Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bean, Robert S.; Hockert, John W.; Hebditch, David J.

2009-01-01

There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wonder, E.F.

2010-01-01

The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

2010-07-01

The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

Solution Monitoring Evaluated by Proliferation Risk Assessment and Fuzzy Optimization Analysis for Safeguards in a Reprocessing Process

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mitsutoshi Suzuki

2013-01-01

Full Text Available Solution monitoring (SM has been used in a nuclear reprocessing plant as an additional measure to provide assurance that the plant is operated as declared. The inline volume and density monitoring equipment with dip tubes is important for safety and safeguards purposes and is a typical example of safeguards by design (SBD. Recently safety, safeguards, and security by design (3SBD are proposed to promote an efficient and effective generation of nuclear energy. In 3SBD, proliferation risk assessment has the potential to consider likelihood of the incidence and proliferation risk in safeguards. In this study, risk assessment methodologies for safeguards and security are discussed and several mathematical methods are presented to investigate risk notion applied to intentional acts of facility misuse in an uncertainty environment. Proliferation risk analysis with the Markov model, deterrence effect with the game model, and SBD with fuzzy optimization are shown in feasibility studies to investigate the potential application of the risk and uncertainty analyses in safeguards. It is demonstrated that the SM is an effective measurement system using risk-informed and cost-effective SBD, even though there are inherent difficulties related to the possibility of operator’s falsification.

Risk-informed approach for safety, safeguards, and security (3S) by design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Burr, Tom; Howell, John

2011-01-01

Over several decades the nuclear energy society worldwide has developed safety assessment methodology based on probabilistic risk analysis for incorporating its benefit into design and accident prevention for nuclear reactors. Although safeguards and security communities have different histories and technical aspects compared to safety, risk assessment as a supplement to their current requirements could be developed to promote synergism between Safety, Safeguards, and Security (3S) and to install effective countermeasures in the design of complex nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Since the 3S initiative was raised by G8 countries at Hokkaido Toyako-Summit in 2008, one approach to developing synergism in a 3S By Design (3SBD) process has been the application of risk-oriented assessment methodology. In the existing regulations of safeguards and security, a risk notion has already been considered for inherent threat and hazard recognition. To integrate existing metrics into a risk-oriented approach, several mathematical methods have already been surveyed, with attention to the scarcity of intentional acts in the case of safeguards and the sparseness of actual event data. A two-dimensional probability distribution composed of measurement error and incidence probabilities has been proposed to formalize inherent difficulties in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards criteria. In particular, the incidence probability that is difficult to estimate has been explained using a Markov model and game theory. In this work, a feasibility study of 3SBD is performed for an aqueous reprocessing process, and synergetic countermeasures are presented for preliminary demonstration of 3SBD. Although differences and conflicts between individual 'S' communities exist, the integrated approach would be valuable for optimization and balance between the 3S design features as well as for effective and efficient implementation under existing regulation frameworks. In addition

Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat. Theft and sabotage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeMuth, Scott; Mullen, Mark; Pan, Paul

2011-01-01

In recent years, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept has received significant interest with respect to international (IAEA) safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic (or national) Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses domestic requirements for material control and accounting (MC and A) and for physical protection, such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic material control and accounting (MC and A) and physical protection are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and more specifically its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts for international safeguards sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA. This paper identifies the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e., MC and A and physical protection) and explains how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems. (author)

Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Demuth, Scott F.; Mullen, Mark

2011-01-01

Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC and A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC and A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

2014-07-01

The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

2012-08-01

The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

2012-08-01

Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

Report on the NGS3 Working Group on Safeguards by Design For Aqueous Reprocessing Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael; Schanfein, Mark

2011-02-01

The objective of the Working Group on SBD for Aqueous Reprocessing Facilities was to provide recommendations, for facility operators and designers, which would aid in the coordination and integration of nuclear material accountancy and the safeguards requirements of all concerned parties - operators, state/regional authorities, and the IAEA. The recommendations, which are to be provided to the IAEA, are intended to assist in optimizing facility design and operating parameters to ensure the safeguardability of the facility while minimizing impact on the operations. The one day Working Group session addressed a wide range of design and operating topics.

Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

2011-12-15

Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Hebditch, David; Morgan, Jim; Meppen, Bruce; DeMuth, Scott; Ehinger, Michael; Hockert, John

2008-01-01

The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing 'nuclear security' risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as 'the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,' with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: (sm b ullet) Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, (sm b ullet) Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, (sm b ullet) Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of 'nuclear security' considerations as 'full and equal' partners in the design process, (sm b ullet) Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and (sm b ullet) Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic

Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

2013-01-01

In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Security-by-design approach of the KALIMER 600 SFR plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

So, Dong Sup; Lee, Yong Bum

2012-01-01

Security measures as well as safety and safeguards measures should be incorporated and addressed early in the design process to enhance the cost effectiveness of a PPS (Physical Protection System). Safety, security, operations, and safeguards design teams and regulators need to be flexible and perform 'trade studies' on the available options. In this paper, SBD (Security by Design) measures in the design phase of the KALIMER 600 SFR (Sodium Cooled Reactor) plant are identified and discussed qualitatively

Modeling and simulation for process and safeguards system design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gutmacher, R.G.; Kern, E.A.; Duncan, D.R.; Benecke, M.W.

1983-01-01

A computer modeling and simulation approach that meets the needs of both the process and safeguards system designers is described. The results have been useful to Westinghouse Hanford Company process designers in optimizing the process scenario and operating scheme of the Secure Automated Fabrication line. The combined process/measurements model will serve as the basis for design of the safeguards system. Integration of the process design and the safeguards system design should result in a smoothly operating process that is easier to safeguard

Safeguards and nuclear forensics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gangotra, Suresh

2016-01-01

Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Trond Bjornard; Philip C. Durst

2012-05-01

This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility. The need for this guidance is becoming increasingly urgent as more and more nuclear power plants move their spent fuel from resident spent fuel ponds to independent spent fuel storage installations. The safeguards requirements and best practices described herein are also relevant to the design and construction of regional independent spent fuel storage installations that nuclear power plant operators are starting to consider in the absence of a national long-term geological spent fuel repository. The following document has been prepared in support of two of the three foundational pillars for implementing Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). These are: i) defining the relevant safeguards requirements, and ii) defining the best practices for meeting the requirements. This document was prepared with the design of the latest independent dry spent fuel storage installations in mind and was prepared specifically as an aid for designers of commercial nuclear facilities to help them understand the relevant international requirements that follow from a country’s safeguards agreement with

Safeguards planning in a plant design process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heinrich, L.A.

1977-01-01

The safeguards efforts for the partitioning fuel cycle are considered. Included in the discussion are the organization of the safeguards study, the development of safeguards criteria, the expression of these criteria as requirements for facility design, and some preliminary details of the implementation of these requirements in facility and process layout

Safeguards by Design - Experiences from New Nuclear Installation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Okko, O.; Honkamaa, T.; Kuusi, A.; Rautjaervi, J.

2010-01-01

The experiences obtained from the current construction projects at Olkiluoto clearly point out the need to introduce the safeguards requirements into facility design process at an early stage. The early Design Information is completed, in principle, before the construction. However, during the design of containment, surveillance systems, and non-destructive assay equipment and their cabling, the design requirements for safeguards systems were not available either for the new reactor unit or for the disposal plant with a geological repository. Typically, the official Design Information documents are not available early enough for efficient integration of safeguards systems into new facilities. In case of the Olkiluoto projects, this was due to understandable reasons: at the new reactor unit the design acceptance by the ordering company and by the nuclear safety authorities was a long process, ongoing simultaneously with parts of the construction; and at the geological repository the national legislation assigns the repository the status of a nuclear facility only after the initial construction and research phase of the repository when the long-term safety of the disposal concept is demonstrated. As similar factors are likely to delay the completion of the official Design Information documents with any new reactor projects until the construction is well underway and efficient integration of safeguards systems is impossible. Therefore, the proliferation resistance of new nuclear installations should be addressed in the design phase before the official Design Information documents are finished. This approach was demonstrated with the enlargement of the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage building. For this approach to work, strong national contribution is needed to facilitate the early communication and exchange of information between the IAEA and the other stakeholders to enable the design of facilities that can be efficiently safeguarded. With the renaissance of nuclear

Japan-IAEA Workshops on Advanced Safeguards for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffheins, B.; Hori, M.; Suzuki, M.; Kuno, Y.; Kimura, N.; Naito, K.; Hosoya, M.; Khlebnikov, N.; Whichello, J.; Zendel, M.

2010-01-01

Beginning in 2007, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards initiated a workshop series focused on advanced safeguards technologies for the future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). The goals for these workshops were to address safeguards challenges, to share implementation experiences, to discuss fuel cycle plans and promising research and development, and to address other issues associated with safeguarding new fuel cycle facilities. Concurrently, the workshops also served to promote dialog and problem solving, and to foster closer collaborations for facility design and planning. These workshops have sought participation from IAEA Member States' support programmes (MSSP), the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, state systems of accounting and control (SSAC), regulators and inspectorates to ensure that all possible stakeholder views can be shared in an open process. Workshop presentations have covered, inter alia, national fuel cycle programs and plans, research progress in proliferation resistance (PR) and safeguardability, approaches for nuclear measurement accountancy of large material throughputs and difficult to access material, new and novel radiation detectors with increased sensitivity and automation, and lessons learned from recent development and operation of safeguards systems for complex facilities and the experiences of integrated safeguards (IS) in Japan. Although the title of the workshops presumes an emphasis on technology, participants recognized that early planning and organization, coupled with close cooperation among stakeholders, that is, through the application of 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) processes that include nuclear safety and security coordination, 'Remote Inspections' and 'Joint-Use of Equipment (JUE)' would be required to enable more successful implementations of safeguards at future NFC facilities. The needs to cultivate the future workforce, effectively preserve

Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design for Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morgan, James B.; Kovacic, Donald N.; Whitaker, J. Michael

2008-01-01

Safeguards for nuclear facilities can be significantly improved by developing and implementing methodologies for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized into a country's regulatory structure similar to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved to assure a facility's reliable and safe operations will reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state level. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis (IPRA) process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

2015-01-01

Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

Evolution of safeguards systems design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

1979-01-01

Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

Organizational Culture, 3S, and Safeguards by Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

2012-01-31

While Safety and Security Culture are well socialized among nuclear facility designers, the concept of safeguards culture is less well defined. One area where safeguards culture may play a helpful role is in the area of Safeguards by Design. This paper will include a theoretical discussion of organizational culture, leading with safety culture and security culture that are well known, and positing that there may be room to think about safeguards culture along with the others. It will also examine the utility of the 3S concept and how this concept has been used in training for newcomer states. These will lead into a discussion of how the addition of safeguards to the mix of safety by design and security by design can be valuable, particularly as it is socialized to newcomer states.

University of Texas Safeguards by Design Problem Statement

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rauch, Eric Benton [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Scherer, Carolynn P. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Ruggiero, Christy E. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2018-01-22

This document describes the problem statement that students at the University of Texas will use for their senior level capstone design class. The purpose of this project is to introduce students to Safeguards by Design concepts as part of their capstone design course at the culmination of their degree program. This work is supported by Los Alamos National Laboratory with FY17 and FY18 programmatic funding from the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (INS), Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Resource Development Program, Safeguards by Design Project.

Safeguards by Design at the Encapsulation Plant in Finland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ingegneri, M.; Baird, K.; Park, W.-S.; Coyne, J.M.; Enkhjin, L.; Chew, L.S.; Plenteda, R.; Sprinkle, J.; Yudin, Y.; Ciuculescu, C.; Koutsoyannopoulos, C.; Murtezi, M.; Schwalbach, P.; Vaccaro, S.; Pekkarinen, J.; Thomas, M.; Zein, A.; Honkamaa, T.; Hamalainen, M.; Martikka, E.; Moring, M.; Okko, O.

2015-01-01

Finland has launched a spent fuel disposition project to encapsulate all of its spent fuel assemblies and confine the disposal canisters in a deep geological repository. The construction of the underground premises started several years ago with the drilling, blasting and reinforcement of tunnels and shafts to ensure the safe deep underground construction and disposal techniques in the repository, while the design of the encapsulation plant (EP) enters the licencing phase preliminary to its construction. The spent fuel assemblies, which have been safeguarded for decades at the nuclear power plants, are going to be transported to the EP, loaded into copper canisters and stored in underground tunnels where they become inaccessible after backfilling. Safeguards measures are needed to ensure that final spent fuel verification is performed before its encapsulation and that no nuclear material is diverted during the process. This is an opportunity for the inspectorates to have the infrastructure necessary for the safeguards equipment incorporated in the design of the encapsulation plant before licencing for construction occurs. The peculiarity of this project is that it is going to run for more than a century. Therefore, significant changes are to be expected in the technical capabilities available for implementing safeguards (e.g., verification techniques and instruments), as well as in the process itself, e.g., redesign for the encapsulation of future fuel types. For these reasons a high degree of flexibility is required in order to be able to shift to different solutions at a later stage while minimizing the interference with the licencing process and facility operations. This paper describes the process leading to the definition of the technical requirements by IAEA and Euratom to be incorporated in the facility's design. (author)

Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

1987-01-01

The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

2010-01-01

The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

Safe-by-Design : from Safety to Responsibility

NARCIS (Netherlands)

van de Poel, I.R.; Robaey, Z.H.

2017-01-01

Safe-by-design (SbD) aims at addressing safety issues already during the R&D and design phases of new technologies. SbD has increasingly become popular in the last few years for addressing the risks of emerging technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic biology. We ask to what extent SbD

Update of the INPRO Collaborative Project, Proliferation Resistance and Safeguard ability Assessment (Prosta) Tools

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chang, H. L.; Kwon, E. H.; Ahn, S. K.; Ko, W. I.; Kim, H. D. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

The objectives of the INPRO Collaborative Project, Proliferation Resistance and Safeguard ability Assessment (PROSA) Tools are to make the INPRO proliferation resistance (PR) assessment methodology simpler and easier to use, to allow for different users and depths of analysis, to demonstrate the value and its usefulness of the refined assessment methodology to potential users, through a test with a reference case, and to provide input to a revision of the INPRO PR assessment manual. A summary of the project is described herein, including the procedure of PR assessment process and a case study using a SFR metal fuel manufacturing facility (SFMF) which is currently in the conceptual design phase at KAERI. The PROSA process with questionnaire approach is simpler and easier to perform that the original INPRO PR methodology with qualitative scale from 'weak' to 'very strong' to be determined by expert judgment. The PROSA process can be applied from the early stage of design showing the relationship of PR assessment to the SBD process.

Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cartan, F.O.

1982-05-01

This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert Bean; Casey Durst

2009-10-01

This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

Safeguardability of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Li, T. K. (Tien K.); Lee, S. Y. (Sang Yoon); Burr, Tom; Russo, P. A. (Phyllis A.); Menlove, Howard O.; Kim, H. D.; Ko, W. I. (Won Il); Park, S. W.; Park, H. S.

2004-01-01

The Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing this technology since 1977 for the purpose of spent fuel management and is planning to perform a lab-scale demonstration in 2006. By using of this technology, a significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected, which would lighten the burden of final disposal in terms of disposal size, safety and economics. In the framework of collaboration agreement to develop the safeguards system for the ACP, a joint study on the safeguardability of the ACP technology has been performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the KAERI since 2002. In this study, the safeguardability of the ACP technology was examined for the pilot-scale facility. The process and material flows were conceptually designed, and the uncertainties in material accounting were estimated with international target values.

Safeguards System for the Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Ho-dong; Lee, T.H.; Yoon, J.S.; Park, S.W; Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Menlove, H.; Miller, M.C.; Tolba, A.; Zarucki, R.; Shawky, S.; Kamya, S.

2007-01-01

The advanced spent fuel conditioning process (ACP) which is a part of a pyro-processing has been under development at Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since 1997 to tackle the problem of an accumulation of spent fuel. The concept is to convert spent oxide fuel into a metallic form in a high temperature molten salt in order to reduce the heat energy, volume, and radioactivity of a spent fuel. Since the inactive tests of the ACP have been successfully implemented to confirm the validity of the electrolytic reduction technology, a lab-scale hot test will be undertaken in a couple of years to validate the concept. For this purpose, the KAERI has built the ACP Facility (ACPF) at the basement of the Irradiated Material Examination Facility (IMEF) of KAERI, which already has a reserved hot-cell area. Through the bilateral arrangement between US Department of Energy (DOE) and Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for safeguards R and D, the KAERI has developed elements of safeguards system for the ACPF in cooperation with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The reference safeguards design conditions and equipment were established for the ACPF. The ACPF safeguards system has many unique design specifications because of the particular characteristics of the pyro-process materials and the restrictions during a facility operation. For the material accounting system, a set of remote operation and maintenance concepts has been introduced for a non-destructive assay (NDA) system. The IAEA has proposed a safeguards approach to the ACPF for the different operational phases. Safeguards measures at the ACPF will be implemented during all operational phases which include a 'Cold Test', a 'Hot Test' and at the end of a 'Hot test'. Optimization of the IAEA's inspection efforts was addressed by designing an effective safeguards approach that relies on, inter alia, remote monitoring using cameras, installed NDA instrumentation, gate monitors and seals

Safeguards By Design - As applied to the Sellafield Product and Residue Store (SPRS)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chare, Peter; Lahogue, Yves; Schwalbach, Peter; Smejkal, Andreas; Patel, Bharat [European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, Directorate E - Nuclear Safeguards, Euroforum, Luxembourg (Luxembourg)

2011-12-15

Sellafield Product and Residue Store (SPRS) is a new facility that has been constructed on the site of Sellafield. The design work started in early 2001 and active commissioning commenced with the introduction of the first nuclear material which arrived in the building early 2011. The store has been designed for the long term storage of Plutonium product (PuO2) from Thorp and Magnox, MOX residue powder from Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) as well as pellet, powder or granular PuO2 residues from the older stores on the Sellafield site. This paper describes the application of Safeguards By Design commencing at the early design stage based upon the Safeguards Approach to be applied by DG ENER at the Sellafield Product and Residue Store (SPRS). The approach had been developed based upon the requirements for implementing Commission Regulation 302(2005) and the technical measures to be implemented in order to meet Article 77(a) of the Euratom Treaty. In order to meet these requirements a close dialogue was established between the different interested parties and the design team for the installation of instrumentation with associated cabling in order to implement the agreed safeguards measures. Early contacts at the design stage facilitated the inclusion of installed safeguards supplied instrumentation into the overall design and facility construction. The equipment and cabling supplied by Euratom was incorporated into the planning and construction phases. This ensured that upon plant completion the safeguards tools were commissioned and ready for the verification of the first nuclear material to be introduced into SPRS. Detailed discussions at the early stages of the design phase raised the profile of nuclear material safeguards and made certain that the necessary instrumentation infrastructure was incorporated into the plant infrastructure.

The integration of process monitoring for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

2010-01-01

The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

2010-04-01

For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

IAEA Guidance for Safeguards Implementation in Facility Design and Construction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sprinkle, J.; Hamilton, A.; Poirier, S.; Catton, A.; Ciuculescu, C.; Ingegneri, M.; Plenteda, R.

2015-01-01

One of the IAEA's statutory objectives is to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. One way the IAEA works to achieve this objective is through the publication of technical series that can provide guidance to Member States. These series include the IAEA Services Series, the IAEA Safety Standard Series, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series. The Nuclear Energy Series is comprised of publications designed to encourage and assist research and development on, and practical application of, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This includes guidance to be used by owners and operators of utilities, academia, vendors and government officials. The IAEA has chosen the Nuclear Energy Series to publish guidance for States regarding the consideration of safeguards in nuclear facility design and construction. Historically, safeguards were often applied after a facility was designed or maybe even after it was built. However, many in the design and construction community would prefer to include consideration of these requirements from the conceptual design phase in order to reduce the need for retro-fits and modifications. One can then also take advantage of possible synergies between safeguards, security, safety and environmental protection and reduce the project risk against cost increments and schedule slippage. The IAEA is responding to this interest with a suite of publications in the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, developed with the assistance of a number of Member State Support Programmes through a joint support programme task: · International Safeguards in Nuclear Facility Design and Construction (NP-T-2.8, 2013), · International Safeguards in the Design of Nuclear Reactors (NP-T-2.9, 2014), · International Safeguards in the Design of Spent Fuel Management (NF-T-3.1, tbd), · International Safeguards in the Design of Fuel Fabrication Plants (NF-T-4.7, tbd

Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

1984-01-01

An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values, a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives, a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them, and a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs

Task team approach to safeguards and security designs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.; Wilkey, D.D.

