WorldWideScience

Sample records for safeguards radiation monitors

  1. Sequential probability ratio controllers for safeguards radiation monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Coop, K.L.; Nixon, K.V.

    1984-01-01

    Sequential hypothesis tests applied to nuclear safeguards accounting methods make the methods more sensitive to detecting diversion. The sequential tests also improve transient signal detection in safeguards radiation monitors. This paper describes three microprocessor control units with sequential probability-ratio tests for detecting transient increases in radiation intensity. The control units are designed for three specific applications: low-intensity monitoring with Poisson probability ratios, higher intensity gamma-ray monitoring where fixed counting intervals are shortened by sequential testing, and monitoring moving traffic where the sequential technique responds to variable-duration signals. The fixed-interval controller shortens a customary 50-s monitoring time to an average of 18 s, making the monitoring delay less bothersome. The controller for monitoring moving vehicles benefits from the sequential technique by maintaining more than half its sensitivity when the normal passage speed doubles

  2. Radiation detectors as surveillance monitors for IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Dowdy, E.J.

    1980-10-01

    Radiation detectors used for personnel dosimetry are examined for use under IAEA Safeguards as monitors to confirm the passage or nonpassage (YES/NO) of plutonium-bearing nuclear material at barrier penetrations declared closed. In this application where backgrounds are ill defined, no advantage is found for a particular detector type because of intrinsic efficiency. Secondary considerations such as complexity, ease of tamper-proofing, and ease of readout are used to recommend specific detector types for routine monitoring and for data-base measurements. Recommendations are made for applications, data acquisition, and instrument development

  3. Radiation detectors as surveillance monitors for IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Dowdy, E.J.

    1980-10-01

    Radiation detectors used for personnel dosimetry are examined for use under IAEA Safeguards as monitors to confirm the passage or nonpassage (YES/NO) of plutonium-bearing nuclear material at barrier penetrations declared closed. In this application where backgrounds are ill defined, no advantage is found for a particular detector type because of intrinsic efficiency. Secondary considerations such as complexity, ease of tamper-proofing, and ease of readout are used to recommend specific detector types for routine monitoring and for data-base measurements. Recommendations are made for applications, data acquisition, and instrument development.

  4. Smarter radiation monitors for safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Pratt, J.C.; Markin, J.T.; Scurry, T. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    Radiation monitors for nuclear safeguards and security depend on internal control circuits to determine when diversion of special nuclear materials is taking place. Early monitors depended on analog circuits for this purpose, subsequently, digital logic controllers made better monitoring methods possible. Now, versatile microprocessor systems permit new, more efficient, and more useful monitoring methods. One such method is simple stepwise monitoring, which has variable alarm levels to expedite monitoring where extended monitoring periods are required. Another method, sequential probability ratio logic, tests data as it accumulates against two hypothesis - background, or background plus a transient diversion signal - and terminates monitoring as soon as a decision can be made that meets false-alarm and detection confidence requirements. A third method, quantitative monitoring for personnel, calculates count ratios of high- to low-energy gamma-ray regions to predict whether the material detected is a small quantity of bare material or a larger quantity of shielded material. In addition, microprocessor system subprograms can assist in detector calibration and trouble-shooting. Examples of subprograms are a variance analysis technique to set bias levels in plastic scintillators and a state-of-health routine for detecting malfunctions in digital circuit components

  5. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beddingfield, David H.; Nordquist, Heather A.; Umebayaashi, Eiji

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  6. Validation of safeguards monitoring systems and their simulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Standley, V.; Boeck, H.; Villa, M.

    2001-01-01

    Research is underway at the Atominstitut in Vienna Austria where the objective is to design and validate quantitatively a safeguards monitoring system (SMS) and its simulation. The work is novel because the simulation is also used as the basis for automated evaluation of SMS data. Preliminary results indicate that video and radiation data can be automatically interpreted using this approach. Application of the technique promises that an investment in a simulation supports directly the safeguards objective, which is to catch diversion of nuclear material. Consequently, it is easier for a safeguards agency to also realize other benefits associated with simulation-based acquisition, in addition to having a quantitative method for validation

