PUREX Deactivation Health and Safety documentation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dodd, E.N. III

1995-01-01

The purpose of the PUREX Deactivation Project is to establish a passively safe and environmentally secure configuration of PUREX at the Hanford Site, and to preserve that configuration for a 10-year horizon. The 10-year horizon is used to predict future maintenance requirements and represents they typical time duration expended to define, authorize, and initiate the follow-on Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities. This document was prepared to increase attention to worker safety issues during the deactivation project and, as such, identifies the documentation and programs associated with PUREX Deactivation Health and Safety.

SNF fuel retrieval sub project safety analysis document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BERGMANN, D.W.

1999-01-01

This safety analysis is for the SNF Fuel Retrieval (FRS) Sub Project. The FRS equipment will be added to K West and K East Basins to facilitate retrieval, cleaning and repackaging the spent nuclear fuel into Multi-Canister Overpack baskets. The document includes a hazard evaluation, identifies bounding accidents, documents analyses of the accidents and establishes safety class or safety significant equipment to mitigate accidents as needed

SNF fuel retrieval sub project safety analysis document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BERGMANN, D.W.

1999-02-24

This safety analysis is for the SNF Fuel Retrieval (FRS) Sub Project. The FRS equipment will be added to K West and K East Basins to facilitate retrieval, cleaning and repackaging the spent nuclear fuel into Multi-Canister Overpack baskets. The document includes a hazard evaluation, identifies bounding accidents, documents analyses of the accidents and establishes safety class or safety significant equipment to mitigate accidents as needed.

Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Risk Assessment Technical Guidance Document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Astuto-Gribble, Lisa M; Caskey, Susan Adele

2014-07-01

The purpose of this document is threefold: 1) to describe the laboratory bio safety and biosecurity risk assessment process and its conceptual framework; 2) provide detailed guidance and suggested methodologies on how to conduct a risk assessment; and 3) present some practical risk assessment process strategies using realistic laboratory scenarios.

PUREX Deactivation Health and Safety documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dodd, E.N. III.

1995-01-01

The purpose of the PUREX Deactivation Project is to establish a passively safe and environmentally secure configuration of PUREX at the Hanford Site, and to preserve that configuration for a 10-year horizon. The 10-year horizon is used to predict future maintenance requirements and represents they typical time duration expended to define, authorize, and initiate the follow-on Decontamination and Decommissioning (D ampersand D) activities. This document was prepared to increase attention to worker safety issues during the deactivation project and, as such, identifies the documentation and programs associated with PUREX Deactivation Health and Safety

Supporting Fernald Site Closure with Integrated Health and Safety Plans as Documented Safety Analyses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kohler, S.; Brown, T.; Fisk, P.; Krach, F.; Klein, B.

2004-01-01

At the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) near Cincinnati, Ohio, environmental restoration activities are supported by Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) that combine the required project-specific Health and Safety Plans, Safety Basis Requirements (SBRs), and Process Requirements (PRs) into single Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs). These integrated DSAs employ Integrated Safety Management methodology in support of simplified restoration and remediation activities that, so far, have resulted in the decontamination and demolition (D and D) of over 200 structures, including eight major nuclear production plants. There is one of twelve nuclear facilities still remaining (Silos containing uranium ore residues) with its own safety basis documentation. This paper presents the status of the FCP's safety basis documentation program, illustrating that all of the former nuclear facilities and activities have now replaced. Basis of Interim Operations (BIOs) with I-HASPs as their safety basis during the closure process

HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS & RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

EVANS, C B

2004-12-21

The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S&M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard.

Safety assessment of research reactors and preparation of the safety analysis report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This Safety Guide presents guidelines, approved by international consensus, for the preparation, review and assessment of safety documentation for research reactors such as the Safety Analysis Report. While the Guide is most applicable to research reactors in the design and construction stage, it is also recommended for use during relicensing or reassessment of existing reactors

Environmental restoration and decontamination and decommissioning safety documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hansen, J.L.; Frauenholz, L.H.; Kerr, N.R.

1993-01-01

This document presents recommendations of a working group designated by the Environmental Restoration and Remediation (ER) and Decontamination and Decommissioning (D ampersand D) subcommittees of the Westinghouse M ampersand O (Management and Operation) Nuclear Facility Safety Committee. A commonalty of approach to safety documentation specific to ER and D ampersand D activities was developed and is summarized below. Allowance for interpretative tolerance and documentation flexibility appropriate to the activity, graded for hazard category, duration, and complexity, was a primary consideration in development of this guidance

Analysis of truncation limit in probabilistic safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cepin, Marko

2005-01-01

A truncation limit defines the boundaries of what is considered in the probabilistic safety assessment and what is neglected. The truncation limit that is the focus here is the truncation limit on the size of the minimal cut set contribution at which to cut off. A new method was developed, which defines truncation limit in probabilistic safety assessment. The method specifies truncation limits with more stringency than presenting existing documents dealing with truncation criteria in probabilistic safety assessment do. The results of this paper indicate that the truncation limits for more complex probabilistic safety assessments, which consist of larger number of basic events, should be more severe than presently recommended in existing documents if more accuracy is desired. The truncation limits defined by the new method reduce the relative errors of importance measures and produce more accurate results for probabilistic safety assessment applications. The reduced relative errors of importance measures can prevent situations, where the acceptability of change of equipment under investigation according to RG 1.174 would be shifted from region, where changes can be accepted, to region, where changes cannot be accepted, if the results would be calculated with smaller truncation limit

HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS and RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

EVANS, C.B.

2004-01-01

The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S and M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard

The Safety Case and Safety Assessment for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2012-09-15

This Safety Guide provides guidance and recommendations on meeting the safety requirements in respect of the safety case and supporting safety assessment for the disposal of radioactive waste. The safety case and supporting safety assessment provide the basis for demonstration of safety and for licensing of radioactive waste disposal facilities and assist and guide decisions on siting, design and operations. The safety case is also the main basis on which dialogue with interested parties is conducted and on which confidence in the safety of the disposal facility is developed. This Safety Guide is relevant for operating organizations preparing the safety case as well as for the regulatory body responsible for developing the regulations and regulatory guidance that determine the basis and scope of the safety case. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Demonstrating the safety of radioactive waste disposal; 3. Safety principles and safety requirements; 4. The safety case for disposal of radioactive waste; 5. Radiological impact assessment for the period after closure; 6. Specific issues; 7. Documentation and use of the safety case; 8. Regulatory review process.

Upgrading safety documentation for exported nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rosen, M.

1978-01-01

In view of the generally small regulatory staffs of importing countries, suggestions are given for upgrading the ''export edition'' of the traditionally supplied safety documentation by use of a Supplementary Information Report, written specifically for the needs of a smaller and/or less technically qualified staff, which would highlight the differences that exist between the facility to be constructed and the supposedly similar reference plant of the supplier country; by improvement of supporting safety documentation to allow for adequate understanding of significant safety parameters; and by attention to the needs of smaller countries in the critical operating regulations (Technical Specifications for Operation). (author)

LNG Safety Assessment Evaluation Methods

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Muna, Alice Baca [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); LaFleur, Angela Christine [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2015-05-01

Sandia National Laboratories evaluated published safety assessment methods across a variety of industries including Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), hydrogen, land and marine transportation, as well as the US Department of Defense (DOD). All the methods were evaluated for their potential applicability for use in the LNG railroad application. After reviewing the documents included in this report, as well as others not included because of repetition, the Department of Energy (DOE) Hydrogen Safety Plan Checklist is most suitable to be adapted to the LNG railroad application. This report was developed to survey industries related to rail transportation for methodologies and tools that can be used by the FRA to review and evaluate safety assessments submitted by the railroad industry as a part of their implementation plans for liquefied or compressed natural gas storage ( on-board or tender) and engine fueling delivery systems. The main sections of this report provide an overview of various methods found during this survey. In most cases, the reference document is quoted directly. The final section provides discussion and a recommendation for the most appropriate methodology that will allow efficient and consistent evaluations to be made. The DOE Hydrogen Safety Plan Checklist was then revised to adapt it as a methodology for the Federal Railroad Administration’s use in evaluating safety plans submitted by the railroad industry.

Safety assessment for the underground disposal of radioactive wastes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-01-01

This document is addressed to authorities and specialists responsible for or involved in planning, performing and reviewing safety assessments of underground radioactive waste repositories. It introduces and discusses in a general manner approaches and areas to be considered in making such safety assessments; its emphasis is on repositories for long-lived radioactive wastes in deep geological formations. It is hoped that this document will contribute to providing a base for a common understanding among the authorities and specialists concerned with the numerous studies involving a variety of scientific disciplines. While providing guidance, the document is also intended to stimulate further international discussion on this subject. It is the intention of the IAEA to develop more specific reports providing examples for the application of safety analyses for underground waste disposal

Safety assessment for the underground disposal of radioactive wastes

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1981-01-01

This document is addressed to authorities and specialists responsible for or involved in planning, performing and reviewing safety assessments of underground radioactive waste repositories. It introduces and discusses in a general manner approaches and areas to be considered in making such safety assessments; its emphasis is on repositories for long-lived radioactive wastes in deep geological formations. It is hoped that this document will contribute to providing a base for a common understanding among the authorities and specialists concerned with the numerous studies involving a variety of scientific disciplines. While providing guidance, the document is also intended to stimulate further international discussion on this subject. It is the intention of the IAEA to develop more specific reports providing examples for the application of safety analyses for underground waste disposal.

Guidelines for the review research reactor safety. Reference document for IAEA Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

In 1992, the IAEA published new safety standards for research reactors as part of the set of publications considered by its Research Reactor Safety Programme (RRSP). This set also includes publications giving guidance for all safety aspects related to the lifetime of a research reactor. In addition, the IAEA has also revised the Safety Standards for radiation protection. Consequently, it was considered advisable to revise the Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR) procedures to incorporate the new requirements and guidance as well as to extend the scope of the safety reviews to currently operating research reactors. The present report is the result of this revision. The purpose of this report is to give guidance on the preparation, execution, reporting and follow-up of safety review mission to research reactors as conducted by the IAEA under its INSARR missions safety service. However, it will also be of assistance to operators and regulators in conducting: (a) ad hoc safety assessments of research reactors to address individual issues such as ageing or safety culture; and (b) other types of safety reviews such as internal and peer reviews and regulatory inspections

Regulatory review of safety cases and safety assessments - associated challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, D.G.; Ben Belfadhel, M.; Metcalf, P.E.

2006-01-01

Regulatory reviews of safety cases and safety assessments are essential for credible decision making on the licensing or authorization of radioactive waste disposal facilities. Regulatory review also plays an important role in developing the safety case and in establishing stakeholders' confidence in the safety of the facility. Reviews of safety cases for radioactive waste disposal facilities need to be conducted by suitably qualified and experienced staff, following systematic and well planned review processes. Regulatory reviews should be sufficiently comprehensive in their coverage of issues potentially affecting the safety of the disposal system, and should assess the safety case against clearly established criteria. The conclusions drawn from a regulatory review, and the rationale for them should be reproducible and documented in a transparent and traceable way. Many challenges are faced when conducting regulatory reviews of safety cases. Some of these relate to issues of project and programme management, and resources, while others derive from the inherent difficulties of assessing the potential long term future behaviour of engineered and environmental systems. The paper describes approaches to the conduct of regulatory reviews and discusses some of the challenges faced. (author)

Geosphere process report for the safety assessment SR-Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Skagius, Kristina

2010-11-01

This report documents geosphere processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository, and forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Site. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process reports in the assessment, is described in the SR-Site Main report /SKB 2011/

Geosphere process report for the safety assessment SR-Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Skagius, Kristina (ed.) (Kemakta Konsult AB, Stockholm (Sweden))

2010-11-15

This report documents geosphere processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository, and forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Site. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process reports in the assessment, is described in the SR-Site Main report /SKB 2011/

Safety assessment document for spent fuel handling, packaging, and storage demonstrations at the E-MAD facility on the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-04-01

The objectives for spent fuel handling and packaging demonstration are to develop the capability to satisfactorily encapsulate typical commercial nuclear reactor spent fuel assemblies and to establish the suitability of interim dry surface and near surface storage concepts. To accomplish these objectives, spent fuel assemblies from a pressurized water reactor have been received, encapsulated in steel canisters, and emplaced in on-site storage facilities and subjected to other tests. As an essential element of these demonstrations, a thorough safety assessment of the demonstration activities conducted at the E-MAD facility has been completed. This document describes the site location and characteristics, the existing E-MAD facility, and the facility modifications and equipment additions made specifically for the demonstrations. The document also summarizes the Quality Assurance Program utilized, and specifies the principal design criteria applicable to the facility modifications, equipment additions, and process operations. Evaluations have been made of the radiological impacts of normal operations, abnormal operations, and postulated accidents. Analyses have been performed to determine the affects on nuclear criticality safety of postulated accidents and credible natural phenomena. The consequences of postulated accidents resulting in fission product gas release have also been estimated. This document identifies the engineered safety features, procedures, and site characteristics that (1) prevent the occurrence of potential accidents or (2) assure that the consequences of postulated accidents are either insignificant or adequately mitigated

A graded approach to safety documentation at processing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cowen, M.L.

1992-01-01

Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) has over 40 major Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) in preparation for non-reactor facilities. These facilities include nuclear material production facilities, waste management facilities, support laboratories and environmental remediation facilities. The SARs for these various projects encompass hazard levels from High to Low, and mission times from startup, through operation, to shutdown. All of these efforts are competing for scarce resources, and therefore some mechanism is required for balancing the documentation requirements. Three of the key variables useful for the decision making process are Depth of Safety Analysis, Urgency of Safety Analysis, and Resource Availability. This report discusses safety documentation at processing facilities

Using resources for scientific-driven pharmacovigilance: from many product safety documents to one product safety master file.

Science.gov (United States)

Furlan, Giovanni

2012-08-01

Current regulations require a description of the overall safety profile or the specific risks of a drug in multiple documents such as the Periodic and Development Safety Update Reports, Risk Management Plans (RMPs) and Signal Detection Reports. In a resource-constrained world, the need for preparing multiple documents reporting the same information results in shifting the focus from a thorough scientific and medical evaluation of the available data to maintaining compliance with regulatory timelines. Since the aim of drug safety is to understand and characterize product issues to take adequate risk minimization measures rather than to comply with bureaucratic requirements, there is the need to avoid redundancy. In order to identify core drug safety activities that need to be undertaken to protect patient safety and reduce the number of documents reporting the results of these activities, the author has reviewed the main topics included in the drug safety guidelines and templates. The topics and sources that need to be taken into account in the main regulatory documents have been found to greatly overlap and, in the future, as a result of the new Periodic Safety Update Report structure and requirements, in the author's opinion this overlap is likely to further increase. Many of the identified inter-document differences seemed to be substantially formal. The Development Safety Update Report, for example, requires separate presentation of the safety issues emerging from different sources followed by an overall evaluation of each safety issue. The RMP, instead, requires a detailed description of the safety issues without separate presentation of the evidence derived from each source. To some extent, however, the individual documents require an in-depth analysis of different aspects; the RMP, for example, requires an epidemiological description of the indication for which the drug is used and its risks. At the time of writing this article, this is not specifically

Documents pertaining to safety control of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) controls the safety of nuclear facilities in Finland. This control encompasses on one hand the evaluation of plant safety on the basis of plans and analyses pertaining to the plant and on the other hand the inspection of plant structures, systems and components as well as of operational activity. STUK also monitors plants operational experience feedback and technical developments in the field, as well as the development of safety research and takes the necessary measures on their basis. Guide YVL 1.1 describes how STUK controls the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The documents to be submitted to STUK are described in the nuclear energy legislation and YVL guides. This guide presents the mode of delivery, quality, contents and number of documents to be submitted to STUK

Safety assessment of primary system components at the USNRC

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Serpan, C Z; Chen, C Y; Taboada, A

1988-12-31

This document deals with the safety assessment in nuclear reactor components at the USNRC. The USNRC regulations and requirements concerning nuclear reactor design and operations are presented, together with guides and standards which describe how the actions should be implemented. The safety assessment relies on fracture analysis and Non Destructive Examination (NDE). (TEC).

Intranet-based safety documentation in management of major hazards and occupational health and safety.

Science.gov (United States)

Leino, Antti

2002-01-01

In the European Union, Council Directive 96/82/EC requires operators producing, using, or handling significant amounts of dangerous substances to improve their safety management systems in order to better manage the major accident potentials deriving from human error. A new safety management system for the Viikinmäki wastewater treatment plant in Helsinki, Finland, was implemented in this study. The system was designed to comply with both the new safety liabilities and the requirements of OHSAS 18001 (British Standards Institute, 1999). During the implementation phase experiences were gathered from the development processes in this small organisation. The complete documentation was placed in the intranet of the plant. Hyperlinks between documents were created to ensure convenience of use. Documentation was made accessible for all workers from every workstation.

Evolution of Safety Basis Documentation for the Fernald Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, T.; Kohler, S.; Fisk, P.; Krach, F.; Klein, B.

2004-01-01

The objective of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Fernald Closure Project (FCP), in suburban Cincinnati, Ohio, is to safely complete the environmental restoration of the Fernald site by 2006. Over 200 out of 220 total structures, at this DOE plant site which processed uranium ore concentrates into high-purity uranium metal products, have been safely demolished, including eight of the nine major production plants. Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) for these facilities have gone through a process of simplification, from individual operating Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) to a single site-wide Authorization Basis containing nuclear facility Bases for Interim Operations (BIOs) to individual project Auditable Safety Records (ASRs). The final stage in DSA simplification consists of project-specific Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs) and Nuclear Health and Safety Plans (N-HASPs) that address all aspects of safety, from the worker in the field to the safety basis requirements preserving the facility/activity hazard categorization. This paper addresses the evolution of Safety Basis Documentation (SBD), as DSAs, from production through site closure

LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE HANFORD SWOC MASTER DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS (MDSA) and IMPLEMENTATION VALIDATION REVIEW (IVR)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MORENO, M.R.

2004-01-01

DOE set clear expectations on a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (20 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule), which ensured long-term benefit to Hanford, via issuance of a nuclear safety strategy in February 2003. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development with the goal of a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was approved to standardize methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was approved for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated at Hanford. Standard safety management program chapters were approved for use as a means of compliance with the programmatic chapters of DOE-STD-3009, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports''. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. The new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) developed to address the operations of four facilities within the Solid Waste Operations Complex (SWOC) necessitated development of an Implementation Validation Review (IVR) process. The IVR process encompasses the following objectives: safety basis controls and requirements are adequately incorporated into appropriate facility documents and work instructions, facility personnel are knowledgeable of controls and requirements, and the DSA/TSR controls have been implemented. Based on DOE direction and safety analysis tools, four waste management nuclear facilities were integrated into one safety basis document. With successful completion of implementation of this safety document, lessons-learned from the in-process review, safety analysis tools and IVR process were documented for future action

Human factors in safety assessment. Safety culture assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Li; Deng Zhiliang; Wang Yiqun; Huang Weigang

1996-01-01

This paper analyses the present conditions and problems in enterprises safety assessment, and introduces the characteristics and effects of safety culture. The authors think that safety culture must be used as a 'soul' to form the pattern of modern safety management. Furthermore, they propose that the human safety and synthetic safety management assessment in a system should be changed into safety culture assessment. Finally, the assessment indicators are discussed

Synthesis of the IRSN report on its analysis of the safety guidance package (DOrS) of the ASTRID reactor project. Safety guidance document for the ASTRID prototype: Referral to the GPR. Opinion related to the safety guidance document of the ASTRID reactor project. ASTRID prototype: Safety guidance document for the ASTRID prototype

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lachaume, Jean-Luc; Niel, Jean-Christophe

2013-01-01

A first document indicates the improvement guidelines for the ASTRID project based on the French experience in the field of sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors, addresses the safety objectives as they are presented for the ASTRID project, discusses how the project includes a regulation and design referential, and how it addresses various aspects of the design approach (ranking and analysis of operation situations, defence in depth, use of probabilistic studies, safety classification and qualification to accidental situations, taking internal and external aggressions into account and taking severe accidents into account at the design level). It comments the guidelines related to the first two barriers, to main safety functions (control of reactivity and of reactor cooling, containment of radioactive and toxic materials), to dismantling, to R and D for safety support. A second document is a letter sent by the ASN to the GPR (permanent group of experts in charge of nuclear reactors) about the safety guidance document for the ASTRID prototype. The third document is the answer and contains comments and recommendations by this group about the content of this document, and therefore addresses the same topics as the first document. The last document defines the framework of the approach to this document

Radionuclide transport report for the safety assessment SR-Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

2010-12-15

This document compiles radionuclide transport calculations of a KBS-3 repository for the safety assessment SR-Site. The SR-Site assessment supports the licence application for a final repository at Forsmark, Sweden

Safety and security risk assessments--now demystified!

Science.gov (United States)

White, Donald E

2011-01-01

Safety/security risk assessments no longer need to spook nor baffle healthcare safety/security managers. This grid template provides at-at-glance quick lookup of the possible threats, the affected people and things, a priority ranking of these risks, and a workable solution for each risk. Using the standard document, spreadsheet, or graphics software already available on your computer, you can easily use a scientific method to produce professional looking risk assessments that get quickly understood by both senior managers and first responders alike!

IAEA safety requirements for safety assessment of fuel cycle facilities and activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jones, G.

2013-01-01

The IAEA's Statute authorises the Agency to establish standards of safety for protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property. In that respect, the IAEA has established a Safety Fundamentals publication which contains ten safety principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. A number of these principles require safety assessments to be carried out as a means of evaluating compliance with safety requirements for all nuclear facilities and activities and to determine the measures that need to be taken to ensure safety. The safety assessments are required to be carried out and documented by the organisation responsible for operating the facility or conducting the activity, are to be independently verified and are to be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the licensing or authorisation process. In addition to the principles of the Safety Fundamentals, the IAEA establishes requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment and which are governed by the principles in the Safety Fundamentals. The IAEA's Safety Requirements publication 'Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities', establishes the safety requirements that need to be fulfilled in conducting and maintaining safety assessments for the lifetime of facilities and activities, with specific attention to defence in depth and the requirement for a graded approach to the application of these safety requirements across the wide range of fuel cycle facilities and activities. Requirements for independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the operating organisation, including the requirement for the safety assessment to be periodically reviewed and updated are also covered. For many fuel cycle facilities and activities, environmental impact assessments and non-radiological risk assessments will be required. The

Preparation of safety and regulatory document for BARC Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prasad, S.S.; Jayarajan, K.

2017-01-01

In India, the necessary codes and safety guidelines for achieving the safety objectives are provided by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which are in conformity with the principles of radiation protection as formulated by the International Council of Radiation Protection (ICRP) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The same is followed by BARC Safety Council (BSC), which is the regulatory body for the BARC facilities. In addition to all types of fuel cycle facilities, BSC regulates safety of many types of conventional facilities. Many such types of facilities and projects are not under the regulatory purview of AERB. Therefore, the Council has also initiated a programme for development and publication of safety documents for installations in BARC in the fields/ topics yet not addressed by IAEA or AERB. This makes the task pioneering, as some of the areas taken up for defining the regulatory requirements are new, where standard regulatory documents are not available

Assessment of the nuclear installation's safety significant events

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vidican, D.

2005-01-01

This document tries to establish, based on the available documentation, the main steps in development of Assessment of the Events in Nuclear Installations. It takes into account: selection of the safety significant occurrences, establishing the direct cause and contributors as well as the root cause and contributors. Also, the document presents the necessary corrective actions and generic lessons to be learned from the event. The document is based especially on IAEA - ASSET guidelines and DOE root cause analysis Guidance. (author)

Model review and evaluation for application in DOE safety basis documentation of chemical accidents - modeling guidance for atmospheric dispersion and consequence assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lazaro, M. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Woodarad, K. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Hanna, S. R. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Hesse, D. J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Huang, J. -C. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Lewis, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Mazzola, C. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

1997-09-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through its Defense Programs (DP), Office of Engineering and Operations Suppon, established the Accident Phenomenology and Consequence (AP AC) Methodology Evaluation Program to identify and evaluate methodologies and computer codes to support accident phenomenological and consequence calculations for both radiological and nonradiological materials at DOE facilities and to identify development needs. The program is also intended to define and recommend "best or good engineering/safety analysis practices" to be followed in preparing ''design or beyond design basis" assessments to be included in DOE nuclear and nonnuclear facility safety documents. The AP AC effort is intended to provide scientifically sound and more consistent analytical approaches, by identifying model selection procedures and application methodologies, in order to enhance safety analysis activities throughout the DOE complex.

Probabilistic safety assessment for research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-12-01

Increasing interest in using Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methods for research reactor safety is being observed in many countries throughout the world. This is mainly because of the great ability of this approach in achieving safe and reliable operation of research reactors. There is also a need to assist developing countries to apply Probabilistic Safety Assessment to existing nuclear facilities which are simpler and therefore less complicated to analyse than a large Nuclear Power Plant. It may be important, therefore, to develop PSA for research reactors. This might also help to better understand the safety characteristics of the reactor and to base any backfitting on a cost-benefit analysis which would ensure that only necessary changes are made. This document touches on all the key aspects of PSA but placed greater emphasis on so-called systems analysis aspects rather than the in-plant or ex-plant consequences

IAEA activities in preparation of reglamentary documents on nuclear power plant safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konstantinov, L.V.

1976-01-01

The activities of the IAEA in the field of working out practical rules and recommendations ensuring the nuclear power plant safety are discussed. The practical rules will establish the aims and the minimum of requirements, that must be carried out to ensure the necessary safety of systems, components and equipment of the nuclear power plant throughout the whole period of its exploitation. Described is the procedure of the document preparation, consisting of the collection of documents, edited in different countries, the integration of documents by the IAEA Secretariat, the consideratiom of documents by the Group of senior advisers, the preparation of the draft document, the additional wort at the document in accordaqce with the remarks of the IAEA member-countries, the edition and dissemination of documents. The necessity for the active participation of the CMEA member-countries in the development and discussion of documents concerning the nuclear power plant safety is stated [ru

Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Werme, Lars; Lilja, Christina

2010-12-01

This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Site. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process reports in the assessment, is described in the SR-Site Main report /SKB 2011/

Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Werme, Lars; Lilja, Christina (eds.)

2010-12-15

This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Site. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process reports in the assessment, is described in the SR-Site Main report /SKB 2011/

Using Addenda in Documented Safety Analysis Reports

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swanson, D.S.; Thieme, M.A.

2003-01-01

This paper discusses the use of addenda to the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Addenda were prepared for several systems and processes at the facility that lacked adequate descriptive information and hazard analysis in the DSA. They were also prepared for several new activities involving unreviewed safety questions (USQs). Ten addenda to the RWMC DSA have been prepared since the last annual update

Climate and climate-related issues for the safety assessment SR-Can

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Naeslund, Jens-Ove

2006-11-01

The purpose of this report is to document current scientific knowledge of the climate-related conditions and processes relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository to a level required for an adequate treatment in the safety assessment SR-Can. The report also includes a concise background description of the climate system. The report includes three main chapters: A description of the climate system (Chapter 2); Identification and discussion of climate-related issues (Chapter 3); and, A description of the evolution of climate-related conditions for the safety assessment (Chapter 4). Chapter 2 includes an overview of present knowledge of the Earth climate system and the climate conditions that can be expected to occur in Sweden on a 100,000 year time perspective. Based on this, climate-related issues relevant for the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository are identified. These are documented in Chapter 3 'Climate-related issues' to a level required for an adequate treatment in the safety assessment. Finally, in Chapter 4, 'Evolution of climate-related conditions for the safety assessment' an evolution for a 120,000 year period is presented, including discussions of identified climate-related issues of importance for repository safety. The documentation is from a scientific point of view not exhaustive, since such a treatment is neither necessary for the purposes of the safety assessment nor possible within the scope of a safety assessment. As further described in the SR-Can Main Report and in the Features Events and Processes report, the content of the present report has been audited by comparison with FEP databases compiled in other assessment projects. This report follows as far as possible the template for documentation of processes regarded as internal to the repository system. However, the term processes is not used in this report, instead the term issue has been used. Each issue includes a set of processes together resulting in the behaviour of a

Climate and climate-related issues for the safety assessment SR-Can

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Naeslund, Jens-Ove (comp.)

2006-11-15

The purpose of this report is to document current scientific knowledge of the climate-related conditions and processes relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository to a level required for an adequate treatment in the safety assessment SR-Can. The report also includes a concise background description of the climate system. The report includes three main chapters: A description of the climate system (Chapter 2); Identification and discussion of climate-related issues (Chapter 3); and, A description of the evolution of climate-related conditions for the safety assessment (Chapter 4). Chapter 2 includes an overview of present knowledge of the Earth climate system and the climate conditions that can be expected to occur in Sweden on a 100,000 year time perspective. Based on this, climate-related issues relevant for the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository are identified. These are documented in Chapter 3 'Climate-related issues' to a level required for an adequate treatment in the safety assessment. Finally, in Chapter 4, 'Evolution of climate-related conditions for the safety assessment' an evolution for a 120,000 year period is presented, including discussions of identified climate-related issues of importance for repository safety. The documentation is from a scientific point of view not exhaustive, since such a treatment is neither necessary for the purposes of the safety assessment nor possible within the scope of a safety assessment. As further described in the SR-Can Main Report and in the Features Events and Processes report, the content of the present report has been audited by comparison with FEP databases compiled in other assessment projects. This report follows as far as possible the template for documentation of processes regarded as internal to the repository system. However, the term processes is not used in this report, instead the term issue has been used. Each issue includes a set of processes together resulting in the

Handling of future human actions in the safety assessment SR-Can

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moren, Lena

2006-10-01

This report documents the future human actions (FHA) considered in the long-term safety analysis of a KBS-3 repository. The report is one of the supporting documents to the safety assessment SR-Can. The purpose of this report is to provide an account of: General considerations concerning FHA; The methodology applied in SR-Can to assess FHA; The aspects of FHA that need to be considered in the evaluation of their impact on a deep geological repository; and The selection of representative scenarios for illustrative consequence analysis

Handling of future human actions in the safety assessment SR-Can

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Moren, Lena

2006-10-15

This report documents the future human actions (FHA) considered in the long-term safety analysis of a KBS-3 repository. The report is one of the supporting documents to the safety assessment SR-Can. The purpose of this report is to provide an account of: General considerations concerning FHA; The methodology applied in SR-Can to assess FHA; The aspects of FHA that need to be considered in the evaluation of their impact on a deep geological repository; and The selection of representative scenarios for illustrative consequence analysis.

ESRS guidelines for software safety reviews. Reference document for the organization and conduct of Engineering Safety Review Services (ESRS) on software important to safety in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The IAEA provides safety review services to assist Member States in the application of safety standards and, in particular, to evaluate and facilitate improvements in nuclear power plant safety performance. Complementary to the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) and the International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) services are the Engineering Safety Review Services (ESRS), which include reviews of siting, external events and structural safety, design safety, fire safety, ageing management and software safety. Software is of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as the use of computer based equipment and systems, controlled by software, is increasing in new and older plants. Computer based devices are used in both safety related applications (such as process control and monitoring) and safety critical applications (such as reactor protection). Their dependability can only be ensured if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is used. The ESRS on software safety are designed to assist a nuclear power plant or a regulatory body of a Member State in the review of documentation relating to the development, application and safety assessment of software embedded in computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. The software safety reviews can be tailored to the specific needs of the requesting organization. Examples of such reviews are: project planning reviews, reviews of specific issues and reviews prior final acceptance. This report gives information on the possible scope of ESRS software safety reviews and guidance on the organization and conduct of the reviews. It is aimed at Member States considering these reviews and IAEA staff and external experts performing the reviews. The ESRS software safety reviews evaluate the degree to which software documents show that the development process and the final product conform to international standards, guidelines and current practices. Recommendations are

Topical session proceedings of the 5. IGSC meeting on: observations regarding the safety case in recent safety assessment studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hooper, Alan J.; Voinis, Sylvie; Van Luik, Abraham E.

2004-01-01

Within the NEA, the IGSC (Integration Group for the Safety Case) has, as an essential role, to develop common views on such key aspects of the safety case. Therefore, since the inauguration of the IGSC in 2000, four meetings were organised with topical sessions to explore various of these key aspects. This is a report on the fifth such topical session, held as part of the 5. plenary meeting of the IGSC. The session was attended by 36 participants, representing waste management organisations and regulatory authorities from 16 NEA member countries, the IAEA and the European Commission. The purpose of this topical session was to provide support to the finalising of the IGSC safety case brochure by getting a description of the safety case content of the IAEA Draft Safety Requirements document and by getting an overview of progress that could be observed from national organisations on developing their cases for system safety and/or developing the required methodologies. The objective was that the IGSC safety case brochure should be supportive of the IAEA/NEA document, and be reflective of the experience of the IGSC member programmes and organisations. The topical session was mainly aimed at exchanging information on: - The safety case related content of the proposed IAEA/NEA document (currently titled: 'IAEA Safety Standards Series, Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Draft Safety Requirements (DS-154)'). - National programmes where safety assessments have recently been completed, e.g. ONDRAF/NIRAS, Nagra and Andra. - Feedback from international peer reviews, e.g. the Andra Dossier 2001 Argile, the Belgian SAFIR 2 report, the SR 97 report and the US-DOE Yucca Mountain TSPA. - The evolution of some national assessment methods and approaches e.g. SKB and Nagra. - The content of the draft IGSC safety case brochure entitled: 'The Nature and Purpose of the Post-closure Safety Case in Geological Disposal'. This document presents the various

Safety assessment document for the dynamic test complex (Building 836)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Odell, B.N.; Pfeifer, H.E.

1981-01-01

A safety assessment was performed to determine if potential accidents at the 836 Complex at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. These were earthquake, extreme wind (including missiles), lightning, flood, criticality, high explosive (H) detonation that disperses uranium and beryllium, spontaneous oxidation of plutonium, explosions due to finely divided particles, and a fire

Safety assessment document for the dynamic test complex (Building 836)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Odell, B.N.; Pfeifer, H.E.

1981-11-24

A safety assessment was performed to determine if potential accidents at the 836 Complex at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. These were earthquake, extreme wind (including missiles), lightning, flood, criticality, high explosive (H) detonation that disperses uranium and beryllium, spontaneous oxidation of plutonium, explosions due to finely divided particles, and a fire.

Considerations on Applying the Method for Assessing the Level of Safety at Work

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Costica Bejinariu

2017-07-01

Full Text Available The application of the method for assessing the level of safety at work starts with a document that contains the cover page, the description of the company (name, location, core business, organizational chart etc., description of the work system, a detailed list of its components, and a brief description of the assessment method. It continues with a Microsoft Excel document, which represents the actual application of the method and, finally, there is another document presenting conclusions, proposals, and prioritizations, which leads to the execution of the Prevention and Protection Plan. The present paper approaches the issue of developing the Microsoft Excel document, an essential part of the method for assessing the level of safety at work. The document is divided into a variable number of worksheets, showing the risk categories of general, specific, and management.