1991-01-01

In 1987, a U.S. department of Energy (DOE) supported task team was organized at the request of the DOE Idaho Field Office (DOE-ID) to provide support for safeguards and security (S and S) designs of the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) facility. Prior to deferral of the project, the SIS facility was to be constructed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to produce weapons grade plutonium from DOE owned fuel grade plutonium. The task team was assembled to provide the resources necessary to assure that S and S considerations were included as an integral part of the design of the facility, and that SIS designs would take advantage of available technology in the areas of physical security, measurements, accountability, and material and personnel tracking. The task team included personnel from DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE-OSS), DOE-ID, DOE contractors, and the national laboratories providing a wide range of expertise and experience. This paper reports that the team reviewed proposed designs and provided recommendations for safeguards and security features in each stage of the design process. The value of this approach to safeguards and security designs will be discussed with respect to benefits, lessons learned, and recommendations for future applications

Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Terada, Hiromi; Akiba, Mitsunori; Ando, Hisataka; Okazaki, Shuji; Irikura, Masatoshi; Kurihara, Hiroyoshi

2000-01-01

With domestic application of the IAEA new measures (program 93+2) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Nuclear Regulation Laws was amended for implementation of the new measures based upon the Additional Protocol, and also the new Designated Organization System was introduced to the SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) for safeguards implementation in Japan since beginning of January 2000. On the basis of accumulated experiences of the state safeguards implementation for more than 20 years and then established standardization of the inspection procedures, the Japan's Government is able to utilize the expertise of private organizations for the safeguards implementation. Any capable organizations can be designated by the Government as the Designated Organization for all or a part of safeguards implementations on behalf of the Government. According to the amended Law, the Prime Minister can make the Designated Organization implement safeguards implementations that are defined firstly as safeguards inspections which can be done along the Government instructions without any discussions and decisions, secondarily as destructive analysis of safeguards samples, and thirdly as technical research on advanced safeguards measures. The amendment of the Law was approved by the National Diet on June 9th 1999 and entered into force on December 16th 1999. The Additional Protocol also entered into force in Japan at the same time. The NMCC (Nuclear Material Control Center) was designated as the Organization on December 27th 1999 and started the safeguards implementation in January 7th 2000. In order to prepare for the Designated Organization, the NMCC rearranged the organizational system and kept capable human resources enough for the safeguards implementations. Also the NMCC carried out many programs of education and training for the inspectors. Furthermore, manuals and criteria for the

Selected topics in special nuclear materials safeguard system design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

King, L.L.; Thatcher, C.D.; Clarke, J.D.; Rodriguez, M.P.

1991-01-01

During the past two decades the improvements in circuit integration have given rise to many new applications in digital processing technology by continuously reducing the unit cost of processing power. Along with this increase in processing power a corresponding decrease in circuit volume has been achieved. Progress has been so swift that new classes of applications become feasible every 2 or 3 years. This is especially true in the application of proven new technology to special nuclear materials (SNM) safeguard systems. Several areas of application were investigated in establishing the performance requirements for the SNM safeguard system. These included the improvements in material control and accountability and surveillance by using multiple sensors to continuously monitor SNM inventory within the selected value(s); establishing a system architecture to provide capabilities needed for present and future performance requirements; and limiting operating manpower exposure to radiation. This paper describes two selected topics in the application of state-of-the-art, well-proven technology to SNM safeguard system design

Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

1984-07-01

An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: (1) a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values; (2) a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives; (3) a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them; and (4) a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs. 6 references, 4 figures, 5 tables

The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Synetos, Sotiris

2013-01-01

Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Select Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Plant Design for Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) per Used Fuel Campaign

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Demuth, Scott Francis [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Sprinkle, James K. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2015-05-26

As preparation to the year-end deliverable (Provide SSBD Best Practices for Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant) for the Work Package (FT-15LA040501–Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage), the initial step was to select a generic dry-storage pilot plant design for SSBD. To be consistent with other DOE-NE Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCR&D) activities, the Used Fuel Campaign was engaged for the selection of a design for this deliverable. For the work Package FT-15LA040501–“Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage”, SSBD will be initiated for the Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant described by the layout of Reference 2. SSBD will consider aspects of the design that are impacted by domestic material control and accounting (MC&A), domestic security, and international safeguards.

Production of small starch granules by expression of a tandem-repeat of a family 20 starch-binding domain (SBD3-SBD5) in an amylose-free potato genetic background

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Nazarian, F.; Trindade, L.M.; Visser, R.G.F.

2012-01-01

Starch exists typically as semicrystalline granules of varying size. Granule size plays an important role for many industrial starch applications. Microbial non-catalytic starch binding domains (SBD) exhibit an affinity for starch granules on their own. Three different constructs were introduced in

Preliminary assessment of safeguardability on the concepture design of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Sang Yoon; Ha, Jang Ho; Ko, Won Il; Song, Dae Yong; Kim, Ho Dong

2003-04-01

In this report, a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP (Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process) was conducted with Los Alamos National Laboratory. The proposed ACP concept is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuels into metal forms, which can achieve significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel to be stored and disposed of. For the safeguardability analysis of the ACP facility, sub-processes and their KMPs (Key Measurement Points) were defined first, and then their material flows were analyzed. Finally, the standard deviation of the Inventory Difference (ID) value of the facility was estimated with assumption by assuming international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods and their uncertainty. From the preliminary calculation, we concluded that if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility, the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met. In the second phase of this study, further study on sensitivity analyses considering various factors such as measurement errors, facility capacities, MBA periods etc. may be needed.

Preliminary assessment of safeguardability on the concepture design of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Sang Yoon; Ha, Jang Ho; Ko, Won Il; Song, Dae Yong; Kim, Ho Dong

2003-04-01

In this report, a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP (Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process) was conducted with Los Alamos National Laboratory. The proposed ACP concept is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuels into metal forms, which can achieve significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel to be stored and disposed of. For the safeguardability analysis of the ACP facility, sub-processes and their KMPs (Key Measurement Points) were defined first, and then their material flows were analyzed. Finally, the standard deviation of the Inventory Difference (ID) value of the facility was estimated with assumption by assuming international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods and their uncertainty. From the preliminary calculation, we concluded that if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility, the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met. In the second phase of this study, further study on sensitivity analyses considering various factors such as measurement errors, facility capacities, MBA periods etc. may be needed

Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

1995-01-01

The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards

Safeguards Considerations for the Design of a Future Fast Neutron Sodium Cooled Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cazalet, J.; Raymond, P.; Masson, M.; Saturnin, A.

2015-01-01

Incorporating safeguards at an early stage of a reactor design is a way to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards measures minimizing the possibilities of misuse of the plant or nuclear material diversion. It also reduces the impact on the construction and operation cost. At the preliminary phase, the design will integrate: confinement, containment, surveillance features and non-destructive assay equipment. Taking into account these requirements will help the operator in the approval of the plant at the design phase by national and international authorities in charge of Nuclear Material accounting and safeguards. A large amount of work has been made by the GEN IV International Forum to assess the proliferation resistance of nuclear systems. The IAEA has developed guidelines on ''Safeguards by design'' describing reference requirements for future nuclear facilities. Based on these studies, this communication details implementation of safeguards in the design of a sodium cooled fast neutron reactor (SFR) currently studied in France. Specificities are the use of MOX fuel with high concentration of plutonium and the potential capacity of breeding. A great attention should be paid to avoid diversion of nuclear material contained in fresh or irradiated fuel. Scenarios of reactor misuse are analyzed. The identification of diversion pathways and requirements for nuclear material accountancy, leads to an approach of safeguards, specific to SFR: Material Balance Areas (MBA) and some key measurement points (KMP) are characterized. Specific instrumentation assay helping in the identification and/or characterization of fuel elements and the inventory of nuclear material is described. As concerns the fuel cycle, the safeguards of the reprocessing unit will be progressively increased through the development of materials monitoring and the implementation of these measures at strategic locations of buildings, thus providing real-time information

Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

2012-04-01

Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.; Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.

1975-06-01

There has been much discussion and public debate concerning the effectiveness of the national system of safeguards against malevolent acts involving nuclear materials. Useful dialogue on this subject has been hampered by the lack of well-defined objectives, system parameters and boundary conditions as a framework for communication. This study provides such a framework. Expressing the safeguards objective in terms of societal risk represents a change in focus, rather than intent, from the earlier view of safeguards as a system for protecting nuclear material against theft or diversion. The study defines both the safeguards problem and the safeguards system in terms that can be related to the general safeguards objective. It is axiomatic that the first step to an effective solution is a careful definition of the problem. The significant and immediate value of this study lies in the rigorous definition and systematic organization of recognized elements into a coherent and comprehensive pattern. Although the title specifically addresses design and evaluation, the framework provided by the study will be a useful management tool for safeguards implementation and administration as well. (U.S.)

Process monitoring for reprocessing plant safeguards: a summary review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kerr, H.T.; Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.

1986-10-01

Process monitoring is a term typically associated with a detailed look at plant operating data to determine plant status. Process monitoring has been generally associated with operational control of plant processes. Recently, process monitoring has been given new attention for a possible role in international safeguards. International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) Task C.59 has the goal to identify specific roles for process monitoring in international safeguards. As the preliminary effort associated with this task, a review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts mentioned concepts and a few specific applications. None were comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report summarizes the basic elements that must be developed in a comprehensive process monitoring application for safeguards. It then summarizes the significant efforts that have been documented in the literature with respect to the basic elements that were addressed

Advanced safeguards systems development for chemical processing plants. Final report for Fiscal Year 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, C.E.

1980-01-01

A computer system is being installed by INEL to test and evaluate safeguards monitoring concepts in an operating nuclear fuel processing plant. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the ICPP provide plant information to a computer data acquisition and analysis system. Objective of the system is to collect data from process and safeguards sensors and show how this data can be analyzed to detect diversion operations or improper plant operation, and to test the performance of the monitoring devices. Approximately one-third of the installation designs and one-eighth of the installations were completed in FY 1979. The ICPP processing schedule for FY 1980 permits installation of the remaining monitoring devices before process startup in the fourth quarter of FY 1980. All computer hardware was delivered and checked out in FY 1979. Computer software system designs were completed with the majority of the programming scheduled for FY 1980. Sensor and instrument development in FY 1979 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications

Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Badwan, Faris M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Demuth, Scott Francis [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Miller, Michael Conrad [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Pshakin, Gennady [Obninsk Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (Russian Federation)

2015-02-23

Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may

Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Badwan, Faris M.; Demuth, Scott Francis; Miller, Michael Conrad; Pshakin, Gennady

2015-01-01

Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may

Advances in the Processing of VHR Optical Imagery in Support of Safeguards Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Niemeyer, I.; Listner, C.; Canty, M.

2015-01-01

Under the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) complementing the safeguards agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, commercial satellite imagery, preferably acquired by very high-resolution (VHR) satellite sensors, is an important source of safeguards-relevant information. Satellite imagery can assist in the evaluation of site declarations, design information verification, the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the preparation of inspections or other visits. With the IAEA's Geospatial Exploitation System (GES), satellite imagery and other geospatial information such as site plans of nuclear facilities are available for a broad range of inspectors, analysts and country officers. The demand for spatial information and new tools to analyze this data is growing, together with the rising number of nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide. Automated computer-driven processing of satellite imagery could therefore add a big value in the safeguards verification process. These could be, for example, satellite imagery pre-processing algorithms specially developed for new sensors, tools for pixel or object-based image analysis, or geoprocessing tools that generate additional safeguards-relevant information. In the last decade procedures for automated (pre-) processing of satellite imagery have considerably evolved. This paper aims at testing some pixel-based and object-based procedures for automated change detection and classification in support of safeguards verification. Taking different nuclear sites as examples, these methods will be evaluated and compared with regard to their suitability to (semi-) automatically extract safeguards-relevant information. (author)

Current status of process monitoring for IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koroyasu, M.

1987-06-01

Based on literature survey, this report tries to answer some of the following questions on process monitoring for safeguards purposes of future large scale reprocessing plants: what is process monitoring, what are the basic elements of process monitoring, what kinds of process monitoring are there, what are the basic problems of process monitoring, what is the relationship between process monitoring and near-real-time materials accountancy, what are actual results of process monitoring tests and what should be studied in future. A brief description of Advanced Safeguards Approaches proposed by the four states (France, U.K., Japan and U.S.A.), the approach proposed by the U.S.A., the description of the process monitoring, the main part of the report published as a result of one of the U.S. Support Programmes for IAEA Safeguards and an article on process monitoring presented at an IAEA Symposium held in November 1986 are given in the annexes. 24 refs, 20 figs, tabs

Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

2010-01-01

This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of 'safeguards by design'. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how 'safeguardability' was introduced into RRP.

Safeguards system design methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cravens, M.N.; Winblad, A.E.

1977-01-01

Sandia Laboratories is developing methods for the design of physical protection systems to safeguard special nuclear material and vital equipment at fixed sites. One method is outlined and illustrated with simplified examples drawn from current programs. The use of an adversary sequence diagram as an analysis tool is discussed

Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.; Bennett, C.A.

1975-01-01

A comprehensive rationale for safeguards design and evaluation, and a framework for continuing systematic assessment of the system's effectiveness and efficient allocation of available safeguards resources for balanced protection, were developed. The societal risk approach employed considers the likelihood of successful destructive acts involving nuclear materials or facilities and the magnitude of the effects on society. The safeguards problem is described in terms of events affecting societal risk and adversary actions. Structure of the safeguards system and the evaluation of its adequacy are discussed. Adversary characteristics are also discussed

Advanced safeguards research and development plan with an emphasis on its impact on nuclear power-plant design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobin, S.J.; Demuth, S.F.; Miller, M.C.; Swinhoe, M.T.; Thomas, K.E.

2007-01-01

One tool for reducing the concern of nuclear proliferation is enhanced safeguards. Present safeguards have evolved over the past 40 years, and future safeguards will grow from this strong base to implement new technologies for improving our ability to quantify nuclear material. This paper will give an overview of the advanced technology research and development plan for safeguarding. One of the research facilities planned by the Department of Energy is the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), to develop a novel nuclear fuel recycling program. Since the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility will receive and reprocess spent fuel and will fabricate fast-reactor fuel, a wide breadth of safeguards technologies is involved. A fundamental concept in safeguards is material control and accounting (MCA). 4 topics concerning MCA and requiring further research have been identified: 1) measuring spent fuel, 2) measuring the plutonium content in the electro-refiner with pyro-processing, 3) measuring plutonium in the presence of other actinides, and 4) measuring neptunium and americium in the presence of other actinides. As for the long-term research and development plan for the AFCF, it will include improving MCA techniques as well as introducing new techniques that are not related to MCA, for example, enhanced containment and surveillance, or enhanced process monitoring. The top priority will stay quantifying the plutonium as accurately as possible and to reach this purpose 4 relevant technologies have been identified: 1) the microcalorimeter, 2) the passive neutron-albedo reactivity, 3) list-mode data acquisition, and 4) a liquid-scintillator multiplicity counter. Incorporating safeguards into the initial design of AFCF (safeguards by design) is a central concept. As the technology research and development plan for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility is examined, particular attention will be given to safeguards technologies that may affect the physical design of nuclear power plants

Implementing Set Based Design into Department of Defense Acquisition

Science.gov (United States)

2016-12-01

The team employed a tailored waterfall process model in order to explore SBD applications in the support of defense acquisition and PORs. Figure 1...Engineering Model . Additionally, the team reviewed DOD case studies that implemented SBD. The SBD principles, along with the common themes from the...acquisition. 14. SUBJECT TERMS set based design, set based thinking, model based systems engineering, concurrent engineering, defense acquisition

Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

1976-01-01

Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. A facilities safeguards system suitable for a production plant is described in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides an information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

1978-06-01

Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially-severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. This paper describes a facilities safeguards system suitable for production plant, in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely-coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

Technology development for DUPIC process safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hong, J S; Kim, H D; Lee, Y G; Kang, H Y; Cha, H R; Byeon, K H; Park, Y S; Choi, H N [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

1997-07-01

As the strategy for DUPIC(Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU reactor) process safeguards, the neutron detection method was introduced to account for nuclear materials in the whole DUPIC process by selectively measuring spontaneous fission neutron signals from {sup 244}Cm. DSNC was designed and manufactured to measure the account of curium in the fuel bundle and associated process samples in the DUPIC fuel cycle. The MCNP code had response profile along the length of the CANDU type fuel bundle. It was found experimentally that the output signal variation due to the overall azimuthal asymmetry was less than 0.2%. The longitudinal detection efficiency distribution at every position including both ends was kept less than 2% from the average value. Spent fuel standards almost similar to DUPIC process material were fabricated from a single spent PWR fuel rod and the performance verification of the DSNC is in progress under very high radiation environment. The results of this test will be eventually benchmarked with other sources such as code simulation, chemical analysis and gamma analysis. COREMAS-DUPIC has been developed for the accountability management of nuclear materials treated by DUPIC facility. This system is able to track the controlled nuclear materials maintaining the material inventory in near-real time and to generate the required material accountability records and reports. Concerning the containment and surveillance technology, a focused R and D effort is given to the development of unattended continuous monitoring system. Currently, the component technologies of radiation monitoring and surveillance have been established, and continued R and D efforts are given to the integration of the components into automatic safeguards diagnostics. (author).

In-process hold-up as a measure of safeguards significance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hamlin, A.G.

1983-01-01

This paper examines the use of the in-process hold-up itself, as a measure of safeguards significance. It is argued that for any process plant it is possible to define design limits for in-process hold-up, outside which the plant will not operate, or will operate in a detectably abnormal manner. It follows, therefore, that if the in-process hold-up can be derived at frequent intervals by input/output analysis from the start of the campaign, the only diversion that can be made from it during that campaign is limited to the quantity necessary to move the apparent in-process hold-up from its normal operating condition to the upper limiting condition. It also follows that detection of this diversion is as positive for protracted diversion as for abrupt diversion. If that part of the in-process inventory that is only measurable by input/output analysis has an upper operating limit that differs from its normal operating limit by less than a significant safeguards quantity of the material in question, the IAEA's criteria for both quantity and timeliness can be met by a combination of input/output analysis to determine in-process hold-up during the campaign, together with a material balance over the campaign. The paper examines the possibility of applying this measure to process plants in general, discusses means of minimizing the in-process inventory that must be determined by input/output analysis, and the performance required of the input and output analysis. It concludes that with current precision of measurement and with one input and one output batch per day, each measured, the method would be satisfactory for a campaign lasting nearly a year and involving 6 tonnes of plutonium. The paper examines the considerable advantages in verification that would arise from limiting safeguards analyses to the two points of input and output. (author)

Development of data acquisition and processing software based on MS-Windows 3.X for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tan Yajun

1996-01-01

The development method of data acquisition and processing software based on MS-Windows 3.X for safeguards is presented. The paper describes the design methods of graphical user interface (GUI), multiwindow and multitask-based spectrum graph display, data acquisition and processing and the application of object-oriented programming (OOP). Using the package, an effective prototype design path can be found for MS-Windows-based software. The methods and programs have been applied in some safeguard non-destructive assay system

Assessment of Process Monitoring Techniques for Pyro processing Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Y. E.; Kim, C. M.; Yim, M. S. [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

PM technologies can be used to inspect normal/off-normal operation with various data obtained from facility operations in real time to meet safeguards objectives. To support the use of PM technologies for the purpose of pyroprocessing safeguards, this study aims at identifying technologies that could be useful for PM purposes and evaluating their applicability to a pyroprocessing facility. This paper describes the development of the assessment criteria to evaluate the practicality of candidate technologies for PM based on a variety of requirements and considerations. By using the developed assessment criteria, application of technologies in the oxide reduction process was assessed as a test case example. Research is necessary to validate the criteria according to the needs of each unit process, perhaps based on expert elicitation and/or international collaboration with other expert organization(s). These advanced assessment criteria will serve a useful guideline for selecting appropriate candidate PM technologies for pyroprocessing safeguards. Based on the results of using these evaluation criteria, the optimum technologies can be successfully selected for use at a large scale pyroprocessing facility.