  7. The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1998-01-01

    An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data

  8. Radiation detectors as surveillance monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Dowdy, E.J.

    1981-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) proposes to use personnel dosimetry radiation detectors as surveillance monitors for safeguards purposes. It plans to place these YES/NO monitors at barrier penetration points declared closed under IAEA safeguards to detect the passage of plutonium-bearing nuclear material, usually spent fuel. For this application, commercially available dosimeters were surveyed as well as other radiation detectors that appeared suitable and likely to be marketed in the near future. No primary advantage was found in a particular detector type because in this application backgrounds vary during long counting intervals. Secondary considerations specify that the monitor be inexpensive and easy to tamper-proof, interrogate, and maintain. On this basis radiophotoluminescent, thermoluminescent, and electronic dosimeters were selected as possible routine monitors; the latter two may prove useful for data-base acquisition

  9. Safeguards for nuclear material transparency monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacArthur, D.A.; Wolford, J.K.

    1999-01-01

    The US and the Russian Federation are currently engaged in negotiating or implementing several nuclear arms and nuclear material control agreements. These involve placing nuclear material in specially designed containers within controlled facilities. Some of the agreements require the removal of nuclear components from stockpile weapons. These components are placed in steel containers that are then sealed and tagged. Current strategies for monitoring the agreements involve taking neutron and gamma radiation measurements of components in their containers to monitor the presence, mass, and composition of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, as well as other attributes that indicate the use of the material in a weapon. If accurate enough to be useful, these measurements will yield data containing information about the design of the weapon being monitored. In each case, the design data are considered sensitive by one or both parties to the agreement. To prevent the disclosure of this information in a bilateral or trilateral inspection scenario, so-called information barriers have evolved. These barriers combine hardware, software, and procedural safeguards to contain the sensitive data within a protected volume, presenting to the inspector only the processed results needed for verification. Interlocks and volatile memory guard against disclosure in case of failure. Implementing these safeguards requires innovation in radiation measurement instruments and data security. Demonstrating their reliability requires independent testing to uncover any flaws in design. This study discusses the general problem and gives a proposed solution for a high resolution gamma ray detection system. It uses historical examples to illustrate the evolution of other successful systems

  10. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-01-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues

  11. The design of radiation monitor passageway system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chu Chengsheng

    2006-10-01

    The Radiation Monitor Passageway System is designed as four modules, the radiation detection modules, the control modules, the mechanism modules and the optional modules. this system integrate the radiation detection technology and door ban control technology. It is a effective radiation monitor equipment with high detect sensitiveness, it will be hopeful devoted to national nuclear safeguard. (authors)

  12. Process monitoring for reprocessing plant safeguards: a summary review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerr, H.T.; Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.

    1986-10-01

    Process monitoring is a term typically associated with a detailed look at plant operating data to determine plant status. Process monitoring has been generally associated with operational control of plant processes. Recently, process monitoring has been given new attention for a possible role in international safeguards. International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) Task C.59 has the goal to identify specific roles for process monitoring in international safeguards. As the preliminary effort associated with this task, a review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts mentioned concepts and a few specific applications. None were comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report summarizes the basic elements that must be developed in a comprehensive process monitoring application for safeguards. It then summarizes the significant efforts that have been documented in the literature with respect to the basic elements that were addressed

  13. Enhanced safeguards via solution monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.; Wangen, L.

    1996-09-01

    Solution monitoring is defined as the essentially continuous monitoring of solution level, density, and temperature in all tanks in the process that contain, or could contain, safeguards-significant quantities of nuclear material. This report describes some of the enhancements that solution monitoring could make to international safeguards. The focus is on the quantifiable benefits of solution monitoring, but qualitatively, solution monitoring can be viewed as a form of surveillance. Quantitatively, solution monitoring can in some cases improve diversion detection probability. For example, the authors show that under certain assumptions, solution monitoring can be used to reduce the standard deviation of the annual material balance, σ MB , from approximately 17 kg to approximately 4 kg. Such reduction in σ MB will not always be possible, as they discuss. However, in all cases, solution monitoring would provide assurance that the measurement error models are adequate so that one has confidence in his estimate of σ MB . Some of the results in this report were generated using data that were simulated with prototype solution monitoring software that they are developing. An accompanying document describes that software

