and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jang Hee; Kim, Gi Sub.

    1996-12-01

    The principal objective of radiological safety control is intended for achievement and maintenance of appropriately safe condition in environmental control for activities involving exposure from the use of radiation. In order to establish these objective, we should be to prevent deterministic effects and to limit the occurrence stochastic effects to level deemed to be acceptable by the application of general principles of radiation protection and systems of dose limitation based on ICRP recommendations. (author). 22 tabs., 13 figs., 11 refs

  19. Radiological safety and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jang Hee; Kim, Ki Sub

    1995-01-01

    The practical objective of radiological safety control is intended for achievement and maintenance of appropreately safe condition in environmental control for activities involving exposure from the use of radiation. In order to establish these objectives, we should be to prevent deterministic effects and to limit the occurrence stochastic effects to level deemed to be acceptable by the application of general principles of radiation protection and systems of dose limitation based on ICRP recommendations. 34 tabs., 19 figs., 11 refs. (Author) .new

  20. The biological basis of plutonium safety standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mole, R.H.

    1976-01-01

    Since no radiation injury or cancer in man can, as yet, be directly attributed to Pu, all safety standards for Pu must be determined by reference to other safety standards, development of which is discussed. A system of safety standards must be based on links with real damage, such as the requirement for 226 Ra in bone. The type of biological information required for making standards realistic is considered in relation to Pu and Ra in bone. Also considered are the possible effects of Pu in soft tissue such as bone marrow. Not only dose, but also the number of cells exposed to the dose are important biologically and cellular aspects are examined. Since there is no positive evidence of Pu toxicity relevant information on other α emitters must be examined. The observed effectiveness of Ra, daughters of 222 Ra and 232 Th in causing mutations and cancer, is surveyed. Reference is made to the necessity of improving the ICRP system, currently based on the critical organ concept, by recognising the need for summation of risks in other organs where exposure to Pu is concerned. Improved biological understanding particularly that of hereditary damage, in recent years leads to less pessimistic thinking on the effects of ionizing radiations. The immediate need appears to be for consistency in safety standards. (U.K.)

  1. AEC controlled area safety program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hendricks, D W [Nevada Operations Office, Atomic Energy Commission, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    1969-07-01

    The detonation of underground nuclear explosives and the subsequent data recovery efforts require a comprehensive pre- and post-detonation safety program for workers within the controlled area. The general personnel monitoring and environmental surveillance program at the Nevada Test Site are presented. Some of the more unusual health-physics aspects involved in the operation of this program are also discussed. The application of experience gained at the Nevada Test Site is illustrated by description of the on-site operational and safety programs established for Project Gasbuggy. (author)

  2. AEC controlled area safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hendricks, D.W.

    1969-01-01

    The detonation of underground nuclear explosives and the subsequent data recovery efforts require a comprehensive pre- and post-detonation safety program for workers within the controlled area. The general personnel monitoring and environmental surveillance program at the Nevada Test Site are presented. Some of the more unusual health-physics aspects involved in the operation of this program are also discussed. The application of experience gained at the Nevada Test Site is illustrated by description of the on-site operational and safety programs established for Project Gasbuggy. (author)

  3. Supporting Fernald Site Closure with Integrated Health and Safety Plans as Documented Safety Analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kohler, S.; Brown, T.; Fisk, P.; Krach, F.; Klein, B.

    2004-01-01

    At the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) near Cincinnati, Ohio, environmental restoration activities are supported by Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) that combine the required project-specific Health and Safety Plans, Safety Basis Requirements (SBRs), and Process Requirements (PRs) into single Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs). These integrated DSAs employ Integrated Safety Management methodology in support of simplified restoration and remediation activities that, so far, have resulted in the decontamination and demolition (D and D) of over 200 structures, including eight major nuclear production plants. There is one of twelve nuclear facilities still remaining (Silos containing uranium ore residues) with its own safety basis documentation. This paper presents the status of the FCP's safety basis documentation program, illustrating that all of the former nuclear facilities and activities have now replaced. Basis of Interim Operations (BIOs) with I-HASPs as their safety basis during the closure process

  4. Safety design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kunitomi, Kazuhiko; Shiozawa, Shusaku

    2004-01-01

    JAERI established the safety design philosophy of the HTTR based on that of current reactors such as LWR in Japan, considering inherent safety features of the HTTR. The strategy of defense in depth was implemented so that the safety engineering functions such as control of reactivity, removal of residual heat and confinement of fission products shall be well performed to ensure safety. However, unlike the LWR, the inherent design features of the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) enables the HTTR meet stringent regulatory criteria without much dependence on active safety systems. On the other hand, the safety in an accident typical to the HTGR such as the depressurization accident initiated by a primary pipe rupture shall be ensured. The safety design philosophy of the HTTR considers these unique features appropriately and is expected to be the basis for future Japanese HTGRs. This paper describes the safety design philosophy and safety evaluation procedure of the HTTR especially focusing on unique considerations to the HTTR. Also, experiences obtained from an HTTR safety review and R and D needs for establishing the safety philosophy for the future HTGRs are reported

  5. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  6. Risk assessment of safety data link and network communication in digital safety feature control system of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sang Hun; Son, Kwang Seop; Jung, Wondea; Kang, Hyun Gook

    2017-01-01

    Highlights: • Safety data communication risk assessment framework and quantitative scheme were proposed. • Fault-tree model of ESFAS unavailability due to safety data communication failure was developed. • Safety data link and network risk were assessed based on various ESF-CCS design specifications. • The effect of fault-tolerant algorithm reliability of safety data network on ESFAS unavailability was assessed. - Abstract: As one of the safety-critical systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs), the Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) employs safety data link and network communication for the transmission of safety component actuation signals from the group controllers to loop controllers to effectively accommodate various safety-critical field controllers. Since data communication failure risk in the ESF-CCS has yet to be fully quantified, the ESF-CCS employing data communication systems have not been applied in NPPs. This study therefore developed a fault tree model to assess the data link and data network failure-induced unavailability of a system function used to generate an automated control signal for accident mitigation equipment. The current aim is to provide risk information regarding data communication failure in a digital safety feature control system in consideration of interconnection between controllers and the fault-tolerant algorithm implemented in the target system. Based on the developed fault tree model, case studies were performed to quantitatively assess the unavailability of ESF-CCS signal generation due to data link and network failure and its risk effect on safety signal generation failure. This study is expected to provide insight into the risk assessment of safety-critical data communication in a digitalized NPP instrumentation and control system.

  7. Selection of design basis event for modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Hiroyuki; Nakagawa, Shigeaki; Ohashi, Hirofumi

    2016-06-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been investigating safety requirements and basic approach of safety guidelines for modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) aiming to increase internarial contribution for nuclear safety by developing an international HTGR safety standard under International Atomic Energy Agency. In this study, we investigate a deterministic approach to select design basis events utilizing information obtained from probabilistic approach. In addition, selections of design basis events are conducted for commercial HTGR designed by JAEA. As a result, an approach for selecting design basis event considering multiple failures of safety systems is established which has not been considered as design basis in the safety guideline for existing nuclear facility. Furthermore, selection of design basis events for commercial HTGR has completed. This report provides an approach and procedure for selecting design basis events of modular HTGR as well as selected events for the commercial HTGR, GTHTR300. (author)

  8. USAEC Controls for Nuclear Criticality Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McCluggage, W. C. [Division of Operational Safety, United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, DC (United States)

    1966-05-15

    This is a paper written to provide a broad general view of the United States Atomic Energy Commission's controls for nuclear criticality safety within its own facilities. Included also is a brief' discussion of the USAEC's methods of obtaining assurance that the controls are being applied. The body of the document contains three sections. The first two describe the functions of the USAEC; the third deals with the contractors. The provisions of the Atomic Energy Act applicable to health and safety are discussed in relation to nuclear criticality safety. The use of United States Atomic Energy Commission manual chapters and Federal regulations is described. The functions of the USAEC Headquarters' offices and the operations offices are briefly outlined. Comments regarding the USAEC's inspection, auditing and appraisal programmes are included. Also briefly mentioned are the basic qualifications which must be met to become a contractor to possess and process or use fissionable materials. On the plant, factory or facility level the duties and responsibilities of industrial management are briefly outlined. The fundamental standards and their origin, together with the principal documents and guides are mentioned. The chief methods of control used by contractors operating large USAEC facilities and plants are described and compared. These include diagrams of how a typical nuclear criticality safety problem is handled from inception, design, construction and finally plant operation. Also included is a brief discussion of the contractors' methods of assuring strict employee compliance with the operating rules and limits. (author)

  9. Characterisation of Liquefaction Effects for Beyond-Design Basis Safety Assessment of Nuclear Power Plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bán, Zoltán; Győri, Erzsébet; János Katona, Tamás; Tóth, László

    2015-04-01

    Preparedness of nuclear power plants to beyond design base external effects became high importance after 11th of March 2011 Great Tohoku Earthquakes. In case of some nuclear power plants constructed at the soft soil sites, liquefaction should be considered as a beyond design basis hazard. The consequences of liquefaction have to be analysed with the aim of definition of post-event plant condition, identification of plant vulnerabilities and planning the necessary measures for accident management. In the paper, the methodology of the analysis of liquefaction effects for nuclear power plants is outlined. The case of Nuclear Power Plant at Paks, Hungary is used as an example for demonstration of practical importance of the presented results and considerations. Contrary to the design, conservatism of the methodology for the evaluation of beyond design basis liquefaction effects for an operating plant has to be limited to a reasonable level. Consequently, applicability of all existing methods has to be considered for the best estimation. The adequacy and conclusiveness of the results is mainly limited by the epistemic uncertainty of the methods used for liquefaction hazard definition and definition of engineering parameters characterizing the consequences of liquefaction. The methods have to comply with controversial requirements. They have to be consistent and widely accepted and used in the practice. They have to be based on the comprehensive database. They have to provide basis for the evaluation of dominating engineering parameters that control the post-liquefaction response of the plant structures. Experience of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant hit by Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki earthquake of 16 July 2007 and analysis of site conditions and plant layout at Paks plant have shown that the differential settlement is found to be the dominating effect in case considered. They have to be based on the probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and allow the integration into logic

  10. [Safety evaluation and risk control measures of Cassiae Semen].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhao, Yi-Meng; Wu, Li; Zhang, Shuo; Zhang, Li; Gao, Xue-Min; Sun, Xiao-Bo; Wang, Chun

    2017-11-01

    In this study, the authors reviewed domestic and foreign literatures, conducted the textual research on origin and development of Cassia Semen, studied records in ancient books and ancient and modern literatures, clinical adverse reactions and relevant experimental studies in recent years, and summarized the clinical features and influencing factors related to the safety of Cassiae Semen. According to the findings,Cassia Semen's safety risks are mainly liver and kidney system damages, with the main clinical features of fatigue, anorexia, disgusting of oil, yellow urine and gray stool; digestive system injury, with the main clinical features of diarrhea, abdominal distension, nausea and loose stool; reproductive system damage, with the main clinical features of vaginal bleeding. Allergic reactions and clinical adverse events, with the main clinical features for numb mouth, itching skin, nausea and vomiting, diarrhea, wheezing and lip cyanosis were also reported. The toxicological studies on toxic components of Cassiae Semen obtusifolia were carried out through acute toxicity test, subacute toxicity test, subchronic toxicity test and chronic toxicity test. Risk factors might include patients, compatibility and physicians. Physicians should strictly abide by the medication requirements in the Pharmacopoeia, pay attention to rational compatibility, appropriate dosage,correct usage and appropriate processing, control the dosage below 15 g to avoid excessive intake, strictly control the course of treatment to avoid accumulated poisoning caused by long-term administration. At the same time, clinicians should pay attention to the latest research progress, update the knowledge structure, quickly find the latest and useful materials from clinical practice, scientific research and drug information and other literatures, make evaluation and judgment for the materials, establish a traditional Chinese medicine intelligence information library, and strengthen the control over

  11. Transportation Safety Excellence in Operations Through Improved Transportation Safety Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; MAL

    2007-01-01

    A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC. This accomplishment supported excellence in operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport costs; and making facility operations more efficient. The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers. Previously, the TSD did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums. Previous practice was to package the waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations. This practice allowed operations to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations friendly. An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were used effectively to directly support excellence in operations. Several factors contributed to the success of MFC's effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities. (1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to better integrate nuclear safety

  12. Quality control guarantees the safety of radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aaltonen, P.

    1994-01-01

    While radiotherapy equipment has seen some decisive improvements in the last few decades, the technology has also become more complicated. The advanced equipment produces increasingly good treatment results, but the condition of the equipment must be controlled efficiently so as to eliminate any defects that might jeopardise patient safety. The quality assurance measures that are taken to show that certain equipment functions as required are known as quality control. The advanced equipment and stricter requirements set for the precision of radiotherapy have meant that more attention must be paid to quality control. The present radiation legislation stipulates that radiotherapy equipment must undergo regular quality control. The implementation of the quality control is supervised by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK). Hospitals carry out quality control in accordance with a programme approved by STUK, and STUK inspectors periodically visit hospitals to check the results of quality control. (orig.)

  13. Safety evaluation of accident-tolerant FCM fueled core with SiC-coated zircalloy cladding for design-basis-accidents and beyond DBAs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chun, Ji-Han, E-mail: chunjh@kaeri.re.kr; Lim, Sung-Won; Chung, Bub-Dong; Lee, Won-Jae

    2015-08-15

    Highlights: • Thermal conductivity model of the FCM fuel was developed and adopted in the MARS. • Scoping analysis for candidate FCM FAs was performed to select feasible FA. • Preliminary safety criteria for FCM fuel and SiC/Zr cladding were set up. • Enhanced safety margin and accident tolerance for FCM-SiC/Zr core were demonstrated. - Abstract: The FCM fueled cores proposed as an accident tolerant concept is assessed against the design-basis-accident (DBA) and the beyond-DBA (BDBA) scenarios using MARS code. A thermal conductivity model of FCM fuel is incorporated in the MARS code to take into account the effects of irradiation and temperature that was recently measured by ORNL. Preliminary analyses regarding the initial stored energy and accident tolerant performance were carried out for the scoping of various cladding material candidates. A 16 × 16 FA with SiC-coated Zircalloy cladding was selected as the feasible conceptual design through a preliminary scoping analysis. For a selected design, safety analyses for DBA and BDBA scenarios were performed to demonstrate the accident tolerance of the FCM fueled core. A loss of flow accident (LOFA) scenario was selected for a departure-from-nucleate-boiling (DNB) evaluation, and large-break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA) scenario for peak cladding temperature (PCT) margin evaluation. A control element assembly (CEA) ejection accident scenario was selected for peak fuel enthalpy and temperature. Moreover, a station blackout (SBO) and LBLOCA without a safety injection (SI) scenario were selected as a BDBA. It was demonstrated that the DBA safety margin of the FCM core is satisfied and the time for operator actions for BDBA s is evaluated.

  14. Improving safety through an integrated approach for advanced control room development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haugset, K.; Berg, O.; Bologna, S.; Foerdestroemmen, N.T.; Kvalem, J.; Nelson, W.R.; Yamane, N.

    1992-01-01

    With the fast development of computer technology, the potential exists for improving operational safety of nuclear plants by using advanced operator tools in the control room. Specific systems are being introduced, such as systems for alarm handling, failure detection, disturbance diagnosis, procedural advice and others, often based on process modeling techniques or expert system technology. To ensure a maximum benefit from the new technology, a careful integration of the various systems must, however, take place, resulting in a well coordinated interface between the operator and the process. The OECD Halden Reactor Project has started the development of an Integrated Surveillance And Control System (ISACS). The basis for the activity is the experience at Halden in developing specific Computerized Operator Support Systems (COSSs), and the activity around the experimental control room HAMMLAB where detailed validations of operator tools have been performed for a number of years. The first goal in the ISACS project is to have a first, limited prototype in operation at the end of 1990. Validation experiments will follow. (orig.)

  15. Improving safety through an integrated approach for advanced control room development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haugset, K.; Berg, O.; Foerdestroemmen, N.T.; Kvalem, J.; Nelson, W.R.

    1990-01-01

    With the fast development of computer technology, the potential exists for improving operational safety of nuclear plants by using advanced operator tools in the control room. Specific systems are being introduced, such as systems for alarm handling, failure detection, disturbance diagnosis, procedural advice and others, often based on process modeling techniques or expert system technology. To ensure a maximum benefit from the new technology, a careful integration of the various systems must, however, take place, resulting in a well coordinated interface between the operator and the process. The OECD Halden Reactor Project has started the development of an Integrated Surveillance And Control System (ISACS). The basis for the activity is the experience at Halden in developing specific Computerized Operator Support Systems (COSSs), and the activity around the experimental control room HAMMLAB where detailed validations of operator tools have been performed for a number of years. The first goal in the ISACS project is to have a first, limited prototype in operation at the end of 1990. Validation experiments will follow

  16. SAFETY: STRICTER CONTROLS IN CONTROLLED AREAS IN THE PS

    CERN Multimedia

    G. Daems

    2001-01-01

    The PS accelerators will soon stop for several months. Work will take place in controlled areas in the PS and will involve many people who are not always aware of the risks associated with the work sites. To guarentee the safety of these workers, the following two measures will be applied: everyone working in a controlled zone - Linacs, PSB, and PS machines tunnels, and transfer lines - must wear, visibly, his CERN access card and his film badge. the CERN access card and the film badge will only be issued after following a basic safety course. Regular checks will be carried out during the shutdown. Anyone without these two items on their person will be obliged to leave the area immediately.

  17. The Safety Case and Safety Assessment for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-09-15

    This Safety Guide provides guidance and recommendations on meeting the safety requirements in respect of the safety case and supporting safety assessment for the disposal of radioactive waste. The safety case and supporting safety assessment provide the basis for demonstration of safety and for licensing of radioactive waste disposal facilities and assist and guide decisions on siting, design and operations. The safety case is also the main basis on which dialogue with interested parties is conducted and on which confidence in the safety of the disposal facility is developed. This Safety Guide is relevant for operating organizations preparing the safety case as well as for the regulatory body responsible for developing the regulations and regulatory guidance that determine the basis and scope of the safety case. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Demonstrating the safety of radioactive waste disposal; 3. Safety principles and safety requirements; 4. The safety case for disposal of radioactive waste; 5. Radiological impact assessment for the period after closure; 6. Specific issues; 7. Documentation and use of the safety case; 8. Regulatory review process.

  18. Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 1999

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tossavainen, K. [ed.

    2000-06-01

    This report concerns the regulatory control of nuclear energy in Finland in 1999. Its submission to the Ministry of Trade and Industry by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is stipulated in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. STUK's regulatory work was focused on the operation of the Finnish nuclear power plants as well as on nuclear waste management and safeguards of nuclear materials. The operation of the Finnish nuclear power plants was in compliance with the conditions set out in their operating licences and with current regulations, with the exception of some inadvertent deviations from the Technical Specifications. No plant events endangering the safe use of nuclear energy occurred. The individual doses of all nuclear power plant workers remained below the dose threshold. The collective dose of the workers was low, compared internationally, and did not exceed STUK's guidelines at either nuclear power plant. The radioactive releases were minor and the dose calculated on their basis for the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant was well below the limit established in a decision of the Council of State at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. STUK issued statements to the Ministry of Trade and Industry about the environmental impact assessment programme reports on the possible nuclear power plant projects at Olkiluoto and Loviisa and about the continued operation of the research reactor in Otaniemi, Espoo. A Y2k-related safety assessment of the Finnish nuclear power plants was completed in December. In nuclear waste management STUK's regulatory work was focused on spent fuel storage and final disposal plans as well as on the treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor waste. No events occurred in nuclear waste management that would have endangered safety. A statement was issued to the Ministry of Trade and Industry about an environmental impact assessment report on a proposed final

  19. Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 1999

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tossavainen, K.

    2000-06-01

    This report concerns the regulatory control of nuclear energy in Finland in 1999. Its submission to the Ministry of Trade and Industry by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is stipulated in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. STUK's regulatory work was focused on the operation of the Finnish nuclear power plants as well as on nuclear waste management and safeguards of nuclear materials. The operation of the Finnish nuclear power plants was in compliance with the conditions set out in their operating licences and with current regulations, with the exception of some inadvertent deviations from the Technical Specifications. No plant events endangering the safe use of nuclear energy occurred. The individual doses of all nuclear power plant workers remained below the dose threshold. The collective dose of the workers was low, compared internationally, and did not exceed STUK's guidelines at either nuclear power plant. The radioactive releases were minor and the dose calculated on their basis for the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant was well below the limit established in a decision of the Council of State at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. STUK issued statements to the Ministry of Trade and Industry about the environmental impact assessment programme reports on the possible nuclear power plant projects at Olkiluoto and Loviisa and about the continued operation of the research reactor in Otaniemi, Espoo. A Y2k-related safety assessment of the Finnish nuclear power plants was completed in December. In nuclear waste management STUK's regulatory work was focused on spent fuel storage and final disposal plans as well as on the treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor waste. No events occurred in nuclear waste management that would have endangered safety. A statement was issued to the Ministry of Trade and Industry about an environmental impact assessment report on a proposed final disposal facility for

  20. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Safety criteria for ferrocyanide watch list tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Postma, A.K.; Meacham, J.E.; Barney, G.S.

    1994-01-01

    This report provides a technical basis for closing the ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) at the Hanford Site. Three work efforts were performed in developing this technical basis. The efforts described herein are: 1. The formulation of criteria for ranking the relative safety of waste in each ferrocyanide tank. 2. The current classification of tanks into safety categories by comparing available information on tank contents with the safety criteria; 3. The identification of additional information required to resolve the ferrocyanide safety issue

  1. Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Technical Basis Guide Describing How to Perform Safety Margin Configuration Risk Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Curtis Smith; James Knudsen; Bentley Harwood

    2013-08-01

    The INL has carried out a demonstration of the RISMC approach for the purpose of configuration risk management. We have shown how improved accuracy and realism can be achieved by simulating changes in risk – as a function of different configurations – in order to determine safety margins as the plant is modified. We described the various technical issues that play a role in these configuration-based calculations with the intent that future applications can take advantage of the analysis benefits while avoiding some of the technical pitfalls that are found for these types of calculations. Specific recommendations have been provided on a variety of topics aimed at improving the safety margin analysis and strengthening the technical basis behind the analysis process.

  2. radiation safety culture for developing country: Basis for s minimum operational radiation protection programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rozental, J. J.

    1997-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to present a methodology for an integrated strategy aiming at establishing an adequate radiation Safety infrastructure for developing countries, non major power reactor programme. Its implementation will allow these countries, about 50% of the IAEA's Member States, to improve marginal radiation safety, specially to those recipients of technical assistance and do not meet the Minimum radiation Safety Requirements of the IAEA's Basic Safety Standards for radiation protection Progress in the implementation of safety regulations depends on the priority of the government and its understanding and conviction about the basic requirements for protection against the risks associated with exposure to ionizing radiation. There is no doubt to conclude that the reasons for the deficiency of sources control and dose limitation are related to the lack of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework, specially considering the establishment of an adequate legislation; A minimum legal infrastructure; A minimum operational radiation safety programme; Alternatives for a Point of Optimum Contact, to avoid overlap and conflict, that is: A 'Memorandum of Understanding' among Regulatory Authorities in the Country, dealing with similar type of licensing and inspection

  3. A holistic strategy for quality and safety control of traditional Chinese medicines by the "iVarious" standard system.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Anzhen; Sun, Lei; Yuan, Hang; Wu, Aiying; Lu, Jingguang; Ma, Shuangcheng

    2017-10-01

    An effective quality control system is the key to ensuring the quality, safety and efficacy of traditional Chinese medicines (TCMs). However, the current quality standard research lacks the top-design and systematic design, mostly based on specific technologies or evaluation methods. To resolve the challenges and questions of quality control of TCMs, a brand-new quality standard system, named "iVarious", was proposed. The system comprises eight elements in a modular format. Meaning of every element was specifically illustrated via corresponding research instances. Furthermore, frankincense study was taken as an example for demonstrating standards and research process, based on the "iVarious" system. This system highlighted a holistic strategy for effectiveness, security, integrity and systematization of quality and safety control standards of TCMs. The establishment of "iVarious" integrates multi-disciplinary technologies and progressive methods, basis elements and key points of standard construction. The system provides a novel idea and technological demonstration for regulation establishment of TCMs quality standards.

  4. Safety assessment as basis for the decision making process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilie, P.; Didita, L.; Danchiv, A.

    2005-01-01

    This paper deals with the safety assessment for a new near surface repository, particularly for the early stage of repository development using ISAM (Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities) safety assessment methodology. In this stage of the repository life cycle the main purpose of the safety assessment is to demonstrate that the plant is capable to be constructed and operated safely. The paper is based on development of the ASAM (Application of the Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near-Surface Disposal Facilities) Decision Support Subgroup of the Common Aspects Working Group. The implications of decision making for the application of the ISAM methodology on post-closure safety assessment are analysed. Some important elements of the decision-making process with impact on key components of the ISAM process are described. Following the development of Decision Support Subgroup of the ASAM Common Aspects Working Group the proposed change of ISAM methodology is analysed. This approach puts all activities in a decision context where the first iteration of the safety assessment is based on the existing state of knowledge and the initial engineering design. Confidence in the process is accomplished through the direct inclusion of all decision makers and stakeholders in the formulation of decisions, the definition of the state of knowledge, and decision making activities. The decision process is developed in context of undertaking assessments with little site-specific information, this situation is specifically for new planned repository. Limited site-specific information can result in a high degree of uncertainty, therefore it is important first of all to identify the sources of uncertainty arising from the limited nature of the site-specific information and then to apply appropriate approaches to manage the uncertainties and to determine whether the uncertainties are important to the overall safety of the disposal facility

  5. Operation safety of control systems. Principles and methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aubry, J.F.; Chatelet, E.

    2008-01-01

    This article presents the main operation safety methods that can be implemented to design safe control systems taking into account the behaviour of the different components with each other (binary 'operation/failure' behaviours, non-consistent behaviours and 'hidden' failures, dynamical behaviours and temporal aspects etc). To take into account these different behaviours, advanced qualitative and quantitative methods have to be used which are described in this article: 1 - qualitative methods of analysis: functional analysis, preliminary risk analysis, failure mode and failure effects analyses; 2 - quantitative study of systems operation safety: binary representation models, state space-based methods, event space-based methods; 3 - application to the design of control systems: safe specifications of a control system, qualitative analysis of operation safety, quantitative analysis, example of application; 4 - conclusion. (J.S.)

  6. Design of reactor containment systems for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It is a revision of the Safety Guide on Design of the Reactor Containment Systems in Nuclear Power Plants (Safety Series No. 50-Sg-D1) issued in 1985 and supplements the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. The present Safety Guide was prepared on the basis of a systematic review of the relevant publications, including the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, the Safety fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations, Safety Guides, INSAG Reports, a Technical Report and other publications covering the safety of nuclear power plants. 1.2. The confinement of radioactive material in a nuclear plant, including the control of discharges and the minimization of releases, is a fundamental safety function to be ensured in normal operational modes, for anticipated operational occurrences, in design basis accidents and, to the extent practicable, in selected beyond design basis accidents. In accordance with the concept of defence in depth, this fundamental safety function is achieved by means of several barriers and levels of defence. In most designs, the third and fourth levels of defence are achieved mainly by means of a strong structure enveloping the nuclear reactor. This structure is called the 'containment structure' or simply the 'containment'. This definition also applies to double wall containments. 1.3. The containment structure also protects the reactor against external events and provides radiation shielding in operational states and accident conditions. The containment structure and its associated systems with the functions of isolation, energy management, and control of radionuclides and combustible gases are referred to as the containment systems

  7. Design of reactor containment systems for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It is a revision of the Safety Guide on Design of the Reactor Containment Systems in Nuclear Power Plants (Safety Series No. 50-Sg-D1) issued in 1985 and supplements the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. The present Safety Guide was prepared on the basis of a systematic review of the relevant publications, including the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, the Safety fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations, Safety Guides, INSAG Reports, a Technical Report and other publications covering the safety of nuclear power plants. 1.2. The confinement of radioactive material in a nuclear plant, including the control of discharges and the minimization of releases, is a fundamental safety function to be ensured in normal operational modes, for anticipated operational occurrences, in design basis accidents and, to the extent practicable, in selected beyond design basis accidents. In accordance with the concept of defence in depth, this fundamental safety function is achieved by means of several barriers and levels of defence. In most designs, the third and fourth levels of defence are achieved mainly by means of a strong structure enveloping the nuclear reactor. This structure is called the 'containment structure' or simply the 'containment'. This definition also applies to double wall containments. 1.3. The containment structure also protects the reactor against external events and provides radiation shielding in operational states and accident conditions. The containment structure and its associated systems with the functions of isolation, energy management, and control of radionuclides and combustible gases are referred to as the containment systems

  8. 76 FR 35130 - Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management/Human Factors

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-16

    ...: Control Room Management/Human Factors AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration... the Control Room Management/Human Factors regulations in order to realize the safety benefits sooner... FR 5536). By this amendment to the Control Room Management/Human Factors (CRM) rule, an operator must...

  9. Common basis of establishing safety standards and other safety decision-making levels for different sources of health risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Demin, V.F.

    2002-01-01

    Current approaches in establishing safety standards and other decision-making levels for different sources of health risk are critically analysed. To have a common basis for this decision-making a specific risk index R is recommended. In the common sense R is quantitatively defined as LLE caused by the annual exposure to the risk source considered: R = annual exposure, damage (LLE) from the exposure unit. This common definition is also rewritten in specific forms for a set of different risk sources (ionising radiation, chemical pollutants, etc): for different risk sources the exposure can be measured with different quantities (the probability of death, the exposure dose, etc.). R is relative LLE: LLE in years referred to 1 year under the risk. The dimension of this value is [year/year]. In the statistical sense R is conditionally the share of the year, which is lost due to exposure to a risk source during this year. In this sense R can be called as the relative damage. Really lifetime years are lost after the exposure. R can be in some conditional sense considered as a dimensionless quantity. General safety standards R n for the public and occupational workers have been suggested in terms of this index: R n = 0.0007 and 0.01 accordingly. Secondary safety standards are derived for a number of risk sources (ionising radiation, environmental chemical pollutants, etc). Values of R n are chosen in such a way that to have the secondary radiation BSS being equivalent to the current one's. Other general and derived levels for safety decision-making are also proposed including the de-minimus levels. Their possible dependence on the national or regional health-demographic data (HDD) is considered. Such issues as the ways of the integration and averaging of risk indices considered through the national or regional HDD for different risk sources and the use of non-threshold linear exposure - response relationships for ionising radiation and chemical pollutants are analysed

  10. Assessment of the long-term safety of repositories. Scientific basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noseck, Ulrich; Becker, Dirk; Fahrenholz, Christine

    2008-12-01

    The project contributed to increase the scientific knowledge on the long-term safety assessment and the safety cases of a radioactive waste repository. International guidelines and more recent safety cases from other countries were evaluated. The feasibility study of the three safety indicators ''individual dose rate'', ''radiotoxicity concentration in the biosphere water'' and ''radiotoxicity flux from the geosphere'' showed that due to the independently derived corresponding reference values these indicators describe three different safety statements. The combination of the three values can give a stronger argument for the safety of the repository system. Another important methodological aspect of the safety cases is the definition and selection of scenarios, one of these the human intrusion scenario. Various human intrusion scenarios are considered in the different nations, which differ significantly with respect to type and time scale, the exposition type and exposition pathway. Further progress has been achieved in how to treat human intrusion scenarios in a German post-closure safety case. Another port of the project dealt with the impact of specific geochemical processes on the long-term safety of the repository. The impact of climate changes on the long-term safety of a radioactive waste repository in rock salt was investigated with respect to processes in the overburden and the biosphere where highest impact is expected. Sofa simplified models and only discrete climate estates have been considered

  11. 75 FR 69648 - Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-15

    ... interpretative posture weakens the safety structure the rule is designed to hold firmly in place. 10 CFR Part 830... Basis Documents, and notes that the Safety Basis Approval Authority may prescribe interim controls and... managers ``are expected to carefully evaluate situations that fall short of expectations and only provide...

  12. 75 FR 74022 - Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-30

    ... posture weakens the safety structure the rule is designed to hold firmly in place. 10 CFR Part 830 imposes... Basis Documents, and notes that the Safety Basis Approval Authority may prescribe interim controls and... managers ``are expected to carefully evaluate situations that fall short of expectations and only provide...

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  15. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  16. Development of embedded Control System for Control and Safety Rod Drive Mechanisms (CSRDMs) of PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kameswari, K.; Palanisami, K.; Thirugnana Murthy, D.; Murali, N.; Satyamurty, S.A.V.

    2013-01-01

    Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), a 500 MWe, Sodium cooled, fast breeder reactor is nearing completion at Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu. PFBR has two independent, fast acting and diverse shutdown systems, one with nine Control and Safety Rods (CSRs) and another with three Diverse Safety Rods (DSRs), with independent driving mechanisms called CSRDMs and DSRDMs respectively. This paper deals with the development of Real Time Computer based Control system for controlling nine CSRDMs with model based software development environment - SCADE (Safety Critical Application Development Environment). (author)

  17. The power of simplification: Operator interface with the AP1000R during design-basis and beyond design-basis events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, M. G.; Mouser, M. R.; Simon, J. B.

    2012-01-01

    The AP1000 R plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and cost. The passive safety features are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC. The AP1000 passive safety features achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of a design-basis accident for 72 hours without need for operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the European Utility Requirements and the Utility Requirement Document for passive plants. Limited operator actions may be required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool (SFP) via passive means. This safety approach therefore minimizes the reliance on operator action for accident mitigation, and this paper examines the operator interaction with the Human-System Interface (HSI) as the severity of an accident increases from an anticipated transient to a design basis accident and finally, to a beyond-design-basis event. The AP1000 Control Room design provides an extremely effective environment for addressing the first 72 hours of design-basis events and transients, providing ease of information dissemination and minimal reliance upon operator actions. Symptom-based procedures including Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) are used to mitigate design basis transients and accidents. Use of the Computerized Procedure System (CPS) aids the operators during mitigation of the event. The CPS provides cues and direction to the operators as the event progresses. If the event becomes progressively worse or lasts longer than 72 hours, and depending upon the nature of failures that may have occurred, minimal operator actions may be required outside of the control room in areas that have been designed to be accessible using components that have been designed

  18. Radiological safety and control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chang, Sea Young; Yoo, Y S; Lee, J C; Lee, T Y; Lee, J L; Kim, B W; Lee, B J; Chung, K K; Chung, R I; Kim, J S; Lee, H S; Han, Y D; Lee, J I; Lee, K C; Yoon, J H; Sul, C W; Kim, C K; Yoon, K S; Seo, K W; Yoon, Y C [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1996-01-01

    This report describes the annual results of radiological safety and control program of 1995. This program consists of working area monitoring including HANARO, personnel radiation monitoring, education for radiation protection. As a result, the objectives of radiation protection have been achieved satisfactorily through the activities mentioned above. Also, the calibration services were provided to insure accurate radiation measurement in the radiation working places. 21 figs., 39 tabs., 5 refs. (Author) .new.

  19. Selecting Optimal Control Portfolios to Improve Army Aviation Safety

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Shelton, Sarah

    2001-01-01

    .... The Safety Center chartered the Aviation Safety Investment Strategy Team to evaluate accidents to determine their hazards, or contributing conditions, and their controls, or reduction measures...

  20. Radiobiological basis for setting neutron radiation safety standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Straume, T.

    1985-01-01

    Present neutron standards, adopted more than 20 yr ago from a weak radiobiological data base, have been in doubt for a number of years and are currently under challenge. Moreover, recent dosimetric re-evaluations indicate that Hiroshima neutron doses may have been much lower than previously thought, suggesting that direct data for neutron-induced cancer in humans may in fact not be available. These recent developments make it urgent to determine the extent to which neutron cancer risk in man can be estimated from data that are available. Two approaches are proposed here that are anchored in particularly robust epidemiological and experimental data and appear most likely to provide reliable estimates of neutron cancer risk in man. The first approach uses gamma-ray dose-response relationships for human carcinogenesis, available from Nagasaki (Hiroshima data are also considered), together with highly characterized neutron and gamma-ray data for human cytogenetics. When tested against relevant experimental data, this approach either adequately predicts or somewhat overestimates neutron tumorigenesis (and mutagenesis) in animals. The second approach also uses the Nagasaki gamma-ray cancer data, but together with neutron RBEs from animal tumorigenesis studies. Both approaches give similar results and provide a basis for setting neutron radiation safety standards. They appear to be an improvement over previous approaches, including those that rely on highly uncertain maximum neutron RBEs and unnecessary extrapolations of gamma-ray data to very low doses. Results suggest that, at the presently accepted neutron dose limit of 0.5 rad/yr, the cancer mortality risk to radiation workers is not very different from accidental mortality risks to workers in various nonradiation occupations

  1. Information about the control of nuclear safety in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerster, D.

    1994-01-01

    The permanent objective of the French Nuclear Safety Authority is the public information about technical controls performed in French nuclear installations. Three publications from the DSIN (Direction of Nuclear Installations Safety) are devoted to this effort: the MAGNUC Minitel magazine, the annual activity report and the CONTROLE magazine. Details about the content of these publications are given. A large part of the information about control of nuclear safety concerns the incidents and accidents and their importance level. A seriousness scale was created in France at the beginning of 1988 and replaced in April 1994 by the very similar International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). Explanation of this scale is given and illustrated with examples of real events and accidents. However, international comparison between incidents and accidents remains delicate because the detailed content of safety reports can change significantly from one country to another. (J.S.). 1 fig

  2. Analysis of Electrical Safety Conditions Taking into Account Soil Conductivity Determined on the Basis of Fuzzy Logic

    OpenAIRE

    Manusov, V.Z.; Zaytseva, N.M.

    2017-01-01

    The goal of this work is to prove a possibility of determining soil parameters that influence its conductivity being the basis of grounding, step voltage and touch voltage calculation. This in its turn increases the safety level of electric equipment operation. The article is devoted to development of new, no conventional models of soil conductivity using the theory of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic. The description of the solution includes the following sections: fuzzy models of specific electri...