Report Of The Workshop On Nuclear Facility Design Information Examination And Verification For Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, Richard; Bean, Robert

2009-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA's Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility's general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility's layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future

Reactor safeguards system assessment and design. Volume I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Daniel, S.L.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.

1978-06-01

This report describes the development and application of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear power reactor safeguards systems. Analytic techniques are used to identify the sabotage acts which could lead to release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, to determine the areas of a plant which must be protected to assure that significant release does not occur, to model the physical plant layout, and to evaluate the effectiveness of various safeguards systems. The methodology was used to identify those aspects of reactor safeguards systems which have the greatest effect on overall system performance and which, therefore, should be emphasized in the licensing process. With further refinements, the methodology can be used by the licensing reviewer to aid in assessing proposed or existing safeguards systems

Current Status of J-MOX Safeguards Design and Future Prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sampei, T.; Hiruta, K.; Shimizu, J.; Ikegame, K.

2015-01-01

The construction of JNFL MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant (J-MOX) is proceeding toward active test using uranium and MOX in July 2017, and completion of construction in October 2017. Although the construction schedule is largely impacted by progress of licencing, according to domestic law, JNFL is making every effort to get necessary permission of business licence and authorization of design and construction method as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is desirable that integrated safeguards approach is effective, efficient and consistent with J-MOX facility features. Discussion about the approach is going on among IAEA, Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO) and JNFL, and IAEA is planning to introduce the measures into the approach such as application of Near Real-Time Accountancy with frequent declaration from operator, Containment/Surveillance measures to storages, internal flow verification with 100%, random interim inspection (RII) and so on. RII scheme is intended to increase efficiency without compromising effectiveness and makes interruption of facility operation minimum. Also newly developed and improved safeguards equipment will be employed and it is possible to realize to increase credibility and efficiency of inspection by introduction of unattended/automatic safeguards equipment. Especially IAEA and JSGO share the development of non-destructive assay systems which meet the requirements from both parties. These systems will be jointly utilized at the flow verification, RII and PIV. JNFL will continue to provide enough design information in a timely manner toward early establishment of safeguards approach for J-MOX. Also JNFL will implement the coordination of installation and commissioning of safeguards equipment, and Design Information Verification activities for completion of construction in October 2017

REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

2009-10-01

Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

2010-08-07

This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

Design measures to facilitate implementation of safeguards at future water cooled nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The report is intended to present guidelines to the State authorities, designers and prospective purchasers of future water cooled power reactors which, if taken into account, will minimize the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation and ensure efficient and effective acquisition of safeguards data to the mutual benefit of the Member State, the plant operator and the IAEA. These guidelines incorporate the IAEA's experience in establishing and carrying out safeguards at currently operating nuclear power plants, the ongoing development of safeguards techniques and feedback of experience from plant operators and designers on the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation. The following main subjects are included: The IAEA's safeguards function for current and future nuclear power plants; summary of the political and legal foundations of the IAEA's safeguards system; the technical objective of safeguards and the supply and use of required design information; safeguards approaches for nuclear power plants; design implications of experience in safeguarding nuclear power plants and guidelines for future water cooled reactors to facilitate the implementation of safeguards

Computerization of the safeguards analysis decision process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.

1990-01-01

This paper reports that safeguards regulations are evolving to meet new demands for timeliness and sensitivity in detecting the loss or unauthorized use of sensitive nuclear materials. The opportunities to meet new rules, particularly in bulk processing plants, involve developing techniques which use modern, computerized process control and information systems. Using these computerized systems in the safeguards analysis involves all the challenges of the man-machine interface experienced in the typical process control application and adds new dimensions to accuracy requirements, data analysis, and alarm resolution in the regulatory environment

Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

2001-05-01

We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system.

Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

2001-05-01

We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system

International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included

Material Control and Accounting Design Considerations for High-Temperature Gas Reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Hockert, John

2011-01-01

The subject of this report is domestic safeguards and security by design (2SBD) for high-temperature gas reactors, focusing on material control and accountability (MC and A). The motivation for the report is to provide 2SBD support to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project, which was launched by Congress in 2005. This introductory section will provide some background on the NGNP project and an overview of the 2SBD concept. The remaining chapters focus specifically on design aspects of the candidate high-temperature gas reactors (HTGRs) relevant to MC and A, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements, and proposed MC and A approaches for the two major HTGR reactor types: pebble bed and prismatic. Of the prismatic type, two candidates are under consideration: (1) GA's GT-MHR (Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor), and (2) the Modular High-Temperature Reactor (M-HTR), a derivative of Areva's Antares reactor. The future of the pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR) for NGNP is uncertain, as the PBMR consortium partners (Westinghouse, PBMR (Pty) and The Shaw Group) were unable to agree on the path forward for NGNP during 2010. However, during the technology assessment of the conceptual design phase (Phase 1) of the NGNP project, AREVA provided design information and technology assessment of their pebble bed fueled plant design called the HTR-Module concept. AREVA does not intend to pursue this design for NGNP, preferring instead a modular reactor based on the prismatic Antares concept. Since MC and A relevant design information is available for both pebble concepts, the pebble-bed HTGRs considered in this report are: (1) Westinghouse PBMR; and (2) AREVA HTR-Module. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) sponsors the Fuel Cycle Research and Development program (FCR and D), which contains an element specifically focused on the domestic (or state) aspects of SBD. This Material Protection, Control and Accountancy Technology (MPACT) program supports the present

International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-12-31

Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included Refs, figs, 1 tab

The process monitoring computer system an integrated operations and safeguards surveillance system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liester, N.A.

1995-01-01

The use of the Process Monitoring Computer System (PMCS) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) relating to Operations and Safeguards concerns is discussed. Measures taken to assure the reliability of the system data are outlined along with the measures taken to assure the continuous availability of that data for use within the ICPP. The integration of process and safeguards information for use by the differing organizations is discussed. The PMCS successfully demonstrates the idea of remote Safeguards surveillance and the need for sharing of common information between different support organizations in an operating plant

Functional components for a design strategy: Hot cell shielding in the high reliability safeguards methodology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Borrelli, R.A., E-mail: rborrelli@uidaho.edu

2016-08-15

The high reliability safeguards (HRS) methodology has been established for the safeguardability of advanced nuclear energy systems (NESs). HRS is being developed in order to integrate safety, security, and safeguards concerns, while also optimizing these with operational goals for facilities that handle special nuclear material (SNM). Currently, a commercial pyroprocessing facility is used as an example system. One of the goals in the HRS methodology is to apply intrinsic features of the system to a design strategy. This current study investigates the thickness of the hot cell walls that could adequately shield processed materials. This is an important design consideration that carries implications regarding the formation of material balance areas, the location of key measurement points, and material flow in the facility.

Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Badwan, Faris M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2015-01-06

Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the

CIPSS [computer-integrated process and safeguards system]: The integration of computer-integrated manufacturing and robotics with safeguards, security, and process operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leonard, R.S.; Evans, J.C.

1987-01-01

This poster session describes the computer-integrated process and safeguards system (CIPSS). The CIPSS combines systems developed for factory automation and automated mechanical functions (robots) with varying degrees of intelligence (expert systems) to create an integrated system that would satisfy current and emerging security and safeguards requirements. Specifically, CIPSS is an extension of the automated physical security functions concepts. The CIPSS also incorporates the concepts of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) with integrated safeguards concepts, and draws upon the Defense Advance Research Project Agency's (DARPA's) strategic computing program

Modeling and simulation in the design and evaluation of conceptual safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cobb, D.D.; Smith, D.B.

1977-01-01

Recent work in modeling nuclear fuel-cycle processes and the materials measurement and accountability portion of integrated safeguards systems is summarized. Process variability, especially in the levels of in-process holdup and in scrap and waste sidestreams, impacts significantly on the design of dynamic materials accounting and control systems. In the absence of operating data from modern facilities, detailed dynamic models of process operation are required in order to evaluate systems design concepts. Numerical data are presented from the simulated operation of major portions of spent fuel reprocessing, plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion, and mixed-oxide fuel-fabrication processes

The IAEA safeguards information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

1976-01-01

The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

Integrated safeguards and security for a highly automated process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.; Hunteman, W.J.; Jaeger, C.D.

1993-01-01

Before the cancellation of the New Production Reactor Programs for the production of tritium, the reactors and associated processing were being designed to contain some of the most highly automated and remote systems conceived for a Department of Energy facility. Integrating safety, security, materials control and accountability (MC and A), and process systems at the proposed facilities would enhance the overall information and protection-in-depth available. Remote, automated fuel handling and assembly/disassembly techniques would deny access to the nuclear materials while upholding ALARA principles but would also require the full integration of all data/information systems. Such systems would greatly enhance MC and A as well as facilitate materials tracking. Physical protection systems would be connected with materials control features to cross check activities and help detect and resolve anomalies. This paper will discuss the results of a study of the safeguards and security benefits achieved from a highly automated and integrated remote nuclear facility and the impacts that such systems have on safeguards and computer and information security

Designing Data Protection Safeguards Ethically

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ugo Pagallo

2011-03-01

Full Text Available Since the mid 1990s, lawmakers and scholars have worked on the idea of embedding data protection safeguards in information and communication technology (ICT with the aim to access and control personal data in compliance with current regulatory frameworks. This effort has been strengthened by the capacities of computers to draw upon the tools of artificial intelligence (AI and operations research. However, work on AI and the law entails crucial ethical issues concerning both values and modalities of design. On one hand, design choices might result in conflicts of values and, vice versa, values may affect design features. On the other hand, the modalities of design cannot only limit the impact of harm-generating behavior but also prevent such behavior from occurring via self-enforcement technologies. In order to address some of the most relevant issues of data protection today, the paper suggests we adopt a stricter, yet more effective version of “privacy by design.” The goal should be to reinforce people’s pre-existing autonomy, rather than having to build it from scratch.

Process data in safeguards at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.

1988-01-01

The desire to improve timeliness and sensitivity of material control and accounting capabilities is the basis for evaluation and upgrade of regulatory requirements throughout the nuclear industry. Improvements invariably require better measurement capabilities and more frequent measurements. Operating plants typically include a broad range of measurements and equipment devoted to process control. How can these measurements be used to benefit safeguards? A part of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory has focused on the use of process data for safeguards. This report discusses recent safeguards demonstrations and current activities in a test facility at Oak Ridge

The evolution of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heinonen, O.

1999-01-01

The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

Euratom Safeguards: Improving Safeguards by Cooperation in R&D and Implementation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schwalbach, P.; Schoop, K.; Ancius, D.; Marszalek, Y.; Smejkal, A.; Vaccaro, S.; De Baere, P.; Koutsoyannopoulos, C.; Meylemans, P.; Murtezi, M.; Persson, L.; Synetos, S.; Tempesta, S.; Canadell Bofarull, V.; Turner, D.; Goncalves, J.G.M.; Peerani, P.; Berndt, R.; Stringa, E.; Richir, P.; Sequeira, V.; Tagziria, H.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Zuleger, E.; Luetzenkirchen, K.; )

2015-01-01

Euratom Safeguards, implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty by the European Commission's Directorate Nuclear Safeguards, is the largest Regional Safeguards System and involved in many R&D activities of its own, often in close cooperation with external partners. Most of the results of these activities are shared with or offered to the IAEA. The work described in this paper is complementary to the projects run by the European Commission Cooperative Support Programme (ECSP) to the IAEA. The ECSP activities will be described elsewhere at this conference. The present paper will provide an overview on R&D activities run in addition to the ECSP, and will attempt to link them to the capabilities discussed by the IAEA in the Long Term R&D Plan. The range of topics will include work on unattended data acquisition systems (hard- and software), advanced data analysis tools, news from seals related technology, containment and design verification applications of 3D lasers, activities to keep standard measurement technologies sustainable etc. Work done with the IAEA in preparation of new facilities and facility types will be discussed briefly. The paper will also highlight some current challenges and make suggestions how to address them. (author)

Safeguards and security design guidelines for conceptual monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Byers, K.R.; Clark, R.G.; Harms, N.L.; Roberts, F.P.

1984-07-01

Existing safeguards/security regulations and licensing requirements that may be applicable to an MRS facility are not currently well-defined. Protection requirements consistent with the NRC-graded safeguards approach are identified, as a baseline safeguards system with a comparison of the impacts on safeguards and security of salient features of the different storage concepts. In addition, MRS facility design features and operational considerations are proposed that would enhance facility protection and provide additional assurance that protection systems and procedures would be effectively implemented. 3 figures

DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

2009-07-01

A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, Pierre

2001-01-01

Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

Development of DUPIC safeguards neutron counter

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Young Gil; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Ho Dong; Hong, Jong Sook; Kang, Hee Young

1999-08-01

KAERI, in cooperation with LANL, developed DSNC (DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter) for safeguards implementing on DUPIC process which is under development by KAERI for direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DSNC is a well-type neutron coincidence counter with substantial shielding to protect system from high gamma radiation of spent fuel. General development procedures in terms of design, manufacturing, fabrication, cold and hot test, performance test for DSNC authentication by KAERI-IAEA-LANL are described in this report. It is expected that the techniques related DSNC development and associated neutron detection and evaluation method could be applied for safeguards improvement. (Author). 20 refs., 16 tabs. 98 figs.

Safeguards approaches for conversion and gas centrifuge enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stanuch, C.; Whitaker, M.; Lockwood, D.; Boyer, B.

2013-01-01

This paper describes recent studies and investigations of new safeguards measures and inspection tools to strengthen international safeguards at GCEPs (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants) and conversion plants. The IAEA has indicated that continuous, unattended process monitoring should play a central role in future safeguards approaches for conversion plants and GCEPs. Monitoring safeguards relevant information from accountancy scales, process load cells, and unit header pipes can make existing safeguards approaches more efficient by replacing repetitive, routine, labor-intensive inspection activities with automated systems. These systems can make the safeguards approach more effective by addressing more completely the safeguards objectives at these facilities. Automated collection and analysis of the data can further enable the IAEA to move towards a fully-information driven inspection regime with randomized (from the operator's perspective), short-notice inspections. The reduction in repetitive on-site inspection activities would also be beneficial to plant operators, but only if sensitive and proprietary information can be protected and the new systems prove to be reliable. New facilities that incorporate Safeguards by Design into the earliest design stages can facilitate the effective DIV (Design Information Verification) of the plant to allow the inspectors to analyze the capacity of the plant, to project maximum production from the plant, and to provide a focus on the areas in the plant where credible diversion scenarios could be attempted. Facilitating efficient nuclear material accountancy by simplifying process pipework and making flow measurement points more accessible can allow for easier estimation of plant holdup and a potential reduction in the number of person-days of inspection. Lastly, a universal monitoring standard that tracks the location, movement, and use of UF 6 cylinders may enhance the efficiency of operations at industry sites and would

Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant by IAEA Member State Support Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shin, H. S.; Kim, H. D.; Song, D. Y.; Eom, S. H.; Lee, T. H.; Ahn, S. K.; Park, S. H.; Han, B. Y.; Choi, Y.

2012-01-01

. However, in this report the Reference Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) is proposed to develop a safeguards approach for the integrated pyroprocessing facility. The REPF has identical processes with ESPF model but has been primarily designed for the purpose of safeguards approach development. The main subject in this report is to develop a nuclear material accounting system that includes an analysis of possible Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Points (KMP), the identification of possible operator measurement systems at KMP, and a simulation of processing operation. Based on those information, Material Unaccounted For (MUF) for the REPF were estimated. Most of contents in this report has been discussed and revised by IAEA and KAERI in the MSSP working group meeting. The assessment of the safeguard ability of the reference pyroprocessing facility concept was studied preliminarily. Pyroprocess technology is focused on securing the sustain ability of nuclear energy by improving proliferation resistance, economic efficiency, environmental friendliness, and resource utilization of back end nuclear fuel cycle. The international community's confidence should be secured for the realization of pyroprocess technology. Also, a study to demonstrate the safeguard ability for pyroprocess facility is needed through analyzing and evaluating nuclear material flow, accountancy of pyroprocess, and the measurement uncertainties of accounting equipment

International safeguards data management system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Franklin, M.; Dondi, M.G.

1981-01-01

The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

Process monitor design for an extraction column: an application of estimation/detection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Candy, J.V.; Emmert, R.A.; Patterson, G.K.

1979-03-01

The NRC Safeguards Program at LLL is directed toward developing a methodology for assessing the effectiveness of material control and accounting systems at processing/reprocessing facilities for special nuclear material. The methodology under development requires many types of mathematical models including performance models of safeguard components. Included in the class of safeguard components are real-time measurement systems which incorporate on-line estimators/detectors for the timely detection of material losses. Performance modeling generally involves mathematical model development and simulation of the physical process being measured. This report discusses the development of material estimator designs for a liquid--liquid extraction column using a reprocessing application. These designs are applicable to any processing unit which can be adequately represented by linear or nonlinear models in state space form. Although this work is discussed in the context of a plutonium extraction column, it is representative of two classes of safeguard components which are generic to any fuel cycle involving chemical separations/purifications

Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Howell, John

2010-01-01

Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF 6 feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load

Inventory of safeguards software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

2009-03-01

The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

Safeguards can not operate alone

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

2013-01-01

There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility: Coprecal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.

1979-02-01

This report describes the conceptual design of an advanced materials-management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility based on the Coprecal process. Design concepts are presented for near real-time (dynamic) accountability by forming dynamic materials balances from information provided by chemical and nondestructive analyses and from process-control instrumentation. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to compare the sensitivities of proposed dynamic materials accounting strategies to both abrupt and protracted diversion. The safeguards implications of coconversion as well as some unique features of the reference process are discussed and design criteria are identified to improve the safeguardability of the Coprecal coconversion process

Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

1999-01-01

A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

Safeguards as Design Criteria - Guidance for Regulators

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leask, Andrew; Leslie, Russell; Carlson, John

2004-01-01

This paper examines some technological barriers which should be taken into account at the conceptual stage of fuel cycle design. First, the strategic value of nuclear material and reactor-associated fissile material acquisition paths is briefly outlined. Then, it discusses three basic approaches to enhance the proliferation resistance of nuclear power reactors, namely: (1) reduction of strategic value of materials involved in nuclear power generation; (2) incorporating reactor design features preventing diversion of material; and (3) facilitating safeguards implementation. (author)

Networking of safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chare, P.; Dutrannois, A.; Kloeckner, W.; Swinhoe, M.

1995-01-01

This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

The next generation safeguards initiative

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobey, William

2008-01-01

NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

Holdup-related issues in safeguarding of nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.

1988-03-01

Residual inventories of special nuclear materials (SNM) remaining in processing facilities (holdup) are recognized as an insidious problem for both safety and safeguards. This paper identifies some of the issues that are of concern to the safeguards community at-large that are related to holdup of SNM in large-scale process equipment. These issues range from basic technologies of SNM production to changing regulatory requirements to meet the needs of safeguarding nuclear materials. Although there are no magic formulas to resolve these issues, there are several initiatives that could be taken in areas of facility design, plant operation, personnel training, SNM monitoring, and regulatory guidelines to minimize the problems of holdup and thereby improve both safety and safeguards at nuclear material processing plants. 8 refs

Middle term prospects for Japan's safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ogawa, T.