  14. Current status of process monitoring for IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koroyasu, M.

    1987-06-01

    Based on literature survey, this report tries to answer some of the following questions on process monitoring for safeguards purposes of future large scale reprocessing plants: what is process monitoring, what are the basic elements of process monitoring, what kinds of process monitoring are there, what are the basic problems of process monitoring, what is the relationship between process monitoring and near-real-time materials accountancy, what are actual results of process monitoring tests and what should be studied in future. A brief description of Advanced Safeguards Approaches proposed by the four states (France, U.K., Japan and U.S.A.), the approach proposed by the U.S.A., the description of the process monitoring, the main part of the report published as a result of one of the U.S. Support Programmes for IAEA Safeguards and an article on process monitoring presented at an IAEA Symposium held in November 1986 are given in the annexes. 24 refs, 20 figs, tabs

  15. Safeguards equipment of the future integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-01-01

    Becoming aware of the significant events of the past four years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take and the implications. The lime proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factor's and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify the proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in international safeguards, including technical and other related factors

  16. Tamper proofing of safeguards monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Riley, R.J.

    1982-11-01

    The tamper proofing of safeguards monitors is essential if the data they produce is, and can be seen to be, reliable. This report discusses the problem of tamper proofing and gives guidance on when and how to apply tamper proofing techniques. The report is split into two parts. The first concerns the fundamental problem of how much tamper proofing to apply and the second describes methods of tamper proofing and discusses their usefulness. Both sections are applicable to all safeguards monitors although particular reference will be made to doorway monitors in some cases. The phrase 'tamper proofing' is somewhat misleading as it is impossible to completely tamper proof any device. Given enough time and resources, even the most elaborate tamper proofing can be overcome. In safeguards applications we are more interested in making the device tamper resistant and tamper indicating. That is, it should be able to resist a certain amount of tampering, and if tampering proves successful, that fact should be immediately obvious. Techniques of making a device tamper indicating and tamper resistant will be described below. The phrase tamper proofing will be used throughout this report as a generic term, including both tamper resistance and tamper indicating. (author)

  17. Safeguards equipment of the future: Integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-01-01

    From the beginning, equipment to support IAEA Safeguards could be characterized as that which is used to measure nuclear material, Destructive Assay (DA) and Non Destructive Assay (NDA), and that which is used to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals, Containment ampersand Surveillance (C/S). C/S equipment has often been thought of as Cameras and Seals, with a limited number of monitors being employed as they became available. In recent years, technology has advanced at an extremely rapid rate, and continues to do so. The traditional film cameras are being replaced by video equipment, and fiber optic and electronic seals have come into rather widespread use. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this evolution, and that which indicates the wave of the future without much question, is the integration of video surveillance and electronic seals with a variety of monitors. This is demonstrated by safeguards systems which are installed in several nuclear facilities in France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the USA, and elsewhere. The terminology of Integrated Monitoring Systems (IMS) has emerged, with the employment of network technology capable of interconnecting all desired elements in a very flexible manner. Also, the technology for transmission of a wide variety of information to off-site locations, termed Remote Monitoring, is in widespread industrial use, requiring very little adaptation for safeguards use. This paper examines the future of the Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in International Safeguards, including technical and other related factors

  18. Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

  19. Remote monitoring in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1996-01-01

    In recent years, technology that permits the integration of monitoring sensors and instruments into a coherent network has become available. Such integrated monitoring systems provide a means for the automatic collection and assessment of sensor signals and instrument readings and for processing such signals and readings in near real time. To gain experience with the new monitoring system technology, the US Department of energy, through bilateral agreements with its international partners, has initiated a project to emplace demonstration systems in various nuclear facilities and conduct field trials of the technology. This effort is the International Remote Monitoring Project. Under this project, remote monitoring systems are being deployed around the world in an incremental manner. Each deployment is different and each offers lessons for improving the performance and flexibility of the technology. Few problems were encountered with the operation of the installations to date, and much has been learned about the operation and use of the new technology. In the future, the authors believe systems for safeguards applications should be capable of being monitored remotely, emphasize the use of sensors, and utilize selective triggering for recording of images. Remote monitoring across national borders can occur only in the context of a cooperative, nonadversarial implementation regime. However, significant technical and policy work remains to be done before widespread safeguards implementation of remote monitoring should be considered. This paper shows that an abundance of technology supports the implementation of integrated and remote monitoring systems. Current field trials of remote monitoring systems are providing practical data and operational experience to aid in the design of tomorrow's systems

  20. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1994-01-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. The authors compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and they examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well

  1. Technology of remote nuclear activity monitoring for national safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwack, Eun Ho; Kim, B. K.; Kim, J. S.; Yoon, W. K.; Kim, J. S.; Kim, J. S.; Cha, H. R.; Na, W. W.; Choi, Y. M.