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

Science.gov (United States)

Zelkin, Natalie; Henriksen, Stephen

2011-01-01

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Assessment by peer review of the effectiveness of a regulatory programme for radiation safety. Interim report for comment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-06-01

This document covers assessment of those aspects of a radiation protection and safety infrastructure that are implemented by the Regulatory Authority for radiation sources and practices using such sources and necessarily includes those ancillary technical services, such as dosimetry services, which directly affect the ability of the Regulatory Authority to discharge its responsibilities. The focus of the guidance in this TECDOC is on assessment of a regulatory programme intended to implement the BSS. The BSS address transportation and waste safety mainly by reference to other IAEA documents. When conducting an assessment, the Review Team members should be aware of the latest IAEA documents (or similar national documents) concerning transportation and waste safety and, if appropriate, nuclear safety, and take them into account to the extent applicable when assessing the effectiveness of the regulatory programme governing radiation protection and safety of radiation source practices in a particular State

Assessment by peer review of the effectiveness of a regulatory programme for radiation safety. Interim report for comment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-05-01

This document covers assessment of those aspects of a radiation protection and safety infrastructure that are implemented by the Regulatory Authority for radiation sources and practices using such sources and necessarily includes those ancillary technical services, such as dosimetry services, which directly affect the ability of the Regulatory Authority to discharge its responsibilities. The focus of the guidance in this TECDOC is on assessment of a regulatory programme intended to implement the BSS. The BSS address transportation and waste safety mainly by reference to other IAEA documents. When conducting an assessment, the Review Team members should be aware of the latest IAEA documents (or similar national documents) concerning transportation and waste safety and, if appropriate, nuclear safety, and take them into account to the extent applicable when assessing the effectiveness of the regulatory programme governing radiation protection and safety of radiation source practices in a particular State

Guidelines for the Review of Research Reactor Safety: Revised Edition. Reference Document for IAEA Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR) is an IAEA safety review service available to Member States with the objective of supporting them in ensuring and enhancing the safety of their research reactors. This service consists of performing a comprehensive peer review and an assessment of the safety of the respective research reactor. The reviews are based on IAEA safety standards and on the provisions of the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors. The INSARR can benefit both the operating organizations and the regulatory bodies of the requesting Member States, and can include new research reactors under design or operating research reactors, including those which are under a Project and Supply Agreement with the IAEA. The first IAEA safety evaluation of a research reactor operated by a Member State was completed in October 1959 and involved the Swiss 20 MW DIORIT research reactor. Since then, and in accordance with its programme on research reactor safety, the IAEA has conducted safety review missions in its Member States to enhance the safety of their research reactor facilities through the application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors and the relevant IAEA safety standards. About 320 missions in 51 Member States were undertaken between 1972 and 2012. The INSARR missions and other limited scope safety review missions are conducted following the guidelines presented in this publication, which is a revision of Guidelines for the Review of Research Reactor Safety (IAEA Services Series No. 1), published in December 1997. This publication details those IAEA safety standards and guidance publications relevant to the safety of research reactors that have been revised or published since 1997. The purpose of this publication is to give guidance on the preparation, implementation, reporting and follow-up of safety review missions. It is also intended to be of assistance to operators and regulators in conducting

Living probabilistic safety assessment (LPSA)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-08-01

Over the past few years many nuclear power plant organizations have performed probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) to identify and understand key plant vulnerabilities. As a result of the availability of these PSA studies, there is a desire to use them to enhance plant safety and to operate the nuclear stations in the most efficient manner. PSA is an effective tool for this purpose as it assists plant management to target resources where the largest benefit to plant safety can be obtained. However, any PSA which is to be used in this way must have a credible and defensible basis. Thus, it is very important to have a high quality 'living PSA' accepted by the plant and the regulator. With this background in mind, the IAEA has prepared this report on Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (LPSA) which addresses the updating, documentation, quality assurance, and management and organizational requirements for LPSA. Deficiencies in the areas addressed in this report would seriously reduce the adequacy of the LPSA as a tool to support decision making at NPPs. This report was reviewed by a working group during a Technical Committee Meeting on PSA Applications to Improve NPP Safety held in Madrid, Spain, from 23 to 27 February 1998

National Waste Repository Novi Han operational safety analysis report. Safety assessment methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The scope of the safety assessment (SA), presented includes: waste management functions (acceptance, conditioning, storage, disposal), inventory (current and expected in the future), hazards (radiological and non-radiological) and normal and accidental modes. The stages in the development of the SA are: criteria selection, information collection, safety analysis and safety assessment documentation. After the review the facilities functions and the national and international requirements, the criteria for safety level assessment are set. As a result from the 2nd stage actual parameters of the facility, necessary for safety analysis are obtained.The methodology is selected on the base of the comparability of the results with the results of previous safety assessments and existing standards and requirements. The procedure and requirements for scenarios selection are described. A radiological hazard categorisation of the facilities is presented. Qualitative hazards and operability analysis is applied. The resulting list of events are subjected to procedure for prioritization by method of 'criticality analysis', so the estimation of the risk is given for each event. The events that fall into category of risk on the boundary of acceptability or are unacceptable are subjected to the next steps of the analysis. As a result the lists with scenarios for PSA and possible design scenarios are established. PSA logical modeling and quantitative calculations of accident sequences are presented

Hanford Site Wide Transportation Safety Document [SEC 1 Thru 3

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MCCALL, D L

2002-06-01

This safety evaluation report (SER) documents the basis for the US Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL) to approve the Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document (TSD) for onsite Transportation and Packaging (T&P) at Hanford. Hanford contractors, on behalf of DOE-RL, prepared and submitted the Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document, DOE/RL-2001-0036, Revision 0, (DOE/RL 2001), dated October 4, 2001, which is referred to throughout this report as the TSD. In the context of the TSD, Hanford onsite shipments are the activities of moving hazardous materials, substances, and wastes between DOE facilities and over roadways where public access is controlled or restricted and includes intra-area and inter-area movements. The TSD sets forth requirements and standards for onsite shipment of radioactive and hazardous materials and wastes within the confines of the Hanford Site on roadways where public access is restricted by signs, barricades, fences, or other means including road closures and moving convoys controlled by Hanford Site security forces.

Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

A well performed and adequately documented safety assessment of a nuclear facility will serve as a basis to determine whether the facility complies with the safety objectives, principles and criteria as stipulated by the national regulatory body of the country where the facility is in operation. International experience shows that the practices and methodologies used to perform safety assessments and periodic safety re-assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities differ significantly from county to country. Most developing countries do not have methods and guidance for safety assessment that are prescribed by the regulatory body. Typically the safety evaluation for the facility is based on a case by case assessment. Whilst conservative deterministic analyses are predominantly used as a licensing basis in many countries, recently probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques have been applied as a useful complementary tool to support safety decision making. The main benefit of PSA is to provide insights into the safety aspects of facility design and operation. PSA points up the potential environmental impacts of postulated accidents, including the dominant risk contributors, and enables safety analysts to compare options for reducing risk. In order to advise on how to apply PSA methodology for the safety assessment of non-reactor nuclear facilities, the IAEA organized several consultants meetings, which led to the preparation of this TECDOC. This document is intended as guidance for the conduct of PSA in non-nuclear facilities. The main emphasis here is on the general procedural steps of a PSA that is specific for a non-reactor nuclear facility, rather than the details of the specific methods. The report is directed at technical staff managing or performing such probabilistic assessments and to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for these PSAs. It is understood that the level of detail implied in the tasks presented in this

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

Science.gov (United States)

Zelkin, Natalie; Henriksen, Stephen

2011-01-01

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Development and Application of Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific Safety Guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for meeting the IAEA safety requirements in performing or managing a level 2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) project for a nuclear power plant; thus it complements the Safety Guide on level 1 PSA. One of the aims of this Safety Guide is to promote a standard framework, standard terms and a standard set of documents for level 2 PSAs to facilitate regulatory and external peer review of their results. It describes all elements of the level 2 PSA that need to be carried out if the starting point is a fully comprehensive level 1 PSA. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. PSA project management and organization; 3. Identification of design aspects important to severe accidents and acquisition of information; 4. Interface with level 1 PSA: Grouping of sequences; 5. Accident progression and containment analysis; 6. Source terms for severe accidents; 7. Documentation of the analysis: Presentation and interpretation of results; 8. Use and applications of the PSA; Annex I: Example of a typical schedule for a level 2 PSA; Annex II: Computer codes for simulation of severe accidents; Annex III: Sample outline of documentation for a level 2 PSA study.

Safety assessment for the 24 CANFLEX-NU bundle demonstration irradiation at Wolsong-1 generation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Suk, Ho Chun; Cho, M. S.; Jun, J. S. and others

2001-06-01

This document is a report on the safety assessment for the 24 CANFLEX-NU(CANDU Flexible fuelling - Natural Uranium) fuel bundle demonstration irradiation at Wolsong-1 Generating Station. The CANFLEX fuel bundle as a CANDU advanced fuel has been jointly developed by KAERI/AECL. This document describes the rationale for the demonstration irradiation and comments on the Korean government licensing issues such as the status of the CANFLEX fuel irradiations at NRU research reactor in AECL, status and plan of the CANFLEX fuel irradiations at a CANDU-6 power reactor, status of the water CHF(Critical Heat Flux) test at Stern Laboratories and the CHF correlation. This documents presents an assessment the consequences of postulated accidents with all safety system available during demonstration irradiation of 24 CANFLEX-NU fuel bundles at Wolsong-1 Generating Station. The assessment is made by two kinds of approaches. One approach is based on the document of the safety assessment for the 24 CANFLEX-NU fuel bundle demonstration irradiation at Point Lepreau Generating Station. The other approach is taken from the safety analyses using the analysis methods and assumptions used in the final safety reports on the 600 MWe CANDU-PHWR Wolsung-2, 3, and 4 Nuclear Power Plants for the Korea Electric Power Cooperation. The analyses are not comprehensive reviews of the postulated accidents, but examination of the expected difference in accident consequences because of the presence of 24 CANFLEX fuel bundles in two channels. The approach is to compare the difference to the safety margin for 37-element bundle cases.

Data report for the safety assessment SR-Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-12-01

This report compiles, documents, and qualifies input data identified as essential for the long-term safety assessment of a KBS-3 repository, and forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment project SR-Site. The input data concern the repository system, broadly defined as the deposited spent nuclear fuel, the engineered barriers surrounding it, the host rock, and the biosphere in the proximity of the repository. The input data also concern external influences acting on the system, in terms of climate related data. Data are provided for a selection of relevant conditions and are qualified through traceable standardised procedures

Data report for the safety assessment SR-Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

2010-12-15

This report compiles, documents, and qualifies input data identified as essential for the long-term safety assessment of a KBS-3 repository, and forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment project SR-Site. The input data concern the repository system, broadly defined as the deposited spent nuclear fuel, the engineered barriers surrounding it, the host rock, and the biosphere in the proximity of the repository. The input data also concern external influences acting on the system, in terms of climate related data. Data are provided for a selection of relevant conditions and are qualified through traceable standardised procedures

Safety assessment of cast steel valve housing using NDE- and FM-methods

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Blauel, J G; Hodulak, L [Fraunhofer-Institut fuer Werkstoffmechanik, Freiburg im Breisgau (Germany)

1988-12-31

This document presents some results concerning the safety assessment of cast steel valve housing. This risk assessment is performed through the Non Destructive Examination and Fracture Mechanics methods. (TEC).

A Practical Risk Assessment Methodology for Safety-Critical Train Control Systems

Science.gov (United States)

2009-07-01

This project proposes a Practical Risk Assessment Methodology (PRAM) for analyzing railroad accident data and assessing the risk and benefit of safety-critical train control systems. This report documents in simple steps the algorithms and data input...

[Agricultural biotechnology safety assessment].

Science.gov (United States)

McClain, Scott; Jones, Wendelyn; He, Xiaoyun; Ladics, Gregory; Bartholomaeus, Andrew; Raybould, Alan; Lutter, Petra; Xu, Haibin; Wang, Xue

2015-01-01

Genetically modified (GM) crops were first introduced to farmers in 1995 with the intent to provide better crop yield and meet the increasing demand for food and feed. GM crops have evolved to include a thorough safety evaluation for their use in human food and animal feed. Safety considerations begin at the level of DNA whereby the inserted GM DNA is evaluated for its content, position and stability once placed into the crop genome. The safety of the proteins coded by the inserted DNA and potential effects on the crop are considered, and the purpose is to ensure that the transgenic novel proteins are safe from a toxicity, allergy, and environmental perspective. In addition, the grain that provides the processed food or animal feed is also tested to evaluate its nutritional content and identify unintended effects to the plant composition when warranted. To provide a platform for the safety assessment, the GM crop is compared to non-GM comparators in what is typically referred to as composition equivalence testing. New technologies, such as mass spectrometry and well-designed antibody-based methods, allow better analytical measurements of crop composition, including endogenous allergens. Many of the analytical methods and their intended uses are based on regulatory guidance documents, some of which are outlined in globally recognized documents such as Codex Alimentarius. In certain cases, animal models are recommended by some regulatory agencies in specific countries, but there is typically no hypothesis or justification of their use in testing the safety of GM crops. The quality and standardization of testing methods can be supported, in some cases, by employing good laboratory practices (GLP) and is recognized in China as important to ensure quality data. Although the number of recommended, in some cases, required methods for safety testing are increasing in some regulatory agencies, it should be noted that GM crops registered to date have been shown to be

Documentation design for probabilistic risk assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Parkinson, W.J.; von Herrmann, J.L.

1985-01-01

This paper describes a framework for documentation design of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and is based on the EPRI document NP-3470 ''Documentation Design for Probabilistic Risk Assessment''. The goals for PRA documentation are stated. Four audiences are identified which PRA documentation must satisfy, and the documentation consistent with the needs of the various audiences are discussed, i.e., the Summary Report, the Executive Summary, the Main Report, and Appendices. The authors recommend the documentation specifications discussed herein as guides rather than rigid definitions

UPSAT guidelines. 1996 edition. Reference document for IAEA Uranium Productions Safety Assessment Teams (UPSATs)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-05-01

The IAEA Uranium Production Safety Assessment Team (UPSAT) programme provides advice and assistance to Member States to enhance the safety and environmental performance of uranium production facilities during construction, commissioning and operation. Sound design and construction are prerequisite for the safe and environmentally responsible operation of uranium mines and mills. However, the safety of the facility depends ultimately on sound policies, procedures and practices; on the capability and reliability of the construction, commissioning and operating personnel; on comprehensive instructions; and on adequate resources. A positive attitude and conscientiousness on the part of the management and staff in discharging their responsibilities is important to safety. The UPSAT guidelines have been developed in the following areas: (1) management, organization and administration; (2) training and qualification; (3) operation (4) maintenance; (5) safety, fire protection, emergency planning, and preparedness; (6) radiation protection; (7) environmental monitoring programme; (8) construction management; (9) commissioning and decommissioning

NPP Krsko periodic safety review. Safety assessment and analyses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Basic, I.; Spiler, J.; Thaulez, F.

2002-01-01

Definition of a PSR (Periodic Safety Review) project is a comprehensive safety review of a plant after ten years of operation. The objective is a verification by means of a comprehensive review using current methods that the plant remains safe when judged against current safety objectives and practices and that adequate arrangements are in place to maintain plant safety. The overall goals of the NEK PSR Program are defined in compliance with the basic role of a PSR and the current practice typical for most of the countries in EU. This practice is described in the related guides and good practice documents issued by international organizations. The overall goals of the NEK PSR are formulated as follows: to demonstrate that the plant is as safe as originally intended; to evaluate the actual plant status with respect to aging and wear-out identifying any structures, systems or components that could limit the life of the plant in the foreseeable future, and to identify appropriate corrective actions, where needed; to compare current level of safety in the light of modern standards and knowledge, and to identify where improvements would be beneficial for minimizing deviations at justifiable costs. The Krsko PSR will address the following safety factors: Operational Experience, Safety Assessment, EQ and Aging Management, Safety Culture, Emergency Planning, Environmental Impact and Radioactive Waste.(author)

Application of fuzzy set theory for safety culture and safety management assessment of Kartini research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Syarip; Hauptmanns, U.

2000-01-01

The safety culture status of nuclear power plant is usually assessed through interview and/or discussions with personnel and management in plant, and an assessment of the pertinent documentation. The approach for safety culture assessment described in IAEA Safety Series, make uses of a questionnaire composed of questions which require 'Yes' or 'No' as an answer. Hence, it is basically a check-list approach which is quite common for safety assessments in industry. Such a procedure ignores the fact that the expert answering the question usually has knowledge which goes far beyond a mere binary answer. Additionally, many situations cannot readily be described in such restricted terms. Therefore, it was developed a checklist consisting of questions which are formulated such that they require more than a simple 'yes' or 'no' as an answer. This allows one to exploit the expert knowledge of the analyst appropriately by asking him to qualify the degree of compliance of each of the topics examined. The method presented has proved useful in assessing the safety culture and quality of safety management of the research reactor. The safety culture status and the quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is rated as 'average'. The method is also flexible and allows one to add questions to existing areas or to introduce new areas covering related topics

Safety assessment for TA-48 radiochemical operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-08-01

The purpose of this report is to document an assessment performed to evaluate the safety of the radiochemical operations conducted at the Los Alamos National Laboratory operations area designated as TA-48. This Safety Assessment for the TA-48 radiochemical operations was prepared to fulfill the requirements of US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System.'' The area designated as TA-48 is operated by the Chemical Science and Technology (CST) Division and is involved with radiochemical operations associated with nuclear weapons testing, evaluation of samples collected from a variety of environmental sources, and nuclear medicine activities. This report documents a systematic evaluation of the hazards associated with the radiochemical operations that are conducted at TA-48. The accident analyses are limited to evaluation of the expected consequences associated with a few bounding accident scenarios that are selected as part of the hazard analysis. Section 2 of this report presents an executive summary and conclusions, Section 3 presents pertinent information concerning the TA-48 site and surrounding area, Section 4 presents a description of the TA-48 radiochemical operations, and Section 5 presents a description of the individual facilities. Section 6 of the report presents an evaluation of the hazards that are associated with the TA-48 operations and Section 7 presents a detailed analysis of selected accident scenarios

Safety Assessment Document for the Spent Reactor Fuel Geologic Storage Test in the Climax Granite Stock at the Nevada Test site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

The objective of the Spent Fuel Geologic Storage Test in the Climax Granite Stock is to evaluate the response of a granitic rock mass to the underground storage of encapsulated spent reactor fuel in a geometry that simulates a module of a large-scale geologic repository. This document reports an assessment of the safety of conducting this test. Descriptions are provided of the geography, meteorology, hydrology, geology, and seismology of the Climax Site; the effects of postulated natural phenomena and other activities at the nevada Test Site on the safety of the test; and the design and operation of the test facility and associated equipment. Evaluations are made of both the radiological and nonradiological impacts of normal operations, abnormal operations, and postulated accidents. It is concluded that conduct of the spent fuel test at the Climax Site will not result in any undue risk to the public, property, environment, or site employees

The Safety Assessment Framework Tool (SAFRAN) - Description, Overview and Applicability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alujevic, Luka

2014-01-01

The SAFRAN tool (Safety Assessment Framework) is a user-friendly software application that incorporates the methodologies developed in the SADRWMS (Safety Assessment Driven Radioactive Waste Management Solutions) project. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized the International Project on Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions (SADRWMS) to examine international approaches to safety assessment for predisposal management of all types of radioactive waste, including disused sources, small volumes, legacy and decommissioning waste, operational waste, and large volume naturally occurring radioactive material residues. SAFRAN provides aid in: Describing the predisposal RW management activities in a systematic way, Conducting the SA (safety assessment) with clear documentation of the methodology, assumptions, input data and models, Establishing a traceable and transparent record of the safety basis for decisions on the proposed RW management solutions, Demonstrating clear consideration of and compliance with national and international safety standards and recommendations. The SAFRAN tool allows the user to visibly, systematically and logically address predisposal radioactive waste management and decommissioning challenges in a structured way. It also records the decisions taken in such a way that it constitutes a justifiable safety assessment of the proposed management solutions. The objective of this paper is to describe the SAFRAN architecture and features, properly define the terms safety case and safety assessment, and to predict the future development of the SAFRAN tool and assess its applicability to the construction of a future LILW (Low and Intermediate Level Waste) storage facility and repository in Croatia, taking into account all the capabilities and modelling features of the SAFRAN tool. (author)

Safety assessment of discharge chute isolation barrier preparation and installation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meichle, R.H.

1994-01-01

This analysis examines activities associated with the installation of isolation barriers in the K Basins at the Hanford Reservation. This revision adds evaluation of barrier drops on stored fuel and basin floor, identifies fuel which will be moved and addresses criticality issues with sludge. The safety assessment is made for the activities for the preparation and installation of the discharge chute isolation barriers. The safety assessment includes a hazard assessment and comparisons of potential accidents/events to those addressed by the current safety basis documentation. No significant hazards were identified. An evaluation against the USQ evaluation questions was made and the determination made that the activities do not represent a USQ. Hazard categorization techniques were used to provide a basis for readiness review classifications

Audit of data and code use in the SR-Can safety assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hicks, T.W.; Baldwin, T.D. [Galson Sciences Ltd, 5 Grosvenor House, Melton R oad, Oakham, Rutland LE15 6AX (United Kingdom)

2008-03-15

assessment should be obtained from controlled sources or suitable external references such as textbooks or peer-reviewed journals. Information should be provided on how data are managed and controlled such that the data are selected and used appropriately in safety assessment calculations. Procedures for ensuring that controlled and quality assured data and parameter values are obtained for use in the safety assessment should be explained. - Comprehensive references to controlled data sources and documentation on data abstraction to derive parameter values for all data sets should be included in the Data Report. The Data Report should become the primary reference for data and parameter values used in the safety assessment to build confidence that data and parameter values are used consistently and traceable throughout the safety assessment. - Information on the review criteria or procedures used by SKB to determine whether a particular data set is acceptable for use in the safety assessment should be provided. Procedures for accepting data for use in the safety assessment should include a check that the data qualification process has been documented, and confirmation that data were acquired under appropriate quality assurance procedures or that suitable data qualification methods have been applied (such as confirmation testing, peer review, or independent technical assessment). - To build confidence in SKB's process of review and approval of safety assessment reports, information should be provided on the method of selection of reviewers, the review criteria, the process of comment resolution, and the availability of review records. - The role of each code used in the safety assessment should be explained in the Model Summary Report, with cross-references to where associated features, events, and processes, input data, and code applications are presented, and to where results are used in the safety assessment documentation, possibly through greater use of the Assessment

Workshop on Regulatory Review and Safety Assessment Issues in Repository Licensing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilmot, Roger D.

2011-02-01

The workshop described here was organised to address more general issues regarding regulatory review of SKB's safety assessment and overall review strategy. The objectives of the workshop were: - to learn from other programmes' experiences on planning and review of a license application for a nuclear waste repository, - to offer newly employed SSM staff an opportunity to learn more about selected safety assessment issues, and - to identify and document recommendations and ideas for SSM's further planning of the licensing review

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program: Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Docket No. 50-29)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-10-01

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared Supplement 1 to the final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR) (NUREG-0825), under the scope of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), for Yankee Atomic Electric Company's Yankee Nuclear Power Station located in Rowe, Massachusetts. The SEP was initiated by the NRC to review the design of older operating nuclear power plants to reconfirm and document their safety. This report documents the review completed under the SEP for those issues that required refined engineering evaluations or the continuation of ongoing evaluations after the Final IPSAR for the Yankee plant was issued. The review has provided for (1) an assessment of the significance of differences between current technical positions on selected safety issues and those that existed when Yankee was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. 2 tabs

RADON-type disposal facility safety case for the co-ordinated research project on improvement of safety assessment methodologies for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities (ISAM)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guskov, A.; Batanjieva, B.; Kozak, M.W.; Torres-Vidal, C.

2002-01-01

The ISAM safety assessment methodology was applied to RADON-type facilities. The assessments conducted through the ISAM project were among the first conducted for these kinds of facilities. These assessments are anticipated to lead to significantly improved levels of safety in countries with such facilities. Experience gained though this RADON-type Safety Case was already used in Russia while developing national regulatory documents. (author)

Safety assessment for facilities and activities. General safety requirements. Pt. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Fundamental Safety Principles. Section 3 describes the graded approach to implementation of the requirements for safety assessment for different facilities and activities. Section 4 establishes the overall requirements for a safety assessment and specific requirements that relate to the assessment of features relevant to safety. Section 4 also establishes the requirements to address defence in depth and safety margins, to perform safety analysis, to document the safety assessment and to carry out an independent verification. Section 5 establishes the requirements for the management, use and maintenance of the safety assessment

Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Fundamental Safety Principles. Section 3 describes the graded approach to implementation of the requirements for safety assessment for different facilities and activities. Section 4 establishes the overall requirements for a safety assessment and specific requirements that relate to the assessment of features relevant to safety. Section 4 also establishes the requirements to address defence in depth and safety margins, to perform safety analysis, to document the safety assessment and to carry out an independent verification. Section 5 establishes the requirements for the management, use and maintenance of the safety assessment

Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Fundamental Safety Principles. Section 3 describes the graded approach to implementation of the requirements for safety assessment for different facilities and activities. Section 4 establishes the overall requirements for a safety assessment and specific requirements that relate to the assessment of features relevant to safety. Section 4 also establishes the requirements to address defence in depth and safety margins, to perform safety analysis, to document the safety assessment and to carry out an independent verification. Section 5 establishes the requirements for the management, use and maintenance of the safety assessment

Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

from the Fundamental Safety Principles. Section 3 describes the graded approach to implementation of the requirements for safety assessment for different facilities and activities. Section 4 establishes the overall requirements for a safety assessment and specific requirements that relate to the assessment of features relevant to safety. Section 4 also establishes the requirements to address defence in depth and safety margins, to perform safety analysis, to document the safety assessment and to carry out an independent verification. Section 5 establishes the requirements for the management, use and maintenance of the safety assessment

Safety assessment for the 118-B-1 Burial Ground excavation treatability tests. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zimmer, J.J.; Frain, J.M.

1994-12-01

This revision of the Safety Assessment provides an auditable safety analysis of the hazards for the proposed treatability test activities per DOE-EM-STD-5502-94, DOE Limited Standard, Hazard Baseline Documentation (DOE 1994). The proposed activities are classified as radiological activities and as such, no longer require Operational Safety Limits (OSLs). The OSLS, Prudent Actions, and Institutional and Organization Controls have been removed from this revision and replaced with ''Administrative Actions Important to Safety,'' as determined by the hazards analysis. Those Administrative Actions Important to Safety are summarized in Section 1.1, ''Assessment Summary.''

[Safety assessment of foods derived from genetically modified plants].

Science.gov (United States)

Pöting, A; Schauzu, M

2010-06-01

The placing of genetically modified plants and derived food on the market falls under Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003. According to this regulation, applicants need to perform a safety assessment according to the Guidance Document of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which is based on internationally agreed recommendations. This article gives an overview of the underlying legislation as well as the strategy and scientific criteria for the safety assessment, which should generally be based on the concept of substantial equivalence and carried out in relation to an unmodified conventional counterpart. Besides the intended genetic modification, potential unintended changes also have to be assessed with regard to potential adverse effects for the consumer. All genetically modified plants and derived food products, which have been evaluated by EFSA so far, were considered to be as safe as products derived from the respective conventional plants.

Evaluation of safety assessment methodologies in Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide (1985) and Building 707 Final Safety Analysis Report (1987)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walsh, B.; Fisher, C.; Zigler, G.; Clark, R.A.

1990-01-01

FSARs. Rockwell International, as operating contractor at the Rocky Flats plant, conducted a safety analysis program during the 1980s. That effort resulted in Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) for several buildings, one of them being the Building 707 Final Safety Analysis Report, June 87 (707FSAR) and a Plant Safety Analysis Report. Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide, March 1985 (RFRAG85) documents the methodologies that were used for those FSARs. Resources available for preparation of those Rocky Flats FSARs were very limited. After addressing the more pressing safety issues, some of which are described below, the present contractor (EG ampersand G) intends to conduct a program of upgrading the FSARs. This report presents the results of a review of the methodologies described in RFRAG85 and 707FSAR and contains suggestions that might be incorporated into the methodology for the FSAR upgrade effort

Improvement of operational safety: The self-assessment at the Russian NPPs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kolotov, Aleksander

2002-01-01

The operating organization has scheduled for the forthcoming year to elaborate the NPP safety self-assessment standards and to settle precise criterion for its performance. Toward this end it was decided to form a Working Team including of NPP and VNIIAES representatives to elaborate major tasks on the self-assessment improvement, development and implementation of new documentation and training the personnel in new methodology. Actions developed by R osenergoatom , one of its items is the participation of 'Rosenergoatom' and VNIIAES representatives in the workshop, contains the sequence of Russian NPP safety self-assessment improvement at the first stage

Safety assessment of discharge chute isolation barrier preparation and installation activities. Revision 3

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meichle, R.H.

1994-01-01

This revision adds a section addressing impacts of dropping surfacing tool and rack cutter on the basin floor, and corrects typographical errors. The safety assessment is made for the activities for the preparation and installation of the discharge chute isolation barriers. The safety assessment includes a hazard assessment and comparisons of potential accidents/events to those addressed by the current safety basis documentation. No significant hazards were identified. An evaluation against the USQ evaluation questions was made and the determination made that the activities do not represent a USQ. Hazard categorization techniques were used to provide a basis for readiness review classifications

Workshop on Regulatory Review and Safety Assessment Issues in Repository Licensing

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wilmot, Roger D. (Galson Sciences Limited (United Kingdom))

2011-02-15

The workshop described here was organised to address more general issues regarding regulatory review of SKB's safety assessment and overall review strategy. The objectives of the workshop were: - to learn from other programmes' experiences on planning and review of a license application for a nuclear waste repository, - to offer newly employed SSM staff an opportunity to learn more about selected safety assessment issues, and - to identify and document recommendations and ideas for SSM's further planning of the licensing review

NASA Aviation Safety Program Systems Analysis/Program Assessment Metrics Review

Science.gov (United States)

Louis, Garrick E.; Anderson, Katherine; Ahmad, Tisan; Bouabid, Ali; Siriwardana, Maya; Guilbaud, Patrick

2003-01-01

The goal of this project is to evaluate the metrics and processes used by NASA's Aviation Safety Program in assessing technologies that contribute to NASA's aviation safety goals. There were three objectives for reaching this goal. First, NASA's main objectives for aviation safety were documented and their consistency was checked against the main objectives of the Aviation Safety Program. Next, the metrics used for technology investment by the Program Assessment function of AvSP were evaluated. Finally, other metrics that could be used by the Program Assessment Team (PAT) were identified and evaluated. This investigation revealed that the objectives are in fact consistent across organizational levels at NASA and with the FAA. Some of the major issues discussed in this study which should be further investigated, are the removal of the Cost and Return-on-Investment metrics, the lack of the metrics to measure the balance of investment and technology, the interdependencies between some of the metric risk driver categories, and the conflict between 'fatal accident rate' and 'accident rate' in the language of the Aviation Safety goal as stated in different sources.

Integrated safety assessment report: Integrated Safety Assessment Program: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (Docket No. 50-245): Draft report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-04-01

The Integrated Safety Assessment Program (ISAP) was initiated in November 1984, by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct integrated assessments for operating nuclear power reactors. The integrated assessment is conducted in a plant-specific basis to evaluate all licensing actions, licensee initiated plant improvements and selected unresolved generic/safety issues to establish implementation schedules for each item. In addition, procedures will be established to allow for a periodic updating of the schedules to account for licensing issues that arise in the future. This report documents the review of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, operated by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (located in Waterford, Connecticut). Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, is one of two plants being reviewed under the pilot program for ISAP. This report indicates how 85 topics selected for review were addressed. This report presents the staff's recommendations regarding the corrective actions to resolve the 85 topics and other actions to enhance plant safety. The report is being issued in draft form to obtain comments from the licensee, nuclear safety experts, and the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Once those comments have been resolved, the staff will present its positions, along with a long-term implementation schedule from the licensee, in the final version of this report

Transportation Safety Excellence in Operations Through Improved Transportation Safety Document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dr. Michael A. Lehto; MAL

2007-01-01

A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC. This accomplishment supported excellence in operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport costs; and making facility operations more efficient. The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers. Previously, the TSD did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums. Previous practice was to package the waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations. This practice allowed operations to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations friendly. An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were used effectively to directly support excellence in operations. Several factors contributed to the success of MFC's effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities. (1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to better integrate nuclear safety

An Assessment of SKB's Performance Assessment Calculations in the Interim Main Report for the Safety Assessment SR-Can

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maul, Philip; Robinson, Peter

2005-03-01

SKB have published their Interim Main Report of the safety assessment SR-Can, which is intended to establish the framework for what will be submitted in 2006 in support of a licence application for construction of the spent fuel encapsulation plant. This follows on from the SR-Can Planning Document published in 2003. The purpose of the Interim Report is stated to be to demonstrate the methodology that will be used for safety assessment. The present report evaluates the information provided in the Interim SR-Can Report that is relevant to the Performance Assessment (PA) calculations that SKB intend to undertake, using independent calculations to facilitate this process. SKB consider that the primary safety function is to isolate completely the fuel within the canisters over the entire assessment period. Should a canister be damaged, the secondary safety function is to ensure that any release is retarded and dispersed sufficiently to ensure that concentrations levels in the accessible environment cannot cause unacceptable consequences. In this report PA calculations are considered to include both a high-level representation of the evolution of the system (relevant to the primary safety function), and any subsequent radionuclide transport (relevant to the secondary safety function). The main conclusions drawn are: 1. The effects of climate evolution on engineered barriers have not been analysed in detail in the Interim Report, and this limits the usefulness of the preliminary calculations that have been undertaken. 2. A key aspect of SKB's approach is the use of an integrated near-field evolution model. The information provided on this model demonstrates its capability efficiently to reproduce calculations from individual process models, but insufficient information is given at the present time to justify statements about interactions between processes. In particular it is assumed that relatively short term thermal and resaturation processes do not affect the

The current CEA/DRN safety approach for the design and the assessment of future nuclear installations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fiorini, G.L.; Pinto, P.L.; Costa, M.

1999-01-01

The purpose of the document is to present the basis of the safety approach currently implemented by the CEA/DRN, both for the design and the assessment of innovative systems and future nuclear installations. This approach is the result of the experience maturated, within the context of the CEA/DRN Innovative Programme through practical applications over several future concepts, both for fission and fusion reactors, as well as for waste disposal. The background of this experience is structured coherently with the European Safety Authorities recommendations and the European Utilities Requirements (EUR). The Defence In Depth principle and its application, by means, among others, of the barrier concept, remains the basis of the safety design process of future nuclear installations. Its adequacy is checked through the safety assessment. The methodology for Lines Of Defence (LOD) implementation as well as the one for the LOD architecture assessment is shown and motivated. The document shows that the clear and unambiguous definition of the safety approach provides an essential base for the organisation of the design tasks, being sure that the safety aspects are correctly taken into account and implemented, and for an adequate safety assessment of the final design, both from qualitative point of view as well as for the quantitative safety analysis. (author)

Implementing 10 CFR 830 at the FEMP Silos: Nuclear Health and Safety Plans as Documented Safety Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fisk, Patricia; Rutherford, Lavon

2003-01-01

The objective of the Silos Project at the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) is to safely remediate high-grade uranium ore residues (Silos 1 and 2) and metal oxide residues (Silo 3). The evolution of Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) for these facilities has reflected the changes in remediation processes. The final stage in silos DSAs is an interpretation of 10 CFR 830 Safe Harbor Requirements that combines a Health and Safety Plan with nuclear safety requirements. This paper will address the development of a Nuclear Health and Safety Plan, or N-HASP

Climate and climate-related issues for the safety assessment SR-Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-12-01

The purpose of this report is to document current scientific knowledge on climate and climate-related conditions, relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository, to a level required for an adequate treatment in the safety assessment SR-Site. The report also presents a number of dedicated studies on climate and selected climate-related processes of relevance for the assessment of long term repository safety. Based on this information, the report presents a number of possible future climate developments for Forsmark, the site selected for building a repository for spent nuclear fuel in Sweden (Figure 1-1). The presented climate developments are used as basis for the selection and analysis of SR-Site safety assessment scenarios in the SR-Site main report /SKB 2011/. The present report is based on research conducted and published by SKB as well as on research reported in the general scientific literature

Climate and climate-related issues for the safety assessment SR-Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

2010-12-15

The purpose of this report is to document current scientific knowledge on climate and climate-related conditions, relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository, to a level required for an adequate treatment in the safety assessment SR-Site. The report also presents a number of dedicated studies on climate and selected climate-related processes of relevance for the assessment of long term repository safety. Based on this information, the report presents a number of possible future climate developments for Forsmark, the site selected for building a repository for spent nuclear fuel in Sweden (Figure 1-1). The presented climate developments are used as basis for the selection and analysis of SR-Site safety assessment scenarios in the SR-Site main report /SKB 2011/. The present report is based on research conducted and published by SKB as well as on research reported in the general scientific literature

Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Can

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Werme, Lars

2006-10-01

This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Can. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process report in the assessment, is described in the SR-Can Main report. The report is written by, and for, experts in the relevant scientific fields. It should though be possible for a generalist in the area of long-term safety assessments of geologic nuclear waste repositories to comprehend the contents of the report. The report is an important part of the documentation of the SR-Can project and an essential reference within the project, providing a scientifically motivated plan for the handling of geosphere processes. It is, furthermore, foreseen that the report will be essential for reviewers scrutinising the handling of geosphere issues in the SR-Can assessment. Several types of fuel will be emplaced in the repository. For the reference case with 40 years of reactor operation, the fuel quantity from boiling water reactors, BWR fuel, is estimated at 7,000 tonnes, while the quantity from pressurized water reactors, PWR fuel, is estimated at about 2,300 tonnes. In addition, 23 tonnes of mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fuel of German origin from BWR and PWR reactors and 20 tonnes of fuel from the decommissioned heavy water reactor in Aagesta will be disposed of. To allow for future changes in the Swedish nuclear programme, the safety assessment assumes a total of 6,000 canister corresponding to 12,000 tonnes of fuel

Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Can

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Werme, Lars (ed.)