2001-01-01

Japan has responded to IAEA requirements on reinforced safeguard regulations. The IAEA additional protocol entered in force in Japan on December 1999. Japan submitted a preliminary information report to IAEA on June 2000 after joint works with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) of Japan. The first annual report was submitted to IAEA on May 2001. Another activity for the additional protocol is complementary accesses. The total 36 accesses to facilities have been done from November 2000 to September 2001. Procedures of access to managements are under discussion. MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has been constructing the Rokkasho Safeguards On-Site Laboratory from 1997, and the Rokkasho Safeguards Center from 2000. The Design Information Verification (DIV) is now ongoing. Much more personal resources will be needed for future inspections. Therefore, the budget for safeguards is increasing in contrast to the flat base budget for the total atomic energy. As for future activity, a MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuels) fuel processing plant is one of the issues for discussion. The construction of the MOX processing plant is supposed to begin on around 2004. The conclusion of additional protocol will be given by IAEA until end of 2002. Shift to integrated safeguards are under discussions by MEXT, NMCC and utilities of Japan parallel with IAEA. Key issues of discussion are cost saving for safeguards, development of personal resources for inspectors and the role of NMCC. (Y. Tanaka)

Authentication method for safeguards instruments securing data transmission

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Neumann, G.; Gartner, K.J.

1986-01-01

Because of the worldwide increase in nuclear fuel cycle activities, the need arises to reduce inspection effort by increasing the inspection efficiency per facility. Therefore, more and more advanced safeguards instruments will be designed for automatic operation. In addition, sensoring and recording devices may be well separated from each other within the facility, while the data transmission medium is a cable. The basic problem is the authenticity of the transmitted information. It has to be ensured that no potential adversary is able to falsify the transmitted safeguards data, i.e. the data transmission is secured. At present, predominantly C/S-devices are designed for automatic and remote interrogation. Also in other areas of safeguards instrumentation authentication will become a major issue, in particular, where the facility operator may offer his process instrumentation to be used also for safeguards purposes. In this paper possibilities to solve the problem of authentication are analysed

EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heppleston, M.

1999-01-01

This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

Understanding national and international safeguards: an evolutionary process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Higinbotham, W.A.

1983-01-01

Domestic and international safeguards have been evolving and will continue to evolve. in the case of the United States, the concern was to protect the classified materials, at first. Then attention focussed on material accounting, then on measures to promptly detect theft by individuals with access, and later on physical protection to ward-off armed terrorists. The objective of the IAEA has always been to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not being diverted from the peaceful facilities that are under safeguards. The evolution has taken place in deciding how to provide this assurance, and in the definition of specific safeguards goals. In both cases the technology needed to meet the goals has improved due to R and D and to experience. A plea is made for more cooperation betwen those who develop and manage the policies, those who develop safeguards techniques, and those who are subject to national and IAEA safeguards. Some illustrations of the evolution of policies, inadequate coordination and general progress are given

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Bowersox, D.F.

1977-09-01

The conceptual design of a materials management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility is developed and evaluated. Dynamic material balances are drawn from information provided by nondestructive-analysis techniques, process-control instrumentation, and conventional chemical analyses augmented by process-monitoring devices. Powerful statistical methods, cast in the framework of decision analysis and applied to unit-process accounting areas, ensure adequate spatial and temporal quantification of possible diversion with minimal process disruption. Modeling and simulation techniques assist in evaluating the sensitivity of the system to various diversion schemes and in comparing safeguards strategies. Features that would improve the safeguardability of the conversion process are discussed

Improved IAEA safeguards for closed nuclear fuel cycles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-12-01

The paper recognises the limitations of nuclear material accountancy in applying safeguards to future large scale processing plants. For those plants the following will be necessary: (i) The inclusion of safeguards requirements in design criteria. (ii) Extensive application of containment and surveillance with monitors on personnel and goods exits, pipework, tanks, etc. (iii) Continuous inspectorate measurement of input and output flows. Local IAEA laboratories to ensure timeliness. (iv) Upgrading of process control information to enable the inspectorate to monitor the in-process inventory. The inspectorates knowledge of the in-process inventory will be valuable in their assessment of any alarms given by the containment-surveillance system

Design of an engineered safeguards system for a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Winblad, A.E.; McKnight, R.P.; Fienning, W.C.; Fenchel, B.R.

1977-06-01

Several Engineered Safeguards System concepts and designs are described that provide increased protection against a wide spectrum of adversary threats. An adversary sequence diagram that outlines all possible adversary paths through the safeguards elements in a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility is shown. An example of a critical adversary path is given

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a fuel reprocessing plant. Volume I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Augustson, R.H.; Barnes, J.W.

1977-09-01

A materials management system is described for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a fuel-reprocessing plant. Recently developed nondestructive-analysis techniques and process-monitoring devices are combined with conventional chemical analyses and process-control instrumentation for improved materials accounting data. Unit-process accounting based on dynamic material balances permits localization of diversion in time and space, and the application of advanced statistical methods supported by decision-analysis theory ensures optimum use of accounting information for detecting diversion. This coordinated safeguards system provides maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimum process interference. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to evaluate the sensitivity of the system to single and multiple thefts and to compare various safeguards options. The study identifies design criteria that would improve the safeguardability of future plants

Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swinhoe, Martyn T.

2012-01-01

The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R and D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

Torsional fatigue model for limitorque type SMB/SB/SBD actuators for motor-operated valves

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Somogyi, D.; Alvarez, P.D.; Kalsi, M.S. [Kalsi Engineering, Inc., Sugar Land, TX (United States)

1996-12-01

Kalsi Engineering, Inc. has recently developed a computer program to predict the torsional fatigue life of Limitorque Type SMB/SB/SBD actuators for motor-operated valves under given loading levels, including those that exceed the ratings. The development effort was an outgrowth of the {open_quote}Thrust Rating Increase{close_quote} test program. The fatigue model computes all pertinent stress components and their variations as a function of the loading ramp. The cumulative damage and fatigue life due to stress cycling is computed by use of a modification of Miner`s rule. Model predictions were validated against actual cyclic loading test results.

Torsional fatigue model for limitorque type SMB/SB/SBD actuators for motor-operated valves

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Somogyi, D.; Alvarez, P.D.; Kalsi, M.S.

1996-01-01

Kalsi Engineering, Inc. has recently developed a computer program to predict the torsional fatigue life of Limitorque Type SMB/SB/SBD actuators for motor-operated valves under given loading levels, including those that exceed the ratings. The development effort was an outgrowth of the open-quote Thrust Rating Increase close-quote test program. The fatigue model computes all pertinent stress components and their variations as a function of the loading ramp. The cumulative damage and fatigue life due to stress cycling is computed by use of a modification of Miner's rule. Model predictions were validated against actual cyclic loading test results

Improving collaborative work and project management in a nuclear power plant design team: A human-centered design approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boy, Guy André; Jani, Gopal; Manera, Annalisa; Memmott, Matthew; Petrovic, Bojan; Rayad, Yassine; Stephane, Lucas; Suri, Neha

2016-01-01

This article presents a collaborative system, called SCORE, useful for a multi-disciplinary team designing a new nuclear power plant (NPP). It was developed during the first phase of the I 2 S-LWR project (Integral Inherently Safe Light Water Reactor). SCORE enables the generation of design cards (DCs). A DC includes four main spaces (Boy, 2005): (1) a rationalization space where the various components of the system being designed (SBD) are described in terms of design rationale, integration and requirements; this space includes declarative and procedural descriptions and statements; (2) an activity space where the current version of the SBD is displayed; it includes static and dynamic features; this space enables SBD manipulation; (3) a structure space where the various components and their inter-relations are formally and declaratively described as systems of systems; (4) a function space where the various functions of the SBD are described in terms of procedural knowledge and dynamic processes involved; this space includes qualitative and quantitative physical and cognitive models. The rationalization space is informed using an adapted version of the QOC method (Questions, Options, Criteria), which was tested within the I 2 S-LWR design team. The activity space contains 3D models developed using AutoDesk Inventor, and transferred into the Unity game engine web player in order to facilitate integration within the DC spaces and enable intuitive manipulation of objects in the activity space. Two additional spaces were added: an instant messaging capability that allows design team members (DTMs) to exchange with one another on a DC; and a structured evaluation space. DCs are cooperatively created and refined by DTMs, and synthesized during periodic design meetings, the frequency of which may vary. Incrementally combining abstract explanations of designed elements and integration with their explicit visual representation improves mutual understanding among DTMs, and

Computer-based safeguards information and accounting system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

Acquiring, processing and analysing information about inventories and flow of nuclear materials are essential parts of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards information originates from several sources. The information to be provided is specified in the various safeguards agreements between the States and the IAEA, including both NPT agreements and safeguards trilateral agreements. Most of the safeguards information currently received by the IAEA is contained in accounting reports from the States party to the NPT. Within the frame of the material balance concept of NPT, three types of reports are provided to the IAEA by the States: Physical Inventory Listings (PIL); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports (MBR). In addition, facility design information is reported when NPT safeguards are applied and whenever there is a change in the facility or its operation. Based on this data, an accounting system is used to make available such information as the book inventories of nuclear material as a function of time, material balance evaluations, and analysis of shipments versus receipts of nuclear material. A second source of NPT safeguards information is the inspection activities carried out in the field as a necessary counterpart for verification of the data presented by the States in their accounting reports. The processing of inspection reports and other inspection data is carried out by the present system in a provisional manner until a new system, which is under development is available. The major effort currently is directed not to computer processing but toward developing and applying uniform inspection procedures and information requirements. A third source of NPT safeguards information is advanced notifications and notifications of transfer of source materials before the starting point of safeguards. Since, however, the States are not completely aware of the need and requirement to provide these data, this is a point to be emphasized in future workshops and

Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Garcia, Humberto; Desmond, William; Demuth, Scott

2010-01-01

International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

Coupling a Transient Solvent Extraction Module with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

de Almeida, Valmor F [ORNL; Birdwell Jr, Joseph F [ORNL; DePaoli, David W [ORNL; Gauld, Ian C [ORNL

2009-10-01

A past difficulty in safeguards design for reprocessing plants is that no code existed for analysis and evaluation of the design. A number of codes have been developed in the past, but many are dated, and no single code is able to cover all aspects of materials accountancy, process monitoring, and diversion scenario analysis. The purpose of this work was to integrate a transient solvent extraction simulation module developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the SSPM Separations and Safeguards Performance Model, developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The SSPM was designed for materials accountancy and process monitoring analyses, but previous versions of the code have included limited detail on the chemical processes, including chemical separations. The transient solvent extraction model is based on the ORNL SEPHIS code approach to consider solute build up in a bank of contactors in the PUREX process. Combined, these capabilities yield a much more robust transient separations and safeguards model for evaluating safeguards system design. This coupling and the initial results are presented. In addition, some observations toward further enhancement of separations and safeguards modeling based on this effort are provided, including: items to be addressed in integrating legacy codes, additional improvements needed for a fully functional solvent extraction module, and recommendations for future integration of other chemical process modules.

On-line safeguards design: an application of estimation/detection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Candy, J.V.; Dunn, D.R.; Rozsa, R.B.

1979-01-01

The applicability of madern signal processing techniques to the safeguards problem for a plutonium nitrate storage tank and concentrator is addressed. The techniques involve mathematical modeling, optimal estimation of process variables, and the detection of abnormal changes in these variables due to adversary diversion. The performance of these techniques is preesented for various diversion scenarios

Safeguards resource management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.

1986-01-01

Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

1983-01-01

Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

Safeguards systems parameters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

1979-01-01

In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.

2011-01-01

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

Simulation enabled safeguards assessment methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bean, Robert; Bjornard, Trond; Larson, Tom

2007-01-01

It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wire-frame construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed. (authors)

Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

2007-01-01

It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed

Safeguards Export-Import Training: Adapting to Changes in the Department of Safeguards Over 6 Years of Experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, R.; ); Crete, J.-M.; Schot, P.-M.; Hushbeck, E.C.; Heine, P.

2015-01-01

Safeguards relevant information encompasses information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfiling its obligations under relevant safeguards agreement(s). It includes information relating to nuclear or nuclear related trade like international transfers of nuclear material, or export (or import upon request by the Agency) of specified equipment described in annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. It may also include information provided by States on a voluntary basis. In 2005, the General Conference (see GC(49)/RES/13) encouraged the provision of information on procurement enquiries, export denials and other nuclear related information. Objectively and independently assessing this information and combining it with other Safeguards data and knowledge requires relevant expertise and well defined processes. Since 2008, the bi-annual Export-Import (EXIM) Training Workshop, jointly run by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the U.S. Department of Energy, enables SG staff to develop competencies required for collecting, processing and drawing objective conclusions in this area. Over the years, more than 150 SG staff have been exposed to technical information on relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, trade data from different origins, analytical processes, and exercises to use this knowledge in realistic safeguards work scenarios. The EXIM training has also been an opportunity to develop analytical best practices and explore how this analytical work finds it place in the verification process. The paper describes the background and purpose of the EXIM training, how it helps Safeguards to independently collect and analyze relevant trade information to fulfil its obligations. It also touches on the lessons learned from six years of training experience, observing how the Department of Safeguards develops and implements structured processes to collect, process and evaluate safeguards relevant trade information, in order to establish findings and draw

THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stanbro, W. D.

1990-01-01

The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

Impact of certain safeguards considerations on fuel-cycle facility design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Darby, J.L.; de Montmollin, J.M.

1979-01-01

Both physical protection and containment/surveillance systems impact plant design and operations. Effective physical protection systems can be systematically designed; work on designing containment/surveillance systems is in progress. Fuel fabrication facility designers need to be cognizant of these safeguards system developments to enable effective implementation of them with as little effect on plant functions as possible. This brief overview provides a general indication of what the impacts of the systems might be, and current thinking on their structure

Design features for enhancing international safeguards of AFR dry storage for spent LWR fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roberts, F.P.; Harms, N.L.

1985-05-01

The Pacific Northwest Laboratory has performed a study for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to identify and analyze design features that can facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards at facilities for dry storage of light water reactor spent fuels. Specific design features are identified that can enhance nuclear material flow and inventory verification. These are assessed from the viewpoint of safeguards effectiveness and possible impacts on the IAEA and the operator of the AFR facility. 11 refs., 3 figs., 2 tabs

Design features to facilitate IAEA safeguards at light water reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pasternak, T.; Glancy, J.; Goldman, L.; Swartz, J.

1981-01-01

Several studies have been performed recently to identify and analyze light water reactor (LWR) features that, if incorporated into the facility design, would facilitate the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This paper presents results and conclusions of these studies. 2 refs

Coupling a transient solvent extraction module with the separations and safeguards performance model.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

DePaoli, David W. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Birdwell, Joseph F. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Gauld, Ian C. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Cipiti, Benjamin B.; de Almeida, Valmor F. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN)

2009-10-01

A number of codes have been developed in the past for safeguards analysis, but many are dated, and no single code is able to cover all aspects of materials accountancy, process monitoring, and diversion scenario analysis. The purpose of this work was to integrate a transient solvent extraction simulation module developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The SSPM was designed for materials accountancy and process monitoring analyses, but previous versions of the code have included limited detail on the chemical processes, including chemical separations. The transient solvent extraction model is based on the ORNL SEPHIS code approach to consider solute build up in a bank of contactors in the PUREX process. Combined, these capabilities yield a more robust transient separations and safeguards model for evaluating safeguards system design. This coupling and initial results are presented. In addition, some observations toward further enhancement of separations and safeguards modeling based on this effort are provided, including: items to be addressed in integrating legacy codes, additional improvements needed for a fully functional solvent extraction module, and recommendations for future integration of other chemical process modules.

Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) into the design of small modular reactors : a handbook.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Middleton, Bobby D. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Mendez, Carmen Margarita [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2013-10-01

The existing regulatory environment for nuclear reactors impacts both the facility design and the cost of operations once the facility is built. Delaying the consideration of regulatory requirements until late in the facility design - or worse, until after construction has begun - can result in costly retrofitting as well as increased operational costs to fulfill safety, security, safeguards, and emergency readiness requirements. Considering the scale and scope, as well as the latest design trends in the next generation of nuclear facilities, there is an opportunity to evaluate the regulatory requirements and optimize the design process for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), as compared to current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). To this end, Sandia has embarked on an initiative to evaluate the interactions of regulations and operations as an approach to optimizing the design of SMR facilities, supporting operational efficiencies, as well as regulatory requirements. The early stages of this initiative consider two focus areas. The first focus area, reported by LaChance, et al. (2007), identifies the regulatory requirements established for the current fleet of LWR facilities regarding Safety, Security, Operations, Safeguards, and Emergency Planning, and evaluates the technical bases for these requirements. The second focus area, developed in this report, documents the foundations for an innovative approach that supports a design framework for SMR facilities that incorporates the regulatory environment, as well as the continued operation of the facility, into the early design stages, eliminating the need for costly retrofitting and additional operating personnel to fulfill regulatory requirements. The work considers a technique known as Integrated Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (ISOSS) (Darby, et al., 2007). In coordination with the best practices of industrial operations, the goal of this effort is to develop a design framework that outlines how ISOSS

Applying new safeguards technology to existing nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, C.E.; Wagner, E.P.

1979-01-01

The application and operation of safeguards instrumentation in a facility containing special nuclear material is most successful when the installation is designed for the operation of the specific facility. Experience at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory demonstrates that installation designs must consider both Safeguards and Production requirements of specific facilities. Equipment selection and installation design influenced by the training and experience of production operations and safeguards personnel at a specific facility help assure successful installation, reliable operation, and minimal operator training. This minimizes impacts on existing plant production activities while maximizing utility of the safeguards information obtained

Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Durbin, Samuel G. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Lindgren, Eric Richard [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Jones, Robert [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Ketusky, Edward [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); England, Jeffrey [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Scherer, Carolynn [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Sprinkle, James [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Miller, Michael. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Rauch, Eric [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Scaglione, John [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Dunn, T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2016-05-01

In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. A set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.

Safeguardability of a commercial-scaled ACP facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ko, Won Il; Lee, S. Y.; Kim, H. D.; Ha, J. H.; Song, D. Y.; Lee, T. H

2004-07-01

The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. This report documents a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot scale ACP facility were designed for this study. Then, their Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Point (KMP) were defined based on diversion scenario analysis. Finally, the limit of error in the MUF value was estimated using international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods. Based on the results of preliminary study, we concluded that the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility.

Safeguardability of a commercial-scaled ACP facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ko, Won Il; Lee, S. Y.; Kim, H. D.; Ha, J. H.; Song, D. Y.; Lee, T. H.