    2001-07-01

    This project mainly focused on technical development on remote monitoring. It covers optical fiber scintillator to be used as NDA sensor to targets to be applied. Optical fiber scintillator was tested at the high radioactive environment. It is the first try in its kind for spent fuel measurement. It is confirmed that optical fiber sensor can be used for safeguards verification. Its feasibility for spent fuel storage silo at Wolsong reactor was studied. And to optimize remote transmission cost which can be regarded as a major barrier, virtual private network was studied for possible application for safeguards purpose. It can drastically reduce transmission cost and upgrade information surety. As target for remote monitoring, light water reactor and heavy water reactor were feasibly studied. Especially heavy water reactor has much potential for reduction of inspection efforts if remote monitoring is introduced. In overall remote monitoring can play a pivotal role to streamline safeguards inspection

  2. Remote monitoring for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1999-01-01

    Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards-relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these Geld trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology Fortunately, modem technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. (author)

  3. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-01-01

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  4. Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Ward, Rebecca; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Middleton, Bobby D.

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

  5. Safeguard Application Options for the Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D

    2008-01-01

    Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing a Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS) for advanced safeguards at nuclear facilities. LBIMS uses a low-power laser transceiver to monitor the presence and position of items with retroreflective tags. The primary advantages of LBIMS are its scalability to continuously monitor a wide range of items, its ability to operate unattended, its low cost of implementation, and its inherent information security due to its line-of-sight and non-broadcasting operation. The primary proposed safeguard application of LBIMS is described in its name: item monitoring. LBIMS could be implemented in a storage area to continuously monitor containers of nuclear material and the area in which they are stored. The system could be configured to provide off-site notification if any of the containers are moved or removed or if the area is accessed. Individual tags would be used to monitor storage containers, and additional tags could be used to record information regarding secondary storage units and room access. The capability to register small changes in tag position opens up the possibility of several other uses. These include continuously monitoring piping arrangements for design information verification or recording equipment positions for other safeguards systems, such as tracking the opening and closing of autoclaves as part of a cylinder tracking system or opening and closing valves on a sample or product take-off line. Combined with attribute tags, which transmit information from any kind of sensor by modulating the laser signal, LBIMS provides the capability to wirelessly and securely collect safeguards data, even in areas where radio-frequency or other wireless communication methods are not practicable. Four application types are described in this report: static item monitoring, in-process item monitoring with trigger tags, multi-layered integration with trigger tags, and line-of-sight data transfer with

  6. Standard evaluation techniques for containment and surveillance radiation monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1982-01-01

    Evaluation techniques used at Los Alamos for personnel and vehicle radiation monitors that safeguard nuclear material determine the worst-case sensitivity. An evaluation tests a monitor's lowest sensitivity regions with sources that have minimum emission rates. The result of our performance tests are analyzed as a binomial experiment. The number of trials that are required to verify the monitor's probability of detection is determined by a graph derived from the confidence limits for a binomial distribution. Our testing results are reported in a way that characterizes the monitor yet does not compromise security by revealing its routine performance for detecting process materials

  7. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-01-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed

  8. Performance monitoring of safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sirisena, K.; Peltoranta, M.; Goussarov, V.; Vodrazka, P.

    1999-01-01

    SGTCS is responsible for monitoring and reporting the performance of the SG equipment. Performance monitoring (PM) has been implemented in most important safeguards equipment operating unattended in nuclear facilities. Inspectors acquire equipment performance data in facilities. After inspection, the data package is submitted to SGTCS for processing and analysis. The performance data is used for identification of systems or components, which should be changed in the field and for identification of modules which, should be diagnosed at HQ in order to determine the cause of failure. Moreover, the performance data is used for preventive maintenance and spares distribution planning, and to provide statistics for official reports and management decision making. An important part of the performance monitoring is reporting. Equipment performance reports contain information about equipment inventory, utilization, failure types, failure distribution, and reliability. Trends in performance are given in graphical form in cases, where past data is available. Reliability estimates such as expected times between failures are provided. The automated reporting tools are obtainable through EMIS database application. (author)

  9. The process monitoring computer system an integrated operations and safeguards surveillance system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liester, N.A.