2006-10-15

This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Can. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process report in the assessment, is described in the SR-Can Main report. The report is written by, and for, experts in the relevant scientific fields. It should though be possible for a generalist in the area of long-term safety assessments of geologic nuclear waste repositories to comprehend the contents of the report. The report is an important part of the documentation of the SR-Can project and an essential reference within the project, providing a scientifically motivated plan for the handling of geosphere processes. It is, furthermore, foreseen that the report will be essential for reviewers scrutinising the handling of geosphere issues in the SR-Can assessment. Several types of fuel will be emplaced in the repository. For the reference case with 40 years of reactor operation, the fuel quantity from boiling water reactors, BWR fuel, is estimated at 7,000 tonnes, while the quantity from pressurized water reactors, PWR fuel, is estimated at about 2,300 tonnes. In addition, 23 tonnes of mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fuel of German origin from BWR and PWR reactors and 20 tonnes of fuel from the decommissioned heavy water reactor in Aagesta will be disposed of. To allow for future changes in the Swedish nuclear programme, the safety assessment assumes a total of 6,000 canister corresponding to 12,000 tonnes of fuel.

ITER safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Raeder, J.; Piet, S.; Buende, R.

1991-01-01

As part of the series of publications by the IAEA that summarize the results of the Conceptual Design Activities for the ITER project, this document describes the ITER safety analyses. It contains an assessment of normal operation effluents, accident scenarios, plasma chamber safety, tritium system safety, magnet system safety, external loss of coolant and coolant flow problems, and a waste management assessment, while it describes the implementation of the safety approach for ITER. The document ends with a list of major conclusions, a set of topical remarks on technical safety issues, and recommendations for the Engineering Design Activities, safety considerations for siting ITER, and recommendations with regard to the safety issues for the R and D for ITER. Refs, figs and tabs

Upgrading the safety assessment of exported nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rosen, M.

1978-01-01

An examination of the safety aspects of exported nuclear power plants demonstrates that additional and somewhat special considerations exist for these plants, and thus that some new approaches may be required to insure their safety. In view of the generally small regulatory staffs of importing countries, suggestions are given for measures which should be taken by the various organizations involved in the export and import of nuclear power facilities to raise the level of the very essential safety assessment. These include the upgrading of the 'export edition' of the traditionally supplied safety documentation by use of a Supplementary Information Report, written specifically for the needs of a smaller and/or less technically qualified staff, which highlights the differences that exist between the facility to be constructed and the supposedly similar reference plant of the supplier country; by improvement of supporting safety documentation to allow for adequate understanding of significant safety parameters; and by attention to the needs of smaller countries in the critical Operating Regulations (Technical Specifications for Operation). Consideration is also given to upgrading the regulatory effort and to the obligations of principal organizations involved with exported nuclear plants, including national and international, for insuring the importing countries' technical readiness and the adequacy of the regulatory effort. Special attention is directed towards the project contract as a means of implementing programmes to achieve these goals. (author)

General safety considerations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-09-01

This document presents the full filling of the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Chapter 4 of the document contains some details about the priority to safety, financial and human resources, human factors, quality assurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection and emergency preparedness.

General safety considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

This document presents the full filling of the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Chapter 4 of the document contains some details about the priority to safety, financial and human resources, human factors, quality assurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection and emergency preparedness

General safety considerations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-09-01

This document presents the full filling of the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Chapter 4 of the document contains some details about the priority to safety, financial and human resources, human factors, quality assurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection and emergency preparedness.

General safety considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This document presents the full filling of the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Chapter 4 of the document contains some details about the priority to safety, financial and human resources, human factors, quality assurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection and emergency preparedness

Review of Policy Documents for Nuclear Safety and Regulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Woong Sik; Choi, Kwang Sik; Choi, Young Sung; Kim, Hho Jung; Kim, Ho Ki

2006-01-01

The goal of regulation is to protect public health and safety as well as environment from radiological hazards that may occur as a result of the use of atomic energy. In September 1994, the Korean government issued the Nuclear Safety Policy Statement (NSPS) to establish policy goals of maintaining and achieving high-level of nuclear safety and also help the public understand the national policy and a strong will of the government toward nuclear safety. It declares the importance of establishing safety culture in nuclear community and also specifies five nuclear regulatory principles (Independence, Openness, Clarity, Efficiency and Reliability) and provides the eleven regulatory policy directions. In 2001, the Nuclear Safety Charter was declared to make the highest goal of safety in driving nuclear business clearer; to encourage atomic energy- related institutions and workers to keep in mind the mission and responsibility for assuring safety; to guarantee public confidence in related organizations. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) also issues Yearly Regulatory Policy Directions at the beginning of every year. Recently, the third Atomic Energy Promotion Plan (2007-2011) has been established. It becomes necessary for the relevant organizations to prepare the detailed plans on such areas as nuclear development, safety management, regulation, etc. This paper introduces a multi-level structure of nuclear safety and regulation policy documents in Korea and presents some improvements necessary for better application of the policies

Review of Policy Documents for Nuclear Safety and Regulation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Woong Sik; Choi, Kwang Sik; Choi, Young Sung; Kim, Hho Jung; Kim, Ho Ki [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

2006-07-01

The goal of regulation is to protect public health and safety as well as environment from radiological hazards that may occur as a result of the use of atomic energy. In September 1994, the Korean government issued the Nuclear Safety Policy Statement (NSPS) to establish policy goals of maintaining and achieving high-level of nuclear safety and also help the public understand the national policy and a strong will of the government toward nuclear safety. It declares the importance of establishing safety culture in nuclear community and also specifies five nuclear regulatory principles (Independence, Openness, Clarity, Efficiency and Reliability) and provides the eleven regulatory policy directions. In 2001, the Nuclear Safety Charter was declared to make the highest goal of safety in driving nuclear business clearer; to encourage atomic energy- related institutions and workers to keep in mind the mission and responsibility for assuring safety; to guarantee public confidence in related organizations. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) also issues Yearly Regulatory Policy Directions at the beginning of every year. Recently, the third Atomic Energy Promotion Plan (2007-2011) has been established. It becomes necessary for the relevant organizations to prepare the detailed plans on such areas as nuclear development, safety management, regulation, etc. This paper introduces a multi-level structure of nuclear safety and regulation policy documents in Korea and presents some improvements necessary for better application of the policies.

Safety assessment document for the Dynamic Test Complex B854

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Odell, B.N.; Pfeifer, H.E.

1981-01-01

A safety assessment was performed to determine if potential accidents at the 854 Complex at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. These were earthquake, extreme wind (including missiles), lightning, flood, criticality, high explosive (HE) detonation that disperses uranium and beryllium, spontaneous oxidation of plutonium, explosions due to finely divided particles, and a fire. Seismic and extreme wind (including missiles) analyses indicate that the buildings are basically sound. The lightning protection system is in the process of being upgraded to meet AMCR 385-100. These buildings are located high above the dry creek bed so that a flood is improbable. The probability of high explosive detonation involving plutonium is very remote since the radioactive materials are encased and plutonium and HE are not permitted concurrently in the same area at Site 300. (The exception to this policy is that explosive actuating devices are sometimes located in assemblies containing fissile materials. However, an accidental actuation will not affect the safe containment of the plutonium within the assembly.) There is a remote possibility of an HE explosion involving uranium and beryllium since these are permitted in the same area.The possibility of a criticality accident is very remote since the fissile materials are doubly encased in stout metal containers. All operations involving these materials are independently reviewed and inspected by the Criticality Safety Office. It was determined that a fire was unlikely due to the low fire loading and the absence of ignition sources. It was also determined that the consequences of any accidents were reduced by the remote location of these facilities, their design, and by administrative controls

Safety Assessment for Decommissioning

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2013-06-15

In the past few decades, international guidance has been developed on methods for assessing the safety of predisposal and disposal facilities for radioactive waste. More recently, it has been recognized that there is also a need for specific guidance on safety assessment in the context of decommissioning nuclear facilities. The importance of safety during decommissioning was highlighted at the International Conference on Safe Decommissioning for Nuclear Activities held in Berlin in 2002 and at the First Review Meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 2003. At its June 2004 meeting, the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved the International Action Plan on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (GOV/2004/40), which called on the IAEA to: ''establish a forum for the sharing and exchange of national information and experience on the application of safety assessment in the context of decommissioning and provide a means to convey this information to other interested parties, also drawing on the work of other international organizations in this area''. In response, in November 2004, the IAEA launched the international project Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety for Decommissioning of Facilities Using Radioactive Material (DeSa) with the following objectives: -To develop a harmonized approach to safety assessment and to define the elements of safety assessment for decommissioning, including the application of a graded approach; -To investigate the practical applicability of the methodology and performance of safety assessments for the decommissioning of various types of facility through a selected number of test cases; -To investigate approaches for the review of safety assessments for decommissioning activities and the development of a regulatory approach for reviewing safety assessments for decommissioning activities and as a basis for regulatory decision making; -To provide a forum

Operational safety review programmes for nuclear power plants. Guidelines for assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The IAEA has been offering the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme to provide advice and assistance to Member States in enhancing the operational safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Simultaneously, the IAEA has encouraged self-assessment and review by Member States of their own nuclear power plants to continuously improve nuclear safety. Currently, some utilities have been implementing safety review programmes to independently review their own plants. Corporate or national operational safety review programmes may be compliance or performance based. Successful utilities have found that both techniques are necessary to provide assurance that (i) as a minimum the NPP meets specific corporate and legal requirements and (ii) management at the NPP is encouraged to pursue continuous improvement principles. These programmes can bring nuclear safety benefits to the plants and utilities. The IAEA has conducted two pilot missions to assess the effectiveness of the operational review programme. Based on these missions and on the experience gained during OSART missions, this document has been developed to provide guidance on and broaden national/corporate safety review programmes in Member States, and to assist in maximizing their benefits. These guidelines are intended primarily for the IAEA team to conduct assessment of a national/corporate safety review programme. However, this report may also be used by a country or utility to establish its own national/corporate safety review programme. The guidelines may likewise be used for self-assessment or for establishing a baseline when benchmarking other safety review programmes. This report consists of four parts. Section 2 addresses the planning and preparation of an IAEA assessment mission and Sections 3 and 4 deal with specific guidelines for conducting the assessment mission itself

Safety assessment of emergency power systems for nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

This publication is intended to assist the safety assessor within a regulatory body, or one working as a consultant, in assessing the safety of a given design of the emergency power systems (EPS) for a nuclear power plant. The present publication refers closely to the NUSS Safety Guide 50-SG-D7 (Rev. 1), Emergency Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants. It covers therefore exactly the same technical subject as that Safety Guide. In view of its objective, however, it attempts to help in the evaluation of possible technical solutions which are intended to fulfill the safety requirements. Section 2 clarifies the scope further by giving an outline of the assessment steps in the licensing process. After a general outline of the assessment process in relation to the licensing of a nuclear power plant, the publication is divided into two parts. First, all safety issues are presented in the form of questions that have to be answered in order for the assessor to be confident of a safe design. The second part presents the same topics in tabulated form, listing the required documentation which the assessor has to consult and those international and national technical standards pertinent to the topics. An extensive reference list provides information on standards. 1 tab

33 CFR 96.250 - What documents and reports must a safety management system have?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... safety management system have? 96.250 Section 96.250 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.250 What documents and...

Preliminary safety evaluation, based on initial site investigation data. Planning document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hedin, Allan

2002-12-01

This report is a planning document for the preliminary safety evaluations (PSE) to be carried out at the end of the initial stage of SKBs ongoing site investigations for a deep repository for spent nuclear fuel. The main purposes of the evaluations are to determine whether earlier judgements of the suitability of the candidate area for a deep repository with respect to long-term safety holds up in the light of borehole data and to provide feed-back to continued site investigations and site specific repository design. The preliminary safety evaluations will be carried out by a safety assessment group, based on a site model, being part of a site description, provided by a site modelling group and a repository layout within that model suggested by a repository engineering group. The site model contains the geometric features of the site as well as properties of the host rock. Several alternative interpretations of the site data will likely be suggested. Also the biosphere is included in the site model. A first task for the PSE will be to compare the rock properties described in the site model to previously established criteria for a suitable host rock. This report gives an example of such a comparison. In order to provide more detailed feedback, a number of thermal, hydrological, mechanical and chemical analyses of the site will also be included in the evaluation. The selection of analyses is derived from the set of geosphere and biosphere analyses preliminarily planned for the comprehensive safety assessment named SR-SITE, which will be based on a complete site investigation. The selection is dictated primarily by the expected feedback to continued site investigations and by the availability of data after the PSE. The repository engineering group will consider several safety related factors in suggesting a repository layout: Thermal calculations will be made to determine a minimum distance between canisters avoiding canister surface temperatures above 100 deg C

Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batandjieva, B.; Torres-Vidal, C.

2002-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated research program ''Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities'' (ISAM) has developed improved safety assessment methodology for near surface disposal facilities. The program has been underway for three years and has included around 75 active participants from 40 countries. It has also provided examples for application to three safety cases--vault, Radon type and borehole radioactive waste disposal facilities. The program has served as an excellent forum for exchange of information and good practices on safety assessment approaches and methodologies used worldwide. It also provided an opportunity for reaching broad consensus on the safety assessment methodologies to be applied to near surface low and intermediate level waste repositories. The methodology has found widespread acceptance and the need for its application on real waste disposal facilities has been clearly identified. The ISAM was finalized by the end of 2000, working material documents are available and an IAEA report will be published in 2002 summarizing the work performed during the three years of the program. The outcome of the ISAM program provides a sound basis for moving forward to a new IAEA program, which will focus on practical application of the safety assessment methodologies to different purposes, such as licensing radioactive waste repositories, development of design concepts, upgrading existing facilities, reassessment of operating repositories, etc. The new program will also provide an opportunity for development of guidance on application of the methodology that will be of assistance to both safety assessors and regulators

Computer codes for level 1 probabilistic safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-06-01

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) entails several laborious tasks suitable for computer codes assistance. This guide identifies these tasks, presents guidelines for selecting and utilizing computer codes in the conduct of the PSA tasks and for the use of PSA results in safety management and provides information on available codes suggested or applied in performing PSA in nuclear power plants. The guidance is intended for use by nuclear power plant system engineers, safety and operating personnel, and regulators. Large efforts are made today to provide PC-based software systems and PSA processed information in a way to enable their use as a safety management tool by the nuclear power plant overall management. Guidelines on the characteristics of software needed for management to prepare a software that meets their specific needs are also provided. Most of these computer codes are also applicable for PSA of other industrial facilities. The scope of this document is limited to computer codes used for the treatment of internal events. It does not address other codes available mainly for the analysis of external events (e.g. seismic analysis) flood and fire analysis. Codes discussed in the document are those used for probabilistic rather than for phenomenological modelling. It should be also appreciated that these guidelines are not intended to lead the user to selection of one specific code. They provide simply criteria for the selection. Refs and tabs

State of the art on the probabilistic safety assessment (P.S.A.)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Devictor, N.; Bassi, A.; Saignes, P.; Bertrand, F.

2008-01-01

The use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is internationally increasing as a means of assessing and improving the safety of nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. To support the development of a competence on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, a set of states of the art regarding these tools and their use has been made between 2001 and 2005, in particular on the following topics: - Definition of the PSA of level 1, 2 and 3; - Use of PSA in support to design and operation of nuclear plants (risk-informed applications); - Applications to Non Reactor Nuclear Facilities. The report compiled in a single document these states of the art in order to ensure a broader use; this work has been done in the frame of the Project 'Reliability and Safety of Nuclear Facility' of the Nuclear Development and Innovation Division of the Nuclear Energy Division. As some of these states of the art have been made in support to exchanges with international partners and were written in English, a section of this document is written in English. This work is now applied concretely in support to the design of 4. Generation nuclear systems as Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors and especially Gas-cooled Fast Reactor, that have been the subject of communications during the conferences ANS (Annual Meeting 2007), PSA'08, ICCAP'08 and in the journal Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations. (authors)

Upgraded safety analysis document including operations policies, operational safety limits and policy changes. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batchelor, K.

1996-03-01

The National Synchrotron Light Source Safety Analysis Reports (1), (2), (3), BNL reports number-sign 51584, number-sign 52205 and number-sign 52205 (addendum) describe the basic Environmental Safety and Health issues associated with the department's operations. They include the operating envelope for the Storage Rings and also the rest of the facility. These documents contain the operational limits as perceived prior or during construction of the facility, much of which still are appropriate for current operations. However, as the machine has matured, the experimental program has grown in size, requiring more supervision in that area. Also, machine studies have either verified or modified knowledge of beam loss modes and/or radiation loss patterns around the facility. This document is written to allow for these changes in procedure or standards resulting from their current mode of operation and shall be used in conjunction with the above reports. These changes have been reviewed by NSLS and BNL ES and H committee and approved by BNL management

Environment, safety and health progress assessment manual

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-12-01

On June 27, 1989, the Secretary of Energy announced a 10-Point Initiative to strengthen environment, safety, and health (ES ampersand H) programs, and waste management activities at DOE production, research, and testing facilities. One of the points involved conducting dent Tiger Team Assessments of DOE operating facilities. The Office of Special independent Projects (OSP), EH-5, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health, EH-1, was assigned the responsibility to conduct the Tiger Team Assessments. Through June 1992, a total of 35 Tiger Team Assessments were completed. The Secretary directed that Corrective Action Plans be developed and implemented to address the concerns identified by the Tiger Teams. In March 1991, the Secretary approved a plan for assessments that are ''more focused, concentrating on ES ampersand H management, ES ampersand H corrective actions, self-assessment programs, and root-cause related issues.'' In July 1991, the Secretary approved the initiation of ES ampersand H Progress Assessments, as a followup to the Tiger Team Assessments, and in the continuing effort to institutionalize the self-assessment process and line management accountability in the ES ampersand H areas. This manual documents the processes to be used to perform the ES ampersand H Progress Assessments. It was developed based upon the lessons learned from Tiger Team Assessments, the two pilot Progress Assessments, and Progress Assessments that have been completed. The manual will be updated periodically to reflect lessons learned or changes in policy

Buffer, backfill and closure process report for the safety assessment SR-Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sellin, Patrik

2010-11-01

This report gives an account of how processes in buffer, deposition tunnel backfill and the closure important for the long-term evolution of a KBS-3 repository for spent nuclear fuel, will be documented in the safety assessment SR-Site

Buffer, backfill and closure process report for the safety assessment SR-Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sellin, Patrik (ed.)

2010-11-15

This report gives an account of how processes in buffer, deposition tunnel backfill and the closure important for the long-term evolution of a KBS-3 repository for spent nuclear fuel, will be documented in the safety assessment SR-Site

Human reliability analysis in probabilistic safety assessment for nuclear power plants. A Safety Practice. A publication within the NUSS programme

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is playing an increasingly important role in the safe operation of nuclear power plants throughout the world. In order to establish a consistent framework for conducting PSA studies, for promoting technology transfer of the state of the art, and for encouraging uniformity in the way PSA is carried out, the IAEA is preparing a set of publications which gives guidance on various aspects of PSA. This document presents a practical approach for incorporating human reliability analysis (HRA) into PSA. It describes the steps needed and the documentation that should be provided both to support the PSA itself and to ensure effective communication of important information arising from the studies. It also describes a framework for analysing those human actions which could affect safety and for relating such human influences to specific parts of a PSA. This Safety Practice also addresses the limitations of PSA in taking account of human factors in relation to safety and risk. Refs, figs and tabs

Nuclear data for radiation damage assessment and related safety aspects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kocherov, N.P.

1989-12-01

The IAEA Advisory Group Meeting on Nuclear Data for Radiation Damage Assessment and Related Safety Aspects was held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, 19-22 September 1989. This report contains the conclusions and recommendations of this meeting. The papers which the participants prepared for and presented at the meeting will be published as an IAEA Technical Document. (author)

HSE's safety assessment principles for criticality safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simister, D N; Finnerty, M D; Warburton, S J; Thomas, E A; Macphail, M R

2008-01-01

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) published its revised Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities (SAPs) in December 2006. The SAPs are primarily intended for use by HSE's inspectors when judging the adequacy of safety cases for nuclear facilities. The revised SAPs relate to all aspects of safety in nuclear facilities including the technical discipline of criticality safety. The purpose of this paper is to set out for the benefit of a wider audience some of the thinking behind the final published words and to provide an insight into the development of UK regulatory guidance. The paper notes that it is HSE's intention that the Safety Assessment Principles should be viewed as a reflection of good practice in the context of interpreting primary legislation such as the requirements under site licence conditions for arrangements for producing an adequate safety case and for producing a suitable and sufficient risk assessment under the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999 (SI1999/3232 www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1999/uksi_19993232_en.pdf). (memorandum)

Assessment of reliability and validity of a new safety culture questionnaire

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

A.A. Farshad

2010-04-01

Full Text Available Background and aims   As a Development of Industrial process, human, environment, equipment, material and validity of system has been exposed to hazardous conditions. Regards of 32.3 percent of occupations in industries, this study focused on risk assessment of foundry unit by energy trace and barrier analysis (ETBA method and presented approaches to control of accident.     Methods   the recent study is as a case study one to risk assessment in a foundry unit in Qazvin industrial city in1387. In this study risks were founded by ETBA method and evaluated by MILSTD- 882B. Data were collected by direct observations, interview with workers and supervisor and engineers, walking-talking through method, documents investigation of operational processors, preventive maintenances, equipment technical properties, accidental and medical documents. Finally ETBA worksheets completed.     Results   totally 154 risks has been found. 40 from total are been unacceptable risk, 68 unfavorable and also 46 acceptable but with remediation action. Casting workshop had risks more than other workshops (with 74 identified risks.Potential and heat energies were founded as most   hazardous energies, with respectively 51 and 38 risk cases.     Conclusion   This study recommended to be done actions for identification and control risk, such as: safety training, occupation training, preventive maintenance, contract safety, safety  communication and safety audit group.  

Integrated plant safety assessment. Systematic evaluation program, Big Rock Point Plant (Docket No. 50-155). Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-05-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. The review provides (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety when the supplement to the Final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report has been issued. This report documents the review of the Big Rock Point Plant, which is one of ten plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. It also addresses a majority of the pending licensing actions for Big Rock Point, which include TMI Action Plan requirements and implementation criteria for resolved generic issues. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Health Information Technology, Patient Safety, and Professional Nursing Care Documentation in Acute Care Settings.

Science.gov (United States)

Lavin, Mary Ann; Harper, Ellen; Barr, Nancy

2015-04-14

The electronic health record (EHR) is a documentation tool that yields data useful in enhancing patient safety, evaluating care quality, maximizing efficiency, and measuring staffing needs. Although nurses applaud the EHR, they also indicate dissatisfaction with its design and cumbersome electronic processes. This article describes the views of nurses shared by members of the Nursing Practice Committee of the Missouri Nurses Association; it encourages nurses to share their EHR concerns with Information Technology (IT) staff and vendors and to take their place at the table when nursing-related IT decisions are made. In this article, we describe the experiential-reflective reasoning and action model used to understand staff nurses' perspectives, share committee reflections and recommendations for improving both documentation and documentation technology, and conclude by encouraging nurses to develop their documentation and informatics skills. Nursing issues include medication safety, documentation and standards of practice, and EHR efficiency. IT concerns include interoperability, vendors, innovation, nursing voice, education, and collaboration.

Re-assessment of seismic loads in conjunction with periodic safety review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jonczyk, Josef

2002-01-01

The objective of this paper is the fundamental consideration of a safeguard-aim-oriented approach for use in the re-assessment of seismic events with regard to the periodic safety review (PSR) of nuclear power plants (NPP). The re-assessment aspects of site-specific design earthquakes (DEQ), specially the procedure for seismic hazard analysis, will not, however, be considered in detail here. The proposed assessment concept clearly presents a general approach for safety assessments. The approach is based on a successive screening review of components that are considered sufficiently earthquake-resistant. In this respect, the principle of maximum practical application of the design documentation has been considered in the re-assessment process. On the other hand, the safeguard-aim-oriented evaluation will also be applied with regard to whether the requirements of the safety regulations are fulfilled with respect to the safety goals. The review in conjunction with PSR does not, however, attempt to perform this under all technical aspects. Moreover, it is possible to make extensive use of experimental knowledge and engineering judgement with regard to the structural capacity behaviour in case of a seismic event. Compared with design procedures, however, this proposed approach differs from the one applied in licensing procedures, in which such assessment freedom will not usually be exhausted. (author)

Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

This publication supports the Safety Requirements on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. This Safety Guide was prepared on the basis of a systematic review of all the relevant publications including the Safety Fundamentals, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, current and ongoing revisions of other Safety Guides, INSAG reports and other publications that have addressed the safety of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide also provides guidance for Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in meeting their obligations under Article 14 on Assessment and Verification of Safety. The Safety Requirements publication entitled Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design states that a comprehensive safety assessment and an independent verification of the safety assessment shall be carried out before the design is submitted to the regulatory body. This publication provides guidance on how this requirement should be met. This Safety Guide provides recommendations to designers for carrying out a safety assessment during the initial design process and design modifications, as well as to the operating organization in carrying out independent verification of the safety assessment of new nuclear power plants with a new or already existing design. The recommendations for performing a safety assessment are suitable also as guidance for the safety review of an existing plant. The objective of reviewing existing plants against current standards and practices is to determine whether there are any deviations which would have an impact on plant safety. The methods and the recommendations of this Safety Guide can also be used by regulatory bodies for the conduct of the regulatory review and assessment. Although most recommendations of this Safety Guide are general and applicable to all types of nuclear reactors, some specific recommendations and examples apply mostly to water cooled reactors. Terms such as 'safety assessment', 'safety analysis' and 'independent

IMPLEMENTING CHANGES TO AN APPROVED AND IN-USE DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

KING JP

2008-01-01

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) has refined a process to ensure a comprehensive and complete DSA/TSR change implementation. Successful Nuclear Facility Safety Basis implementation is essential to avoid creating a Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA) situation, or implementing a facility into a non-compliance that can result in a TSR violation. Once past initial implementation, additional changes to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are often needed due to needed requirement clarifications, operating experience indicating that Conditions/Required Actions/Surveillance Requirements could be improved, changes in facility conditions, or changes in facility mission etc. An effective change implementation process is essential to ensuring compliance with 10 CFR 830.202(a), 'The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1,2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis for the facility'

Defining initiating events for purposes of probabilistic safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-09-01

This document is primarily directed towards technical staff involved in the performance or review of plant specific Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). It highlights different approaches and provides typical examples useful for defining the Initiating Events (IE). The document also includes the generic initiating event database, containing about 300 records taken from about 30 plant specific PSAs. In addition to its usefulness during the actual performance of a PSA, the generic IE database is of the utmost importance for peer reviews of PSAs, such as the IAEA's International Peer Review Service (IPERS) where reference to studies on similar NPPs is needed. 60 refs, figs and tabs

Use of operational experience in fire safety assessment of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

Fire hazard has been identified as a major contributor to a plant's operational risk and the international nuclear power industry has been studying and developing tools for defending against this hazard. Considerable progress in design and regulatory requirements for fire safety, in fire protection technology and in related analytical techniques has been made in the past two decades. Substantial efforts have been undertaken worldwide to implement these advances in the interest of improving fire safety both at new and existing nuclear power plants. To assist in these efforts, the IAEA initiated a programme on fire safety that was intended to provide assistance to Member States in improving fire safety in nuclear power plants. In order to achieve this general objective, the IAEA programme aimed at the development of guidelines and good practices, the promotion of advanced fire safety assessment techniques, the exchange of state of the art information between practitioners and the provision of engineering safety advisory services and training in the implementation of internationally accepted practices. During the period 1993-1994, the IAEA activities related to fire safety concentrated on the development of guidelines and good practice documents related to fire safety and fire protection of operating plants. One of the first tasks was the development of a Safety Guide that formulates specific requirements with regard to the fire safety of operating nuclear power plants. Several documents, which provide advice on fire safety inspection, were developed to assist in its implementation. In the period 1995-1996, the programme focused on the preparation of guidelines for the systematic analysis of fire safety at nuclear power plants (NPPs). The IAEA programme on fire safety for 1997-1998 includes tasks aimed at promoting systematic assessment of fire safety related occurrences and dissemination of essential insights from this assessment. One of the topics addressed is the

Documented Safety Analysis for the B695 Segment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D

2008-09-11

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was prepared for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 695 (B695) Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF). The report provides comprehensive information on design and operations, including safety programs and safety structures, systems and components to address the potential process-related hazards, natural phenomena, and external hazards that can affect the public, facility workers, and the environment. Consideration is given to all modes of operation, including the potential for both equipment failure and human error. The facilities known collectively as the DWTF are used by LLNL's Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division to store and treat regulated wastes generated at LLNL. RHWM generally processes low-level radioactive waste with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (e.g., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., {sup 90}Sr, {sup 137}Cs, or {sup 3}H. The mission of the B695 Segment centers on container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. The B695 Segment is used for storage of radioactive waste (including transuranic and low-level), hazardous, nonhazardous, mixed, and other waste. Storage of hazardous and mixed waste in B695 Segment facilities is in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LLNL is operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the Department of Energy (DOE). The B695 Segment is operated by the RHWM Division of LLNL. Many operations in the B695 Segment are performed under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operation plan, similar to commercial treatment operations with best demonstrated available technologies. The buildings of the B695 Segment were designed and built considering such operations, using proven building

Documented Safety Analysis for the B695 Segment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laycak, D.

2008-01-01

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was prepared for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 695 (B695) Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF). The report provides comprehensive information on design and operations, including safety programs and safety structures, systems and components to address the potential process-related hazards, natural phenomena, and external hazards that can affect the public, facility workers, and the environment. Consideration is given to all modes of operation, including the potential for both equipment failure and human error. The facilities known collectively as the DWTF are used by LLNL's Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division to store and treat regulated wastes generated at LLNL. RHWM generally processes low-level radioactive waste with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (e.g., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., 90 Sr, 137 Cs, or 3 H. The mission of the B695 Segment centers on container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. The B695 Segment is used for storage of radioactive waste (including transuranic and low-level), hazardous, nonhazardous, mixed, and other waste. Storage of hazardous and mixed waste in B695 Segment facilities is in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LLNL is operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the Department of Energy (DOE). The B695 Segment is operated by the RHWM Division of LLNL. Many operations in the B695 Segment are performed under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operation plan, similar to commercial treatment operations with best demonstrated available technologies. The buildings of the B695 Segment were designed and built considering such operations, using proven building systems, and keeping

Intergrated plant safety assessment. Systematic evaluation program. Palisades plant, Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-255. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-10-01

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has published its Final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR) (NUREG-0820), under the scope of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), for Consumers Power Company's Palisades Plant located in Covert, Van Buren County, Michigan. The SEP was initiated by the NRC to review the design of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. This report documents the review completed under the SEP for the Palisades Plant. The review has provided for (1) as assessment of the significance of differences between current technical positions on selected safety issues and those that existed when the Palisades Plant was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety when all supplements to the Final IPSAR and the Safety Evaluation Report for converting the license from a provisional to a full-term license have been issued. The report also addresses the comments and recommendations made by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in connection with its review of the Draft Report, issued in April 1982

Safety assessment for Area 5 radioactive-waste-management site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hunter, P.H.; Card, D.H.; Horton, K.

1982-09-01

The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Safety Assessment Document contains evaluations of site characteristics, facilities, and operating practices that contribute to the safe handling, storage, and disposal of low-level radioactive wastes at the Nevada Test Site. Physical geography, cultural factors, climate and meteorology, geology, hydrology (with emphasis on radionuclide migration), ecology, natural phenomena, and natural resources are discussed and determined to be suitable for effective containment of radionuclides. A separate section considers facilities and operating practices such as monitoring, storage/disposal criteria, site maintenance, equipment, and support. The section also considers the transportation and waste handling requirements supporting the new Greater Confinement Disposal Facility (GCDF), GCDF demonstration project, and other requirements for the safe handling, storage, and disposal of low-level radioactive wastes. Finally, the document provides an analysis of releases and an assessment of the near-term operational impacts and dose commitments to operating personnel and the general public from normal operations and anticipated accidental occurrences. The conclusion of this report is that the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site is suitable for low-level radioactive waste handling, storage, and disposal. Also, the new GCDF demonstration project will not affect the overall safety of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

Study on systematic integration technology of design and safety assessment for HLW geological disposal. 2. Research document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ishihara, Yoshinao; Fukui, Hiroshi; Sagawa, Hiroshi; Matsunaga, Kenichi; Ito, Takaya; Kohanawa, Osamu; Kuwayama, Yuki

2003-02-01

The present study was carried out relating to basic design of the Geological Disposal Technology Integration System' that will be systematized as knowledge base for design analysis and safety assessment of HLW geological disposal system by integrating organically and hierarchically various technical information in three study field. The key conclusions are summarized as follows: (1) As referring to the current performance assessment report, the technical information for R and D program of HLW geological disposal system was systematized hierarchically based on summarized information in a suitable form between the work flow (work item) and processes/characteristic flow (process item). (2) As the result of the systematized technical information, database structure and system functions necessary for development and construction to the computer system were clarified in order to secure the relation between technical information and data set for assessment of HLW geological disposal system. (3) The control procedure for execution of various analysis code used by design and safety assessment in HLW geological disposal study was arranged possibility in construction of 'Geological Disposal Technology Integration System' after investigating the distributed computing technology. (author)

The Regulatory Approach for the Assessment of Safety Culture in Germany: A Tool for Practical Use for Inspections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fassmann, W.; Beck, J.; Kopisch, C.

2016-01-01

Need for methods to assess licencees’ safety culture has been recognised since the Chernobyl accident. Several conferences organized by IAEA and OECD-NEA stated the need for regulatory oversight of safety culture and for suitable methods. In 2013, IAEA published a Technical Document (TECDOC 1707) on the process of safety culture oversight by regulatory authorities which leaves much room for regulators’ ways of performing safety culture oversight. In response to these developments, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) as the federal regulatory body commissioned GRS in 2011 to develop a practical guidance for assessing licencees’ safety culture in the process of regulatory oversight. This research and development project was completed just recently. The publicly available documentation comprises a shorter guidance document with the indispensable information for an appropriate, practical application and a report with more detailed information about the scientific basis of this guidance. To achieve best possible adaptation to regulators’ needs, GRS asked members of the regulatory authority of Baden-Wuerttemberg (one of the federal states of Germany) for comments on a draft of the guidance which was then finalised by duly considering this highly valuable and favorable feedback. Decisions regarding future use rest with German regulatory authorities.

A Tool for Assessment of Animal Health Laboratory Safety and Biosecurity: The Safety Module of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Laboratory Mapping Tool

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Beatrice Mouillé

2018-03-01

Full Text Available The Laboratory Management Tool (LMT is a standardized spreadsheet-based assessment tool developed to help support national, regional, and global efforts to maintain an effective network of animal health and veterinary public health laboratories. The safety and biosecurity module of the LMT (LMT-S includes 98 measures covering administrative, operational, engineering, and personal protective equipment practices used to provide laboratory safety and biosecurity. Performance aspects of laboratory infrastructure and technical compliance considered fundamental for ensuring that a laboratory is able to appropriately function in a safe and biosecure manner are systematically queried and scored for compliance on a four-point scale providing for a semi-quantitative assessment. Data collected is used to generate graphs and tables mapping levels of compliance with international standards and good practices, as well as for documenting progress over time. The LMT-S was employed by trained auditors in 34 laboratories located in 19 countries between 2015 and 2017. The tool is intended to help standardize animal health laboratory assessments, document compliance with recognized laboratory safety and biosecurity measures, serve as a self-help and training tool, and assist global laboratory development efforts by providing an accurate measurement of laboratory safety and biosecurity at local, national, and regional levels.

Review and assessments of potential environmental, health and safety impacts of MHD technology. Final draft

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

The purpose of this document is to develop an environmental, health and safety (EH and S) assessment and begin a site - specific assessment of these and socio - economic impacts for the magnetohydrodynamics program of the United States Department of Energy. This assessment includes detailed scientific and technical information on the specific EH and S issues mentioned in the MHD Environmental Development Plan. A review of current literature on impact-related subjects is also included. This document addresses the coal-fired, open-cycle MHD technology and reviews and assesses potential EH and S impacts resulting from operation of commercially-installed technology.