2004-07-01

The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. This report documents a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot scale ACP facility were designed for this study. Then, their Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Point (KMP) were defined based on diversion scenario analysis. Finally, the limit of error in the MUF value was estimated using international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods. Based on the results of preliminary study, we concluded that the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility

Strain-Based Design Methodology of Large Diameter Grade X80 Linepipe

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lower, Mark D. [ORNL

2014-04-01

Continuous growth in energy demand is driving oil and natural gas production to areas that are often located far from major markets where the terrain is prone to earthquakes, landslides, and other types of ground motion. Transmission pipelines that cross this type of terrain can experience large longitudinal strains and plastic circumferential elongation as the pipeline experiences alignment changes resulting from differential ground movement. Such displacements can potentially impact pipeline safety by adversely affecting structural capacity and leak tight integrity of the linepipe steel. Planning for new long-distance transmission pipelines usually involves consideration of higher strength linepipe steels because their use allows pipeline operators to reduce the overall cost of pipeline construction and increase pipeline throughput by increasing the operating pressure. The design trend for new pipelines in areas prone to ground movement has evolved over the last 10 years from a stress-based design approach to a strain-based design (SBD) approach to further realize the cost benefits from using higher strength linepipe steels. This report presents an overview of SBD for pipelines subjected to large longitudinal strain and high internal pressure with emphasis on the tensile strain capacity of high-strength microalloyed linepipe steel. The technical basis for this report involved engineering analysis and examination of the mechanical behavior of Grade X80 linepipe steel in both the longitudinal and circumferential directions. Testing was conducted to assess effects on material processing including as-rolled, expanded, and heat treatment processing intended to simulate coating application. Elastic-plastic and low-cycle fatigue analyses were also performed with varying internal pressures. Proposed SBD models discussed in this report are based on classical plasticity theory and account for material anisotropy, triaxial strain, and microstructural damage effects

All-Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ferguson, Matthew; Norman, Claude

2010-01-01

All source information analysis enables proactive implementation of in-field verification activities, supports the State Evaluation process, and is essential to the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. Information sources include State-declared nuclear material accounting and facility design information; voluntarily supplied information such as nuclear procurement data; commercial satellite imagery; open source information and information/results from design information verifications (DIVs), inspections and complementary accesses (CAs). The analysis of disparate information sources directly supports inspections, design information verifications and complementary access, and enables both more reliable cross-examination for consistency and completeness as well as in-depth investigation of possible safeguards compliance issues. Comparison of State-declared information against information on illicit nuclear procurement networks, possible trafficking in nuclear materials, and scientific and technical information on nuclear-related research and development programmes, provides complementary measures for monitoring nuclear developments and increases Agency capabilities to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. Likewise, expert analysis of commercial satellite imagery plays a critical role for monitoring un-safeguarded sites and facilities. In sum, the combination of these measures provides early identification of possible undeclared nuclear material or activities, thus enhancing deterrence of safeguards system that is fully information driven, and increasing confidence in Safeguards conclusions. By increasing confidence that nuclear materials and technologies in States under Safeguards are used solely for peaceful purposes, information-driven safeguards will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system. Key assets for Agency collection, processing, expert analysis, and integration of these information sources are the Information Collection and Analysis

Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

1980-01-01

This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

Implementation of the NANoREG Safe-by-Design approach for different nanomaterial applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Micheletti, C; Roman, M; Tedesco, E; Olivato, I; Benetti, F

2017-01-01

The Safe-by-Design (SbD) concept is already in use in different industrial sectors as an integral part of the innovation process management. However, the adopted approach is often limited to design solutions aiming at hazard reduction. Safety is not always considered during the innovation process, mainly due to the lack of knowledge (e.g. in small and medium companies, SMEs) and the lack of dialogue between actors along the innovation chain. The net result is that safety is considered only at the end of the innovation process at the market authorization phase, with potential loss of time and money. This is especially valid for manufactured nanomaterials (MNM) for which the regulatory context is not completely developed, and the safety knowledge is not readily available. In order to contribute to a sustainable innovation process in the nanotechnology field by maximising both benefits and safety, the NANoREG project developed a Safe Innovation approach, based on two elements: the Safe-by-Design approach which aims at including risk assessment into all innovation stages; and the Regulatory Preparedness, focused on the dialogue with stakeholders along the innovation chain. In this work we present some examples about the implementation in our Laboratory of this approach for different MNM applications, covering different steps of the innovation chain. The case studies include: the feasibility study of a medical device including substances, for topical application; the testing of two potential nanotech solutions for the consolidation of cultural heritage artifacts; the testing of coatings already on the market for other uses, which was tested as food contact materials (FCM) to evaluate the conformity to food applications. These three examples represent a good opportunity to show the importance of NANoREG SbD and Safe Innovation Approach in general, for developing new nanotechnology-based products, also highlighting the crucial role of EU ProSafe project in promoting this

Implementation of the NANoREG Safe-by-Design approach for different nanomaterial applications

Science.gov (United States)

Micheletti, C.; Roman, M.; Tedesco, E.; Olivato, I.; Benetti, F.

2017-06-01

The Safe-by-Design (SbD) concept is already in use in different industrial sectors as an integral part of the innovation process management. However, the adopted approach is often limited to design solutions aiming at hazard reduction. Safety is not always considered during the innovation process, mainly due to the lack of knowledge (e.g. in small and medium companies, SMEs) and the lack of dialogue between actors along the innovation chain. The net result is that safety is considered only at the end of the innovation process at the market authorization phase, with potential loss of time and money. This is especially valid for manufactured nanomaterials (MNM) for which the regulatory context is not completely developed, and the safety knowledge is not readily available. In order to contribute to a sustainable innovation process in the nanotechnology field by maximising both benefits and safety, the NANoREG project developed a Safe Innovation approach, based on two elements: the Safe-by-Design approach which aims at including risk assessment into all innovation stages; and the Regulatory Preparedness, focused on the dialogue with stakeholders along the innovation chain. In this work we present some examples about the implementation in our Laboratory of this approach for different MNM applications, covering different steps of the innovation chain. The case studies include: the feasibility study of a medical device including substances, for topical application; the testing of two potential nanotech solutions for the consolidation of cultural heritage artifacts; the testing of coatings already on the market for other uses, which was tested as food contact materials (FCM) to evaluate the conformity to food applications. These three examples represent a good opportunity to show the importance of NANoREG SbD and Safe Innovation Approach in general, for developing new nanotechnology-based products, also highlighting the crucial role of EU ProSafe project in promoting this

Automatic image processing as a means of safeguarding nuclear material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kahnmeyer, W.; Willuhn, K.; Uebel, W.

1985-01-01

Problems involved in computerized analysis of pictures taken by automatic film or video cameras in the context of international safeguards implementation are described. They include technical ones as well as the need to establish objective criteria for assessing image information. In the near future automatic image processing systems will be useful in verifying the identity and integrity of IAEA seals. (author)

Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

1986-01-01

At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a State are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. The authors have examined safeguards approaches for a State nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the State. They have focused on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches

The Department of Safeguards Quality Management System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konecni, S.

2015-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards quality management system (QMS) provides the framework for all activities that support the Agency's commitment to providing soundly-based safeguards conclusions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material. The focus of the QMS is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through defined, documented processes, routine oversight and continual improvement initiatives. In accordance with QMS principles, the high-level business processes representing the Department's activities are defined in procedures, guidelines and policies that are maintained in the Safeguards Document Manager. These processes form the basis for Department operations for drawing safeguards conclusions regarding State's compliance with their safeguards obligations. Oversight is provided through internal quality audits. These audits are targeted at processes selected by Senior Management with a focus on procedure compliance as well as customer expectations. Best practices and areas for improvement are assessed through continual improvement. Noncompliance and conditions that are adverse to quality are identified and analyzed in the Condition Report System. Root cause analysis and the implementation actions to eliminate the cause reduce the chance of condition recurrence. Through continual process improvement, processes are measured and analyzed to reduce process and administration waste. The improved processes improve efficiency while providing the desired results. Within the scope of the QMS, these tools support the performance of Departmental processes so that Safeguards products achieve the intended purpose. This paper describes how the various elements of the Department's QMS support safeguards implementation. (author)

Safeguarding aspects of large-scale commercial reprocessing plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-03-01

The paper points out that several solutions to the problems of safeguarding large-scale plants have been put forward: (1) Increased measurement accuracy. This does not remove the problem of timely detection. (2) Continuous in-process measurement. As yet unproven and likely to be costly. (3) More extensive use of containment and surveillance. The latter appears to be feasible but requires the incorporation of safeguards into plant design and sufficient redundancy to protect the operators interests. The advantages of altering the emphasis of safeguards philosophy from quantitative goals to the analysis of diversion strategies should be considered

Design impacts of safeguards and security requirements for a US MOX fuel fabrication facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Erkkila, B.H.; Rinard, P.M.; Thomas, K.E.; Zack, N.R.; Jaeger, C.D.

1998-01-01

The disposition of plutonium that is no longer required for the nation's defense is being structured to mitigate risks associated with the material's availability. In the 1997 Record of Decision, the US Government endorsed a dual-track approach that could employ domestic commercial reactors to effect the disposition of a portion of the plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuels. To support this decision, the Office of Materials Disposition requested preparation of a document that would review US requirements for safeguards and security and describe their impact on the design of a MOX fuel fabrication facility. The intended users are potential bidders for the construction and operation of the facility. The document emphasizes the relevant DOE Orders but also considers the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. Where they are significantly different, the authors have highlighted this difference and provided guidance on the impact to the facility design. Finally, the impacts of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on facility design are discussed. Security and materials control and accountability issues that influence facility design are emphasized in each area of discussion. This paper will discuss the prepared report and the issues associated with facility design for implementing practical, modern safeguards and security systems into a new MOX fuel fabrication facility

New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iwanaga, Masayuki

2000-01-01

The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

IAEA safeguards glossary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khlebnikov, Nikolai

2001-01-01

IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

1991-01-01

Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D.

2013-01-01

Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers

Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D. [Sandia National Laboratories, PO Box 5800 MS 0747, Albuquerque, NM 87185 (United States)

2013-07-01

Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

The Canadian safeguards program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

1981-12-01

In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moran, B.W.

2005-01-01

In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

Advanced-safeguards systems development for chemical-processing plants. Final report for FY 1980

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cartan, F.O.

1981-04-01

The program is installing a computer system to test and evaluate process monitoring as a new Safeguards function to supplement the usual physical security and accountability functions. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) provide information via a data acquisition system to a Safeguards analysis computer. The monitoring function can significantly enhance current material control (accountability) and containment surveillance capabilities for domestic and international Safeguards uses. Installation of sensors and instruments in the ICPP was more than 75% complete in FY-1980. Installation work was halted at the request of ICPP operations near the end of the year to eliminate possible conflict with instrument calibrations prior to plant startup. Some improvements to the computer hardware were made during FY-1980. Sensor and instrument development during FY-1980 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications. Pressure transducers, pressure switches, a bubble flowmeter, and load cells were tested; an ultrasonic liquid-in-line sensor was developed and tested. Work on the portable, isotope-ratio mass spectrometer led to the comparison of the HP quadrupole instrument with a small magnetic instrument and to the selection of the quadrupole

Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

1982-04-01

This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards

Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B. (comps.)

1982-04-01

This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

Applying new safeguards technology to existing nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harris, W.J.; Wagner, E.P.

1979-01-01

The application and operation of safeguards instrumentation in a facility containing special nuclear material is most successful when the installation is desinged for the operation of the specific facility. Experience at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory demonstrates that installation designs must consider both safeguards and production requirements of specific facilities. Equipment selection and installation design influenced by the training and experience of production operations and safeguards personnel at a specific facility help assure successful installation, reliable operation, and minimal operator training. This minimizes impacts on existing plant production activities while maximizing utility of the safeguards information obtained

Safeguards on nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

2001-01-01

The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

Process monitoring in modern safeguards applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.

1989-01-01

From the safeguards standpoint, regulatory requirements are finally moving into the modern world of communication and information processing. Gone are the days when the accountant with the green eye shade and arm bands made judgments on the material balance a month after the balance was closed. The most recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) orders have very strict standards for timeliness and sensitivity to loss or removal of material. The latest regulations recognize that plant operators have a lot of information on and control over the location and movement of material within their facilities. This information goes beyond that traditionally reported under accountability requirements. These new regulations allow facility operators to take credit for many of the more informal process controls

Designing new nuclear chemical processing plants for safeguards accountability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sprouse, K.M.

1987-01-01

New nuclear chemical processing plants will be required to develop material accountability control limits from measurement error propagation analysis rather than historical inventory difference data as performed in the past. In order for measurement error propagation methods to be viable alternatives, process designers must ensure that two nondimensional accountability parameters are maintained below 0.1. These parameters are ratios between the material holdup increase and the variance in inventory difference measurement uncertainty. Measurement uncertainty data for use in error propagation analysis is generally available in the open literature or readily derived from instrument calibration data. However, nuclear material holdup data has not been adequately developed for use in the material accountability design process. Long duration development testing on isolated unit operations is required to generate this necessary information

Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2012-07-01

The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

Year 2000 experience with safeguards instruments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coffing, J.

1999-01-01

Presentation covers the following items concerning the experiences with safeguards instruments related to Y2K issues: initial Y2K evaluation process; improvement of Y2K testing procedure, policy of the Aquila Technologies Group, Inc. The results concerning Y2K evaluation are presented as designed in the manufacturing process in order to assure success

Safeguards as an evolutionary system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1998-01-01

NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP): overview

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chapman, L.D; Engi, D.

1979-08-01

Nuclear safeguards systems provide physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The outputs provided by the SNAP simulation program supplements the safeguards analyst's evaluative capabilities and supports the evaluation of existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-01-01

This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table

Multi-Level Policy Dialogues, Processes, and Actions: Challenges and Opportunities for National REDD+ Safeguards Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Pamela Jagger

2014-09-01

Full Text Available REDD+ social safeguards have gained increasing attention in numerous forums. This paper reviews the evolution of multi-level policy dialogues, processes, and actions related to REDD+ social safeguards (e.g., Cancun Safeguards 1–5 among policy makers, civil society organizations, and within the media in Brazil, Indonesia and Tanzania, three countries with well advanced REDD+ programs. We find that progress on core aspects of social safeguards is uneven across the three countries. Brazil is by far the most advanced having drafted a REDD+ social safeguards policy. Both Brazil and Indonesia have benefited from progress made by strong sub-national entities in the operationalization of REDD+ safeguards including free prior and informed consent (FPIC, participation, and benefit sharing. Tanzania has weakly articulated how social safeguards will be operationalized and has a more top-down approach. We conclude that in all three countries, measuring, reporting and verifying progress on social safeguards is likely to be a complex issue. Stakeholders with vested interests in REDD+ social safeguards operate in polycentric rather than nested systems, suggesting that aggregation of information from local to national-scale will be a challenge. However, polycentric systems are also likely to support more transparent and comprehensive safeguards systems. Clear direction from the international community and financing for REDD+ safeguard MRV is essential if REDD+ social safeguards are to be meaningfully integrated into forest-based climate mitigation strategies.

Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, K.E.

1991-01-01

This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program

Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

1990-11-01

From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment of a SFR Metal Fuel Manufacturing Facility (SFMF) using the INPRO Methodology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chang, H. L.; Ko, W. I.; Park, S. H.; Kim, H. D.; Park, G. I. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

To illustrate the proposed Prosta process, to demonstrate its usefulness, and to provide input to a revision of the INPRO manual in the area of proliferation resistance, a case study has been carried out with a conceptually designed sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR) metal fuel manufacturing facility (SFMF), representing novel technology still in the conceptual design phase. A coarse acquisition path analysis has been carried out of the SFMF to demonstrate the assessment process with identified different target materials. The case study demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed PROSA PR assessment process and the interrelationship of the PR assessment with the safeguards-by-design process, identifying potential R and D needs. The PROSA process has been applied to a conceptually designed SFMF, representing novel technology that is still in the conceptual design phase at KAERI. The case study demonstrated that the proposed PROSA process is simpler and easier to perform than the original INPRO methodology and can be applied from the early stage of design showing the relationship of PR assessment to the safeguard-by-design process. New evaluation questionnaire for UR1 is more logical and comprehensive, and provides the legal basis enabling the IAEA to achieve its safeguards objectives including the detection of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. NES information catalogue replacing UR2 was a useful modification and supports safeguardability assessment at the NES and facility level. The proposed PROSA process is also capable to identify strengths and weaknesses of a system in the area of proliferation resistance in a generally understandable form, including R and D gaps that need to be filled in order to meet the criteria for proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system.

Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

2008-09-01

The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bean, Robert; Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron

2008-01-01

The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant's large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis

Problem statement: international safeguards for a light-water reactor fuels reprocessing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.; Hakkila, E.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Darby, J.L.

1979-03-01

This report considers the problem of developing international safeguards for a light-water reactor (LWR) fuel reprocessing/conversion facility that combines the Purex process with conversion of plutonium nitrate to the oxide by means of plutonium (III) oxalate precipitation and calcination. Current international safeguards systems are based on the complementary concepts of materials accounting and containment and surveillance, which are designed to detect covert, national diversion of nuclear material. This report discusses the possible diversion threats and some types of countermeasures, and it represents the first stage in providing integrated international safeguards system concepts that make optimum use of available resources. The development of design methodology to address this problem will constitute a significant portion of the subsequent effort. Additionally, future technology development requirements are identified. 8 figures, 1 table

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

Safeguards through secure automated fabrication

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeMerschman, A.W.; Carlson, R.L.

1982-01-01

Westinghouse Hanford Company, a prime contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy, is constructing the Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) line for fabrication of mixed oxide breeder fuel pins. Fuel processing by automation, which provides a separation of personnel from fuel handling, will provide a means whereby advanced safeguards concepts will be introduced. Remote operations and the inter-tie between the process computer and the safeguards computer are discussed

Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

1977-04-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given

Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

1977-04-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given.

SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron; Charlton, William; Bean, Robert

2008-01-01

The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of 'non-traditional' operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes

32 CFR Appendix D to Part 323 - Word Processing Center (WPC) Safeguards

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... DEFENSE (CONTINUED) PRIVACY PROGRAM DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY PRIVACY PROGRAM Pt. 323, App. D Appendix D to... (WPCs) operating independent of the customer's function. However, managers of word processing systems... addressed. C. Safeguarding Information During Receipt. 1. The word processing manager will establish...

Designing a safeguards approach for the transfer and storage of used fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benjamin, Robert; Truong, Q.S. Bob; Keeffe, Richard; Whiting, Neville; Green, Brian

2001-01-01

Full text: To provide needed space in the bays for continued CANDU reactor discharges, used fuel must be moved from the bays to dry storage facilities, which are built on site. Over the next decades, used fuel in the bays in Canada will be loaded into containers or transfer flasks and moved to the dry storage facilities. The IAEA currently verifies the transfer of used fuel to dry storage at the Point Lepreau and Gentilly and Pickering CANDU reactor stations. When the Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility starts operating in 2002 followed by the Darlington Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility in 2007-2009 increased Agency safeguards resources will be required. Safeguarding these new facilities and the flow of fuel to them would place additional demand on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, were used. In a continuous search for more efficient approaches, the IAEA, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the facility operators are working together to develop a safeguards scheme that depends less upon inspectors and more upon instruments, operator activity and remote monitoring. This paper describes the current approach to safeguarding used fuel in transit and in storage at the Pickering site and how that approach might be applied to the Bruce site. Alternative approaches are also discussed and their application to existing and future used fuel dry storage facilities is considered. Safeguards approaches under existing Safeguards Criteria are compared with approaches that might be possible under a safeguards regime strengthened by the Additional Protocol, and with approaches optimised under Integrated Safeguards. The technologies being considered to safeguard used fuel include position tracking using Global Positioning System (GPS), Geospatial Information System (GIS), radio frequency techniques, electronic seals, operator activity and remote surveillance and monitoring. (author)

An analytical laboratory to facilitate international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clark, B.E.; Muellner, P.; Deron, S.

1976-01-01

Member States which have concluded safeguards agreements accept safeguards on part or all of their nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. The Agreements enable the Agency to make inspections in order to verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all safeguarded nuclear material. The independent analysis of samples of safeguards material is an essential part of the verification process. A new analytical laboratory has been made available to the Agency by the Austrian Government. This facility is staffed by the Agency with scientists and technicians from five Member States. Design criteria for the laboratory were defined by the Agency. Construction was carried out under the project management of the Oesterreichische Studiengesellschaft fuer Atomenergie Ges.m.b.H. Scientific equipment was procured by the Agency. Samples of feed and product material from the nuclear fuel cycle will constitute the main work load. Irradiated and unirradiated samples of uranium, plutonium and mixtures of both will be analysed for concentration and isotopic composition. Since highly diluted solutions of spent fuel will be the most active beta-gamma samples, shielded and remote manipulation facilities are not necessary. Ptentiometry, mass spectrometry and coulometry are the main techniques to be employed. Gravimetry, alpha and gamma spectrometry and emission spectroscopy will also be utilized as required. It is not intended that this laboratory, should carry the whole burden of the Agency's safeguards analytical work, but that it should function as a member of a network of international laboratories which has been set up by the Agency for this purpose. (author)

The safeguards active response inventory system (SARIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, R.L.; Hairston, L.A.; O'Callaghan, P.B.; Grambihler, A.J.; Ruemmler, W.P.

1987-01-01

The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) is a computerized accountability system developed for nuclear materials control that incorporates elements of process monitoring, criticality safety, physical inventory and safeguards. It takes data from the process operations, stores it in an on-line database and translates the information into the formats needed by the various users. It traces the material through the process from feed to product; including recycle, waste and scraps streams. It models the process as the material changes form to ensure that artificial losses are not created. It automatically generates input to Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), performs checks to prevent the possibility of a criticality accident, prepares an audit trail for Safeguards, prints labels for nuclear material containers, and produces DOE/NRC 741 forms. SARIS has been installed at three laboratories across the country

Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chapman, L.D.; Grady, L.M.; Bennett, H.A.; Sasser, D.W.; Engi, D.