    1995-01-01

    The use of the Process Monitoring Computer System (PMCS) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) relating to Operations and Safeguards concerns is discussed. Measures taken to assure the reliability of the system data are outlined along with the measures taken to assure the continuous availability of that data for use within the ICPP. The integration of process and safeguards information for use by the differing organizations is discussed. The PMCS successfully demonstrates the idea of remote Safeguards surveillance and the need for sharing of common information between different support organizations in an operating plant

  10. Nonproliferation and safeguarding via ionization detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koster, J.E.; Johnson, J.P.; Steadman, P.

    1995-01-01

    A significant signature of the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) is ionizing radiation. SNM naturally decays with the emission of alpha particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. Detecting and monitoring these emissions is an important capability for international safeguards. A new detection method collects the ions produced by such radiation in ambient air. Alpha particles in particular are specific to heavy nuclei but have very short range. The ions produced by an alpha, however, can be transported tens of meters to an ion detector. These new monitors are rugged, very sensitive, respond in real time, and in most cases are quite portable

  11. Survey of special nuclear material vehicle monitors for domestic and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Atwater, H.F.; Caldwell, J.T.; Shunk, E.R.

    1979-01-01

    Special nuclear materials vehicle monitors, including gateside vehicle monitors, hand-held personnel-vehicle monitors, and a new tunnel monitor concept for very large vehicles, are discussed. The results of a comparison of effectiveness of monitors for domestic application are presented. The results of calculations and small scale prototype measurements are given for a tunnel-like neutron monitor for monitoring at the perimeter of an enrichment plant subjected to International Safeguards

  12. Remote monitoring field trial. Application to automated air sampling. Report on Task FIN-E935 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poellaenen, R.; Ilander, T.; Lehtinen, J.; Leppaenen, A.; Nikkinen, M.; Toivonen, H.; Ylaetalo, S.; Smartt, H.; Garcia, R.; Martinez, R.; Glidewell, D.; Krantz, K.

    1999-01-01

    An automated air sampling station has recently been developed by Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The station is furnished with equipment that allows comprehensive remote monitoring of the station and the data. Under the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards, STUK and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) established a field trial to demonstrate the use of remote monitoring technologies. STUK provided means for real-lime radiation monitoring and sample authentication whereas SNL delivered means for authenticated surveillance of the equipment and its location. The field trial showed that remote monitoring can be carried out using simple means although advanced facilities are needed for comprehensive surveillance. Authenticated measurement data could be reliably transferred from the monitoring site to the headquarters without the presence of authorized personnel in the monitoring site. The operation of the station and the remote monitoring system were reliable. (orig.)

  13. Research and development of safeguards measures for the large scale reprocessing plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Sato, Yuji; Yokota, Yasuhiro; Masuda, Shoichiro; Kobayashi, Isao; Uchikoshi, Seiji; Tsutaki, Yasuhiro; Nidaira, Kazuo [Nuclear Material Control Center, Tokyo (Japan)

    1994-12-31

    The Government of Japan agreed on the safeguards concepts of commercial size reprocessing plant under the bilateral agreement for cooperation between the Japan and the United States. In addition, the LASCAR, that is the forum of large scale reprocessing plant safeguards, could obtain the fruitful results in the spring of 1992. The research and development of safeguards measures for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant should be progressed with every regard to the concepts described in both documents. Basically, the material accountancy and monitoring system should be established, based on the NRTA and other measures in order to obtain the timeliness goal for plutonium, and the un-attended mode inspection approach based on the integrated containment/surveillance system coupled with radiation monitoring in order to reduce the inspection efforts. NMCC has been studying on the following measures for a large scale reprocessing plant safeguards (1) A radiation gate monitor and integrated surveillance system (2) A near real time Shipper and Receiver Difference monitoring (3) A near real time material accountancy system operated for the bulk handling area (4) A volume measurement technique in a large scale input accountancy vessel (5) An in-process inventory estimation technique applied to the process equipment such as the pulse column and evaporator (6) Solution transfer monitoring approach applied to buffer tanks in the chemical process (7) A timely analysis technique such as a hybrid K edge densitometer operated in the on-site laboratory (J.P.N.).