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program, Palisades Plant (Docket No. 50-255)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-11-01

This report documents the review completed under the SEP for those issues that required refined engineering evaluations or the continuation of ongoing evaluations after the Final IPSAR for the Palisades Plant was issued. The review has provided for (1) an assessment of the significance of differences between current technical positions on selected safety issues and those that existed when the Palisades Plant was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety when the supplement to the Final IPSAR and the Safety Evaluation Report for converting the license from a provisional to a full-term license have been issued. The Final IPSAR and its supplement will form part of the bases for considering the conversion of the provisional operating license to a full-term operating license

Liquefied Gaseous Fuels Safety and Environmental Control Assessment Program: second status report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1980-10-01

The Assistant Secretary for Environment has responsibility for identifying, characterizing, and ameliorating the environmental, health, and safety issues and public concerns associated with commercial operation of specific energy systems. The need for developing a safety and environmental control assessment for liquefied gaseous fuels was identified by the Environmental and Safety Engineering Division as a result of discussions with various governmental, industry, and academic persons having expertise with respect to the particular materials involved: liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, hydrogen, and anhydrous ammonia. This document is arranged in three volumes and reports on progress in the Liquefied Gaseous Fuels (LGF) Safety and Environmental Control Assessment Program made in Fiscal Year (FY)-1979 and early FY-1980. Volume 1 (Executive Summary) describes the background, purpose and organization of the LGF Program and contains summaries of the 25 reports presented in Volumes 2 and 3. Annotated bibliographies on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Safety and Environmental Control Research and on Fire Safety and Hazards of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) are included in Volume 1.

The role of risk assessment and safety analysis in integrated safety assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Niall, R.; Hunt, M.; Wierman, T.E.

1990-01-01

To ensure that the design and operation of both nuclear and non- nuclear hazardous facilities is acceptable, and meets all societal safety expectations, a rigorous deterministic and probabilistic assessment is necessary. An approach is introduced, founded on the concept of an ''Integrated Safety Assessment.'' It merges the commonly performed safety and risk analyses and uses them in concert to provide decision makers with the necessary depth of understanding to achieve ''adequacy.'' 3 refs., 1 fig

Status of High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) post-restart safety analysis and documentation upgrades

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cook, D.H.; Radcliff, T.D.; Rothrock, R.B.; Schreiber, R.E.

1990-01-01

The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), an experimental reactor located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and operated for the US Department of Energy by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, was shut down in November, 1986 after the discovery of unexpected neutron embrittlement of the reactor vessel. The reactor was restarted in April, 1989, following an extensive review by DOE and ORNL of the HFIR design, safety, operation, maintenance and management, and the implementation of several upgrades to HFIR safety-related hardware, analyses, documents and procedures. This included establishing new operating conditions to provide added margin against pressure vessel failure, as well as the addition, or upgrading, of specific safety-related hardware. This paper summarizes the status of some of the follow-on (post-restart) activities which are currently in progress, and which will result in a comprehensive set of safety analyses and documentation for the HFIR, comparable with current practice in commercial nuclear power plants. 8 refs

Basic concept of fuel safety design and assessment for sodium-cooled fast reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nakae, Nobuo; Baba, Toshikazu; Kamimura, Katsuichiro

2013-03-01

'Philosophy in Safety Evaluation of Fast Breeder Reactors' was published as a guideline for safety design and safety evaluation of Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor in Japan. This guideline points out that cladding creep and swelling due to internal pressure should be taken into account since the fuel is used under high temperature and high burnup, and that fuel assembly deformation and the prevention from coolant channel blockage should be taken into account in viewpoints of nuclear and thermal hydraulic design. However, the requirements including their criteria and evaluation items are not described. Two other domestic guidelines related to core design are applied for fuel design of fast reactor, but the description is considered to not be enough to practically use. In addition, technical standard for nuclear fuel used in power reactors is also applied for fuel inspection. Therefore, the technical standard and guideline for fuel design and safety evaluation are considered to be very important issue for nuclear safety regulation. This document has been developed according to the following steps: The guidelines and the technical standards, which are prepared in foreign countries and international organization, were reviewed. The technical background concerning fuel design and safety evaluation for fast reactor was collected and summarized in the world wide scale. The basic concept of fuel safety design and assessment for sodium-cooled fast reactor was developed by considering a wide range of views of the specialists in Japan. In order to discuss the content with foreign specialists IAEA Consultancy Meetings have been held on January, 2011 and January, 2012. The participants of the meeting came from USA, UK, EC, India, China and South Korea. The specialists of IAEA and JNES were also joined. Although this document is prepared for application to 'Monju'(prototype LMFR), it may be applied to experimental, demonstration and commercial types of LMFR after revising it by taking

Analysis of compatibility of current Czech initial documentation in the area of technical assurance of nuclear safety with the requirements of the EUR document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zdebor, J.; Zdebor, R.; Kratochvil, L.

2001-11-01

The publication is structured as follows: Description of existing documentation. General requirements, goals, principles and design principles: Documents being compared; Method of comparison; Results and partial evaluation of comparison of requirements between EUR and Czech regulations (basic goals and safety philosophy; quantitative safety objectives; basic design requirements; extended design requirements; external and internal threats; technical requirements; site conditions); Summary of the comparison of safety requirements. Comparison of requirements for the systems: Requirements for the nuclear reactor unit systems; Barrier systems (fuel system; reactor cooling system; containment system); Remaining systems (control systems; protection systems; coolant makeup and purification system; residual heat removal system; emergency cooling system; power systems); Common technical requirements for systems (technical requirements for systems; internal and external events). (P.A.)

THE FORMATION OF THE CONTOUR OF THE DOCUMENTED AND REAL FLIGHT SAFETY IN THE SYSTEM OF THE INFORMATION PROVISION OF SAFETY OF FLIGHTS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

B. I. Bachkalo

2015-01-01

Full Text Available The article discusses the principles and mechanisms of formation of the contour of the real safety of flights and contour of the documented safety, allowing us to obtain information to control fligh safety. The proposed approach can be used in the algorithms of active on-board flight safety management system for the implementation of information support to the crew in flight and automatic control of flight safety.

Safety assessment for a KBS-3H spent nuclear fuel repository at Olkiluoto. Complementary evaluations of safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neall, Fiona; Pastina, Barbara; Snellman, Margit; Smith, Paul; Gribi, P.; Johnson, Lawrence

2008-12-01

The KBS-3H design is a variant of the more general KBS-3 method for the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland and Sweden. In the KBS-3H design, multiple assemblies containing spent fuel are emplaced horizontally in parallel, approximately 300 m long, slightly inclined deposition drifts. The copper canisters, each with a surrounding layer of bentonite clay, are placed in perforated steel shells prior to deposition in the drifts; the assembly is called the 'supercontainer'. The other KBS-3 variant is the KBS-3V design, in which the copper canisters are emplaced vertically in individual deposition holes surrounded by bentonite clay but without steel supercontainer shells. SKB and Posiva have conducted a Research, Development and Demonstration programme over the period 2002-2007 with the overall aim of establishing whether KBS-3H represents a feasible alternative to KBS-3V. As part of this programme, the long-term safety of a KBS-3H repository has been assessed in the KBS-3H safety studies. In order to focus the safety studies, the Olkiluoto site in the municipality of Eurajoki, which is the proposed site for a spent fuel repository in Finland, was used as a hypothetical site for a KBS-3H repository. The present report is part of a portfolio of reports discussing the long-term safety of the KBS-3H repository. The overall outcome of the KBS-3H safety studies is documented in the summary report, 'Safety assessment for a KBS-3H repository for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto'. The purpose and scope of the KBS-3H complementary evaluations of safety report is provided in Posiva's Safety Case Plan, which is based on Regulatory Guide YVL 8.4 and on international guidelines on complementary lines of argument to long-term safety that are considered an important element of a post-closure safety case for geological repositories. Complementary evaluations of safety require the use of evaluations, evidence and qualitative supporting arguments that lie outside the

Specifications of the International Atomic Energy Agency's international project on safety assessment driven radioactive waste management solutions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ghannadi, M.; Asgharizadeh, F.; Assadi, M. R.

2008-01-01

Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the production and use of radioactive materials in the industry, research, and medicine. The nuclear waste management facilities need to perform a safety assessment in order to ensure the safety of a facility. Nuclear safety assessment is a structured and systematic way of examining a proposed facility, process, operation and activity. In nuclear waste management point of view, safety assessment is a process which is used to evaluate the safety of radioactive waste management and disposal facilities. In this regard the International Atomic Energy Agency is planed to implement an international project with cooperation of some member states. The Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions Project is an international programme of work to examine international approaches to safety assessment in aspects of p redisposal r adioactive waste management, including waste conditioning and storage. This study is described the rationale, common aspects, scope, objectives, work plan and anticipated outcomes of the project with refer to International Atomic Energy Agency's documents, such as International Atomic Energy Agency's Safety Standards, as well as the Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions project reports

Assessment of Safety Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bilic Zabric, T.; Kavsek, D.

2006-01-01

A strong safety culture leads to more effective conduct of work and a sense of accountability among managers and employees, who should be given the opportunity to expand skills by training. The resources expended would thus result in tangible improvements in working practices and skills, which encourage further improvement of safety culture. In promoting an improved safety culture, NEK has emphasized both national and organizational culture with an appropriate balance of behavioural sciences and quality management systems approaches. In recent years there has been particular emphasis put on an increasing awareness of the contribution that human behavioural sciences can make to develop good safety practices. The purpose of an assessment of safety culture is to increase the awareness of the present culture, to serve as a basis for improvement and to keep track of the effects of change or improvement over a longer period of time. There is, however, no single approach that is suitable for all purposes and which can measure, simultaneously, all the intangible aspects of safety culture, i.e. the norms, values, beliefs, attitudes or the behaviours reflecting the culture. Various methods have their strengths and weaknesses. To prevent significant performance problems, self-assessment is used. Self-assessment is the process of identifying opportunities for improvement actively or, in some cases, weaknesses that could cause more serious errors or events. Self-assessments are an important input to the corrective action programme. NEK has developed questionnaires for safety culture self-assessment to obtain information that is representative of the whole organization. Questionnaires ensure a greater degree of anonymity, and create a less stressful situation for the respondent. Answers to questions represent the more apparent and conscious values and attitudes of the respondent. NEK proactively co-operates with WANO, INPO, IAEA in the areas of Safety Culture and Human

SKI's and SSI's joint review of SKB's safety assessment report, SR 97. Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB) has a programme for the siting of a repository for spent nuclear fuel in Swedish bedrock. In 1996, the Swedish Government decided that SKB must perform an assessment of the repository's long-term safety before undertaking the next step of the programme which entails drilling in a minimum of two municipalities (site investigations). SKB has presented such a safety assessment in SR 97 Post-closure Safety (henceforth referred to as SR 97). SR 97 is one of the documents in the comprehensive reporting that SKB must provide when it proposes sites for investigation. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute (SSI) have evaluated SR 97 in terms of its purposes which are to demonstrate a methodology for safety assessment, to show that Swedish bedrock can provide a safe repository using SKB's method, to provide a basis for specifying the factors that are important for site selection and to derive preliminary requirements on the function of the engineered barriers. The authorities have reached the following conclusions: SR 97 does not indicate any conditions that would mean that geological final disposal in accordance with SKB's method would have significant deficiencies in relation to the safety and radiation protection requirements of the authorities. SR 97 contains the elements required for a comprehensive assessment of safety and radiation protection. SKB's safety assessment methodology has improved within several important areas, such as the documentation of processes and properties that can affect repository performance and the development of models for safety assessment calculations. The methodology used in SR 97 has some deficiencies, for example, the specification of future events to be described in the safety assessment. SR 97 has not, to an adequate extent, dealt with unfavourable conditions that can affect the future safety of a repository. SKB states that the

Planning Document for an NBSR Conversion Safety Analysis Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Diamond D. J.; Baek J.; Hanson, A.L.; Cheng, L-Y.; Brown, N.; Cuadra, A.

2013-09-25

The NIST Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) is a reactor-laboratory complex providing the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the nation with a world-class facility for the performance of neutron-based research. The heart of this facility is the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR). The NBSR is a heavy water moderated and cooled reactor operating at 20 MW. It is fueled with high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements. A Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program is underway to convert the reactor to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This program includes the qualification of the proposed fuel, uranium and molybdenum alloy foil clad in an aluminum alloy, and the development of the fabrication techniques. This report is a planning document for the conversion Safety Analysis Report (SAR) that would be submitted to, and approved by, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) before the reactor could be converted.This report follows the recommended format and content from the NRC codified in NUREG-1537, “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-power Reactors,” Chapter 18, “Highly Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium Conversions.” The emphasis herein is on the SAR chapters that require significant changes as a result of conversion, primarily Chapter 4, Reactor Description, and Chapter 13, Safety Analysis. The document provides information on the proposed design for the LEU fuel elements and identifies what information is still missing. This document is intended to assist ongoing fuel development efforts, and to provide a platform for the development of the final conversion SAR. This report contributes directly to the reactor conversion pillar of the GTRI program, but also acts as a boundary condition for the fuel development and fuel fabrication pillars.

Waste isolation safety assessment program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brandstetter, A.; Harwell, M.A.

1979-05-01

Associated with commercial nuclear power production in the United States is the generation of potentially hazardous radioactive wastes. The Department of Energy (DOE), through the National Waste Terminal Storage (NWTS) Program, is seeking to develop nuclear waste isolation systems in geologic formations that will preclude contact with the biosphere of waste radionuclides in concentrations which are sufficient to cause deleterious impact on humans or their environments. Comprehensive analyses of specific isolation systems are needed to assess the expectations of meeting that objective. The Waste Isolation Safety Assessment Program (WISAP) has been established at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (operated by Battelle Memorial Institute) for developing the capability of making those analyses. Among the analyses required for isolation system evaluation is the detailed assessment of the post-closure performance of nuclear waste repositories in geologic formations. This assessment is essential, since it is concerned with aspects of the nuclear power program which previously have not been addressed. Specifically, the nature of the isolation systems (e.g., involving breach scenarios and transport through the geosphere), and the time-scales necessary for isolation, dictate the development, demonstration and application of novel assessment capabilities. The assessment methodology needs to be thorough, flexible, objective, and scientifically defensible. Further, the data utilized must be accurate, documented, reproducible, and based on sound scientific principles

ITER-FEAT safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gordon, C.W.; Bartels, H.-W.; Honda, T.; Raeder, J.; Topilski, L.; Iseli, M.; Moshonas, K.; Taylor, N.; Gulden, W.; Kolbasov, B.; Inabe, T.; Tada, E.

2001-01-01

Safety has been an integral part of the design process for ITER since the Conceptual Design Activities of the project. The safety approach adopted in the ITER-FEAT design and the complementary assessments underway, to be documented in the Generic Site Safety Report (GSSR), are expected to help demonstrate the attractiveness of fusion and thereby set a good precedent for future fusion power reactors. The assessments address ITER's radiological hazards taking into account fusion's favourable safety characteristics. The expectation that ITER will need regulatory approval has influenced the entire safety design and assessment approach. This paper summarises the ITER-FEAT safety approach and assessments underway. (author)

Assessment of policy issues in nuclear safety regulation according to circumstantial changes

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chang, Soon Heung; Lee, Byong Ho; Baek, Woon Pil; Lee, Seong Wook; Choi, Seong Soo; Roh, Chang Hyun; Lee, Kwang Gu [Korea Advanced Institute of Scienc and Technology, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

1998-03-15

The objective of the work is to assess various issues in nuclear safety regulation in consideration of circumstantial changes. Emphasis is given to the safety of operating NPPs. The derivation of an effective regulation system considering 'Rhodic Safety Review (PSR)', 'operating License Renewal (LR)', 'backfitting' and 'maintenance rule' is the main objective of the first two years. It is found that those approaches should be introduced in Korea as soon as possible, with cross lingkage to maximize the effectiveness of regulation. In particular, the approaches for PSR are discussed with consultation of IAEA document and foreign practices.

Computerising documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1992-01-01

The nuclear power generation industry is faced with public concern and government pressures over safety, efficiency and risk. Operators throughout the industry are addressing these issues with the aid of a new technology - technical document management systems (TDMS). Used for strategic and tactical advantage, the systems enable users to scan, archive, retrieve, store, edit, distribute worldwide and manage the huge volume of documentation (paper drawings, CAD data and film-based information) generated in building, maintaining and ensuring safety in the UK's power plants. The power generation industry has recognized that the management and modification of operation critical information is vital to the safety and efficiency of its power plants. Regulatory pressure from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) to operate within strict safety margins or lose Site Licences has prompted the need for accurate, up-to-data documentation. A document capture and management retrieval system provides a powerful cost-effective solution, giving rapid access to documentation in a tightly controlled environment. The computerisation of documents and plans is discussed in this article. (Author)

Safety assessment, safety performance indicators at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baji, C.; Vamos, G.; Toth, J.

2001-01-01

The Paks Nuclear Power Plant has been using different methods of safety assessment (event analysis, self-assessment, probabilistic safety analysis), including performance indicators characterizing both operational and safety performance since the early years of operation of the plant. Regarding the safety performance, the indicators include safety system performance, number of scrams, release of radioactive materials, number of safety significant events, industrial safety indicator, etc. The Paks NPP also reports a set of ten indicators to WANO Performance Indicator Programme which, among others, include safety related indicators as well. However, a more systematic approach to structuring and trending safety indicators is needed so that they can contribute to the enhancement of the operational safety. A more comprehensive set of indicators and a systematic evaluation process was introduced in 1996. The performance indicators framework proposed by the IAEA was adapted to Paks in this year to further improve the process. Safety culture assessment and characterizing safety culture is part of the assessment process. (author)

Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessments of nuclear power plants (Level 1)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

This report provides guidance for conducting a Level 1 of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), that is a PSA concerned with events leading to core damage. The scope of this report is confined to internal initiating events (excluding internal fires and floods). A particular aim is to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for PSAs so as to facilitate external review of the results of such studies. The report is divided into the following major sections: management and organization; identification of sources of radioactive releases and accident initiators; accident sequence modelling; data assessment and parameter estimation; accident sequence quantification; documentation of the analysis: display and interpretation of result. 45 refs, 7 figs, 23 tabs

Safety assessment of human and organizational factors in French fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menuet, Lise; Beauquier, Sophie

2013-01-01

According to the French law, each nuclear facility has to provide a safety demonstration every ten years. The assessment of this demonstration supports the decision of the French Safety Authority regarding the authorisation of operating for the ten years to come. In addition, transversal topics, which are linked with safety performance, such as safety management, management of competencies, maintenance's policy are periodically evaluated. One aspect of these assessments relates to Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) and their contribution to safety. Our communication will describe the assessment of the HOF-related part, performed by the Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute (IRSN) the Technical Support Organisation of the French Safety Authority). It will focus on the methodological framework, the tools which are developed and used for assessing the integration of HOF in safety demonstration, and the main difficulties of this kind of assessment. Each situation will be illustrated by concrete examples coming from safety assessments concerning fuel cycle's plants: Areva's plants dedicated to uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, fuel manufacturing, spent fuel reprocessing, treatment facilities and CEA's laboratories dedicated to research and development and to interim spent fuel storage. The methodological framework for assessing HOF currently implements three main steps which will be precisely described: - checking that the nuclear plant has made an exhaustive analysis of the risks linked with HOF. Regarding to HOF, the Licensee safety demonstration is based on the description of the main human activities which are considered as hazardous regarding safety. These activities are accomplished with a human contribution and they require a safe realisation. - assessing the human, organisational and technical barriers that the nuclear plant have planed in order to make the operations safe, to avoid, prevent or detect an

Experiences in assessing safety culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Spitalnik, J.

2002-01-01

Based on several Safety Culture self-assessment applications in nuclear organisations, the paper stresses relevant aspects to be considered when programming an assessment of this type. Reasons for assessing Safety Culture, basic principles to take into account, necessary resources, the importance of proper statistical analyses, the feed-back of results, and the setting up of action plans to enhance Safety Culture are discussed. (author)

Development of the NIREX generic transport safety assessment to assist in the provision of waste packaging advice

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hutchinson, D.L.; Marrison, A.R.; Sievwright, R.W.T.

2002-01-01

The current Nirex Mission is to provide the United Kingdom with safe, environmentally sound and publicly acceptable options for the long-term management of radioactive materials. As part of this role, Nirex has developed a phased deep geological disposal concept which is defined by six 'generic documents' that describe systems, processes and safety assessments that are not specific to any one location or geology. These generic documents give access to detailed information about the ideas and approaches that underpin the phased disposal concept, and have been published with an invitation to enter into dialogue with Nirex regarding these issues. The generic documents identify the requirements for an integrated transport system that would be necessary for the management of the intermediate-level (ILW) and low-level (LLW) wastes within Nirex's remit - the so-called reference case volume. This has involved Nirex in the development of transport hardware and associated safety reports and modelling and assessment tools for transport system logistics and system safety. Although the phased disposal concept is only one option for the long-term management of waste, the integrated transport system and associated modelling tools, is likely to be of equal relevance to other options. The safety assessment of the generic transport operation for the movement of ILW and LLW waste from waste producers' sites to a future radioactive waste disposal facility is described in one of the generic documents - the generic transport safety assessment (GTSA). The GTSA demonstrates that the transport operation is compliant with Nirex safety principles, and that the nuclear and non-nuclear risks to the public and workers from routine transport and from accidents are acceptable. This paper describes the types of risk that are calculated, and discusses the data requirements and calculation methodology. The verification and validation methodology is outlined, together with a discussion of the results

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D

2008-06-16

This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

Environment, Safety and Health Progress Assessment of the Hanford Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-05-01

This report documents the result of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Environment, Safety and Health (ES ampersand H) Progress Assessment of the Hanford Site, in Richland, Washington. The assessment, which was conducted from May 11 through May 22, 1992, included a selective-review of the ES ampersand H management systems and programs of the responsible DOE Headquarters Program Offices the DOE Richland Field Office, and the site contractors. The ES ampersand H Progress Assessments are part of the Secretary of Energy's continuing effort to institutionalize line management accountability and the self-assessment process throughout DOE and its contractor organizations. The purpose of the Hanford Site ES ampersand H Progress Assessment is to provide the Secretary with an independent assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the DOE and contractor management structures, resources, and systems to address ES ampersand H problems and requirements. They are not intended to be comprehensive compliance assessments of ES ampersand H activities. The point of reference for assessing programs at the Hanford Site was, for the most part, the Tiger Team Assessment of the Hanford Site, which was conducted from May 21 through July 18, 1990. A summary of issues and progress in the areas of environment, safety and health, and management is included

Probabilistic safety assessment of Tehran Research Reactor using systems analysis programs for hands-on integrated reliability evaluations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hosseini, M.H.; Nematollahi, M.R.; Sepanloo, K.

2004-01-01

Probabilistic safety assessment application is found to be a practical tool for research reactor safety due to intense involvement of human interactions in an experimental facility. In this document the application of the probabilistic safety assessment to the Tehran Research Reactor is presented. The level 1 practicabilities safety assessment application involved: Familiarization with the plant, selection of accident initiators, mitigating functions and system definitions, event tree constructions and quantifications, fault tree constructions and quantification, human reliability, component failure data base development and dependent failure analysis. Each of the steps of the analysis given above is discussed with highlights from the selected results. Quantification of the constructed models is done using systems analysis programs for hands-on integrated reliability evaluations software

Safety assessment for a KBS-3H spent nuclear fuel repository at Olkiluoto. Complementary evaluations of safety

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Neall, Fiona; Pastina, Barbara; Snellman, Margit; Smith, Paul; Gribi, P.; Johnson, Lawrence

2008-12-15

The KBS-3H design is a variant of the more general KBS-3 method for the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland and Sweden. In the KBS-3H design, multiple assemblies containing spent fuel are emplaced horizontally in parallel, approximately 300 m long, slightly inclined deposition drifts. The copper canisters, each with a surrounding layer of bentonite clay, are placed in perforated steel shells prior to deposition in the drifts; the assembly is called the 'supercontainer'. The other KBS-3 variant is the KBS-3V design, in which the copper canisters are emplaced vertically in individual deposition holes surrounded by bentonite clay but without steel supercontainer shells. SKB and Posiva have conducted a Research, Development and Demonstration programme over the period 2002-2007 with the overall aim of establishing whether KBS-3H represents a feasible alternative to KBS-3V. As part of this programme, the long-term safety of a KBS-3H repository has been assessed in the KBS-3H safety studies. In order to focus the safety studies, the Olkiluoto site in the municipality of Eurajoki, which is the proposed site for a spent fuel repository in Finland, was used as a hypothetical site for a KBS-3H repository. The present report is part of a portfolio of reports discussing the long-term safety of the KBS-3H repository. The overall outcome of the KBS-3H safety studies is documented in the summary report, 'Safety assessment for a KBS-3H repository for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto'. The purpose and scope of the KBS-3H complementary evaluations of safety report is provided in Posiva's Safety Case Plan, which is based on Regulatory Guide YVL 8.4 and on international guidelines on complementary lines of argument to long-term safety that are considered an important element of a post-closure safety case for geological repositories. Complementary evaluations of safety require the use of evaluations, evidence and qualitative supporting arguments

OSART Independent Safety Culture Assessment (ISCA) Guidelines

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

Safety culture is understood as an important part of nuclear safety performance. This has been demonstrated by the analysis of significant events such as Chernobyl, Davis Besse, Vandellos II, Asco, Paks, Mihamma and Forsmark, among others. In order to enhance safety culture, one essential activity is to perform assessments. IAEA Safety Standard Series No. GS-R-3, The Management System for Facilitites and Activities, states requirements for continuous improvement of safety culture, of which self, peer and independent safety culture assessments constitute an essential part. In line with this requirement, the Independent Safety Culture Assessment (ISCA) module is offered as an add-on module to the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme. The OSART programme provides advice and assistance to Member States to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants during commissioning and operation. By including the ISCA module in an OSART mission, the receiving organization benefits from the synergy between the technical and the safety culture aspects of the safety review. The joint operational safety and safety culture assessment provides the organization with the opportunity to better understand the interactions between technical, human, organizational and cultural aspects, helping the organization to take a systemic approach to safety through identifying actions that fully address the root causes of any identified issue. Safety culture assessments provide insight into the fundamental drivers that shape organizational patterns of behaviour, safety consciousness and safety performance. The complex nature of safety culture means that the analysis of the results of such assessments is not as straightforward as for other types of assessment. The benefits of the results of nuclear safety culture assessments are maximized only if appropriate tools and guidance for these assessments is used; hence, this comprehensive guideline has been developed. The methodology explained

Metrics design for safety assessment

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Luo, Yaping; van den Brand, M.G.J.

2016-01-01

Context:In the safety domain, safety assessment is used to show that safety-critical systems meet the required safety objectives. This process is also referred to as safety assurance and certification. During this procedure, safety standards are used as development guidelines to keep the risk at an

Integrated plant safety assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 (Docket No. 50-237)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-10-01

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared Supplement 1 to the final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR) (NUREG-0823), under the scope of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), for the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 located in Grundy County, Illinois. The NRC initiated the SEP to provide the framework for reviewing the design of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. This report documents the review completed by means of the SEP for those issues that required refined engineering evaluations or the continuation of ongoing evaluations subsequent to issuing the final IPSAR for Dresden Unit 2. The review was provided for (1) an assessment of the significance of differences between current technical positions on selected issues and those that existed when Dresden Unit 2 was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. The final IPSAR and this supplement forms part of the bases for considering the conversion of the existing provisional operating license to a full-term operating license. 83 refs., 9 tabs

Preliminary Safety Information Document for the Standard MHTGR. Volume 1, (includes latest Amendments)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

1986-01-01

With NRC concurrence, the Licensing Plan for the Standard HTGR describes an application program consistent with 10CFR50, Appendix O to support a US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review and design certification of an advanced Standard modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MHTGR) design. Consistent with the NRC's Advanced Reactor Policy, the Plan also outlines a series of preapplication activities which have as an objective the early issuance of an NRC Licensability Statement on the Standard MHTGR conceptual design. This Preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID) has been prepared as one of the submittals to the NRC by the US Department of Energy in support of preapplication activities on the Standard MHTGR. Other submittals to be provided include a Probabilistic Risk Assessment, a Regulatory Technology Development Plan, and an Emergency Planning Bases Report.

Documentation of torture victims, assessment of the start procedure for medico-legal documentation.

Science.gov (United States)

Mandel, Lene; Worm, Lise

2007-01-01

A Pilot Study was performed at the Rehabilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims (RCT) in Copenhagen in order to explore the possibilities for adding a medico-legal documentation component to the rehabilitation of torture victims already taking place. It describes the process and results on implementing medico-legal documentation in a rehabilitative setting. A modified version of the Guidelines in the Istanbul Protocol was developed on the basis of the review of literature and current practices described in "Documentation of torture victims, implementation of medico-legal protocols". The modified guidelines were tested on five clients. The aim was twofold: 1) To assess the client's attitude towards the idea of adding a documentation component to the rehabilitation process and: 2) To assess the practical circumstances of implementing the Istanbul Protocol in the everyday life of a rehabilitation centre. Results show that all five clients were positive towards the project and found comfort in being able to contribute to the fight against impunity. Also, the Pilot Study demonstrated that a large part of the medico-legal documentation was already obtained in the rehabilitation process. It was however not accessible due to lack of systematization and a data registering system. There are thus important synergies in collecting data for rehabilitation and documentation but a joint database system is necessary to realize these synergies.

Correlation between safety climate and contractor safety assessment programs in construction.

Science.gov (United States)

Sparer, Emily H; Murphy, Lauren A; Taylor, Kathryn M; Dennerlein, Jack T

2013-12-01

Contractor safety assessment programs (CSAPs) measure safety performance by integrating multiple data sources together; however, the relationship between these measures of safety performance and safety climate within the construction industry is unknown. Four hundred and one construction workers employed by 68 companies on 26 sites and 11 safety managers employed by 11 companies completed brief surveys containing a nine-item safety climate scale developed for the construction industry. CSAP scores from ConstructSecure, Inc., an online CSAP database, classified these 68 companies as high or low scorers, with the median score of the sample population as the threshold. Spearman rank correlations evaluated the association between the CSAP score and the safety climate score at the individual level, as well as with various grouping methodologies. In addition, Spearman correlations evaluated the comparison between manager-assessed safety climate and worker-assessed safety climate. There were no statistically significant differences between safety climate scores reported by workers in the high and low CSAP groups. There were, at best, weak correlations between workers' safety climate scores and the company CSAP scores, with marginal statistical significance with two groupings of the data. There were also no significant differences between the manager-assessed safety climate and the worker-assessed safety climate scores. A CSAP safety performance score does not appear to capture safety climate, as measured in this study. The nature of safety climate in construction is complex, which may be reflective of the challenges in measuring safety climate within this industry. Am. J. Ind. Med. 56:1463-1472, 2013. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Project SAFE. Update of the SFR-1 safety assessment. Phase 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersson, Johan; Riggare, P.; Skagius, K.

1998-10-01

SFR-1 is a facility for disposal of low-level radioactive operational waste from the nuclear power plants in Sweden. Low-level radioactive waste from industry, medicine, and research is also disposed in SFR-1. The facility is situated in bedrock beneath the Baltic Sea, 1 km off the coast near the Forsmark nuclear power plant. SFR-1 was built between the years 1983 and 1988. An assessment of the long-term performance of the facility was included in the vast documentation that was a part of the application for an operational license. The assessment was presented in the form of a final safety report. In the operational licence for SFR-1 it is stated that renewed safety assessments should be carried out at least each ten years. In order to meet this demand SKB has launched a special project, SAFE (Safety Assessment of Final Disposal of Operational Radioactive Waste). The aim of the project is to update the safety analysis and to prepare a safety report that will be presented to the Swedish authorities not later than year 2000. Project SAFE is divided into three phases. The first phase is a prestudy, and the results of the prestudy are given in this report. The aim of the prestudy is to identify issues where additional studies would improve the basis for the updated safety analysis as well as to suggest how these studies should be carried out. The work has been divided into six different topics, namely the inventory, the near field, the far field, the biosphere, radionuclide transport calculations and scenarios. For each topic the former safety reports and regulatory reviews are scrutinised and needs for additional work is identified. The evaluations are given in appendices covering the respective topics. The main report is a summary of the appendices with a more stringent description of the repository system and the processes that are of interest and therefore should be addressed in an updated safety assessment. However, it should be pointed out that one of the

Towards web documents quality assessment for digital humanities scholars

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Ceolin, D.; Noordegraaf, Julia; Aroyo, L.M.; van Son, C.M.; Nejdl, Wolfgang; Hall, Wendy; Parigi, Paolo; Staab, Steffen

2016-01-01

We present a framework for assessing the quality of Web documents, and a baseline of three quality dimensions: trustworthiness, objectivity and basic scholarly quality. Assessing Web document quality is a "deep data" problem necessitating approaches to handle both data size and complexity.

Development of safety related technology and infrastructure for safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Venkat Raj, V.

1997-01-01

Development and optimum utilisation of any technology calls for the building up of the necessary infrastructure and backup facilities. This is particularly true for a developing country like India and more so for an advanced technology like nuclear technology. Right from the inception of its nuclear power programme, the Indian approach has been to develop adequate infrastructure in various areas such as design, construction, manufacture, installation, commissioning and safety assessment of nuclear plants. This paper deals with the development of safety related technology and the relevant infrastructure for safety assessment. A number of computer codes for safety assessment have been developed or adapted in the areas of thermal hydraulics, structural dynamics etc. These codes have undergone extensive validation through data generated in the experimental facilities set up in India as well as participation in international standard problem exercises. Side by side with the development of the tools for safety assessment, the development of safety related technology was also given equal importance. Many of the technologies required for the inspection, ageing assessment and estimation of the residual life of various components and equipment, particularly those having a bearing on safety, were developed. This paper highlights, briefly, the work carried out in some of the areas mentioned above. (author)

A generic standard for assessing and managing activities with significant risk to health and safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilde, T.S.; Sandquist, G.M.

2005-01-01

Some operations and activities in industry, business, and government can present an unacceptable risk to health and safety if not performed according to established safety practices and documented procedures. The nuclear industry has extensive experience and commitment to assessing and controlling such risks. This paper provides a generic standard based upon DOE Standard DOE-STD-3007- 93, Nov 1993, Change Notice No. 1, Sep 1998. This generic standard can be used to assess practices and procedures employed by any industrial and government entity to ensure that an acceptable level of safety and control prevail for such operations. When any activity and operation is determined to involve significant risk to health and safety to workers or the public, the organization should adopt and establish an appropriate standard and methodology to ensure that adequate health and safety prevail. This paper uses DOE experience and standards to address activities with recognized potential for impact upon health and safety. Existing and future assessments of health and safety issues can be compared and evaluated against this generic standard for insuring that proper planning, analysis, review, and approval have been made. (authors)

Thinking of the safety assessment of HLW disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li Honghui; Zhao Shuaiwei; Liu Jianqin; Liu Wei; Wan Lei; Yang Zhongtian; An Hongxiang; Sun Qinghong

2014-01-01

The function and the research methods of safety assessment are discussed. Two methods about safety assessment and the requirement of safety assessment are introduced. The key parameters and influence factors in nuclide transport of safety assessment are specialized. The works will be done on safety assessment is discussed which will give some suggests for the development of safety assessment. (authors)

ALARP considerations in criticality safety assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bowden, Russell L.; Barnes, Andrew; Thorne, Peter R.; Venner, Jack

2003-01-01

Demonstrating that the risk to the public and workers is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) is a fundamental requirement of safety cases for nuclear facilities in the United Kingdom. This is embodied in the Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) published by the Regulator, the essence of which is incorporated within the safety assessment processes of the various nuclear site licensees. The concept of ALARP within criticality safety assessments has taken some time to establish in the United Kingdom. In principle, the licensee is obliged to search for a deterministic criticality safety solution, such as safe geometry vessels and passive control features, rather than placing reliance on active measurement devices and plant administrative controls. This paper presents a consideration of some ALARP issues in relation to the development of criticality safety cases. The paper utilises some idealised examples covering a range of issues facing the criticality safety assessor, including new plant design, operational plant and decommissioning activities. These examples are used to outline the elements of the criticality safety cases and present a discussion of ALARP in the context of criticality safety assessments. (author)

Safety culture assessment developed by JANTI

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hamada, Jun

2009-01-01

Japan's JCO accident in September 1999 provided a real-life example of what can happen when insufficient attention is paid to safety culture. This accident brought to light the importance of safety culture and reinforced the movement to foster a safety culture. Despite this, accidents and inappropriate conduct have continued to occur. Therefore, there is a strong demand to instill a safety culture throughout the nuclear power industry. In this context, Japan's nuclear power regulator, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), decided to include in its safety inspections assessments of the safety culture found in power utilities' routine safety operations to get signs of deterioration in the organizational climate. In 2007, NISA constructed guidelines for their inspectors to carry out these assessments. At the same time, utilities have embarked on their own independent safety culture initiatives, such as revising their technical specifications and building effective PDCA cycle to promote safety culture. In concert with these developments, JANTI has also instituted safety culture assessments. (author)

Peer review of the Barselina Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McKay, S.L.; Coles, G.A.