  3. A holistic strategy for quality and safety control of traditional Chinese medicines by the “iVarious” standard system

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anzhen Chen

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available An effective quality control system is the key to ensuring the quality, safety and efficacy of traditional Chinese medicines (TCMs. However, the current quality standard research lacks the top-design and systematic design, mostly based on specific technologies or evaluation methods. To resolve the challenges and questions of quality control of TCMs, a brand-new quality standard system, named “iVarious”, was proposed. The system comprises eight elements in a modular format. Meaning of every element was specifically illustrated via corresponding research instances. Furthermore, frankincense study was taken as an example for demonstrating standards and research process, based on the “iVarious” system. This system highlighted a holistic strategy for effectiveness, security, integrity and systematization of quality and safety control standards of TCMs. The establishment of “iVarious” integrates multi-disciplinary technologies and progressive methods, basis elements and key points of standard construction. The system provides a novel idea and technological demonstration for regulation establishment of TCMs quality standards.

  4. OSR encapsulation basis -- 100-KW

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meichle, R.H.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide the basis for a change in the Operations Safety Requirement (OSR) encapsulated fuel storage requirements in the 105 KW fuel storage basin which will permit the handling and storing of encapsulated fuel in canisters which no longer have a water-free space in the top of the canister. The scope of this report is limited to providing the change from the perspective of the safety envelope (bases) of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and Operations Safety Requirements (OSR). It does not change the encapsulation process itself

  5. Approach to developing a ground-motion design basis for facilities important to safety at Yucca Mountain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, J.L.

    1990-01-01

    This paper discusses a methodology for developing a ground-motion design basis for prospective facilities at Yucca Mountain that are important to safety. The methodology utilizes a guasi-deterministic construct called the 10,000-year cumulative-slip earthquake that is designed to provide a conservative, robust, and reproducible estimate of ground motion that has a one-in-ten chance of occurring during the preclosure period. This estimate is intended to define a ground-motion level for which the seismic design would ensure minimal disruption to operations engineering analyses to ensure safe performance are included

  6. Verification of BGA type FPGA logic applied to a control equipment with Safety Class using the special socket

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chung, YounHu; Yoo, Kwanwoo; Lee, Myeongkyun; Yun, Donghwa

    2015-01-01

    This article aims to provide the verification method for BGA-type FPGA of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) developed as Safety Class. The logic of FPGA in the control device with Safety Class is the circuit to control overall logic of PLC. This device converts to the different module from the input signals for both digital and analogue of the equipment in the field and outputs their data. In addition, it should perform the logical controls such as backplane communication control and data communication. We suggest acquiring method of the data signal with efficient logic using the socket in this article. Proposed test socket is made by simpler process than former one, and the process is done in batches by which cost can be reduces, and the test socket can be quickly produced in response to any request. Also, it is possible to reduce the wear by reducing the contact force of the ball phenomenon. The structure on the basis of silicon can be reduced the modification, and it has excellent linearity. At the logic verification, the operation that state data block is designed in the FPGA could be easily confirmed by using a socket

  7. 29 CFR 1975.2 - Basis of authority.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... Relating to Labor (Continued) OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (CONTINUED) COVERAGE OF EMPLOYERS UNDER THE WILLIAMS-STEIGER OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 § 1975.2 Basis... Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, is derived mainly from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution...

  8. A risk-informed framework for establishing a beyond design basis safety basis for external hazards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Amico, P. [Hughes Associates, Inc, Baltimore, MD (United States); Anoba, R. [Hughes Associates, Inc, Raleigh, NC (United States); Najafi, B. [Hughes Associates, Inc., Los Gatos, CA (United States)

    2014-07-01

    The events at Fukushima Daiichi taught us that meeting a deterministic design basis requirement for external hazards does not assure that the risk is low. As observed at the plant, the two primary reasons for this are failure cliffs above the design basis event and that combined hazard effects are not considered in design. Because the possible combinations of design basis exceedences and external hazard combinations are very large and complex, an approach focusing only on the most important ones is needed. For this reason, a risk informed approach is the most effective approach, which is discussed in this paper. (author)

  9. The Argentine Approach to Radiation Safety: Its Ethical Basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gonzalez, A.J.

    2011-01-01

    The ethical bases of Argentina's radiation safety approach are reviewed. The applied principles are those recommended and established internationally, namely: the principle of justification of decisions that alters the radiation exposure situation; the principle of optimization of protection and safety; the principle of individual protection for restricting possible inequitable outcomes of optimized safety; and the implicit principle of inter generational prudence for protection future generations and the habitat. The principles are compared vis-a-vis the prevalent ethical doctrines: justification vis-a-vis teleology; optimization vis-a-vis utilitarianism; individual protection vis-a-vis de ontology; and, inter generational prudence vis-a-vis aretaicism (or virtuosity). The application of the principles and their ethics in Argentina is analysed. These principles are applied to All exposure to radiation harm; namely, to exposures to actual doses and to exposures to actual risk and potential doses, including those related to the safety of nuclear installations, and they are harmonized and applied in conjunction. It is concluded that building a bridge among all available ethical doctrines and applying it to radiation safety against actual doses and actual risk and potential doses is at the roots of the successful nuclear regulatory experience in Argentina.

  10. Patient safety and infection control: bases for curricular integration.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Silva, Andréa Mara Bernardes da; Bim, Lucas Lazarini; Bim, Felipe Lazarini; Sousa, Alvaro Francisco Lopes; Domingues, Pedro Castania Amadio; Nicolussi, Adriana Cristina; Andrade, Denise de

    2018-05-01

    To analyze curricular integration between teaching of patient safety and good infection prevention and control practices. Integrative review, designed to answer the question: "How does curricular integration of content about 'patient safety teaching' and content about 'infection prevention and control practices' occur in undergraduate courses in the health field?". The following databases were searched for primary studies: CINAHL, LILACS, ScienceDirect, Web of Science, Scopus, Europe PMC and MEDLINE. The final sample consisted of 13 studies. After content analysis, primary studies were grouped into two subject categories: "Innovative teaching practices" and "Curricular evaluation. Patient safety related to infection prevention and control practices is present in the curriculum of health undergraduate courses, but is not coordinated with other themes, is taught sporadically, and focuses mainly on hand hygiene.

  11. The power of simplification: Operator interface with the AP1000{sup R} during design-basis and beyond design-basis events

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, M. G.; Mouser, M. R.; Simon, J. B. [Westinghouse Electric Company, 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (United States)

    2012-07-01

    The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and cost. The passive safety features are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC. The AP1000 passive safety features achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of a design-basis accident for 72 hours without need for operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the European Utility Requirements and the Utility Requirement Document for passive plants. Limited operator actions may be required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool (SFP) via passive means. This safety approach therefore minimizes the reliance on operator action for accident mitigation, and this paper examines the operator interaction with the Human-System Interface (HSI) as the severity of an accident increases from an anticipated transient to a design basis accident and finally, to a beyond-design-basis event. The AP1000 Control Room design provides an extremely effective environment for addressing the first 72 hours of design-basis events and transients, providing ease of information dissemination and minimal reliance upon operator actions. Symptom-based procedures including Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) are used to mitigate design basis transients and accidents. Use of the Computerized Procedure System (CPS) aids the operators during mitigation of the event. The CPS provides cues and direction to the operators as the event progresses. If the event becomes progressively worse or lasts longer than 72 hours, and depending upon the nature of failures that may have occurred, minimal operator actions may be required outside of the control room in areas that have been designed to be accessible using components that have been

  12. Operating experience and systems analysis at Trillo NPP: A program intended for systematic review of plant safety systems to assess design basis requirements compliance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vega, R. de la

    1996-01-01

    The program was defined to apply to all plant safety systems and/or systems included in plant Technical Specifications. The goal of the program was to ensure, by systematic design, construction, and commissioning review, the adequacy of safety systems, structures and components to fulfill their safety functions. Also, as a result of the program, it was established that a complete, unambiguous, systematic, design basis definition shall take place. And finally, a complete documental review of the plant design shall result from the program execution

  13. The enhancement of Ignalina NPP in design and operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Negrivoda, G.

    1999-01-01

    Enhancement of Ignalina NPP design include: core design improvements; fuel channel integrity (multiple pressure tube rupture); improvements of shutdown systems; improvements of instrumentation and control devices; containment strength and tightness; design basis accident analysis; improvements of safety and support systems; seismic safety enhancement; Year 2000 project; cracks in pipes. Enhancement of operational safety includes: quality assurance; configuration management; safety management and safety culture; emergency operating procedures; training and full scope simulator; in-service inspection; fire protection and ageing monitoring and management

  14. A new radiation safety control system for Ganil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saint Jores, P. De; Luong, T.T.; Martina, L.; Vega, G.

    1991-01-01

    A second generation radiation safety control system has been installed to upgrade the initial system which was not flexible enough to support new ion beams and new experimental conditions required by the accelerator operation. The main reasons which necessitated the improvement of the safety control system are presented. The new system which controls the Ganil accelerator from the first quarter of 1990 is described. It uses a star structured architecture, VME standard processors and front-end modules activated by pDOS operating system and high level language (C and Fortran) tasks, associated with enhanced resolution color displays for real time synoptics. (R.P.) 4 refs., 4 figs

  15. System and software safety analysis for the ERA control computer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beerthuizen, P.G.; Kruidhof, W.

    2001-01-01

    The European Robotic Arm (ERA) is a seven degrees of freedom relocatable anthropomorphic robotic manipulator system, to be used in manned space operation on the International Space Station, supporting the assembly and external servicing of the Russian segment. The safety design concept and implementation of the ERA is described, in particular with respect to the central computer's software design. A top-down analysis and specification process is used to down flow the safety aspects of the ERA system towards the subsystems, which are produced by a consortium of companies in many countries. The user requirements documents and the critical function list are the key documents in this process. Bottom-up analysis (FMECA) and test, on both subsystem and system level, are the basis for safety verification. A number of examples show the use of the approach and methods used

  16. UAV Control on the Basis of 3D Landmark Bearing-Only Observations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Karpenko, Simon; Konovalenko, Ivan; Miller, Alexander; Miller, Boris; Nikolaev, Dmitry

    2015-11-27

    The article presents an approach to the control of a UAV on the basis of 3D landmark observations. The novelty of the work is the usage of the 3D RANSAC algorithm developed on the basis of the landmarks' position prediction with the aid of a modified Kalman-type filter. Modification of the filter based on the pseudo-measurements approach permits obtaining unbiased UAV position estimation with quadratic error characteristics. Modeling of UAV flight on the basis of the suggested algorithm shows good performance, even under significant external perturbations.

  17. [Infection control and safety culture in German hospitals].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hansen, Sonja; Schwab, Frank; Gropmann, Alexander; Behnke, Michael; Gastmeier, Petra

    2016-07-01

    Healthcare-associated infections (HAI) are the most frequent adverse events in the healthcare setting and their prevention is an important contribution to patient safety in hospitals. To analyse to what extent safety cultural aspects with relevance to infection control are implemented in German hospitals. Safety cultural aspects of infection control were surveyed with an online questionnaire; data were analysed descriptively. Data from 543 hospitals with a median of [IQR] 275 [157; 453] beds were analysed. Almost all hospitals (96.6 %) had internal guidelines for infection control (IC) in place; 82 % defined IC objectives, most often regarding hand hygiene (HH) (93 %) and multidrug resistant organisms (72 %) and less frequently for antibiotic stewardship (48 %) or prevention of specific HAI. In 94 % of hospitals, a reporting system for adverse events was in place, which was also used to report low compliance with HH, outbreaks and Clostridium difficile-associated infections. Members of the IC team were most often seen to hold daily responsibility for IC in the hospital, but rarely other hospital staff (94 versus 19 %). Safety cultural aspects are not fully implemented in German hospitals. IC should be more strongly implemented in healthcare workers' daily routine and more visibly supported by hospital management.

  18. ELECTRONIC CONTROL FOR FUEL SUPPLY OF DIESEL ENGINE ON THE BASIS OF PROGRAMMABLE PID-REGULATOR

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    A. G. Bakhanovich

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The article presents a schematic diagram of the Euro-3 diesel engine electronic control and describes hard- and software platform of the high pressure fuel pump pneumatic actuator control that allows to realize the concept of electronic fuel supply control of diesel engine KamAZ-740. The strategic dependence beetwen the angular position of fuel pump governor lever and the angular position of electronic accelerator pedal were put on the basis of electronic control concept. Implementation of this dependence was carried out by applying a modulated PWM signal with determined duty cycle by the controller to the coil proportional solenoid valve, which is responsible for the amount of air pressure in the working chamber of the power air cylinder, connected by articulated-type to the governor lever of the high pressure fuel pump. In this case, the feedback control by position of governor lever of the high pressure fuel pump was introduced in the control circuit, but engine crankshaft speed control was carried out using a software continuous PID governor. Developed strategy gives possibility to track the deflection  of control parameter from a predetermined value by real-time and almost instantly, to make a control action on actuators to eliminate this deflection, while providing a minimum time of transition. Governor’s setting (proportional, integral and differential component performed empirically using the classical Ziegler – Nichols method, based on the analysis of the safety factor of automatic control system. The results of calculating the coefficients of proportional integral-differential regulator and oscillograms HIL experiment on testing the proposed diesel engine throttle control strategies using visualization CoDeSys V2.3 are given in activity.

  19. Toward risk assessment 2.0: Safety supervisory control and model-based hazard monitoring for risk-informed safety interventions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Favarò, Francesca M.; Saleh, Joseph H.

    2016-01-01

    Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a staple in the engineering risk community, and it has become to some extent synonymous with the entire quantitative risk assessment undertaking. Limitations of PRA continue to occupy researchers, and workarounds are often proposed. After a brief review of this literature, we propose to address some of PRA's limitations by developing a novel framework and analytical tools for model-based system safety, or safety supervisory control, to guide safety interventions and support a dynamic approach to risk assessment and accident prevention. Our work shifts the emphasis from the pervading probabilistic mindset in risk assessment toward the notions of danger indices and hazard temporal contingency. The framework and tools here developed are grounded in Control Theory and make use of the state-space formalism in modeling dynamical systems. We show that the use of state variables enables the definition of metrics for accident escalation, termed hazard levels or danger indices, which measure the “proximity” of the system state to adverse events, and we illustrate the development of such indices. Monitoring of the hazard levels provides diagnostic information to support both on-line and off-line safety interventions. For example, we show how the application of the proposed tools to a rejected takeoff scenario provides new insight to support pilots’ go/no-go decisions. Furthermore, we augment the traditional state-space equations with a hazard equation and use the latter to estimate the times at which critical thresholds for the hazard level are (b)reached. This estimation process provides important prognostic information and produces a proxy for a time-to-accident metric or advance notice for an impending adverse event. The ability to estimate these two hazard coordinates, danger index and time-to-accident, offers many possibilities for informing system control strategies and improving accident prevention and risk mitigation

  20. Assessment of Safety Standards for Automotive Electronic Control Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-06-01

    This report summarizes the results of a study that assessed and compared six industry and government safety standards relevant to the safety and reliability of automotive electronic control systems. These standards include ISO 26262 (Road Vehicles - ...

  1. Nuclear electric power safety, operation, and control aspects

    CERN Document Server

    Knowles, J Brian

    2013-01-01

    Assesses the engineering of renewable sources for commercial power generation and discusses the safety, operation, and control aspects of nuclear electric power From an expert who advised the European Commission and UK government in the aftermath of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl comes a book that contains experienced engineering assessments of the options for replacing the existing, aged, fossil-fired power stations with renewable, gas-fired, or nuclear plants. From geothermal, solar, and wind to tidal and hydro generation, Nuclear Electric Power: Safety, Operation, and Control Aspects ass

  2. Safety regulations concerning instrumentation and control systems for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    El-Shanshoury, A.I.

    2009-01-01

    A brief study on the safety and reliability issues related to instrumentation and control systems in nuclear reactor plants is performed. In response, technical and strategic issues are used to accomplish instrumentation and control systems safety. For technical issues there are ; systems aspects of digital I and C technology, software quality assurance, common-mode software, failure potential, safety and reliability assessment methods, and human factors and human machine interfaces. The strategic issues are the case-by-case licensing process and the adequacy of the technical infrastructure. The purpose of this work was to review the reliability of the safety systems related to these technical issues for research reactors

  3. Some safety considerations in laser-controlled thermonuclear reactors. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Botts, T.E.; Breton, D.; Chan, C.K.; Levy, S.I.; Sehnert, M.; Ullman, A.Z.

    1978-07-01

    A major objective of this study was to identify potential safety questions for laser controlled thermonuclear reactors. From the safety viewpoint, it does not appear that the actual laser controlled thermonuclear reactor conceptual designs present hazards very different than those of magnetically confined fusion reactors. Some aspects seem beneficial, such as small lithium inventories, and the absence of cryogenic devices, while other aspects are new, for example the explosion of pressure vessels and laser hazards themselves. Major aspects considered in this report include: (a) general safety considerations, (b) tritium inventories, (c) system behavior during loss of flow accidents, and (d) safety considerations of laser related penetrations

  4. Key issues on safety design basis selection and safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An, S.; Togo, Y.

    1976-01-01

    In current fast reactor design in Japan, four design accident conditions and four design seismic conditions are adopted as the design base classifications. These are classified by the considerations on both likelihood of occurrence and the severeness of the consequences. There are several major problem areas in safety design consideration such as core accident problems which include fuel sodium interaction, fuel failure propagation and residual decay heat removal, and decay heat removal systems problems which is more or less the problem of selection of appropriate system and of assurance of high reliability of the system. In view of licensing, two kinds of accidents are postulated in evaluating the adequacy of a reactor site. The one is the ''major accident'' which is the accident to give most severe radiation hazard to the public from technical point of view. The other is the ''hypothetical accident'', induced public accident of which is severer than that of major accident. While the concept of the former is rather unique to Japanese licensing, the latter is almost equivalent to design base hypothetical accident of the US practice. In this paper, design bases selections, key safety issues and some of the licensing considerations in Japan are described

  5. Automated safety control by video cameras

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Lefter, I.; Rothkrantz, L.; Somhorst, M.

    2012-01-01

    At this moment many surveillance systems are installed in public domains to control the safety of people and properties. They are constantly watched by human operators who are easily overloaded. To support the human operators, a surveillance system model is designed that detects suspicious behaviour

  6. Performance-oriented asymptotic tracking control of hydraulic systems with radial basis function network disturbance observer

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jian Hu

    2016-05-01

    Full Text Available Uncertainties, including parametric uncertainties and uncertain nonlinearities, always exist in positioning servo systems driven by a hydraulic actuator, which would degrade their tracking accuracy. In this article, an integrated control scheme, which combines adaptive robust control together with radial basis function neural network–based disturbance observer, is proposed for high-accuracy motion control of hydraulic systems. Not only parametric uncertainties but also uncertain nonlinearities (i.e. nonlinear friction, external disturbances, and/or unmodeled dynamics are taken into consideration in the proposed controller. The above uncertainties are compensated, respectively, by adaptive control and radial basis function neural network, which are ultimately integrated together by applying feedforward compensation technique, in which the global stabilization of the controller is ensured via a robust feedback path. A new kind of parameter and weight adaptation law is designed on the basis of Lyapunov stability theory. Furthermore, the proposed controller obtains an expected steady performance even if modeling uncertainties exist, and extensive simulation results in various working conditions have proven the high performance of the proposed control scheme.

  7. Control of Nuclear Materials and Special Equipment (Nuclear Safety Regulations)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cizmek, A.; Prah, M.; Medakovic, S.; Ilijas, B.

    2008-01-01

    Based on Nuclear Safety Act (OG 173/03) the State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) in 2008 adopted beside Ordinance on performing nuclear activities (OG 74/06) and Ordinance on special conditions for individual activities to be performed by expert organizations which perform activities in the area of nuclear safety (OG 74/06) the new Ordinance on the control of nuclear material and special equipment (OG 15/08). Ordinance on the control of nuclear material and special equipment lays down the list of nuclear materials and special equipment as well as of nuclear activities covered by the system of control of production of special equipment and non-nuclear material, the procedure for notifying the intention to and filing the application for a license to carry out nuclear activities, and the format and contents of the forms for doing so. This Ordinance also lays down the manner in which nuclear material records have to be kept, the procedure for notifying the State administration organization (regulatory body) responsible for nuclear safety by the nuclear material user, and the keeping of registers of nuclear activities, nuclear material and special equipment by the State administration organization (regulatory body) responsible for nuclear safety, as well as the form and content of official nuclear safety inspector identification card and badge.(author)

  8. Safety Metrics for Human-Computer Controlled Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leveson, Nancy G; Hatanaka, Iwao

    2000-01-01

    The rapid growth of computer technology and innovation has played a significant role in the rise of computer automation of human tasks in modem production systems across all industries. Although the rationale for automation has been to eliminate "human error" or to relieve humans from manual repetitive tasks, various computer-related hazards and accidents have emerged as a direct result of increased system complexity attributed to computer automation. The risk assessment techniques utilized for electromechanical systems are not suitable for today's software-intensive systems or complex human-computer controlled systems.This thesis will propose a new systemic model-based framework for analyzing risk in safety-critical systems where both computers and humans are controlling safety-critical functions. A new systems accident model will be developed based upon modem systems theory and human cognitive processes to better characterize system accidents, the role of human operators, and the influence of software in its direct control of significant system functions Better risk assessments will then be achievable through the application of this new framework to complex human-computer controlled systems.

  9. Reactivity control in HTR power plants with respect to passive safety system. Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barnert, H; Kugeler, K [Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH (Germany). Inst. fuer Sicherheitsforschung und Reaktortechnik

    1996-12-01

    The R and D and Demonstration of the High Temperature Reactor (HTR) is described in overview. The HTR-MODULE power plant, as the most advanced concept, is taken for the description of the reactivity control in general. The idea of the ``modularization of the core`` of the HTR has been developed as the answer on the experiences of the core melt accident at Three Miles Island. The HTR module has two shutdown systems: The ``6 rods``-system for hot shutdown at the ``18 small absorber pebbles units`` - system for cold shutdown. With respect to the definition of ``Passive Systems`` of IAEA-TECDOC-626 the total reactivity control system of the HTR-MODULE is a passive system of category D, because it is an emergency reactor shutdown system based on gravity driven rods, and devices, activated by fail-safe trip logic. But reactivity control of the HTR does not only consist of these engineered safety system but does have a self-acting stabilization by the negative temperature coefficient of the reactivity, being rather effective in reactivity control. Examples from computer calculations are presented, and, in addition, experimental results from the ``Stuck Rod Experiment`` at the AVR reactor in Juelich. On the basis of this the proposal is made that ``self-acting stabilization as a quality of the function`` should be discussed as a new category in addition to the active and passive engineered safety systems, structures and components of IAEA-TECDOC-626. The requirements for a future ``catastrophe-free`` nuclear technology are presented. In the appendix the 7th amendment of the atomic energy act of the Federal Republic of Germany, effective 28 July 94, is given. (author).

  10. Safety aspects of core power distribution surveillance and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beraha, D.; Grumbach, R.; Hoeld, A.; Werner, W.

    1978-01-01

    The incentives for improved core surveillance and core control systems are outlined. An efficient code for evaluating the power distribution is indispensable for designing and testing such a system. The characteristics of the core simulator QUABOX/CUBBOX and the features required for off-line and on-line applications are described. The important role of the simulator for the safety assessment of a digital core control system is underlined. With regard to the safety aspects of core control, possible disturbances are classified. Simulation results are given concerning the failure of a control actuator. It is shown that means can be devised to prevent unstable behaviour of the control system and, furthermore, to contribute to a safe reactor operation by accounting for process disturbances. (author)

  11. Is road safety management linked to road safety performance?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Papadimitriou, Eleonora; Yannis, George

    2013-10-01

    This research aims to explore the relationship between road safety management and road safety performance at country level. For that purpose, an appropriate theoretical framework is selected, namely the 'SUNflower' pyramid, which describes road safety management systems in terms of a five-level hierarchy: (i) structure and culture, (ii) programmes and measures, (iii) 'intermediate' outcomes'--safety performance indicators (SPIs), (iv) final outcomes--fatalities and injuries, and (v) social costs. For each layer of the pyramid, a composite indicator is implemented, on the basis of data for 30 European countries. Especially as regards road safety management indicators, these are estimated on the basis of Categorical Principal Component Analysis upon the responses of a dedicated road safety management questionnaire, jointly created and dispatched by the ETSC/PIN group and the 'DaCoTA' research project. Then, quasi-Poisson models and Beta regression models are developed for linking road safety management indicators and other indicators (i.e. background characteristics, SPIs) with road safety performance. In this context, different indicators of road safety performance are explored: mortality and fatality rates, percentage reduction in fatalities over a given period, a composite indicator of road safety final outcomes, and a composite indicator of 'intermediate' outcomes (SPIs). The results of the analyses suggest that road safety management can be described on the basis of three composite indicators: "vision and strategy", "budget, evaluation and reporting", and "measurement of road user attitudes and behaviours". Moreover, no direct statistical relationship could be established between road safety management indicators and final outcomes. However, a statistical relationship was found between road safety management and 'intermediate' outcomes, which were in turn found to affect 'final' outcomes, confirming the SUNflower approach on the consecutive effect of each layer

  12. Seismic methodology in determining basis earthquake for nuclear installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ameli Zamani, Sh.

    2008-01-01

    Design basis earthquake ground motions for nuclear installations should be determined to assure the design purpose of reactor safety: that reactors should be built and operated to pose no undue risk to public health and safety from earthquake and other hazards. Regarding the influence of seismic hazard to a site, large numbers of earthquake ground motions can be predicted considering possible variability among the source, path, and site parameters. However, seismic safety design using all predicted ground motions is practically impossible. In the determination of design basis earthquake ground motions it is therefore important to represent the influences of the large numbers of earthquake ground motions derived from the seismic ground motion prediction methods for the surrounding seismic sources. Viewing the relations between current design basis earthquake ground motion determination and modem earthquake ground motion estimation, a development of risk-informed design basis earthquake ground motion methodology is discussed for insight into the on going modernization of the Examination Guide for Seismic Design on NPP

  13. Safety and interlock system for Tristan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takeda, S.; Kudo, K.; Katoh, T.; Akiyama, A.

    1987-01-01

    This report describes alarm and interlock system of TRISTAN, concentrating on personnel safety. The basis of TRISTAN machine-control system (TMS) is an N-to-N computer network and KEK NODAL which offers high software productivity. TMC achieves high flexibility of operation both for normal operation and for the fast commissioning. However, to assure the safety of personnel and the TRISTAN machine operation, the safety system has to continue functioning during TMC failure as well. A distributed safety and interlock system (DSIS) is used for diversification of risks in TRISTAN system. DSIS is functionally subdivided along local system lines and has a hierarchical structure of 12 programmable sequence controllers (PSCs). Optical fiber links connect the PSCs at subsystem level and a PSC at the supervisory level of TRISTAN central control room (TCCR). The subsystem PSCs provide the interlock functions between their local devices. The local PSCs interact with the central system through a limited number of summarized signals. The central PSC provides the interlock functions between the subsystems and interacts with an operator's panel. Personnel safety is based on a system of electrical interlock keys, emergency push-buttons around the tunnel, at the entrance gates or in the control room

  14. The legal basis of natural gas distribution technology. 2. rev. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ambos, G.; Bramkamp, F.B.; Rienen, W. van

    1993-01-01

    The body of legal regulations reaches from general power economy laws to technical safety and environmental laws as well as to laws on construction regulations. The legal regulations laid down by the European Community in regard to the creation of a European single market are of increasing significance. The book wants to give basic information on the relevant legal areas and makes it easier to understand the structure and the systematics of the laws on power supply technology. It does so by differentiating three areas: - Survey of the legal regulatory framework: - Depiction of the basis of energy laws and the questions which arise from the practical work of the energy control board: - Survey of the technical safety and emission control laws in regard to natural-gas distribution by public utilities. (orig.) [de

  15. Performance Testing Methodology for Safety-Critical Programmable Logic Controller

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Chang Ho; Oh, Do Young; Kim, Ji Hyeon; Kim, Sung Ho; Sohn, Se Do

    2009-01-01

    The Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) for use in Nuclear Power Plant safety-related applications is being developed and tested first time in Korea. This safety-related PLC is being developed with requirements of regulatory guideline and industry standards for safety system. To test that the quality of the developed PLC is sufficient to be used in safety critical system, document review and various product testings were performed over the development documents for S/W, H/W, and V/V. This paper provides the performance testing methodology and its effectiveness for PLC platform conducted by KOPEC

  16. Programmable controllers replace relays in MFTF-B personnel-safety interlocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Branum, J.D.

    1981-01-01

    This paper describes a new approach for implementing personnel safety interlocks logic using industrial-type programmable controllers. The logic for all personnel safety interlocks except those totally internal to a subsystem is implemented in two non-redundant controllers. A high degree of fail-safe reliability is achieved by augmenting the protective features intrinsic to each controller with those provided by a small amount of external support hardware. The controllers are interfaced to the host computer system via fiber optic data links to enable display of interlock and overall system status on the control room graphic displays. When fully implemented, the controllers will perform the equivalent of over 2000 discreet relay functions

  17. A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kriaa, Siwar; Pietre-Cambacedes, Ludovic; Bouissou, Marc; Halgand, Yoran

    2015-01-01

    The migration towards digital control systems creates new security threats that can endanger the safety of industrial infrastructures. Addressing the convergence of safety and security concerns in this context, we provide a comprehensive survey of existing approaches to industrial facility design and risk assessment that consider both safety and security. We also provide a comparative analysis of the different approaches identified in the literature. - Highlights: • We raise awareness of safety and security convergence in numerical control systems. • We highlight safety and security interdependencies for modern industrial systems. • We give a survey of approaches combining safety and security engineering. • We discuss the potential of the approaches to model safety and security interactions

  18. PRELIMINARY SELECTION OF MGR DESIGN BASIS EVENTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kappes, J.A.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this analysis is to identify the preliminary design basis events (DBEs) for consideration in the design of the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). For external events and natural phenomena (e.g., earthquake), the objective is to identify those initiating events that the MGR will be designed to withstand. Design criteria will ensure that radiological release scenarios resulting from these initiating events are beyond design basis (i.e., have a scenario frequency less than once per million years). For internal (i.e., human-induced and random equipment failures) events, the objective is to identify credible event sequences that result in bounding radiological releases. These sequences will be used to establish the design basis criteria for MGR structures, systems, and components (SSCs) design basis criteria in order to prevent or mitigate radiological releases. The safety strategy presented in this analysis for preventing or mitigating DBEs is based on the preclosure safety strategy outlined in ''Strategy to Mitigate Preclosure Offsite Exposure'' (CRWMS M andO 1998f). DBE analysis is necessary to provide feedback and requirements to the design process, and also to demonstrate compliance with proposed 10 CFR 63 (Dyer 1999b) requirements. DBE analysis is also required to identify and classify the SSCs that are important to safety (ITS)

  19. The cohort of the atomic bomb survivors major basis of radiation safety regulations

    CERN Document Server

    Rühm, W; Nekolla, E A

    2006-01-01

    Since 1950 about 87 000 A-bomb survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been monitored within the framework of the Life Span Study, to quantify radiation-induced late effects. In terms of incidence and mortality, a statistically significant excess was found for leukemia and solid tumors. In another major international effort, neutron and gamma radiation doses were estimated, for those survivors (Dosimetry System DS02). Both studies combined allow the deduction of risk coefficients that serve as a basis for international safety regulations. As an example, current results on all solid tumors combined suggest an excess relative risk of 0.47 per Sievert for an attained age of 70 years, for those who were exposed at an age of 30 years. After exposure to an effective dose of one Sievert the solid tumor mortality would thus be about 50% larger than that expected for a similar cohort not exposed to any ionizing radiation from the bombs.

  20. CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMIT EVALUATION PROGRAM (CSLEP's) AND QUICK SCREENS: ANSWERS TO EXPEDITED PROCESSING LEGACY CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS AND EVALUATIONS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TOFFER, H.

    2006-01-01

    Since the end of the cold war, the need for operating weapons production facilities has faded. Criticality Safety Limits and controls supporting production modes in these facilities became outdated and furthermore lacked the procedure based rigor dictated by present day requirements. In the past, in many instances, the formalism of present day criticality safety evaluations was not applied. Some of the safety evaluations amounted to a paragraph in a notebook with no safety basis and questionable arguments with respect to double contingency criteria. When material stabilization, clean out, and deactivation activities commenced, large numbers of these older criticality safety evaluations were uncovered with limits and controls backed up by tenuous arguments. A dilemma developed: on the one hand, cleanup activities were placed on very aggressive schedules; on the other hand, a highly structured approach to limits development was required and applied to the cleanup operations. Some creative approaches were needed to cope with the limits development process

  1. Analysis Method of Common Cause Failure on Non-safety Digital Control System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eun Gse [KHNP, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-08-15

    The effects of common cause failure on safety digital instrumentation and control system had been considered in defense in depth analysis with safety analysis method. However, the effects of common cause failure on non-safety digital instrumentation and control system also should be evaluated. The common cause failure can be included in credible failure on the non-safety system. In the I and C architecture of nuclear power plant, many design feature has been applied for the functional integrity of control system. One of that is segmentation. Segmentation defenses the propagation of faults in the I and C architecture. Some of effects from common cause failure also can be limited by segmentation. Therefore, in this paper there are two type of failure mode, one is failures in one control group which is segmented, and the other is failures in multiple control group because that the segmentation cannot defense all effects from common cause failure. For each type, the worst failure scenario is needed to be determined, so the analysis method has been proposed in this paper. The evaluation can be qualitative when there is sufficient justification that the effects are bounded in previous safety analysis. When it is not bounded in previous safety analysis, additional analysis should be done with conservative assumptions method of previous safety analysis or best estimation method with realistic assumptions.

  2. A study on enforcement effects of radiation safety control regulations for diagnostic X-ray equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sung, Mo IL; Park, Myeong Hwan; Kwon, Duk Moon; Lee, Joon IL

    1999-01-01

    The purposes of this study are to analyze the realities after enforcements of safety control regulations for diagnostic X-ray equipment and to suggest means for an improvement of low radiation safety control. A questionnaire survey for medical radiologic technologists was carried out to determine enforcement effects of the safety control regulations. The results of analysis from the survey are as follows. That is, most of he respondents realized the importance of the radiation safety control system, but about a half of them revealed that regulations were not well observed in accordance with their purposes. Only 43.9 percent of the respondents took an active part in quality control of radiation. And responsibility, sex, age, and knowledge for safety control were important indicators for observations of the regulations. Training for the safety control regulations are needed to ensure safety control and proper usage of diagnostic X-ray equipment. And management of organizations using diagnostic X-ray equipment have to understand and stress the importance of radiation safety control system. (author)

  3. Stabilization with guaranteed safety using Control Lyapunov–Barrier Function

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Romdlony, Muhammad Zakiyullah; Jayawardhana, Bayu

    2016-01-01

    We propose a novel nonlinear control method for solving the problem of stabilization with guaranteed safety for nonlinear systems. The design is based on the merging of the well-known Control Lyapunov Function (CLF) and the recent concept of Control Barrier Function (CBF). The proposed control

  4. Safety tests carried out at Cadarache. Sodium fires

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fruchard, M.

    1976-01-01

    Safety test on sodium fires developed at the Cadarache Nuclear Centre by the Department of Nuclear Safety, section of safety experiments on radioactivity transfer are conducted in two main directions: analysis of the behavior and thermodynamic consequences of accidental fires, working on the basis of typical experimental results; research and development of methods and equipment to control and if possible extinguish these fires. The most important part of this programme is concerned with the sodium pool fires which would result from the failure of a secondary coolant circuit pipe [fr

  5. The role of quantitative uncertainty in the safety analysis of flammable gas accidents in Hanford waste tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bratzel, D.R.

    1998-01-01

    Following a 1990 investigation into flammable gas generation, retention, and release mechanisms within the Hanford Site high-level waste tanks, personnel concluded that the existing Authorization Basis documentation did not adequately evaluate flammable gas hazards. The US Department of Energy Headquarters subsequently declared the flammable gas hazard as an unresolved safety issue. Although work scope has been focused on resolution of the issue, it has yet to be resolved due to considerable uncertainty regarding essential technical parameters and associated risk. Resolution of the Flammable Gas Safety Issue will include the identification of a set of controls for the Authorization Basis for the tanks which will require a safety analysis of flammable gas accidents. A traditional nuclear facility safety analysis is based primarily on the analysis of a set of bounding accidents to represent the risks of the possible accidents and hazardous conditions at a facility. While this approach may provide some indication of the bounding consequences of accidents for facilities, it does not provide a satisfactory basis for identification of facility risk or safety controls when there is considerable uncertainty associated with accident phenomena and/or data as is the case with potential flammable gas accidents at the Hanford Site. This is due to the difficulties in identifying the bounding case and reaching consensus among safety analysts, facility operations and engineering, and the regulator on the implications of the safety analysis results. In addition, the bounding cases are frequently based on simplifying assumptions that make the analysis results insensitive to variations among facilities or the impact of alternative safety control strategies. The existing safety analysis of flammable gas accidents for the Tank Waste Remediation system (TWRS) at the Hanford Site has these difficulties. However, Hanford Site personnel are developing a refined safety analysis approach

  6. Conception of transport cask with advanced safety, aimed at transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel of power reactors, which meets the requirements of IAEA in terms of safety and increased stability during beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Il'kaev, R.I.; Matveev, V.Z.; Morenko, A.I.; Shapovalov, V.I.; Semenov, A.G.; Sergeyev, V.M.; Orlov, V.K.; Shatalov, V.V.; Gotovchikov, V.T.; Seredenko, V.A.; Haire, Jonathan M.; Forsberg, C.W.