  14. GPS positioning and desktop mapping. Applications to environmental monitoring. Report on task JNT B898 on the Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kansanaho, A.; Ilander, T.; Toivonen, H.

    1995-10-01

    Satellite navigation has been used for in-field applications by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety since 1993. Because of this experience, training in the use of GPS positioning and desktop mapping was chosen as a task under the Finnish Support programme to IAEA safeguards. A lecture and a field experiment was held in the training course on environmental monitoring at the IAEA headquarters in June 1995. Real-time mapping of the co-ordinates and storing information on sampling sites and procedures can make safeguards implementation more efficient and effective. Further software development are needed for these purposes. (author) (6 figs.)

  15. Surveillance instrumentation for spent-fuel safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKenzie, J.M.; Holmes, J.P.; Gillman, L.K.; Schmitz, J.A.; McDaniel, P.J.

    1978-01-01

    The movement, in a facility, of spent reactor fuel may be tracked using simple instrumentation together with a real time unfolding algorithm. Experimental measurements, from multiple radiation monitors and crane weight and position monitors, were obtained during spent fuel movements at the G.E. Morris Spent-Fuel Storage Facility. These data and a preliminary version of an unfolding algorithm were used to estimate the position of the centroid and the magnitude of the spent fuel radiation source. Spatial location was estimated to +-1.5 m and source magnitude to +-10% of their true values. Application of this surveillance instrumentation to spent-fuel safeguards is discussed

  16. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  17. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  18. Update on Monitoring Technologies for International Safeguards and Fissile Material Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Croessmann, C. Dennis; Glidewell, Don D.; Mangan, Dennis L.; Smathers, Douglas C.

    1999-01-01

    Monitoring technologies are playing an increasingly important part in international safeguards and fissile material verification. The developments reduce the time an inspector must spend at a site while assuring continuity of knowledge. Monitoring technologies' continued development has produced new seal systems and integrated video surveillance advances under consideration for Trilateral Initiative use. This paper will present recent developments for monitoring systems at Embalse, Argentina, VNHEF, Sarov, Russian, and Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina

  19. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. open-quotes Militaryclose quotes refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. open-quotes Excessclose quotes refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term open-quotes safeguardingclose quotes is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC ampersand A), containment and surveillance (C ampersand S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term open-quotes safeguardingclose quotes was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. open-quotes Monitoringclose quotes is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized

  20. Global nuclear material monitoring with NDA and C/S data through integrated facility monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Argo, P.; Goulding, C.; Klosterbuer, S.; Halbig, J.

    1996-01-01

    This paper focuses on a flexible, integrated demonstration of a monitoring approach for nuclear material monitoring. This includes aspects of item signature identification, perimeter portal monitoring, advanced data analysis, and communication as a part of an unattended continuous monitoring system in an operating nuclear facility. Advanced analysis is applied to the integrated nondestructive assay and containment and surveillance data that are synchronized in time. End result will be the foundation for a cost-effective monitoring system that could provide the necessary transparency even in areas that are denied to foreign nationals of both US and Russia should these processes and materials come under full-scope safeguards or bilateral agreements. Monitoring systems of this kind have the potential to provide additional benefits including improved nuclear facility security and safeguards and lower personnel radiation exposures. Demonstration facilities in this paper include VTRAP-prototype, Los Alamos Critical Assemblies Facility, Kazakhstan BM-350 Reactor monitor, DUPIC radiation monitoring, and JOYO and MONJU radiation monitoring

  1. Data analysis for remote monitoring of safeguarded facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeLand, S.M.

    1997-01-01

    The International Remote Monitoring Project (IRMP) sponsored by the US DOE allows DOE and its international partners to gain experience with the remote collection, transmission, and interpretation of safeguards-relevant data. This paper focuses on the interpretation of the data from these remote monitoring systems. Users of these systems need to be able to ascertain that the remote monitoring system is functioning as expected and that the events generated by the sensors are consistent with declared activity. The initial set of analytical tools being provided for IRMP installations this year include a suite of automatically generated views of user-selected data. The baseline set of tools, with illustrative examples, will be discussed. Plans for near-term enhancements will also be discussed. Finally, the applicability of more advanced analytical techniques such as expert systems will be discussed

  2. Solution Monitoring Evaluated by Proliferation Risk Assessment and Fuzzy Optimization Analysis for Safeguards in a Reprocessing Process