1995-01-01

The Barselina Project is a Swedish-funded, cooperative effort among Lithuania, Russia and Sweden to transfer Western probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodology to the designers/operators of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP). The overall goal is to use the PSA as a tool for assessing plant operational safety. The INPP is a two-unit, Former Soviet Union-designed nuclear facility located in Lithuania. The results of this PSA will ultimately be used to identify plant-specific improvements in system design and the conduct of facility operations, allowing improved operational safety. Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) was asked to perform an independent expert peer review of the Barselina PSA. This report documents the findings of this review. This review, financed with nuclear safety assistance funds through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Department of Energy (DOE), satisfies Task II of the PNL peer review of the Barselina project. The objective is to provide an independent, in-proce ss examination of the Barselina Level 1 PSA of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2. The review consisted of an investigation of the project documentation, interviews, and extensive discussions with the PSA staff during critical stages of the project. PNL assessed the readability, completeness, consistency, validity, and applicability of the PSA. The major aspects explored were its purpose, major assumptions, analysis/modeling, results, and interpretation. It was not within the scope of this review to perform plant walkdowns or to review material other than the PSA documentation

Assessment of Human Performance and Safety Culture at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toth, Janos; Hadnagy, Lajos

2002-01-01

Evaluation of human performance and safety culture of the personnel at a Nuclear Power Plant is a very important element of the self assessment process. At the Paks NPP a systematic approach to this problem started in the early 90's. The first comprehensive analysis of the human performance of the personnel was performed by the Hungarian Research Institute for Electric Power (VEIKI). The analysis of human failures is also a part of the investigation and analysis of safety related reported events. This human performance analysis of events is carried out by the Laboratory of Psychology of the plant and a supporting organisation namely the Department of Ergonomics and Psychology of the Budapest University of Technical and Economical Sciences. The analysis of safety culture at the Paks NPP has been in the focus of attention since the implementation of the INSAG-4 document started world-wide. In 1993 an IAEA model project namely 'Strengthening Training for Operational Safety' was initiated with a sub-project called 'Enhancement of Safety Culture'. Within this project the first step was the initial assessment of the safety culture level at the Paks NPP. It was followed by some corrective actions and safety culture improvement programme. In 1999 the second assessment was performed in order to evaluate the progress as a result of the improvement programme. A few indicators reflecting the elements of safety culture were defined and compared. The assessment of the safety culture with a survey among the managers was performed in September 2000 and the results are being evaluated at the moment. The intention of the plant management is to repeat the assessment every 2-3 years and evaluate the trend of the indicator. (authors)

Ferrocyanide Safety Program rationale for removing six tanks from the safety watch list

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Borsheim, G.L.

1993-09-01

This report documents an in-depth study of single-shell tanks containing ferrocyanide wastes. Topics include: safety assessments, tank histories, supportive documentation about interim stabilization and planned remedial activities

Rad waste disposal safety analysis / Integrated safety assessment of a waste repository

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jeong, Jongtae; Choi, Jongwon; Kang, Chulhyung

2012-04-01

We developed CYPRUS+and adopted PID and RES method for the development of scenario. Safety performance assessment program was developed using GoldSim for the safety assessment of disposal system for the disposal of spnet fuels and wastes resulting from the pyrpoprocessing. Biosphere model was developed and verified in cooperation with JAEA. The capability to evaluate post-closure performance and safety was added to the previously developed program. And, nuclide migration and release to the biosphere considering site characteristics was evaluated by using deterministic and probabilistic approach. Operational safety assessment for drop, fire, and earthquake was also statistically evaluated considering well-established input parameter distribution. Conservative assessment showed that dose rate is below the limit value of low- and intermediate-level repository. Gas generation mechanism within engineered barrier was defined and its influence on safety was evaluated. We made probabilistic safety assessment by obtaining the probability distribution functions of important input variables and also made a sensitivity analysis. The maximum annual dose rate was shown to be below the safety limit value of 10 mSv/yr. The structure and element of safety case was developed to increase reliability of safety assessment methodology for a deep geological repository. Finally, milestone for safety case development and implementation strategy for each safety case element was also proposed

Considerations in the safety assessment of sealed nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-06-01

This report is a part of the International Atomic Energy Agency's radioactive waste management programme, whose objective is to provide assistance to Member States in developing guidance for identifying safe alternatives for isolating radioactive waste from man and his environment. This report attempts to integrate information from the previous reports on decommissioning of nuclear facilities, mitigation of accidents at such facilities, and performance assessment of disposal systems to provide useful advice and qualitative guidance to those responsible for performance and safety assessments of sealed nuclear facilities by giving an overview of possible approaches and techniques for such assessments. In this context, the establishment of requirements and rules governing the radiological safety of personnel, the general public, and the environment for sealing and post-sealing activities will enable the choice of the most appropriated approach and help to promote consistency in both decommissioning and waste management standards. The near-field effects discussed in this document include gas generation, interactions of the groundwater and the residual water with other components of the system, thermal, thermo-mechanical, radiation effects and chemical and geochemical reactions. 59 refs, figs and tabs

Risk-Informed Safety Assurance and Probabilistic Assessment of Mission-Critical Software-Intensive Systems

Science.gov (United States)

Guarro, Sergio B.

2010-01-01

This report validates and documents the detailed features and practical application of the framework for software intensive digital systems risk assessment and risk-informed safety assurance presented in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioner. This framework, called herein the "Context-based Software Risk Model" (CSRM), enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a manner which is entirely compatible and integrated with the format of a "standard" Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently documented and applied for NASA missions and applications. The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path and criteria for conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, within this risk-informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety and mission success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated. The framework is based on the concept of context-dependent software risk scenarios and on the modeling of such scenarios via the use of traditional PRA techniques - i.e., event trees and fault trees - in combination with more advanced modeling devices such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other dynamic logic-modeling representations. The scenarios can be synthesized and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation. The application of the CSRM method documented in this report refers to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center.

Towards understanding work-as-done in air traffic management safety assessment and design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woltjer, Rogier; Pinska-Chauvin, Ella; Laursen, Tom; Josefsson, Billy

2015-01-01

This paper describes the approach taken and the results to develop guidance, to include Resilience Engineering principles in methodology for safety assessment of functional changes, in Air Traffic Management (ATM). It summarizes the process of deriving resilience principles for ATM, originating from Resilience Engineering concepts and transposed into ATM operations. These principles are the foundation for guidance material incorporating Resilience Engineering (RE) concepts into safety assessment methodology. The guidance material provides a method using workshops generating qualitative descriptions of RE principles applied to ATM services of everyday work, as done currently and as envisioned after introduction of a new technology or way of working. The guidance material has been proposed as part of the safety assessment methodology of SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research), and as stand-alone guidance for ATM design processes. The methodology was validated via a test case on the i4D/CTA (Controlled Time of Arrival) concept. Operational examples from the application of the developed guidance to the i4D/CTA concept are provided. Initial evaluation of the guidance suggests that the methodology (1) provides a narrative, vocabulary and documentation means of project discussions on resilience; (2) brings the discussions of safety and resilience closer to operational practice; (3) facilitates a broader systemic and integrative perspective on operational, management, business, safety, environmental, and human performance aspects; and (4) can extend the vocabulary of safety assessment to include the description of emergent properties, to better support functional changes in ATM. - Highlights: • Guidance material for safety assessment based on systemic thinking is proposed. • It operationalizes Resilience Engineering principles in Air Traffic Management, including a case study. • It enables description of expected changes in work-as-done when introducing a new

The complementary roles of fracture mechanics and non-destructive examination in the safety assessment of components

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-01-01

This document presents the various speeches of the workshop of the Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) that took place in Wuerenligen, Switzerland, in October 1988. The speeches deal with the roles of Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) and Fracture Mechanics (FM) in the safety assessment of reactor components, such as pressure vessels. Some calibration standards and reference values of defects are presented, and several NDE and FM methods for the assessment of components are described. Separate abstracts were prepared for all the papers in this volume. (TEC)

The complementary roles of fracture mechanics and non-destructive examination in the safety assessment of components

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1988-12-31

This document presents the various speeches of the workshop of the Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) that took place in Wuerenligen, Switzerland, in October 1988. The speeches deal with the roles of Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) and Fracture Mechanics (FM) in the safety assessment of reactor components, such as pressure vessels. Some calibration standards and reference values of defects are presented, and several NDE and FM methods for the assessment of components are described. Separate abstracts were prepared for all the papers in this volume. (TEC).

New IAEA guidance on safety culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haage, Monica; )

2012-01-01

Monica Haage described a project for Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant in Bulgaria which was also funded by the Norwegian government. This project included the development of guidance documents and training on self-assessment and continuous improvement of safety culture. A draft IAEA safety culture survey was also developed as part of this project in collaboration with St Mary's University, Canada. This project was conducted in parallel with an IAEA project to develop new safety reports on safety culture self-assessment and continuous improvement. A safety report on safety culture during the pre-operational phases of NPPs has also been drafted. The IAEA approach to safety culture assessment was outlined and core principles of the approach were discussed. These include the use of several assessment methods (survey, interview, observation, focus groups, document review), and two distinct levels of analysis. The first is a descriptive analysis of the observed cultural characteristics from each assessment method and overarching themes. This is followed by a 'normative' analysis comparing what has been observed with the desirable characteristics of a strong, positive, safety culture, as defined by the IAEA safety culture framework. The application of this approach during recent Operational Safety Assessment Review Team (OSART) missions was described along with key learning points

The assessment of fire safety of cast iron structures in historical buildings: Theory and practice

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Twilt, L.; Hunen, M. van

2000-01-01

The assessment of structural fire safety of cast iron structures in historical buildings is difficult because the available information on the fire behaviour is limited, whilst the fire design assumptions (if any) often are not well docu-mented. A complicating factor with regard to protective

Review of SKB's Code Documentation and Testing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hicks, T.W.

2005-01-01

SKB is in the process of developing the SR-Can safety assessment for a KBS 3 repository. The assessment will be based on quantitative analyses using a range of computational codes aimed at developing an understanding of how the repository system will evolve. Clear and comprehensive code documentation and testing will engender confidence in the results of the safety assessment calculations. This report presents the results of a review undertaken on behalf of SKI aimed at providing an understanding of how codes used in the SR 97 safety assessment and those planned for use in the SR-Can safety assessment have been documented and tested. Having identified the codes us ed by SKB, several codes were selected for review. Consideration was given to codes used directly in SKB's safety assessment calculations as well as to some of the less visible codes that are important in quantifying the different repository barrier safety functions. SKB's documentation and testing of the following codes were reviewed: COMP23 - a near-field radionuclide transport model developed by SKB for use in safety assessment calculations. FARF31 - a far-field radionuclide transport model developed by SKB for use in safety assessment calculations. PROPER - SKB's harness for executing probabilistic radionuclide transport calculations using COMP23 and FARF31. The integrated analytical radionuclide transport model that SKB has developed to run in parallel with COMP23 and FARF31. CONNECTFLOW - a discrete fracture network model/continuum model developed by Serco Assurance (based on the coupling of NAMMU and NAPSAC), which SKB is using to combine hydrogeological modelling on the site and regional scales in place of the HYDRASTAR code. DarcyTools - a discrete fracture network model coupled to a continuum model, recently developed by SKB for hydrogeological modelling, also in place of HYDRASTAR. ABAQUS - a finite element material model developed by ABAQUS, Inc, which is used by SKB to model repository buffer

Safety Justification and Safety Case for Safety-critical Software in Digital Reactor Protection System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, Kee-Choon; Lee, Jang-Soo; Jee, Eunkyoung

2016-01-01

Nuclear safety-critical software is under strict regulatory requirements and these regulatory requirements are essential for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. The verification & validation (V and V) and hazard analysis of the safety-critical software are required to follow regulatory requirements through the entire software life cycle. In order to obtain a license from the regulatory body through the development and validation of safety-critical software, it is essential to meet the standards which are required by the regulatory body throughout the software development process. Generally, large amounts of documents, which demonstrate safety justification including standard compliance, V and V, hazard analysis, and vulnerability assessment activities, are submitted to the regulatory body during the licensing process. It is not easy to accurately read and evaluate the whole documentation for the development activities, implementation technology, and validation activities. The safety case methodology has been kwon a promising approach to evaluate the level and depth of the development and validation results. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. It is suggested to evaluate the level and depth of the results of development and validation by applying safety case methodology to achieve software safety demonstration. A lot of documents provided as evidence are connected to claim that corresponds to the topic for safety demonstration. We demonstrated a case study in which more systematic safety demonstration for the target system software is performed via safety case construction than simply listing the documents

Safety Justification and Safety Case for Safety-critical Software in Digital Reactor Protection System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kwon, Kee-Choon; Lee, Jang-Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Jee, Eunkyoung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

Nuclear safety-critical software is under strict regulatory requirements and these regulatory requirements are essential for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. The verification & validation (V and V) and hazard analysis of the safety-critical software are required to follow regulatory requirements through the entire software life cycle. In order to obtain a license from the regulatory body through the development and validation of safety-critical software, it is essential to meet the standards which are required by the regulatory body throughout the software development process. Generally, large amounts of documents, which demonstrate safety justification including standard compliance, V and V, hazard analysis, and vulnerability assessment activities, are submitted to the regulatory body during the licensing process. It is not easy to accurately read and evaluate the whole documentation for the development activities, implementation technology, and validation activities. The safety case methodology has been kwon a promising approach to evaluate the level and depth of the development and validation results. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. It is suggested to evaluate the level and depth of the results of development and validation by applying safety case methodology to achieve software safety demonstration. A lot of documents provided as evidence are connected to claim that corresponds to the topic for safety demonstration. We demonstrated a case study in which more systematic safety demonstration for the target system software is performed via safety case construction than simply listing the documents.

Emergency Response Capability Baseline Needs Assessment - Requirements Document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sharry, J A

2016-10-04

This document was prepared by John A. Sharry, LLNL Fire Marshal and LLNL Division Leader for Fire Protection and reviewed by LLNL Emergency Management Department Head James Colson. The document follows and expands upon the format and contents of the DOE Model Fire Protection Baseline Capabilities Assessment document contained on the DOE Fire Protection Web Site, but only addresses emergency response.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Emergency Response Capability Baseline Needs Assessment Requirement Document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sharry, J A

2009-12-30

This revision of the LLNL Fire Protection Baseline Needs Assessment (BNA) was prepared by John A. Sharry, LLNL Fire Marshal and LLNL Division Leader for Fire Protection and reviewed by Martin Gresho, Sandia/CA Fire Marshal. The document follows and expands upon the format and contents of the DOE Model Fire Protection Baseline Capabilities Assessment document contained on the DOE Fire Protection Web Site, but only address emergency response. The original LLNL BNA was created on April 23, 1997 as a means of collecting all requirements concerning emergency response capabilities at LLNL (including response to emergencies at Sandia/CA) into one BNA document. The original BNA documented the basis for emergency response, emergency personnel staffing, and emergency response equipment over the years. The BNA has been updated and reissued five times since in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004. A significant format change was performed in the 2004 update of the BNA in that it was 'zero based.' Starting with the requirement documents, the 2004 BNA evaluated the requirements, and determined minimum needs without regard to previous evaluations. This 2010 update maintains the same basic format and requirements as the 2004 BNA. In this 2010 BNA, as in the previous BNA, the document has been intentionally divided into two separate documents - the needs assessment (1) and the compliance assessment (2). The needs assessment will be referred to as the BNA and the compliance assessment will be referred to as the BNA Compliance Assessment. The primary driver for separation is that the needs assessment identifies the detailed applicable regulations (primarily NFPA Standards) for emergency response capabilities based on the hazards present at LLNL and Sandia/CA and the geographical location of the facilities. The needs assessment also identifies areas where the modification of the requirements in the applicable NFPA standards is appropriate, due to the improved fire protection

US Department of Energy Environment, Safety and Health Progress Assessment of the Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1992-08-01

This report documents the result of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Progress Assessment of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nye County, Nevada. The assessment, which was conducted from July 20 through August 4, 1992, included a selective review of the ES&H management systems and progress of the responsible DOE Headquarters Program Offices; the DOE Nevada Field Office (NV); and the site contractors. The ES&H Progress Assessments are part of the Secretary of Energy`s continuing effort to institutionalize line management accountability and the self-assessment process throughout DOE and its contractor organizations. This report presents a summary of issues and progress in the areas of environment, safety and health, and management.

US Department of Energy Environment, Safety and Health Progress Assessment of the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-08-01

This report documents the result of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Environment, Safety, and Health (ES ampersand H) Progress Assessment of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nye County, Nevada. The assessment, which was conducted from July 20 through August 4, 1992, included a selective review of the ES ampersand H management systems and progress of the responsible DOE Headquarters Program Offices; the DOE Nevada Field Office (NV); and the site contractors. The ES ampersand H Progress Assessments are part of the Secretary of Energy's continuing effort to institutionalize line management accountability and the self-assessment process throughout DOE and its contractor organizations. This report presents a summary of issues and progress in the areas of environment, safety and health, and management

Safety analysis, risk assessment, and risk acceptance criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jamali, K.

1997-01-01

This paper discusses a number of topics that relate safety analysis as documented in the Department of Energy (DOE) safety analysis reports (SARs), probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) as characterized primarily in the context of the techniques that have assumed some level of formality in commercial nuclear power plant applications, and risk acceptance criteria as an outgrowth of PRA applications. DOE SARs of interest are those that are prepared for DOE facilities under DOE Order 5480.23 and the implementing guidance in DOE STD-3009-94. It must be noted that the primary area of application for DOE STD-3009 is existing DOE facilities and that certain modifications of the STD-3009 approach are necessary in SARs for new facilities. Moreover, it is the hazard analysis (HA) and accident analysis (AA) portions of these SARs that are relevant to the present discussions. Although PRAs can be qualitative in nature, PRA as used in this paper refers more generally to all quantitative risk assessments and their underlying methods. HA as used in this paper refers more generally to all qualitative risk assessments and their underlying methods that have been in use in hazardous facilities other than nuclear power plants. This discussion includes both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment methods. PRA has been used, improved, developed, and refined since the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) was published in 1975 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Much debate has ensued since WASH-1400 on exactly what the role of PRA should be in plant design, reactor licensing, 'ensuring' plant and process safety, and a large number of other decisions that must be made for potentially hazardous activities. Of particular interest in this area is whether the risks quantified using PRA should be compared with numerical risk acceptance criteria (RACs) to determine whether a facility is 'safe.' Use of RACs requires quantitative estimates of consequence frequency and magnitude

Stalking: A Multidimensional Framework for Assessment and Safety Planning.

Science.gov (United States)

Logan, T K; Walker, Robert

2015-09-03

Despite the high prevalence of stalking and the risk of harm it poses to victims, arrest rates, prosecutions, and convictions for stalking continue to be low in the United States. The overall goal of this article is to introduce a multidimensional framework of stalking that adds to the current literature by (1) providing a conceptual framework consistent with legal elements of many stalking statutes to facilitate assessment, communication, documentation, and safety planning for stalking several victims; (2) introducing a more systematic way of assessing course of conduct and the context of fear in stalking situations in order to increase the understanding of cumulative fear for stalking victims; (3) emphasizing the aspects of stalking harm that go beyond violence and that show how harm from stalking accumulates over time including life sabotage; and (4) discussing 12 risk factors derived from the overall multidimensional framework that can be used to describe the big picture of stalking and to facilitate safety planning for victims. Implications for future research are discussed. © The Author(s) 2015.

The waste isolation safety assessment programme

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brandstetter, A.; Harwell, M.A.

1980-01-01

Associated with commercial nuclear power production in the USA is the generation of potentially hazardous radioactive wastes. The Department of Energy (DOE), through the National Waste Terminal Storage (NWTS) Programme, is seeking to develop nuclear waste isolation systems in geologic formations that will preclude contact with the biosphere of waste radionuclides in concentrations which are sufficient to cause deleterious impact on humans or their environments. Comprehensive analyses of specific isolation systems are needed to assess the expectations of meeting that objective. The Waste Isolation Safety Assessment Programme (WISAP) has been established at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (operated by Battelle Memorial Institute) for developing the capability of making those analyses. Among the analyses required for isolation system evaluation is the detailed assessment of the post-closure performance of nuclear waste repositories in geologic formations. This assessment is essential, since it is concerned with aspects of the nuclear power programme which previously have not been addressed. Specifically, the nature of the isolation systems (e.g. involving breach scenarios and transport through the geosphere), and the time-scales necessary for isolation, dictate the development, demonstration and application of novel assessment capabilities. The assessment methodology needs to be thorough, flexible, objective, and scientifically defensible. Further, the data utilized must be accurate, documented, reproducible, and based on sound scientific principles. (author)

Safety assessment of emergency electric power systems for nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-09-01

This paper is intended to assist the safety assessor within a regulatory body, or one working as a consultant, in assessing a given design of the Emergency Electrical Power System. Those non-electric power systems which may be used in a plant design to serve as emergency energy sources are addressed only in their general safety aspects. The paper thus relates closely to Safety Series 50-SG-D7 ''Emergency Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants'' (1982), as far as it addresses emergency electric power systems. Several aspects are dealt with: the information the assessor may expect from the applicant to fulfill his task of safety review; the main questions the reviewer has to answer in order to determine the compliance with requirements of the NUSS documents; the national or international standards which give further guidance on a certain system or piece of equipment; comments and suggestions which may help to judge a variety of possible solutions

Safety Culture Monitoring: How to Assess Safety Culture in Real Time?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zronek, B.; Maryska, J.; Treslova, L.

2016-01-01

Do you know what is current level of safety culture in your company? Are you able to follow trend changes? Do you know what your recent issues are? Since safety culture is understood as vital part of nuclear industry daily life, it is crucial to know what the current level is. It is common to perform safety culture survey or ad hoc assessment. This contribution shares Temelin NPP, CEZ approach how to assess safety culture level permanently. Using behavioral related outputs of gap solving system, observation program, dedicated surveys, regulatory assessment, etc., allows creating real time safety culture monitoring without the need to perform any other activities. (author)

340 Waste Handling Facility interim safety basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bendixsen, R.B.

1995-01-01

This document establishes the interim safety basis (ISB) for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility). An ISB is a documented safety basis that provides a justification for the continued operation of the facility until an upgraded final safety analysis report is prepared that complies with US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The ISB for the 340 Facility documents the current design and operation of the facility. The 340 Facility ISB (ISB-003) is based on a facility walkdown and review of the design and operation of the facility, as described in the existing safety documentation. The safety documents reviewed, to develop ISB-003, include the following: OSD-SW-153-0001, Operating Specification Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1990); OSR-SW-152-00003, Operating Limits for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1989); SD-RE-SAP-013, Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Railroad Liquid Waste Tank Cars (Mercado 1993); SD-WM-TM-001, Safety Assessment Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (Berneski 1994a); SD-WM-SEL-016, 340 Facility Safety Equipment List (Berneski 1992); and 340 Complex Fire Hazard Analysis, Draft (Hughes Assoc. Inc. 1994)

Integrated plant safety assessment: systematic evaluation program. Haddam Neck Plant, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company. Docket No. 50-213

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-03-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of Haddam Neck Plant, operated by Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company. The Haddam Neck Plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Integrated plant safety assessment: Systematic Evaluation Program. LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor, Dairyland Power Cooperative, Docket No. 50-409

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-04-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, operated by Dairyland Power Cooperative. The La Crosse plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addresed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Intermediate probabilistic safety assessment approach for safety critical digital systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Taeyong, Sung; Hyun Gook, Kang

2001-01-01

Even though the conventional probabilistic safety assessment methods are immature for applying to microprocessor-based digital systems, practical needs force to apply it. In the Korea, UCN 5 and 6 units are being constructed and Korean Next Generation Reactor is being designed using the digital instrumentation and control equipment for the safety related functions. Korean regulatory body requires probabilistic safety assessment. This paper analyzes the difficulties on the assessment of digital systems and suggests an intermediate framework for evaluating their safety using fault tree models. The framework deals with several important characteristics of digital systems including software modules and fault-tolerant features. We expect that the analysis result will provide valuable design feedback. (authors)

Safety assessments for potential exposures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dunn, D.I.

2012-04-01

Safety Assessment of potential exposures have been carried out in major practices, namely: industrial radiography, gamma irradiators and electron accelerators used in industry and research, and radiotherapy. This paper focuses on reviewing safety assessment methodologies and using developed software to analyse radiological accidents, also review, and discuss these past accidents.The primary objective of the assessment is to assess the adequacy of planned or existing measures for protection and safety and to identify any additional measures that should be put in place. As such, both routine use of the source and the probability and magnitude of potential exposures arising from accidents or incidents should be considered. Where the assessment indicates that there is a realistic possibility of an accident affecting workers or members of the public or having consequences for the environment, the registrant or licensee should prepare a suitable emergency plan. A safety assessment for normal operation addresses all the conditions under which the radiation source operates as expected, including all phases of the lifetime of the source. Due account needs to be taken of the different factors and conditions that will apply during non-operational phases, such as installation, commissioning and maintenance. (author)

Additional safety assessments, follow-up of stress tests of the French nuclear power stations. Action plan of the nuclear safety authority

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This document presents the French national action plan defined by the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) in compliance with the recommendations made by the ENSREG (European nuclear safety regulators group). It refers to decisions taken at the national level after the Fukushima accident, recommendations after European stress tests, and recommendations after the extraordinary meeting of contracting parties at the Convention on Nuclear Safety of August 2012. For different topics, this document recalls the recommendations made by the peer review, indicates the ASN's opinion and progress or ASN's requirements for different power stations. The first part addresses the recommendations made by peers and based on the European review. Topics concern natural hazards (effects, detection, inspections and controls related to earthquakes, margin assessment with respect to flooding and natural hazards), the loss of safety systems (cooling systems, electricity supplies, actions, instruments, training, and so on), the management of a severe accident (reference levels, measures, guides, exercises, training, management of contaminated water, radiation protection, premises). The second part deals with topics addressed within the frame of the Convention: national organisations, organisations in an emergency and post-accidental situation, international cooperation. A third part addresses the follow-up of additional measures issued by the ASN

Safety assessment for spent fuel storage facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This Safety Practice has been prepared as part of the IAEA's programme on the safety assessment of interim spent fuel storage facilities which are not an integral part of an operating nuclear power plant. This report provides general guidance on the safety assessment process, discussing both deterministic and probabilistic assessment methods. It describes the safety assessment process for normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences and also related to accident conditions. 10 refs, 2 tabs

Engineering and Safety Partnership Enhances Safety of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP)

Science.gov (United States)

Duarte, Alberto

2007-01-01

Project Management must use the risk assessment documents (RADs) as tools to support their decision making process. Therefore, these documents have to be initiated, developed, and evolved parallel to the life of the project. Technical preparation and safety compliance of these documents require a great deal of resources. Updating these documents after-the-fact not only requires substantial increase in resources - Project Cost -, but this task is also not useful and perhaps an unnecessary expense. Hazard Reports (HRs), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs), Critical Item Lists (CILs), Risk Management process are, among others, within this category. A positive action resulting from a strong partnership between interested parties is one way to get these documents and related processes and requirements, released and updated in useful time. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) at the Marshall Space Flight Center has implemented a process which is having positive results and gaining acceptance within the Agency. A hybrid Panel, with equal interest and responsibilities for the two larger organizations, Safety and Engineering, is the focal point of this process. Called the Marshall Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), its charter (Space Shuttle Program Directive 110 F, April 15, 2005), and its Operating Control Plan emphasizes the technical and safety responsibilities over the program risk documents: HRs; FMEA/CILs; Engineering Changes; anomalies/problem resolutions and corrective action implementations, and trend analysis. The MSERP has undertaken its responsibilities with objectivity, assertiveness, dedication, has operated with focus, and has shown significant results and promising perspectives. The MSERP has been deeply involved in propulsion systems and integration, real time technical issues and other relevant reviews, since its conception. These activities have transformed the propulsion MSERP in a truly participative and value added panel, making a

ITER final design report, cost review and safety analysis (FDR) and relevant documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This volume contains the fourth major milestone report and documents associated with its acceptance, review and approval. This ITER Final Design Report, Cost Review and Safety Analysis was presented to the ITER Council at its 13th meeting in February 1998 and was approved at its extraordinary meeting on 25 June 1998. The contents include an outline of the ITER objectives, the ITER parameters and design overview as well as operating scenarios and plasma performance. Furthermore, design features, safety and environmental characteristics and schedule and cost estimates are given

Interim main report of the safety assessment SR-Can

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hedin, Allan [and others

2004-08-01

This document is an interim report on the safety assessment SR-Can (SR in the acronym stands for Safety Report and Can is short for canister). The final SR-Can report will support SKB's application to build an Encapsulation plant for spent nuclear fuel and is to be produced in 2006. The purpose of the present interim report is to demonstrate the methodology for safety assessment so that it can be reviewed before it is used in a license application. The assessment relates to the KBS-3 disposal concept in which copper canisters with a cast iron insert containing spent nuclear fuel are surrounded by bentonite clay and deposited at approximately 500 m depth in saturated, granitic rock. Preliminary data from the Forsmark site, presently being investigated by SKB as one of the candidate for a KBS-3 repository are used to some extent as examples. However, the collected data are yet too sparse to allow an evaluation of safety for this site. An important aim of this report is to demonstrate the proper handling of requirements on the safety assessment in applicable regulations. Therefore, regulations issued by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority are duplicated in an Appendix. The principal acceptance criterion requires that 'the annual risk of harmful effects after closure does not exceed 10{sup -6} for a representative individual in the group exposed to the greatest risk'. 'Harmful effects' refer to cancer and hereditary effects. Following the introductory chapter 1, this report outlines the methodology for the SR-Can assessment in chapter 2, and presents in chapters 3, 4 and 5 the initial state of the system and the plans and methods for handling external influences and internal processes, respectively. Function indicators are introduced in chapter 6 and a preliminary evaluation of these is given in chapter 7. The material presented in the first seven chapters is utilised in the scenario selection in chapter 8

Interim main report of the safety assessment SR-Can

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hedin, Allan

2004-08-01

This document is an interim report on the safety assessment SR-Can (SR in the acronym stands for Safety Report and Can is short for canister). The final SR-Can report will support SKB's application to build an Encapsulation plant for spent nuclear fuel and is to be produced in 2006. The purpose of the present interim report is to demonstrate the methodology for safety assessment so that it can be reviewed before it is used in a license application. The assessment relates to the KBS-3 disposal concept in which copper canisters with a cast iron insert containing spent nuclear fuel are surrounded by bentonite clay and deposited at approximately 500 m depth in saturated, granitic rock. Preliminary data from the Forsmark site, presently being investigated by SKB as one of the candidate for a KBS-3 repository are used to some extent as examples. However, the collected data are yet too sparse to allow an evaluation of safety for this site. An important aim of this report is to demonstrate the proper handling of requirements on the safety assessment in applicable regulations. Therefore, regulations issued by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority are duplicated in an Appendix. The principal acceptance criterion requires that 'the annual risk of harmful effects after closure does not exceed 10 -6 for a representative individual in the group exposed to the greatest risk'. 'Harmful effects' refer to cancer and hereditary effects. Following the introductory chapter 1, this report outlines the methodology for the SR-Can assessment in chapter 2, and presents in chapters 3, 4 and 5 the initial state of the system and the plans and methods for handling external influences and internal processes, respectively. Function indicators are introduced in chapter 6 and a preliminary evaluation of these is given in chapter 7. The material presented in the first seven chapters is utilised in the scenario selection in chapter 8. Hydrogeological

Assessment of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) for nuclear reactor safety problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, B. L.; Andreani, M.; Bieder, U.; Bestion, D.; Ducros, F.; Graffard, E.; Heitsch, M.; Scheuerer, M.; Henriksson, M.; Hoehne, T.; Rohde, U.; Lucas, D.; Komen, E.; Houkema, M.; Mahaffy, J.; Moretti, F.; Morii, T.; Muehlbauer, P.; Song, C.H.; Zigh, G.; Menter, F.; Watanabe, T.

2008-01-01

The basic objective of the present work was to provide documented evidence of the need to perform CFD simulations in Nuclear Reactor Safety (NRS), concentrating on single-phase applications, and to assess the competence of the present generation of CFD codes to perform these simulations reliably. The fulfilling of this objective involves multiple tasks, summarized as: to provide a classification of NRS problems requiring CFD analysis, to identify and catalogue existing CFD assessment bases, to identify shortcomings in CFD approaches, to put into place a means for extending the CFD assessment database, with an emphasis on NRS applications. The resulting document is presented here. After some introductory remarks, chapter 3 lists twenty-two NRS issues for which it is considered that the application of CFD would bring real benefits in terms of better predictive capability. This classification is followed by a short description of the safety issue, a state-of-the-art summary of what has been attempted, and what is still needed to be done to improve reliability. Chapter 4 details the assessment bases that have already been established in both the nuclear and non-nuclear domains, and discusses the usefulness and relevance of the work to NRS applications, where appropriate. This information is augmented in Chapter 5 by descriptions of the existing CFD assessment bases that have been established around specific, NRS problems. Typical examples are experiments devoted to the boron dilution issue, pressurised thermal shock, and thermal fatigue in pipes. Chapter 6 is devoted to identifying the technology gaps which need to be closed to make CFD a more trustworthy analytical tool. Some deficiencies identified are lack of a Phenomenon Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT), limitations in the range of application of turbulence models, coupling of CFD with neutronics and system codes, and computer power limitations. Most CFD codes currently being used have their own, custom

Documents preparation and review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

Ignalina Safety Analysis Group takes active role in assisting regulatory body VATESI to prepare various regulatory documents and reviewing safety reports and other documentation presented by Ignalina NPP in the process of licensing of unit 1. The list of main documents prepared and reviewed is presented

Consideration of aging in probabilistic safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Titina, B.; Cepin, M.

2007-01-01

Probabilistic safety assessment is a standardised tool for assessment of safety of nuclear power plants. It is a complement to the safety analyses. Standard probabilistic models of safety equipment assume component failure rate as a constant. Ageing of systems, structures and components can theoretically be included in new age-dependent probabilistic safety assessment, which generally causes the failure rate to be a function of age. New age-dependent probabilistic safety assessment models, which offer explicit calculation of the ageing effects, are developed. Several groups of components are considered which require their unique models: e.g. operating components e.g. stand-by components. The developed models on the component level are inserted into the models of the probabilistic safety assessment in order that the ageing effects are evaluated for complete systems. The preliminary results show that the lack of necessary data for consideration of ageing causes highly uncertain models and consequently the results. (author)

A Methodology for Safety Culture Impact Assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Han, Kiyoon; Jae, Moosung [Hanyang Univ., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

2014-05-15

The purpose of this study is to develop methodology for assessing safety culture impact on nuclear power plants. A new methodology for assessing safety culture impact index has been developed and applied for the reference nuclear power plants. The developed SCII model might contribute to comparing the level of safety culture among nuclear power plants as well as to improving the safety of nuclear power plants. Safety culture is defined to be fundamental attitudes and behaviors of the plant staff which demonstrate that nuclear safety is the most important consideration in all activities conducted in nuclear power operation. Through several accidents of nuclear power plant including the Fukusima Daiichi in 2011 and Chernovyl accidents in 1986, the safety of nuclear power plant is emerging into a matter of interest. From the accident review report, it can be easily found out that safety culture is important and one of dominant contributors to accidents. However, the impact methodology for assessing safety culture has not been established analytically yet. It is difficult to develop the methodology for assessing safety culture impact quantitatively.