    2004-01-01

    The report is devoted to the problem of creation of a new generation of multi-purpose universal transport cask with advanced safety, aimed at transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of power reactors, which meets all requirements of IAEA in terms of safety and increased stability during beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism. Meeting all IAEA requirements in terms of safety both in normal operation conditions and accidents, as well as increased stability of transport cask (TC) with SNF under the conditions of beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism has been achieved in the design of multi-purpose universal TC due to the use of DU (depleted uranium) in it. At that, it is suggested to use DU in TC, which acts as effective gamma shield and constructional material in the form of both metallic depleted uranium and metal-ceramic mixture (cermet), based on stainless or carbon steel and DU dioxide. The metal in the cermet is chosen to optimize cask performance. The use of DU in the design of multi-purpose universal TC enables getting maximum load of the container for spent nuclear fuel when meeting IAEA requirements in terms of safety and providing increased stability of the container with SNF under conditions of beyond-design-basis accident and acts of terrorism

  7. Conception of transport cask with advanced safety, aimed at transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel of power reactors, which meets the requirements of IAEA in terms of safety and increased stability during beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Il' kaev, R.I.; Matveev, V.Z.; Morenko, A.I.; Shapovalov, V.I. [Russian Federal Nuclear Center - All-Russian Research Inst. of Experimental Physics, Sarov (Russian Federation); Semenov, A.G.; Sergeyev, V.M.; Orlov, V.K. [All-Russian Research Inst. of Inorganic Materials, Moscow (Russian Federation); Shatalov, V.V.; Gotovchikov, V.T.; Seredenko, V.A. [All-Russian Research Inst. of Applied Chemistry, Moscow (Russian Federation); Haire, Jonathan M.; Forsberg, C.W. [Oak Ridge National Lab., Oak Ridge (United States)

    2004-07-01

    The report is devoted to the problem of creation of a new generation of multi-purpose universal transport cask with advanced safety, aimed at transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of power reactors, which meets all requirements of IAEA in terms of safety and increased stability during beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism. Meeting all IAEA requirements in terms of safety both in normal operation conditions and accidents, as well as increased stability of transport cask (TC) with SNF under the conditions of beyond-design-basis accidents and acts of terrorism has been achieved in the design of multi-purpose universal TC due to the use of DU (depleted uranium) in it. At that, it is suggested to use DU in TC, which acts as effective gamma shield and constructional material in the form of both metallic depleted uranium and metal-ceramic mixture (cermet), based on stainless or carbon steel and DU dioxide. The metal in the cermet is chosen to optimize cask performance. The use of DU in the design of multi-purpose universal TC enables getting maximum load of the container for spent nuclear fuel when meeting IAEA requirements in terms of safety and providing increased stability of the container with SNF under conditions of beyond-design-basis accident and acts of terrorism.

  8. Trends in Control Area of PLC Reliability and Safety Parameters

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Juraj Zdansky

    2008-01-01

    Full Text Available Extension of the PLC application possibilities is closely related to increase of reliability and safety parameters. If the requirement of reliability and safety parameters will be suitable, the PLC could by implemented to specific applications such the safety-related processes control. The goal of this article is to show the way which producers are approaching to increase PLC`s reliability and safety parameters. The second goal is to analyze these parameters for range of present choice and describe the possibility how the reliability and safety parameters can be affected.

  9. Who is in control of road safety? A STAMP control structure analysis of the road transport system in Queensland, Australia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Salmon, Paul M; Read, Gemma J M; Stevens, Nicholas J

    2016-11-01

    Despite significant progress, road trauma continues to represent a global safety issue. In Queensland (Qld), Australia, there is currently a focus on preventing the 'fatal five' behaviours underpinning road trauma (drug and drink driving, distraction, seat belt wearing, speeding, and fatigue), along with an emphasis on a shared responsibility for road safety that spans road users, vehicle manufacturers, designers, policy makers etc. The aim of this article is to clarify who shares the responsibility for road safety in Qld and to determine what control measures are enacted to prevent the fatal five behaviours. This is achieved through the presentation of a control structure model that depicts the actors and organisations within the Qld road transport system along with the control and feedback relationships that exist between them. Validated through a Delphi study, the model shows a diverse set of actors and organisations who share the responsibility for road safety that goes beyond those discussed in road safety policies and strategies. The analysis also shows that, compared to other safety critical domains, there are less formal control structures in road transport and that opportunities exist to add new controls and strengthen existing ones. Relationships that influence rather than control are also prominent. Finally, when compared to other safety critical domains, the strength of road safety controls is brought into question. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  10. Safety margins in older adults increase with improved control of a dynamic object

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hasson, Christopher J.; Sternad, Dagmar

    2014-01-01

    Older adults face decreasing motor capabilities due to pervasive neuromuscular degradations. As a consequence, errors in movement control increase. Thus, older individuals should maintain larger safety margins than younger adults. While this has been shown for object manipulation tasks, several reports on whole-body activities, such as posture and locomotion, demonstrate age-related reductions in safety margins. This is despite increased costs for control errors, such as a fall. We posit that this paradox could be explained by the dynamic challenge presented by the body or also an external object, and that age-related reductions in safety margins are in part due to a decreased ability to control dynamics. To test this conjecture we used a virtual ball-in-cup task that had challenging dynamics, yet afforded an explicit rendering of the physics and safety margin. The hypotheses were: (1) When manipulating an object with challenging dynamics, older adults have smaller safety margins than younger adults. (2) Older adults increase their safety margins with practice. Nine young and 10 healthy older adults practiced moving the virtual ball-in-cup to a target location in exactly 2 s. The accuracy and precision of the timing error quantified skill, and the ball energy relative to an escape threshold quantified the safety margin. Compared to the young adults, older adults had increased timing errors, greater variability, and decreased safety margins. With practice, both young and older adults improved their ability to control the object with decreased timing errors and variability, and increased their safety margins. These results suggest that safety margins are related to the ability to control dynamics, and may explain why in tasks with simple dynamics older adults use adequate safety margins, but in more complex tasks, safety margins may be inadequate. Further, the results indicate that task-specific training may improve safety margins in older adults. PMID:25071566

  11. Safety Margins in Older Adults Increase with Improved Control of a Dynamic Object

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Christopher James Hasson

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available Older adults face decreasing motor capabilities due to pervasive neuromuscular degradations. As a consequence errors in movement control increase. Thus, older individuals should maintain larger safety margins than younger adults. While this has been shown for object manipulation tasks, several reports on whole-body activities, such as posture and locomotion, however demonstrate age-related reductions in safety margins. This is despite increased costs for control errors, such as a fall. We posit that this paradox could be explained by the dynamic challenge presented by the body or an external object, and that age-related reductions in safety margins are in part due to a decreased ability to control dynamics. To test this conjecture we used a virtual ball-in-cup task that had challenging dynamics, yet afforded an explicit rendering of the physics and safety margin. The hypotheses were: 1 When manipulating an object with challenging dynamics, older adults have smaller safety margins than younger adults. 2 Older adults increase their safety margins with practice. Nine young and 10 healthy older adults practiced moving the virtual ball-in-cup to a target location in exactly two seconds. The accuracy and precision of the timing error quantified skill and the ball energy relative to an escape threshold quantified the safety margin. Compared to the young adults, older adults had increased timing errors, greater variability, and decreased safety margins. With practice, both young and older adults improved their ability to control the object with decreased timing errors and variability, and increased their safety margins. These results suggest that safety margins are related to the ability to control dynamics, and may explain why in tasks with simple dynamics older adults use adequate safety margins, but in more complex tasks, safety margins may be inadequate. Further, the results indicate that task-specific training may improve safety margins in older

  12. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KOPELIC, S.D.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  13. Antisideslip and Antirollover Safety Speed Controller Design for Vehicle on Curved Road

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Guo Lie

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available When the drivers cannot be aware of the existing of forthcoming curved roads and fail to regulate their safety speeds accordingly, sideslip or rollover may occur with high probability. The antisideslip and antirollover control of vehicle on curved road in automatic highway systems is studied. The safety speed warning system is set before entering the curved road firstly. The speed adhesion control is adopted to shorten the braking distance while decelerating and to guarantee the safety speed. The velocity controller when decelerating on the straight path and the posture controller when driving on curved road are designed, respectively, utilizing integral backstepping technology. Simulation results demonstrate that this control system is characterized by quick and precise tracking and global stability. Consequently, it is able to avoid the dangerous operating conditions, such as sideslip and rollover, and guarantee the safety and directional stability when driving on curved road.

  14. New Methodology for a Comprehensive Modular Safety Control System in a Cyclotron Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaufman, Y.; Kravitz, M.; Arad, M.; Osovizky, A.; Paran, J.; Sarussi, B.; Ellenbogen, M.; Tal, N.

    2004-01-01

    This Paper describes a new methodology for a comprehensive modular Safety Control System (SCS), for a cyclotron site. The developed SCS is a modular approach for controlling the production procedures, safety conditions and documentation aspects in the Cyclotron site. Usually, the safety conditions in cyclotron sites are maintained by a variety of sensors. The cyclotron is supplied from the manufacturer with a self-integrated control system for its operation, yet the comprehensive SCS has to be defined and setup by the customer. Therefore, customers face a lot of integration problems in trying to combine all the signals from the different safety systems such as radiation monitoring, environmental and access control, in order to maintain proper safety working conditions. The presented SCS design provides main user interface and the complete safety solution required by including preset control logic definitions and open logic for specific user applications. The knowledge for the preset control logic definitions was gathered in previous projects. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) method has been implemented on the SCS to analyze the potential failure modes and their impact on the product reliability

  15. Watershed safety and quality control by safety threshold method

    Science.gov (United States)

    Da-Wei Tsai, David; Mengjung Chou, Caroline; Ramaraj, Rameshprabu; Liu, Wen-Cheng; Honglay Chen, Paris

    2014-05-01

    Taiwan was warned as one of the most dangerous countries by IPCC and the World Bank. In such an exceptional and perilous island, we would like to launch the strategic research of land-use management on the catastrophe prevention and environmental protection. This study used the watershed management by "Safety Threshold Method" to restore and to prevent the disasters and pollution on island. For the deluge prevention, this study applied the restoration strategy to reduce total runoff which was equilibrium to 59.4% of the infiltration each year. For the sediment management, safety threshold management could reduce the sediment below the equilibrium of the natural sediment cycle. In the water quality issues, the best strategies exhibited the significant total load reductions of 10% in carbon (BOD5), 15% in nitrogen (nitrate) and 9% in phosphorus (TP). We found out the water quality could meet the BOD target by the 50% peak reduction with management. All the simulations demonstrated the safety threshold method was helpful to control the loadings within the safe range of disasters and environmental quality. Moreover, from the historical data of whole island, the past deforestation policy and the mistake economic projects were the prime culprits. Consequently, this study showed a practical method to manage both the disasters and pollution in a watershed scale by the land-use management.

  16. The Designing Bus for Nuclear Safety Class Controller

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Dongil; Lee, Myeongkyun; Yun, Donghwa [PONUTech Co,. Ltd., Research Institute, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of); Ryoo, Kwangki [Hanbat National Univ., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    EtherCAT (Ethernet for Control Automation Technology) is based on the IEEE 802.3 standard as one of the communication which is the I/O (Input/Output), sensors and communication function of PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) in industry and factory environment use is increasing. The Nuclear Safety Class Controller implemented by the EtherCAT applied bus can be shown the improving performance of data transmission in the controller.

  17. The Designing Bus for Nuclear Safety Class Controller

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Dongil; Lee, Myeongkyun; Yun, Donghwa; Ryoo, Kwangki

    2013-01-01

    EtherCAT (Ethernet for Control Automation Technology) is based on the IEEE 802.3 standard as one of the communication which is the I/O (Input/Output), sensors and communication function of PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) in industry and factory environment use is increasing. The Nuclear Safety Class Controller implemented by the EtherCAT applied bus can be shown the improving performance of data transmission in the controller

  18. Model review and evaluation for application in DOE safety basis documentation of chemical accidents - modeling guidance for atmospheric dispersion and consequence assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lazaro, M. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Woodarad, K. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Hanna, S. R. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Hesse, D. J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Huang, J. -C. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Lewis, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Mazzola, C. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through its Defense Programs (DP), Office of Engineering and Operations Suppon, established the Accident Phenomenology and Consequence (AP AC) Methodology Evaluation Program to identify and evaluate methodologies and computer codes to support accident phenomenological and consequence calculations for both radiological and nonradiological materials at DOE facilities and to identify development needs. The program is also intended to define and recommend "best or good engineering/safety analysis practices" to be followed in preparing ''design or beyond design basis" assessments to be included in DOE nuclear and nonnuclear facility safety documents. The AP AC effort is intended to provide scientifically sound and more consistent analytical approaches, by identifying model selection procedures and application methodologies, in order to enhance safety analysis activities throughout the DOE complex.

  19. Safety evaluation report of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant safety analysis report: Contact-handled transuranic waste disposal operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-02-01

    DOE 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, requires that the US Department of Energy conduct an independent, defensible, review in order to approve a Safety Analysis Report (SAR). That review and the SAR approval basis is documented in this formal Safety Evaluation Report (SER). This SER documents the DOE's review of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant SAR and provides the Carlsbad Area Office Manager, the WIPP SAR approval authority, with the basis for approving the safety document. It concludes that the safety basis documented in the WIPP SAR is comprehensive, correct, and commensurate with hazards associated with planned waste disposal operations

  20. The increased use of radiation requires enhanced activities regarding radiation safety control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Yun Jong; Lee, Jin Woo; Jeong, Gyo Seong

    2015-01-01

    More recently, companies that have obtained permission to use radioactive materials or radiation device and registered radiation workers have increased by 10% and 4% respectively. The increased use of radiation could have an effect on radiation safety control. However, there is not nearly enough manpower and budget compared to the number of workers and facilities. This paper will suggest a counteroffer thought analyzing pending issues. The results of this paper indicate that there are 47 and 31.3 workers per radiation protection officer in educational and research institutes, respectively. There are 20.1 persons per RPO in hospitals, even though there are 2 RPOs appointed. Those with a special license as a radioisotope handler were ruled out as possible managers because medical doctors who have a special license for radioisotope handling normally have no experience with radiation safety. The number of staff members and budget have been insufficient for safety control at most educational and research institutes. It is necessary to build an optimized safety control system for effective Radiation Safety Control. This will reduce the risk factor of safety, and a few RPOs can be supplied for efficiency and convenience

  1. The increased use of radiation requires enhanced activities regarding radiation safety control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Yun Jong; Lee, Jin Woo; Jeong, Gyo Seong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Jeongeup (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    More recently, companies that have obtained permission to use radioactive materials or radiation device and registered radiation workers have increased by 10% and 4% respectively. The increased use of radiation could have an effect on radiation safety control. However, there is not nearly enough manpower and budget compared to the number of workers and facilities. This paper will suggest a counteroffer thought analyzing pending issues. The results of this paper indicate that there are 47 and 31.3 workers per radiation protection officer in educational and research institutes, respectively. There are 20.1 persons per RPO in hospitals, even though there are 2 RPOs appointed. Those with a special license as a radioisotope handler were ruled out as possible managers because medical doctors who have a special license for radioisotope handling normally have no experience with radiation safety. The number of staff members and budget have been insufficient for safety control at most educational and research institutes. It is necessary to build an optimized safety control system for effective Radiation Safety Control. This will reduce the risk factor of safety, and a few RPOs can be supplied for efficiency and convenience.

  2. Research on Occupational Safety, Health Management and Risk Control Technology in Coal Mines.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhou, Lu-Jie; Cao, Qing-Gui; Yu, Kai; Wang, Lin-Lin; Wang, Hai-Bin

    2018-04-26

    This paper studies the occupational safety and health management methods as well as risk control technology associated with the coal mining industry, including daily management of occupational safety and health, identification and assessment of risks, early warning and dynamic monitoring of risks, etc.; also, a B/S mode software (Geting Coal Mine, Jining, Shandong, China), i.e., Coal Mine Occupational Safety and Health Management and Risk Control System, is developed to attain the aforementioned objectives, namely promoting the coal mine occupational safety and health management based on early warning and dynamic monitoring of risks. Furthermore, the practical effectiveness and the associated pattern for applying this software package to coal mining is analyzed. The study indicates that the presently developed coal mine occupational safety and health management and risk control technology and the associated software can support the occupational safety and health management efforts in coal mines in a standardized and effective manner. It can also control the accident risks scientifically and effectively; its effective implementation can further improve the coal mine occupational safety and health management mechanism, and further enhance the risk management approaches. Besides, its implementation indicates that the occupational safety and health management and risk control technology has been established based on a benign cycle involving dynamic feedback and scientific development, which can provide a reliable assurance to the safe operation of coal mines.

  3. Evaluation on safety issues of SMART

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, W. S.; Seol, K. W.; Yoon, Y. K.; Lee, J. H.

    2001-01-01

    Safety issues on the SMART were evaluated in the light of the compliance with the Ministerial Ordinance of Technical Requirements applying to Nuclear Installations, which was recently revised. Evaluation concludes that regulatory requirements associated with following items have to be developed as the licensing criteria for the SMART: (1) proving the safety of design or materials different form existing reactors; (2) coping with beyond design basis accidents; (3) rulemaking on the safety of reactor safeguard vessel ; (4) ensuring integrity of steam generator tubes; and (5) classifying equipment based on their safety significance. Appropriate actions including implementation of new requirements under development should be taken for safety issues such as diversity of reactivity control and in-service inspection of steam generator tubes that are not complied with the current Technical Requirements. Safety level of the SMART design will be evaluated further by the more detailed assessment according to the Technical Requirements, and additional safety issues will be identified and resolved, if it necessary

  4. Safety control of nuclear power operations using self-programming neural networks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jouse, W.C.; Williams, J.G.

    1993-01-01

    In the design and operation of nuclear reactors, safety-related goals must be embedded in complex multivariate control strategies. It is often the case that the goals exist only as mental models in the mind of the designer or the operator. In order to effect control that is risk averse, the goals must be translated into an effective control strategy that can be both verified and validated. The relation that these safety goals have to a particular architecture of artificial neural network, the Barto-Sutton architecture, is examined and the capability of the network to embed safety goals in nontrivial control tasks is demonstrated. To realize these goals, the network was extended to encompass a multiple-input/multiple-output control structure. The network synthesizes a control schedule through the construction of artificial precursors to failure; these serve as an additional, virtual layer in the defenses against fission product release. The synthesized schedule can be visually inspected for anomalies and inconsistencies and is validated during training

  5. The basis and safety of food irradiation. Advantages of radiation treatment for food sanitation and storage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ito, Hitoshi [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Takasaki, Gunma (Japan). Takasaki Radiation Chemistry Research Establishment

    2001-09-01

    The food irradiation has the history of more than 60 years in its development. However, its commercial application has not been promoted well in Japan even though the safety of irradiated foods was confirmed. Recently, relevant authorities in 52 countries have given clearance to many commodities, and irradiated foods are commercially distributed in USA and EU countries. The international situation makes some unavoidable circumstances which can not close the commercialization of food irradiation in Japan. The present report contains the basis and application of food irradiation, and history of development in the World and Japan. Moreover, the safety of irradiated foods are demonstrated from many evidences of researches in animal feeding tests, in analysis of radiolytic products, in nutritional evaluations and in microbiological studies of irradiated foods. Especially, it makes obvious from the results of many researches that unique radiolytic products can not be produced by irradiation of foods. Because main radiation effects are induced by oxidation degradation of food components as similar to natural oxidation by heating or UV light. Radiation engineering for commercial process and identification methods of irradiated foods are also presented. (author)

  6. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    KOPELIC, S.D.

    1999-02-25

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  7. Control of Industrial Safety Based on Dynamic Characteristics of a Safety Budget-Industrial Accident Rate Model in Republic of Korea.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Choi, Gi Heung; Loh, Byoung Gook

    2017-06-01

    Despite the recent efforts to prevent industrial accidents in the Republic of Korea, the industrial accident rate has not improved much. Industrial safety policies and safety management are also known to be inefficient. This study focused on dynamic characteristics of industrial safety systems and their effects on safety performance in the Republic of Korea. Such dynamic characteristics are particularly important for restructuring of the industrial safety system. The effects of damping and elastic characteristics of the industrial safety system model on safety performance were examined and feedback control performance was explained in view of cost and benefit. The implications on safety policies of restructuring the industrial safety system were also explored. A strong correlation between the safety budget and the industrial accident rate enabled modeling of an industrial safety system with these variables as the input and the output, respectively. A more effective and efficient industrial safety system could be realized by having weaker elastic characteristics and stronger damping characteristics in it. A substantial decrease in total social cost is expected as the industrial safety system is restructured accordingly. A simple feedback control with proportional-integral action is effective in prevention of industrial accidents. Securing a lower level of elastic industrial accident-driving energy appears to have dominant effects on the control performance compared with the damping effort to dissipate such energy. More attention needs to be directed towards physical and social feedbacks that have prolonged cumulative effects. Suggestions for further improvement of the safety system including physical and social feedbacks are also made.

  8. Safety aspects of pulsed YAYOI and Japan Linac Booster

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    An, S.; Oka, Y.; Wakabayashi, J.

    1976-01-01

    The paper consists of two parts. The first part is concerned with safety aspects of pulsed YAYOI. Reactivity pulsed operation of YAYOI is performed with reactivity oscillating devices. Inherent safety characteristics due to dilation of metal fuel, a small amount of f.p. build up, reactor operation preserving fuel integrity and experience on transient experiments are the principal basis for safety assurance. Conditions for pulsed operation, namely, maximum allowable temperature, maximum number of repetition of pulsed operation and so on are derived from the consideration on the integrity of fuel. Instrumentation and control systems are reinforced by displacement meter in the core, interlock system, special timer for pulsed operation, additional scram conditions and reactivity meter. Accident analysis and safety evaluation indicate the conservative safety features of the facility. Concerning pulsed operation of YAYOI combined with Linac, special attention must be given to the design of Linac target placed in the core. In the second part are described the principal guide-lines and basic ideas for safety design of Japan Linac Booster (JLB). JLB is a U-Mo fueled and sodium cooled fast reactor with rotating reflector and Linac target in the core. The pulsed neutrons are injected into the core coincidentally with repetitive peaks of reactivity. Design of rotating reflector and Linac target system are the new and important safety problems not yet encountered in the usual sodium fast reactor design. The axis of the rotating reflector is horizontal, which avoids the collision of reflector block with core in the case of failure of rotating reflector. The separate cooling channels for target and the Linac electron beam control system are provided. Reactor shut down and power control systems must be carefully designed. Core meltdown and disassembly accident is considered as a hypothetical accident which is a basis for containment system design. (auth.)

  9. Cold Vacuum Drying Safety Class Instrumentation and Control System Design Description

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WHITEHURST, R.

    1999-01-01

    This document describes the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) Safety Class Instrumentation and Control system (SCIC). The SCIC provides safety functions and features to protect the environment, off-site and on-site personnel and equipment. The function of the SCIC is to provide automatic trip features, valve interlocks, alarms, indication and control for the cold vacuum drying process

  10. Safety aid use and social anxiety symptoms: The mediating role of perceived control.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Korte, Kristina J; Unruh, Amanda S; Oglesby, Mary E; Schmidt, Norman B

    2015-08-30

    The use of safety aids, cognitive or behavioral strategies used to reduce or cope with anxiety, has emerged as a key construct of interest in anxiety disorders due to their role in the development and maintenance of anxiety symptoms. It has been suggested that individuals with anxiety engage in safety aid use to reduce their anxiety and feel more in control of a situation; however, no studies to date have examined the association between perceived control, that is, perceived level of control over internal events in anxiety provoking situations, and the use of safety aids. The purpose of the present study was to examine the association of perceived control, the use of safety aids, and symptoms of social anxiety. It was predicted that the association between safety aid use and social anxiety symptoms would be mediated by perceived control. This prediction was examined in a large sample of 281 participants. As predicted, perceived control was a significant mediator of the association between the use of safety aids and social anxiety symptoms. This effect remained significant after running a multiple mediation model with distress tolerance added as a competing mediator. Implications for future research are discussed. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  11. The present condition of the radiation safety control education in training schools for radiological technologists

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takahashi, Yasuyuki; Saito, Kyoko; Hirai, Shoko; Igarashi, Hiroshi; Negishi, Tooru; Hirano, Kunihiro; Kawaharada, Yasuhiro

    2010-01-01

    We made a detailed study on the course of study in radiation safety control prescribed on March 28, 2003. Questionnaires were sent to 39 training schools for radiological technology, to which 66.7% replied (26/39). Subjects on radiation safety control must include knowledge and technology in both radiation control and medical safety. The contents for instruction of radiation control were in accordance with those given in the traditional program; however, some discrepancies were found in the contents of medical safety. As medical safety, emphasized by the revised Medical Service Law, is regarded as very important by many hospitals, safety control education that include medical ethics should be required as part of the curriculum in the training schools for radiological technologists. (author)

  12. Liquefied Gaseous Fuels Safety and Environmental Control Assessment Program: second status report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-10-01

    The Assistant Secretary for Environment has responsibility for identifying, characterizing, and ameliorating the environmental, health, and safety issues and public concerns associated with commercial operation of specific energy systems. The need for developing a safety and environmental control assessment for liquefied gaseous fuels was identified by the Environmental and Safety Engineering Division as a result of discussions with various governmental, industry, and academic persons having expertise with respect to the particular materials involved: liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, hydrogen, and anhydrous ammonia. This document is arranged in three volumes and reports on progress in the Liquefied Gaseous Fuels (LGF) Safety and Environmental Control Assessment Program made in Fiscal Year (FY)-1979 and early FY-1980. Volume 1 (Executive Summary) describes the background, purpose and organization of the LGF Program and contains summaries of the 25 reports presented in Volumes 2 and 3. Annotated bibliographies on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Safety and Environmental Control Research and on Fire Safety and Hazards of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) are included in Volume 1.

  13. Impacts of safety on the design of light remotely-piloted helicopter flight control systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Di Rito, G.; Schettini, F.

    2016-01-01

    This paper deals with the architecture definition and the safety assessment of flight control systems for light remotely-piloted helicopters for civil applications. The methods and tools to be used for these activities are standardised for conventional piloted aircraft, while they are currently a matter of discussion in case of light remotely-piloted systems flying into unsegregated airspaces. Certification concerns are particularly problematic for aerial systems weighing from 20 to 150 kgf, since the airworthiness permission is granted by national authorities. The lack of specific requirements actually requires to analyse both the existing standards for military applications and the certification guidelines for civil systems, up to derive the adequate safety objectives. In this work, after a survey on applicable certification documents for the safety objectives definition, the most relevant functional failures of a light remotely-piloted helicopter are identified and analysed via Functional Hazard Assessment. Different architectures are then compared by means of Fault-Tree Analysis, highlighting the contributions to the safety level of the main elements of the flight control system (control computers, servoactuators, antenna) and providing basic guidelines on the required redundancy level. - Highlights: • A method for architecture definition and safety assessment of light RW‐UAS flight control systems is proposed. • Relevant UAS failures are identified and analysed via Functional Hazard Assessment and Fault‐Tree Analysis. • The key safety elements are control computers, servoactuators and TX/RX system. • Single‐simplex flight control systems have inadequate safety levels. • Dual‐duplex flight control systems demonstrate to be safety compliant, with safety budgets dominated by servoactuators.

  14. SAFETY EVALUATION OF OXALIC ACID WASTE RETRIEVAL IN SINGLE SHELL TANK (SST) 241-C-106

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SHULTZ, M.V.

    2003-01-01

    This report documents the safety evaluation of the process of retrieving sludge waste from single-shell tank 241-C-106 using oxalic acid. The results of the HAZOP, safety evaluation, and control allocation/decision are part of the report. This safety evaluation considers the use of oxalic acid to recover residual waste in single-shell tank (SST) 241-C-106. This is an activity not addressed in the current tank farm safety basis. This evaluation has five specific purposes: (1) Identifying the key configuration and operating assumptions needed to evaluate oxalic acid dissolution in SST 241-C-106. (2) Documenting the hazardous conditions identified during the oxalic acid dissolution hazard and operability study (HAZOP). (3) Documenting the comparison of the HAZOP results to the hazardous conditions and associated analyzed accident currently included in the safety basis, as documented in HNF-SD-WM-TI-764, Hazard Analysis Database Report. (4) Documenting the evaluation of the oxalic acid dissolution activity with respect to: (A) Accident analyses described in HNF-SD-WM-SAR-067, Tank Farms Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and (B) Controls specified in HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements (TSR). (5) Documenting the process and results of control decisions as well as the applicability of preventive and/or mitigative controls to each oxalic acid addition hazardous condition. This safety evaluation is not intended to be a request to authorize the activity. Authorization issues are addressed by the unreviewed safety question (USQ) evaluation process. This report constitutes an accident analysis

  15. Nuclear Safety Bureau: safety objectives and principles for the proposed ANSTO reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Westall, D.

    1993-01-01

    Siting criteria and safety assessment principles were previously promulgated by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), and have been applied by ANSTO and the Nuclear Safety Bureau (NSB). The NSB is revising these criteria and principles to take account of evolving nuclear safety standards and practices. The NSB Safety and Siting Assessment Principles (SSAP) are presented and it is estimated that it will provide a comprehensive basis for the safety assessment of research reactors in Australia, and be applicable to all stages of a reactor project: siting: design and construction; operation; modification; and decommissioning. The SSAP are similar to the principles promulgated by the AAEC, in that probabilistic safety criteria are set for assessment of design, however these criteria are complimentary to a deterministic design basis approach. This is a similar approach to that recently published by the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 4 . Siting principles are now also included, where they were previously separate, and require a consideration of the consequences of severe accidents which are an extension of accidents catered for by the design of the plant. Criteria for radiation doses due to normal operations and design basis accidents are included in the principles for safety assessment. 9 refs

  16. Safety implications of computerized process control in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-02-01

    Modern nuclear power plants are making increasing use of computerized process control because of the number of potential benefits that accrue. This practice not only applies to new plants but also to those in operation. Here, the replacement of both conventional process control systems and outdated computerized systems is seen to be of benefit. Whilst this contribution is obviously of great importance to the viability of nuclear electricity generation, it must be recognized that there are major safety concerns in taking this route. However, there is the potential for enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants if the full power of microcomputers and the associated electronics is applied correctly through well designed, engineered, installed and maintained systems. It is essential that areas where safety can be improved be identified and that the pitfalls are clearly marked so that they can be avoided. The deliberations of this Technical Committee Meeting are a step on the road to this goal of improved safety through computerized process control. This report also contains the papers presented at the technical committee meeting by participants. A separate abstract was prepared for each of these 15 presentations. Refs, figs and tabs

  17. Joint nuclear safety research projects between the US and Russian Federation International Nuclear Safety Centers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bougaenko, S.E.; Kraev, A.E.; Hill, D.L.; Braun, J.C.; Klickman, A.E.

    1998-01-01

    The Russian Federation Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the US Department of Energy (USDOE) formed international Nuclear Safety Centers in October 1995 and July 1996, respectively, to collaborate on nuclear safety research. Since January 1997, the two centers have initiated the following nine joint research projects: (1) INSC web servers and databases; (2) Material properties measurement and assessment; (3) Coupled codes: Neutronic, thermal-hydraulic, mechanical and other; (4) Severe accident management for Soviet-designed reactors; (5) Transient management and advanced control; (6) Survey of relevant nuclear safety research facilities in the Russian Federation; (8) Advanced structural analysis; and (9) Development of a nuclear safety research and development plan for MINATOM. The joint projects were selected on the basis of recommendations from two groups of experts convened by NEA and from evaluations of safety impact, cost, and deployment potential. The paper summarizes the projects, including the long-term goals, the implementing strategy and some recent accomplishments for each project

  18. Groebner Basis Solutions to Satellite Trajectory Control by Pole Placement

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kukelova, Z.; Krsek, P.; Smutny, V.; Pajdla, T.

    2013-09-01

    Satellites play an important role, e.g., in telecommunication, navigation and weather monitoring. Controlling their trajectories is an important problem. In [1], an approach to the pole placement for the synthesis of a linear controller has been presented. It leads to solving five polynomial equations in nine unknown elements of the state space matrices of a compensator. This is an underconstrained system and therefore four of the unknown elements need to be considered as free parameters and set to some prior values to obtain a system of five equations in five unknowns. In [1], this system was solved for one chosen set of free parameters with the help of Dixon resultants. In this work, we study and present Groebner basis solutions to this problem of computation of a dynamic compensator for the satellite for different combinations of input free parameters. We show that the Groebner basis method for solving systems of polynomial equations leads to very simple solutions for all combinations of free parameters. These solutions require to perform only the Gauss-Jordan elimination of a small matrix and computation of roots of a single variable polynomial. The maximum degree of this polynomial is not greater than six in general but for most combinations of the input free parameters its degree is even lower. [1] B. Palancz. Application of Dixon resultant to satellite trajectory control by pole placement. Journal of Symbolic Computation, Volume 50, March 2013, Pages 79-99, Elsevier.

  19. Kowledge-based dynamic network safety calculations. Wissensbasierte dynamische Netzsicherheitsberechnungen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kulicke, B [Inst. fuer Hochspannungstechnik und Starkstromanlagen, Berlin (Germany); Schlegel, S [Inst. fuer Hochspannungstechnik und Starkstromanlagen, Berlin (Germany)

    1993-06-28

    An important part of network operation management is the estimation and maintenance of the security of supply. So far the control personnel has only been supported by static network analyses and safety calculations. The authors describe an expert system, which is coupled to a real time simulation program on a transputer basis, for dynamic network safety calculations. They also introduce the system concept and the most important functions of the expert system. (orig.)

  20. Software V and V methods for a safety - grade programmable logic controller

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang Yeol Kim; Young Jun Lee; Kyung Ho Cha; Se Woo Cheon; Jang Soo Lee; Kee Choon Kwon

    2006-01-01

    This paper addresses the Verification and Validation(V and V) process and the methodology for an embedded real time software of a safety-grade Programmable Logic Controller(PLC). This safety- grade PLC is being developed as one of the Korean Nuclear Instrumentation and Control System (KNICS) projects. KNICS projects are developing a Reactor Protection System(RPS) and an Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System(ESF-CCS) as well as a safety-grade PLC. The safety-grade PLC will be a major component that encomposes the RPS systems and the ESF-CCS systems as nuclear instruments and control equipment. This paper describes the V and V guidelines and procedures, V and V environment, V and V process and methodology, and the V and V tools in the KNICS projects. Specifically, it describes the real-time operating system V and V experience which corresponds to the requirement analysis phase, design phase and the implementation and testing phase of the software development life cycle. Main activities of the V and V for the PLC system software are a technical evaluation, licensing suitability evaluation, inspection and traceability analysis, formal verification, software safety analysis, and a software configuration management. The proposed V and V methodology satisfies the Standard Review Plan(SRP)/Branch Technical Position(BTP)-14 criteria for the safety software in nuclear power plants. The proposed V and V methodology is going to be used to verify the upcoming software life cycle in the KNICS projects. (author)

  1. Development of a Novel Nuclear Safety Culture Evaluation Method for an Operating Team Using Probabilistic Safety Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Han, Sangmin; Lee, Seung Min; Seong, Poong Hyun [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    IAEA defined safety culture as follows: 'Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance'. Also, celebrated behavioral scientist, Cooper, defined safety culture as,'safety culture is that observable degree of effort by which all organizational members direct their attention and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis' with his internal psychological, situational, and behavioral context model. With these various definitions and criteria of safety culture, several safety culture assessment methods have been developed to improve and manage safety culture. To develop a new quantitative safety culture evaluation method for an operating team, we unified and redefined safety culture assessment items. Then we modeled a new safety culture evaluation by adopting level 1 PSA concept. Finally, we suggested the criteria to obtain nominal success probabilities of assessment items by using 'operational definition'. To validate the suggested evaluation method, we analyzed the collected audio-visual recording data collected from a full scope main control room simulator of a NPP in Korea.

  2. Development of a Novel Nuclear Safety Culture Evaluation Method for an Operating Team Using Probabilistic Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Sangmin; Lee, Seung Min; Seong, Poong Hyun

    2015-01-01

    IAEA defined safety culture as follows: 'Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance'. Also, celebrated behavioral scientist, Cooper, defined safety culture as,'safety culture is that observable degree of effort by which all organizational members direct their attention and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis' with his internal psychological, situational, and behavioral context model. With these various definitions and criteria of safety culture, several safety culture assessment methods have been developed to improve and manage safety culture. To develop a new quantitative safety culture evaluation method for an operating team, we unified and redefined safety culture assessment items. Then we modeled a new safety culture evaluation by adopting level 1 PSA concept. Finally, we suggested the criteria to obtain nominal success probabilities of assessment items by using 'operational definition'. To validate the suggested evaluation method, we analyzed the collected audio-visual recording data collected from a full scope main control room simulator of a NPP in Korea

  3. Some questions of monitoring on nuclear installations and quality of safety assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Labazov, V.

    1998-01-01

    The paper is prepared on the basis of assessment performed by the State Scientific and Technical Centre on Nuclear and Radiation safety which deals with scientific and technical support of the Regulatory Authorities of Ukraine concerning integrity of pressurised elements in the NPP. A number of acute issues on control equipment could be distinguished: placement of sensors should provide adequate information on the data under control necessary for safety analysis; properties of instrumentation should provide trustworthy information about measured values; accurate recommendations should be imposed to operating organisations for performing special analyses for control devices

  4. Charged-particle beam: a safety mandate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Young, K.C.

    1983-01-01

    The Advanced Test Accelerator (ATA) is a recent development in the field of charged particle beam research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. With this experimental apparatus, researchers will characterize intense pulses of electron beams propagated through air. Inherent with the ATA concept was the potential for exposure to hazards, such as high radiation levels and hostile breathing atmospheres. The need for a comprehensive safety program was mandated; a formal system safety program was implemented during the project's conceptual phase. A project staff position was created for a safety analyst who would act as a liaison between the project staff and the safety department. Additionally, the safety analyst would be responsible for compiling various hazards analyses reports, which formed the basis of th project's Safety Analysis Report. Recommendations for safety features from the hazards analysis reports were incorporated as necessary at appropriate phases in project development rather than adding features afterwards. The safety program established for the ATA project faciliated in controlling losses and in achieving a low-level of acceptable risk

  5. Safety controls according to the non-proliferation treaty in EC countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pander, J. von.