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mitsutoshi Suzuki

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Solution monitoring (SM has been used in a nuclear reprocessing plant as an additional measure to provide assurance that the plant is operated as declared. The inline volume and density monitoring equipment with dip tubes is important for safety and safeguards purposes and is a typical example of safeguards by design (SBD. Recently safety, safeguards, and security by design (3SBD are proposed to promote an efficient and effective generation of nuclear energy. In 3SBD, proliferation risk assessment has the potential to consider likelihood of the incidence and proliferation risk in safeguards. In this study, risk assessment methodologies for safeguards and security are discussed and several mathematical methods are presented to investigate risk notion applied to intentional acts of facility misuse in an uncertainty environment. Proliferation risk analysis with the Markov model, deterrence effect with the game model, and SBD with fuzzy optimization are shown in feasibility studies to investigate the potential application of the risk and uncertainty analyses in safeguards. It is demonstrated that the SM is an effective measurement system using risk-informed and cost-effective SBD, even though there are inherent difficulties related to the possibility of operator’s falsification.

  3. Radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larsson, L.Eh.; B'yuli, D.K.; Karmikel, Dzh.Kh.E.

    1985-01-01

    Recommendations on radiation monitoring of personnel, used medical ionizing radiation source, are given. The necessity to carry out radiation monitoring of situation at medical personnel's positions and personnel dosimetry is marked. It is convenient to subdivide radiation monitoring into 3 types: usual, surgical and special. Usual monitoring is connected with current work; surgical monitoring is carried out to receive information during a concrete operation; special monitoring is used to detect possible deviation from standard conditions of work or when suspecting them

  4. A theoretical approach to calibrate radiation portal monitor (RPM) systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nafee, Sherif S.; Abbas, Mahmoud I.

    2008-01-01

    Radiation portal monitor (RPM) systems are widely used at international border crossings, where they are applied to the task of detecting nuclear devices, special nuclear material, and radiation dispersal device materials that could appear at borders. The requirements and constraints on RPM systems deployed at high-volume border crossings are significantly different from those at weapons facilities or steel recycling plants, the former being required to rapidly detect localized sources of radiation with a very high detection probability and low false-alarm rate, while screening all of the traffic without impeding the flow of commerce [Chambers, W.H., Atwater, H.F., Fehlau, P.E., Hastings, R.D., Henry, C.N., Kunz, W.E., Sampson, T.E., Whittlesey, T.H., Worth, G.M., 1974. Portal Monitor for Diversion Safeguards. LA-5681, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM]. In the present work, compact analytical formulae are derived and used to calibrate two RPM systems with isotropic radiating sources: (i) polyvinyltoluene (PVT) or plastic and (ii) thallium-doped crystalline sodium iodide, NaI(Tl), gamma-ray detector materials. The calculated efficiencies are compared to measured values reported in the literatures, showing very good agreement

  5. Scoping Study of Machine Learning Techniques for Visualization and Analysis of Multi-source Data in Nuclear Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cui, Yonggang

    2018-05-07

    In implementation of nuclear safeguards, many different techniques are being used to monitor operation of nuclear facilities and safeguard nuclear materials, ranging from radiation detectors, flow monitors, video surveillance, satellite imagers, digital seals to open source search and reports of onsite inspections/verifications. Each technique measures one or more unique properties related to nuclear materials or operation processes. Because these data sets have no or loose correlations, it could be beneficial to analyze the data sets together to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards processes. Advanced visualization techniques and machine-learning based multi-modality analysis could be effective tools in such integrated analysis. In this project, we will conduct a survey of existing visualization and analysis techniques for multi-source data and assess their potential values in nuclear safeguards.

  6. Automated high-volume aerosol sampling station for environmental radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toivonen, H.; Honkamaa, T.; Ilander, T.; Leppaenen, A.; Nikkinen, M.; Poellaenen, R.; Ylaetalo, S.