1978-08-01

An automated approach to facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation has been developed. This automated process, called Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE), consists of a collection of a continuous stream of operational modules for facility characterization, the selection of critical paths, and the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness along these paths. The technique has been implemented on an interactive computer time-sharing system and makes use of computer graphics for the processing and presentation of information. Using this technique, a comprehensive evaluation of a safeguards system can be provided by systematically varying the parameters that characterize the physical protection components of a facility to reflect the perceived adversary attributes and strategy, environmental conditions, and site operational conditions. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

Structure of safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.

1978-06-01

An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

Novel technologies for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

Real‑time, fast neutron detection for stimulated safeguards assay

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joyce, Malcolm J.; Adamczyk, Justyna; Plenteda, Romano; Aspinall, Michael D.; Cave, Francis D.

2015-01-01

The advent of low‑hazard organic liquid scintillation detectors and real‑time pulse‑shape discrimination (PSD) processing has suggested a variety of modalities by which fast neutrons, as opposed to neutrons moderated prior to detection, can be used directly to benefit safeguards needs. In this paper we describe a development of a fast‑neutron based safeguards assay system designed for the assessment of 235 U content in fresh fuel. The system benefits from real‑time pulse‑shape discrimination processing and auto‑calibration of the detector system parameters to ensure a rapid and effective set‑up protocol. These requirements are essential in optimising the speed and limit of detection of the fast neutron technique, whilst minimising the intervention needed to perform the assay.

Safeguardability assessment on pilot-scale advanced spent fuel conditioning facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Pickett, S.E.; Miller, M.C.; Ko, W.I.; Kim, H.D.

2006-01-01

Full text: In South Korea, approximately 6,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactor operation has been accumulated with the expectation of more than 30,000 metric tons, three times the present storage capacity, by the end of 2040. To resolve these challenges in spent fuel management, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a dry reprocessing technology called Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP). This is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent fuel into a metallic form, and the electrolytic reduction (ER) technology developed recently is known as a more efficient concept for spent fuel conditioning. The goal of the ACP study is to recover more than 99% of the actinide elements into a metallic form with minimizing the volume and heat load of spent fuel. The significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected to lighten the burden of final disposal in terms of disposal size, safety, and economics. In the framework of R and D collaboration for the ACP safeguards, a joint study on the safeguardability of the ACP technology has been performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and KAERI. The purpose of this study is to address the safeguardability of the ACP technology, through analysis of material flow and development of a proper safeguards system that meet IAEA's comprehensive safeguards objective. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot-scale ACP facility were analyzed, and subsequently the relevant material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) were designed for material accounting. The uncertainties in material accounting were also estimated with international target values, and design requirements for the material accounting systems were derived

Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S.

1994-10-01

This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient

Domestic safeguards: annual report to Congress, fiscal year 1978

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

The annual report includes an assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of safeguards at facilities and activities licensed by the Commission. The report details NRC's criteria for judging the adequacy of safeguards at fuel cycle facilities; the report also summarizes actions required by NRC at any fuel facility whose safeguards systems are judged to provide less than high assurance protection against our design threat. The report also contains a discussion of NRC's criteria for safeguards adequacy at nuclear reactors and for transportation activities

Safeguarding a future industrial reprocessing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-11-01

This paper is submitted to Working Group 5, Sub-Group B for information. It is being submitted to Working Group 4 for discussion at their meeting in January 1979 and shows that by a combination of accountancy, surveillance and containment a reliable safeguards system can be designed for the reprocessing of fuels of the BWR and PWR type. Its arguments can, in general terms, be applied to plants for reprocessing LMFBR fuels, with due allowance for future advances which should improve our overall knowledge of the reliability of safeguards systems. In the reprocessing of fast reactor (LMFBR) fuels, as compared with LWR fuels, the main differences are the higher plutonium concentration and lower heavy metal throughput in the early stages of the reprocessing operations. At later stages in the process (after plutonium/uranium separation) the plants could be similar and have similar safeguarding problems. Plants for reprocessing LMFBR on a commercial scale will not be in operation for a number of years. In these plants greater attention may have to be paid to safeguards at the early stages, especially to waste/raffinate streams, than in the PWR/BWR reprocessing plant. The actual balance between containment, surveillance and accountancy adopted will depend on the status of the technology of safeguards and reprocessing. It can be anticipated that improvements to measurement systems will be made which may allow greater reliance on actual measurement. Treatment and recycle of solid wastes will advance and could therefore lead to improvements in accountancy in, for example, the ''head-end''

Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

1987-01-01

This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

Separations and safeguards model integration.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

2010-09-01

Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

Bridging the Gap between Eco-Design and the Human Thinking System

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mona Komeijani

2016-03-01

Full Text Available Technological progress has enabled widespread adoption and use of consumer electronics, changing how global society lives and works. This progress has come with immense environmental cost, including extraction of scarce materials, consumption of fossil fuels, and growing e-waste challenges. Eco-design has emerged as a promising approach to reduce the environmental footprint of electronics by integrating sustainability-oriented decisions early in the product realization process. However, most approaches focus on the product itself, not on the consumer who ultimately decides how to purchase, use, maintain, and dispose of the device. This article presents a new framework to guide designers in developing products with features that encourage consumers to use them in an environmentally sustainable manner. The Sustainable Behavior Design (SBD framework links common design concepts (ergonomic, emotional, preventative, and interaction design with core aspects of the human thinking system to create features to make users aware of their behavior and decisions (reflective thinking or result in sustainable behaviors even when users are unaware (automatic thinking. The SBD framework is demonstrated using a case study on a smartphone, a high demand product. The reimagined smartphone design integrates solutions addressing both automatic and reflective thinking systems, potentially reducing life cycle impacts by almost 30%.

LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.; Farnitano, M.; Carelli, J.; Hazeltine, J.; Bailey, D.

2001-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process

IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-10-01

Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-09-01

broaden the IAEA safeguards toolbox, the study recommends that the Agency consider closing potential gaps in safeguards coverage by, among other things: 1) adapting its safeguards measures based on a case-by-case assessment; 2) using more frequent and expanded/enhanced mailbox declarations (ideally with remote transmission of the data to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna) coupled with short-notice or unannounced inspections; 3) putting more emphasis on the collection and analysis of environmental samples at hot cells and waste storage tanks; 4) taking Safeguards by Design into account for the construction of new research reactors and best practices for existing research reactors; 5) utilizing fully all legal authorities to enhance inspection access (including a strengthened and continuing DIV process); and 6) utilizing new approaches to improve auditing activities, verify reactor operating data history, and track/monitor the movement and storage of spent fuel.

Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beddingfield, David H.; Nordquist, Heather A.; Umebayaashi, Eiji

2009-01-01

Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

Technology development for safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

2005-04-01

The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

Framework for Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards in the Design and Operation of Nuclear Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Darby, John L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Horak, Karl Emanuel [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); LaChance, Jeffrey L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Tolk, Keith Michael [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whitehead, Donnie Wayne [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2007-10-01

The US is currently on the brink of a nuclear renaissance that will result in near-term construction of new nuclear power plants. In addition, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) ambitious new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program includes facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and reactors for transmuting safeguards material. The use of nuclear power and material has inherent safety, security, and safeguards (SSS) concerns that can impact the operation of the facilities. Recent concern over terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation led to an increased emphasis on security and safeguard issues as well as the more traditional safety emphasis. To meet both domestic and international requirements, nuclear facilities include specific SSS measures that are identified and evaluated through the use of detailed analysis techniques. In the past, these individual assessments have not been integrated, which led to inefficient and costly design and operational requirements. This report provides a framework for a new paradigm where safety, operations, security, and safeguards (SOSS) are integrated into the design and operation of a new facility to decrease cost and increase effectiveness. Although the focus of this framework is on new nuclear facilities, most of the concepts could be applied to any new, high-risk facility.

Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Finch, Robert J. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Smartt, Heidi A. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Haddal, Risa [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2017-10-01

Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.

Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gallucci, Nicholas [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Poe, Sarah [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

2015-10-01

Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

International safeguards 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.

1979-01-01

First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

IAEA safeguards for the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Close, D.A.

1995-06-01

This document is an overview of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the basic requirements or elements of an IAEA safeguards regime. The primary objective of IAEA safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of material and the timely detection of undeclared activities. The two important components of IAEA safeguards to accomplish their primary objective are nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance. This overview provides guidance to the Fissile Materials Disposition Project for IAEA inspection requirements. IAEA requirements, DOE Orders, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations will be used as the basis for designing a safeguards and security system for the facilities recommended by the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper S. E.; .; Worrall, L.; Pickett, C.; Bachner, K.; Queirolo, A.

2014-08-08

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, the U.S. Department of State, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a a workshop on the subject of ”Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation.” The workshop was held at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. The workshop participants included software and hardware experts from national laboratories, industry, government, and IAEA member states who were specially selected by the workshop organizers based on their experience with software that is developed for the control and operation of safeguards instrumentation. The workshop included presentations, to orient the participants to the IAEA Department of Safeguards software activities related to instrumentation data collection and processing, and case studies that were designed to inspire discussion of software development, use, maintenance, and upgrades in breakout sessions and to result in recommendations for effective software practices and management. This report summarizes the results of the workshop.

The activity of barley alpha-amylase on starch granules is enhanced by fusion of a starch binding domain from Aspergillus niger glucoamylase

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Juge, N.; Nøhr, J.; Le Gal-Coëffet, M.-F.

2006-01-01

High affinity for starch granules of certain amylolytic enzymes is mediated by a separate starch binding domain (SBD). In Aspergillus niger glucoamylase (GA-I), a 70 amino acid O-glycosylated peptide linker connects SBD with the catalytic domain. A gene was constructed to encode barley alpha......-amylase 1 (AMY1) fused C-terminally to this SBD via a 37 residue GA-I linker segment. AMY1-SBD was expressed in A. niger, secreted using the AMY1 signal sequence at 25 mg x L(-1) and purified in 50% yield. AMY1-SBD contained 23% carbohydrate and consisted of correctly N-terminally processed multiple forms...... in A. niger). AMY1-SBD showed a 2-fold increased activity for soluble starch at low (0.5%) but not at high (1%) concentration. AMY1-SBD hydrolysed amylose DP440 with an increased degree of multiple attack of 3 compared to 1.9 for rAMY1. Remarkably, at low concentration (2 nM), AMY1-SBD hydrolysed...

Work Group 1: Future Directions for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Casterton, J.; Meylemans, P.

2013-01-01

The State-Level Concept (SLC) is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States with safeguards agreements. It is based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a State level approach for each State, including a specific combination of safeguards measures. It is executed through an annual implementation plan. The SLC has the value of considering the State as a whole. It provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into account through all stages of safeguards implementation. The implementation of the SLC permits the IAEA to be responsive to all kinds of changes arising from continuous analysis. As a result the safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date. The SLC is implemented by the IAEA as a continuous process involving three major components: establishing knowledge about the State and drawing conclusions, determining the specific State level approach, and planning and implementing safeguards activities. The major products that emerge from this process are the State level approach, the annual implementation plan that is the basis for implementing safeguards activities in a State on an annual basis, and the safeguards conclusions, which are set out in the Safeguards Implementation Report on an annual basis. A better cooperation between IAEA and SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material), RSAC (Regional State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material is important for developing and implementing SLC. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

A safeguards case study of the Nuclear Materials and equipment corporation uranium processing plant Apollo, Pennsylvania. Appendix B with proprietary information removed. Staff technical report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Altman, W.; Hockert, J.; Quinn, E.

1980-04-01

The report characterizes the Atomic Energy Commission safeguards requirements and the safeguards systems and procedures in place at the Nuclear Materials and Equipment (NUMEC) uranium processing plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania during the spring of 1964. Based upon this characterization, a list of safeguards weaknesses which would be considered deficiencies under 1979 requirements is developed. Appendixes A and B to the report provide a detailed characterization of AEC safeguards requirements as well as a side by side comparison of NUMEC's safeguards program in 1964 with the safeguards program currently required of a comparable licensed facility

Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

Nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Estrampres, J.

2010-01-01

Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

Optimizing and joining future safeguards efforts by 'remote inspections'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zendel, M.; Khlebnikov, N.

2009-01-01

Full-text: Remote inspections have a large potential to save inspection effort in future routine safeguards implementation. Such inspections involve remote activities based on the analysis of data acquired in the field without the physical presence of an inspector, shifting the inspectors' priorities further toward unannounced inspections, complementary access activities and data evaluation. Large, automated and complex facilities require facility resident and specific safeguards equipment systems with features for unattended and remotely controlled operation as well as being integrated in the nuclear process. In many instances the use of such equipment jointly with the SSAC/RSAC and the operator is foreseen to achieve affordable effectiveness with a minimum level of intrusiveness to the facility operation. Where it becomes possible to achieve independent conclusions by this approach, the IAEA would make full use of the SSAC/RSAC, involving State inspectors and/or facility operators to operate inspection systems under remotely controlled IAEA mechanisms. These mechanisms would include documented procedures for routine joint-use, defining arrangements for data sharing, physical security and authentication mechanisms, recalibration and use of standards and software, maintenance, repair, storage and transportation. The level of cooperation and willingness of a State to implement such measures requested and properly justified by the IAEA will demonstrate its commitment to full transparency in its nuclear activities. Examples of existing remote inspection activities, including joint-use activities will be discussed. The future potential of remote inspections will be assessed considering technical developments and increased needs for process monitoring. Enhanced cooperation with SSAC/RSAC within the framework of remote inspections could further optimize the IAEA's inspection efforts while at the same time maintaining effective safeguards implementation. (author)

Safeguards for the atom

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1959-10-15

the Agency to set up a system of safeguards that would guarantee that no nuclear material at all could be diverted to unauthorized use. What the Agency intends is to apply its safeguards in such a manner as to achieve a high probability of detecting the diversion of even small quantities of materials, and when larger quantities are involved, to make detection almost certain. The need for safeguards would obviously arise in the case of fissile materials, because of their possible use in the production of weapons. The Agency safeguards may, therefore, be applied - depending on the quantity and other factors involved - to all types of these materials, namely natural uranium, thorium, enriched uranium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and plutonium. The greater the quantity of the actual fissile substances involved and the greater the possibility of diversion, the greater will be the need for safeguards. Details of the safeguards procedures are yet to be finally approved. Broadly speaking, they are expected to provide, inter alia, for the approval by the Agency of designs of facilities or installations in which materials subject to Agency safeguards are to be used, processed, recovered, produced or stored; the maintenance by the State concerned of records concerning accountability, inventory, operation and waste disposal; submission of periodic reports to the Agency; the deposit of excess fissile materials with the Agency; and visits by Agency representatives to the locations where the materials or facilities provided by the Agency are in use. Procedures for the application of health and safety measures will be set out in similar detail. The Agency has already provided for the application of Agency safeguards to the project under which Japan has bought from it three tons of natural uranium for use in a research reactor. A number of bilateral agreements also contain clauses referring to the possible application of Agency safeguards to projects to be carried out under the

Safeguards for the atom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1959-01-01

the Agency to set up a system of safeguards that would guarantee that no nuclear material at all could be diverted to unauthorized use. What the Agency intends is to apply its safeguards in such a manner as to achieve a high probability of detecting the diversion of even small quantities of materials, and when larger quantities are involved, to make detection almost certain. The need for safeguards would obviously arise in the case of fissile materials, because of their possible use in the production of weapons. The Agency safeguards may, therefore, be applied - depending on the quantity and other factors involved - to all types of these materials, namely natural uranium, thorium, enriched uranium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and plutonium. The greater the quantity of the actual fissile substances involved and the greater the possibility of diversion, the greater will be the need for safeguards. Details of the safeguards procedures are yet to be finally approved. Broadly speaking, they are expected to provide, inter alia, for the approval by the Agency of designs of facilities or installations in which materials subject to Agency safeguards are to be used, processed, recovered, produced or stored; the maintenance by the State concerned of records concerning accountability, inventory, operation and waste disposal; submission of periodic reports to the Agency; the deposit of excess fissile materials with the Agency; and visits by Agency representatives to the locations where the materials or facilities provided by the Agency are in use. Procedures for the application of health and safety measures will be set out in similar detail. The Agency has already provided for the application of Agency safeguards to the project under which Japan has bought from it three tons of natural uranium for use in a research reactor. A number of bilateral agreements also contain clauses referring to the possible application of Agency safeguards to projects to be carried out under the

Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

1982-06-01

The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments

Implications for Advanced Safeguards Derived from PR and PP Case Study Results

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Nuclear Nonproliferation Division, N-4, Safeguards and Security Group, P. O. Box 1663, N-4, Mail Stop E541, Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 (United States)

2009-06-15

The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyro-processing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyro-processing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material because of keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRU products that should provide a radiation barrier that slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel and by the process if it intrinsically will take major modification to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. This is an issue that the ESFR design must answer to state it has valuable

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-07-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

Some basic concepts of fast breeder reactor safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tkharev, E.; Walford, F.J.

1987-04-01

The range of discussion topics of this report is restricted to a few key areas of safeguards importance at Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) only. The differences between thermal and fast reactors that may have safeguards significance in the case of FBRs are listed. The FBR principles of design are mentioned. The relevant safeguards objectives and criteria are given. The fundamental issues for safeguarding FBR are treated. An outline safeguards approach is presented. Model inspection activities are mentioned. 4 figs

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitney, J.M.; LaMontagne, S.; Sunshine, A.; Lockwood, D.; Peranteau, D.; Dupuy, G.

2010-01-01

Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

1996-01-01

While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future

Safeguards for geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fattah, A.

2000-01-01

Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Danker, W.

1996-05-01

This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

Analysis on approach of safeguards implementation at research reactor handling item count and bulk material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyun Jo; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung Doo; Jung, Juang

2016-01-01

KiJang research reactor (KJRR) will be constructed to produce the radioisotope such as Mo-99 etc., provide the neutron transmutation doping (NTD) service of silicon, and develop the core technologies of research reactor. In this paper, the features of the process and nuclear material flow are reviewed and the material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) are established based on the nuclear material flow. Also, this paper reviews the approach on safeguards and nuclear material accountancy at the facility level for Safeguards-by-Design at research reactor handling item count and bulk material. In this paper, MBA and KMPs are established through the analysis on facility features and major process at KJRR handling item count and bulk material. Also, this paper reviews the IAEA safeguards implementation and nuclear material accountancy at KJRR. It is necessary to discuss the safeguards approach on the fresh FM target assemblies and remaining uranium in the intermediate level liquid wastes

Analysis on approach of safeguards implementation at research reactor handling item count and bulk material

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Hyun Jo; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung Doo; Jung, Juang [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

KiJang research reactor (KJRR) will be constructed to produce the radioisotope such as Mo-99 etc., provide the neutron transmutation doping (NTD) service of silicon, and develop the core technologies of research reactor. In this paper, the features of the process and nuclear material flow are reviewed and the material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) are established based on the nuclear material flow. Also, this paper reviews the approach on safeguards and nuclear material accountancy at the facility level for Safeguards-by-Design at research reactor handling item count and bulk material. In this paper, MBA and KMPs are established through the analysis on facility features and major process at KJRR handling item count and bulk material. Also, this paper reviews the IAEA safeguards implementation and nuclear material accountancy at KJRR. It is necessary to discuss the safeguards approach on the fresh FM target assemblies and remaining uranium in the intermediate level liquid wastes.

Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

1986-01-01

At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

An analysis of a regional nuclear safeguards organisation: the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the development of nuclear safeguards in Western Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Howlett, Darryl.

1988-08-01

This thesis argues that the nuclear safeguards system implemented by EURATOM in Western Europe has come to fruition as a result of a complex political process. This process has involved negotiations over the exact limits on safeguards interventions into the nuclear affairs of the European Community. There are two dimensions to these negotiations. On the one hand, they involve EURATOM and its member states over the necessary limits on safeguards intervention in member states' domestic nuclear affairs. On the other, there are negotiations between EURATOM and several actors outside the region, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency. The thesis concludes by arguing that international safeguards organisations, of which EURATOM is a regional example, have made important contributions to arms control and international security. In the process, certain kinds of precedents and procedures which have potential for broader application have been established. (author)

Improving the Transparency of IAEA Safeguards Reporting

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toomey, Christopher; Hayman, Aaron M.; Wyse, Evan T.; Odlaug, Christopher S.