    1978-01-01

    Above all, content and extent of the duty conferred upon the IAEA according to article III, paragraph 1 of the NP treaty which implies the conducting of safety controls and the consequences resulting here from are examined. Including the peaceful use of nuclear energy developing under international law the agreement on safety control signed on 5th April 1973 between IAEA and EURATOM as well as its seven non-nuclear-weapon member states is discussed, along with its technical and its implicit legal problems. In detail the manifold technical and judicial problems of IAEA safety controls are shown, their realization requiring a well-working cooperation between IAEA and the European Communities. As only the non-nuclear-weapon member states of the EC are subject to the IAEA safety control system within the frame of this agreement the following questions are discussed: 1. effects on the member status after the signing of the EURATOM contract and 2. granting the principle of equal treatment for all member states as against the nuclear-weapon member states of the EC, France and the United Kingdom. (orig./HP) [de

  6. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.; PIEPHO, M.G.

    2000-01-01

    This document provided the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report''. All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  7. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support ''HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety, Analysis Report, Annex A,'' ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  8. Quality Control Activities Related to Mechanical Maintenance of Safety Related Components at Krsko NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Djakovic, D.

    2016-01-01

    For successful, safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plant, maintenance processes have to be systematically controlled and procedures for quality control of maintenance activities shall be established. This is requested by the quality assurance program, which shall provide control over activities affecting the quality of structures, systems, and components, considering their importance to safety. As a part of Quality and Nuclear Oversight Division (QNOD; SKV), the Quality Control Department (QC) provides quality control activities, which are deeply involved in maintenance processes at Krsko NPP, both on safety related and non-safety related (non-nuclear safety) components. QC activities on safety related components have to fulfil all requirements, which will enable the components to perform their intended safety functions. This paper describes quality control activities related to mechanical maintenance of safety related components at Krsko NPP and significant role of the Krsko plant QC Department in three particular maintenance cases connected with safety related components. In these three specific cases, the QC has confirmed its importance in compliance with quality assurance program and presented its significant added value in providing safe and reliable operation of the plant. The first maintenance activity was installation of nozzle check valves in the scope of a modification for improving regulation of spent fuel pit pumps. The QC Department performed receipt inspection of the valves. Using non-destructive examination methods and X-ray spectrometry, it was found out that the valve diffuser was made of improper material, which could cause progressive corrosion of the valve diffuser in borated water and consequently a loss of safety function of the valves followed by long-term consequences. The second one was the receipt inspection of containment ventilation fan coolers. The coolers were claimed and sent back to the supplier because the QC Department

  9. Regulation on the organizatjon of radiation safety control bodies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    This is a basic document on matters of structure, organization, objectives, rights, and responsibilities of agencies enforcing compliance with radiation safety standards set up in Bulgaria. Under Public Health Law and Ministerial Council Decree No. 117, the organization and management of radiation safety in Bulgaria is entrusted to the Ministry of Public Health (MPH). Within its agency, the State Sanitary Control, authorities specialized in the area of radiation safety are as follows: the Radiation Hygiene Division (RHD) of the MPH Hygiene-and Epidemiology Bureau (HEB); the Specialized Radiation Safety Inspectorate of the Research Institute of Radiobiology and Radiation Hygiene (RIRRH); the Radiation Hygiene Sections of country HEBs; and State sanitary Inspectors assigned to large establishments in the country. (G.G.)

  10. Anticipation and the adaptive control of safety margins in driving

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van der Hulst, M.; Meijman, T.F.; Rothengatter, J.A.

    Driving is a task that requires the timely detection of critical events and relevant changes in traffic circumstances. Adaptation of speed and safety margins allows drivers to control the time available to react to potential hazards. One of the basic safety margins in driving is the time headway

  11. Intelligent control of PV system on the basis of the fuzzy recurrent neuronet*

    Science.gov (United States)

    Engel, E. A.; Kovalev, I. V.; Engel, N. E.

    2016-04-01

    This paper presents the fuzzy recurrent neuronet for PV system’s control. Based on the PV system’s state, the fuzzy recurrent neural net tracks the maximum power point under random perturbations. The validity and advantages of the proposed intelligent control of PV system are demonstrated by numerical simulations. The simulation results show that the proposed intelligent control of PV system achieves real-time control speed and competitive performance, as compared to a classical control scheme on the basis of the perturbation & observation algorithm.

  12. Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 2008

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kainulainen, E.

    2009-06-01

    This report covers the regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2008, including the design, construction and operation of nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear waste management and nuclear materials. The control of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management, as well as nuclear non-proliferation, concern two STUK departments: Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation. It constitutes the report on regulatory control in the field of nuclear energy, which the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is required to submit to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy pursuant to section 121 of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Decree. The first parts of the report explain the basics of the nuclear safety regulation included as part of STUK's responsibilities, as well as the objectives of the operations, and briefly introduce the objects of regulation. The chapter concerning the development and implementation of legislation and regulations describes changes in nuclear legislation, as well as the progress of STUK's YVL Guide revision. The chapter also includes a summary of the application of the updated YVL Guides to nuclear facilities. The section concerning the regulation of nuclear facilities contains a complete safety assessment of the nuclear facilities currently in operation or under construction. For the nuclear facilities in operation, the section describes plant operation, events during operation, annual maintenance, development of the plants and their safety, and observations made during monitoring. Data and observations gained during regulatory activities are reviewed with a focus on ensuring the safety functions of nuclear facilities and the integrity of structures and components. The report also includes a description of the oversight of the operations and quality management of organisations, oversight of operational experience feedback activities, and the results of these oversight activities. The radiation safety of nuclear

  13. Safety balance: Analysis of safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delage, M.; Giroux, C.

    1990-12-01

    Safety analysis, and particularly analysis of exploitation of NPPs is constantly affected by EDF and by the safety authorities and their methodologies. Periodic safety reports ensure that important issues are not missed on daily basis, that incidents are identified and that relevant actions are undertaken. French safety analysis method consists of three principal steps. First type of safety balance is analyzed at the normal start-up phase for each unit including the final safety report. This enables analysis of behaviour of units ten years after their licensing. Second type is periodic operational safety analysis performed during a few years. Finally, the third step consists of safety analysis of the oldest units with the aim to improve the safety standards. The three steps of safety analysis are described in this presentation in detail with the aim to present the objectives and principles. Examples of most recent exercises are included in order to illustrate the importance of such analyses

  14. Safety of timber : An analysis of quality control options

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kovryga, A.; Stapel, P.; Van de Kuilen, J.W.G.

    2014-01-01

    The quality assurance of timber properties is important for the safety of timber structures. In the current study, the quality control options of timber are analysed under the prism of the different growth regions. Therefore, these options - machine and output control - are simulated in accordance

  15. Agricultural pest control programmes, food security and safety | Eze ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Agricultural pest management control strategies are primarily concerned with food security and safety. Popular pest control methods include application of synthetic pesticides, biopesticides (plant extracts), non-chemical pest management and integrated pest management (IPM). The resistance of some of the pests to the ...

  16. Nuclear criticality safety basics for personnel working with nuclear fissionable materials. Phase I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vausher, A.L.

    1984-10-01

    DOE order 5480.1A, Chapter V, ''Safety of Nuclear Facilities,'' establishes safety procedures and requirements for DOE nuclear facilities. The ''Nuclear Criticality Safety Basic Program - Phase I'' is documented in this report. The revised program has been developed to clearly illustrate the concept of nuclear safety and to help the individual employee incorporate safe behavior in his daily work performance. Because of this, the subject of safety has been approached through its three fundamentals: scientific basis, engineering criteria, and administrative controls. Only basics of these three elements were presented. 5 refs

  17. Materials safety data sheets: the basis for control of toxic chemicals

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bolton, N. E.; Ketchen, E. E.; Porter, W. E.; Hunt, C. L.

    1977-05-01

    For large industrial and research operations, maintaining reasonable control of all toxic materials used in their operations can be a formidable task. A system utilizing cards has been developed that serves a dual purpose, informing the user regarding hazards of a particular material and also facilitating appropriate workplace surveillance during its use. Selected data, including threshold limit values, routes of absorption, symptoms of exposure, chronic effects, and emergency first-aid procedures, are printed on the card. A portion of the card contains the label that the user detaches and affixes to the container. This label classifies the material according to flammability, toxicity, reactivity, and special properties on a 0 through 4 hazard rating system. This report describes the development and use of such cards, contains the associated Toxic Material Data Sheets that provide full backup data for the labels, and furnishes a glossary of biomedical terms used in the Data Sheets.

  18. Determination of Design Basis Earthquake ground motion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kato, Muneaki [Japan Atomic Power Co., Tokyo (Japan)

    1997-03-01

    This paper describes principle of determining of Design Basis Earthquake following the Examination Guide, some examples on actual sites including earthquake sources to be considered, earthquake response spectrum and simulated seismic waves. In sppendix of this paper, furthermore, seismic safety review for N.P.P designed before publication of the Examination Guide was summarized with Check Basis Earthquake. (J.P.N.)

  19. Determination of Design Basis Earthquake ground motion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kato, Muneaki

    1997-01-01

    This paper describes principle of determining of Design Basis Earthquake following the Examination Guide, some examples on actual sites including earthquake sources to be considered, earthquake response spectrum and simulated seismic waves. In sppendix of this paper, furthermore, seismic safety review for N.P.P designed before publication of the Examination Guide was summarized with Check Basis Earthquake. (J.P.N.)

  20. Control system of labour safety measures in the higher educational institution

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    O. G. Feoktistova

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available The article examines a system of labour safety measures control. With the introduction of the integrated system of management the competitive ability of production and organization, the effectiveness of its activity rise, and sinnergicheskiy effect is also reached and the savings of all forms of resources are ensured. Objectives and methods of control system of labour safety measures in enterprises are developed, including in the educational institutions.

  1. Process Control Systems in the Chemical Industry: Safety vs. Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeffrey Hahn; Thomas Anderson

    2005-04-01

    Traditionally, the primary focus of the chemical industry has been safety and productivity. However, recent threats to our nation’s critical infrastructure have prompted a tightening of security measures across many different industry sectors. Reducing vulnerabilities of control systems against physical and cyber attack is necessary to ensure the safety, security and effective functioning of these systems. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has developed a strategy to secure these vulnerabilities. Crucial to this strategy is the Control Systems Security and Test Center (CSSTC) established to test and analyze control systems equipment. In addition, the CSSTC promotes a proactive, collaborative approach to increase industry's awareness of standards, products and processes that can enhance the security of control systems. This paper outlines measures that can be taken to enhance the cybersecurity of process control systems in the chemical sector.

  2. Reliability analysis of diverse safety logic systems of fast breeder reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ravi Kumar, Bh.; Apte, P.R.; Srivani, L.; Ilango Sambasivan, S.; Swaminathan, P.

    2006-01-01

    Safety Logic for Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) is designed to initiate safety action against Design Basis Events. Based on the outputs of various processing circuits, Safety logic system drives the control rods of the shutdown system. So, Safety Logic system is classified as safety critical system. Therefore, reliability analysis has to be performed. This paper discusses the Reliability analysis of Diverse Safety logic systems of FBRs. For this literature survey on safety critical systems, system reliability approach and standards to be followed like IEC-61508 are discussed in detail. For Programmable Logic device based systems, Hardware Description Languages (HDL) are used. So this paper also discusses the Verification and Validation for HDLs. Finally a case study for the Reliability analysis of Safety logic is discussed. (author)

  3. Fundamental safety principles. Safety fundamentals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This publication states the fundamental safety objective and ten associated safety principles, and briefly describes their intent and purpose. The fundamental safety objective - to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation - applies to all circumstances that give rise to radiation risks. The safety principles are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire lifetime of all facilities and activities - existing and new - utilized for peaceful purposes, and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks. They provide the basis for requirements and measures for the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks and for the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, including, in particular, nuclear installations and uses of radiation and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste

  4. Fundamental safety principles. Safety fundamentals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This publication states the fundamental safety objective and ten associated safety principles, and briefly describes their intent and purpose. The fundamental safety objective - to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation - applies to all circumstances that give rise to radiation risks. The safety principles are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire lifetime of all facilities and activities - existing and new - utilized for peaceful purposes, and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks. They provide the basis for requirements and measures for the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks and for the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, including, in particular, nuclear installations and uses of radiation and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste

  5. HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS & RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    EVANS, C B

    2004-12-21

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S&M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard.

  6. Safety review for human factors engineering and control rooms of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Mengzhuo

    1998-01-01

    Safety review for human factors engineering and control rooms of nuclear power plants (NPP) is in a forward position of science and technology, which began at American TMI severe accident and had been implemented in China. The importance and the significance of the safety review are expounded, the requirements of its scope and profundity are explained in detail. In addition, the situation of the technical document system for nuclear safety regulation on human factors engineering and control rooms of NPP in China is introduced briefly, on which the safety review is based

  7. Safety Case Development as an Information Modelling Problem

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lewis, Robert

    This paper considers the benefits from applying information modelling as the basis for creating an electronically-based safety case. It highlights the current difficulties of developing and managing large document-based safety cases for complex systems such as those found in Air Traffic Control systems. After a review of current tools and related literature on this subject, the paper proceeds to examine the many relationships between entities that can exist within a large safety case. The paper considers the benefits to both safety case writers and readers from the future development of an ideal safety case tool that is able to exploit these information models. The paper also introduces the idea that the safety case has formal relationships between entities that directly support the safety case argument using a methodology such as GSN, and informal relationships that provide links to direct and backing evidence and to supporting information.

  8. 75 FR 5536 - Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management/Human Factors, Correction

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-03

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Parts...: Control Room Management/Human Factors, Correction AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety... following correcting amendments: PART 192--TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL AND OTHER GAS BY PIPELINE: MINIMUM...

  9. Range and limits of application of Sec.12, Atomic Energy Act, as a legal basis of the nuclear plant safety ordinance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmidt-Preuss, Matthias

    2009-01-01

    Ensuring plant safety is a key purpose of nuclear law. Sec.7 II No.3, Atomic Energy Act, is considered the basic norm of nuclear legislation. The main requirement this embodies is ensuring 'the provisions against damage arising from construction and operation of a plant as required in accordance with the state of the art'. These normative requirements constitute the strictest yardstick existing in legislation about technology. Putting it into effect has always been the purpose of the set of nuclear rules and regulations constituting the next lower level of legislation, which so far have developed by evolution and are now to be updated comprehensively in the format of so-called modules as provided for in the concept of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU). So far, there has not been a nuclear plant safety ordinance. The Atomic Energy Act has always provided a basis for adopting such an ordinance, especially so in Sec.12 I 1 No.1, Atomic Energy Act. No federal government has so far wanted to make use of it. This makes it all the more remarkable that the BMU took up the subject of a nuclear plant safety ordinance as early as in 2006, starting a dialog with the federal states. This dialog meanwhile has come to a halt. The subject seems to be dormant right now, but certainly has not been shelved. Ensuring plant safety is a key purpose of nuclear law. Sec.7 II No.3, Atomic Energy Act, is considered the basic norm of nuclear legislation. The main requirement this embodies is ensuring 'the provisions against damage arising from construction and operation of a plant as required in accordance with the state of the art'. These normative requirements constitute the strictest yardstick existing in legislation about technology. Putting it into effect has always been the purpose of the set of nuclear rules and regulations constituting the next lower level of legislation, which so far have developed by evolution and are now to be

  10. NEURO-SYSTEM OF AIMING AND STABILIZING WITH A REGULATOR ON THE BASIS OF STANDARD MODEL MODEL REFERENCE CONTROLLER

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    B.I. Kuznetsov

    2015-08-01

    Full Text Available The aim of this work is the synthesis of neural network aiming and stabilization system for the special equipment of moving objects with neuro-controller on the basis of standard model and performance comparison of the neural network system with the neural network predictive control. Build a block diagram of the neural network aiming and stabilization system, based on the subject control principle with PD-regulator in the position loop and with neuro-controller on the basis of standard model in the in the velocity loop. The neuro-controller on the basis of standard model Model Reference Controller is synthesized in the MATLAB Neural Network Toolbox and system simulation is performed. The studies show that the transient state variables of the system are oscillatory. Therefore, the neuro-controller with the prediction NN Predictive Controller should be used for aiming and stabilizing system to provide high dynamic characteristics achieved at the cost of higher complexity and computational cost.

  11. Selecting of key safety parameters in reactor nuclear safety supervision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    He Fan; Yu Hong

    2014-01-01

    The safety parameters indicate the operational states and safety of research reactor are the basis of nuclear safety supervision institution to carry out effective supervision to nuclear facilities. In this paper, the selecting of key safety parameters presented by the research reactor operating unit to National Nuclear Safety Administration that can express the research reactor operational states and safety when operational occurrence or nuclear accident happens, and the interrelationship between them are discussed. Analysis shows that, the key parameters to nuclear safety supervision of research reactor including design limits, operational limits and conditions, safety system settings, safety limits, acceptable limits and emergency action level etc. (authors)

  12. Preliminary considerations on safety of computerized control rooms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vittet, J.

    1983-02-01

    Safety problems are analyzed in this report by the study of the interaction: ''human behavior in a rigid environment/information overload in perturbed situation''. For pedagogy the study is presented as a research of factors influencing operator performance in a control room and a dialogue between an analyst and a conceiving engineer. Danger of all control room where the strategy for data acquisition is too rigid and without spatial reference is stressed in conclusion. Orientations for an advanced control room are outlined [fr

  13. 75 FR 67450 - Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management Implementation Workshop

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-02

    ... regulations to address human factors and other aspects of control room management for certain pipelines where controllers use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Under the final rule, pipeline... Washington, DC on October 22, 2010. Jeffrey D. Wiese, Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety. [FR Doc...

  14. Use of feedback control to address flight safety issues

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ganguli, Subhabrata

    This thesis addresses three control problems related to flight safety. The first problem relates to the scope of improvement in performance of conventional flight control laws. In particular, aircraft longitudinal axis control based on the Total Energy Control System (TECS) is studied. The research draws attention to a potentially sluggish and undesirable aircraft response when the engine dynamics is slow (typically the case). The proposed design method uses a theoretically well-developed modern design method based on Hinfinity optimization to improve the aircraft dynamic behavior in spite of slow engine characteristics. At the same time, the proposed design method achieves other desirable performance goals such as insensitivity to sensor noise and wind gust rejection: all addressed in one unified framework. The second problem is based on a system level analysis of control structure hierarchy for aircraft flight control. The objective of the analysis problem is to translate outer-loop stability and performance specifications into a comprehensive inner-loop metric. The prime motivation is to make the flight control design process more systematic and the system-integration reliable and independent of design methodology. The analysis problem is posed within the robust control analysis framework. Structured singular value techniques and free controller parameterization ideas are used to impose a hierarchical structure for flight control architecture. The third problem involves development and demonstration of a new reconfiguration strategy in the flight control architecture that has the potential of improving flight safety while keeping cost and complexity low. This research proposes a fault tolerant feature based on active robust reconfiguration. The fault tolerant control problem is formulated in the Linear Parameter Varying (LPV) design framework. A prime advantage of this approach is that the synthesis results in a single nonlinear controller (as opposed to a bank

  15. Job characteristics and safety climate: the role of effort-reward and demand-control-support models.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Phipps, Denham L; Malley, Christine; Ashcroft, Darren M

    2012-07-01

    While safety climate is widely recognized as a key influence on organizational safety, there remain questions about the nature of its antecedents. One potential influence on safety climate is job characteristics (that is, psychosocial features of the work environment). This study investigated the relationship between two job characteristics models--demand-control-support (Karasek & Theorell, 1990) and effort-reward imbalance (Siegrist, 1996)--and safety climate. A survey was conducted with a random sample of 860 British retail pharmacists, using the job contents questionnaire (JCQ), effort-reward imbalance indicator (ERI) and a measure of safety climate in pharmacies. Multivariate data analyses found that: (a) both models contributed to the prediction of safety climate ratings, with the demand-control-support model making the largest contribution; (b) there were some interactions between demand, control and support from the JCQ in the prediction of safety climate scores. The latter finding suggests the presence of "active learning" with respect to safety improvement in high demand, high control settings. The findings provide further insight into the ways in which job characteristics relate to safety, both individually and at an aggregated level.

  16. Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 1998

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tossavainen, K. [ed.

    1999-10-01

    The report describes regulatory control of the safe use of nuclear energy by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in 1998. STUK is the Finnish nuclear safety authority. The submission of this report to the Ministry of Trade and Industry is stipulated in Section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. It was verified by regulatory control that the operation of Finnish NPPs was in compliance with conditions set out in the operating licences of the plants and with regulations currently in force. In addition to supervising the normal operation of the plants, STUK oversaw projects carried out at the plant units, which related to the uprating of their power and the improvement of their safety. STUK issued to the Ministry of Trade and Industry a statement about applications for the renewal of the operating licences of Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs, which had been submitted by Imatran Voima Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy. Regulatory activities in the field of nuclear waste management were focused on the storage and final disposal of spent fuel as well as the treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor waste. STUK issued a statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry about an environmental impact assessment programme pertaining to a spent fuel repository project, which had been submitted by Posiva Oy, as well as on Imatran Voima Oy's application concerning the operation of a repository for medium- and low-level reactor waste from Loviisa NPP. The use of nuclear materials was in compliance with the regulations currently in force and also the whereabouts of every batch of nuclear material were ensured by safeguards control. In international safeguards, important changes took place, which were reflected also in safeguards activities at national level. International co-operation continued based on financing both from STUK's budget and from additional sources. The focus of co-operation funded from outside sources was as follows: improvement of the safety of

  17. Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tossavainen, K.

    1999-10-01

    The report describes regulatory control of the safe use of nuclear energy by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in 1998. STUK is the Finnish nuclear safety authority. The submission of this report to the Ministry of Trade and Industry is stipulated in Section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. It was verified by regulatory control that the operation of Finnish NPPs was in compliance with conditions set out in the operating licences of the plants and with regulations currently in force. In addition to supervising the normal operation of the plants, STUK oversaw projects carried out at the plant units, which related to the uprating of their power and the improvement of their safety. STUK issued to the Ministry of Trade and Industry a statement about applications for the renewal of the operating licences of Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs, which had been submitted by Imatran Voima Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy. Regulatory activities in the field of nuclear waste management were focused on the storage and final disposal of spent fuel as well as the treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor waste. STUK issued a statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry about an environmental impact assessment programme pertaining to a spent fuel repository project, which had been submitted by Posiva Oy, as well as on Imatran Voima Oy's application concerning the operation of a repository for medium- and low-level reactor waste from Loviisa NPP. The use of nuclear materials was in compliance with the regulations currently in force and also the whereabouts of every batch of nuclear material were ensured by safeguards control. In international safeguards, important changes took place, which were reflected also in safeguards activities at national level. International co-operation continued based on financing both from STUK's budget and from additional sources. The focus of co-operation funded from outside sources was as follows: improvement of the safety of Kola and

  18. Safety strategy and safety analysis of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1976-01-01

    The safety strategy for nuclear power plants is characterized by the fact that the high level of safety was attained not as a result of experience, but on the basis of preventive accident analyses and the finding derived from such analyses. Although, in these accident analyses, the deterministic approach is predominant, it is supplemented by reliability analyses. The accidents analyzed in nuclear licensing procedures cover a wide spectrum from minor incidents to the design basis accidents which determine the design of the safety devices. The initial and boundary conditions, which are essentail for accident analyses, and the determination of the loads occurring in various states during regular operation and in accidents flow into the design of the individual systems and components. The inevitable residual risk and its origins are discussed. (orig.) [de

  19. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CROWE, R.D.

    1999-09-09

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support ''HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety, Analysis Report, Annex A,'' ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  20. Safety class methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donner, E.B.; Low, J.M.; Lux, C.R.

    1992-01-01

    DOE Order 6430.1A, General Design Criteria (GDC), requires that DOE facilities be evaluated with respect to ''safety class items.'' Although the GDC defines safety class items, it does not provide a methodology for selecting safety class items. The methodology described in this paper was developed to assure that Safety Class Items at the Savannah River Site (SRS) are selected in a consistent and technically defensible manner. Safety class items are those in the highest of four categories determined to be of special importance to nuclear safety and, merit appropriately higher-quality design, fabrication, and industrial test standards and codes. The identification of safety class items is approached using a cascading strategy that begins at the 'safety function' level (i.e., a cooling function, ventilation function, etc.) and proceeds down to the system, component, or structure level. Thus, the items that are required to support a safety function are SCls. The basic steps in this procedure apply to the determination of SCls for both new project activities, and for operating facilities. The GDC lists six characteristics of SCls to be considered as a starting point for safety item classification. They are as follows: 1. Those items whose failure would produce exposure consequences that would exceed the guidelines in Section 1300-1.4, ''Guidance on Limiting Exposure of the Public,'' at the site boundary or nearest point of public access 2. Those items required to maintain operating parameters within the safety limits specified in the Operational Safety Requirements during normal operations and anticipated operational occurrences. 3. Those items required for nuclear criticality safety. 4. Those items required to monitor the release of radioactive material to the environment during and after a Design Basis Accident. Those items required to achieve, and maintain the facility in a safe shutdown condition 6. Those items that control Safety Class Item listed above

  1. Integrated Safety Culture Model and Application

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    汪磊; 孙瑞山; 刘汉辉

    2009-01-01

    A new safety culture model is constructed and is applied to analyze the correlations between safety culture and SMS. On the basis of previous typical definitions, models and theories of safety culture, an in-depth analysis on safety culture's structure, composing elements and their correlations was conducted. A new definition of safety culture was proposed from the perspective of sub-cuhure. 7 types of safety sub-culture, which are safety priority culture, standardizing culture, flexible culture, learning culture, teamwork culture, reporting culture and justice culture were defined later. Then integrated safety culture model (ISCM) was put forward based on the definition. The model divided safety culture into intrinsic latency level and extrinsic indication level and explained the potential relationship between safety sub-culture and all safety culture dimensions. Finally in the analyzing of safety culture and SMS, it concluded that positive safety culture is the basis of im-plementing SMS effectively and an advanced SMS will improve safety culture from all around.

  2. Chapter 8: Plasma operation and control [Progress in the ITER Physics Basis (PIPB)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gribov, Y.; Humphreys, D.; Kajiwara, K.; Lazarus, E.A.; Lister, J.B.; Ozeki, T.; Portone, A.; Shimada, M.; Sips, A.C.C.; Wesley, J.C.

    2007-01-01

    The ITER plasma control system has the same functional scope as the control systems in present tokamaks. These are plasma operation scenario sequencing, plasma basic control (magnetic and kinetic), plasma advanced control (control of RWMs, NTMs, ELMs, error fields, etc) and plasma fast shutdown. This chapter considers only plasma initiation and plasma basic control. This chapter describes the progress achieved in these areas in the tokamak experiments since the ITER Physics Basis (1999 Nucl. Fusion 39 2577) was written and the results of assessment of ITER to provide the plasma initiation and basic control. This assessment was done for the present ITER design (15 MA machine) at a more detailed level than it was done for the ITER design 1998 (21 MA machine) described in the ITER Physics Basis (1999 Nucl. Fusion 39 2577). The experiments on plasma initiation performed in DIII-D and JT-60U, as well as the theoretical studies performed for ITER, have demonstrated that, within specified assumptions on the plasma confinement and the impurity influx, ITER can produce plasma initiation in a low toroidal electric field (0.3 V m -1 ), if it is assisted by about 2 MW of ECRF heating. The plasma basic control includes control of the plasma current, position and shape-the plasma magnetic control, as well as control of other plasma global parameters or their profiles-the plasma performance control. The magnetic control is based on more reliable and simpler models of the control objects than those available at present for the plasma kinetic control. Moreover the real time diagnostics used for the magnetic control in many cases are more precise than those used for the kinetic control. Because of these reasons, the plasma magnetic control was developed for modern tokamaks and assessed for ITER better than the kinetic control. However, significant progress has been achieved in the plasma performance control during the last few years. Although the physics basis of plasma operation

  3. System theory and safety models in Swedish, UK, Dutch and Australian road safety strategies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hughes, B P; Anund, A; Falkmer, T

    2015-01-01

    Road safety strategies represent interventions on a complex social technical system level. An understanding of a theoretical basis and description is required for strategies to be structured and developed. Road safety strategies are described as systems, but have not been related to the theory, principles and basis by which systems have been developed and analysed. Recently, road safety strategies, which have been employed for many years in different countries, have moved to a 'vision zero', or 'safe system' style. The aim of this study was to analyse the successful Swedish, United Kingdom and Dutch road safety strategies against the older, and newer, Australian road safety strategies, with respect to their foundations in system theory and safety models. Analysis of the strategies against these foundations could indicate potential improvements. The content of four modern cases of road safety strategy was compared against each other, reviewed against scientific systems theory and reviewed against types of safety model. The strategies contained substantial similarities, but were different in terms of fundamental constructs and principles, with limited theoretical basis. The results indicate that the modern strategies do not include essential aspects of systems theory that describe relationships and interdependencies between key components. The description of these strategies as systems is therefore not well founded and deserves further development. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  4. Adaptive control of 5 DOF upper-limb exoskeleton robot with improved safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kang, Hao-Bo; Wang, Jian-Hui

    2013-11-01

    This paper studies an adaptive control strategy for a class of 5 DOF upper-limb exoskeleton robot with a special safety consideration. The safety requirement plays a critical role in the clinical treatment when assisting patients with shoulder, elbow and wrist joint movements. With the objective of assuring the tracking performance of the pre-specified operations, the proposed adaptive controller is firstly designed to be robust to the model uncertainties. To further improve the safety and fault-tolerance in the presence of unknown large parameter variances or even actuator faults, the adaptive controller is on-line updated according to the information provided by an adaptive observer without additional sensors. An output tracking performance is well achieved with a tunable error bound. The experimental example also verifies the effectiveness of the proposed control scheme. © 2013 ISA. Published by ISA. All rights reserved.

  5. National Transportation Safety Board : weak internal control impaired financial accountability

    Science.gov (United States)

    2001-09-28

    The U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to review the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) internal controls over selected types of fiscal year expenditures. They were asked to determine whether internal control weaknesses were a...

  6. HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS and RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    EVANS, C.B.

    2004-01-01

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S and M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard

  7. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ''Unreviewed Safety Questions,'' DOE 5480.22, ''Technical Safety Requirements,'' and DOE 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.'' WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ''Safety Basis'' for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules

  8. Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

  9. Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

  10. Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

  11. Luxury cruise? The safety potential of advanced cruise control.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Oei, H.L.

    2003-01-01

    The principles of advanced cruise control (ACC) are outlined and the requirements for an ACC system are described. An intelligent cruise control system fitted in a Nissan Primera was tested on the road over a 2-week period by 10 drivers, eight of which were experts in road safety. Most test-drives

  12. The use of microprocessors at TRIUMF in the control of radiation safety interlock systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, L.

    1988-01-01

    At TRIUMF the cyclotron vault, all primary beam lines, and each experimental area has a dedicated control unit to manage the safety interlock control of the area lockup sequence, beam blocker drive and area access. Typically each area has 24 devices which are monitored to control 16 outputs. These control units (Area Safety Units) were first implemented through the use of relay logic. The relay logic was reliable but difficult to modify to incorporate changes to the areas. In 1979 it was decided to use microprocessors in the form of single board computers to control the Area Safety Units. The details of the hardware and software is discussed as well as the advantages of microprocessor control

  13. Recommended general safety requirements for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    This report presents recommendations for a set of general safety requirements that could form the basis for the licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic Energy Control Board. In addition to a number of recommended deterministic requirements the report includes criteria for the acceptability of the design of such plants based upon the calculated probability and consequence (in terms of predicted radiation dose to members of the public) of potential fault sequences. The report also contains a historical review of nuclear safety principles and practices in Canada

  14. JACoW Safety instrumented systems and the AWAKE plasma control as a use case

    CERN Document Server

    Blanco Viñuela, Enrique; Fernández Adiego, Borja; Speroni, Roberto

    2018-01-01

    Safety is likely the most critical concern in many process industries, yet there is a general uncertainty on the proper engineering to reduce the risks and ensure the safety of persons or material at the same time as providing the process control system. Some of the reasons for this misperception are unclear requirements, lack of functional safety engineering knowledge or incorrect protection functionalities attributed to the BPCS (Basic Process Control System). Occasionally the control engineers are not aware of the hazards inherent to an industrial process and this causes an incorrect design of the overall controls. This paper illustrates the engineering of the SIS (Safety Instrumented System) and the BPCS of the plasma vapour controls of the AWAKE R&D; project, the first proton-driven plasma wakefield acceleration experiment in the world. The controls design and implementation refers to the IEC61511/ISA84 standard, including technological choices, design, operation and maintenance. Finally, the publica...

  15. Session 1 theme: Various forms of design basis knowledge and effects of its loss on Safety. Views from EDF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Servière, Georges

    2013-01-01

    Design basis knowledge - What happens or may happen and corresponding required knowledge: • Unexpected events or failures of equipment; • Spare part issues (no longer availaible,…); • Change in applicable regulations / requirements; • Change of operating conditions; • Change of plant performances; • Evolution of external environment and conditions; • Events and accidents on other plants, worldwide; • New knowledge availaible; • Periodic safety reviews and upgrades; • Extension of plant operation life; • Decommissioning and dismantling; • Some of those you may choose not to do, but most of them have to be faced and need appropriate knowledge

  16. Safety Impact of Average Speed Control in the UK

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lahrmann, Harry Spaabæk; Brassøe, Bo; Johansen, Jonas Wibert

    2016-01-01

    of automatic speed control was point-based, but in recent years a potentially more effective alternative automatic speed control method has been introduced. This method is based upon records of drivers’ average travel speed over selected sections of the road and is normally called average speed control...... in the UK. The study demonstrates that the introduction of average speed control results in statistically significant and substantial reductions both in speed and in number of accidents. The evaluation indicates that average speed control has a higher safety effect than point-based automatic speed control....

  17. RBMK nuclear reactors: Proposals for instrumentation and control improvements to enhanced safety and availability. IEC technical report of type 3. Working material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The present material presents a CD+V draft report ''RBMK nuclear reactors: Proposals for instrumentation and control improvements to enhance safety and availability'' prepared by the Joint IEC/IAEA team during 1993-1995. Experience has demonstrated the need to improve the safety instrumentation of the RBMK type reactors using well proven modern technology. The working group identified the upgrades and changes of the highest priority based on the evaluation of the RBMK systems and the events where the instrumentation was found to be inadequate for safe operation. The subjects discussed in this document were not selected on a systematic basis but were selected by the IEC and IAEA experts as considered to be appropriate to the activities of the IEC and for which technical experience was available. The items identified therefore do not reflect any ranking of the safety issues or any priority or impact on safety of any of the measures were they to be implemented. Many important safety issued and areas where physical measures are required to improve safety have been omitted and indeed not even acknowledged in this document. The recommendations presented in the document differ from those normally produced by the IEC in the form of standards as they are of a transitory nature and some have already been overtaken by the continuing process of improvements to plant safety. Figs and tabs

  18. Effects of organizational safety practices and perceived safety climate on PPE usage, engineering controls, and adverse events involving liquid antineoplastic drugs among nurses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    DeJoy, David M; Smith, Todd D; Woldu, Henok; Dyal, Mari-Amanda; Steege, Andrea L; Boiano, James M

    2017-07-01

    Antineoplastic drugs pose risks to the healthcare workers who handle them. This fact notwithstanding, adherence to safe handling guidelines remains inconsistent and often poor. This study examined the effects of pertinent organizational safety practices and perceived safety climate on the use of personal protective equipment, engineering controls, and adverse events (spill/leak or skin contact) involving liquid antineoplastic drugs. Data for this study came from the 2011 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Health and Safety Practices Survey of Healthcare Workers which included a sample of approximately 1,800 nurses who had administered liquid antineoplastic drugs during the past seven days. Regression modeling was used to examine predictors of personal protective equipment use, engineering controls, and adverse events involving antineoplastic drugs. Approximately 14% of nurses reported experiencing an adverse event while administering antineoplastic drugs during the previous week. Usage of recommended engineering controls and personal protective equipment was quite variable. Usage of both was better in non-profit and government settings, when workers were more familiar with safe handling guidelines, and when perceived management commitment to safety was higher. Usage was poorer in the absence of specific safety handling procedures. The odds of adverse events increased with number of antineoplastic drugs treatments and when antineoplastic drugs were administered more days of the week. The odds of such events were significantly lower when the use of engineering controls and personal protective equipment was greater and when more precautionary measures were in place. Greater levels of management commitment to safety and perceived risk were also related to lower odds of adverse events. These results point to the value of implementing a comprehensive health and safety program that utilizes available hazard controls and effectively communicates

  19. Geo scientific basis for making the safety case for a SF/HL W/IL W repository in Opalinus clay in ne Switzerland (project Entsorgungsnachweis) 1: overview and main conclusions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gautschi, A.; Lambert, A.; Zuidema, P.

    2004-01-01

    This paper provides an overview of the geo-scientific basis and the main conclusions concerning the safety case for Project Entsorgungsnachweis (Nagra, 2002a, see first paper). The key geo-scientific input for the safety case is summarised in the following three papers. The data and arguments are discussed in great detail in Nagra (2002b) and in numerous reference reports cited therein. (author)

  20. Development of an FPGA-based controller for safety critical application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xing, A.; De Grosbois, J.; Sklyar, V.; Archer, P.; Awwal, A.