A Methodology for Safety Culture Impact Assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Han, Kiyoon; Jae, Moosung

2014-01-01

The purpose of this study is to develop methodology for assessing safety culture impact on nuclear power plants. A new methodology for assessing safety culture impact index has been developed and applied for the reference nuclear power plants. The developed SCII model might contribute to comparing the level of safety culture among nuclear power plants as well as to improving the safety of nuclear power plants. Safety culture is defined to be fundamental attitudes and behaviors of the plant staff which demonstrate that nuclear safety is the most important consideration in all activities conducted in nuclear power operation. Through several accidents of nuclear power plant including the Fukusima Daiichi in 2011 and Chernovyl accidents in 1986, the safety of nuclear power plant is emerging into a matter of interest. From the accident review report, it can be easily found out that safety culture is important and one of dominant contributors to accidents. However, the impact methodology for assessing safety culture has not been established analytically yet. It is difficult to develop the methodology for assessing safety culture impact quantitatively

Safety Basis Report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

R.J. Garrett

2002-01-01

As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the implementation of the requirements identified in the Standards/Requirements Identification Document. The Standards/Requirements Identification Documents commit a facility to compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 5480.19) and the Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program. In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design and operation of the YMP site characterization activities

Safety Basis Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

R.J. Garrett

2002-01-14

As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the implementation of the requirements identified in the Standards/Requirements Identification Document. The Standards/Requirements Identification Documents commit a facility to compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 5480.19) and the Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program. In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design and operation of the YMP site characterization activities.

Regulatory review of safety cases and safety assessments for near surface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nys, V.

2003-01-01

The activities of the ASAM Regulatory Review Working Group are presented. Regulatory review of the safety assessment is made. It includes the regulatory review of post-closure safety assessment; safety case development and confidence building. The ISAM methodology is reviewed and SA system description is presented. Recommendations on the review process management are given

Safety Auditing and Assessments

Science.gov (United States)

Goodin, James Ronald (Ronnie)

2005-01-01

Safety professionals typically do not engage in audits and independent assessments with the vigor as do our quality brethren. Taking advantage of industry and government experience conducting value added Independent Assessments or Audits benefits a safety program. Most other organizations simply call this process "internal audits." Sources of audit training are presented and compared. A relation of logic between audit techniques and mishap investigation is discussed. An example of an audit process is offered. Shortcomings and pitfalls of auditing are covered.

Regulatory review of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) level 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-02-01

Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is increasingly being used as part of the decision making process to assess the level of safety of nuclear power plants. The methodologies in use are maturing and the insights gained from the PSAs are being used along with those from the deterministic analysis. Many regulatory authorities consider that the current state of the art in PSA (especially Level 1 PSA) is sufficiently well developed that it can be used centrally in the regulatory decision making process - referred to as 'risk informed regulation'. For these applications to be successful, it will be necessary for regulatory authorities to have a high degree of confidence in PSA. However, at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on Use of PSA in the Regulatory Process in 1994 and at the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Committee for Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) 'Special Issues' Meeting in 1997 on Review Procedures and Criteria for Different Regulatory Applications of PSA, it was recognized that formal regulatory review guidance for PSA did not exist. The senior regulators noted that there was a need to produce some international guidance for reviewing PSAs to establish an agreed basis for assessing whether important technological and methodological issues in PSAs are treated adequately and to verify that conclusions reached are appropriate. In 1997 the IAEA and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency agreed to produce in co-operation a technical document on the regulatory review of PSA. This publication is intended to provide guidance to regulatory authorities on how to review the PSA for a nuclear power plant to gain confidence that it has been carried out to an acceptable standard so that it can be used as the basis for taking risk informed decisions within a regulatory decision making process. The document gives guidance on how to set about reviewing a PSA and on the technical issues that need to be addressed. This publication gives guidance for the review of Level 1 PSA for

Model summary report for the safety assessment SR-Can

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Vahlund, Fredrik

2006-10-15

This document is the model summary report for the safety assessment SR-Can. In the report, the quality assurance measures conducted for the assessment codes are presented together with the chosen methodology. In the safety assessment SR-Can, a number of different computer codes are used. In order to better understand how these codes are related Assessment Model Flowcharts, AMFs, have been produced within the project. From these, it is possible to identify the different modelling tasks and consequently also the different computer codes used. A large number of different computer codes are used in the assessment of which some are commercial while others are developed especially for the current assessment project. QA requirements must on the one hand take this diversity into account and on the other hand be well defined. In the methodology section of the report the following requirements are defined: It must be demonstrated that the code is suitable for its purpose; It must be demonstrated that the code has been properly used; and, It must be demonstrated that the code development process has followed appropriate procedures and that the code produces accurate results. Although the requirements are identical for all codes, the measures used to show that the requirements are fulfilled will be different for different codes (for instance due to the fact that for some software the source-code is not available for review). Subsequent to the methodology section, each assessment code is presented and it is shown how the requirements are met.

Model summary report for the safety assessment SR-Can

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vahlund, Fredrik

2006-10-01

This document is the model summary report for the safety assessment SR-Can. In the report, the quality assurance measures conducted for the assessment codes are presented together with the chosen methodology. In the safety assessment SR-Can, a number of different computer codes are used. In order to better understand how these codes are related Assessment Model Flowcharts, AMFs, have been produced within the project. From these, it is possible to identify the different modelling tasks and consequently also the different computer codes used. A large number of different computer codes are used in the assessment of which some are commercial while others are developed especially for the current assessment project. QA requirements must on the one hand take this diversity into account and on the other hand be well defined. In the methodology section of the report the following requirements are defined: It must be demonstrated that the code is suitable for its purpose; It must be demonstrated that the code has been properly used; and, It must be demonstrated that the code development process has followed appropriate procedures and that the code produces accurate results. Although the requirements are identical for all codes, the measures used to show that the requirements are fulfilled will be different for different codes (for instance due to the fact that for some software the source-code is not available for review). Subsequent to the methodology section, each assessment code is presented and it is shown how the requirements are met

Confidence building in safety assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grundfelt, Bertil

1999-01-01

Future generations should be adequately protected from damage caused by the present disposal of radioactive waste. This presentation discusses the core of safety and performance assessment: The demonstration and building of confidence that the disposal system meets the safety requirements stipulated by society. The major difficulty is to deal with risks in the very long time perspective of the thousands of years during which the waste is hazardous. Concern about these problems has stimulated the development of the safety assessment discipline. The presentation concentrates on two of the elements of safety assessment: (1) Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, and (2) validation and review. Uncertainty is associated both with respect to what is the proper conceptual model and with respect to parameter values for a given model. A special kind of uncertainty derives from the variation of a property in space. Geostatistics is one approach to handling spatial variability. The simplest way of doing a sensitivity analysis is to offset the model parameters one by one and observe how the model output changes. The validity of the models and data used to make predictions is central to the credibility of safety assessments for radioactive waste repositories. There are several definitions of model validation. The presentation discusses it as a process and highlights some aspects of validation methodologies

Nuclide documentation. Element specific parameter values used in the biospheric models of the safety assessments SR 97 and SAFE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Karlsson, Sara; Bergstroem, Ulla

2002-05-01

In this report the element and nuclide specific parameter values used in the biospheric models of the safety assessments SR 97 and SAFE are presented. The references used are presented and where necessary the process of estimation of data is described. The parameters treated in this report are distribution coefficients in soil, organic soil and suspended matter in freshwater and brackish water, root uptake factors for pasturage, cereals, root crops and vegetables, bioaccumulation factors for freshwater fish, brackish water fish, freshwater invertebrates and marine water plants, transfer coefficients for transfer to milk and meat, translocation factors and dose coefficients for external exposure, ingestion (age-dependent values) and inhalation (age-dependent values). The radionuclides treated are those which could be of interest in the two safety assessments. Physical data such as half-lives and type of decay are also presented

Nuclide documentation. Element specific parameter values used in the biospheric models of the safety assessments SR 97 and SAFE

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Karlsson, Sara; Bergstroem, Ulla [Studsvik Eco and Safety AB, Nykoeping (Sweden)

2002-05-01

In this report the element and nuclide specific parameter values used in the biospheric models of the safety assessments SR 97 and SAFE are presented. The references used are presented and where necessary the process of estimation of data is described. The parameters treated in this report are distribution coefficients in soil, organic soil and suspended matter in freshwater and brackish water, root uptake factors for pasturage, cereals, root crops and vegetables, bioaccumulation factors for freshwater fish, brackish water fish, freshwater invertebrates and marine water plants, transfer coefficients for transfer to milk and meat, translocation factors and dose coefficients for external exposure, ingestion (age-dependent values) and inhalation (age-dependent values). The radionuclides treated are those which could be of interest in the two safety assessments. Physical data such as half-lives and type of decay are also presented.

Use of reliability engineering tools in safety and risk assessment of nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Raso, Amanda Laureano; Vasconcelos, Vanderley de; Marques, Raíssa Oliveira; Soares, Wellington Antonio; Mesquita, Amir Zacarias, E-mail: amandaraso@hotmail.com, E-mail: vasconv@cdtn.br, E-mail: raissaomarques@gmail.com, E-mail: soaresw@cdtn.br, E-mail: amir@cdtn.br [Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear (CDTN/CNEN-MG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil). Serviço de Tecnologia de Reatores

2017-07-01

Safety, reliability and availability are fundamental criteria in design, construction and operation of nuclear facilities, as nuclear power plants. Deterministic and probabilistic risk assessments of such facilities are required by regulatory authorities in order to meet licensing regulations, contributing to assure safety, as well as reduce costs and environmental impacts. Probabilistic Risk Assessment has become an important part of licensing requirements of the nuclear power plants in Brazil and in the world. Risk can be defined as a qualitative and/or quantitative assessment of accident sequence frequencies (or probabilities) and their consequences. Risk management is a systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to identify, analyze, plan, implement, control, communicate and document risks. Several tools and computer codes must be combined, in order to estimate both probabilities and consequences of accidents. Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD), and Markov models are examples of evaluation tools that can support the safety and risk assessment for analyzing process systems, identifying potential accidents, and estimating consequences. Because of complexity of such analyzes, specialized computer codes are required, such as the reliability engineering software develop by Reliasoft® Corporation. BlockSim (FTA, RBD and Markov models), RENO (ETA and consequence assessment), Weibull++ (life data and uncertainty analysis), and Xfmea (qualitative risk assessment) are some codes that can be highlighted. This work describes an integrated approach using these tools and software to carry out reliability, safety, and risk assessment of nuclear facilities, as well as, and application example. (author)

Use of reliability engineering tools in safety and risk assessment of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Raso, Amanda Laureano; Vasconcelos, Vanderley de; Marques, Raíssa Oliveira; Soares, Wellington Antonio; Mesquita, Amir Zacarias

2017-01-01

Safety, reliability and availability are fundamental criteria in design, construction and operation of nuclear facilities, as nuclear power plants. Deterministic and probabilistic risk assessments of such facilities are required by regulatory authorities in order to meet licensing regulations, contributing to assure safety, as well as reduce costs and environmental impacts. Probabilistic Risk Assessment has become an important part of licensing requirements of the nuclear power plants in Brazil and in the world. Risk can be defined as a qualitative and/or quantitative assessment of accident sequence frequencies (or probabilities) and their consequences. Risk management is a systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to identify, analyze, plan, implement, control, communicate and document risks. Several tools and computer codes must be combined, in order to estimate both probabilities and consequences of accidents. Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD), and Markov models are examples of evaluation tools that can support the safety and risk assessment for analyzing process systems, identifying potential accidents, and estimating consequences. Because of complexity of such analyzes, specialized computer codes are required, such as the reliability engineering software develop by Reliasoft® Corporation. BlockSim (FTA, RBD and Markov models), RENO (ETA and consequence assessment), Weibull++ (life data and uncertainty analysis), and Xfmea (qualitative risk assessment) are some codes that can be highlighted. This work describes an integrated approach using these tools and software to carry out reliability, safety, and risk assessment of nuclear facilities, as well as, and application example. (author)

Safety Assessment of Probiotics

Science.gov (United States)

Lahtinen, Sampo J.; Boyle, Robert J.; Margolles, Abelardo; Frias, Rafael; Gueimonde, Miguel

Viable microbes have been a natural part of human diet throughout the history of mankind. Today, different fermented foods and other foods containing live microbes are consumed around the world, including industrialized countries, where the diet has become increasingly sterile during the last decades. By definition, probiotics are viable microbes with documented beneficial effects on host health. Probiotics have an excellent safety record, both in humans and in animals. Despite the wide and continuously increasing consumption of probiotics, adverse events related to probiotic use are extremely rare. Many popular probiotic strains such as lactobacilli and bifidobacteria can be considered as components of normal healthy intestinal microbiota, and thus are not thought to pose a risk for the host health - in contrast, beneficial effects on health are commonly reported. Nevertheless, the safety of probiotics is an important issue, in particular in the case of new potential probiotics which do not have a long history of safe use, and of probiotics belonging to species for which general assumption of safety cannot be made. Furthermore, safety of probiotics in high-risk populations such as critically ill patients and immunocompromized subjects deserves particular attention, as virtually all reported cases of bacteremia and fungemia associated with probiotic use, involve subjects with underlying diseases, compromised immune system or compromised intestinal integrity.

Assessment by peer review of the effectiveness of a regulatory programme for radiation safety. Interim report for comment; Evaluacion mediante examen por pares de la efectividad de un programa regulador para la seguridad radiologica. Informe provisional para formular comentarios

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

This document covers assessment of those aspects of a radiation protection and safety infrastructure that are implemented by the Regulatory Authority for radiation sources and practices using such sources and necessarily includes those ancillary technical services, such as dosimetry services, which directly affect the ability of the Regulatory Authority to discharge its responsibilities. The focus of the guidance in this TECDOC is on assessment of a regulatory programme intended to implement the BSS. The BSS address transportation and waste safety mainly by reference to other IAEA documents. When conducting an assessment, the Review Team members should be aware of the latest IAEA documents (or similar national documents) concerning transportation and waste safety and, if appropriate, nuclear safety, and take them into account to the extent applicable when assessing the effectiveness of the regulatory programme governing radiation protection and safety of radiation source practices in a particular State.

Methods and tools used at the IPSN for the safety assessment of critical software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Regnier, P.; Henry, J.Y.

1998-01-01

A significant feature of EDF's latest 1400MWe ''N4'' generation of pressurized water reactor (PWR) is the extensive use of computerized instrumentation and control, including a fully digital system for the reactor protection function. For the safety assessment of the software driving the operation of this digital reactor protection called SPIN, IPSN has developed and implemented a set of methods and tools. Using the lessons learned from this experience, IPSN has worked at improving those methods and tools, mainly trying to make them more automatic to use, and has participated in an international assessment exercise to test some other methods and tools, either new products on the market or self-developed products. As a result of these works, this paper presents an up to date overview of the IPSN methods and tools used for the assessment of safety critical software. This assessment, which consists of an analysis of all the documentation associated with the technical specifications and of a representative set of functions, is usually carried out in five steps: (1) critical examination of the documents, (2) evaluation of the quality of the code, (3) determination of the critical software components, (4) development of test cases and choice of testing strategy, (5) dynamic analysis (consistency and robustness). This paper also presents methods and tools developed or implemented by IPSN in order to: evaluate the completeness and consistency of specification and design documents written in natural language; build a model and simulate specification or design items; evaluate the quality of the source code; carry out FMEA analysis; run the binary code and perform tests (CLAIRE); perform random or mutational tests. (author)

The practical implementation of integrated safety management for nuclear safety analysis and fire hazards analysis documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

COLLOPY, M.T.

1999-01-01

the integrated safety management system approach for having a uniform and consistent process: a method has been suggested by the U S . Department of Energy at Richland and the Project Hanford Procedures when fire hazard analyses and safety analyses are required. This process provides for a common basis approach in the development of the fire hazard analysis and the safety analysis. This process permits the preparers of both documents to jointly participate in the development of the hazard analysis process. This paper presents this method to implement the integrated safety management approach in the development of the fire hazard analysis and safety analysis that provides consistency of assumptions. consequences, design considerations, and other controls necessarily to protect workers, the public. and the environment

Safety Management and Safety Culture Self Assessment of Kartini Research Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Syarip, S., E-mail: syarip@batan.go.id [Centre for Accelerator and Material Process Technology, National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN), Yogyakarta (Indonesia)

2014-10-15

The self-assessment of safety culture and safety management status of Kartini research reactor is a step to foster safety culture and management by identifying good practices and areas for improvement, and also to improve reactor safety in a whole. The method used in this assessment is based on questionnaires provided by the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), then reviewed by experts. Based on the assessment and evaluation results, it can be concluded that there were several good practices in maintaining the safety status of Kartini reactor such as: reactor operators and radiation protection workers were aware and knowledgeable of the safety standards and policies that apply to their operation, readily accept constructive criticism from their management and from the inspectors of regulatory body that address safety performance. As a proof, for the last four years the number of inspection/audit findings from Regulatory Body (BAPETEN) tended to decrease while the reactor utilization and its operating hour increased. On the other hands there were also some comments and recommendations for improvement of reactor safety culture, such as that there should be more frequent open dialogues between employees and managers, to grow and attain a mutual support to achieve safety goals. (author)

Determination of Safety Performance Grade of NPP Using Integrated Safety Performance Assessment (ISPA) Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chung, Dae Wook

2011-01-01

Since the beginning of 2000, the safety regulation of nuclear power plant (NPP) has been challenged to be conducted more reasonable, effective and efficient way using risk and performance information. In the United States, USNRC established Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) in 2000 for improving the effectiveness of safety regulation of operating NPPs. The main idea of ROP is to classify the NPPs into 5 categories based on the results of safety performance assessment and to conduct graded regulatory programs according to categorization, which might be interpreted as 'Graded Regulation'. However, the classification of safety performance categories is highly comprehensive and sensitive process so that safety performance assessment program should be prepared in integrated, objective and quantitative manner. Furthermore, the results of assessment should characterize and categorize the actual level of safety performance of specific NPP, integrating all the substantial elements for assessing the safety performance. In consideration of particular regulatory environment in Korea, the integrated safety performance assessment (ISPA) program is being under development for the use in the determination of safety performance grade (SPG) of a NPP. The ISPA program consists of 6 individual assessment programs (4 quantitative and 2 qualitative) which cover the overall safety performance of NPP. Some of the assessment programs which are already implemented are used directly or modified for incorporating risk aspects. The others which are not existing regulatory programs are newly developed. Eventually, all the assessment results from individual assessment programs are produced and integrated to determine the safety performance grade of a specific NPP

Planning report for the safety assessment SR-Can

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2003-06-01

This document is a planning report for SKB's next assessment of long-term safety for a KBS 3 repository. The assessment, SR-Can, is to be finished by the end of 2005 and will be used for SKB's application to build an Encapsulation plant for spent nuclear fuel. Apart from outlining the methodology, the report discusses the handling in SR-Can of a number of important issues regarding the near field, the geosphere, the biosphere, the climatic evolution etc. The Swedish nuclear safety and radiation protection authorities have recently issued regulations concerning the final disposal of nuclear waste. The principal compliance criterion states that the annual risk of harmful effects must not exceed 10{sup -6} for a representative individual in the group exposed to the greatest risk. There are also a number of requirements on methodological aspects of the safety assessment as well as on the contents of a safety report. The regulations are reproduced in an Appendix to this report. The primary safety function of the KBS 3 system is to completely isolate the spent nuclear fuel within copper canisters over the entire assessment period, which will be one million years in SR-Can. Should a canister be damaged, the secondary safety function is to retard any releases from the canisters. The main steps of the assessment are the following: 1. Qualitative system description, FEP processing: This step consists of defining a system boundary and of describing the system on a format suitable for the safety assessment. Databases of relevant features, events and processes influencing long-term safety are structured and used as one starting point for the assessment. 2. Initial state descriptions. 3. Process descriptions: In this step all identified processes within the system boundary involved in the long-term evolution of the system are described in detail. 4. Description of boundary conditions: This step is a broad description of the evolution of the boundaries of the system

Molten Salt Reactor Experiment Facility (Building 7503) standards/requirements identification document adherence assessment plan at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-02-01

This is the Phase 2 (adherence) assessment plan for the Building 7503 Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) Facility standards/requirements identification document (S/RID). This document outlines the activities to be conducted from FY 1996 through FY 1998 to ensure that the standards and requirements identified in the MSRE S/RID are being implemented properly. This plan is required in accordance with the Department of Energy Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-2, November 9, 1994, Attachment 1A. This plan addresses the major aspects of the adherence assessment and will be consistent with Energy Systems procedure QA-2. 7 ''Surveillances.''

Interim main report of the safety assessment SR-Can

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hedin, Allan (ed.) [and others

2004-08-01

This document is an interim report on the safety assessment SR-Can (SR in the acronym stands for Safety Report and Can is short for canister). The final SR-Can report will support SKB's application to build an Encapsulation plant for spent nuclear fuel and is to be produced in 2006. The purpose of the present interim report is to demonstrate the methodology for safety assessment so that it can be reviewed before it is used in a license application. The assessment relates to the KBS-3 disposal concept in which copper canisters with a cast iron insert containing spent nuclear fuel are surrounded by bentonite clay and deposited at approximately 500 m depth in saturated, granitic rock. Preliminary data from the Forsmark site, presently being investigated by SKB as one of the candidate for a KBS-3 repository are used to some extent as examples. However, the collected data are yet too sparse to allow an evaluation of safety for this site. An important aim of this report is to demonstrate the proper handling of requirements on the safety assessment in applicable regulations. Therefore, regulations issued by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority are duplicated in an Appendix. The principal acceptance criterion requires that 'the annual risk of harmful effects after closure does not exceed 10{sup -6} for a representative individual in the group exposed to the greatest risk'. 'Harmful effects' refer to cancer and hereditary effects. Following the introductory chapter 1, this report outlines the methodology for the SR-Can assessment in chapter 2, and presents in chapters 3, 4 and 5 the initial state of the system and the plans and methods for handling external influences and internal processes, respectively. Function indicators are introduced in chapter 6 and a preliminary evaluation of these is given in chapter 7. The material presented in the first seven chapters is utilised in the scenario selection

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) reference document. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murphy, J.A.

1984-09-01

This document describes the current status of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as practiced in the nuclear reactor regulatory process. The PRA studies that have been completed or are under way are reviewed. The levels of maturity of the methodologies used in a PRA are discussed. Insights derived from PRAs are listed. The potential uses of PRA results for regulatory purposes are discussed. This document was issued for comment in February 1984 entitled Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): Status Report and Guidance for Regulatory Application. The comments received on the draft have been considered for this final version of the report

Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: Implementing inherent safety perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

2008-01-01

Layout planning plays a key role in the inherent safety performance of process plants since this design feature controls the possibility of accidental chain-events and the magnitude of possible consequences. A lack of suitable methods to promote the effective implementation of inherent safety in layout design calls for the development of new techniques and methods. In the present paper, a safety assessment approach suitable for layout design in the critical early phase is proposed. The concept of inherent safety is implemented within this safety assessment; the approach is based on an integrated assessment of inherent safety guideword applicability within the constraints typically present in layout design. Application of these guidewords is evaluated along with unit hazards and control devices to quantitatively map the safety performance of different layout options. Moreover, the economic aspects related to safety and inherent safety are evaluated by the method. Specific sub-indices are developed within the integrated safety assessment system to analyze and quantify the hazard related to domino effects. The proposed approach is quick in application, auditable and shares a common framework applicable in other phases of the design lifecycle (e.g. process design). The present work is divided in two parts: Part 1 (current paper) presents the application of inherent safety guidelines in layout design and the index method for safety assessment; Part 2 (accompanying paper) describes the domino hazard sub-index and demonstrates the proposed approach with a case study, thus evidencing the introduction of inherent safety features in layout design

Integrated plant safety assessment. Systematic Evaluation Program. La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor. Dairyland Power Cooperative, Docket No. 50-409. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-06-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, operated by Dairyland Power Cooperative. The La Crosse plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment: Systematic Evaluation Program. Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Docket No. 50-29. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-06-01

The Systematic Evaluation program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of Yankee Nuclear Power Station, operated by Yankee Atomic Electric Company. The Yankee plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program. Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Docket No. 50-29. Draft report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-02-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of Yankee Nuclear Power Station, operated by Yankee Atomic Electric Company. The Yankee plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

Integrated Plant Safety Assessment: Systematic Evaluation Program. Haddam Neck Plant, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50-213. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-01-01

The Systematic Evaluation Progam was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to confirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with curent licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of Haddam Neck Plant, operated by Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company. The Haddam Neck Plant is one of 10 plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

The role of probabilistic safety assessment and probabilistic safety criteria in nuclear power plant safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

The purpose of this Safety Report is to provide guidelines on the role of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and a range of associated reference points, collectively referred to as probabilistic safety criteria (PSC), in nuclear safety. The application of this Safety Report and the supporting Safety Practice publication should help to ensure that PSA methodology is used appropriately to assess and enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. The guidelines are intended for use by nuclear power plant designers, operators and regulators. While these guidelines have been prepared with nuclear power plants in mind, the principles involved have wide application to other nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In Section 2 of this Safety Report guidelines are established on the role PSA can play as part of an overall safety assurance programme. Section 3 summarizes guidelines for the conduct of PSAs, and in Section 4 a PSC framework is recommended and guidance is provided for the establishment of PSC values

Safety assessment of Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2. Decision of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority regarding the periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto NPP

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-02-01

In this safety assessment the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has evaluated the safety of the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant units 1 and 2 in connection with the periodic safety review. This safety assessment provides a summary of the reviews, inspections and continuous oversight carried out by STUK. The issues addressed in the assessment and the related evaluation criteria are set forth in the nuclear energy and radiation safety legislation and the regulations issued thereunder. The provisions of the Nuclear Energy Act concerning the safe use of nuclear energy, security and emergency preparedness arrangements, and waste management are specified in more detail in the Government Decrees and Regulatory Guides issued by STUK. Based on the assessment, STUK consideres that the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant units 1 and 2 meet the set safety requirements for operational nuclear power plants, the emergency preparedness arrangements are sufficient and the necessary control to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been appropriately arranged. The physical protection of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is not yet completely in compliance with the requirements of Government Decree 734/2008, which came into force in December 2008. Further requirements concerning this issue based also on the principle of continuous improvement were included in the decision relating to the periodic safety review. The safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was assessed in compliance with the Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008), which came into force in 2008. The decree notes that existing nuclear power plants need not meet all the requirements set out for new plants. Most of the design bases pertaining to the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units were set in the 1970s. Substantial modernisations have been carried out at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units since their commissioning to improve safety. This is in line with

Reactor Safety Assessment System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sebo, D.E.; Bray, M.A.; King, M.A.

1987-01-01

The Reactor Safety Assessment System (RSAS) is an expert system under development for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). RSAS is designed for use at the USNRC Operations Center in the event of a serious incident at a licensed nuclear power plant. RSAS is a situation assessment expert system which uses plant parametric data to generate conclusions for use by the NRC Reactor Safety Team. RSAS uses multiple rule bases and plant specific setpoint files to be applicable to all licensed nuclear power plants in the United States. RSAS currently covers several generic reactor categories and multiple plants within each category

Reactor safety assessment system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sebo, D.E.; Bray, M.A.; King, M.A.

1987-01-01

The Reactor Safety Assessment System (RSAS) is an expert system under development for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). RSA is designed for use at the USNRC Operations Center in the event of a serious incident at a licensed nuclear power plant. RSAS is a situation assessment expert system which uses plant parametric data to generate conclusions for use by the NRC Reactor Safety Team. RSAS uses multiple rule bases and plant specific setpoint files to be applicable to all licensed nuclear power plants in the United States. RSAS currently covers several generic reactor categories and multiple plants within each category

Independent assessment for new nuclear reactor safety

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

D'Auria Francesco

2017-01-01

Full Text Available A rigorous framework for safety assessment is established in all countries where nuclear technology is used for the production of electricity. On the one side, industry, i.e. reactor designers, vendors and utilities perform safety analysis and demonstrate consistency between results of safety analyses and requirements. On the other side, regulatory authorities perform independent assessment of safety and confirm the acceptability of safety of individual reactor units. The process of comparing results from analyses by reactor utilities and regulators is very complex. The process is also highly dependent upon mandatory approaches pursued for the analysis and from very many details which required the knowledge of sensitive proprietary data (e.g. spacer designs. Furthermore, all data available for the design, construction and operation of reactors produced by the nuclear industry are available to regulators. Two areas for improving the process of safety assessment for individual Nuclear Power Plant Units are identified: New details introduced by industry are not always and systematically requested by regulators for the independent assessment; New analytical techniques and capabilities are not necessarily used in the analyses by regulators (and by the industry. The established concept of independent assessment constitutes the way for improving the process of safety assessment. This is possible, or is largely facilitated, by the recent availability of the so-called Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty approach.

Independent assessment for new nuclear reactor safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

D'Auria, F.; Glaeser, H.; Debrecin, N.

2017-01-01

A rigorous framework for safety assessment is established in all countries where nuclear technology is used for the production of electricity. On one side, industry, i.e. reactor designers, vendors and utilities perform safety analysis and demonstrate consistency between results of safety analyses and requirements. On the other side, regulatory authorities perform independent assessment of safety and confirm the acceptability of safety of individual reactor units. The process of comparing results from analyses by reactor utilities and regulators is very complex. The process is also highly dependent upon mandatory approaches pursued for the analysis and from very many details which required the knowledge of sensitive proprietary data (e.g. spacer designs). Furthermore, all data available for the design, construction and operation of reactors produced by the nuclear industry are available to regulators. Two areas for improving the process of safety assessment for individual Nuclear Power Plant Units are identified: New details introduced by industry are not always and systematically requested by regulators for the independent assessment; New analytical techniques and capabilities are not necessarily used in the analyses by regulators (and by the industry). The established concept of independent assessment constitutes the way for improving the process of safety assessment. This is possible, or is largely facilitated, by the recent availability of the so-called Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) approach. (authors)

Assessment of LANL solid low-level mixed waste documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jennrich, E.A.; Lund, D.M.; Davis, K.D.; Hoevemeyer, S.S.

1991-04-01

DOE Order 5820.2A requires that a system performance assessment be conducted to assure efficient and compliant management of all radioactive waste. The objective of this report is to determine the present status of the Radioactive Waste Operations Section and the Chemical Waste Operations Section capabilities regarding preparation and maintenance of appropriate criteria, plans, and procedures. Additionally, a comparison is made which identifies areas where these documents are not presently in existence or being fully implemented. The documents being assessed in this report are: Solid Low-Level Mixed Waste Acceptance Criteria, Solid Low-Level Mixed Waste Characterization Plan, Solid Low-Level Mixed waste Certification Plan, Solid Low-Level Mixed Waste Acceptance Procedures, Solid Low-Level Mixed Waste characterization Procedures, Solid Low-Level Mixed Waste Certification Procedures, Solid Low-Level Mixed Waste Training Procedures, and Solid Low-Level Mixed Waste Recordkeeping Requirements. This report compares the current status of preparation and implementation, by the Radioactive Waste Operations Section and the Chemical Waste Operations Section, of these documents to the requirements of DOE 5820.2A,. 40 CFR 260 to 270, and to recommended practice. Chapters 2 through 9 of the report presents the results of the comparison in tabular form for each of the documents being assessed, followed by narrative discussion of all areas which are perceived to be unsatisfactory or out of compliance with respect to the availability and content of the documents. The final subpart of each of the following chapters provides recommendations where documentation practices may be improved to achieve compliance or to follow the recommended practice

A review of the report ''IAEA safety targets and probabilistic risk assessment'' prepared for Greenpeace International

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

At the request of the Director General, INSAG reviewed the report ''IAEA Safety Targets and Probabilistic Risk Assessment'' prepared for Greenpeace International by the Gesellschaft fuer Oekologische Forschung und Beratung mbH, Hannover, Germany. The conclusions of the report as well as the review results of INSAG experts are reproduced in this document

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D T

2010-03-05

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

AGR core safety assessment methodologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McLachlan, N.; Reed, J.; Metcalfe, M.P.

1996-01-01

To demonstrate the safety of its gas-cooled graphite-moderated AGR reactors, nuclear safety assessments of the cores are based upon a methodology which demonstrates no component failures, geometrical stability of the structure and material properties bounded by a database. All AGRs continue to meet these three criteria. However, predictions of future core behaviour indicate that the safety case methodology will eventually need to be modified to deal with new phenomena. A new approach to the safety assessment of the cores is currently under development, which can take account of these factors while at the same time providing the same level of protection for the cores. This approach will be based on the functionality of the core: unhindered movement of control rods, continued adequate cooling of the fuel and the core, continued ability to charge and discharge fuel. (author). 5 figs

Model summary report for the safety assessment SR-Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vahlund, Fredrik; Zetterstroem Evins, Lena; Lindgren, Maria

2010-12-01

This document is the model summary report for the safety assessment SR-Site. In the report, the quality assurance (QA) measures conducted for assessment codes are presented together with the chosen QA methodology. In the safety assessment project SR-Site, a large number of numerical models are used to analyse the system and to show compliance. In order to better understand how the different models interact and how information are transferred between the different models Assessment Model Flowcharts, AMFs, are used. From these, different modelling tasks can be identify and the computer codes used. As a large number of computer codes are used in the assessment the complexity of these differs to a large extent, some of the codes are commercial while others are developed especially for the assessment at hand. QA requirements must on the one hand take this diversity into account and on the other hand be well defined. In the methodology section of the report the following requirements are defined for all codes: - It must be demonstrated that the code is suitable for its purpose. - It must be demonstrated that the code has been properly used. - It must be demonstrated that the code development process has followed appropriate procedures and that the code produces accurate results. - It must be described how data are transferred between the different computational tasks. Although the requirements are identical for all codes in the assessment, the measures used to show that the requirements are fulfilled will be different for different types of codes (for instance due to the fact that for some software the source-code is not available for review). Subsequent to the methodology section, each assessment code is presented together with a discussion on how the requirements are met

Model summary report for the safety assessment SR-Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Vahlund, Fredrik; Zetterstroem Evins, Lena (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co., Stockholm (Sweden)); Lindgren, Maria (Kemakta Konsult AB, Stockholm (Sweden))

2010-12-15

This document is the model summary report for the safety assessment SR-Site. In the report, the quality assurance (QA) measures conducted for assessment codes are presented together with the chosen QA methodology. In the safety assessment project SR-Site, a large number of numerical models are used to analyse the system and to show compliance. In order to better understand how the different models interact and how information are transferred between the different models Assessment Model Flowcharts, AMFs, are used. From these, different modelling tasks can be identify and the computer codes used. As a large number of computer codes are used in the assessment the complexity of these differs to a large extent, some of the codes are commercial while others are developed especially for the assessment at hand. QA requirements must on the one hand take this diversity into account and on the other hand be well defined. In the methodology section of the report the following requirements are defined for all codes: - It must be demonstrated that the code is suitable for its purpose. - It must be demonstrated that the code has been properly used. - It must be demonstrated that the code development process has followed appropriate procedures and that the code produces accurate results. - It must be described how data are transferred between the different computational tasks. Although the requirements are identical for all codes in the assessment, the measures used to show that the requirements are fulfilled will be different for different types of codes (for instance due to the fact that for some software the source-code is not available for review). Subsequent to the methodology section, each assessment code is presented together with a discussion on how the requirements are met

A new assessment method for demonstrating the sufficiency of the safety assessment and the safety margins of the geological disposal system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ohi, Takao; Kawasaki, Daisuke; Chiba, Tamotsu; Takase, Toshio; Hane, Koji

2013-01-01

A new method for demonstrating the sufficiency of the safety assessment and safety margins of the geological disposal system has been developed. The method is based on an existing comprehensive sensitivity analysis method and can systematically identify the successful conditions, under which the dose rate does not exceed specified safety criteria, using analytical solutions for nuclide migration and the results of a statistical analysis. The successful conditions were identified using three major variables. Furthermore, the successful conditions at the level of factors or parameters were obtained using relational equations between the variables and the factors or parameters making up these variables. In this study, the method was applied to the safety assessment of the geological disposal of transuranic waste in Japan. Based on the system response characteristics obtained from analytical solutions and on the successful conditions, the classification of the analytical conditions, the sufficiency of the safety assessment and the safety margins of the disposal system were then demonstrated. A new assessment procedure incorporating this method into the existing safety assessment approach is proposed in this study. Using this procedure, it is possible to conduct a series of safety assessment activities in a logical manner. (author)

Procedures for self-assessment of operational safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-08-01

Self-assessment processes have been continuously developed by nuclear organizations, including nuclear power plants. Currently, the nuclear industry and governmental organizations are showing an increasing interest in the implementation of this process as an effective way for improving safety performance. Self-assessment involves the use of different types of tools and mechanisms to assist the organizations in assessing their own safety performance against given standards. This helps to enhance the understanding of the need for improvements, the feeling of ownership in achieving them and and the safety culture as a whole. The concepts developed in this report present the basic approach to self-assessment taking into consideration experience gained during Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, from organizations and utilities which have successfully implemented parts of a self-assessment programme and from meetings organized to discuss the subject

Safety assessment of Department of Energy nuclear reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-03-01

One of the first tasks of the NFPQT Committee was to determine which DOE reactors would be assessed. The Committee determined that in view of the limited time available to conduct the assessment, 13 DOE reactors were of such size (physical, power or fission product inventory) to warrant review. This determination was approved by the Under Secretary. A decision was also made in the cases of three weapons material production reactors, C, K and P, to concentrate on the K reactor only, since all three are of the same basic design, have the same operating features, are all at the same site, and are all operated by the same contractor. The assessment was accomplished in the following ways: reviewing the results of assessments conducted by the DOE organizations with reactor safety responsibilities, which were undertaken in compliance with the request of the various program directors; reviewing selected documents that were requested by the Committee and assembled at DOE Headquarters; interviewing DOE Headquarters and Field Office personnel; and conducting on-site reviews of four reactors located at four different sites. The four reactors for on-site reviews were: Advanced Test Reactor (ATR); K Production Reactor; High Flux Beam Reactor (HFBR); and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR). Specific findings and recommendations from the assessment are presented

Choice and complexation of techniques and tools for assessment of NPP I and C systems safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Illiashenko, Oleg; Babeshko, Eugene

2011-01-01

There are a lot of techniques to analyze and assess reliability and safety of NPP Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems (e.g. FMEA - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and its modifications, FTA - Fault Tree Analysis, HAZOP - Hazard and Operability Analysis, RBD - Reliability Block Diagram, Markov Models, etc.) and quantity of tools based on these techniques is constantly increasing. Known ways of safety assessment, as well as problems of their choice and complexation are analyzed. Objective of the paper is the development of general 'technique of techniques choosing' and tool for support of such technique. The following criteria are used for analysis and comparison and their features are described: compliance to normative documents; experience of application in industry; methods used for assessment of system NPP I and C safety; tool architecture/framework; reporting; vendor support, etc. Comparative analysis results of existing T and T - Tools and Techniques for safety analysis are presented in matrix form ('Tools-Criterion') with example. Features of complexation of different safety assessment techniques (FMECA, FTA, RBD, Markov Models) are described. The proposed technique is implemented as special tool for decision-making. The proposed technique was used for development of RPC Radiy company standard CS 66. This guide contains requirements and procedures of FMECA analysis of developed and produced NPP I and C systems based on RADIY platform. (author)

Procedures for conducting common cause failure analysis in probabilistic safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-05-01

The principal objective of this report is to supplement the procedure developed in Mosleh et al. (1988, 1989) by providing more explicit guidance for a practical approach to common cause failures (CCF) analysis. The detailed CCF analysis following that procedure would be very labour intensive and time consuming. This document identifies a number of options for performing the more labour intensive parts of the analysis in an attempt to achieve a balance between the need for detail, the purpose of the analysis and the resources available. The document is intended to be compatible with the Agency's Procedures for Conducting Probabilistic Safety Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants (IAEA, 1992), but can be regarded as a stand-alone report to be used in conjunction with NUREG/CR-4780 (Mosleh et al., 1988, 1989) to provide additional detail, and discussion of key technical issues

Environment, safety and health progress assessment of the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-11-01

This report documents the results of the Environment, Safety, and Health (ES ampersand H) Progress Assessment of the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP), Fernald, Ohio, conducted from October 15 through October 25, 1991. The Secretary of Energy directed that small, focused, ES ampersand H Progress Assessments be performed as part of the continuing effort to institutionalize line management accountability and the self-assessment process in the areas of ES ampersand H. The FEMP assessment is the pilot assessment for this new program. The objectives for the FEMP ES ampersand H Progress Assessment were to assess: (1) how the FEMP has progressed since the 1989 Tiger Assessment; (2) how effectively the FEMP has corrected specific deficiencies and associated root causes identified by that team; and (3) whether the current organization, resources, and systems are sufficient to proactively manage ES ampersand H issues

Environment, safety and health progress assessment of the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1991-11-01

This report documents the results of the Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Progress Assessment of the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP), Fernald, Ohio, conducted from October 15 through October 25, 1991. The Secretary of Energy directed that small, focused, ES&H Progress Assessments be performed as part of the continuing effort to institutionalize line management accountability and the self-assessment process in the areas of ES&H. The FEMP assessment is the pilot assessment for this new program. The objectives for the FEMP ES&H Progress Assessment were to assess: (1) how the FEMP has progressed since the 1989 Tiger Assessment; (2) how effectively the FEMP has corrected specific deficiencies and associated root causes identified by that team; and (3) whether the current organization, resources, and systems are sufficient to proactively manage ES&H issues.