2011-01-01

In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data.

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The system of international safeguards carried out by the IAEA is designed to verify that governments are living up to pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes under the NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and similar agreements. The film illustrates the range of field inspections and analytical work involved. It also shows how new approaches are helping to strengthen the system

Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

2010-01-01

IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.

1998-01-01

Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

DOE assessment guide for safeguards and security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.; Christorpherson, W.E.; Clark, R.J.; Martin, F.; Hodges, Jr.

1978-04-01

DOE operations are periodically assessed to assure that special nuclear material, restricted data, and other classified information and DOE facilities are executed toward continuing the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. A guide to describe the philosophy and mechanisms through which these assessments are conducted is presented. The assessment program is concerned with all contractor, field office, and Headquarters activities which are designed to assure that safeguards and security objectives are reached by contractors at DOE facilities and operations. The guide takes into account the interlocking relationship between many of the elements of an effective safeguards and security program. Personnel clearance programs are a part of protecting classified information as well as nuclear materials. Barriers that prevent or limit access may contribute to preventing theft of government property as well as protecting against sabotage. Procedures for control and surveillance need to be integrated with both information systems and procedures for mass balance accounting. Wherever possible, assessment procedures have been designed to perform integrated inspection, evaluation, and follow-up for the safeguards and security program

Status of Safeguards and Separations Model Development at Plant and Molecular Levels

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

de Almeida, Valmor F [ORNL; Hay, Benjamin [ORNL; DePaoli, David W [ORNL

2009-10-01

A primary goal of the Safeguards and Separations IPSC effort is the development of process modeling tools that allow dynamic simulations of separations plant operations under various configurations and conditions, and integration of relevant safeguards analyses. A requirement of the effort is to develop codes on modern, expandable architectures, with flexibility to explore and evaluate a wide range of process options. During FY09, efforts at ORNL have been focused on two priority tasks toward achieving the IPSC goal: (1) a top-down exploration of architecture - Subtask 1: Explore framework for code development and integration for plant-level simulation; and (2) a bottom-up fundamental modeling effort - Subtask 2: Development of molecular-level agent design code. Subtask 1 is important because definition and development of architecture is a key issue for the overall effort, as selection of an overall approach and code/data requirements is a necessary first step in the organization, design and development of separations and safeguards codes that will be incorporated. The agent design effort of Subtask 2 is a molecular-level modeling effort that has a direct impact on a near-term issue of the Separations and Waste Forms Campaign. A current focus of experimental efforts is the development of robust agents and processes for separation of Am/Cm. Development of enhanced agent-design codes will greatly accelerate discovery and experimental testing.

Status of Safeguards and Separations Model Development at Plant and Molecular Levels

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

de Almeida, Valmor F.; Hay, Benjamin; DePaoli, David W.

2009-01-01

A primary goal of the Safeguards and Separations IPSC effort is the development of process modeling tools that allow dynamic simulations of separations plant operations under various configurations and conditions, and integration of relevant safeguards analyses. A requirement of the effort is to develop codes on modern, expandable architectures, with flexibility to explore and evaluate a wide range of process options. During FY09, efforts at ORNL have been focused on two priority tasks toward achieving the IPSC goal: (1) a top-down exploration of architecture - Subtask 1: Explore framework for code development and integration for plant-level simulation; and (2) a bottom-up fundamental modeling effort - Subtask 2: Development of molecular-level agent design code. Subtask 1 is important because definition and development of architecture is a key issue for the overall effort, as selection of an overall approach and code/data requirements is a necessary first step in the organization, design and development of separations and safeguards codes that will be incorporated. The agent design effort of Subtask 2 is a molecular-level modeling effort that has a direct impact on a near-term issue of the Separations and Waste Forms Campaign. A current focus of experimental efforts is the development of robust agents and processes for separation of Am/Cm. Development of enhanced agent-design codes will greatly accelerate discovery and experimental testing.

Use of curium neutron flux from head-end pyroprocessing subsystems for the High Reliability Safeguards methodology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Borrelli, R.A., E-mail: r.angelo.borrelli@gmail.com

2014-10-01

The deployment of nuclear energy systems (NESs) is expanding around the world. Nations are investing in NESs as a means to establish energy independence, grow national economies, and address climate change. Transitioning to the advanced nuclear fuel cycle can meet growing energy demands and ensure resource sustainability. However, nuclear facilities in all phases of the advanced fuel cycle must be ‘safeguardable,’ where safety, safeguards, and security are integrated into a practical design strategy. To this end, the High Reliability Safeguards (HRS) approach is a continually developing safeguardability methodology that applies intrinsic design features and employs a risk-informed approach for systems assessment that is safeguards-motivated. Currently, a commercial pyroprocessing facility is used as the example system. This paper presents a modeling study that investigates the neutron flux associated with processed materials. The intent of these studies is to determine if the neutron flux will affect facility design, and subsequently, safeguardability. The results presented in this paper are for the head-end subsystems in a pyroprocessing facility. The collective results from these studies will then be used to further develop the HRS methodology.

Nuclear safeguards surveys as performed by the Albuquerque operations office

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jewell, D.

1987-01-01

The nuclear safeguards survey program as administered by the Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) is comprehensive in scope and evaluates the facility's safeguards program for an entire appraisal period. The survey program focuses on both the integrated and graded safeguards concepts and includes both compliance and performance evaluations. The program utilizes independent measurement support to verify facility inventory values and measurement system capabilities. The AL survey program is oriented towards facility development and management as opposed to development and management by numerous detailed departmental directives

Cost/Benefit Prioritization for Advanced Safeguards Research and Development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeMuth, S.F.; Adeli, R.; Thomas, K.E.

2008-01-01

A system level study utilizing commercially available Extend TM software, has been initiated to perform cost/benefit analyses for advanced safeguards research and development. The methodology is focused on estimating standard error in the inventory difference (SEID) for reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities, for various proposed advanced safeguards measurement technologies. The inventory duration, and consequent number of inventories per year, is dictated by the detection of a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM). Detection is limited by the cumulative measurement uncertainty for the entire system. The cost of inventories is then compared with the cost of advanced instrumentation and/or process design changes. Current progress includes development of the methodology, future efforts will be focused on ascertaining estimated costs and performance. Case studies will be provided as examples of the methodology. (author)

The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitworth, A.

1996-01-01

The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickman, D.A.

1986-10-01

Safeguarding our country's nuclear materials against theft or diversion is extremely important due to their significantly strategic value. In addition, nuclear materials also have an extremely high monetary value. The term ''safeguards'' is defined as an integrated system of physical protection, accountability, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession and use of special nuclear materials. An aggressive Safeguards program, therefore, employs both good security measures and a strong material control and accountability system. For effective internal control of nuclear materials, having people qualified in the many aspects of safeguards and accountability is essential. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), this goal is accomplished through a Laboratory-wide Safeguards Awareness Program. All PNL staff members receive a level of Safeguards training appropriate to their particular function within the Laboratory. This paper presents an overview of the unique training opportunities this topic provides and how the training goals are accomplished through the various training courses given to the staff members

Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

1981-12-01

This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility

Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

2007-01-01

This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to 'breed' nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and 'burn' actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is 'fertile' or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing 'TRU'-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II 'EBR-II' at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line--a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors

A safeguards verification technique for solution homogeneity and volume measurements in process tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suda, S.; Franssen, F.

1987-01-01

A safeguards verification technique is being developed for determining whether process-liquid homogeneity has been achieved in process tanks and for authenticating volume-measurement algorithms involving temperature corrections. It is proposed that, in new designs for bulk-handling plants employing automated process lines, bubbler probes and thermocouples be installed at several heights in key accountability tanks. High-accuracy measurements of density using an electromanometer can now be made which match or even exceed analytical-laboratory accuracies. Together with regional determination of tank temperatures, these measurements provide density, liquid-column weight and temperature gradients over the fill range of the tank that can be used to ascertain when the tank solution has reached equilibrium. Temperature-correction algorithms can be authenticated by comparing the volumes obtained from the several bubbler-probe liquid-height measurements, each based on different amounts of liquid above and below the probe. The verification technique is based on the automated electromanometer system developed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The IAEA has recently approved the purchase of a stainless-steel tank equipped with multiple bubbler and thermocouple probes for installation in its Bulk Calibration Laboratory at IAEA Headquarters, Vienna. The verification technique is scheduled for preliminary trials in late 1987

Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

1995-01-01

Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed

21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 5 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Safeguards for patient safety. 312.88 Section 312... Severely-debilitating Illnesses § 312.88 Safeguards for patient safety. All of the safeguards incorporated within parts 50, 56, 312, 314, and 600 of this chapter designed to ensure the safety of clinical testing...

Outcome and Perspectives from the First IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Norman, C.; Binner, R.; Peter, N. J.; Wuester, J.; Zhao, K.; Krieger, T.; Walczak-Typke, A.C.; Richet, S.; Portaix, C.G.; Martin, K.; Bonner, E.R.

2015-01-01

Statistical and probabilistic methodologies have always played a fundamental role in the field of safeguards. In-field inspection approaches are based on sampling algorithms and random verification schemes designed to achieve a designed detection probability for defects of interest (e.g., missing material, indicators of tampering with containment and other equipment, changes of design). In addition, the evaluation of verification data with a view to drawing soundly based safeguards conclusions rests on the application of various advanced statistical methodologies. The considerable progress of information technology in the field of data processing and computational capabilities as well as the evolution of safeguards concepts and the steep increase in the volume of verification data in the last decades call for the review and modernization of safeguards statistical methodologies, not only to improve the efficiency of the analytical processes but also to address new statistical and probabilistic questions. Modern computer-intensive approaches are also needed to fully exploit the large body of verification data collected over the years in the increasing number and diversifying types of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the world. The first biennial IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards was held in Vienna from the 16 to 18 October 2013. Recommendations and a working plan were drafted which identify and chart necessary steps to review, harmonize, update and consolidate statistical methodologies for safeguards. Three major problem spaces were identified: Random Verification Schemes, Estimation of Uncertainties and Statistical Evaluation of Safeguards Verification Data for which a detailed list of objectives and actions to be taken were established. Since the meeting, considerable progress was made to meet these objectives. The actions undertaken and their outcome are presented in this paper. (author)

Behavior of 241Am in fast reactor systems - a safeguards perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beddingfield, David H.; Lafleur, Adrienne M.

2009-01-01

Advanced fuel-cycle developments around the world currently under development are exploring the possibility of disposing of 241 Am from spent fuel recycle processes by burning this material in fast reactors. For safeguards practitioners, this approach could potentially complicate both fresh- and spent-fuel safeguards measurements. The increased (α,n) production in oxide fuels from the 241 Am increases the uncertainty in coincidence assay of Pu in MOX assemblies and will require additional information to make use of totals-based neutron assay of these assemblies. We have studied the behavior of 241 Am-bearing MOX fuel in the fast reactor system and the effect on neutron and gamma-ray source-terms for safeguards measurements. In this paper, we will present the results of simulations of the behavior of 241 Am in a fast breeder reactor system. Because of the increased use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors and advances in fuel-cycle designs aimed at americium disposal in fast reactors, we have undertaken a brief study of the behavior of americium in these systems to better understand the safeguards impacts of these new approaches. In this paper we will examine the behavior of 241 Am in a variety of nuclear systems to provide insight into the safeguards implications of proposed Am disposition schemes.

Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

1983-01-01

A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.

1995-01-01

The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies

An overview of artificial intelligence applications to safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, C.E.

1987-01-01

The rapidly growing discipline of artificial intelligence (AI) has delivered a number of expert systems that aid analyses of processes and procedures by emulating the analysis and decisions of experts. Expert systems have not reached the point of replacing experts, but can provide assistance in their absence. In narrow domains, expert systems can relieve the expert of less demanding analyses and decisions, freeing him/her for more important tasks. Safeguards experts are in great demand, and the decision processes they perform are not always well-defined. The general area of safeguards analysis is representative of the type of activity that benefits from the assistance provided by AI techniques. The American Nuclear Society is holding a topical meeting, Artificial Intelligence and Other Innovative Computer Applications in the Nuclear Industry, on August 31-September 2, 1987. The technical papers cover a number of applications of potential benefit to safeguards and the safeguards interface with facility operations. This paper is a technical review of papers presented at the topical meeting

Integrated software package for nuclear material safeguards in a MOX fuel fabrication facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schreiber, H.J.; Piana, M.; Moussalli, G.; Saukkonen, H.

2000-01-01

Since computerized data processing was introduced to Safeguards at large bulk handling facilities, a large number of individual software applications have been developed for nuclear material Safeguards implementation. Facility inventory and flow data are provided in computerized format for performing stratification, sample size calculation and selection of samples for destructive and non-destructive assay. Data is collected from nuclear measurement systems running in attended, unattended mode and more recently from remote monitoring systems controlled. Data sets from various sources have to be evaluated for Safeguards purposes, such as raw data, processed data and conclusions drawn from data evaluation results. They are reported in computerized format at the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters and feedback from the Agency's mainframe computer system is used to prepare and support Safeguards inspection activities. The integration of all such data originating from various sources cannot be ensured without the existence of a common data format and a database system. This paper describes the fundamental relations between data streams, individual data processing tools, data evaluation results and requirements for an integrated software solution to facilitate nuclear material Safeguards at a bulk handling facility. The paper also explains the basis for designing a software package to manage data streams from various data sources and for incorporating diverse data processing tools that until now have been used independently from each other and under different computer operating systems. (author)

Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mollah, A.S.

2010-01-01

Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

Design and Implementation of Equipment for Enhanced Safeguards of a Plutonium Storage in a Reprocessing Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richir, P.; Dechamp, L.; Buchet, P.; Dransart, P.; Dzbikowicz, Z.; Peerani, P.; ); Pierssens, L.; Persson, L.; Ancius, D.; Synetos, S.; ); Edmonds, N.; Homer, A.; Benn, K.-A.; Polkey, A.

2015-01-01

The Nuclear Security unit (NUSEC) of the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU, JRC) was entrusted by DG ENER to design and implement equipment in order to achieve enhanced safeguards of a plutonium dioxide storage located on the MAGNOX reprocessing plant in Sellafield (UK). Enhanced safeguards must lead to a win-win situation for all parties involved. In this case the DG ENER inspectorate will save inspection time, manpower and future financial resources and the operator will have the right to access its storage without the need for inspector presence. To reach this goal, while at the same time taking into account current budget constraints, NUSEC developed applications that use equipment commonly used in the safety and security fields but so far have not been used in safeguards. For instance, two laser scanners are used to detect entry/exit events into and out of the store and to provide the necessary information to an algorithm in order to categorize objects/people passing the scanners, e.g., a Fork Lift Truck, a trolley used to bring in PuO 2 containers, a system used for the dispatch of cans, people, etc. An RFID reader is used to identify equipment duly authorized to access the store. All PuO 2 containers arriving from the production line must be weighed, identified and measured using gamma and neutron detectors before they can be transferred to the store. For this purpose an Unattended Combined Measurement System (UCMS) was designed and manufactured by the JRC in order to do all verification activities using a single instrument. This paper describes the design features of the equipment and its implementation with the support of the Sellafield Ltd. in the framework of the MAGNOX store project. (author)

Integrating virtual reality applications in nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barletta, Michael; Crete, Jean-Maurice; Pickett, Susan

2011-01-01

Virtual reality (VR) tools have already been developed and deployed in the nuclear industry, including in nuclear power plant construction, project management, equipment and system design, and training. Recognized as powerful tools for, inter alia, integration of data, simulation of activities, design of facilities, validation of concepts and mission planning, their application in nuclear safeguards is still very limited. However, VR tools may eventually offer transformative potential for evolving the future safeguards system to be more fully information-driven. The paper focuses especially on applications in the area of training that have been underway in the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also outlines future applications envisioned for safeguards information and knowledge management, and information-analytic collaboration. The paper identifies some technical and programmatic pre-requisites for realizing the integrative potential of VR technologies. If developed with an orientation to integrating applications through compatible platforms, software, and models, virtual reality tools offer the long-term potential of becoming a real 'game changer,' enabling a qualitative leap in the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA invites Member States, industry, and academia to make proposals as to how such integrating potential in the use of virtual reality technology for nuclear safeguards could be realized. (author)

Psychology of nuclear safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

1978-08-17

it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

Operationalizing social safeguards in REDD+: actors, interests and ideas

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McDermott, Constance L.; Coad, Lauren; Helfgott, Ariella; Schroeder, Heike

2012-01-01

“REDD+” is a mechanism created under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for Reducing {carbon} Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation and forest enhancement. In addition, REDD+ “safeguards” are intended to protect non-carbon forest values. While REDD+ countries are formally requested to provide information on safeguards, there is as yet no agreement on the relative priority of carbon versus non-carbon values, and the appropriate level of safeguard standardization. This, we argue, has allowed REDD+ to function as a “boundary object” spanning disparate priorities. Meanwhile, the contestation of these priorities has been displaced from intergovernmental processes to the various organizations involved in operationalizing REDD+ activities. This article applies a set of organizational, substantive and conceptual typologies to compare differences in the balance of actors, interests and ideas across these organizations. It finds that multi-lateral funding programs have drawn heavily on existing safeguards for international aid, while private certification schemes have specialized in different niche priorities at the project level. In regards to the substance of safeguard requirements, the involvement of donors and investors appears correlated with a stronger emphasis on carbon and risk mitigation while greater NGO involvement and the decoupling of safeguards design from REDD+ funding appear correlated with greater emphasis on social rights and benefits. These findings have several critical implications for future REDD+ activities. Firstly, the choice of organizations involved in defining, funding and verifying safeguard activities, and the balance of actors in their governing structures, are likely to influence the relative emphasis on non-carbon values. Secondly, a diversity of approaches to disbursing REDD+ incentives may be necessary to maintain widespread support for REDD+. Thirdly, it remains to be seen whether REDD

Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

2007-12-15

This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dugan, V.L.; Chapman, L.D.

1977-01-01

A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dugan, V.L.; Chapman, L.D.

1977-08-01

A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.

1987-01-01

This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

Safeguards and Security Research and Development progress report, October 1990--September 1991

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

1992-07-01

This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research And Development (R ampersand D) program from October 1990 through September 1991. The activities presented in the first three parts--Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, and Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support--were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS). The activities described in Part 4--International Safeguards--were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (OACN/IS). Part 5 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS or OACN/IS. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R ampersand D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published in 1991

IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities. Review and analysis of the status of safeguards technology for uranium enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-09-01

The objective of this paper is to examine critically the diversion potential at uranium enrichment facilities and to outline a basic safeguards strategy which counters all identified hazards as completely as possible yet with a minimum of non-essential redundancy. Where existing technology does not appear to be adequate for effective safeguards, the limitations are examined, and suggestions for further R and D effort are made. Parts of this report are generally applicable to all currently known enrichment processes, while other parts are specifically directed toward facilities based on the gas centrifuge process. It is hoped that additional sections discussing a safeguards strategy for gas diffusion facilities can be added later. It should be emphasized that this is a technical report, and does not reflect any legal positions. The safeguards strategy and subsequent inspection procedures are intended as guidelines, not as negotiating positions

Special Agricultural Safeguards; Virtual Benefits and Real Costs—Lessons for the Doha Round

OpenAIRE

Jean-Jacques Hallaert

2005-01-01

In the Doha Round, negotiators are discussing the elimination or continuation of the special agricultural safeguards introduced by the Uruguay Round as well as the creation of special safeguard mechanism for use by developing countries. This paper argues that, in violation of the spirit of the WTO Agreement in Agriculture, the special agricultural safeguards have often been used as a prolonged protectionist device. It then draws lessons for the design of the special safeguard mechanism.

Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

1989-04-01

Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

2010-01-01

The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

IAEA safeguards and classified materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

1997-01-01

The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

Insider safeguards effectiveness model (ISEM). User's guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

1977-11-01

A comprehensive presentation of the ISEM computer program is provided. ISEM was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a fixed-site facility safeguards system in coping with the theft, sabotage, or dispersal of radiological material by a single person who has authorized access to the facility. This insider may be aided by a group of insiders who covertly degrade sensor systems. Each ISEM run evaluates safeguards system performance for a particular scenario specified by the user. The dispatching of guards following alarms and their interaction with the insider are explicitly treated by the model

Safeguards '85

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1981-01-01

IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

IAEA safeguards technical manual

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-03-01

Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Howsley, R.; Burrows, B.; Longevialle, H. de; Kuroi, H.; Izumi, A.

1997-01-01

In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rezniczek, A.

2013-01-01

Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Safeguarding the atom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

1985-01-01

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-01-01

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-07-12

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Safeguards at NRC licensed facilities: Are we doing enough

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Asselstine, J.K.

1986-01-01

Safeguards at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) facilities are discussed in this paper. The NRC is pursuing a number of initiatives in the safeguards area. The Commission is conducting a reassessment of its safeguards design basis threat statements to consider the possible implications of an explosive-laden vehicle for U.S. nuclear safeguards and to examine the comparability of safeguards features at NRC-licensed and DOE facilities. The Commission is also completing action on measures to protect against the sabotage threat from an insider at NRC-licensed facilities, and is examining the potential safety implications of safeguards measures. Finally, the NRC has developed measures to reduce the theft potential for high-enriched uranium

Information collection strategies to support strengthened safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Costantini, L.; Hill, J.

2001-01-01

The IAEA Board of Governors approved the implementation of Part 1 of Strengthened Safeguards in June 1995. Since then, the collection and analysis of information beyond that provided by States parties and acquired by inspectors under NPT Safeguards Agreements has been an integral part of IAEA safeguards. The Agency has formally established internal structures and procedures to facilitate the effective use of open-source and other information not previously used in safeguards. Over this period the IAEA Division of Safeguards Information Technology (SGIT) has been building its collections of electronically held open source information. Some of these collections are quite nuclear-specific, such as material from the Monterey Institute in California, and nuclear news collections provided voluntarily by a number of Member States. Others are completely general news sources. Several of these collections contain many more reports than could possibly be reviewed by a human analyst. So a need has arisen for computerised search facilities to identify nuclear-relevant items from those collections. The Agency has more than one piece of software available to help searching and analysis of substantial collections of reports. Search 97 from Verity was chosen for this particular application because it is very straightforward to use, and it was expected that personnel from all over the Department of Safeguards would carry out these searches on a routine basis. The approach whereby special-purpose search mechanisms are designed for use by a large number of users, who are unfamiliar with the details of the search software, seems to be unusual if not unique to the Agency

Safeguards at NRC licensed facilities: Are we doing enough

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Asselstine, J.K.

1986-01-01

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is pursuing a number of initiatives in the safeguards area. The Commission is conducting a reassessment of its safeguards design basis threat statements to consider the possible implications of an explosive-laden vehicle for U.S. nuclear safeguards and to examine the comparability of safeguards features at NRC-licensed and DOE facilities. The Commission is also completing action on measures to protect against the sabotage threat from an insider at NRC-licensed facilities, and is examining the potential safety implications of safeguards measures. Finally, the NRC has developed measures to reduce the theft potential for high-enriched uranium

International safeguards for a modern MOX [mixed-oxide] fuel fabrication facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

1987-03-01

Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating σ/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials

International safeguards for a modern MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel fabrication facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

1987-03-01

Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating sigma/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials.

Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

1980-04-01

The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance

Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

1980-04-01

The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance. (DLC)

Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

Methodology and preliminary models for analyzing nuclear safeguards decisions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-11-01

This report describes a general analytical tool designed to assist the NRC in making nuclear safeguards decisions. The approach is based on decision analysis--a quantitative procedure for making decisions under uncertain conditions. The report: describes illustrative models that quantify the probability and consequences of diverted special nuclear material and the costs of safeguarding the material, demonstrates a methodology for using this information to set safeguards regulations (safeguards criteria), and summarizes insights gained in a very preliminary assessment of a hypothetical reprocessing plant

Building safeguards infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

2009-01-01

Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

Safeguards for nuclear material transparency monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MacArthur, D.A.; Wolford, J.K.

1999-01-01

The US and the Russian Federation are currently engaged in negotiating or implementing several nuclear arms and nuclear material control agreements. These involve placing nuclear material in specially designed containers within controlled facilities. Some of the agreements require the removal of nuclear components from stockpile weapons. These components are placed in steel containers that are then sealed and tagged. Current strategies for monitoring the agreements involve taking neutron and gamma radiation measurements of components in their containers to monitor the presence, mass, and composition of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, as well as other attributes that indicate the use of the material in a weapon. If accurate enough to be useful, these measurements will yield data containing information about the design of the weapon being monitored. In each case, the design data are considered sensitive by one or both parties to the agreement. To prevent the disclosure of this information in a bilateral or trilateral inspection scenario, so-called information barriers have evolved. These barriers combine hardware, software, and procedural safeguards to contain the sensitive data within a protected volume, presenting to the inspector only the processed results needed for verification. Interlocks and volatile memory guard against disclosure in case of failure. Implementing these safeguards requires innovation in radiation measurement instruments and data security. Demonstrating their reliability requires independent testing to uncover any flaws in design. This study discusses the general problem and gives a proposed solution for a high resolution gamma ray detection system. It uses historical examples to illustrate the evolution of other successful systems

Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gyane, E.

2010-01-01

Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

Assurance of the effectiveness of safeguards in light of their objectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kennedy, R.T.; Lyon, H.E.

1977-01-01

The purpose of nuclear safeguards is to prevent unauthorized use of SNM or sabotage of facilities in which significant quantities of SNM are located. A balanced safeguards system includes the three elements of material accountability, material control, and physical protection. These safeguard systems must detect unauthorized activities, initiate timely response and, as necessary, provide sufficient delay for an appropriate action to be taken. Methods used to assure effectiveness of safeguards systems for both ERDA and licensed facilities will be reviewed in this paper. The respective responsibilities of ERDA and NRC are briefly outlined as are the procedures and methods used for implementing these responsibilities. The objective of achieving overall comparability between ERDA and licensed facilities is discussed. The manner in which adequacy of safeguards is assessed is discussed. New techniques which are beginning to be employed and further refined is presented. These involve characterization of the representative threats, development of modeling of outsider and insider threats, site specific analysis of facility vulnerabilities to threats and selection of critical paths. Modeling is used to assess effectiveness with which a system protects against a postulated threat along critical attack paths. Assumptions with regard to the protection provided by the different elements can be varied to improve (decrease) vulnerability along any path. This method along with graphic analysis techniques can be used to: - Identify current weaknesses in existing or as designed systems. - Evaluate upgrading plans. - Develop design trade-offs. - Identify hardware or other developments required. Research and development is required to deal with the problems identified in these assessments and in the safeguards related studies conducted by both ERDA and NRC. These efforts and a summary of the areas currently under review will be described briefly. The practical problems of proof testing

Aggregated systems model for nuclear safeguards decisions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-03-01

This report summarizes a general analytical tool designed to assist nuclear safeguards decision-makers. The approach is based on decision analysis--a quantitative procedure for evaluating complex decision alternatives with uncertain outcomes. The report describes the general analytical approach in the context of safeguards decisions at a hypothetical nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

Safeguards uses of confirmatory measurements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coulter, C.A.

1985-01-01

An analysis is made of the role of shipper and receiver measurements in safeguarding special nuclear materials (SNM) transferred from one facility to another, with emphasis on the case where the receiver requires an analytical accounting measurement of the transferred SNM and does not need the material for process purposes at the time of receipt. Seven possible diversion periods are considered, ranging from the interval between the shipper's final accounting measurement on the material and the time it is placed in the shipper's vault, through the actual transport of the material between facilities, to the time the material is removed from the receiver's vault and placed in the process. The detection power of various combinations of six possible shipper/receiver measurements for these diversion opportunities is then evaluated; the measurements considered include the shipper's and receiver's accounting measurements, the latter at two possible times, and various nondestructive assay (NDA) confirmatory measurements. It is concluded that all safeguards measurement objectives can be met by a combination of a shipper's accounting measurement at the time the material is removed from the process, an appropriate shipper's NDA confirmatory measurement either immediately after canning or immediately before shipping, an equivalent receiver's NDA confirmatory measurement immediately after the material is received, and a receiver's accounting measurement when the material is placed in the process. Furthermore, it is found that a receiver's analytical accounting measurement immediately after receipt when the material is not yet required for process has dubious safeguards value

The evolution of IAEA safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-01

This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

The evolution of IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

Safeguards in Pyroprocessing: an Integrated Model Development and Measurement Data Analysis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Zhang, Jinsuo [The Ohio State Univ., Columbus, OH (United States). Nuclear Engineering Program, Dept. of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering

2017-10-01

Pyroprocessing is an electrochemical method based on the molten salt electrolyte, mainly the LiCl-KCl eutectic molten salt, to recycle the used nuclear fuel. For a conceptual design of commercial pyroprocessing facility, tons of special nuclear materials, namely U and Pu, may be involved, which could be used for non-peaceful purposes if they are diverted. Effective safeguards approaches have to be developed prior to the development and construction of a pyroprocessing facility. Present research focused on two main objectives, namely calculating the properties of nuclear species in LiCl-KCl molten salt and developing integrated model to safeguard a pyroprocessing facility. Understanding the characteristics of special nuclear materials in LiCl-KCl eutectic salt is extremely important to understand their behaviors in an electrorefiner. The model development for the separation processes in the pyroprocessing, including electrorefining, actinide drawdown, and rare earth drawdown benefits the understanding of material transport and separation performance of these processes under various conditions. The output signals, such as potential, current, and species concentration contribute to the material balance closure and provide safeguards signatures to detect the scenarios of diversion. U and Pu are the two main elements concerned in this study due to our interest in safeguards.

Safeguards operations in the integral fast reactor fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goff, K.M.; Benedict, R.W.; Brumbach, S.B.; Dickerman, C.E.; Tompot, R.W.

1994-01-01

Argonne National Laboratory is currently demonstrating the fuel cycle for the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), an advanced reactor concept that takes advantage of the properties of metallic fuel and liquid metal cooling to offer significant improvements in reactor safety, operation, fuel-cycle economics, environmental protection, and safeguards. The IFR fuel cycle employs a pyrometallurgical process using molten salts and liquid metals to recover actinides from spent fuel. The safeguards aspects of the fuel cycle demonstration must be approved by the United States Department of Energy, but a further goal of the program is to develop a safeguards system that could gain acceptance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency. This fuel cycle is described with emphasis on aspects that differ from aqueous reprocessing and on its improved safeguardability due to decreased attractiveness and diversion potential of all process streams, including the fuel product

Safeguards resource management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.

1986-01-01

Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

Nuclear safeguards policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1982-01-01

Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

Transit Matching for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

2015-01-01

In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

Summary of safeguards interactions between Los Alamos and Chinese scientists

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eccleston, G.W.

1994-01-01

Los Alamos has been collaborating since 1984 with scientists from the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) to develop nuclear measurement instrumentation and safeguards systems technologies that will help China support implementation of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). To date, four Chinese scientists have visited Los Alamos, for periods of six months to two years, where they have studied nondestructive assay instrumentation and learned about safeguards systems and inspection techniques that are used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Part of this collaboration involves invitations from the CIAE to US personnel to visit China and interact with a larger number of Institute staff and to provide a series of presentations on safeguards to a wider audience. Typically, CIAE scientists, Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering (BINE) staff, and officials from the Government Safeguards Office attend the lectures. The BINE has an important role in developing the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle. BINE is designing a reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel from Chinese nuclear Power reactors. China signed the nonproliferation treaty in 1992 and is significantly expanding its safeguards expertise and activities. This paper describes the following: DOE support for US and Chinese interactions on safeguards; Chinese safeguards; impacts of US-China safeguards interactions; and possible future safeguards interactions

International safeguards concerns of Spent Fuel Disposal Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.

1988-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussions on the subjects of safeguarding large quantities of plutonium contained in spent fuels to be disposed of in geologic respositories. All the spent fuel disposal scenarios examined here pose a variety of safeguards problems, none of which are adequately addressed by the international safeguards community. The spent fuels from once-through fuel cycles in underground repositories would become an increasingly attractive target for diversion because of their plutonium content and decreasing radioactivity. Current design of the first geologic repository in the US will have the capacity to accommodate wastes equivalent to 70,000 Mt of uranium from commercial and defense fuel cycles. Of this, approximately 62,000 Mt uranium equivalent will be commerical spent fuel, containing over 500 Mt of plutonium. International safeguards commitments may require us to address the safeguards issues of disposing of such large quanities of plutonium in a geologic repository, which has the potential to become a plutonium mine in the future. This paper highlights several issues that should be addressed in the near term by US industries and the DOE before geologic repositories for spent fuels become a reality

The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fritzell, Anni (ES-konsult, Solna (Sweden))

2011-01-15

All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fritzell, Anni

2011-01-01

All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Xavier, Roberto Salles, E-mail: xavier@cnen.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Coordenacao Geral de Planejamento e Avaliacao

2011-07-01

Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xavier, Roberto Salles

2011-01-01

Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

Analytical chemistry needs for nuclear safeguards in nuclear fuel reprocessing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.

1977-01-01

A fuel reprocessing plant designed to process 1500 tons of light water reactor fuel per year will recover 15 tons of Pu during that time, or approximately 40 to 50 kg of Pu per day. Conventional nuclear safeguards accountability has relied on batch accounting at the head and tail ends of the reprocessing plant with semi-annual plant cleanout to determine in-process holdup. An alternative proposed safeguards system relies on dynamic material accounting whereby in-line NDA and conventional analytical techniques provide indications on a daily basis of SNM transfers into the system and information of Pu holdup within the system. Some of the analytical requirements and problems for dynamic materials accounting in a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant are described. Some suggestions for further development will be proposed

Experimental demonstration of microscopic process monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hurt, R.D.; Hurrell, S.J.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.; Crawford, A.B.

1982-01-01

Microscopic process monitoring (MPM) is a material control strategy designed to use standard process control data to provide expanded safeguards protection of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The MPM methodology identifies process events by recognizing significant patterns of changes in on-line measurements. The goals of MPM are to detect diversions of nuclear material and to provide information on process status useful to other facility safeguards operations

U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brenner, L.M.; McDowell, S.C.T.

1989-01-01

In discussing the U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development, five significant eras are identified. The period ending January 1, 1947, may be called the first era. Safeguards as known today did not exist and the classic military approach of security protection applied. The second era covers the period from 1947 to 1954 (when the Atomic Energy Act was completely rewritten to accommodate the then foreseen Civil uses Program and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the first steps were taken by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish material accounting records for all source and fissionable materials on inventory. The third era covers the period 1954 through 1968, which focused on nuclear safeguards in its domestic activities and made major policy changes in its approach to material control and accountability. The fourth era, 1968 to 1972 saw a quantum jump in the recognition and need for a significant safeguards research and development program, answered by the formation of a safeguards technical support organization at Brookhaven National Laboratory and a safeguards Laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the development and application of non-destructive assay technology. The fifth era had its beginning in 1972 with the burgeoning of international terrorism. The corresponding need for a strong physical protection research and development support program was responded to by the Sandia National Laboratory

Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1980-09-01

Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

IAEA safeguards assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

1981-01-01

This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Krichinsky, Alan M.; Bates, Bruce E.; Chesser, Joel B.; Koo, Sinsze; Whitaker, J. Michael

2009-01-01

plant operating conditions. The ultimate use of technologies tested on the engineering-scale test bed is to work with safeguards agencies to install them in operating plants (e.g., enrichment and fuel processing plants), thereby promoting new safeguards measures with minimal impact to operating plants. In addition, this system is useful in identifying features for new plants that can be incorporated as part of 'safeguards by design,' in which load cells and other monitoring technologies are specified to provide outputs for automated monitoring and inspector evaluation.

Methodology and preliminary models for analyzing nuclear-safeguards decisions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Judd, B.R.; Weissenberger, S.

1978-11-01

This report describes a general analytical tool designed with Lawrence Livermore Laboratory to assist the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in making nuclear safeguards decisions. The approach is based on decision analysis - a quantitative procedure for making decisions under uncertain conditions. The report: describes illustrative models that quantify the probability and consequences of diverted special nuclear material and the costs of safeguarding the material; demonstrates a methodology for using this information to set safeguards regulations (safeguards criteria); and summarizes insights gained in a very preliminary assessment of a hypothetical reprocessing plant

Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR and PP case study results

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boyer, Brian D.

2009-01-01

The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design

Safeguarding of spent fuel conditioning and disposal in geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forsstroem, H.; Richter, B.

1997-01-01

Disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formations, without reprocessing, is being considered in a number of States. Before disposal the fuel will be encapsulated in a tight and corrosion resistant container. The method chosen for disposal and the design of the repository will be determined by the geological conditions and the very strict requirements on long-term safety. From a safeguards perspective spent fuel disposal is a new issue. As the spent fuel still contains important amounts of material under safeguards and as it can not be considered practicably irrecoverable in the repository, the IAEA has been advised not to terminate safeguards, even after closure of the repository. This raises a number of new issues where there could be a potential conflict of interests between safety and safeguards demands, in particular in connection with the safety principle that burdens on future generations should be avoided. In this paper some of these issues are discussed based on the experience gained in Germany and Sweden about the design and future operation of encapsulation and disposal facilities. The most important issues are connected to the required level of safeguards for a closed repository, the differences in time scales for waste management and safeguards, the need for verification of the fissile content in the containers and the possibility of retrieving the fuel disposed of. (author)

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fishbone, L.G.

1988-09-28

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.

1988-01-01

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2006-07-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

Keeping the focus on children: the challenges of safeguarding children affected by domestic abuse.

Science.gov (United States)

Peckover, Sue; Trotter, Fiona

2015-07-01

Safeguarding children affected by domestic abuse is a key responsibility for all professionals working with children and families, but can be difficult to achieve in practice. Despite a policy emphasis on early intervention and child-centred work, limited attention has been paid to how professionals in universal and additional support services address this important area of work. This paper reports findings from qualitative research undertaken in one local authority area in the north of England during 2011 which examines the challenges facing professionals in safeguarding children affected by domestic abuse. Six mixed professional focus groups were held, attended by a total of 23 participants. Discussion focused upon participants' awareness of domestic abuse, how they assessed and met children and young peoples' needs, and their views about service provision and safeguarding processes. Data were transcribed and thematic analysis undertaken. The themes presented in this paper--embodied recognition, someone else's job, service gaps, skills deficits, and focusing upon children and young people--illustrate the scope and limitations of professionals' work with children and young people affected by domestic abuse. Areas for practice improvement are discussed. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-07-01

What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

Optimization of a two stage process for biodiesel production from shea butter using response surface methodology

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

E.O. Ajala

2017-12-01

Full Text Available The challenges of biodiesel production from high free fatty acid (FFA shea butter (SB necessitated this study. The reduction of %FFA of SB by esterification and its subsequent utilization by transesterification for biodiesel production in a two stage process for optimization studies was investigated using response surface methodology based on a central composite design (CCD. Four operating conditions were investigated to reduce the %FFA of SB and increase the %yield of shea biodiesel (SBD. The operating conditions were temperature (40–60°C, agitation speed (200–1400 rpm, methanol (MeOH: oil mole ratio: 2:1–6:1 (w/w for esterification and 4:1–8:1 (w/w for transesterification and catalyst loading: 1–2% (H2SO4, (v/v for esterification and KOH, (w/w for transesterification. The significance of the parameters obtained in linear and non-linear form from the models were determined using analysis of variance (ANOVA. The optimal operating conditions that gave minimum FFA of 0.26% were 52.19°C, 200 rpm, 2:1 (w/w and 1.5% (v/v, while those that gave maximum yield of 92.16% SBD were 40°C, 800 rpm, 7:1 (w/w and 1% (w/w. The p-value of <0.0001 for each of the stages showed that the models were significant with R2 of 0.96 each. These results indicate the reproducibility of the models and showed that the RSM is suitable to optimize the esterification and transesterification of SB for SBD production. Therefore, RSM is a useful tool that can be employed in industrial scale production of SBD from high FFA SB.

Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in Nuclear Power Plants