    2011-01-01

    In implementing safety functions, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) technology offers a distinct combination of benefits and advantages over microprocessor-based systems. FPGAs can be designed such that the final product is purely hardware, without any overhead runtime software, bringing the design closer to a conventional hardware-based solution. On the other hand, FPGAs can implement more complex safety logic that would generally require microprocessor-based safety systems. There are now qualified FPGA-based platforms available on the market with a credible use history in safety applications in nuclear power plants. Atomic Energy of Canada (AECL), in collaboration with RPC Radiy, has initiated a development program to define a vigorous FPGA engineering process suitable for implementing safety critical functions at the application development level. This paper provides an update on the FPGA development program along with the proposed design model using function block diagrams for the development of safety controllers in CANDU applications. (author)

  1. Patients as teachers: a randomised controlled trial on the use of personal stories of harm to raise awareness of patient safety for doctors in training.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jha, Vikram; Buckley, Hannah; Gabe, Rhian; Kanaan, Mona; Lawton, Rebecca; Melville, Colin; Quinton, Naomi; Symons, Jools; Thompson, Zoe; Watt, Ian; Wright, John

    2015-01-01

    Patient safety training often provides learners with a health professional's perspective rather than the patient's. Personal narratives of health-related harm allow patients to share their stories with health professionals to influence clinical behaviour by rousing emotions and improving attitudes to safety. This study measured the impact of patient narratives used to train junior doctors in patient safety. An open, multi-centre, two-arm, parallel design randomised controlled trial was conducted in the North Yorkshire East Coast Foundation School (NYECFS). The intervention consisted of 1-h-long patient narratives followed by discussion. The control arm received conventional faculty-delivered teaching. The Attitude to Patient Safety Questionnaire (APSQ) and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) were used to measure the impact of the intervention. 142 trainees received the intervention; 141 the control teaching. There was no evidence of a difference in post-intervention APSQ scores between the groups. There was a statistically significant difference in the underlying distribution of both post PA (positive affect) and post NA (negative affect) scores between the groups on the PANAS (pappeal and seems an obvious choice in designing safety interventions. On the basis of our primary outcome measure, we were unable to demonstrate effectiveness of the intervention in changing general attitudes to safety compared to control. While the intervention may impact on emotional engagement and learning about communication, we remain uncertain whether this will translate into improved behaviours in the clinical context or indeed if there are any negative effects. Grant reference no. RP-PG-0108-10049. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.

  2. 75 FR 69912 - Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management/Human Factors

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-16

    ... 192 and 195 [Docket ID PHMSA-2007-27954] RIN 2137-AE64 Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management/Human... Control Room Management/Human Factors rule at 49 CFR 192.631 and 195.446. The NPRM proposes to expedite... rule and to engage in open discussions with the agency at PHMSA's Control Room Management...

  3. Evaluating a Website to Teach Children Safety with Dogs: A Randomized Controlled Trial

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    David C. Schwebel

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available Dog bites represent a significant threat to child health. Theory-driven interventions scalable for broad dissemination are sparse. A website was developed to teach children dog safety via increased knowledge, improved cognitive skills in relevant domains, and increased perception of vulnerability to bites. A randomized controlled trial was conducted with 69 children aged 4–5 randomly assigned to use the dog safety website or a control transportation safety website for ~3 weeks. Assessment of dog safety knowledge and behavior plus skill in three relevant cognitive constructs (impulse control, noticing details, and perspective-taking was conducted both at baseline and following website use. The dog safety website incorporated interactive games, instructional videos including testimonials, a motivational rewards system, and messaging to parents concerning child lessons. Our results showed that about two-thirds of the intervention sample was not adherent to website use at home, so both intent-to-treat and per-protocol analyses were conducted. Intent-to-treat analyses yielded mostly null results. Per-protocol analyses suggested children compliant to the intervention protocol scored higher on knowledge and recognition of safe behavior with dogs following the intervention compared to the control group. Adherent children also had improved scores post-intervention on the cognitive skill of noticing details compared to the control group. We concluded that young children’s immature cognition can lead to dog bites. Interactive eHealth training on websites shows potential to teach children relevant cognitive and safety skills to reduce risk. Compliance to website use is a challenge, and some relevant cognitive skills (e.g., noticing details may be more amenable to computer-based training than others (e.g., impulse control.

  4. Risk-based configuration control: Application of PSA in improving technical specifications and operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Samanta, P.K.; Kim, I.S.; Vesely, W.E.

    1992-01-01

    Risk-based configuration control is the management of component configurations using a risk perspective to control risk and assure safety. A configuration, as used here, is a set of component operability statuses that define the state of a nuclear power plant. If the component configurations that have high risk implications do not occur, then the risk from the operation of nuclear power plants would be minimal. The control of component configurations, i.e., the management of component statuses, to minimize the risk from components being unavailable, becomes difficult, because the status of a standby safety system component is often not apparent unless it is tested. Controlling plant configuration from a risk-perspective can provide more direct risk control and also more operational flexibility by allowing looser controls in areas unimportant to risk. Risk-based configuration control approaches can be used to replace parts of nuclear power plant Technical Specifications. With the advances in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) technology, such approaches to improve Technical Specifications and operational safety are feasible. In this paper, we present an analysis of configuration risks, and a framework for risk-based configuration control to achieve the desired control of risk-significant configurations during plant operation

  5. Specification of safety requirements for waste packages with respect to practicable quality control measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruendler, D.; Wurtinger, W.

    1987-01-01

    Waste packages for disposal in a repository in the Federal Republic of Germany have to meet safety requirements derived from site specific safety analyses. The examination of the waste packages with regard to compliance with these requirements is the main objective of quality control measures. With respect to quality control the requirements have to be specified in a way that practicable control measures can be applied. This is dealt with for the quality control of the activity inventory and the quality control of the waste form. The paper discusses the determination of the activity of hard-to-measure radionuclides and the specification of safety related requirements for the waste form and the packaging using typical examples

  6. Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tossavainen, K.

    1998-08-01

    The report describes regulatory control of the use of nuclear energy by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in Finland in 1997. Nuclear regulatory control ascertained that the operation of Finnish NPPs was in compliance with the conditions set out in operating licences and current regulations. In addition to NPP normal operation, STUK oversaw projects at the plant units relating to power uprating and safety improvements. STUK prepared statements for the Ministry of Trade and Industry about the applications for renewing the operating licenses of Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs. The most important items of supervision in nuclear waste management were studies relating to the final disposal of spent fuel from NPPs and the review of the licence application for a repository for low- and intermediate-level reactor waste from Loviisa NPP. Preparation of general safety regulations for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel, to be published in the form of a Council of State Decision, was started. By safeguards control, the use of nuclear materials was verified to be in compliance with current regulations and that the whereabouts of every batch of nuclear material were always known. Nuclear material safeguards were stepped up to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials. In co-operation with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Institute of Seismology (University of Helsinki), preparations were undertaken to implement the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). For enforcement of the Treaty and as part of the international regulatory approach, STUK is currently developing laboratory analyses relating to airborne radioactivity measurements. The focus of co-operation funded by external sources was as follows: improvement of the safety of Kola and Leningrad NPPs, improvement of nuclear waste management in North-West Russia, development of the organizations of nuclear safety authorities in Eastern Europe and development

  7. Importance of Decision Support Systems About Food Safety in Raw Milk Production

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ecem Akan

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available In raw milk production decision support systems for control of food safety hazards has not been developed but main points of this system are available. The decision support systems’ elements include data identification at critical points in the milk supply chain, an information management system and data exchange. Decision supports systems has been developed on the basis of these elements. In dairy sector decision support systems are significant for controlling of food safety hazards and preferred by producers. When these systems are implemented in the milk supply chain, it can be prevented unnecessary sampling and analysis. In this article it will be underlined effects of decision support system elements on food safety of raw milk.

  8. Safety implications of using programmable digital computers in nuclear safety and control systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adams, D.M.; Rohrdanz, R.R.

    1982-01-01

    This papers describes the activities being conducted at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory associated with the use of stored-program computers for protection and control systems. This project has recently been initiated and a preliminary report will be available. The use of computers in plant control and protection (and more generally in system important to safety) represents a major departure from the systems which have been used in the past. The design, development, and audit methods used for these systems are significantly different, thus requiring different skills and different perspectives

  9. The safety feature of hydraulic driving system of control rod for 200 MW nuclear heating reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chi Zongbo; Wu Yuanqiang

    1997-01-01

    The hydraulic driving system of control rod is used as control rod drive mechanism in 200 MW nuclear heating reactor. Design of this system is based on passive system, integrating drive and guide of control rod. The author analyzes the inherent safety and the design safety of this system, with mechanism of control rod not ejecting when the pressure of pressure vessel is lost, and calculating result of core not exposing when the amount of coolant is drained by broken pipe. The results indicate that this system has good safety feature, and assures reactor safety under any accident conditions, providing important technology support for 200 MW nuclear heating reactor with inherent safety feature

  10. Consensus standards utilized and implemented for nuclear criticality safety in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, Yasushi; Okuno, Hiroshi; Naito, Yoshitaka

    1996-01-01

    The fundamental framework for the criticality safety of nuclear fuel facilities regulations is, in many advanced countries, generally formulated so that technical standards or handbook data are utilized to support the licensing safety review and to implement its guidelines. In Japan also, adequacy of the safety design of nuclear fuel facilities is checked and reviewed on the basis of licensing safety review guides. These guides are, first, open-quotes The Basic Guides for Licensing Safety Review of Nuclear Fuel Facilities,close quotes and as its subsidiaries, open-quotes The Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facility Licensing Safety Review Guidesclose quotes and open-quotes The Reprocessing Facility Licensing Safety Review Guides.close quotes The open-quotes Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook close-quote of Japan and the Technical Data Collection are published and utilized to supply related data and information for the licensing safety review, such as for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The well-established technical standards and data abroad such as those by the American Nuclear Society and the American National Standards Institute are also utilized to complement the standards in Japan. The basic principles of criticality safety control for nuclear fuel facilities in Japan are duly stipulated in the aforementioned basic guides as follows: 1. Guide 10: Criticality control for a single unit; 2. Guide 11: Criticality control for multiple units; 3. Guide 12: Consideration for a criticality accident

  11. Mergers and concentrations occurring on the basis of acquiring of control in Serbian and EU competition law

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Fišer-Šobot Sandra S.

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Relevant Serbian and EU competition legislation does not define what is considered a concentration, but regulates which business transactions lead to concentrations of undertakings. Concentrations can be differentiated according to whether the concentration affects legal position of the merging undertakings. A concentration shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a lasting basis results from the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings. Second type of concentrations occurs in the case of an acquisition of control. Finally, the concentration shall be deemed to arise in the case of creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. This paper analyses mergers and concentrations occurring on the basis of acquiring of control in Serbian and EU competition law.

  12. Vector control of wind turbine on the basis of the fuzzy selective neural net*

    Science.gov (United States)

    Engel, E. A.; Kovalev, I. V.; Engel, N. E.

    2016-04-01

    An article describes vector control of wind turbine based on fuzzy selective neural net. Based on the wind turbine system’s state, the fuzzy selective neural net tracks an maximum power point under random perturbations. Numerical simulations are accomplished to clarify the applicability and advantages of the proposed vector wind turbine’s control on the basis of the fuzzy selective neuronet. The simulation results show that the proposed intelligent control of wind turbine achieves real-time control speed and competitive performance, as compared to a classical control model with PID controllers based on traditional maximum torque control strategy.

  13. The ConCom Safety Management Scale: developing and testing a measurement instrument for control-based and commitment-based safety management approaches in hospitals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alingh, Carien W; Strating, Mathilde M H; van Wijngaarden, Jeroen D H; Paauwe, Jaap; Huijsman, Robbert

    2018-03-06

    Nursing management is considered important for patient safety. Prior research has predominantly focused on charismatic leadership styles, although it is questionable whether these best characterise the role of nurse managers. Managerial control is also relevant. Therefore, we aimed to develop and test a measurement instrument for control-based and commitment-based safety management of nurse managers in clinical hospital departments. A cross-sectional survey design was used to test the newly developed questionnaire in a sample of 2378 nurses working in clinical departments. The nurses were asked about their perceptions of the leadership behaviour and management practices of their direct supervisors. Psychometric properties were evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis and reliability estimates. The final 33-item questionnaire showed acceptable goodness-of-fit indices and internal consistency (Cronbach's α of the subscales range: 0.59-0.90). The factor structure revealed three subdimensions for control-based safety management: (1) stressing the importance of safety rules and regulations; (2) monitoring compliance; and (3) providing employees with feedback. Commitment-based management consisted of four subdimensions: (1) showing role modelling behaviour; (2) creating safety awareness; (3) showing safety commitment; and (4) encouraging participation. Construct validity of the scale was supported by high factor loadings and provided preliminary evidence that control-based and commitment-based safety management are two distinct yet related constructs. The findings were reconfirmed in a cross-validation procedure. The results provide initial support for the construct validity and reliability of our ConCom Safety Management Scale. Both management approaches were found to be relevant for managing patient safety in clinical hospital departments. The scale can be used to deepen our understanding of the influence of patient safety management on healthcare professionals

  14. Technical Details on Beyond Design Basis Event Pilot Evaluations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    2013-01-01

    The primary focus of the BDBE pilot project was the review of BDBE analysis and mitigation features at four DOE nuclear facilities representing a range of DOE sites, nuclear facility types/activities, and responsible program offices. The pilots looked at (1) how beyond design basis accidents were evaluated and documented in the facility Documented Safety Analysis, (2) potential BDBE vulnerabilities and margins to failure of facility safety features as obtained from general area and specific system walkdowns and design documents reviews, and (3) preparations made in facility and site emergency management programs to respond to severe accidents. It also evaluated whether draft BDBE guidance on safety analysis and emergency management could be used to improve the analysis of and preparations for mitigating severe and beyond design basis accidents. The details of these activities are organized in this report as described below.

  15. Vibration control of uncertain multiple launch rocket system using radial basis function neural network

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Bo; Rui, Xiaoting

    2018-01-01

    Poor dispersion characteristics of rockets due to the vibration of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) have always restricted the MLRS development for several decades. Vibration control is a key technique to improve the dispersion characteristics of rockets. For a mechanical system such as MLRS, the major difficulty in designing an appropriate control strategy that can achieve the desired vibration control performance is to guarantee the robustness and stability of the control system under the occurrence of uncertainties and nonlinearities. To approach this problem, a computed torque controller integrated with a radial basis function neural network is proposed to achieve the high-precision vibration control for MLRS. In this paper, the vibration response of a computed torque controlled MLRS is described. The azimuth and elevation mechanisms of the MLRS are driven by permanent magnet synchronous motors and supposed to be rigid. First, the dynamic model of motor-mechanism coupling system is established using Lagrange method and field-oriented control theory. Then, in order to deal with the nonlinearities, a computed torque controller is designed to control the vibration of the MLRS when it is firing a salvo of rockets. Furthermore, to compensate for the lumped uncertainty due to parametric variations and un-modeled dynamics in the design of the computed torque controller, a radial basis function neural network estimator is developed to adapt the uncertainty based on Lyapunov stability theory. Finally, the simulated results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed control system and show that the proposed controller is robust with regard to the uncertainty.

  16. Administrative goals and safety standards for hazard control on forested recreation sites

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee A. Paine

    1973-01-01

    For efficient control of tree hazard on recreation sites, a specific administrative goal must be selected. A safety standard designed to achieve the selected goal and a uniform hazard-rating procedure will then promote a consistent level of safety at an acceptable cost. Safety standards can be established with the aid of data for past years, and dollar evaluations are...

  17. Risk based limits for Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    OSR limits are designed to protect the assumptions made in the facility safety analysis in order to preserve the safety envelope during facility operation. Normally, limits are set based on ''worst case conditions'' without regard to the likelihood (frequency) of a credible event occurring. In special cases where the accident analyses are based on ''time at risk'' arguments, it may be desirable to control the time at which the facility is at risk. A methodology has been developed to use OSR limits to control the source terms and the times these source terms would be available, thus controlling the acceptable risk to a nuclear process facility. The methodology defines a new term ''gram-days''. This term represents the area under a source term (inventory) vs time curve which represents the risk to the facility. Using the concept of gram-days (normalized to one year) allows the use of an accounting scheme to control the risk under the inventory vs time curve. The methodology results in at least three OSR limits: (1) control of the maximum inventory or source term, (2) control of the maximum gram-days for the period based on a source term weighted average, and (3) control of the maximum gram-days at the individual source term levels. Basing OSR limits on risk based safety analysis is feasible, and a basis for development of risk based limits is defensible. However, monitoring inventories and the frequencies required to maintain facility operation within the safety envelope may be complex and time consuming

  18. Simplifying documentation while approaching site closure: integrated health and safety plans as documented safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, Tulanda

    2003-01-01

    At the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) near Cincinnati, Ohio, environmental restoration activities are supported by Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) that combine the required project-specific Health and Safety Plans, Safety Basis Requirements (SBRs), and Process Requirements (PRs) into single Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs). By isolating any remediation activities that deal with Enriched Restricted Materials, the SBRs and PRs assure that the hazard categories of former nuclear facilities undergoing remediation remain less than Nuclear. These integrated DSAs employ Integrated Safety Management methodology in support of simplified restoration and remediation activities that, so far, have resulted in the decontamination and demolition (D and D) of over 150 structures, including six major nuclear production plants. This paper presents the FCP method for maintaining safety basis documentation, using the D and D I-HASP as an example

  19. Nuclear Safety Charter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The AREVA 'Values Charter' reaffirmed the priority that must be given to the requirement for a very high level of safety, which applies in particular to the nuclear field. The purpose of this Nuclear Safety Charter is to set forth the group's commitments in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection so as to ensure that this requirement is met throughout the life cycle of the facilities. It should enable each of us, in carrying out our duties, to commit to this requirement personally, for the company, and for all stakeholders. These commitments are anchored in organizational and action principles and in complete transparency. They build on a safety culture shared by all personnel and maintained by periodic refresher training. They are implemented through Safety, Health, and Environmental management systems. The purpose of these commitments, beyond strict compliance with the laws and regulations in force in countries in which we operate as a group, is to foster a continuous improvement initiative aimed at continually enhancing our overall performance as a group. Content: 1 - Organization: responsibility of the group's executive management and subsidiaries, prime responsibility of the operator, a system of clearly defined responsibilities that draws on skilled support and on independent control of operating personnel, the general inspectorate: a shared expertise and an independent control of the operating organization, an organization that can be adapted for emergency management. 2 - Action principles: nuclear safety applies to every stage in the plant life cycle, lessons learned are analyzed and capitalized through the continuous improvement initiative, analyzing risks in advance is the basis of Areva's safety culture, employees are empowered to improve nuclear Safety, the group is committed to a voluntary radiation protection initiative And a sustained effort in reducing waste and effluent from facility Operations, employees and subcontractors are treated

  20. Safety precautions in atomic pile control (1962); Securite dans le controle des piles atomiques (1962)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Furet, J [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1962-07-01

    We have been led to study the problem of safety in atomic pile control as a result of our participation on the one hand in the planning of C.E.A. atomic piles, and on the other hand in the pile safety sub omission considering atomic pile safety of operational or planned C.E.A. piles. We have thus had to consider the wishes occurring in piles during their operation and also their behaviour in the dynamic state The present work deals mainly with the importance of intrinsic safety devices, with the influence of reactivity variations on the power fluctuations during accidental operation, and with the development of robust and reliable safety appliances. The starting p accident has been especially studied both for low-flux piles where a compromise is necessary between the response time of the safety appliances and the statistical fluctuations and for high lux piles where xenon poisoning has an effect on the lower limit of the velocity of reactivity liberation. The desirability has been stressed of automation as a safety factor in atomic pile control. The details required for an understanding of the diagrams of the apparatus are given. (author) [French] Nous avons aborde le probleme de la securite dans le controle des piles atomiques a la suite de notre participation d'une part aux avant rojets de piles atomiques du CE.A. et d'autre part a l'examen au sein de la sous ommission de surete des piles, de la securite des piles du CE.A. en fonctionnement ou en projet. Nous avons ete amenes a nous interesser alors aux risques encourus par les piles pendant leur fonctionnement et par la meme a leur comportement en regime dynamique. Ce travail traite principalement de l'importance des securites intrinseques, de l'influence des variations de reactivite sur les evolutions de puissance en regime d'accident et du developpement d'appareillages de securite robustes et de fonctionnement tres sur. L'accident de demarrage a ete particulierement developpe aussi bien pour les piles a bas

  1. Safety precautions in atomic pile control (1962); Securite dans le controle des piles atomiques (1962)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Furet, J. [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1962-07-01

    We have been led to study the problem of safety in atomic pile control as a result of our participation on the one hand in the planning of C.E.A. atomic piles, and on the other hand in the pile safety sub omission considering atomic pile safety of operational or planned C.E.A. piles. We have thus had to consider the wishes occurring in piles during their operation and also their behaviour in the dynamic state The present work deals mainly with the importance of intrinsic safety devices, with the influence of reactivity variations on the power fluctuations during accidental operation, and with the development of robust and reliable safety appliances. The starting p accident has been especially studied both for low-flux piles where a compromise is necessary between the response time of the safety appliances and the statistical fluctuations and for high lux piles where xenon poisoning has an effect on the lower limit of the velocity of reactivity liberation. The desirability has been stressed of automation as a safety factor in atomic pile control. The details required for an understanding of the diagrams of the apparatus are given. (author) [French] Nous avons aborde le probleme de la securite dans le controle des piles atomiques a la suite de notre participation d'une part aux avant rojets de piles atomiques du CE.A. et d'autre part a l'examen au sein de la sous ommission de surete des piles, de la securite des piles du CE.A. en fonctionnement ou en projet. Nous avons ete amenes a nous interesser alors aux risques encourus par les piles pendant leur fonctionnement et par la meme a leur comportement en regime dynamique. Ce travail traite principalement de l'importance des securites intrinseques, de l'influence des variations de reactivite sur les evolutions de puissance en regime d'accident et du developpement d'appareillages de securite robustes et de fonctionnement tres sur. L'accident de demarrage a ete particulierement

  2. 76 FR 49532 - Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control; Technical Report on the...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-10

    ...-0112] Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control; Technical Report on the Effectiveness of Electronic Stability Control Systems for Cars and LTVs AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety..., Electronic Stability Control Systems. The report's title is: Crash Prevention Effectiveness in Light-Vehicle...

  3. Implementation of an Enhanced Measurement Control Program for handling nuclear safety samples at WSRC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boler-Melton, C.; Holland, M.K.

    1991-01-01

    In the separation and purification of nuclear material, nuclear criticality safety (NCS) is of primary concern. The primary nuclear criticality safety controls utilized by the Savannah River Site (SRS) Separations Facilities involve administrative and process equipment controls. Additional assurance of NCS is obtained by identifying key process hold points where sampling is used to independently verify the effectiveness of production control. Nuclear safety measurements of samples from these key process locations provide a high degree of assurance that processing conditions are within administrative and procedural nuclear safety controls. An enhanced procedure management system aimed at making improvements in the quality, safety, and conduct of operation was implemented for Nuclear Safety Sample (NSS) receipt, analysis, and reporting. All procedures with nuclear safety implications were reviewed for accuracy and adequate detail to perform the analytical measurements safely, efficiently, and with the utmost quality. Laboratory personnel worked in a ''Deliberate Operating'' mode (a systematic process requiring continuous expert oversight during all phases of training, testing, and implementation) to initiate the upgrades. Thus, the effort to revise and review nuclear safety sample procedures involved a team comprised of a supervisor, chemist, and two technicians for each procedure. Each NSS procedure was upgraded to a ''Use Every Time'' (UET) procedure with sign-off steps to ensure compliance with each step for every nuclear safety sample analyzed. The upgrade program met and exceeded both the long and short term customer needs by improving measurement reliability, providing objective evidence of rigid adherence to program principles and requirements, and enhancing the system for independent verification of representative sampling from designated NCS points

  4. Automated Systems for Road Safety control in a Developing World ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    An Automated system was finally designed and developed for road safety control. This Automated system is believed to have the capacity to minimize or eliminate the problems identified in this study on traffic control in a developing world. Key words: drivers, traffic situation information, accident causation, FRSC ...

  5. Safety culture as a matter of regulatory control and regulatory effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camargo, C.T.M.; Furieri, E.B.; Arrieta, L.A.I.; Almeida, C.U.C.

    2002-01-01

    More than 15 years have passed since the term 'safety culture' was introduced by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), and although the concept now is widely accepted, practical applications and characteristics have been disseminated mainly for nuclear power plant operating organizations. There is still a lack of international guidance on the use of safety culture as a regulatory matter and on the application of the concept within regulatory organizations. This work explores the meaning of safety culture in two different fields: as an element of safety management systems it shall be a matter of regulatory control; as a complementary tool for quality management it should be used to enhance regulatory effectiveness. Brazilian recent experience on regulating nuclear power reactors provide some examples on how the concept of safety culture may influence regulatory strategies and regulatory management. (author)

  6. A holistic approach to control process safety risks: Possible ways forward

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pasman, H.J.; Knegtering, B.; Rogers, W.J.

    2013-01-01

    system, the process industry is monitoring safety performance indicators. The critical intensity level upon which management must be alarmed is less simple. Risk assessment may be improved, made dynamic, and be a tool of process control by taking account of short-term risk fluctuations based on sensor signals and the influence of human factors with its long-term changes via indicators. Bayesian network can provide the infrastructure. The paper will describe various complexities when applying a holistic control of safety to a process plant in general, and it will more specifically focus on safeguarding measures such as barriers and other controls with some examples. -- Highlights: • Complexity of process installations makes risk control of a process challenging. • Erosive drift by cost pressure and efficiency increase may undermine safety level. • Resilience engineering in socio-psychological context analyzed this successfully. • There is prospect too to develop the technical side of process safety resilience. • Process safety performance indicator information may help to establish risk level

  7. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PIEPHO, M.G.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).'' All assumptions, parameters and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR

  8. Design basis document open-item resolution and reportability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gambhir, S.K.; Livingston, B.R.; Purcell, J.J.; Erickson, E.A.

    1989-01-01

    In the process of reconstituting the design bases for older nuclear power plants, information or references may not be available to fully define the design requirements or to document and verify the adequacy of the design. Also, information that is in conflict with other data is identified. The missing and conflicting information must be reconstituted in order to adequately document the design bases of the plant. For these operating facilities, the identification, tracking, and resolution of missing or conflicting information is very important when the reporting requirements stipulated by 10CFR21, 10CFR50.72, and 10CFR50.73 are considered. Additionally, controlled documentation (calculations, drawings, etc.) used to develop the design basis documents may contain conflicting data. In some cases, conflicts between the as-built design and licensing or design basis requirements established in specific commitments to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission may be identified. Furthermore, concerns regarding the adequacy of safety-related systems or components to perform their required function may be identified that would warrant prompt action by the licensee. The approach discussed in this paper was used by Omaha Public Power District for the ongoing design basis reconstitution effort at the Fort Calhoun nuclear plant

  9. Quality and safety control in the production of recreational-purpose cottage cheese

    OpenAIRE

    Мостова, Людмила Миколаївна; Клусович, Тетяна Валеріївна

    2015-01-01

    The paper deals with the relevant problem of implementing safety control systems according to HACCP principles for Ukrainian catering establishments in the integration of trade space. Taking into account high competition and consumer audience gaining priority, the work emphasizes the need to develop and implement safety control system according to HACCP principles as a precondition for leadership of catering establishments  in the national market, and get significant competitive advantages in...

  10. Occupational safety and health textbook for radiological personnel employed in structural material testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abraham, J.

    1981-01-01

    The comprehensive textbook for X-ray and radiological testing personnel includes requirements and rules of occupational safety and health on the basis of Hungarian and international (mainly German) literature. In the chapter Fundamentals, X-ray and radioactive radiations, their measurements and biological effects, doses etc are described. In the chapter Occupational safety and health, the jobs representing radiation hazards are listed and safety regulations for them are reported. Finally, information for prevention and first aid is presented. Control questions are added to each part. The Appendix contains safety standards and regulations, information on legal aspects of safety and radiation protection as well as recommendations. (Sz.J.)

  11. Developing safety in the nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, M.L.

    1996-01-01

    The nuclear fuel cycle had its origins in the new technology developed in the 1940s and 50s involving novel physical and chemical processes. At the front end of the cycle, mining, milling and fuel fabrication all underwent development, but in general the focus of process development and safety concerns was the reprocessing stage, with radiation, contamination and criticality the chief hazards. Safety research is not over and there is still work to be done in advancing technical knowledge to new generation nuclear fuels such as Mixed Oxide Fuel and in refining knowledge of margins and of potential upset conditions. Some comments are made on potential areas for work. The NUCEF facility will provide many useful data to aid safety analysis and accident prevention. The routine operations in such plants, basically chemical factories, requires industrial safety and in addition the protection of workers against radiation or contamination. The engineering and management measures for this were novel and the early operation of such plants pioneering. Later commissioning and operating experience has improved routine operating safety, leading to a new generation of factories with highly developed worker protection, engineering safeguards and safety management systems. Ventilation of contamination control zones, remote operation and maintenance, and advanced neutron shielding are engineering examples. In safety management, dose control practices, formally controlled operating procedures and safety cases, and audit processes are comparable with, or lead, best industry practice in other hazardous industries. Nonetheless it is still important that the knowledge and experience from operating plants continue to be gathered together to provide a common basis for improvement. The NEA Working Group on Fuel Cycle Safety provides a forum for much of this interchange. Some activities in the Group are described in particular the FINAS incident reporting system. (J.P.N.)

  12. A Randomized, Controlled Clinical Trial Comparing Efficacy, Safety ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    A Randomized, Controlled Clinical Trial Comparing Efficacy, Safety and Cost Effectiveness of Lornoxicam with Diclofenac Sodium in Patients of Osteoarthritis Knee. ... All patients were assessed with visual analogue scale and 100 meter walking test before starting of therapy, at 15 days and at 1, 2 and 3 months of therapy.

  13. Safety aspects of pressurised water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    This submission to the Health and Safety Executive has been prepared by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants (IPCS) as a contribution to the debate on safety aspects associated with Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). Although supporting an energy policy which includes the development of nuclear power, assurances are sought on a number of safety issues if it is decided that this should be generated by a PWR-type reactor. These issues are listed. In particular the following are mentioned: the wider publication of design information, the use of elastic-plastic fracture mechanics as the basis for determining pressure vessel integrity, the failure rate of steam generating units, water coolant quality control, greater investigation of two-phase flow accident conditions, the components of the reactor cooling system and training of reactor personnel in the understanding of LOCA effects. (U.K.)

  14. 77 FR 22637 - Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Accelerator Control Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-04-16

    ... revise the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard for accelerator control systems (ACS) in two ways. First... Standard (FMVSS) No. 124, Accelerator Control Systems,\\2\\ in two ways. First, we are proposing to update... February 2011 final report ``Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Systems,'' the...

  15. Relative hazard potential: the basis for definition of safety criteria for fast reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cave, L.; Ilberg, D.

    1977-02-01

    One of the main safety criteria to be met for larger thermal reactors is that the probability of exceeding the dose limits imposed by 10 CRF 100 should not be greater than 10 per reactor year. The potential hazard presented by a fast reactor could be substantially greater than that due to an LWR. The potential for harm of a reactor system may be judged by the effects which would arise from a severe accident. Several different types of effects may be considered: number of latent fatal cancers; number of deaths due to acute effects; number of thyroid tumors or nodules; extent of property damage; and genetic effects. Analytical methods for comparison are employed in this paper. A second important parameter reviewed in this report is the radio-toxicity attributed to the various isotopes. It was found that the worst conceivable accident to a 1000 MW(e) fast reactor would lead to effects on health greater by an order of magnitude than the worst accident usually considered for an LWR. Therefore, some reconsideration of the need for additional safety criteria for LMFBRs, as a guide to designers in relation to the control of the effects of very severe accidents, is desirable

  16. V and V methods of a safety-critical software for a programmable logic controller

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jang Yeol; Lee, Young Jun; Cha, Kyung Ho; Cheon, Se Woo; Lee, Jang Soo; Kwon, Kee Choon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kong, Seung Ju [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Ltd, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2005-11-15

    This paper addresses the Verification an Validation(V and V) process and the methodology for an embedded real time software of a safety-grade Programmable Logic Controller(PLC). This safety-grade PLC is being developed as one of the Korean Nuclear Instrumentation and Control System(KNICS) project KNICS projects are developing a Reactor Protection System(RPS) and an Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System(ESF-CCS) as well as a safety-grade PLC. The safety-grade PLC will be a major component that encomposes the RPS systems and the ESF-CCS systems as nuclear instruments and control equipment. This paper describes the V and V guidelines an procedures, V and V environment, V and V process and methodology, and the V and V tools in the KNICS projects. Specifically, it describes the real-time operating system V and V experience which corresponds to the requirement analysis phase, design phase and the implementation and testing phase of the software development life cycle. Main activities of the V and V for the PLC system software are a technical evaluation, licensing suitability evaluation, inspection and traceability analysis, formal verification, software safety analysis, and a software configuration management. The proposed V and V methodology satisfies the Standard Review Plan(SRP)/Branch Technical Position(BTP)-14 criteria for the safety software in nuclear power plants. The proposed V and V methodology is going to be used to verify the upcoming software life cycle in the KNICS projects.

  17. V and V methods of a safety-critical software for a programmable logic controller

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jang Yeol; Lee, Young Jun; Cha, Kyung Ho; Cheon, Se Woo; Lee, Jang Soo; Kwon, Kee Choon; Kong, Seung Ju

    2005-01-01

    This paper addresses the Verification an Validation(V and V) process and the methodology for an embedded real time software of a safety-grade Programmable Logic Controller(PLC). This safety-grade PLC is being developed as one of the Korean Nuclear Instrumentation and Control System(KNICS) project KNICS projects are developing a Reactor Protection System(RPS) and an Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System(ESF-CCS) as well as a safety-grade PLC. The safety-grade PLC will be a major component that encomposes the RPS systems and the ESF-CCS systems as nuclear instruments and control equipment. This paper describes the V and V guidelines an procedures, V and V environment, V and V process and methodology, and the V and V tools in the KNICS projects. Specifically, it describes the real-time operating system V and V experience which corresponds to the requirement analysis phase, design phase and the implementation and testing phase of the software development life cycle. Main activities of the V and V for the PLC system software are a technical evaluation, licensing suitability evaluation, inspection and traceability analysis, formal verification, software safety analysis, and a software configuration management. The proposed V and V methodology satisfies the Standard Review Plan(SRP)/Branch Technical Position(BTP)-14 criteria for the safety software in nuclear power plants. The proposed V and V methodology is going to be used to verify the upcoming software life cycle in the KNICS projects

  18. LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE HANFORD SWOC MASTER DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS (MDSA) and IMPLEMENTATION VALIDATION REVIEW (IVR)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MORENO, M.R.

    2004-01-01

    DOE set clear expectations on a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (20 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule), which ensured long-term benefit to Hanford, via issuance of a nuclear safety strategy in February 2003. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development with the goal of a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was approved to standardize methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was approved for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated at Hanford. Standard safety management program chapters were approved for use as a means of compliance with the programmatic chapters of DOE-STD-3009, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports''. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. The new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) developed to address the operations of four facilities within the Solid Waste Operations Complex (SWOC) necessitated development of an Implementation Validation Review (IVR) process. The IVR process encompasses the following objectives: safety basis controls and requirements are adequately incorporated into appropriate facility documents and work instructions, facility personnel are knowledgeable of controls and requirements, and the DSA/TSR controls have been implemented. Based on DOE direction and safety analysis tools, four waste management nuclear facilities were integrated into one safety basis document. With successful completion of implementation of this safety document, lessons-learned from the in-process review, safety analysis tools and IVR process were documented for future action

  19. Cadmium control/safety rod disposal at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McInnis, S.H.

    1995-01-01

    Four heavy-water-moderated reactors at the Savannah River Site will undergo the removal of 862 activated cadmium control/safety rods. Although these reactors are 40 years old, they offer 4 basic advantages for decommissioning: the equipment is still in some sort of operable state; the reactor is blow the floor in a large process room, allowing access; Control/safety rods can be handled remotely by existing equipment; a radiologically shielded removal path exists. Drawbacks include the following: age of reactors; improvements in technology have caused incompatibility problems; more strigent standards; compliance with environmental regulations. This article details how the removal was carried out and the current status of the project, keeping in mind the above considerations

  20. A recommendation of the National Board for Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection for the appointment of Nuclear Safety Control Officers for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adler, B.

    1990-01-01

    The Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection of the GDR requires that the managers of plants where nuclear facilities are operated appoint Control Officers for the fields of radiation protection, nuclear safety, physical protection, and accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The Control Officers are staff members of the operating organization but their appointment is subject to approval by the National Board and requires adequate qualification. The main task of the Control Officers as specialists is to give advice to the plant manager who retains responsibility for the safety of nuclear facilities, and to verify on his behalf that all requirements within their competence are met by the operating group. For this reason the Control Officer has to be absolutely independent of the head of the operating group. To enable the Control Officers to accomplish all necessary control activities and to guarantee independence from the head of the operating group, the plant manager has to establish adequate regulations of operation. As a pattern for such regulations the National Board has issued a Recommendation for the Appointment of Nuclear Safety Control Officers for Research Reactors, which provides a comprehensive survey of the requisite qualification features as well as the duties and rights of these Control Officers. This recommendation will be dealt with in the presentation

  1. Single parameter controls for nuclear criticality safety at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baker, J.S.; Peek, W.M.

    1995-01-01

    At the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, there are numerous situations in which nuclear criticality safety must be assured and subcriticality demonstrated by some method other than the straightforward use of the double contingency principle. Some cases are cited, and the criticality safety evaluation of contaminated combustible waste collectors is considered in detail. The criticality safety evaluation for combustible collectors is based on applying one very good control to the one controllable parameter. Safety can only be defended when the contingency of excess density is limited to a credible value based on process knowledge. No reasonable single failure is found that will result in a criticality accident. The historically accepted viewpoint is that this meets double contingency, even though there are not two independent controls on the single parameter of interest

  2. On safety classification of instrumentation and control systems and their components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yastrebenetskij, M.A.; Rozen, Yu.V.

    2004-01-01

    Safety classification of instrumentation and control systems (I and C) and their components (hardware, software, software-hardware complexes) is described: - evaluation of classification principles and criteria in Ukrainian standards and rules; comparison between Ukrainian and international principles and criteria; possibility and ways of coordination of Ukrainian and international standards related to (I and C) safety classification

  3. Enhancing Safety at Airline Operations Control Centre

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lukáš Řasa

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available In recent years a new term of Safety Management System (SMS has been introduced into aviation legislation. This system is being adopted by airline operators. One of the groundbased actors of everyday operations is Operations Control Centre (OCC. The goal of this article has been to identify and assess risks and dangers which occur at OCC and create a template for OCC implementation into SMS.