Development of probabilistic methods for safety assessment of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schott, H.; Berg, H.P.

1998-01-01

Since its introduction by the German Risk Study, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has developed in Germany to a valuable tool in regulatory decision-making. Plant specific PSAs of Level 1+ are now conducted for all nuclear power plants in the frame of Periodic Safety Reviews. This paper is devoted to the description or key elements set out in the regulatory guidelines for PSA-Level 1+ and the corresponding technical documents and the further development of PSA methodology in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the course of the next years it is intended to make progress in the modeling of common cause failures, human reliability evaluation, reduction of uncertainties in PSA modeling techniques and data estimation, analysis of low power and shut down states as well as in reaching a mature methodology for inclusion of external events into the analysis. (author)

Uncertainty analysis in safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lemos, Francisco Luiz de; Sullivan, Terry

1997-01-01

Nuclear waste disposal is a very complex subject which requires the study of many different fields of science, like hydro geology, meteorology, geochemistry, etc. In addition, the waste disposal facilities are designed to last for a very long period of time. Both of these conditions make safety assessment projections filled with uncertainty. This paper addresses approaches for treatment of uncertainties in the safety assessment modeling due to the variability of data and some current approaches used to deal with this problem. (author)

NUMO's approach for long-term safety assessment - 59404

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ebashi, Takeshi; Kaku, Kenichi; Ishiguro, Katsuhiko

2012-01-01

One of NUMO's policies for ensuring safety is staged and flexible project implementation and decision-making based on iterative confirmation of safety. The safety assessment takes the central role in multiple lines of reasoning and argumentation by providing a quantitative evaluation of long-term safety; a key aspect is uncertainty management. This paper presents NUMO's basic strategies for long-term safety assessment based on the above policy. NUMO's approach considering Japanese boundary conditions is demonstrated as a starting-point for evaluating the long-term safety of an actual site. In Japan, the Act on Final Disposal of Specified Radioactive Waste states that the siting process shall consist of three stages. The Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO) is responsible for geological disposal of vitrified high-level waste and some types of TRU waste. NUMO has chosen to implement a volunteer approach to siting. NUMO decided to prepare the so-called 2010 technical report, which sets out three safety policies, one of which is staged project implementation and decision-making based on iterative confirmation of safety. Based on this policy, NUMO will gradually integrate relevant interdisciplinary knowledge to build a safety case when a formal volunteer application is received that would allow site investigations to be initiated. The safety assessment takes the central role in multiple lines of reasoning and argumentation by providing a quantitative evaluation of long-term safety; one of a key aspect is uncertainty management. This paper presents the basic strategies for NUMO's long-term safety assessment based on the above policy. In concrete terms, the common procedures involved in safety assessment are applied in a stepwise manner, based on integration of knowledge obtained from site investigations/evaluations and engineered measures. The results of the safety assessment are then reflected in the planning of site investigations and engineered

Handling of future human actions in the safety assessment SR-Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-12-01

This report documents the future human actions, FHA, considered in the long-term safety analysis of a KBS-3 repository. The report is one of the supporting documents to the safety assessment SR-Site (see further the Main report /SKB 2011/). The purpose of this report is to provide an account of general considerations concerning FHA, the methodology applied in SR-Site to assess FHA, the aspects of FHA needed to be considered in the evaluation of their impact on a deep geological repository and to select and analyse representative scenarios for illustrative consequence analysis. The main focus of this report is a time period when institutional control has ceased to be effective, thereby permitting inadvertent intrusion. However, a brief discussion of the earlier period when the repository has been closed, sealed and continuously kept under institutional control is also provided. General The potential exposure to large quantities of radiotoxic material is an inescapable consequence of the deposition of spent nuclear fuel in a final repository, and consequently intrusion into the repository needs to be considered in repository design and safety assessment. In accordance with ICRP recommendations /ICRP 2000/, intrusion in the post-closure phase of institutional control and beyond is primarily prevented through the design of the repository. In addition to that there will presumably continue to be safeguards measures, preservation of information (record keeping) and possibly some sort of markers placed at the site. During the institutional control period, activities at the site have to be restricted or directed if they have the potential to interfere with or hinder surveillance of the site, but this does not necessarily rule out all forms of access to the area. Also the fact that the repository contains fissile materials is an important aspect. Control of safeguards measures will most likely be upheld by national as well as international agencies. Furthermore, the

Handling of future human actions in the safety assessment SR-Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

2010-12-15

This report documents the future human actions, FHA, considered in the long-term safety analysis of a KBS-3 repository. The report is one of the supporting documents to the safety assessment SR-Site (see further the Main report /SKB 2011/). The purpose of this report is to provide an account of general considerations concerning FHA, the methodology applied in SR-Site to assess FHA, the aspects of FHA needed to be considered in the evaluation of their impact on a deep geological repository and to select and analyse representative scenarios for illustrative consequence analysis. The main focus of this report is a time period when institutional control has ceased to be effective, thereby permitting inadvertent intrusion. However, a brief discussion of the earlier period when the repository has been closed, sealed and continuously kept under institutional control is also provided. General The potential exposure to large quantities of radiotoxic material is an inescapable consequence of the deposition of spent nuclear fuel in a final repository, and consequently intrusion into the repository needs to be considered in repository design and safety assessment. In accordance with ICRP recommendations /ICRP 2000/, intrusion in the post-closure phase of institutional control and beyond is primarily prevented through the design of the repository. In addition to that there will presumably continue to be safeguards measures, preservation of information (record keeping) and possibly some sort of markers placed at the site. During the institutional control period, activities at the site have to be restricted or directed if they have the potential to interfere with or hinder surveillance of the site, but this does not necessarily rule out all forms of access to the area. Also the fact that the repository contains fissile materials is an important aspect. Control of safeguards measures will most likely be upheld by national as well as international agencies. Furthermore, the

Overview of IAEA guidelines for fire safety inspection and operation in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mowrer, D.S.

1998-01-01

In 1992, the International Atomic Energy Agency began an ambitious project on fire safety in nuclear power plants. The purpose of this ongoing project is to provide specific guidance on compliance with the requirements set forth through the IAEA Nuclear Safety Standards program established in 1974. The scope of the Fire Safety project encompasses several tasks, including the development of new standards and guidelines to assist Member States in assessing the level of fire safety in existing plants. Five new Safety Practices, one new Safety Guide and a Technical Document have been developed for use by the fire safety community. The primary intent of these new documents is to provide detailed guidance and a consistent format for the assessment of the overall level of fire safety being provided in existing nuclear power plants around the world and especially in developing countries. Sufficient detail is provided in the Safety Guide and Safety Practices to allow technically knowledgeable plant personnel, outside consultants or other technical experts to assess the adequacy of fire safety within the plant facilities. This paper describes topics addressed by each of the IAEA Fire Safety documents and discussed the relationship of each document to others in the series. (author)

Probabilistic safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoertner, H.; Schuetz, B.

1982-09-01

For the purpose of assessing applicability and informativeness on risk-analysis methods in licencing procedures under atomic law, the choice of instruments for probabilistic analysis, the problems in and experience gained in their application, and the discussion of safety goals with respect to such instruments are of paramount significance. Naturally, such a complex field can only be dealt with step by step, making contribution relative to specific problems. The report on hand shows the essentials of a 'stocktaking' of systems relability studies in the licencing procedure under atomic law and of an American report (NUREG-0739) on 'Quantitative Safety Goals'. (orig.) [de

A Methodology To Incorporate The Safety Culture Into Probabilistic Safety Assessments

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Park, Sunghyun; Kim, Namyeong; Jae, Moosung [Hanyang University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

In order to incorporate organizational factors into PSA, a methodology needs to be developed. Using the AHP to weigh organizational factors as well as the SLIM to rate those factors, a methodology is introduced in this study. The safety issues related to nuclear safety culture have occurred increasingly. The quantification tool has to be developed in order to include the organizational factor into Probabilistic Safety Assessments. In this study, the state-of-the-art for the organizational evaluation methodologies has been surveyed. This study includes the research for organizational factors, maintenance process, maintenance process analysis models, a quantitative methodology using Analytic Hierarchy Process, Success Likelihood Index Methodology. The purpose of this study is to develop a methodology to incorporate the safety culture into PSA for obtaining more objective risk than before. The organizational factor considered in nuclear safety culture might affect the potential risk of human error and hardware-failure. The safety culture impact index to monitor the plant safety culture can be assessed by applying the developed methodology into a nuclear power plant.

A Methodology To Incorporate The Safety Culture Into Probabilistic Safety Assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Sunghyun; Kim, Namyeong; Jae, Moosung

2015-01-01

In order to incorporate organizational factors into PSA, a methodology needs to be developed. Using the AHP to weigh organizational factors as well as the SLIM to rate those factors, a methodology is introduced in this study. The safety issues related to nuclear safety culture have occurred increasingly. The quantification tool has to be developed in order to include the organizational factor into Probabilistic Safety Assessments. In this study, the state-of-the-art for the organizational evaluation methodologies has been surveyed. This study includes the research for organizational factors, maintenance process, maintenance process analysis models, a quantitative methodology using Analytic Hierarchy Process, Success Likelihood Index Methodology. The purpose of this study is to develop a methodology to incorporate the safety culture into PSA for obtaining more objective risk than before. The organizational factor considered in nuclear safety culture might affect the potential risk of human error and hardware-failure. The safety culture impact index to monitor the plant safety culture can be assessed by applying the developed methodology into a nuclear power plant

Complementary safety assessments - Report by the French Nuclear Safety Authority

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-12-01

As an immediate consequence of the Fukushima accident, the French Authority of Nuclear Safety (ASN) launched a campaign of on-site inspections and asked operators (mainly EDF, AREVA and CEA) to make complementary assessments of the safety of the nuclear facilities they manage. The approach defined by ASN for the complementary safety assessments (CSA) is to study the behaviour of nuclear facilities in severe accidents situations caused by an off-site natural hazard according to accident scenarios exceeding the current baseline safety requirements. This approach can be broken into 2 phases: first conformity to current design and secondly an approach to the beyond design-basis scenarios built around the principle of defence in depth. 38 inspections were performed on issues linked to the causes of the Fukushima crisis. It appears that some sites have to reinforce the robustness of the heat sink. The CSA confirmed that the processes put into place at EDF to detect non-conformities were satisfactory. The complementary safety assessments demonstrated that the current seismic margins on the EDF nuclear reactors are satisfactory. With regard to flooding, the complementary safety assessments show that the complete reassessment carried out following the flooding of the Le Blayais nuclear power plant in 1999 offers the installations a high level of protection against the risk of flooding. Concerning the loss of electrical power supplies and the loss of cooling systems, the analysis of EDF's CSA reports showed that certain heat sink and electrical power supply loss scenarios can, if nothing is done, lead to core melt in just a few hours in the most unfavourable circumstances. As for nuclear facilities that are not power or experimental reactors, some difficulties have appeared to implement the CSA approach that was initially devised for reactors. Generally speaking, ASN considers that the safety of nuclear facilities must be made more robust to improbable risks which are not

Quality assurance application in the documentation of nuclear research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nababan, N.

1999-01-01

For each nuclear research reactor a document control system should be established and should be provide for preparation, review, approval, issuance, distribution, revision and validation (where appropriate) of documents essential to the management, performance and verification of work. In the document control system the responsibilities for each participating organization or individual should be defined in writing. The types of document include, but are not limited to document comprising the QA program, safety requirements, maintenance and operating procedures, inspection instructions, inspection and test reports, assessment reports, drawings, data files, calculations, specifications, computer codes, purchase orders and related documents, vendor supplied documents and work instruction. Management should identify the need for documents and should provide guidance to the organizations and people preparing them. The guidance should cover the status, scope and contents and the policies, standards and codes witch apply. It should also explain the need for feedback of experience. Plant modification or the results of assessments could also give rise to the need for a new document

Development and applications of a safety assessment system for promoting safety culture in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Takano, Ken-ichi; Hasegawa, Naoko; Hirose, Ayako; Hayase, Ken-ichi

2004-01-01

For past five years, CRIEPI has been continuing efforts to develop and make applications of a 'safety assessment system' which enable to measure the safety level of organization. This report describe about frame of the system, assessment results and its reliability, and relation between labor accident rate in the site and total safety index (TSI), which can be obtained by the principal factors analysis. The safety assessment in this report is based on questionnaire survey of employee. The format and concrete questionnaires were developed using existing literatures including organizational assessment tools. The tailored questionnaire format involved 124 questionnaire items. The assessment results could be considered as a well indicator of the safety level of organization, safety management, and safety awareness of employee. (author)

Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Treatment Building Safety Information Document (SID)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fatell, L.B.; Woolsey, G.B.

1993-01-01

This Safety Information Document (SID) provides a description and analysis of operations for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Disposal Facility Treatment Building (the Treatment Building). The Treatment Building has been classified as a moderate hazard facility, and the level of analysis performed and the methodology used are based on that classification. Preliminary design of the Treatment Building has identified the need for two separate buildings for waste treatment processes. The term Treatment Building applies to all these facilities. The evaluation of safety for the Treatment Building is accomplished in part by the identification of hazards associated with the facility and the analysis of the facility's response to postulated events involving those hazards. The events are analyzed in terms of the facility features that minimize the causes of such events, the quantitative determination of the consequences, and the ability of the facility to cope with each event should it occur. The SID presents the methodology, assumptions, and results of the systematic evaluation of hazards associated with operation of the Treatment Building. The SID also addresses the spectrum of postulated credible events, involving those hazards, that could occur. Facility features important to safety are identified and discussed in the SID. The SID identifies hazards and reports the analysis of the spectrum of credible postulated events that can result in the following consequences: Personnel exposure to radiation; Radioactive material release to the environment; Personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals; Hazardous chemical release to the environment; Events leading to an onsite/offsite fatality; and Significant damage to government property. The SID addresses the consequences to the onsite and offsite populations resulting from postulated credible events and the safety features in place to control and mitigate the consequences

Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Treatment Building Safety Information Document (SID)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fatell, L.B.; Woolsey, G.B.

1993-04-15

This Safety Information Document (SID) provides a description and analysis of operations for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Disposal Facility Treatment Building (the Treatment Building). The Treatment Building has been classified as a moderate hazard facility, and the level of analysis performed and the methodology used are based on that classification. Preliminary design of the Treatment Building has identified the need for two separate buildings for waste treatment processes. The term Treatment Building applies to all these facilities. The evaluation of safety for the Treatment Building is accomplished in part by the identification of hazards associated with the facility and the analysis of the facility`s response to postulated events involving those hazards. The events are analyzed in terms of the facility features that minimize the causes of such events, the quantitative determination of the consequences, and the ability of the facility to cope with each event should it occur. The SID presents the methodology, assumptions, and results of the systematic evaluation of hazards associated with operation of the Treatment Building. The SID also addresses the spectrum of postulated credible events, involving those hazards, that could occur. Facility features important to safety are identified and discussed in the SID. The SID identifies hazards and reports the analysis of the spectrum of credible postulated events that can result in the following consequences: Personnel exposure to radiation; Radioactive material release to the environment; Personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals; Hazardous chemical release to the environment; Events leading to an onsite/offsite fatality; and Significant damage to government property. The SID addresses the consequences to the onsite and offsite populations resulting from postulated credible events and the safety features in place to control and mitigate the consequences.

Review of SKB's interim report of SR-Can: SKI's and SSI's evaluation of SKB's up-dated methodology for safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dverstorp, Bjoern; Moberg, Leif; Wiebert, Anders; Xu Shulan; Stroemberg, Bo; Kautsky, Fritz; Lilja, Christina; Simic, Eva; Sundstroem, Benny; Toverud, Oeivind

2005-07-01

This report presents the findings of a review of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co.'s (SKB) interim report of the safety assessment SR-Can (SKB TR 04-11), conducted by the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). SKB's interim report describes and exemplifies the safety assessment methodology that SKB plans to use in the oncoming licence applications for an encapsulation plant and a final repository for spent nuclear fuel. The authorities' review takes into account the findings of an international peer review of SKB's interim report. The authorities conclude that SKB has improved its safety assessment methodology in several aspects compared to earlier safety reports. Among other things the authorities commend SKB for giving a comprehensive account of relevant regulations and guidance, and for the systematic approach to identification and documentation of features, events and processes that need to be considered in the safety assessment. However, the authorities also conclude that important parts of SKB's method need to be further developed before they are mature enough to be used as a basis for a license application. The authorities' overall assessment is summarised in chapter 8 of this report

Safety culture' is integrating 'human' into risk assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sugimoto, Taiji

2014-01-01

Significance of Fukushima nuclear power accident requested reconsideration of safety standards, of which we had usually no doubt. Risk assessment standard (JIS B 9702), Which was used for repetition of database preparation and cumulative assessment, defined allowable risk and residual risk. However, work site and immediate assessment was indispensable beside such assessment so as to ensure safety. Risk of casualties was absolutely not acceptable in principle and judgments to approve allowable risk needed accountability, which was reminded by safety culture proposed by IAEA and also identified by investigation of organizational cause of Columbia accident. Actor of safety culture would be organization and individual, and mainly individual. Realization of safety culture was conducted by personnel having moral consciousness and firm sense of mission in the course of jobs and working daily with sweat pouring. Safety engineering/technology should have framework integrating human as such totality. (T. Tanaka)

Concepts and examples of safety analyses for radioactive waste repositories in continental geological formations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-01-01

This document is addressed to authorities and specialists responsible for or involved in planning, performing and/or reviewing safety assessments of underground radioactive waste repositories. It is a companion to a general introductory document on the subject ''Safety Assessment for the Underground Disposal of Radioactive Wastes'', IAEA Safety Series No. 56, 1981, and reference to this earlier document will facilitate the reader's understanding of the present report. Since examples of safety analyses are summarized here, it is hoped that this document will contribute to providing a basis for a common understanding among authorities and specialists concerned with the numerous studies involving a variety of scientific disciplines. While providing technical information, this document is also intended to stimulate further international discussion. The purposes of this report are: a) to identify the factors to be taken into account in radiological safety analyses of deep geological repositories, indicating as far as possible their relative importance during the various phases of system development; b) to show how these factors have been analysed in various safety assessment studies; and c) to comment on the merits of the selected and alternative approaches

Concepts and examples of safety analyses for radioactive waste repositories in continental geological formations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1983-01-01

This document is addressed to authorities and specialists responsible for or involved in planning, performing and/or reviewing safety assessments of underground radioactive waste repositories. It is a companion to a general introductory document on the subject ''Safety Assessment for the Underground Disposal of Radioactive Wastes'', IAEA Safety Series No. 56, 1981, and reference to this earlier document will facilitate the reader's understanding of the present report. Since examples of safety analyses are summarized here, it is hoped that this document will contribute to providing a basis for a common understanding among authorities and specialists concerned with the numerous studies involving a variety of scientific disciplines. While providing technical information, this document is also intended to stimulate further international discussion. The purposes of this report are: a) to identify the factors to be taken into account in radiological safety analyses of deep geological repositories, indicating as far as possible their relative importance during the various phases of system development; b) to show how these factors have been analysed in various safety assessment studies; and c) to comment on the merits of the selected and alternative approaches.

The use of safety indicators, complementary to dose and risk, in the assessment of radioactive waste disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gera, F.; Vovk, I.; Wingefors, S.

1998-01-01

The use of safety indicators, other than dose and risk, to complement the safety assessment of disposal systems for radioactive waste, is not a new idea. Several possible approaches have been proposed through the years, including a discussion in an IAEA document of 1994. The present paper reviews critically the various proposed indicators, identifies the most promising ones and suggests a possible approach for the assessment of their viability. In particular it suggests that a Coordinated Research Project should be organized with the main objectives of assembling, reviewing and generating the necessary scientific information on natural values, particularly fluxes and concentrations of pollutants, and on their impacts on public health and environmental quality. (author)

Consideration of the FQPA Safety Factor and Other Uncertainty Factors in Cumulative Risk Assessment of Chemicals Sharing a Common Mechanism of Toxicity

Science.gov (United States)

This guidance document provides OPP's current thinking on application of the provision in FFDCA about an additional safety factor for the protection of infants and children in the context of cumulative risk assessments.

Reactor operation safety information document

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1990-01-01

The report contains a reactor facility description which includes K, P, and L reactor sites, structures, operating systems, engineered safety systems, support systems, and process and effluent monitoring systems; an accident analysis section which includes cooling system anomalies, radioactive materials releases, and anticipated transients without scram; a summary of onsite doses from design basis accidents; severe accident analysis (reactor core disruption); a description of operating contractor organization and emergency planning; and a summary of reactor safety evolution. (MB)

Uncertainty analysis in safety assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lemos, Francisco Luiz de [Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear (CDTN), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil); Sullivan, Terry [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

1997-12-31

Nuclear waste disposal is a very complex subject which requires the study of many different fields of science, like hydro geology, meteorology, geochemistry, etc. In addition, the waste disposal facilities are designed to last for a very long period of time. Both of these conditions make safety assessment projections filled with uncertainty. This paper addresses approaches for treatment of uncertainties in the safety assessment modeling due to the variability of data and some current approaches used to deal with this problem. (author) 13 refs.; e-mail: lemos at bnl.gov; sulliva1 at bnl.gov

Nuclear safety in Slovak Republic. Safety analysis reports for WWER 440 reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rohar, S.

1999-01-01

Implementation of nuclear power program is connected to establishment of regulatory body for safe regulation of siting, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations. Licensing being one of the most important regulatory surveillance activity is based on independent regulatory review and assessment of information on nuclear safety for particular nuclear facility. Documents required to be submitted to the regulatory body by the licensee in Slovakia for the review and assessment usually named Safety Analysis Report (SAR) are presented in detail in this paper. Current status of Safety Analysis Reports for Bohunice V-1, Bohunice V-2 and Mochovce NPP is shown

Setting clear expectations for safety basis development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MORENO, M.R.

2003-01-01

DOE-RL has set clear expectations for a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule) which will ensure long-term benefit to Hanford. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development resulting in a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was issued to standardized methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was issued for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated for Hanford. A standard Site Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) detailing the safety management programs was issued for use as a means of compliance with a majority of 3009 Standard chapters. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. As a result of setting expectations and providing safety analysis tools, the four Hanford Site waste management nuclear facilities were able to integrate into one Master Waste Management Documented Safety Analysis (WM-DSA)

Documenting Quality Improvement and Patient Safety Efforts: The Quality Portfolio. A Statement from the Academic Hospitalist Taskforce

OpenAIRE

Taylor, Benjamin B.; Parekh, Vikas; Estrada, Carlos A.; Schleyer, Anneliese; Sharpe, Bradley

2013-01-01

Physicians increasingly investigate, work, and teach to improve the quality of care and safety of care delivery. The Society of General Internal Medicine Academic Hospitalist Task Force sought to develop a practical tool, the quality portfolio, to systematically document quality and safety achievements. The quality portfolio was vetted with internal and external stakeholders including national leaders in academic medicine. The portfolio was refined for implementation to include an outlined fr...

Basis for the safety approach for design and assessment of Generation IV nuclear systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fiorini, G.L.; Leahy, T.

2009-01-01

The primary objective of the RSWG is the implementation of a harmonized approach on long-term safety, and to address risk and regulatory issues in development of the next generation of nuclear systems. To this end, the group is proposing safety goals and evaluation methodology applicable for the design and assessment of future systems. The paper resumes the content of the first RSWG report which provides insights for the safety approach and assists the GIF Systems Steering Committee as well as the GIF Experts Group and the GIF Policy Group for the definition of the most adequate safety related Gen IV R and D. The document is also an essential contributor to help identifying the needed supportive crosscut R and D effort (i.e. applicable to all the innovative nuclear technologies). Although the report presents a number of thoughts and recommendations, it really represents only the start of the efforts for the RSWG. (author)

The current CEA/DRN safety approach for the design and the assessment of non-electrical applications of nuclear heat

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fiorini, G.L.; Costa, M.

2000-01-01

This paper presents the basis of the safety approach currently implemented by the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique - Nuclear Reactor Directorate (CEA/DRN), both for the design and the assessment of innovative systems and future nuclear installations. It is considered that the described approach is applicable to the plants built for non-electrical applications of nuclear heat. This is typically the case of Nuclear Desalination Installations. This approach is the result of the experience maturated, within the context of the CEA/DRN Innovative Programme, through practical applications over several future concepts (both fission and fusion plants). The background of this experience is structured coherently with the European Safety Authorities recommendations, the European Utilities Requirements (EUR) and the ''fundamental safety objectives'' defined by the IAEA. The Defence In Depth principle and its application, by means, among others, of the barrier concept, remains the basis of the safety design process of future nuclear installations. Its adequacy is checked through the safety assessment. The methodology for Lines of Defence (LOD) implementation as well as the one for the LOD architecture assessment is shown and motivated. The document shows that the clear and unambiguous definition of the safety approach provides an essential base for the organisation of the design tasks, being sure that the safety aspects are correctly taken into account and implemented, and for an adequate safety assessment of the final design, both from qualitative point of view as well as for the quantitative safety analysis. (author)

Model summary report for the safety assessment SFR 1 SAR-08

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

2008-03-15

This document is the model summary report for the safety assessment SFR 1 SAR-08. In the report, the quality assurance measures conducted for the assessment codes are presented together with the chosen methodology. In the safety assessment SFR1 SAR-08, a number of different computer codes are used. In order to better understand how these codes are related an Assessment Model Flowchart, AMF, has been produced within the project. From the AMF, it is possible to identify the different modelling tasks and consequently also the different computer codes used. A number of different computer codes are used in the assessment of which some are commercial while others are developed for assessment projects. QA requirements must on the one hand take this diversity into account and on the other hand be well defined. In the methodology section of the report the following requirements are defined: - It must be demonstrated that the code is suitable for its purpose. - It must be demonstrated that the code has been properly used. - It must be demonstrated that the code development process has followed appropriate procedures and that the code produces accurate results. Although the requirements are identical for all codes, the measures used to show that the requirements are fulfilled will be different for different codes (for instance due to the fact that for some software the source-code is not available for review). Subsequent to the methodology section, each assessment code is presented and it is shown how the requirements are met

Model summary report for the safety assessment SFR 1 SAR-08

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-03-01

This document is the model summary report for the safety assessment SFR 1 SAR-08. In the report, the quality assurance measures conducted for the assessment codes are presented together with the chosen methodology. In the safety assessment SFR1 SAR-08, a number of different computer codes are used. In order to better understand how these codes are related an Assessment Model Flowchart, AMF, has been produced within the project. From the AMF, it is possible to identify the different modelling tasks and consequently also the different computer codes used. A number of different computer codes are used in the assessment of which some are commercial while others are developed for assessment projects. QA requirements must on the one hand take this diversity into account and on the other hand be well defined. In the methodology section of the report the following requirements are defined: - It must be demonstrated that the code is suitable for its purpose. - It must be demonstrated that the code has been properly used. - It must be demonstrated that the code development process has followed appropriate procedures and that the code produces accurate results. Although the requirements are identical for all codes, the measures used to show that the requirements are fulfilled will be different for different codes (for instance due to the fact that for some software the source-code is not available for review). Subsequent to the methodology section, each assessment code is presented and it is shown how the requirements are met

Safety assessment of foods derived from genetically modified crops

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kleter, G.A.; Kuiper, H.A.

2003-01-01

The pre-market safety assessment of foods derived from genetically modified crops is carried out according to the consensus approach of "substantial equivalence", in other words: the comparative safety assessment. Currently, the safety assessment of genetically modified foods is harmonized at the

Integrated-plant-safety assessment Systematic Evaluation Program. Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket No. 50-237

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-10-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues; (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review; and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of Dresden Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 owned and operated by the Commonwealth Edison Company and located in Grundy County, Illinois. Dresden Unit 2 is one of ten plants reviewed under Phase II of this program, which indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review. It is expected that this report will be one of the bases in considering the issuance of a full-term operating license in place of the existing provisional operating license

The Safety Assessment Education and Training Programme (SAET). Education and Training in the Area of Safety Assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mellinger-Deroy, M.

2014-01-01

• The SAET Programme provides a systematic approach for training regulatory, operational and technical support staff in the skills needed for informed decision-making and technical review of NPP safety case documentation. • The objective of the Programme is to support the IAEA Member States in developing the knowledge and skills necessary for making the right decisions in NPP design, licensing and operation. (author)

Geosphere process report for the safety assessment SR-Can

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Skagius, Kristina

2006-09-01

This report documents geosphere processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS- repository, and forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Can. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process report in the assessment, is described in the SR-Can Main report. The following excerpts describe the methodology, and clarify the role of this process report in the assessment. The repository system, broadly defined as the deposited spent nuclear fuel, the engineered barriers surrounding it, the host rock and the biosphere in the proximity of the repository, will evolve over time. Future states of the system will depend on the initial state of the system, a number of radiation related, thermal, hydraulic, mechanical, chemical and biological processes acting within the repository system over time, and external influences acting on the system. A methodology in ten steps has been developed for SR-Can described below. Identification of factors to consider (FEP processing): This step consists of identifying all the factors that need to be included in the analysis. Experience from earlier safety assessments and KBS-specific and international databases of relevant features, events and processes influencing long-term safety are utilised. Based on the results of the FEP processing, an SR-Can FEP catalogue, containing FEPs to be handled in SR-Can, has been established. The initial state of the system is described based on the design specifications of the KBS repository, a descriptive model of the repository site and a site-specific layout of the repository. The initial state of the fuel and the engineered components is that immediately after deposition, as described in the SR-Can Initial state report. The initial state of the geosphere and the biosphere is that of the natural system prior to excavation, as described in the site descriptive models. The repository layouts adapted to the sites are provided in underground

Geosphere process report for the safety assessment SR-Can

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Skagius, Kristina [Kemakta Konsult AB, Stockholm (SE)] (ed.)

2006-09-15

This report documents geosphere processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS- repository, and forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Can. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process report in the assessment, is described in the SR-Can Main report. The following excerpts describe the methodology, and clarify the role of this process report in the assessment. The repository system, broadly defined as the deposited spent nuclear fuel, the engineered barriers surrounding it, the host rock and the biosphere in the proximity of the repository, will evolve over time. Future states of the system will depend on the initial state of the system, a number of radiation related, thermal, hydraulic, mechanical, chemical and biological processes acting within the repository system over time, and external influences acting on the system. A methodology in ten steps has been developed for SR-Can described below. Identification of factors to consider (FEP processing): This step consists of identifying all the factors that need to be included in the analysis. Experience from earlier safety assessments and KBS-specific and international databases of relevant features, events and processes influencing long-term safety are utilised. Based on the results of the FEP processing, an SR-Can FEP catalogue, containing FEPs to be handled in SR-Can, has been established. The initial state of the system is described based on the design specifications of the KBS repository, a descriptive model of the repository site and a site-specific layout of the repository. The initial state of the fuel and the engineered components is that immediately after deposition, as described in the SR-Can Initial state report. The initial state of the geosphere and the biosphere is that of the natural system prior to excavation, as described in the site descriptive models. The repository layouts adapted to the sites are provided in underground

Assessment of safety culture: Changing regulatory approach in Hungary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ronaky, Jozsef; Toth, Andras

2002-01-01

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) is changing its inspection practice and assessment methods of safety performance and safety culture in operating nuclear facilities. The new approach emphasises integrated team inspection of safety cornerstones and systematic assessment of safety performance of operators. (author)

Tolerability of risk, safety assessment principles and their implications for probabilistic safety analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ewing, D.J.F.; Campbell, J.F.

1994-01-01

This paper gives a regulatory view of probabilistic safety assessment as seen by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) and in the light of the general regulatory risk aims set out in the Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) The tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations (TOR) and in Safety assessment principles for nuclear plants (SAPs), prepared by NII on behalf of the HSE. Both of these publications were revised and republished in 1992. This paper describes the SAPs, together with the historical background, the motivation for review, the effects of the Sizewell and Hinkley Point C public inquiries, changes since the original versions, comparison with international standards and use in assessment. For new plant, probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is seen as an essential tool in balancing the safety of the design and in demonstrating compliance with TOR and the SAPs. (Author)

How to evaluate the effectiveness of safety assessment in the area of human factors?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rolina, G.; Moisdon, J.C.; Jeffroy, F.