  4. Payload Safety: Risk and Characteristic-Based Control of Engineered Nanomaterials

    Science.gov (United States)

    Abou, Seraphin Chally; Saad, Maarouf

    2013-09-01

    In the last decade progress has been made to assist organizations that are developing payloads intended for flight on the International Space Station (ISS) and/or Space Shuttle. Collaboration programs for comprehensive risk assessment have been initiated between the U.S. and the European Union to generate requirements and data needed to comply with payloads safety and to perform risk assessment and controls guidance. Yet, substantial research gaps remain, as do challenges in the translation of these research findings to control for exposure to nanoscale material payloads, and the health effects. Since nanomaterial structures are different from traditional molecules, some standard material properties can change at size of 50nm or less. Changes in material properties at this scale challenge our understanding of hazards posed by nanomaterial payloads in the ISS realistic exposure conditions, and our ability to anticipate, evaluate, and control potential health issues, and safety. The research question addressed in this framework is: what kind of descriptors can be developed for nanomaterial payloads risks assessment? Methods proposed incorporate elements of characteristic- based risk an alysis: (1) to enable characterization of anthropogenic nanomaterials which can result in incidental from natural nanoparticles; and (2) to better understand safety attributes in terms of human health impacts from exposure to varying types of engineered nanomaterials.

  5. Critical review of controlled release packaging to improve food safety and quality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Xi; Chen, Mo; Xu, Chenyi; Yam, Kit L

    2018-03-19

    Controlled release packaging (CRP) is an innovative technology that uses the package to release active compounds in a controlled manner to improve safety and quality for a wide range of food products during storage. This paper provides a critical review of the uniqueness, design considerations, and research gaps of CRP, with a focus on the kinetics and mechanism of active compounds releasing from the package. Literature data and practical examples are presented to illustrate how CRP controls what active compounds to release, when and how to release, how much and how fast to release, in order to improve food safety and quality.

  6. Improved safety in advanced control complexes, without side effects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harmon, D.L.

    1997-01-01

    If we only look for a moment at the world around us, it is obvious that advances in digital electronic equipment and Human-System Interface (HSI) technology are occurring at a phenomenal pace. This is evidenced from our home entertainment systems to the dashboard and computer-based operation of our new cars. Though the nuclear industry has less vigorously embraced these advances, their application is being implemented through individual upgrades to current generation nuclear plants and as plant-wide control complexes for advanced plants. In both venues modem technology possesses widely touted advantages for improving plant availability as well as safety. The well-documented safety benefits of digital Instrumentation and Controls (I ampersand C) include higher reliability resulting from redundancy and fault tolerance, inherent self-test and self-diagnostic capabilities which have replaced error-prone human tasks, resistance to setpoint drift increasing available operating margins, and the ability to run complex, real-time, computer-based algorithms directly supporting an operator's monitoring and control task requirements. 22 refs., 3 figs., 5 tabs

  7. [Recommendations for inspections of the French nuclear safety authority].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rousse, C; Chauvet, B

    2015-10-01

    The French nuclear safety authority is responsible for the control of radiation protection in radiotherapy since 2002. Controls are based on the public health and the labour codes and on the procedures defined by the controlled health care facility for its quality and safety management system according to ASN decision No. 2008-DC-0103. Inspectors verify the adequacy of the quality and safety management procedures and their implementation, and select process steps on the basis of feedback from events notified to ASN. Topics of the inspection are communicated to the facility at the launch of a campaign, which enables them to anticipate the inspectors' expectations. In cases where they are not physicians, inspectors are not allowed to access information covered by medical confidentiality. The consulted documents must therefore be expunged of any patient-identifying information. Exchanges before the inspection are intended to facilitate the provision of documents that may be consulted. Finally, exchange slots between inspectors and the local professionals must be organized. Based on improvements achieved by the health care centres and on recommendations from a joint working group of radiotherapy professionals and the nuclear safety authority, changes will be made in the control procedure that will be implemented when developing the inspection program for 2016-2019. Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier SAS.

  8. The concept of underground nuclear heat and power plants (UNHPP) of upgraded safety, developed on the basis of ship-building technologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pashin, V.M.; Petrov, Eh.L.; Shalik, G.P.; Khazov, B.S.; Malyshev, S.P.

    1996-01-01

    A concept of underground nuclear heat and power plants (UNHPP) of upgraded safety on the basis of ship-building technologies is considered, in which the priority is set to population security and environmental protection. Ways of realization of ziro radiation risk for the population residing in a close vicinity of UNHPP are substantiated. basic principles of the concept are formulated which envisage the use of ship propulsion reactor facilities that have been multiply tested in operation. The sources of economic competitiveness of UNHPPs, as compared with the existing NPPs, are shown

  9. Accident beyond the design basis management with the coolant loss at the NPP with WWER

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skalozubov, V.I.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Kolykhanov, V.N.

    2010-01-01

    The analysis of status and experience of development on modelling and accident beyond the design basis management, including the severe accidents, at the nuclear power plants is carried out. The methodical providing of manuals on the accident beyond the design basis management with the coolant loss on the basis of simulated critical system configurations providing the necessary safety function performance on reactor unit is proposed. The project of symptom-oriented manuals on accident beyond the design basis management with the coolant loss on the serial power unit with WWER-1000 on the basis of developed methodical providing and well known results of deepened safety analysis is presented.

  10. A Study of Cyber Security Activities for Development of Safety-related Controller

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Myeongkyun; Song, Seunghwan; Yoo, Kwanwoo; Yun, Donghwa [Korea Univ., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    Nuclear Power Plant Regulatory guide describes the regulatory requirements to implement cyber security activities to ensure that design and operate to respond to cyber threats that exploited to vulnerability of digital-based technologies associated with safety-related digital instrumentation and control systems at nuclear power plants. Cyber security activities coverage is instrumentation and control systems to perform safety functions and digital-based equipment to use development, test, analysis and asset for instrumentation and control systems. Regulatory guidance is required to the cyber security activities that should be performed in each development phase of safety-related controller. Development organization should establish and implement to cyber security plans for responding to cyber threats throughout each lifecycle phase and the result of the cyber security activities should be generated to the documents. In addition, the independent verification and validation organization should perform simulated penetration test for enhancing response capabilities to cyber security threats and development organization should establish and implement response hardening solutions for the cyber security vulnerabilities identified in the simulated penetration test.

  11. A Study of Cyber Security Activities for Development of Safety-related Controller

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Myeongkyun; Song, Seunghwan; Yoo, Kwanwoo; Yun, Donghwa

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear Power Plant Regulatory guide describes the regulatory requirements to implement cyber security activities to ensure that design and operate to respond to cyber threats that exploited to vulnerability of digital-based technologies associated with safety-related digital instrumentation and control systems at nuclear power plants. Cyber security activities coverage is instrumentation and control systems to perform safety functions and digital-based equipment to use development, test, analysis and asset for instrumentation and control systems. Regulatory guidance is required to the cyber security activities that should be performed in each development phase of safety-related controller. Development organization should establish and implement to cyber security plans for responding to cyber threats throughout each lifecycle phase and the result of the cyber security activities should be generated to the documents. In addition, the independent verification and validation organization should perform simulated penetration test for enhancing response capabilities to cyber security threats and development organization should establish and implement response hardening solutions for the cyber security vulnerabilities identified in the simulated penetration test

  12. Continuous restraint control systems: safety improvement for various occupants

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Laan, E. van der; Jager, B. de; Veldpaus, F.; Steinbuch, M.; Nunen, E. van; Willemsen, D.

    2009-01-01

    Occupant safety can be significantly improved by continuous restraint control systems. These restraint systems adjust their configuration during the impact according to the actual operating conditions, such as occupant size, weight, occupant position, belt usage and crash severity. In this study,

  13. A safety control device for detecting undesirable conditions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1974-09-26

    The invention relates to safety control devices. It deals with a device adapted to transmit a warning signal and to the detection of an undesirable condition in an associated apparatus, said device comprising switching means comprising transistors mounted in a reaction path, feeding means for opening the switching means whenever an undesirable condition has been detected by sensors, whereby an oscillator is caused to stop oscillating, and an outlet device controlled by the oscillator stoppage. This can be applied to the supervision of nuclear reactor.

  14. Technical basis for acceptance criteria on the susceptibility of digital systems to electromagnetic interference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, P.D.; Korsah, K.; Antonescu, C.

    1992-01-01

    This paper discusses the development of the technical basis for establishing acceptance criteria on the susceptibility of digital systems to electromagnetic interference (EMI). The effort is sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and stems from the safety-related issues that need to be addressed with the application of digital instrumentation and controls systems in nuclear power plants. Designers of digital circuits are incorporating increasingly higher clock frequencies and lower logic voltage levels, thereby leading to the risk of susceptibility when spurious interference is misinterpreted as legitimate logic. Development of the technical basis for acceptance criteria centers around establishing good engineering practices to ensure that sufficient levels of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) are maintained between the nuclear power plant's electronic and electromechanical systems. First, good EMC design and installation practices are needed to control the emissions from interference sources and their impact on other nearby circuits and systems. Then, a test and evaluation program is needed to outline the EMI tests to be performed, the associated test methods to be followed, and adequate test limits to ensure that the circuit or system under test meets the recommended guidelines. Test and evaluation should be followed by periodic maintenance to assess whether the recommended EMI control practices continue to be adhered to as part of the routine operation of the nuclear power plant. By following these steps, the probability of encountering safety-related problems associated with EMI will be greatly reduced

  15. Safety Supervisory Strategy for an Upper-Limb Rehabilitation Robot Based on Impedance Control

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lizheng Pan

    2013-02-01

    Full Text Available User security is an important consideration for robots that interact with humans, especially for upper-limb rehabilitation robots, during the use of which stroke patients are often more susceptible to injury. In this paper, a novel safety supervisory control method incorporating fuzzy logic is proposed so as to guarantee the impaired limb's safety should an emergency situation occur and the robustness of the upper-limb rehabilitation robot control system. Firstly, a safety supervisory fuzzy controller (SSFC was designed based on the impaired-limb's real-time physical state by extracting and recognizing the impaired-limb's tracking movement features. Then, the proposed SSFC was used to automatically regulate the desired force either to account for reasonable disturbance resulting from pose or position changes or to respond in adequate time to an emergency based on an evaluation of the impaired-limb's physical condition. Finally, a position-based impedance controller was implemented to achieve compliance between the robotic end-effector and the impaired limb during the robot-assisted rehabilitation training. The experimental results show the effectiveness and potential of the proposed method for achieving safety and robustness for the rehabilitation robot.

  16. Radiation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-04-01

    Most of the ionizing radiation that people are exposed to in day-to-day activities comes from natural, rather than manmade, sources. The health effects of radiation - both natural and artificial - are relatively well understood and can be effectively minimized through careful safety measures and practices. The IAEA, together with other international and expert organizations, is helping to promote and institute Basic Safety Standards on an international basis to ensure that radiation sources and radioactive materials are managed for both maximum safety and human benefit

  17. Safety aspects on the Asea-Atom BWR 75 control room design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gemst, Paul van; Pedersen, Tor.

    1978-01-01

    The control room is an integrated part of the total plant layout and is located in a special building, known as the control building. The problems of designing a control room meeting all safety requirements and at the same time allowing for modifications to meet special customer specifications are described. (author)

  18. Hanford Waste Transfer Planning and Control - 13465

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirch, N.W.; Uytioco, E.M.; Jo, J. [Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington (United States)

    2013-07-01

    Hanford tank waste cleanup requires efficient use of double-shell tank space to support single-shell tank retrievals and future waste feed delivery to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Every waste transfer, including single-shell tank retrievals and evaporator campaign, is evaluated via the Waste Transfer Compatibility Program for compliance with safety basis, environmental compliance, operational limits and controls to enhance future waste treatment. Mixed radioactive and hazardous wastes are stored at the Hanford Site on an interim basis until they can be treated, as necessary, for final disposal. Implementation of the Tank Farms Waste Transfer Compatibility Program helps to ensure continued safe and prudent storage and handling of these wastes within the Tank Farms Facility. The Tank Farms Waste Transfer Compatibility Program is a Safety Management Program that is a formal process for evaluating waste transfers and chemical additions through the preparation of documented Waste Compatibility Assessments (WCA). The primary purpose of the program is to ensure that sufficient controls are in place to prevent the formation of incompatible mixtures as the result of waste transfer operations. The program defines a consistent means of evaluating compliance with certain administrative controls, safety, operational, regulatory, and programmatic criteria and specifies considerations necessary to assess waste transfers and chemical additions. Current operations are most limited by staying within compliance with the safety basis controls to prevent flammable gas build up in the tank headspace. The depth of solids, the depth of supernatant, the total waste depth and the waste temperature are monitored and controlled to stay within the Compatibility Program rules. Also, transfer planning includes a preliminary evaluation against the Compatibility Program to assure that operating plans will comply with the Waste Transfer Compatibility Program. (authors)

  19. The human factor in the organisation and regulation of nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bordes, F.; Savagner, J.-M.; Snanoudj, G.

    1981-10-01

    The TMI accident has brought to light the importance of the human factor in the safe operation of complex installations such as nuclear power plants. On this basis, the paper outlines the institutional framework for nuclear safety in France and reports on EDF practices in human resources management as well as in the improvement of working premises (control rooms) to optimize human behaviour in accident conditions. Finally, the interaction of labour laws on nuclear law in connection with safety is described. (NEA) [fr

  20. Safety assessment and quality control of medical x-ray facilities in some hospitals in Ghana

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Darko, E.O.; Charles, D.F.

    1998-01-01

    Safety assessment and quality control measurements of diagnostic x-ray installations were carried out in five hospitals in Ghana. The study was focused on the siting, design and construction of the buildings housing the x-ray units, assessment of safety systems and devices and measurements of the technical performance, and film processing conditions. The location, inadequacies in the design/construction, unavailability of relevant safety systems and devices, violation of basic safety principles and poor performance of some of the x-ray facilities indicate the need to improve quality control programmes, safety culture and enforcement of regulatory standards in diagnostic x-ray examinations in Ghana. (author). 8 refs., 11 tabs., 8 figs

  1. The Official Control beyond the Official Control. How To Plan And Schedule Controls Starting From Risk Assessment Along The Agro-Food Supply Chain.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Panunzio, M F; Caporizzi, R; Lagravinese, D; Conversano, M

    2015-01-01

    Every year the Italian Ministry of Health, on the basis of regional data, draws up the "Report on Official Controls" to be submitted to the Parliament. The report contains abundant data, diagrams and charts and illustrates the number and type of official controls (OC) performed by the pertinent Bodies (Ministry of Health, Regional and Local Health Authorities) over the previous year on Food Business Operators (FBO), in accordance with the EC Regulation 882/2004. The trend - which has consolidated over the years - relates to the multiplicity of OC and shows a decrease of such controls compared to an increase in "non-conformities". OC frequency is established by the Regional Authorities on the basis of the categorisation of both a "generic risk" for companies calculated taking into account the probability of occurrence of a "non-conformity", and a "specific" risk, assessed on the basis of the results of the OC actually performed on a given "Operatore del Settore Alimentare" (Food Sector Operator, in Italian: OSA). Thus, categorisation (i.e. the probability of occurrence of non-conformities) is the main driver of the OC scheduling and planning process. We have been asking ourselves whether the current OC planning/scheduling method is still suitable for ensuring food safety in the face of internalisation of the food supply chain. As a matter of fact, food safety is now becoming increasingly variable due to the globalization of consumption where "farm to fork", rather than "border to fork", food safety must be ensured. On the basis of these considerations, a different OC planning /scheduling method is being proposed based on the assessment of risks and the estimation of the occurrence of the same along the agro-food chain.

  2. Solid waste burial grounds interim safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saito, G.H.

    1994-01-01

    This Interim Safety Analysis document supports the authorization basis for the interim operation and restrictions on interim operations for the near-surface land disposal of solid waste in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. The Solid Waste Burial Grounds Interim Safety Basis supports the upgrade progress for the safety analysis report and the technical safety requirements for the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. Accident safety analysis scenarios have been analyzed based on the significant events identified in the preliminary hazards analysis. The interim safety analysis provides an evaluation of the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds to determine if the radiological and hazardous material exposures will be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint to the worker, the onsite personnel, the public, and the environment

  3. Solid waste burial grounds interim safety analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Saito, G.H.

    1994-10-01

    This Interim Safety Analysis document supports the authorization basis for the interim operation and restrictions on interim operations for the near-surface land disposal of solid waste in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. The Solid Waste Burial Grounds Interim Safety Basis supports the upgrade progress for the safety analysis report and the technical safety requirements for the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. Accident safety analysis scenarios have been analyzed based on the significant events identified in the preliminary hazards analysis. The interim safety analysis provides an evaluation of the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds to determine if the radiological and hazardous material exposures will be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint to the worker, the onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

  4. Prediction based active ramp metering control strategy with mobility and safety assessment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fang, Jie; Tu, Lili

    2018-04-01

    Ramp metering is one of the most direct and efficient motorway traffic flow management measures so as to improve traffic conditions. However, owing to short of traffic conditions prediction, in earlier studies, the impact on traffic flow dynamics of the applied RM control was not quantitatively evaluated. In this study, a RM control algorithm adopting Model Predictive Control (MPC) framework to predict and assess future traffic conditions, which taking both the current traffic conditions and the RM-controlled future traffic states into consideration, was presented. The designed RM control algorithm targets at optimizing the network mobility and safety performance. The designed algorithm is evaluated in a field-data-based simulation. Through comparing the presented algorithm controlled scenario with the uncontrolled scenario, it was proved that the proposed RM control algorithm can effectively relieve the congestion of traffic network with no significant compromises in safety aspect.

  5. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  6. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  7. Emergency Diesel: Safety-related instrumentation and control with programmable logic controllers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Breidenich, G.; Luedtke, M.

    2004-01-01

    This report presents a new concept for the design of emergency diesel equipment protection circuits as a part of the safety related instrumentation in the nuclear power plant Biblis, units A and B. The concept was implemented with state of the art SIMATIC S7/316 programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and can be adapted to any system with high availability requirements (e.g. power plant turbines, aircraft engines, mining pumps etc). (orig.)

  8. Self-powered remotely controlled machines and tools for safety improvement in mining

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mirzaeva, G. [University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW (Australia)

    2005-07-01

    This paper addresses the problem of meeting the safety requirements of mining industry for implementation of control and monitoring equipment without external wiring. Local power generation and accumulation combined with remote control and wireless data transmission are suggested as an appropriate way to make the implementation of such device safe and convenient, which in its turn would facilitate their wider application for automation and safety improvement. A rope shovel dipper trip system is discussed in detail as an example of a self-powered remotely-controlled system. Other possible applications of the concept are also identified, such as Armoured Face Conveyor (AFC) and water jet drilling operation monitoring. 5 refs., 6 figs.

  9. Functional Basis for Efficient Physical Layer Classical Control in Quantum Processors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ball, Harrison; Nguyen, Trung; Leong, Philip H. W.; Biercuk, Michael J.

    2016-12-01

    The rapid progress seen in the development of quantum-coherent devices for information processing has motivated serious consideration of quantum computer architecture and organization. One topic which remains open for investigation and optimization relates to the design of the classical-quantum interface, where control operations on individual qubits are applied according to higher-level algorithms; accommodating competing demands on performance and scalability remains a major outstanding challenge. In this work, we present a resource-efficient, scalable framework for the implementation of embedded physical layer classical controllers for quantum-information systems. Design drivers and key functionalities are introduced, leading to the selection of Walsh functions as an effective functional basis for both programing and controller hardware implementation. This approach leverages the simplicity of real-time Walsh-function generation in classical digital hardware, and the fact that a wide variety of physical layer controls, such as dynamic error suppression, are known to fall within the Walsh family. We experimentally implement a real-time field-programmable-gate-array-based Walsh controller producing Walsh timing signals and Walsh-synthesized analog waveforms appropriate for critical tasks in error-resistant quantum control and noise characterization. These demonstrations represent the first step towards a unified framework for the realization of physical layer controls compatible with large-scale quantum-information processing.

  10. VVER 1000-NPP Temelin safety upgrading

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fleischhans, J.; Ubra, O.

    1995-01-01

    A modernisation program upgrading Temelin plant to meet internationally adopted standard has been implemented during plant design and construction phases. The initial Czech-Russian design (primary system was of Russian design, secondary system was of Czech design) has been extensively modified and adapted to present western safety criteria and operational requirements. The goals are to achieve a high level of safety, reliability, availability and load-following ability. The load-following ability and response to grid frequency changes are very important for the Czech Republic, since the nuclear capacity represents a high proportion of the overall electrical system there. On the basis of IAEA OSART missions and Halliburton NUS audit results and in compliance with recommendations of The State Office for Nuclear Safety, Czech Power Company and Czech scientists and researchers a modernisation program project for Temelin has been carried out. It includes three main groups of VVER1000 MW unit innovations: - Modernization and upgrading of the safety and control systems. - Fuel replacement and modification of the reactor core. - Innovation of some components of the primary and secondary systems. The tenders for instrumentation and control system, nuclear fuel, diagnostic system and radiation monitoring system were issued to the world-well known suppliers. The US company Westinghouse Electric >Corporation (WEC) was selected to submit contract for the delivery of instrumentation and control system primary side diagnostic system and for the delivery of nuclear fuel. The contract was signed in 1993

  11. Food Safety and Quality Control: Hints from Proteomics

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Angelo D'Alessandro

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Over the last decade, proteomics has been successfully applied to the study of quality control in production processes of food (including meat, wine and beer, transgenic plants and milk and food safety (screening for food-derived pathogens. Indeed, food quality and safety and their influence on the health of end consumers have growingly become a founding principle in the international agenda of health organizations. The application of proteomics in food science was at first characterized by exploratory analyses of food of various origin (bovine, swine, chicken or lamb meat, but also transgenic food such as genetically modified maize, for example and beverages (beer, wine, in parallel to the genomic and transcriptomic approaches seeking determination of quantitative trait loci. In the last few years, technical improvements such as microbial biotyping strategies have growingly allowed proteomicists to address the safety issue as well. The newly introduced technical improvements (instrumentation characterized by higher sensitivity such as mass spectrometers have paved the way for the individuation of food-contaminating pathogens in a fast and efficient workflow which is mandatory in industrial food production chains.

  12. Measures to ensure safety of radioactive materials in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ghosh, P.K.; Sonawane, A.U.; Rane, D.M.

    2001-01-01

    In India, the use of ionizing radiation sources in industry, medicine, agriculture and research registered a significant increase during recent years. The basis of legislative control of the use of radiation in India is the Atomic Energy Act from 1962, which empowers the central Government to provide control over radioactive substances. Exercising these powers, the central Government has promulgated several radiation safety rules, which specify the requirements of licensing, the duties and responsibilities of radiation safety officers, powers of inspection, etc. Later in 1983, by the Act, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) was constituted by the central Government to exercise regulatory and safety functions. The report describes the existing system of regulatory control of radiation sources in India and in particular, refers to the regulatory documents prepared by the AERB, the type approval of radiation equipment, the regulatory consent for every person handling radioactive sources, and the inspection activities and enforcement of regulatory actions. The report also explains how management of disused sources is carried out in India, including the handling of accidents and emergency activities. (author)

  13. Safety of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements for all main areas of safety for research reactors, with particular emphasis on requirements for design and operation. It explains the safety objectives and concepts that form the basis for safety and safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of new research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives and concepts, and they are to be applied to the extent practicable for existing research reactors. The safety requirements established in this publication for the management of safety and regulatory supervision apply to site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning, operation (including utilization and modification), and planning for decommissioning of research reactors (including critical assemblies and subcritical assemblies). The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies and other organizations with responsibilities in these areas and in safety analysis, verification and review, and the provision of technical support.

  14. Preliminary Evaluation Methodology of ECCS Performance for Design Basis LOCA Redefinition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Dong Gu; Ahn, Seung Hoon; Seul, Kwang Won

    2010-01-01

    To improve their existing regulations, the USNRC has made efforts to develop the risk-informed and performance-based regulation (RIPBR) approaches. As a part of these efforts, the rule revision of 10CFR50.46 (ECCS Acceptance Criteria) is underway, considering some options for 4 categories of spectrum of break sizes, ECCS functional reliability, ECCS evaluation model, and ECCS acceptance criteria. Since the potential for safety benefits and unnecessary burden reduction from design basis LOCA redefinition is high relative to other options, the USNRC is proceeding with the rulemaking for design basis LOCA redefinition. An instantaneous break with a flow rate equivalent to a double ended guillotine break (DEGB) of the largest primary piping system in the plant is widely recognized as an extremely unlikely event, while redefinition of design basis LOCA can affect the existing regulatory practices and approaches. In this study, the status of the design basis LOCA redefinition and OECD/NEA SMAP (Safety Margin Action Plan) methodology are introduced. Preliminary evaluation methodology of ECCS performance for LOCA is developed and discussed for design basis LOCA redefinition

  15. Research on conceptual design of simplified nuclear safety instrument and control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huang Jie

    2015-01-01

    The Nuclear safety instrument and control system is directly related to the safety of the reactor. So redundant and diversity design is used to ensure the system's security and reliability. This make the traditional safety system large, more cabinets and wiring complexity. To solve these problem, we can adopt new technology to make the design more simple. The simplify conceptual design can make the system less cabinets, less wiring, but high security, strong reliability. (author)

  16. Battery collection in municipal waste management in Japan: challenges for hazardous substance control and safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Terazono, Atsushi; Oguchi, Masahiro; Iino, Shigenori; Mogi, Satoshi

    2015-05-01

    To clarify current collection rules of waste batteries in municipal waste management in Japan and to examine future challenges for hazardous substance control and safety, we reviewed collection rules of waste batteries in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. We also conducted a field survey of waste batteries collected at various battery and small waste electric and electronic equipment (WEEE) collection sites in Tokyo. The different types of batteries are not collected in a uniform way in the Tokyo area, so consumers need to pay attention to the specific collection rules for each type of battery in each municipality. In areas where small WEEE recycling schemes are being operated after the enforcement of the Act on Promotion of Recycling of Small Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment in Japan in 2013, consumers may be confused about the need for separating batteries from small WEEE (especially mobile phones). Our field survey of collected waste batteries indicated that 6-10% of zinc carbon and alkaline batteries discarded in Japan currently could be regarded as containing mercury. More than 26% of zinc carbon dry batteries currently being discarded may have a lead content above the labelling threshold of the EU Batteries Directive (2006/66/EC). In terms of safety, despite announcements by producers and municipalities about using insulation (tape) on waste batteries to prevent fires, only 2.0% of discarded cylindrical dry batteries were insulated. Our field study of small WEEE showed that batteries made up an average of 4.6% of the total collected small WEEE on a weight basis. Exchangeable batteries were used in almost all of mobile phones, digital cameras, radios, and remote controls, but the removal rate was as low as 22% for mobile phones. Given the safety issues and the rapid changes occurring with mobile phones or other types of small WEEE, discussion is needed among stakeholders to determine how to safely collect and recycle WEEE and waste batteries. Copyright

  17. Technical considerations for the development of an engineering safety features control system with PLC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, C. K.; Kim, C. H.; Han, J. B.; Kim, H.; Lee, S. S.

    2002-01-01

    Technical considerations are summarized for the development of an ESFCS(Engineered Safety Features Control System) with PLC (Programmable Logic Controller). The ESFCS is required for the mitigation of plant accident conditions and therefore developed in conformance with the design requirements applied to the safety critical system. The design of ESFCS primarily considered its safety, and the system has an architecture that will be able to minimize spurious actuation. The PLC based functional distribution and redundant design features are adopted, and the fieldbus is applied in the communication of information and control signals between PLC processors. It is expected that the ESFCS will have several advanced design features compared with the conventional systems supplied by foreign vendors

  18. Control Decisions for Flammable Gas Hazards in Waste Transfer Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRIPPS, L.J.

    2000-01-01

    This report describes the control decisions for flammable gas hazards in waste transfer systems (i.e., waste transfer piping and waste transfer-associated structures) made at control decision meetings on November 30, 1999a and April 19, 2000, and their basis. These control decisions, and the analyses that support them, will be documented in an amendment to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (CHG 2000a) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) (CHG 2000b) to close the Flammable Gas Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) (Bacon 1996 and Wagoner 1996). Following the Contractor Tier I review of the FSAR and TSR amendment, it will be submitted to the US. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) for review and approval. The control decision meeting on November 30, 1999 to address flammable gas hazards in waste transfer systems followed the control decision process and the criteria for control decisions described in Section 3.3.1.5 of the FSAR. The control decision meeting agenda, attendance list, and introductory and background presentations are included in Attachments 1 through 4. The control decision discussions on existing and other possible controls for flammable gas hazards in waste transfer systems and the basis for selecting or not selecting specific controls are summarized in this report

  19. Safety critical FPGA-based NPP instrumentation and control systems: assessment, development and implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bakhmach, E. S.; Siora, A. A.; Tokarev, V. I.; Kharchenko, V. S.; Sklyar, V. V.; Andrashov, A. A.

    2010-10-01

    The stages of development, production, verification, licensing and implementation methods and technologies of safety critical instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants (NPP) based on FPGA (Field Programmable Gates Arrays) technologies are described. A life cycle model and multi-version technologies of dependability and safety assurance of FPGA-based instrumentation and control systems are discussed. An analysis of NPP instrumentation and control systems construction principles developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy using FPGA-technologies and results of these systems implementation and operation at Ukrainian and Bulgarian NPP are presented. The RADIY TM platform has been designed and developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy, Ukraine. The main peculiarity of the RADIY TM platform is the use of FPGA as programmable components for logic control operation. The FPGA-based RADIY TM platform used for NPP instrumentation and control systems development ensures sca lability of system functions types, volume and peculiarities (by changing quantity and quality of sensors, actuators, input/output signals and control algorithms); sca lability of dependability (safety integrity) (by changing a number of redundant channel, tiers, diagnostic and reconfiguration procedures); sca lability of diversity (by changing types, depth and method of diversity selection). (Author)

  20. Cold Vacuum Drying Safety Class Instrumentation and Control System Design Description SYS 93-2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WHITEHURST, R.

    1999-01-01

    This document describes the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) Safety Class Instrumentation and Control system (SCIC). The SCIC provides safety functions and features to protect the environment, off-site and on-site personnel and equipment. The function of the SCIC is to provide automatic trip features, valve interlocks, alarms, indication and control for the cold vacuum drying process

  1. Implementation of Recommendations from the One System Comparative Evaluation of the Hanford Tank Farms and Waste Treatment Plant Safety Bases

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garrett, Richard L.; Niemi, Belinda J.; Paik, Ingle K.; Buczek, Jeffrey A.; Lietzow, J.; McCoy, F.; Beranek, F.; Gupta, M.

    2013-01-01

    A Comparative Evaluation was conducted for One System Integrated Project Team to compare the safety bases for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project (WTP) and Tank Operations Contract (TOC) (i.e., Tank Farms) by an Expert Review Team. The evaluation had an overarching purpose to facilitate effective integration between WTP and TOC safety bases. It was to provide One System management with an objective evaluation of identified differences in safety basis process requirements, guidance, direction, procedures, and products (including safety controls, key safety basis inputs and assumptions, and consequence calculation methodologies) between WTP and TOC. The evaluation identified 25 recommendations (Opportunities for Integration). The resolution of these recommendations resulted in 16 implementation plans. The completion of these implementation plans will help ensure consistent safety bases for WTP and TOC along with consistent safety basis processes. procedures, and analyses. and should increase the likelihood of a successful startup of the WTP. This early integration will result in long-term cost savings and significant operational improvements. In addition, the implementation plans lead to the development of eight new safety analysis methodologies that can be used at other U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) complex sites where URS Corporation is involved

  2. Technical basis for the aboveground structure failure and associated represented hazardous conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    GOETZ, T.G.

    2003-01-01

    This technical basis document describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for the aboveground structure failure representative accident and associated represented hazardous conditions. This document was developed to support the documented safety analysis

  3. Safety in the nuclear era. Politics - strategy - arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siebel, G.

    1988-01-01

    Details are given on safety and the factors specifying safety in Europe; the history of the NATO and development of an alliance of sovereign states; nuclear deterrence - the politico-strategic standard of the nuclear era; the East/West struggle for military power; co-operative arms control - theory and practice of stability in the nuclear era; alternative schemes and models; SDI and EURECA - present and future chances and risks. The world is at the beginning of a fascinating development likely to be culminating in the control over and utilization of space, and the mastering of various technical problems be they of a civil or military nature. It remains to be seen whether man will be able to handle the new additional technical capacities in an ethically and politically responsible way. Be that as it may, political scepticism and negative reactions will not succeed in blocking the dynamic forces inherent in the development described. This is especially true for SDI and EURECA. Both schemes are full of both chances and risks. While chances ought to be made the most of risks must be controlled through policies guided by reason. (orig./HSCH) [de

  4. The passive safety systems of the Swr 1000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neumann, D.

    2001-01-01

    In recent years, a new boiling water reactor (BWR) plant called the SWR 1000 has been developed by Siemens on behalf of Germany's electric utilities. This new plant design concept incorporates the wide range of operating experience gained with German BWRs. The main objective behind developing the SWR 1000 was to design a plant with a rated electric output of approximately 1000 MW which would not only have a lower capital cost and lower power generating costs but would also provide a much higher level of nuclear safety compared to plants currently in operation. This safety-related goal has been met through, for example, the use of passive safety equipment. Passive systems make a significant contribution towards increasing the over-all level of plant safety due to the way in which they operate. They function solely accord-ing to basic laws of nature, such as gravity, and perform their designated functions with-out any need for electric power or other sources of external energy, or signals from instrumentation and control (I and C) equipment. The passive safety systems have been designed such that design basis accidents can be controlled using just these systems alone. However, the design concept of the SWR 1000 is nevertheless still based on the provision of active safety systems in addition to passive systems. (author)

  5. Verification of the safety communication protocol in train control system using colored Petri net

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Lijie; Tang Tao; Zhao Xianqiong; Schnieder, Eckehard

    2012-01-01

    This paper deals with formal and simulation-based verification of the safety communication protocol in ETCS (European Train Control System). The safety communication protocol controls the establishment of safety connection between train and trackside. Because of its graphical user interface and modeling flexibility upon the changes in the system conditions, this paper proposes a composition Colored Petri Net (CPN) representation for both the logic and the timed model. The logic of the protocol is proved to be safe by means of state space analysis: the dead markings are correct; there are no dead transitions; being fair. Further analysis results have been obtained using formal and simulation-based verification approach. The timed models for the open transmit system and the application process are created for the purpose of performance analysis of the safety communication protocol. The models describe the procedure of data transmission and processing, and also provide relevant timed and stochastic factors, as well as time delay and lost packet, which may influence the time for establishment of safety connection of the protocol. Time for establishment of safety connection of the protocol in normal state is verified by formal verification, and then time for establishment of safety connection with different probability of lost packet is simulated. After verification it is found that the time for establishment of safety connection of the safety communication protocol satisfies the safety requirements.

  6. Final safety analysis report (FSAR) for waste receiving and processing (WRAP) facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weidert, J.R.

    1997-01-01

    This safety analysis report provides a summary description of the WRAP Facility, focusing on significant safety-related characteristics of the location and facility design. This report demonstrates that adherence to the safety basis wi11 ensure necessary operational safety considerations have been addressed sufficiently and justifies the adequacy of the safety basis in protecting the health and safety of the public, workers, and the environment

  7. Contribution of psychology to the safety of installations with a high hazard potential

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilpert, B.

    1996-01-01

    Installations with a high hazard potential are usually characterised by the dual attribute 'low risk - high hazard'. Diverse strategies of safety management are employed in such installations in order to limit the great hazard potential of safety-relevant occurrences (faults, abnormal operating states, accidents) that can take place in them. These strategies include specific control principles. In nuclear engineering, for example, the feedforward principle has already been used for some time as a tool of analytic risk determination (e.g., in probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) or Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)). A further example of these strategies of safety management is the empirical determination of risks through evaluation of operating experience (feedback control, e.g., epemiological studies, accident analysis) and, derived from this, identification of the system's weak points in terms of safety. Insights derived from the application of these control principles can serve to develop specific means of intervention. These will tend to be closely oriented to the results obtained with the control method and may consist in, e.g., trainings or measures of organisation development. Independent of this, it will also be possible to identify long-term measures for preventing safety-relevant occurrences (e.g., organisational learning, safety-mindedness). The above-named strategies of safety management (control, intervention, prevention) provide a fertile basis for psychological studies in fields such as the physiology and psychology of perception (information processing), cognitive, psychology (thought and action), social psychology (division of labour, norms), paedagogic psychology (training), or organisational and environmental psychology (safety-mindedness, leadership, environmental influences). (orig./DG) [de

  8. Integrated therapy safety management system.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Podtschaske, Beatrice; Fuchs, Daniela; Friesdorf, Wolfgang

    2013-09-01

    The aim is to demonstrate the benefit of the medico-ergonomic approach for the redesign of clinical work systems. Based on the six layer model, a concept for an 'integrated therapy safety management' is drafted. This concept could serve as a basis to improve resilience. The concept is developed through a concept-based approach. The state of the art of safety and complexity research in human factors and ergonomics forms the basis. The findings are synthesized to a concept for 'integrated therapy safety management'. The concept is applied by way of example for the 'medication process' to demonstrate its practical implementation. The 'integrated therapy safety management' is drafted in accordance with the six layer model. This model supports a detailed description of specific work tasks, the corresponding responsibilities and related workflows at different layers by using the concept of 'bridge managers'. 'Bridge managers' anticipate potential errors and monitor the controlled system continuously. If disruptions or disturbances occur, they respond with corrective actions which ensure that no harm results and they initiate preventive measures for future procedures. The concept demonstrates that in a complex work system, the human factor is the key element and final authority to cope with the residual complexity. The expertise of the 'bridge managers' and the recursive hierarchical structure results in highly adaptive clinical work systems and increases their resilience. The medico-ergonomic approach is a highly promising way of coping with two complexities. It offers a systematic framework for comprehensive analyses of clinical work systems and promotes interdisciplinary collaboration. © 2013 The Authors. British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology © 2013 The British Pharmacological Society.

  9. Integrated therapy safety management system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Podtschaske, Beatrice; Fuchs, Daniela; Friesdorf, Wolfgang

    2013-01-01

    Aims The aim is to demonstrate the benefit of the medico-ergonomic approach for the redesign of clinical work systems. Based on the six layer model, a concept for an ‘integrated therapy safety management’ is drafted. This concept could serve as a basis to improve resilience. Methods The concept is developed through a concept-based approach. The state of the art of safety and complexity research in human factors and ergonomics forms the basis. The findings are synthesized to a concept for ‘integrated therapy safety management’. The concept is applied by way of example for the ‘medication process’ to demonstrate its practical implementation. Results The ‘integrated therapy safety management’ is drafted in accordance with the six layer model. This model supports a detailed description of specific work tasks, the corresponding responsibilities and related workflows at different layers by using the concept of ‘bridge managers’. ‘Bridge managers’ anticipate potential errors and monitor the controlled system continuously. If disruptions or disturbances occur, they respond with corrective actions which ensure that no harm results and they initiate preventive measures for future procedures. The concept demonstrates that in a complex work system, the human factor is the key element and final authority to cope with the residual complexity. The expertise of the ‘bridge managers’ and the recursive hierarchical structure results in highly adaptive clinical work systems and increases their resilience. Conclusions The medico-ergonomic approach is a highly promising way of coping with two complexities. It offers a systematic framework for comprehensive analyses of clinical work systems and promotes interdisciplinary collaboration. PMID:24007448

  10. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    PIEPHO, M.G.

    1999-10-20

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).'' All assumptions, parameters and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR.

  11. 15 CFR 970.205 - Vessel safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Vessel safety. 970.205 Section 970.205... safety. In order to provide a basis for the necessary determinations with respect to the safety of life... Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74) possesses current valid SOLAS 74 certificates; (2) That any...

  12. Technical basis document for external events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    OBERG, B.D.

    2003-01-01

    This document supports the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis and presents the technical basis for the FR-equencies of externally initiated accidents. The consequences of externally initiated events are discussed in other documents that correspond to the accident that was caused by the external event. The external events include aircraft crash, vehicle accident, range fire, and rail accident

  13. Design of control and safety rod and its drive mechanism of PFBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajan Babu, V.; Govindarajan, S.; Chetal, S.C.

    1997-01-01

    Control and Safety Rod (CSR) is one of the two types of absorber rods in shutdown systems of PFBR. Control and Safety Rod Drive Mechanism (CSRDM) actuates CSR to have vertical translatory motion in reactor core. The dual responsibilities entrusted on CSR to control reactor power during normal operating condition and to shutdown the reactor by scram action during abnormal condition, necessitate highly reliable design, analysis, testing and surveillance of CSR and CSRDM. The paper discusses on the salient features of CSR and CSRDM and design and analysis of individual sub-assemblies, viz., gripper, scram-release electromagnet, hydraulic dash pot, seals. Also it discusses on the developmental activities proposed and surveillance test requirements. (author)

  14. Development of methodology for the analysis of fuel behavior in light water reactor in design basis accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salatov, A. A.; Goncharov, A. A.; Eremenko, A. S.; Kuznetsov, V. I.; Bolnov, V. A.; Gusev, A. S.; Dolgov, A. B.; Ugryumov, A. V.

    2013-01-01

    The report attempts to analyze the current experience of the safety fuel for light-water reactors (LWRs) under design-basis accident conditions in terms of its compliance with international requirements for licensing nuclear power plants. The components of fuel behavior analysis methodology in design basis accidents in LWRs were considered, such as classification of design basis accidents, phenomenology of fuel behavior in design basis accidents, system of fuel safety criteria and their experimental support, applicability of used computer codes and input data for computational analysis of the fuel behavior in accidents, way of accounting for the uncertainty of calculation models and the input data. A brief history of the development of probabilistic safety analysis methodology for nuclear power plants abroad is considered. The examples of a conservative approach to safety analysis of VVER fuel and probabilistic approach to safety analysis of fuel TVS-K are performed. Actual problems in development of the methodology of analyzing the behavior of VVER fuel at the design basis accident conditions consist, according to the authors opinion, in following: 1) Development of a common methodology for analyzing the behavior of VVER fuel in the design basis accidents, implementing a realistic approach to the analysis of uncertainty - in the future it is necessary for the licensing of operating VVER fuel abroad; 2) Experimental and analytical support to the methodology: experimental studies to identify and study the characteristics of the key uncertainties of computational models of fuel and the cladding, development of computational models of key events in codes, validation code on the basis of integral experiments

  15. Developing Measures for Assessing the Causality of Safety Culture in a Petrochemical Industry

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wu, T.-C., E-mail: tcwu@sunrise.hk.edu.t [HungKuang University, Department of Safety, Health and Environmental Engineering (China); Lin, C.-H.; Shiau, S.-Y. [HungKuang University, Institute of Occupational Safety and Hazard Prevention (China)

    2009-12-15

    This paper discusses safety culture in the petrochemical sector and the causes and consequences of safety culture. A sample of 520 responses selected by simple random sampling completed questionnaires for this survey, the return rate was 86.75%. The research instrument comprises four sections: basic information, the safety leadership scale (SLS), the safety climate scale (SCS), and the safety performance scale (SPS). SPSS 12.0, a statistical software package, was used for item analysis, validity analysis, and reliability analysis. Exploratory factor analysis indicated that (1) SLS abstracted three factors such as safety caring, safety controlling, and safety coaching; (2) SCS comprised three factors such as emergency response, safety commitment, and risk perception; and (3) SPS was composed of accident investigation, safety training, safety inspections, and safety motivation. We conclude that the SLS, SCS, and SPS developed in this paper have good construct validity and internal consistency and can serve as the basis for future research.

  16. Developing Measures for Assessing the Causality of Safety Culture in a Petrochemical Industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, T.-C.; Lin, C.-H.; Shiau, S.-Y.

    2009-01-01

    This paper discusses safety culture in the petrochemical sector and the causes and consequences of safety culture. A sample of 520 responses selected by simple random sampling completed questionnaires for this survey, the return rate was 86.75%. The research instrument comprises four sections: basic information, the safety leadership scale (SLS), the safety climate scale (SCS), and the safety performance scale (SPS). SPSS 12.0, a statistical software package, was used for item analysis, validity analysis, and reliability analysis. Exploratory factor analysis indicated that (1) SLS abstracted three factors such as safety caring, safety controlling, and safety coaching; (2) SCS comprised three factors such as emergency response, safety commitment, and risk perception; and (3) SPS was composed of accident investigation, safety training, safety inspections, and safety motivation. We conclude that the SLS, SCS, and SPS developed in this paper have good construct validity and internal consistency and can serve as the basis for future research.

  17. Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

  18. Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se

    2016-01-01

    During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

  19. Safety in waste management plants: An Indian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shekhar, P.; Ozarde, P.D.; Gandhi, P.M.

    2000-01-01

    Assurance of safety of public and plant workers and protection of the environment are prime objectives in the design and construction of Waste Management Plants. In India, waste management principles and strategies have been evolved in accordance with national and international regulations and standards for radiation protection. The regulations governing radiation protection have a far-reaching impact on the management of the radioactive waste. The wastes arise at each stages of the fuel cycle with varying chemical nature, generation rate and specific activity levels depending upon the type of the facility. Segregation of waste based on its chemical nature and specific activity levels is an essential feature, as its aids in selection of treatment and conditioning process. Selection of the process, equipment and materials in the plant, are governed by safety consideration alongside factors like efficiency and simplicity. The plant design considerations like physical separation, general arrangement, ventilation zoning, access control, remote handling, process piping routing, decontamination etc. have major role in realizing waste safety. Stringent quality control measures during all stages of construction have helped in achieving the design intended safety. These aspects together with operating experience gained form basis for the improved safety features in the design and construction of waste management plants. The comprehensive safety is derived from adoption of waste management strategies and appropriate plant design considerations. The paper briefly brings safety in waste management programme in India, in its current perspective. (author)

  20. Safety campaigns. TIS Launches New Safety Information Campaign

    CERN Multimedia

    2001-01-01

    Need to start a new installation and worried about safety aspects? Or are you newly responsible for safety matters in a CERN building? Perhaps you're simply interested in how to make the working environment safer for yourself and your colleagues. Whatever the case, a new information campaign launched by TIS this week can help. The most visible aspects of the new campaign will be posters distributed around the Laboratory treating a different subject each month. The Web site - http://safety.cern.ch/ - which provides all safety related information. But these are not the only aspects of the new campaign. Members of the TIS/GS group, whose contact details can be found on the safety web site, are available to give information and advice on a one-to-one basis at any time. The campaign's launch has been timed to coincide with European Safety Week, organized by the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work and the subject treated in the first posters is safety inspection. This particular topic only concerns thos...

  1. Health and safety impacts of nuclear, geothermal, and fossil-fuel electric generation in California. Volume 5. Control of population densities surrounding nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nero, A.V.; Schroeder, C.H.; Yen, W.W.S.

    1977-01-01

    In view of the requirement that the California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission must specify land-use/population-density control measures to be used in the vicinity of nuclear power plants being granted land use, the possible forms of such measures are examined. Since these measures must maintain population densities below Nuclear Regulatory Commission criteria, if appropriate, NRC criteria for land use and population densities are given particular attention. In addition, a preliminary comparison of the cost of possible control measures with the reduced potential for damage to the public health and safety is made, yielding the result that control measures within approximately one mile of the plant site may be justified, in certain cases, on a strictly cost-benefit basis. However, it is not clear whether controls over such a limited region would satisfy the legal mandate

  2. Technical Basis for Water Chemistry Control of IGSCC in Boiling Water Reactors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gordon, Barry; Garcia, Susan

    Boiling water reactors (BWRs) operate with very high purity water. However, even the utilization of near theoretical conductivity water cannot prevent intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of sensitized stainless steel, wrought nickel alloys and nickel weld metals under oxygenated conditions. IGSCC can be further accelerated by the presence of certain impurities dissolved in the coolant. The goal of this paper is to present the technical basis for controlling various impurities under both oxygenated, i.e., normal water chemistry (NWC) and deoxygenated, i.e., hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) conditions for mitigation of IGSCC. More specifically, the effects of typical BWR ionic impurities (e.g., sulfate, chloride, nitrate, borate, phosphate, etc.) on IGSCC propensities in both NWC and HWC environments will be discussed. The technical basis for zinc addition to the BWR coolant will also provided along with an in-plant example of the most severe water chemistry transient to date.

  3. Impact Safety Control Strategy for the Battery System of an Example Electric Bus

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zhen-po Wang

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper proposes a side impact safety control strategy for the battery system, aiming at defusing the hazards of unacceptable behaviors of the battery system such as high-voltage hazards. Based on some collision identification metrics, a side impact discrimination algorithm and a side impact severity algorithm are developed for electric buses. Based on the study on the time to break for power battery, the side impact discrimination algorithm response time is about 20 ms posing a great challenge to the side impact discrimination algorithm. At the same time, the reliability of the impact safety control strategy developed in this paper is evaluated for other plausible side impact signals generated by finite element analysis. The results verify that the impact safety control strategy exhibits robust performance and is able to trigger a breaking signal for power battery system promptly and accurately.

  4. Aspects of operational safety and long-term structural stability of the Morsleben repository for radioactive wastes (ERAM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wernicke, R.S.

    1997-01-01

    The results of safety evaluations and safety reports reveal undoubtedly, that the Morsleben final repository operations is safe and responsible. On the basis of safety-technical evaluations some need was identified for locally optimizing the repository operations and possibly also some geotechnical features of the mine. However, this does not raise safety-related questions for man and the environment. In addition to the control exercised by the supervisory body, continuing evaluations of the repository operations assure, that changes of the safety status will be recognized in a timely manner and that competent action may be taken if necessary. (orig.) [de

  5. Safety evaluation of the ESP sludge washing baselines runs. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, M.K.

    1993-01-01

    Purpose is to provide the technical basis for evaluation of unreviewed safety question for the Extended Sludge Processing (ESP) Sludge Washing Baseline Runs, which are necessary to resolve technical questions associated with process control (sludge suspension, sludge settling, heat transfer, temperature control). The sludge is currently stored in below-ground tanks and will be prepared for processing at the Defense Waste Processing Facility as part of the Integrated Waste Removal Program for Savannah River Site

  6. Safety monitoring in process and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esparza, V. Jr.; Sebo, D.E.

    1984-01-01

    Safety Functions provide a method of ensuring the safe operation of any large-scale processing plant. Successful implementation of safety functions requires continuous monitoring of safety function values and trends. Because the volume of information handled by a plant operator occassionally can become overwhelming, attention may be diverted from the primary concern of maintaining plant safety. With this in mind EG and G, Idaho developed various methods and techniques for use in a computerized Safety Function Monitoring System and tested the application of these techniques using a simulated nuclear power plant, the Loss-of-Fluid Test Facility (LOFT) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). This paper presents the methods used in the development of a Safety Function Monitoring System

  7. Experience in the development and practical use of working control levels for radiation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Epishin, A.V.

    1981-01-01

    The experience of development and practical use of working control levels (WCL) of radiation safety in the Gorky region, is discussed. WCL are introduced by ''Radiation Safety Guides'' (RSG-76) and have great practical importance. Regional control levels of radiation safety are determined for certain types of operations implying radioactive hazard and differentiated according to the types of sources applied and types of operation. Dose rates, radioactive contamination of operating surfaces, skin, air and waste water are subject to normalization. Limits of individual radiation doses specified according to operation categories are included. 10 tables of regional WCL indices are developed [ru

  8. Safety strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schultheiss, G.F.

    1980-01-01

    The basis for safety strategy in nuclear industry and especially nuclear power plants is the prevention of radioactivity release inside or outside of the technical installation. Therefore either technical or administrative measures are combined to a general strategy concept. This introduction will explain in more detail the following topics: - basic principles of safety - lines of assurance (LOA) - defense in depth - deterministic and probabilistic methods. This presentation is seen as an introduction to the more detailed discussion following in this course, nevertheless some selected examples will be used to illustrate the aspects of safety strategy development although they might be repeated later on. (orig.)

  9. History of the nuclear matter safety and control law

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dean, G.

    1994-01-01

    In this text we give the history of the law creation on the control and safety of nuclear matter. Initially based on the CEA regulation single owner of nuclear matter, the development of nuclear energy has conducted the French government to edict law in relation with IAEA and Euratom recommendations

  10. Regulatory control of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The purpose of this book is to support IAEA training courses and workshops in the field of regulatory control of nuclear power plants as well as to support the regulatory bodies of Member States in their own training activities. The target group is the professional staff members of nuclear safety regulatory bodies supervising nuclear power plants and having duties and responsibilities in the following regulatory fields: regulatory framework; regulatory organization; regulatory guidance; licensing and licensing documents; assessment of safety; and regulatory inspection and enforcement. Important topics such as regulatory competence and quality of regulatory work as well as emergency preparedness and public communication are also covered. The book also presents the key issues of nuclear safety such as 'defence-in-depth' and safety culture and explains how these should be taken into account in regulatory work, e.g. during safety assessment and regulatory inspection. The book also reflects how nuclear safety has been developed during the years on the basis of operating experience feedback and results of safety research by giving topical examples. The examples cover development of operating procedures and accident management to cope with complicated incidents and severe accidents to stress the importance of regulatory role in nuclear safety research. The main target group is new staff members of regulatory bodies, but the book also offers good examples for more experienced inspectors to be used as comparison and discussion basis in internal workshops organized by the regulatory bodies for refreshing and continuing training. The book was originally compiled on the basis of presentations provided during the two regulatory control training courses in 1997 and 1998. The textbook was reviewed at the beginning of the years 2000 and 2002 by IAEA staff members and consistency with the latest revisions of safety standards have been ensured. The textbook was completed in the

  11. A line of defense approach to fissile material control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holloway, S.P.; Holloway, N.J.

    1995-01-01

    A crucial element of the safety policy of the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) is that concerned with the safe control of fissile material in order to minimize the potential for unplanned criticality. The principles by which AWE controls fissile material advocate a simple Line of Defense (LOD) approach to assessing criticality-safety related aspects of fissile operations. An LOD assessment provides a measure of the depth of defense available to prevent general types of criticality accident and can be used to demonstrate compliance with the risk-based Basic Safety Limits (BSLs) and Objectives (BSOs) used by the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) to judge the safety of operations in accordance with its Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) for Nuclear Plants. This paper discusses the LOD concept, the basis of LOD assessment and describes LODs specific to criticality control

  12. The practical implementation of integrated safety management for nuclear safety analysis and fire hazards analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    COLLOPY, M.T.

    1999-01-01

    the integrated safety management system approach for having a uniform and consistent process: a method has been suggested by the U S . Department of Energy at Richland and the Project Hanford Procedures when fire hazard analyses and safety analyses are required. This process provides for a common basis approach in the development of the fire hazard analysis and the safety analysis. This process permits the preparers of both documents to jointly participate in the development of the hazard analysis process. This paper presents this method to implement the integrated safety management approach in the development of the fire hazard analysis and safety analysis that provides consistency of assumptions. consequences, design considerations, and other controls necessarily to protect workers, the public. and the environment

  13. Safety critical FPGA-based NPP instrumentation and control systems: assessment, development and implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bakhmach, E. S.; Siora, A. A.; Tokarev, V. I. [Research and Production Corporation Radiy, 29 Geroev Stalingrada Str., Kirovograd 25006 (Ukraine); Kharchenko, V. S.; Sklyar, V. V.; Andrashov, A. A., E-mail: marketing@radiy.co [Center for Safety Infrastructure-Oriented Research and Analysis, 37 Astronomicheskaya Str., Kharkiv 61085 (Ukraine)

    2010-10-15

    The stages of development, production, verification, licensing and implementation methods and technologies of safety critical instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants (NPP) based on FPGA (Field Programmable Gates Arrays) technologies are described. A life cycle model and multi-version technologies of dependability and safety assurance of FPGA-based instrumentation and control systems are discussed. An analysis of NPP instrumentation and control systems construction principles developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy using FPGA-technologies and results of these systems implementation and operation at Ukrainian and Bulgarian NPP are presented. The RADIY{sup TM} platform has been designed and developed by Research and Production Corporation Radiy, Ukraine. The main peculiarity of the RADIY{sup TM} platform is the use of FPGA as programmable components for logic control operation. The FPGA-based RADIY{sup TM} platform used for NPP instrumentation and control systems development ensures sca lability of system functions types, volume and peculiarities (by changing quantity and quality of sensors, actuators, input/output signals and control algorithms); sca lability of dependability (safety integrity) (by changing a number of redundant channel, tiers, diagnostic and reconfiguration procedures); sca lability of diversity (by changing types, depth and method of diversity selection). (Author)

  14. Reconfigurable Flight Control Design using a Robust Servo LQR and Radial Basis Function Neural Networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burken, John J.

    2005-01-01

    This viewgraph presentation reviews the use of a Robust Servo Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) and a Radial Basis Function (RBF) Neural Network in reconfigurable flight control designs in adaptation to a aircraft part failure. The method uses a robust LQR servomechanism design with model Reference adaptive control, and RBF neural networks. During the failure the LQR servomechanism behaved well, and using the neural networks improved the tracking.

  15. Ultrasonic data acquisition installation for basis and in-service testing of nuclear pressure vessels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutmann, G.; Engl, G.

    1976-01-01

    The safety of nuclear installations requires continuous safety inspections during construction and operation. Essential parts of this safety inspection are the basis and in-line inspections. For this purpose installation systems are used which allow an optimal statement to be made regarding the conditions of tested components

  16. Fast reactor safety: proceedings of the international topical meeting. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-07-01

    The emphasis of this meeting was on the safety-related aspects of fast reactor design, analysis, licensing, construction, and operation. Relative to past meetings, there was less emphasis on the scientific and technological basis for accident assessment. Because of its broad scope, the meeting attracted 217 attendees from a wide cross section of the design, safety analysis, and safety technology communities. Eight countries and two international organizations were represented. A total of 126 papers were presented, with contributions from the United States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. Sessions covered in Volume 2 include: safety design concepts; operational transient experiments; analysis of seismic and external events; HCDA-related codes, analysis, and experiments; sodium fires; instrumentation and control/PPS design; whole-core accident analysis codes; and impact of safety design considerations on future LMFBR developments

  17. Multilayer robust control for safety enhancement of reactor operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edwards, R.M.; Lee, K.Y.; Ray, A.

    1991-01-01

    A novel concept of reactor power and temperature control has been recently reported in which a conventional output feedback controller is embedded within a state feedback setting. The embedded output feedback controller at the inner layer largely compensates for plant modeling uncertainties and external disturbances, and the outer layer generates an optimal control signal via feedback of the estimated plant states. A major advantage of this embedded architecture is the robustness of the control system relative to parametric and nonparametric uncertainties and thus the opportunity for designing fault-accommodating control algorithms to improve reactor operations and plant safety. The paper illustrates the architecture of the state-feedback-assisted classical (SFAC) control, which utilizes an embedded output feedback controller designed via classical techniques. It demonstrates the difference between the performance of conventional state feedback control and SFAC by examining the sensitivity of the dominant eigenvalues of the individual closed-loop systems

  18. Effectiveness of web-based tailored advice on parents' child safety behaviors: randomized controlled trial.

    Science.gov (United States)

    van Beelen, Mirjam Elisabeth Johanna; Beirens, Tinneke Monique Jozef; den Hertog, Paul; van Beeck, Eduard Ferdinand; Raat, Hein

    2014-01-24

    Injuries at home are a major cause of death, disability, and loss of quality of life among young children. Despite current safety education, required safety behavior of parents is often lacking. To prevent various childhood disorders, the application of Web-based tools has increased the effectiveness of health promotion efforts. Therefore, an intervention with Web-based, tailored, safety advice combined with personal counseling (E-Health4Uth home safety) was developed and applied. To evaluate the effect of E-Health4Uth home safety on parents' safety behaviors with regard to the prevention of falls, poisoning, drowning, and burns. A randomized controlled trial was conducted (2009-2011) among parents visiting well-baby clinics in the Netherlands. Parents were randomly assigned to the intervention group (E-Health4Uth home safety intervention) or to the control condition consisting of usual care. Parents in the intervention condition completed a Web-based safety behavior assessment questionnaire; the resulting tailored safety advice was discussed with their child health care professional at a well-baby visit (age approximately 11 months). Parents in the control condition received counseling using generic safety information leaflets at this well-baby visit. Parents' child safety behaviors were derived from self-report questionnaires at baseline (age 7 months) and at follow-up (age 17 months). Each specific safety behavior was classified as safe/unsafe and a total risk score was calculated. Logistic and linear regression analyses were used to reveal differences in safety behavior between the intervention and the control condition at follow-up. A total of 1292 parents (response rate 44.79%) were analyzed. At follow-up, parents in the intervention condition (n=643) showed significantly less unsafe behavior compared to parents in the control condition (n=649): top of staircase (23.91% vs. 32.19%; OR 0.65, 95% CI 0.50-0.85); bottom of staircase (63.53% vs. 71.94%; OR 0

  19. Food safety performance indicators to benchmark food safety output of food safety management systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jacxsens, L; Uyttendaele, M; Devlieghere, F; Rovira, J; Gomez, S Oses; Luning, P A

    2010-07-31

    There is a need to measure the food safety performance in the agri-food chain without performing actual microbiological analysis. A food safety performance diagnosis, based on seven indicators and corresponding assessment grids have been developed and validated in nine European food businesses. Validation was conducted on the basis of an extensive microbiological assessment scheme (MAS). The assumption behind the food safety performance diagnosis is that food businesses which evaluate the performance of their food safety management system in a more structured way and according to very strict and specific criteria will have a better insight in their actual microbiological food safety performance, because food safety problems will be more systematically detected. The diagnosis can be a useful tool to have a first indication about the microbiological performance of a food safety management system present in a food business. Moreover, the diagnosis can be used in quantitative studies to get insight in the effect of interventions on sector or governmental level. Copyright 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  20. The micro-processor controlled process radiation monitoring system for reactor safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mizuno, K.; Noguchi, A.; Kumagami, S.; Gotoh, Y.; Kumahara, T.; Arita, S.

    1986-01-01

    Digital computers are soon expected to be applied to various real-time safety and safety-related systems in nuclear power plants. Hitachi is now engaged in the development of a micro-processor controlled process radiation monitoring system, which operates on digital processing methods employed with a log ratemeter. A newly defined methodology of design and test procedures is being applied as a means of software program verification for these safety systems. Recently implemented micro-processor technology will help to achieve an advanced man-machine interface and highly reliable performance. (author)

  1. Flood control construction of Shidao Bay nuclear power plant and safety analysis for hypothetical accident of HTR-PM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Yongrong; Zhang Keke; Zhu Li

    2014-01-01

    A series of events triggered by tsunami eventually led to the Fukushima nuclear accident. For drawing lessons from the nuclear accident and applying to Shidao Bay nuclear power plant flood control construction, we compare with the state laws and regulations, and prove the design of Shidao Bay nuclear power plant flood construction. Through introducing the history of domestic tsunamis and the national researches before and after the Fukushima nuclear accident, we expound the tsunami hazards of Shidao Bay nuclear power plant. In addition, in order to verify the safety of HTR-PM, we anticipate the contingent accidents after ''superposition event of earthquake and extreme flood'', and analyse the abilities and measures of HTR-PM to deal with these beyond design basis accidents (BDBA). (author)

  2. Reactor system safety assurance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattson, R.J.

    1984-01-01

    The philosophy of reactor safety is that design should follow established and conservative engineering practices, there should be safety margins in all modes of plant operation, special systems should be provided for accidents, and safety systems should have redundant components. This philosophy provides ''defense in depth.'' Additionally, the safety of nuclear power plants relies on ''safety systems'' to assure acceptable response to design basis events. Operating experience has shown the need to study plant response to more frequent upset conditions and to account for the influence of operators and non-safety systems on overall performance. Defense in depth is being supplemented by risk and reliability assessment

  3. Basis for Interim Operation for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2003-01-01

    This document establishes the Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility (FSS) as managed by the 300 Area Deactivation Project (300 ADP) organization in accordance with the requirements of the Project Hanford Management Contract procedure (PHMC) HNF-PRO-700, ''Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements''. A hazard classification (Benecke 2003a) has been prepared for the facility in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92 resulting in the assignment of Hazard Category 3 for FSS Facility buildings that store N Reactor fuel materials (303-B, 3712, and 3716). All others are designated Industrial buildings. It is concluded that the risks associated with the current and planned operational mode of the FSS Facility (uranium storage, uranium repackaging and shipment, cleanup, and transition activities, etc.) are acceptable. The potential radiological dose and toxicological consequences for a range of credible uranium storage building have been analyzed using Hanford accepted methods. Risk Class designations are summarized for representative events in Table 1.6-1. Mitigation was not considered for any event except the random fire event that exceeds predicted consequences based on existing source and combustible loading because of an inadvertent increase in combustible loading. For that event, a housekeeping program to manage transient combustibles is credited to reduce the probability. An additional administrative control is established to protect assumptions regarding source term by limiting inventories of fuel and combustible materials. Another is established to maintain the criticality safety program. Additional defense-in-depth controls are established to perform fire protection system testing, inspection, and maintenance to ensure predicted availability of those systems, and to maintain the radiological control program. It is also concluded that because an accidental nuclear criticality is not credible based on the low uranium enrichment

  4. Combining energy and power based safety metrics in controller design for domestic robots

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Tadele, T.S.; de Vries, Theodorus J.A.; Stramigioli, Stefano

    This paper presents a general passivity based interaction controller design approach that utilizes a combined energy and power based safety norms to assert safety of domestic robots. Since these robots are expected to co-habit the same environment with a human user, analysing and ensuring their

  5. Investigation on regulatory requirements for radiation safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Eun Ok; Choi, Yoon Seok; Cho, Dae Hyung

    2013-01-01

    NRC recognizes that efficient management of radiation safety plan is an important factor to achieve radiation safety service. In case of Korea, the contents to perform the actual radiation safety management are legally contained in radiation safety management reports based on the Nuclear Safety Act. It is to prioritize the importance of safety regulations in each sector in accordance with the current situation of radiation and radioactive isotopes-used industry and to provide a basis for deriving safety requirements and safety regulations system maintenance by the priority of radiation safety management regulations. It would be helpful to achieve regulations to conform to reality based on international standards if consistent safety requirements is developed for domestic users, national standards and international standards on the basis of the results of questions answered by radiation safety managers, who lead on-site radiation safety management, about the priority of important factors in radioactive sources use, sales, production, moving user companies, to check whether derived configuration requirements for radiation safety management are suitable for domestic status

  6. Safety assessment of botanicals and botanical preparations used as ingredients in food supplements: testing an European Food Safety Authority-tiered approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Speijers, Gerrit; Bottex, Bernard; Dusemund, Birgit; Lugasi, Andrea; Tóth, Jaroslav; Amberg-Müller, Judith; Galli, Corrado L; Silano, Vittorio; Rietjens, Ivonne M C M

    2010-02-01

    This article describes results obtained by testing the European Food Safety Authority-tiered guidance approach for safety assessment of botanicals and botanical preparations intended for use in food supplements. Main conclusions emerging are as follows. (i) Botanical ingredients must be identified by their scientific (binomial) name, in most cases down to the subspecies level or lower. (ii) Adequate characterization and description of the botanical parts and preparation methodology used is needed. Safety of a botanical ingredient cannot be assumed only relying on the long-term safe use of other preparations of the same botanical. (iii) Because of possible adulterations, misclassifications, replacements or falsifications, and restorations, establishment of adequate quality control is necessary. (iv) The strength of the evidence underlying concerns over a botanical ingredient should be included in the safety assessment. (v) The matrix effect should be taken into account in the safety assessment on a case-by-case basis. (vi) Adequate data and methods for appropriate exposure assessment are often missing. (vii) Safety regulations concerning toxic contaminants have to be complied with. The application of the guidance approach can result in the conclusion that safety can be presumed, that the botanical ingredient is of safety concern, or that further data are needed to assess safety.

  7. [Safety monitoring of cell-based medicinal products (CBMPs)].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Funk, Markus B; Frech, Marion; Spranger, Robert; Keller-Stanislawski, Brigitte

    2015-11-01

    Cell-based medicinal products (CBMPs), a category of advanced-therapy medicinal products (ATMPs), are authorised for the European market by the European Commission by means of the centralized marketing authorisation. By conforming to the German Medicinal Products Act (Sec. 4b AMG), national authorisation can be granted by the Paul-Ehrlich-Institut in Germany exclusively for ATMPs not based on a routine manufacturing procedure. In both procedures, quality, efficacy, and safety are evaluated and the risk-benefit balance is assessed. For the centralised procedure, mainly controlled clinical trial data must be submitted, whereas the requirements for national procedures could be modified corresponding to the stage of development of the ATMP. After marketing authorization, the marketing authorization/license holder is obligated to report all serious adverse reactions to the competent authority and to provide periodic safety update reports. If necessary, post-authorization safety studies could be imposed. On the basis of these regulatory measures, the safety of advanced therapies can be monitored and improved.

  8. The engineering project and reliability research of the safety interlock slow control system in BESIII

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Yinhong; Zhao Jingwei; Li Xiaonan; Xie Xiaoxi; Gao Cuishan; Bai Jingzhi; Chen Xihui; Min Jian; Nie Zhendong

    2008-01-01

    The new safety interlock slow control system of BESIII is designed to ensure that the BESIII interior equipments and the accelerator control center to work in coordination, and to guarantee the safety of the operating staff and all the important equipments at the same time. This paper introduces the hardware and software design of safety interlock system from the engineering requirements angle, including a detailed research on the software implementation technique of the state machine on PLC and the reliability of the system. (authors)

  9. The effects of risk perception and flight experience on airline pilots' locus of control with regard to safety operation behaviors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    You, Xuqun; Ji, Ming; Han, Haiyan

    2013-08-01

    The primary objective of this paper was to integrate two research traditions, social cognition approach and individual state approach, and to understand the relationships between locus of control (LOC), risk perception, flight time, and safety operation behavior (SOB) among Chinese airline pilots. The study sample consisted of 193 commercial airline pilots from China Southern Airlines Ltd. The results showed that internal locus of control directly affected pilot safety operation behavior. Risk perception seemed to mediate the relationship between locus of control and safety operation behaviors, and total flight time moderated internal locus of control. Thus, locus of control primarily influences safety operation behavior indirectly by affecting risk perception. The total effect of internal locus of control on safety behaviors is larger than that of external locus of control. Furthermore, the safety benefit of flight experience is more pronounced among pilots with high internal loci of control in the early and middle flight building stages. Practical implications for aviation safety and directions for future research are also discussed. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  10. 'BeSAFE', effect-evaluation of internet-based, tailored safety information combined with personal counselling on parents' child safety behaviours: study design of a randomized controlled trial

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    van Beeck Eduard F

    2010-08-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Injuries in or around the home are the most important cause of death among children aged 0-4 years old. It is also a major source of morbidity and loss of quality of life. In order to reduce the number of injuries, the Consumer Safety Institute introduced the use of Safety Information Leaflets in the Netherlands to provide safety education to parents of children aged 0-4 years. Despite current safety education, necessary safety behaviours are still not taken by a large number of parents, causing unnecessary risk of injury among young children. In an earlier study an E-health module with internet-based, tailored safety information was developed and applied. It concerns an advice for parents on safety behaviours in their homes regarding their child. The aim of this study is to evaluate the effect of this safety information combined with personal counselling on parents' child safety behaviours. Methods/Design Parents who are eligible for the regular well-child visit with their child at child age 5-8 months are invited to participate in this study. Participating parents are randomized into one of two groups: 1 internet-based, tailored safety information combined with personal counselling (intervention group, or 2 personal counselling using the Safety Information Leaflets of the Consumer Safety Institute in the Netherlands for children aged 12 to 24 months (control group. All parents receive safety information on safety topics regarding the prevention of falling, poisoning, drowning and burning. Parents of the intervention group will access the internet-based, tailored safety information module when their child is approximately 10 months old. After completion of the assessment questions, the program compiles a tailored safety advice. The parents are asked to devise and inscribe a personal implementation intention. During the next well-child visit, the Child Health Clinic professional will discuss this tailored safety information

  11. Artificial intelligence enhancements to safety parameter display systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hajek, B.K.; Hashemi, S.; Sharma, D.; Chandrasekaran, B.; Miller, D.W.

    1986-01-01

    Two prototype knowledge based systems have been developed at The Ohio State University to be the basis of an operator aid that can be attached to an existing nuclear power plant Safety Parameter Display System. The first system uses improved sensor validation techniques to provide input to a fault diagnosis process. The second system would use the diagnostic system output to synthesize corrective procedures to aid the control room licensed operator in plant recovery

  12. Design of Instrumentation and Control Systems for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication is a revision and combination of two Safety Guides, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-1.1 and No. NS-G-1.3. The revision takes into account developments in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems since the publication of the earlier Safety Guides. The main changes relate to the continuing development of computer applications and the evolution of the methods necessary for their safe, secure and practical use. In addition, account is taken of developments in human factors engineering and the need for computer security. This Safety Guide references and takes into account other IAEA Safety Standards and Nuclear Security Series publications that provide guidance relating to I&C design

  13. Safety assessment of computerized instrumentation and control for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fride, B.; Henry, J.Y.; Manners, S.

    1996-01-01

    France's latest 1400 MWe 'N4' generation of Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) use distributed programmable control systems interconnected by data networks. The protection system is also software based. IPSN have the task of evaluating the safety demonstration before the government safety authority (DSIN) give the licensee (EDF) permission to fuel the reactor and to raise power. Some of the different aspects of the evaluation carried out and the methodologies used for assessing the C and I are presented. (author)

  14. Validity of your safety awareness training

    CERN Multimedia

    DG Unit

    2010-01-01

    AIS is setting up an automatic e-mail reminder system for safety training. You are invited to forward this message to everyone concerned. Reminder: Please check the validity of your Safety courses Since April 2009 the compulsory basic Safety awareness courses (levels 1, 2 and 3) have been accessible on a "self-service" basis on the web (see CERN Bulletin). Participants are required to pass a test at the end of each course. The test is valid for 3 years so courses must be repeated on a regular basis. A system of automatic e-mail reminders already exists for level 4 courses on SIR and will be extended to the other levels shortly. The number of levels you are required to complete depends on your professional category. Activity Personnel concerned Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4     Basic safety Basic Safety ...

  15. Hanford Site Wide Transportation Safety Document [SEC 1 Thru 3

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MCCALL, D L

    2002-06-01

    This safety evaluation report (SER) documents the basis for the US Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL) to approve the Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document (TSD) for onsite Transportation and Packaging (T&P) at Hanford. Hanford contractors, on behalf of DOE-RL, prepared and submitted the Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document, DOE/RL-2001-0036, Revision 0, (DOE/RL 2001), dated October 4, 2001, which is referred to throughout this report as the TSD. In the context of the TSD, Hanford onsite shipments are the activities of moving hazardous materials, substances, and wastes between DOE facilities and over roadways where public access is controlled or restricted and includes intra-area and inter-area movements. The TSD sets forth requirements and standards for onsite shipment of radioactive and hazardous materials and wastes within the confines of the Hanford Site on roadways where public access is restricted by signs, barricades, fences, or other means including road closures and moving convoys controlled by Hanford Site security forces.