2007-01-01

The Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident in 1979 led to a new approach regarding safety that includes a better consideration of man and his activities. A few years later, with the set up of a group of specialists at Electricite de France and at the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, a new player appeared at France's nuclear safety organisation: the assessment expert specialising in human factors (HF). The improvement of man-machine interfaces was one of the first projects undertaken by the HF experts, the majority of whom specialise in ergonomics. A review of the literature and analysis of the archives, revealed that the specialists' scope of investigation has since increased; so that organisation is also the subject of HF assessment. However, this area is not one of consensual or established knowledge; neither researchers nor specialists can agree on a model of safe organisation. What then can we say about effectiveness of HF assessment? How can we define the criteria of effectiveness of a safety assessment production system in this area? The question is the subject of original research based on collaboration between the scientific management centre (CGS) of the Ecole des Mines in Paris and the section for the study of human factors (SEFH) at IRSN. To address this question, the CGS team monitors some assessments to which SEFH contributes. In other words, it attends different meetings on framing, technical instruction, reporting, taking notes and collecting related documents (minutes of meetings,...). It carries out additional interviews with different parties involved in assessment in order to ascertain their point of view. A sample of five assessments was defined to cover a varied number of situations encountered by the team of HF experts. The type of facility, the operator and the subject concerned are some of the variables integrated for this choice

The radiation safety self-assessment program of Ontario Hydro

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Armitage, G.; Chase, W.J.

1987-01-01

Ontario Hydro has developed a self-assessment program to ensure that high quality in its radiation safety program is maintained. The self-assessment program has three major components: routine ongoing assessment, accident/incident investigation, and detailed assessments of particular radiation safety subsystems or of the total radiation safety program. The operation of each of these components is described

Integrated plant safety assessment systematic evaluation program. R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, Docket No. 50-244

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-05-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1978 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. The review provides (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (located in Wayne County near Rochester, NY), one of ten plants reviewed under Phase II of this program, and indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review. It is expected that this report will be one of the bases in considering the issuance of a full-term operating license in place of the existing provisional operating license

FLAMMABLE GAS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

KRIPPS, L.J.

2005-03-03

This document describes the qualitative evaluation of frequency and consequences for DST and SST representative flammable gas accidents and associated hazardous conditions without controls. The evaluation indicated that safety-significant structures, systems and components (SSCs) and/or technical safety requirements (TSRs) were required to prevent or mitigate flammable gas accidents. Discussion on the resulting control decisions is included. This technical basis document was developed to support WP-13033, Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), and describes the risk binning process for the flammable gas representative accidents and associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition based on an evaluation of the event frequency and consequence.

Social Work Assessment Notes: A Comprehensive Outcomes-Based Hospice Documentation System.

Science.gov (United States)

Hansen, Angela Gregory; Martin, Ellen; Jones, Barbara L; Pomeroy, Elizabeth C

2015-08-01

This article describes the development of an integrated psychosocial patient and caregiver assessment and plan of care for hospice social work documentation. A team of hospice social workers developed the Social Work Assessment Notes as a quality improvement project in collaboration with the information technology department. Using the Social Work Assessment Tool as an organizing framework, this comprehensive hospice social work documentation system is designed to integrate assessment, planning, and outcomes measurement. The system was developed to guide the assessment of patients' and caregivers' needs related to end-of-life psychosocial issues, to facilitate collaborative care plan development, and to measure patient- and family-centered outcomes. Goals established with the patient and the caregiver are documented in the plan of care and become the foundation for patient-centered, strengths-based interventions. Likert scales are used to assign numerical severity levels for identified issues and progress made toward goals and to track the outcome of social work interventions across nine psychosocial constructs. The documentation system was developed for use in an electronic health record but can be used for paper charting. Future plans include automated aggregate outcomes measurement to identify the most effective interventions and best practices in end-of-life care.

Assessment of the long-term safety for SFR

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Greis Dahlberg, Christina; Vahlund, Frederik [Svensk Kaernbraenslehantering AB, Stockholm (Sweden)

2015-07-01

During operation and decommissioning of the Swedish nuclear facilities, radioactive waste is generated that must be disposed of. Besides waste from the nuclear facilities, some waste derives from other activities such as industry, research, medical care, etc. Short-lived low- and intermediate-level waste from these activities is disposed of in the final repository for short-lived radioactive waste, SFR, in Forsmark. The facility, which has been in operation since 1988, is owned and operated by Svensk Karnbranslehantering AB, SKB. The existing facility has neither sufficient space nor a license to receive decommissioning waste. SFR must therefore be extended so that shortlived low- and intermediate-level decommissioning waste from the nuclear facilities can also be received. The need for additional capacity has been accentuated by the closure of two reactors in Barseback. These reactors cannot be dismantled until the SFR facility has been extended. The existing repository is built to receive, and after closure serve as a passive repository for, low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste. The disposal rooms are situated in the bedrock beneath the sea floor, covered by about 60 metres of rock. The repository has been designed so that it can be abandoned after closure without requiring further measures to maintain its function. The extension of SFR, is done at the -120 m level immediately adjacent to, and within the same depth range as, the existing facility. The basic function of the existing SFR and of the extended one will be the same. However, a clear difference is the design of the tunnel and the rock vault that are required to permit transport and storage of whole reactor pressure vessels. The application for a license to build this extension includes an assessment of the long-term safety (post-closure safety) of the facility. The safety assessment also contains an updated assessment of the long-term safety of the existing facility. The safety assessment for

Probabilistic safety assessment in nuclear power plant management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holloway, N.J.

1989-06-01

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) techniques have been widely used over the past few years to assist in understanding how engineered systems respond to abnormal conditions, particularly during a severe accident. The use of PSAs in the design and operation of such systems thus contributes to the safety of nuclear power plants. Probabilistic safety assessments can be maintained to provide a continuous up-to-date assessment (Living PSA), supporting the management of plant operations and modifications

Management services, quality assurance, and safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1987-01-01

Broad technical and administrative support for the programmatic research and development activities of the Fusion Energy Division is provided by the Management Services Section and by the division's quality assurance (QA) and safety programs. Support is provided through effective communication with division programmatic staff and through the coordination of resources from disciplines outside the division. The QA activity in the division emphasizes the development and documentation of a QA program that conforms to national standards, the review and approval of engineering documents, supplier surveillance, identification and documentation of nonconforming items, audits, and QA assessments/plans. The division's safety activities include a formal safety program, emergency planning activities, and environmental protection services. Efforts devoted to the removal of hazardous wastes from division facilities were expanded during 1986

Radioactive waste storage facilities, involvement of AVN in inspection and safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simenon, R.; Smidts, O.

2006-01-01

The legislative and regulatory framework in Belgium for the licensing and the operation of radioactive waste storage buildings are defined by the Royal Decree of 20 July 2001 (hereby providing the general regulations regarding to the protection of the population, the workers and the environment against the dangers of ionising radiation). This RD introduces in the Belgian law the radiological protection and ALARA-policy concepts. The licence of each nuclear facility takes the form of a Royal Decree of Authorization. It stipulates that the plant has to be in conformity with its Safety Analysis Report. This report is however not a public document but is legally binding. Up to now, the safety assessment for radioactive waste storage facilities, which is implemented in this Safety Analysis Report, has been judged on a case-by-case basis. AVN is an authorized inspection organisation to carry out the surveillance of the Belgian nuclear installations and performs hereby nuclear safety assessments. AVN has a role in the nuclear safety and radiation protection during all the phases of a nuclear facility: issuance of licenses, during design and construction phase, operation (including reviewing and formal approval of modifications) and finally the decommissioning. Permanent inspections are performed on a regular basis by AVN, this by a dedicated site inspector, who is responsible for a site of an operator with nuclear facilities. Besides the day-to-day inspections during operation there are also the periodic safety reviews. AVN assesses the methodological approaches for the analyses, reviews and approves the final studies and results. The conditioned waste in Belgium is stored on the Belgoprocess' sites (region Mol-Dessel) for an intermediate period (about 80 years). In the meantime, a well-defined inspection programme is being implemented to ensure that the conditioned waste continues to be stored safely during this temporary storage period. This programme was draw up by

Safety Assessment for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities - From Methodology to the Use of Results in Decision Making

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batandjieva, B.; Ferch, R.; Joubert, A.; Kaulard, J.; Manson, P.; Percival, K.; Thierfeldt, St.

2008-01-01

The safety assessment of operational facilities in the nuclear industry is well understood and methodologies have been developed and refined over several decades. Similarly safety assessment methodologies for near surface disposal facilities have been harmonized internationally during the last few years. There is however relatively less widespread and documented experience of safety assessment for decommissioning among Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and consequently there is less commonalty of approaches internationally. The importance of safety during decommissioning was further emphasized at the first review meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and the Berlin Conference 'Safe Decommissioning for Nuclear Activities' (14-18 October 2002). As a consequence during its June 2004 meeting the IAEA Board of Governors approved an Action Plan on Decommissioning of nuclear Facilities that requested the Secretariat to 'establish a forum for the sharing and exchange of national information and experience on the application of safety assessment in the context of decommissioning and provide a means to convey this information to other interested parties, also drawing on the work of other international organizations in this area'. In response the IAEA launched the International Project Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety during Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (DeSa) in November 2004 with the following objectives: - To develop a harmonized approach to safety assessment and define the elements of safety assessment for decommissioning; - To investigate the practical applicability of the methodology and performance of safety assessments for the decommissioning of various types of facilities through a selected number of test cases; - To investigate approaches for review of safety assessments for decommissioning activities and the development of a regulatory

Knowledge representation in safety assessment: improving transparency and traceability

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lemos, F.L. de [Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear (CDTN/CNEN-MG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil); Sullivan, T. [Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Ross, T. [University of New Mexico (UNM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Guimaraes, L.N.F. [Instituto de Estudos Avancados (IEAv/CTA), Sao Jose dos Campos, SP (Brazil)

2011-07-01

Transparency and traceability are key factors for confidence building, acceptability, and quality enhancement of the safety assessment, and safety case for a radioactive waste disposal facility. In order to facilitate analysis and promote discussions, all of the information used to make decisions should be readily available to stake holders. The information should convey a good understanding of the intermediate decisions processes, allowing examination of alternatives and 'what if questions'. In an ideal situation all stake holders, including scientists and the public, should be able to follow the path of a certain parameter, from the beginning where it was defined, its assumptions and uncertainties, throughout the calculations until the final results of the safety assessment. One of the main challenges, to achieving such a transparency and traceability, is that stake holders are a very diverse audience, with very different backgrounds. This could require preparation of various versions of the same documentation, which would be impractical. While the linguistic information is of crucial importance to understanding the reasoning, it is very difficult to convey the supporting conditions, and consequent uncertainties for the selection of parameters values. Even scientists involved in the process can become confused due to the overwhelming amount of information that is used to support parameter value selection. The amount of details makes it difficult to track the decisions, which lead to the selection of a certain parameter, throughout the calculations. This paper presents a methodology to represent the linguistic information used in the safety assessment in terms of mathematical expressions by using the fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic tools. This methodology aims to help information to be readily available while keeping, as much as possible, the original meaning of the linguistic expressions and, consequently, to be available at any time as a quick reference

Knowledge representation in safety assessment: improving transparency and traceability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lemos, F.L. de; Sullivan, T.; Ross, T.; Guimaraes, L.N.F.

2011-01-01

Transparency and traceability are key factors for confidence building, acceptability, and quality enhancement of the safety assessment, and safety case for a radioactive waste disposal facility. In order to facilitate analysis and promote discussions, all of the information used to make decisions should be readily available to stake holders. The information should convey a good understanding of the intermediate decisions processes, allowing examination of alternatives and 'what if questions'. In an ideal situation all stake holders, including scientists and the public, should be able to follow the path of a certain parameter, from the beginning where it was defined, its assumptions and uncertainties, throughout the calculations until the final results of the safety assessment. One of the main challenges, to achieving such a transparency and traceability, is that stake holders are a very diverse audience, with very different backgrounds. This could require preparation of various versions of the same documentation, which would be impractical. While the linguistic information is of crucial importance to understanding the reasoning, it is very difficult to convey the supporting conditions, and consequent uncertainties for the selection of parameters values. Even scientists involved in the process can become confused due to the overwhelming amount of information that is used to support parameter value selection. The amount of details makes it difficult to track the decisions, which lead to the selection of a certain parameter, throughout the calculations. This paper presents a methodology to represent the linguistic information used in the safety assessment in terms of mathematical expressions by using the fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic tools. This methodology aims to help information to be readily available while keeping, as much as possible, the original meaning of the linguistic expressions and, consequently, to be available at any time as a quick reference. This would

Development and methodology of level 1 probability safety assessment at PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maskin, Mazleha; Tom, Phongsakorn Prak; Lanyau, Tonny Anak; Saad, Mohamad Fauzi; Ismail, Ahmad Razali; Abu, Mohamad Puad Haji; Brayon, Fedrick Charlie Matthew; Mohamed, Faizal

2014-01-01

As a consequence of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, the safety aspects of the one and only research reactor (31 years old) in Malaysia need be reviewed. Based on this decision, Malaysian Nuclear Agency in collaboration with Atomic Energy Licensing Board and Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia develop a Level-1 Probability Safety Assessment on this research reactor. This work is aimed to evaluate the potential risks of incidents in RTP and at the same time to identify internal and external hazard that may cause any extreme initiating events. This report documents the methodology in developing a Level 1 PSA performed for the RTP as a complementary approach to deterministic safety analysis both in neutronics and thermal hydraulics. This Level-1 PSA work has been performed according to the procedures suggested in relevant IAEA publications and at the same time numbers of procedures has been developed as part of an Integrated Management System programme implemented in Nuclear Malaysia

Development and methodology of level 1 probability safety assessment at PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mazleha Maskin; Phongsakorn, P.T.; Tonny, A.L.; Fedrick, C.M.B.; Faizal Mohamed; Mohamad Fauzi Saad; Ahmad Razali Ismail; Mohamad Puad Haji Abu

2013-01-01

Full-text: As a consequence of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, the safety aspects of the one and only research reactor (31 years old) in Malaysia need be reviewed. Based on this decision, Malaysian Nuclear Agency in collaboration with Atomic Energy Licensing Board and Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia develop a Level-1 Probability Safety Assessment on this research reactor. This work is aimed to evaluate the potential risks of incidents in RTP and at the same time to identify internal and external hazard that may cause any extreme initiating events. This report documents the methodology in developing a Level 1 PSA performed for the RTP as a complementary approach to deterministic safety analysis both in neutronics and thermal hydraulics. This Level-1 PSA work has been performed according to the procedures suggested in relevant IAEA publications and at the same time numbers of procedures has been developed as part of an Integrated Management System programme implemented in Nuclear Malaysia. (author)

Types of safety assessments of near surface repository for radioactive waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mateeva, M.

2004-01-01

The purpose of this article is to presents the classification of different types safety assessments of near surface repository for low and intermediate level radioactive waste substantiated with results of safety assessments generated in Bulgaria. The different approach of safety assessments applied for old existing repository as well as for site selection for construction new repository is outlined. The regulatory requirements in Bulgaria define three main types of assessments: Safety assessment; Technical substation of repository safety; Assessment of repository influence on environment that is in form of report prepared from the Ministry of environment and waters on the base of results obtained in two first types of assessments. Additionally first type is subdivided in three categories - preliminary safety assessment, safety assessment and post closure safety assessment, which are generated using deterministic approach. The technical substation of repository safety is generated using probabilistic approach. Safety assessment results that are presented here are based on evaluation of existing old repository type 'Radon' in Novi Han and real site selection procedure for new near surface repository for low and intermediate level radioactive waste from nuclear power station in Kozloduy. The important role of safety assessment for improvement the repository safety as well as for repository licensing, correct site selection and right choice of engineer barriers and repository design is discussed using generated results. (author)

Data used for safety assessment of reprocessing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nomura, Yasushi; Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Kanagawa, Akira

1990-08-01

For safety assessment of a reprocessing facility, it is important to know performance of radioactive materials in their accidental release and transfer. Accordingly, it is necessary to collect and prepare data for use in analyses for their performance. In JAERI, experiments such as for data acquisition, for source-term evaluation and for radioactive material transfer, are now planned to be performed. Prior to these experiments, it is decided to investigate data in use for accidental safety assessment of reprocessing plants and their based experimental data, thus to make it possible to recommend reasonable values for safety analysis parameters by evaluating the investigated results, to select the experimental items, to edit a safety assessment handbook and so on. In this line of objectives, JAERI rewarded a two-year contract of investigation to Nuclear Safety Research Association, to make a working group under a special committee on data investigation for reprocessing facility safety assessment. This report is a collection of results reviewed and checked by the working group. The contents consist of two parts, one for investigation and review of data used for safety assessment of domestic or oversea reprocessing facilities, and the other for investigation, review and evaluation of ANSI recommended American standard data reported by E. Walker together with their based experimental data resorting to the original referred reports. (author)

Safety functions and safety function indicators - key elements in SKB'S methodology for assessing long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hedin, A.

2008-01-01

The application of so called safety function indicators in SKB safety assessment of a KBS-3 repository for spent nuclear fuel is presented. Isolation and retardation are the two main safety functions of the KBS-3 concept. In order to quantitatively evaluate safety on a sub-system level, these functions need to be differentiated, associated with quantitative measures and, where possible, with quantitative criteria relating to the fulfillment of the safety functions. A safety function is defined as a role through which a repository component contributes to safety. A safety function indicator is a measurable or calculable property of a repository component that allows quantitative evaluation of a safety function. A safety function indicator criterion is a quantitative limit such that if the criterion is fulfilled, the corresponding safety function is upheld. The safety functions and their associated indicators and criteria developed for the KBS-3 repository are primarily related to the isolating potential and to physical states of the canister and the clay buffer surrounding the canister. They are thus not directly related to release rates of radionuclides. The paper also describes how the concepts introduced i) aid in focussing the assessment on critical, safety related issues, ii) provide a framework for the accounting of safety throughout the different time frames of the assessment and iii) provide key information in the selection of scenarios for the safety assessment. (author)

Safety and reliability assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

This report contains the papers delivered at the course on safety and reliability assessment held at the CSIR Conference Centre, Scientia, Pretoria. The following topics were discussed: safety standards; licensing; biological effects of radiation; what is a PWR; safety principles in the design of a nuclear reactor; radio-release analysis; quality assurance; the staffing, organisation and training for a nuclear power plant project; event trees, fault trees and probability; Automatic Protective Systems; sources of failure-rate data; interpretation of failure data; synthesis and reliability; quantification of human error in man-machine systems; dispersion of noxious substances through the atmosphere; criticality aspects of enrichment and recovery plants; and risk and hazard analysis. Extensive examples are given as well as case studies

Safety assessment as basis for the decision making process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ilie, P.; Didita, L.; Danchiv, A.

2005-01-01

This paper deals with the safety assessment for a new near surface repository, particularly for the early stage of repository development using ISAM (Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities) safety assessment methodology. In this stage of the repository life cycle the main purpose of the safety assessment is to demonstrate that the plant is capable to be constructed and operated safely. The paper is based on development of the ASAM (Application of the Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near-Surface Disposal Facilities) Decision Support Subgroup of the Common Aspects Working Group. The implications of decision making for the application of the ISAM methodology on post-closure safety assessment are analysed. Some important elements of the decision-making process with impact on key components of the ISAM process are described. Following the development of Decision Support Subgroup of the ASAM Common Aspects Working Group the proposed change of ISAM methodology is analysed. This approach puts all activities in a decision context where the first iteration of the safety assessment is based on the existing state of knowledge and the initial engineering design. Confidence in the process is accomplished through the direct inclusion of all decision makers and stakeholders in the formulation of decisions, the definition of the state of knowledge, and decision making activities. The decision process is developed in context of undertaking assessments with little site-specific information, this situation is specifically for new planned repository. Limited site-specific information can result in a high degree of uncertainty, therefore it is important first of all to identify the sources of uncertainty arising from the limited nature of the site-specific information and then to apply appropriate approaches to manage the uncertainties and to determine whether the uncertainties are important to the overall safety of the disposal facility

Assessment of safety culture at INPP

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lesin, S.

2002-01-01

Safety Culture covers all main directions of plant activities and the plant departments involved through integration into the INPP Quality Assurance System. Safety Culture is represented by three components. The first is the clear INPP Safety and Quality Assurance Policy. Based on the Policy INPP is safely operated and managers' actions firstly aim at safety assurance. The second component is based on personal responsibility for safety and attitude of each employee of the plant. The third component is based on commitment to safety and competence of managers and employees of the plant. This component links the first two to ensure efficient management of safety at the plant. The above mentioned components including the elements which may significantly affect Safety Culture are also presented in the attachment. The concept of such model implies understanding of effect of different factors on the level of Safety Culture in the organization. In order to continuously correct safety problems, self-assessment of the Safety Culture level is performed at regular intervals. (author)

Integrated-plant-safety assessment Systematic Evaluation program. Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Docket No. 50-245

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-11-01

The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. The review provides: (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety. This report documents the review of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, operated by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (located in Waterford, Connecticut). Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, is one of ten plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review. It is expected that this report will be one of the bases in considering the issuance of a full-term operating license in place of the existing provisional operating license

Planning report for the safety assessment SR-Can

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-06-01

This document is a planning report for SKB's next assessment of long-term safety for a KBS 3 repository. The assessment, SR-Can, is to be finished by the end of 2005 and will be used for SKB's application to build an Encapsulation plant for spent nuclear fuel. Apart from outlining the methodology, the report discusses the handling in SR-Can of a number of important issues regarding the near field, the geosphere, the biosphere, the climatic evolution etc. The Swedish nuclear safety and radiation protection authorities have recently issued regulations concerning the final disposal of nuclear waste. The principal compliance criterion states that the annual risk of harmful effects must not exceed 10 -6 for a representative individual in the group exposed to the greatest risk. There are also a number of requirements on methodological aspects of the safety assessment as well as on the contents of a safety report. The regulations are reproduced in an Appendix to this report. The primary safety function of the KBS 3 system is to completely isolate the spent nuclear fuel within copper canisters over the entire assessment period, which will be one million years in SR-Can. Should a canister be damaged, the secondary safety function is to retard any releases from the canisters. The main steps of the assessment are the following: 1. Qualitative system description, FEP processing: This step consists of defining a system boundary and of describing the system on a format suitable for the safety assessment. Databases of relevant features, events and processes influencing long-term safety are structured and used as one starting point for the assessment. 2. Initial state descriptions. 3. Process descriptions: In this step all identified processes within the system boundary involved in the long-term evolution of the system are described in detail. 4. Description of boundary conditions: This step is a broad description of the evolution of the boundaries of the system, focussing mainly

Environment, safety and health compliance assessment, Feed Materials Production Center, Fernald, Ohio

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1989-09-01

The Secretary of Energy established independent Tiger Teams to conduct environment, safety, and health (ES H) compliance assessments at US Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. This report presents the assessment of the Feed Materials Production Center (FMPC) at Fernald, Ohio. The purpose of the assessment at FMPC is to provide the Secretary with information regarding current ES H compliance status, specific ES H noncompliance items, evaluation of the adequacy of the ES H organizations and resources (DOE and contractor), and root causes for noncompliance items. Areas reviewed included performance under Federal, state, and local agreements and permits; compliance with Federal, state and DOE orders and requirements; adequacy of operations and other site activities, such as training, procedures, document control, quality assurance, and emergency preparedness; and management and staff, including resources, planning, and interactions with outside agencies.

Safety assessment for radioactive waste disposal facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thanaletchumy Karuppiah; Mohd Abdul Wahab Yusof; Nik Marzuki Nik Ibrahim; Nurul Wahida Ahmad Khairuddin

2008-08-01

Safety assessments are used to evaluate the performance of a radioactive waste disposal facility and its impact on human health and the environment. This paper presents the overall information and methodology to carry out the safety assessment for a long term performance of a disposal system. A case study was also conducted to gain hands-on experience in the development and justification of scenarios, the formulation and implementation of models and the analysis of results. AMBER code using compartmental modeling approach was used to represent the migration and fate of contaminants in this training. This safety assessment is purely illustrative and it serves as a starting point for each development stage of a disposal facility. This assessment ultimately becomes more detail and specific as the facility evolves. (Author)

Preliminary safety assessment of the WIPP facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Balestri, R.J.; Torres, B.W.; Pahwa, S.B.; Brannen, J.P.

1979-01-01

This paper summarizes the efforts to perform a safety assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility being proposed for southeastern New Mexico. This preliminary safety assessment is limited to a consequence assessment in terms of the dose to a maximally exposed individual as a result of introducing the radionuclides into the biosphere. The extremely low doses to the organs as a result of the liquid breach scenarios are contrasted with the background radiation

Promoting and assessment of safety culture within regulatory body

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Awasthi, Sumit; Bhattacharya, D.; Koley, J.; Krishnamurthy, P.R.

2015-01-01

Regulators have an important role to play in assisting organizations under their jurisdiction to develop positive safety cultures. It is therefore essential for the regulator to have a robust safety culture as an inherent strategy and communication of this strategy to the organizations it supervises. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) emphasizes every utility to institute a good safety culture during various stages of a NPP. The regulatory requirement for establishing organisational safety culture within utility at different stages are delineated in the various AERB safety codes which are presented in the paper. Although the review and assessment of the safety culture is a part of AERB’s continual safety supervision through existing review mechanism, AERB do not use any specific indicators for safety culture assessment. However, establishing and nurturing a good safety culture within AERB helps in encouraging the utility to institute the same. At the induction level AERB provides training to its staffs for regulatory orientation which include a specific course on safety culture. Subsequently, the junior staffs are mentored by seniors while involving them in various regulatory processes and putting them as observers during regulatory decision making process. Further, AERB established a formal procedure for assessing and improving safety culture within its staff as a management system process. The paper describes as a case study the above safety culture assessment process established within AERB

Building 894 hazards assessment document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Banda, Z.; Williams, M.

1996-07-01

The Department of Energy Order 5500.3A requires facility-specific hazards assessments be prepared, maintained, and used for emergency planning purposes. This hazards assessment document describes the chemical and radiological hazards associated with Building 894. The entire inventory was subjected to the screening criteria for potential airborne impact to onsite and offsite individuals out of which 9 chemicals were kept for further evaluation. The air dispersion model, ALOHA, estimated pollutant concentrations downwind from the source of a release, taking into consideration the toxicological and physical characteristics of the release site, the atmospheric conditions, and the circumstances of the release. The greatest distance at which a postulated facility event will produce consequences exceeding the Early Severe Health Effects threshold is 130 meters. The highest emergency classification is a General Emergency. The Emergency Planning Zone is a nominal 130 meter area that conforms to DOE boundaries and physical/jurisdictional boundaries such as fence lines and streets

Building 6630 hazards assessment document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, M.; Banda, Z.

1996-10-01

The Department of Energy Order 5500.3A requires facility-specific hazards assessments be prepared, maintained, and used for emergency planning purposes. This hazards assessment document describes the chemical and radiological hazards associated with Building 6630. The entire inventory was subjected to the screening criteria for potential airborne impact to onsite and offsite individuals out of which one chemical was kept for further evaluation. The air dispersion model, ALOHA, estimated pollutant concentrations downwind from the source of a release, taking into consideration the toxicological and physical characteristics of the chemical release site, the atmospheric conditions, and the circumstances of the release. The greatest distance at which a postulated facility event will produce consequences exceeding the Early Severe Health Effects threshold is 76 meters. The highest emergency classification is an Alert. The Emergency Planning Zone is a nominal 100 meter area that conforms to DOE boundaries and physical/jurisdictional boundaries such as fence lines and streets

Safety assessment of radioactive wastes storage 'Mironova Gora'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Serbryakov, B.; Karamushka, V.; Ostroborodov, V.

2000-01-01

A project of transforming the radioactive wastes storage 'Mironova Gora' is under development. A safety assessment of this storage facility was performed to gain assurance on the design decision. The assessment, which was based on the safety assessment methods developed for radioactive wastes repositories, is presented in this paper. (author)

A Study on the Quantitative Assessment Method of Software Requirement Documents Using Software Engineering Measures and Bayesian Belief Networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eom, Heung Seop; Kang, Hyun Gook; Park, Ki Hong; Kwon, Kee Choon; Chang, Seung Cheol

2005-01-01

One of the major challenges in using the digital systems in a NPP is the reliability estimation of safety critical software embedded in the digital safety systems. Precise quantitative assessment of the reliability of safety critical software is nearly impossible, since many of the aspects to be considered are of qualitative nature and not directly measurable, but they have to be estimated for a practical use. Therefore an expert's judgment plays an important role in estimating the reliability of the software embedded in safety-critical systems in practice, because they can deal with all the diverse evidence relevant to the reliability and can perform an inference based on the evidence. But, in general, the experts' way of combining the diverse evidence and performing an inference is usually informal and qualitative, which is hard to discuss and will eventually lead to a debate about the conclusion. We have been carrying out research on a quantitative assessment of the reliability of safety critical software using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN). BBN has been proven to be a useful modeling formalism because a user can represent a complex set of events and relationships in a fashion that can easily be interpreted by others. In the previous works we have assessed a software requirement specification of a reactor protection system by using our BBN-based assessment model. The BBN model mainly employed an expert's subjective probabilities as inputs. In the process of assessing the software requirement documents we found out that the BBN model was excessively dependent on experts' subjective judgments in a large part. Therefore, to overcome the weakness of our methodology we employed conventional software engineering measures into the BBN model as shown in this paper. The quantitative relationship between the conventional software measures and the reliability of software were not identified well in the past. Then recently there appeared a few researches on a ranking of

Regulatory regime and its influence in the nuclear safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laaksonen, J.

1999-01-01

Main elements of nuclear regulatory regime in general is presented. These elements are: national rules and safety regulations, system of nuclear facility licensing, activities of regulatory body. Regulatory body is needed to specify the national safety regulations, review and assess the safety documentation presented to support license application, make inspections to verify fulfilment of safety regulations and license conditions, monitor the quality of work processes of user organization, and to assess whether these processes provide a high safety level, promote high safety culture, promote maintenance and development of national infrastructure relevant to nuclear safety, etc

Safety studies on Korean fusion DEMO plant using integrated safety assessment methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oh, Kyemin; Kang, Myoung-suk; Heo, Gyunyoung; Kim, Hyoung-chan

2014-01-01

Highlights: •The purpose of this paper is to suggest methodology that can investigate safety issues and provides a case study for Korean fusion DEMO plant. •The concepts of integrated safety assessment methodology (ISAM) that can be applied in addressing regulatory requirements and recognizing safety issues for K-DEMO were emphasized. •Phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) was proposed. It can recognize vulnerabilities of systems and identify the gaps in technical areas requiring additional researches. •This work is expected to contribute on the conceptual design of safety features for K-DEMO to design engineers and the guidance for regulatory requirements to licensers. -- Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to suggest methodology that can investigate safety issues and provides a case study for Korean fusion DEMO plant (K-DEMO) as a part of R and D program through the National Fusion Research Institute of Korea. Even though nuclear regulation and licensing framework is well setup due to the operating and design experience of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) since 1970s, the regulatory authority of South Korea has concerns on the challenge of facing new nuclear facilities including K-DEMO due to the differences in systems, materials, and inherent safety feature from conventional PWRs. Even though the follow-up of the ITER license process facilitates to deal with significant safety issues of fusion facilities, a licensee as well as a licenser should identify the gaps between ITER and DEMO in terms of safety issues. First we reviewed the methods of conducting safety analysis for unprecedented nuclear facilities such as Generation IV reactors, particularly very high temperature reactor (VHTR), which is called as integrated safety assessment methodology (ISAM). Second, the analysis for the conceptual design of K-DEMO on the basis of ISAM was conducted. The ISAM consists of five analytical tools to develop the safety requirements from licensee

Safety studies on Korean fusion DEMO plant using integrated safety assessment methodology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Oh, Kyemin; Kang, Myoung-suk [Kyung Hee University, Youngin-si, Gyeonggi-do 446-701 (Korea, Republic of); Heo, Gyunyoung, E-mail: gheo@khu.ac.kr [Kyung Hee University, Youngin-si, Gyeonggi-do 446-701 (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Hyoung-chan [National Fusion Research Institute, Daejeon-si 305-333 (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

Highlights: •The purpose of this paper is to suggest methodology that can investigate safety issues and provides a case study for Korean fusion DEMO plant. •The concepts of integrated safety assessment methodology (ISAM) that can be applied in addressing regulatory requirements and recognizing safety issues for K-DEMO were emphasized. •Phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) was proposed. It can recognize vulnerabilities of systems and identify the gaps in technical areas requiring additional researches. •This work is expected to contribute on the conceptual design of safety features for K-DEMO to design engineers and the guidance for regulatory requirements to licensers. -- Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to suggest methodology that can investigate safety issues and provides a case study for Korean fusion DEMO plant (K-DEMO) as a part of R and D program through the National Fusion Research Institute of Korea. Even though nuclear regulation and licensing framework is well setup due to the operating and design experience of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) since 1970s, the regulatory authority of South Korea has concerns on the challenge of facing new nuclear facilities including K-DEMO due to the differences in systems, materials, and inherent safety feature from conventional PWRs. Even though the follow-up of the ITER license process facilitates to deal with significant safety issues of fusion facilities, a licensee as well as a licenser should identify the gaps between ITER and DEMO in terms of safety issues. First we reviewed the methods of conducting safety analysis for unprecedented nuclear facilities such as Generation IV reactors, particularly very high temperature reactor (VHTR), which is called as integrated safety assessment methodology (ISAM). Second, the analysis for the conceptual design of K-DEMO on the basis of ISAM was conducted. The ISAM consists of five analytical tools to develop the safety requirements from licensee

Development of Onsite Transportation Safety Documents for Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frank Hand; Willard Thomas; Frank Sciacca; Manny Negrete; Susan Kelley

2008-01-01

Department of Energy (DOE) Orders require each DOE site to develop onsite transportation safety documents (OTSDs). The Nevada Test Site approach divided all onsite transfers into two groups with each group covered by a standalone OTSD identified as Non-Nuclear and Nuclear. The Non-Nuclear transfers involve all radioactive hazardous material in less than Hazard Category (HC)-3 quantities and all chemically hazardous materials. The Nuclear transfers involve all radioactive material equal to or greater than HC-3 quantities and radioactive material mated with high explosives regardless of quantity. Both OTSDs comply with DOE O 460.1B requirements. The Nuclear OTSD also complies with DOE O 461.1A requirements and includes a DOE-STD-3009 approach to hazard analysis (HA) and accident analysis as needed. All Nuclear OTSD proposed transfers were determined to be non-equivalent and a methodology was developed to determine if 'equivalent safety' to a fully compliant Department of Transportation (DOT) transfer was achieved. For each HA scenario, three hypothetical transfers were evaluated: a DOT-compliant, uncontrolled, and controlled transfer. Equivalent safety is demonstrated when the risk level for each controlled transfer is equal to or less than the corresponding DOT-compliant transfer risk level. In this comparison the typical DOE-STD-3009 risk matrix was modified to reflect transportation requirements. Design basis conditions (DBCs) were developed for each non-equivalent transfer. Initial DBCs were based solely upon the amount of material present. Route-, transfer-, and site-specific conditions were evaluated and the initial DBCs revised as needed. Final DBCs were evaluated for each transfer's packaging and its contents

The safety evaluation guide for laboratories and plants a tool for enhancing safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lhomme, Veronique; Daubard, Jean-Paul

2013-01-01

of safety file (safety options file, general operating rules, on site emergency plan, periodic safety review documents, incident analysis...). In each chapter, the aforesaid Parts 1, 2 and 3 are developed. A first draft of the guide was published in March 2010 for use by assessment's teams of IRSN, and to obtain an operational feedback to improve it. Beyond that, the guide is also intended to be, on the topic of safety assessment for the fuel cycle facilities, laboratories, irradiators, particle accelerators, under-decommissioning reactors and radioactive waste management, a tool for tutoring (inside and outside the IRSN) and a reference to make available, outside of the IRSN, the approach of expertise and the 'know-how' of IRSN. In this context, the IRSN's methodology of assessment regarding 'criticality' and 'fire' have been put online, on the IRSN's web site. The paper presents the purpose and the structure of the guide and its interest for the safety assessment of fuel cycle facilities; in this frame, the chapters 'Assessment of the risk from handling operations' and 'Assessment of the periodic safety review documents' are presented in details as illustrations. It gives also information about its others uses. (authors)