  16. Diagnosis function of safety status in the safety parameter display system (SPDS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Yuanfang

    1993-04-01

    An automatic diagnosis function of safety status for nuclear power plant adopted in the SPDS is introduced. To guarantee diagnosis diversification, two diagnosis criteria of a design basis accident monitoring and a critical safety function monitoring used in plant emergency operation are provided. As an extensive function, a parameter deviation monitoring used in plant normal operation is also provided

  17. Nuclear safety. ICFTU proposals for the international control of the nuclear energy industry

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1989-07-01

    are strong proponents of its use and others have said that they are only prepared to accept its application if safety controls are substantially improved. All affiliates of the ICFTU are convinced that energy policy options must be widened through increased research and development of new and renewable sources and through extensive energy conservation measures. The environmental impact of all methods of energy generation must be assessed on the basis of the public availability of all relevant information. It is in this context, that whatever their views about the desirability or otherwise of nuclear power, all ICFTU affiliates recognise the immediate need to assure the highest possible level of safety for all nuclear plants and activities everywhere - for example to deal with radioactive wastes created over the last 30 years. Even if some countries opt out of nuclear power it is likely that many others will be committed to it for many years. Given the widespread effects of a catastrophic failure anywhere in the world we must therefore all be concerned to strengthen the international safety regime. Because of their historic role in campaigning for health and safety at work, unions are well placed to exercise an independent watchdog role - making use of the knowledge and skills of their members in the nuclear industry - and are also able to speak on behalf of a large membership which is representative representative of the wide public concern about nuclear safety. Immediately following the Chernobyl disaster, the ICFTU Executive Board adopted a resolution (reproduced as Appendix 2 to this document) calling for immediate steps to tighten up nuclear safety. In the light of subsequent developments, the Confederation has now given further detailed consideration to the whole question of nuclear safety and has decided to publish this report which contains detailed proposals for tighter international control of nuclear energy via the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA

  18. Nuclear safety. ICFTU proposals for the international control of the nuclear energy industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    are strong proponents of its use and others have said that they are only prepared to accept its application if safety controls are substantially improved. All affiliates of the ICFTU are convinced that energy policy options must be widened through increased research and development of new and renewable sources and through extensive energy conservation measures. The environmental impact of all methods of energy generation must be assessed on the basis of the public availability of all relevant information. It is in this context, that whatever their views about the desirability or otherwise of nuclear power, all ICFTU affiliates recognise the immediate need to assure the highest possible level of safety for all nuclear plants and activities everywhere - for example to deal with radioactive wastes created over the last 30 years. Even if some countries opt out of nuclear power it is likely that many others will be committed to it for many years. Given the widespread effects of a catastrophic failure anywhere in the world we must therefore all be concerned to strengthen the international safety regime. Because of their historic role in campaigning for health and safety at work, unions are well placed to exercise an independent watchdog role - making use of the knowledge and skills of their members in the nuclear industry - and are also able to speak on behalf of a large membership which is representative representative of the wide public concern about nuclear safety. Immediately following the Chernobyl disaster, the ICFTU Executive Board adopted a resolution (reproduced as Appendix 2 to this document) calling for immediate steps to tighten up nuclear safety. In the light of subsequent developments, the Confederation has now given further detailed consideration to the whole question of nuclear safety and has decided to publish this report which contains detailed proposals for tighter international control of nuclear energy via the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA

  19. Reliability analysis and computation of computer-based safety instrumentation and control used in German nuclear power plant. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ding, Yongjian; Krause, Ulrich; Gu, Chunlei

    2014-01-01

    The trend of technological advancement in the field of safety instrumentation and control (I and C) leads to increasingly frequent use of computer-based (digital) control systems which consisting of distributed, connected bus communications computers and their functionalities are freely programmable by qualified software. The advantages of the new I and C system over the old I and C system with hard-wired technology are e.g. in the higher flexibility, cost-effective procurement of spare parts, higher hardware reliability (through higher integration density, intelligent self-monitoring mechanisms, etc.). On the other hand, skeptics see the new technology with the computer-based I and C a higher potential by influences of common cause failures (CCF), and the easier manipulation by sabotage (IT Security). In this joint research project funded by the Federal Ministry for Economical Affaires and Energy (BMWi) (2011-2014, FJZ 1501405) the Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg and Magdeburg-Stendal University of Applied Sciences are therefore trying to develop suitable methods for the demonstration of the reliability of the new instrumentation and control systems with the focus on the investigation of CCF. This expertise of both houses shall be extended to this area and a scientific contribution to the sound reliability judgments of the digital safety I and C in domestic and foreign nuclear power plants. First, the state of science and technology will be worked out through the study of national and international standards in the field of functional safety of electrical and I and C systems and accompanying literature. On the basis of the existing nuclear Standards the deterministic requirements on the structure of the new digital I and C system will be determined. The possible methods of reliability modeling will be analyzed and compared. A suitable method called multi class binomial failure rate (MCFBR) which was successfully used in safety valve applications will be

  20. Methods of checking general safety criteria in UML statechart specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pap, Zsigmond; Majzik, Istvan; Pataricza, Andras; Szegi, Andras

    2005-01-01

    This paper describes methods and tools for safety analysis of UML statechart specifications. A comprehensive set of general safety criteria including completeness and consistency is applied in automated analysis. Analysis techniques are based on OCL expressions, graph transformations and reachability analysis. Two canonical intermediate representations of the statechart specification are introduced. They are suitable for straightforward implementation of checker methods and for the support of the proof of the correctness and soundness of the applied analysis. One of them also serves as a basis of the metamodel of a variant of UML statecharts proposed for the specification of safety-critical control systems. The analysis is extended to object-oriented specifications. Examples illustrate the application of the checker methods implemented by an automated tool-set

  1. Transient safety performance of the PRISM innovative liquid metal reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magee, P.M.; Dubberley, A.E.; Rhow, S.K.; Wu, T.

    1988-01-01

    The PRISM sodium-cooled reactor concept utilizes passive safety characteristics and modularity to increase performance margins, improve licensability, reduce owner's risk and reduce costs. The relatively small size of each reactor module (471 MWt) facilitates the use of passive self-shutdown and shutdown heat removal features, which permit design simplification and reduction of safety-related systems. Key to the transient performance is the inherent negative reactivity feedback characteristics of the core design resulting from the use of metal (U-Pu-Zr) swing, and very low control rod runout worth. Selected beyond design basis events relying only on these core design features are analyzed and the design margins summarized to demonstrate the advancement in reactor safety achieved with the PRISM design concept

  2. Availability analysis of safety grade multiple redundant controller used in advanced nuclear safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Son, Kwang Seop; Kim, Dong Hoon; Park, Gee Yong; Kang, Hyun Gook

    2018-01-01

    Highlights: •The multiple redundant controller, SPLC is configured as the combination of DMR and TMR architecture. •We construct the Markov model of SPLC using the concept of the system unavailability rate. •To satisfy the availability requirement of safety grade controller, the fault coverage factor (FCF) should be ≥0.8 and the MTTR of each module should be ≤100 h when FCF is 0.9. •The availability of SPLC is better than that of PLC having iTMR architecture however it is poorer than iTMR considering the off-line test and inspection on the assumption that MTTR of each module is ≤200 h. -- Abstract: We analyze the availability of the Safety Programmable Logic Controller (SPLC) having multiple redundant architectures. In the SPLC, input/output and processor module are configured as triple modular redundancy (TMR), and backplane bus, power and communication modules are configured as dual modular redundancy (DMR). The voting logics for redundant architectures are based on the forwarding error detection. It means that the receivers perform the voting logics based on the status information of transmitters. To analyze the availability of SPLC, we construct the Markov model and simplify the model adopting the system unavailability rate. The results show that the fault coverage factor should be ≥0.8 and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) should be ≤100 h in order to satisfy the requirement that the availability of the safety grade PLC should be ≥0.995. Also we evaluate the availability of SPLC comparing to other PLCs such as simplex, processor DMR (pDMR) and independent TMR (iTMR) PLCs used in the existing nuclear safety systems. The availability of SPLC is higher than those of the simplex, pDMR but is lower than that of iTMR for one month which is the periodic off-line test and inspection. That’s why the number of redundant modules used in PLC is more dominant to increasing the availability than the number of fault masking methods such as voting logics used

  3. 340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodovsky, T.J.

    2010-01-01

    The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3. The final hazard categorization for the deactivated 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility) is presented in this document. This hazard categorization was prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-1 027-92, Change Notice 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with Doe Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category (HC) 3. Routine nuclear waste receiving, storage, handling, and shipping operations at the 340 Facility have been deactivated, however, the facility contains a small amount of radioactive liquid and/or dry saltcake in two underground vault tanks. A seismic event and hydrogen deflagration were selected as bounding accidents. The generation of hydrogen in the vault tanks without active ventilation was determined to achieve a steady state volume of 0.33%, which is significantly less than the lower flammability limit of 4%. Therefore, a hydrogen deflagration is not possible in these tanks. The unmitigated release from a seismic event was used to categorize the facility consistent with the process defined in Nuclear Safety Technical Position (NSTP) 2002-2. The final sum-of-fractions calculation concluded that the facility is less than HC 3. The analysis did not identify any required engineered controls or design features. The Administrative Controls that were derived from the analysis are: (1) radiological inventory control, (2) facility change control, and (3) Safety Management Programs (SMPs). The facility configuration and radiological inventory shall be controlled to ensure that the assumptions in the analysis remain valid. The facility commitment to SMPs protects the integrity of the facility and environment by ensuring training, emergency response, and radiation protection. The full scale

  4. Safety first!

    CERN Multimedia

    2016-01-01

    Among the many duties I assumed at the beginning of the year was the ultimate responsibility for Safety at CERN: the responsibility for the physical safety of the personnel, the responsibility for the safe operation of the facilities, and the responsibility to ensure that CERN acts in accordance with the highest standards of radiation and environmental protection.   The Safety Policy document drawn up in September 2014 is an excellent basis for the implementation of Safety in all areas of CERN’s work. I am happy to commit during my mandate to help meet its objectives, not least by ensuring the Organization makes available the necessary means to achieve its Safety objectives. One of the main objectives of the HSE (Occupational Health and Safety and Environmental Protection) unit in the coming months is to enhance the measures to minimise CERN’s impact on the environment. I believe CERN should become a role model for an environmentally-aware scientific research laboratory. Risk ...

  5. Modifications to nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA's programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements Section 7 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which establishes the safety requirements for the modification of nuclear power plants. Reasons for carrying out modifications to nuclear power plants may include: (1) maintaining or strengthening existing safety provisions and thus maintaining consistency with or improving on the current design. (2) recovering from plant faults. (3) improving the thermal performance or increasing the power rating of the plant. (4) increasing the maintainability of the plant, reducing the radiation exposure of personnel or reducing the costs of plant maintenance. And (5) extending the design life of the plant. Most modifications, made on the basis of operating experience, are intended to improve on the design or to improve operational performance and flexibility. Some are rendered necessary by new regulatory requirements, ageing of the plant or obsolescence of equipment. However, the benefits of regularly updating the plant design can be jeopardized if modifications are not kept under rigorous control throughout the lifetime of the plant. The need to reduce costs and improve efficiency, in combination with changes to the structure of the electricity generation sector of the economy in many countries, has led many companies to make changes in the structure of the operating organization for nuclear power plants. Whatever the reason for such organizational changes, consideration should be given to the effects of those changes with the aim of ensuring that they would have no impacts that would compromise the safety of the plant. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance and recommendations on controlling activities relating to modifications at nuclear power plants in order to reduce risk and to ensure that the configuration of the plant is at all times under

  6. Modifications to nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA's programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements Section 7 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which establishes the safety requirements for the modification of nuclear power plants. Reasons for carrying out modifications to nuclear power plants may include: (1) maintaining or strengthening existing safety provisions and thus maintaining consistency with or improving on the current design. (2) recovering from plant faults. (3) improving the thermal performance or increasing the power rating of the plant. (4) increasing the maintainability of the plant, reducing the radiation exposure of personnel or reducing the costs of plant maintenance. And (5) extending the design life of the plant. Most modifications, made on the basis of operating experience, are intended to improve on the design or to improve operational performance and flexibility. Some are rendered necessary by new regulatory requirements, ageing of the plant or obsolescence of equipment. However, the benefits of regularly updating the plant design can be jeopardized if modifications are not kept under rigorous control throughout the lifetime of the plant. The need to reduce costs and improve efficiency, in combination with changes to the structure of the electricity generation sector of the economy in many countries, has led many companies to make changes in the structure of the operating organization for nuclear power plants. Whatever the reason for such organizational changes, consideration should be given to the effects of those changes with the aim of ensuring that they would have no impacts that would compromise the safety of the plant. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance and recommendations on controlling activities relating to modifications at nuclear power plants in order to reduce risk and to ensure that the configuration of the plant is at all times under

  7. AGNES - safety reassessment of Paks NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gado, J.

    1995-01-01

    The main goal of the AGNES (Advanced General and New Evaluation of Safety) project for the reassessment of the safety of Paks Nuclear Power Plant, Hungary, was to improve the safety culture of the technology at Paks. A report was prepared on the reassessment of the Paks NPP safety. The analysis was divided into four groups: systems analysis, analysis of design basis accidents, severe accident analysis, and level 1 probabilistic safety analysis. Proposed safety enhancement measures are discussed. (N.T.)

  8. Safety and security analysis for distributed control system in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lu Zhigang; Liu Baoxu

    2011-01-01

    The Digital Distributed Control System (DCS) is the core that manages all monitoring and operation tasks in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). So, Digital Distributed Control System in Nuclear Power Plant has strict requirements for control and automation device safety and security due to many factors. In this article, factors of safety are analyzed firstly, while placing top priority on reliability, quality of supply and stability have also been carefully considered. In particular, advanced digital and electronic technologies are adopted to maintain sufficient reliability and supervisory capabilities in nuclear power plants. Then, security of networking and information technology have been remarked, several design methodologies considering the security characteristics are suggested. Methods and technologies of this article are being used in testing and evaluation for a real implement of a nuclear power plant in China. (author)

  9. Perspective on safety case to support a possible site recommendation decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gil, A.V.; Gamble, R.P.

    2002-01-01

    The mission of the US Department of Energy (DOE) is to provide the basis for a national decision regarding the development of a geological repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada. There are a number of steps in the decision process defined by US law that must be completed prior to development of a repository at this site. The DOE's focus is currently on the first two steps in this process: characterization of the site to support a determination by the DOE on whether the site is suitable for a geologic repository and a decision by the Secretary of Energy (the Secretary) on whether to recommend to the President that the site be approved for a repository. To enhance the confidence of multiple audiences in the basis for these actions, and to provide a basis for subsequent action by the President and the US Congress, information supporting the decision process must include the elements of a safety case consistent with the statutory and regulatory framework for these decisions. The idea of a safety case is to broaden the basis for confidence by decision-makers and the public in conclusions about safety. A safety case should cite multiple lines of evidence, or reasoning, beyond the results of a safety assessment to support the demonstration of safety, which includes compliance with applicable safety criteria. The multiple lines of evidence should show the basis for confidence in safety. To be most effective, such evidence requires information not directly used in the safety assessment. (author)

  10. Authorization basis requirements comparison report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brantley, W.M.

    1997-08-18

    The TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) consists of a set of documents identified by TWRS management with the concurrence of DOE-RL. Upon implementation of the TWRS Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), the AB list will be revised to include the BIO and TSRs. Some documents that currently form part of the AB will be removed from the list. This SD identifies each - requirement from those documents, and recommends a disposition for each to ensure that necessary requirements are retained when the AB is revised to incorporate the BIO and TSRs. This SD also identifies documents that will remain part of the AB after the BIO and TSRs are implemented. This document does not change the AB, but provides guidance for the preparation of change documentation.

  11. Authorization basis requirements comparison report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brantley, W.M.

    1997-01-01

    The TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) consists of a set of documents identified by TWRS management with the concurrence of DOE-RL. Upon implementation of the TWRS Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), the AB list will be revised to include the BIO and TSRs. Some documents that currently form part of the AB will be removed from the list. This SD identifies each - requirement from those documents, and recommends a disposition for each to ensure that necessary requirements are retained when the AB is revised to incorporate the BIO and TSRs. This SD also identifies documents that will remain part of the AB after the BIO and TSRs are implemented. This document does not change the AB, but provides guidance for the preparation of change documentation

  12. Potential safety enhancements to nuclear plant control: proof testing at EBR-II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lindsay, R.W.; Chisholm, G.H.

    1984-01-01

    Future changes in nuclear plant control and protective systems will reflect an evolutionary improvement through increased use of computers coupled with a better integration of man and machine. Before improvements can be accepted into the licensed commercial plant environment, significant testing must be accomplished to answer safety questions and to prove the worth of new ideas. The Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) is being used as a test-bed for both in-house development and testing for others in a DOE sponsored Man-Machine Integration program. The ultimate result of the development and testing would be a control system for which safety credit could be taken in the licensing process

  13. Safety assessment of computerized instrumentation and control for nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fride, B.; Henry, J.Y.; Manners, S.

    1996-12-31

    France`s latest 1400 MWe `N4` generation of Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) use distributed programmable control systems interconnected by data networks. The protection system is also software based. IPSN have the task of evaluating the safety demonstration before the government safety authority (DSIN) give the licensee (EDF) permission to fuel the reactor and to raise power. Some of the different aspects of the evaluation carried out and the methodologies used for assessing the C and I are presented. (author). 3 refs.

  14. Development of safety analysis technology for integral reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hee Cheol; Kim, K. K.; Kim, S. H.

    2002-04-01

    The state-of-the-arts for the integral reactor was performed to investigate the safety features. The safety and performance of SMART were assessed using the technologies developed during the study. For this purpose, the computer code system and the analysis methodology were developed and the safety and performance analyses on SMART basic design were carried out for the design basis event and accident. The experimental facilities were designed for the core flow distribution test and the self-pressurizing pressurizer performance test. The tests on the 2-phase critical flow with non-condensable gas were completed and the results were used to assess the critical flow model. Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) was carried out to evaluate the safety level and to optimize the design by identifying and remedying any weakness in the design. A joint study with KINS was carried out to promote licensing environment. The generic safety issues of integral reactors were identified and the solutions were formulated. The economic evaluation of the SMART desalination plant and the activities related to the process control were carried out in the scope of the study

  15. Pickering seismic safety margin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ghobarah, A.; Heidebrecht, A.C.; Tso, W.K.

    1992-06-01

    A study was conducted to recommend a methodology for the seismic safety margin review of existing Canadian CANDU nuclear generating stations such as Pickering A. The purpose of the seismic safety margin review is to determine whether the nuclear plant has sufficient seismic safety margin over its design basis to assure plant safety. In this review process, it is possible to identify the weak links which might limit the seismic performance of critical structures, systems and components. The proposed methodology is a modification the EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) approach. The methodology includes: the characterization of the site margin earthquake, the definition of the performance criteria for the elements of a success path, and the determination of the seismic withstand capacity. It is proposed that the margin earthquake be established on the basis of using historical records and the regional seismo-tectonic and site specific evaluations. The ability of the components and systems to withstand the margin earthquake is determined by database comparisons, inspection, analysis or testing. An implementation plan for the application of the methodology to the Pickering A NGS is prepared

  16. Regulatory control and safety of radiation and radioactive sources in Bangladesh

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mollah, A.S.

    2001-01-01

    The application of ionizing radiation and radioactive sources in different fields such as, medicine, industry, agriculture, research and teaching is constantly increasing in Bangladesh. Any system enacted to control exposure to ionizing radiation has as primary objective the protection of health of people against the deleterious effects of radiation. Establishing the appropriate level of radiological protection and safety of radiation sources used in practice or intervention attains this objective. The regulatory program governing the safe use of radioactive and radiation sources in Bangladesh is based on the legislation enacted as Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control (NSRC) Act-93 and NSRC Rules-97 and its implementation by the competent authority. The radiation control infrastructures and procedure are described as well as their functioning for the implementation of relevant activities such as licensing, regular inspection, personal dose monitoring, emergency preparedness, etc. The issue of security of radiation source is dealt in close relation with the preparation and use of the inventory of all radiation sources in the country

  17. Safety culture competition - expectations of a regulatory authority

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keil, D.; Gloeckle, W.

    2000-01-01

    The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station on April 26, 1986 influenced the development of reactor safety and promulgated two basic concepts especially in Germany. On the one hand, extensive measures of in-plant accident management have greatly reduced the so-called residual risk. On the other hand, a comprehensive safety approach has been initiated which comprises the nuclear power plant as a system together with people, technology, and organization and also includes safety culture. In a modern regulatory concept based on the dynamic development of safety, the authority's classical regulatory function of controlling is supplemented by the objective of promoting safety. While preserving the division of responsibilities between the regulatory authority and plant operators, the authority uses 'constructive critical dialog' as a tool to enhance safety. Besides the regulatory assessment of safety culture on the basis of indications or indicators, also the continuous promotion of safety culture in a dialog with plant operators is seen as one of the duties of a regulatory authority. Continued efforts are necessary to maintain the high level of safety culture in German nuclear power plants. Operators are expected to establish a safety management which assigns top priority to safety issues, and which pursues the goal of supervising and promoting safety culture. Developments on the deregulated electricity markets must not lead to safety aspects ranking second to economic aspects. Moreover, also under changed boundary conditions, only the safe operation of nuclear power plants ensures economic viability. (orig.) [de

  18. Design a Smart Control Strategy to Implement an Intelligent Energy Safety and Management System

    OpenAIRE

    Jing-Min Wang; Ming-Ta Yang

    2014-01-01

    The energy saving and electricity safety are today a cause for increasing concern for homes and buildings. Integrating the radio frequency identification (RFID) and ZigBee wireless sensor network (WSN) mature technologies, the paper designs a smart control strategy to implement an intelligent energy safety and management system (IESMS) which performs energy measuring, controlling, monitoring, and saving of the power outlet system. The presented RFID and billing module is used to identify user...

  19. 78 FR 979 - Petition for Positive Train Control Safety Plan Approval and System Certification of the...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-01-07

    ...] Petition for Positive Train Control Safety Plan Approval and System Certification of the Electronic Train... the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) for Positive Train Control (PTC) Safety Plan (PTCSP) approval and system certification of the Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) as required by 49 U.S.C...

  20. Basis Document for Sludge Stabilization

    CERN Document Server

    Risenmay, H R

    2001-01-01

    DOE-RL recently issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER) amendments to the PFP Final Safety Analysis Report, HNF-SD-CP-SAR-021 Rev. 2. The Justification for Continued Operations for 2736-ZB and plutonium oxides in BTCs Safety Basis change (letter DOE-RL ABD-074) was approved by one of the SERs. Also approved by SER was the revised accident analysis for Magnesium Hydroxide Precipitation Process (MHPP) gloveboxes HC-230C-3 and HC-230C-5 containing increased glovebox inventories and corresponding increases in seismic release consequence. Numerous implementing documents require revision and issuance to implement the SER approvals. The SER plutonium oxides into BTCs specifically limited the SER scope to ''pure or clean oxides, i.e., 85 wt% or grater Pu, in this feed change'' (SER Section 3.0 Base Information paragraph 4 [page 11]). Comprehensive USQ Evaluation PFP-2001-12 addressed the packaging of Pu alloy metals into BTCs, and the packaging of Pu alloy oxides (powders) into food pack cans and determined that the ac...

  1. Liquefied gaseous fuels safety and environmental control assessment program: third status report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1982-03-01

    This Status Report contains contributions from all contractors currently participating in the DOE Liquefied Gaseous Fuels (LG) Safety and Environmental Control Assessment Program and is presented in two principal sections. Section I is an Executive Summary of work done by all program participants. Section II is a presentation of fourteen individual reports (A through N) on specific LGF Program activities. The emphasis of Section II is on research conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Reports A through M). Report N, an annotated bibliography of literature related to LNG safety and environmental control, was prepared by Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) as part of its LGF Safety Studies Project. Other organizations who contributed to this Status Report are Aerojet Energy Conversion Company; Applied Technology Corporation; Arthur D. Little, Incorporated; C/sub v/ International, Incorporated; Institute of Gas Technology; and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Separate abstracts have been prepared for Reports A through N for inclusion in the Energy Data Base.

  2. The basis of clinical tribalism, hierarchy and stereotyping: a laboratory-controlled teamwork experiment

    OpenAIRE

    Braithwaite, Jeffrey; Clay-Williams, Robyn; Vecellio, Elia; Marks, Danielle; Hooper, Tamara; Westbrook, Mary; Westbrook, Johanna; Blakely, Brette; Ludlow, Kristiana

    2016-01-01

    Objectives To examine the basis of multidisciplinary teamwork. In real-world healthcare settings, clinicians often cluster in profession-based tribal silos, form hierarchies and exhibit stereotypical behaviours. It is not clear whether these social structures are more a product of inherent characteristics of the individuals or groups comprising the professions, or attributable to a greater extent to workplace factors. Setting Controlled laboratory environment with well-appointed, quiet rooms ...

  3. A new approach to determine the environmental qualification requirements for the safety related equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hasnaoui, C.; Parent, G.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the environmental qualification of safety related equipment is to ensure that the plant defense-in-depth is not compromised by common mode failures following design basis accidents with a harsh environment. A new approach based on safety functions has been developed to determine what safety-related equipment is required to function during and after a design basis accident, as well as their environmental qualification requirements. The main feature of this approach is to use auxiliary safety functions established from safety requirements as credited in the safety analyses. This approach is undertaken in three steps: identification of the auxiliary safety functions of each main safety function; determination of the main equipment groups required for each auxiliary safety function; and review of the safety analyses for design basis accidents in order to determine the credited auxiliary safety functions and their mission times for each accident scenario. Some of the benefits of the proposed approach for the determination of the safety environmental qualification requirements are: a systematic approach for the review of safety analyses based on a safety function check list, and the insurance, with the availability of the safety functions, that Gentilly-2 defense-in-depth would not be compromised by design basis accidents with a harsh environment. (author)

  4. Decision basis for a Danish ultimate storage for low and intermediate radioactive wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-11-01

    In 2003 the Danish Parliament consented to let the government start the preparation of a basis for decision on a Danish ultimate storage for low and intermediate radioactive wastes. The present report was prepared by a working group and it presents the final proposal for such a decision basis. The report describes the fundamental safety and environmental principles for establishing an ultimate storage, including determining the principles for site selection, storage construction, and safety analysis. In an appendix, the amount, types, and activity level of the Danish radioactive wastes are presented. (ln)

  5. Quantitative safety goals for the regulatory process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joksimovic, V.; O'Donnell, L.F.

    1981-01-01

    The paper offers a brief summary of the current regulatory background in the USA, emphasizing nuclear, related to the establishment of quantitative safety goals as a way to respond to the key issue of 'how safe is safe enough'. General Atomic has taken a leading role in advocating the use of probabilistic risk assessment techniques in the regulatory process. This has led to understanding of the importance of quantitative safety goals. The approach developed by GA is discussed in the paper. It is centred around definition of quantitative safety regions. The regions were termed: design basis, safety margin or design capability and safety research. The design basis region is bounded by the frequency of 10 -4 /reactor-year and consequences of no identifiable public injury. 10 -4 /reactor-year is associated with the total projected lifetime of a commercial US nuclear power programme. Events which have a 50% chance of happening are included in the design basis region. In the safety margin region, which extends below the design basis region, protection is provided against some events whose probability of not happening during the expected course of the US nuclear power programme is within the range of 50 to 90%. Setting the lower mean frequency to this region of 10 -5 /reactor-year is equivalent to offering 90% assurance that an accident of given severity will not happen. Rare events with a mean frequency below 10 -5 can be predicted to occur. However, accidents predicted to have a probability of less than 10 -6 are 99% certain not to happen at all, and are thus not anticipated to affect public health and safety. The area between 10 -5 and 10 -6 defines the frequency portion of the safety research region. Safety goals associated with individual risk to a maximum-exposed member of public, general societal risk and property risk are proposed in the paper

  6. Regulatory control of radiation sources. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The basic requirements for the protection of persons against exposure to ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources were established in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (the Basic Safety Standards), jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/ NEA), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (the Sponsoring Organizations). The application of the Basic Safety Standards is based on the presumption that national infrastructures are in place to enable governments to discharge their responsibilities for radiation protection and safety. Requirements relating to the legal and governmental infrastructure for the safety of nuclear facilities and sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material are established in the Safety Requirements on Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1. This Safety Guide, which is jointly sponsored by the FAO, the IAEA, the International Labour Office, the PAHO and the WHO, gives detailed guidance on the key elements for the organization and operation of a national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety, with particular reference to the functions of the national regulatory body that are necessary to ensure the implementation of the Basic Safety Standards. The Safety Guide is based technically on material first published in IAEA-TECDOC-10671, which was jointly sponsored by the FAO, the IAEA, the OECD/NEA, the PAHO and the WHO. The requirements established in GS-R-1 have been taken into account. The Safety Guide is oriented towards national

  7. Fast reactor safety: proceedings of the international topical meeting. Volume 2. [R

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1985-07-01

    The emphasis of this meeting was on the safety-related aspects of fast reactor design, analysis, licensing, construction, and operation. Relative to past meetings, there was less emphasis on the scientific and technological basis for accident assessment. Because of its broad scope, the meeting attracted 217 attendees from a wide cross section of the design, safety analysis, and safety technology communities. Eight countries and two international organizations were represented. A total of 126 papers were presented, with contributions from the United States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. Sessions covered in Volume 2 include: safety design concepts; operational transient experiments; analysis of seismic and external events; HCDA-related codes, analysis, and experiments; sodium fires; instrumentation and control/PPS design; whole-core accident analysis codes; and impact of safety design considerations on future LMFBR developments.

  8. Notes on safety modernization of nuclear power plants in Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammar, L.

    1997-01-01

    Investment programmes are pursued for all reactor generations in the order of 70M USD per year and unit, despite the political decision to phase out nuclear power. 15-20% of this may be safety-related. Major redesign and replacements of piping and joints in the primary system of Ringhals-1 (1:st generation BWR, external pump loops) are under-way aimed at enhancing the barrier reliability at par with with the new reactors with internal circulation pumps. Major upgrading in process control are typically on the agenda, e.g. modern digital protection and control systems as installed in Ringhals 1 and 2 in 1995. Comprehensive modernization of the control rooms are planned for all Swedish reactors, commencing in 1997 with the Forsmark reactors. The needs for modernization in regard of safety are expected to be further clarified in the design basis reviews due for completion in 1998

  9. Safety equipment list for the 241-SY-101 RAPID mitigation project

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MORRIS, K.L.

    1999-06-29

    This document provides the safety classification for the safety (safety class and safety RAPID Mitigation Project. This document is being issued as the project SEL until the supporting authorization basis documentation, this document will be superseded by the TWRS SEL (LMHC 1999), documentation istlralized. Upon implementation of the authorization basis significant) structures, systems, and components (SSCS) associated with the 241-SY-1O1 which will be updated to include the information contained herein.

  10. Safety equipment list for the 241-SY-101 RAPID mitigation project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris, K.L.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the safety classification for the safety (safety class and safety RAPID Mitigation Project. This document is being issued as the project SEL until the supporting authorization basis documentation, this document will be superseded by the TWRS SEL (LMHC 1999), documentation istlralized. Upon implementation of the authorization basis significant) structures, systems, and components (SSCS) associated with the 241-SY-1O1 which will be updated to include the information contained herein

  11. Lyapunov-based distributed control of the safety-factor profile in a tokamak plasma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bribiesca Argomedo, Federico; Witrant, Emmanuel; Prieur, Christophe; Brémond, Sylvain; Nouailletas, Rémy; Artaud, Jean-François

    2013-01-01

    A real-time model-based controller is developed for the tracking of the distributed safety-factor profile in a tokamak plasma. Using relevant physical models and simplifying assumptions, theoretical stability and robustness guarantees were obtained using a Lyapunov function. This approach considers the couplings between the poloidal flux diffusion equation, the time-varying temperature profiles and an independent total plasma current control. The actuator chosen for the safety-factor profile tracking is the lower hybrid current drive, although the results presented can be easily extended to any non-inductive current source. The performance and robustness of the proposed control law is evaluated with a physics-oriented simulation code on Tore Supra experimental test cases. (paper)

  12. An Improved Setpoint Determination Methodology for the Plant Protection System Considering Beyond Design Basis Events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, C.J.; Baik, K.I.; Baek, S.M.; Park, K.-M.; Lee, S.J.

    2013-06-01

    According to the nuclear regulations and industry standards, the trip setpoint and allowable value for the plant protection system have been determined by considering design basis events. In order to improve the safety of a nuclear power plant, an attempt has been made to develop an improved setpoint determination methodology for the plant protection system trip parameter considering not only a design basis event but also a beyond design basis event. The results of a quantitative evaluation performed for the Advanced Power Reactor 1400 nuclear power plant in Korea are presented herein. The results confirmed that the proposed methodology is able to improve the nuclear power plant's safety by determining more reasonable setpoints that can cover beyond design basis events. (authors)

  13. Assessment and management of ageing of major nuclear power plant components important to safety: In-containment instrumentation and control cables. Volume I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-12-01

    At present, there are over four hundred operational nuclear power plants (NPPs) in IAEA Member States. Operating experience has shown that ineffective control of the ageing degradation of major NPP components (e.g. caused by unanticipated phenomena and by operating, maintenance, design or manufacturing error) can jeopardize plant safety and also plant life. Ageing in these NPPs must be therefore effectively managed to ensure the availability of design functions throughout the plant service life. From the safety perspective, this means controlling within acceptable limits the ageing degradation and wear-out of plant components important to safety so that adequate safety margins remain, i.e. integrity and functional capability in excess of normal operating requirements. This publication is one in a series of guidance reports on the assessment and management of ageing of the major NPP components important to safety. The reports are based on experience and practices of NPP operators, regulators, designers, manufacturers, and technical support organizations and a widely accepted Methodology for the Management of Ageing of NPP Components Important to Safety, which was issued by the IAEA in 1992. The current practices for the assessment of safety margins (fitness-for-service) and the inspection, monitoring and mitigation of ageing degradation of selected components of Canadian deuterium-uranium (CANDU) reactors, boiling water reactors (BWRs), pressurized water reactors (PWRs), including the Soviet designed 'water moderated and water cooled energy reactors' (WWERs), are documented in the reports. These practices are intended to help all involved directly and indirectly in ensuring the safe operation of NPPs, and to provide a common technical basis for dialogue between plant operators and regulators when dealing with age related licensing issues. The guidance reports are directed at technical experts and managers from NPPs and from regulatory, plant design, manufacturing

  14. Assessment and management of ageing of major nuclear power plant components important to safety: In-containment instrumentation and control cables. Volume II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-12-01

    At present, there are over four hundred operational nuclear power plants (NPPs) in IAEA Member States. Operating experience has shown that ineffective control of the ageing degradation of major NPP components (e.g. caused by unanticipated phenomena and by operating, maintenance, design or manufacturing error) can jeopardize plant safety and also plant life. Ageing in these NPPs must be therefore effectively managed to ensure the availability of design functions throughout the plant service life. From the safety perspective, this means controlling within acceptable limits the ageing degradation and wear-out of plant components important to safety so that adequate safety margins remain, i.e. integrity and functional capability in excess of normal operating requirements. This publication is one in a series of guidance reports on the assessment and management of ageing of the major NPP components important to safety. The reports are based on experience and practices of NPP operators, regulators, designers, manufacturers, and technical support organizations and a widely accepted Methodology for the Management of Ageing of NPP Components Important to Safety, which was issued by the IAEA in 1992. The current practices for the assessment of safety margins (fitness-for-service) and the inspection, monitoring and mitigation of ageing degradation of selected components of Canadian deuterium-uranium (CANDU) reactors, boiling water reactors (BWRs), pressurized water reactors (PWRs), including the Soviet designed 'water moderated and water cooled energy reactors' (WWERs), are documented in the reports. These practices are intended to help all involved directly and indirectly in ensuring the safe operation of NPPs, and to provide a common technical basis for dialogue between plant operators and regulators when dealing with age related licensing issues. The guidance reports are directed at technical experts and managers from NPPs and from regulatory, plant design, manufacturing

  15. Industrial safety, origins and current situation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gil Sarralbo, J. F.

    2011-01-01

    Basic Introduction to Industrial Safety, purpose and expected outcome. Concepts and fundamental principles that support it. Brief overview of its evolution over the course of history. The current legal basis in Spain for Industrial Safety. (Author) 4 refs.

  16. Materials safety data sheets the basis for control of toxic chemicals. Volume II

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bolton, N. E.; Ketchen, E. E.; Porter, W. E.; Hunt, C. L.

    1977-05-01

    For large industrial and research operations, maintaining reasonable control of all toxic materials used in their operations can be a formidable task. A system utilizing cards has been developed that serves a dual purpose, informing the user regarding hazards of a particular material and also facilitating appropriate workplace surveillance during its use. Selected data, including threshold limit values, routes of absorption, symptoms of exposure, chronic effects, and emergency first-aid procedures, are printed on the card. A portion of the card contains the label that the user detaches and affixes to the container. This label classifies the material according to flammability, toxicity, reactivity, and special properties on a 0 through 4 hazard rating system. This report describes the development and use of such cards, contains the associated Toxic Material Data Sheets that provide full backup data for the labels, and furnishes a glossary of biomedical terms used in the Data Sheets.

  17. NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1; System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dezfuli, Homayoon; Benjamin, Allan; Everett, Christopher; Smith, Curtis; Stamatelatos, Michael; Youngblood, Robert

    2011-01-01

    basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of

  18. Safety analysis of the experimental multi-purpose high-temperature gas-cooled reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitake, Susumu; Ezaki, Masahiro; Suzuki, Katsuo; Takaya, Junichi; Shimazu, Akira

    1976-02-01

    Safety features of the experimental multi-purpose high-temperature gas-cooled reactor being developed in JAERI were studied or the basis of its preliminary conceptual design of the reactor plant. Covered are control of the plant in transients, plant behaviour in accidents, and functions of engineered safeguards, and also dynamics of the uprant and frequencies of the accidents. These studies have shown, (i) the reactor plant can be operated both in plant slave to reactor and reactor slave to plant control, (ii) stable control of

  19. Requirements of safety and reliability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    The safety strategy for nuclear power plants is characterized by the fact that the high level of safety was attained not as a result of experience, but on the basis of preventive accident analyses and the findings derived from such analyses. Although, in these accident analyses, the deterministic approach is predominant it is supplemented by reliability analyses. The accidents analyzed in nuclear licensing procedures cover a wide spectrum from minor incidents to the design basis accidents which determine the design of the safety devices. The initial and boundary conditions, which are essential for accident analyses, and the determination of the loads occuring in various states during regular operation and in accidents flow into the design of the individual systems and components. The inevitable residual risk and its origins are discussed. (orig./HP) [de

  20. Description of the control and safety systems of the RA reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popovic, B.; Pesic, M.

    1962-01-01

    This report contains detailed description and scheme of the control and safety system of the RA reactor. It consists of interconnected five systems: for automated regulation; compensation rods; safety rods; power density measurement device; period meter; automated D 2 O level meter in the core. Automated regulation system is divided into two parts: basic system for reactor operation regime at power from 10kW - 10 MW and precise regulation system for operation at set-up power level up to 10 kW which is used occasionally