    1998-07-01

    An automated high-volume aerosol sampling station, known as CINDERELLA.STUK, for environmental radiation monitoring has been developed by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finland. The sample is collected on a glass fibre filter (attached into a cassette), the airflow through the filter is 800 m 3 /h at maximum. During the sampling, the filter is continuously monitored with Na(I) scintillation detectors. After the sampling, the large filter is automatically cut into 15 pieces that form a small sample and after ageing, the pile of filter pieces is moved onto an HPGe detector. These actions are performed automatically by a robot. The system is operated at a duty cycle of 1 d sampling, 1 d decay and 1 d counting. Minimum detectable concentrations of radionuclides in air are typically 1Ae10 x 10 -6 Bq/m 3 . The station is equipped with various sensors to reveal unauthorized admittance. These sensors can be monitored remotely in real time via Internet or telephone lines. The processes and operation of the station are monitored and partly controlled by computer. The present approach fulfils the requirements of CTBTO for aerosol monitoring. The concept suits well for nuclear material safeguards, too

  7. Tracking and position recognition applied to remote monitoring to be used in integrated safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bonino, Anibal D; Perez, Adrian C; Krimer, Mario J; Teira, Ruben O; Vigile, Rodolfo S; Valentino, Lucia I; Giordano, Luis A; Ferro, Juan M [Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

    2001-07-01

    In the framework of the Strengthening and integrated Safeguards Systems new measures and tools are available to meet the safeguards objective. The credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities derived from the implementation of the Additional Protocol has an impact on the current safeguards approach to declared facilities thus their through review is advisable. Among these tools, a more intensive use of unattended systems and remote transmission of safeguards relevant information are considered, specifically for On Load Reactors (ORLs). A Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) to cover the transfers of spent fuels from the ponds to a dry storage is being tested at Embalse nuclear power plant. In connection with the RMS, this paper describes some of the technologies involved: the Global Position System (GPS) and the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), which were implemented due to the requirement to ascertain the position of valuable elements. The main objective of this design aimed at safeguarding the spent fuels transfers from the welding cell to the silos field by a strict surveillance of the whereabouts. The bases for the development were settled by the specifications imposed by the integrated Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Argentina. The resultant tracking and position recognition system is based on GPS receivers operating in Differential Mode, with the aid of Radio Frequency Identification. In compliance with the safeguard requirement the whole system is able to operate in a continuous and remote mode, what means without human being attention. (author)

  8. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  9. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H.; Miller, Karen A.; Ianakiev, Kiril D.; Reimold, Benjamin A.; Ward, Steven L.; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235 U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  10. A beam radiation monitor based on CVD diamonds for SuperB

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cardarelli, R.; Di Ciaccio, A.

    2013-08-01

    Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) diamond particle detectors are in use in the CERN experiments at LHC and at particle accelerator laboratories in Europe, USA and Japan mainly as beam monitors. Nowadays it is considered a proven technology with a very fast signal read-out and a very high radiation tolerance suitable for measurements in high radiation environment zones i.e. near the accelerators beam pipes. The specific properties of CVD diamonds make them a prime candidate for measuring single particles as well as high-intensity particle cascades, for timing measurements on the sub-nanosecond scale and for beam protection systems in hostile environments. A single-crystalline CVD (scCVD) diamond sensor, read out with a new generation of fast and high transition frequency SiGe bipolar transistor amplifiers, has been tested for an application as radiation monitor to safeguard the silicon vertex tracker in the SuperB detector from excessive radiation damage, cumulative dose and instantaneous dose rates. Test results with 5.5 MeV alpha particles from a 241Am radioactive source and from electrons from a 90Sr radioactive source are presented in this paper.

  11. Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haginoya, Tohru

    1997-01-01

    INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

  12. Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mollah, A.S.

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

  13. The remote monitoring systems LOVER and RECOVER for international safeguards technical, economic and legal aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lauppe, W.D.; Stein, G.; Rezniczek, A.; Stienen, U.

    1983-12-01

    The electronic remote monitoring systems RECOVER and LOVER were developed to comply with the IAEA's tasks concerning international nuclear materials safeguards with the aim of reducing the inspection expenditure and enhancing control effectiveness. The present study on the technical, economic and legal aspects of an application of these systems is intended to show possible implications and provide argumentation aids for discussions on the application of these systems. RECOVER and LOVER offer the possibility of establishing a direct communication path between containment and surveillance system (c/s), instruments at the site of application and a central monitoring station. The demonstration versions of both systems have shown that remote interrogation of data under safeguards-specific boundary conditions (e.g. requirement of tamper safety) will be technically feasible. (orig./HP)

  14. Selected nondestructive assay instrumentation for an international safeguards system at uranium enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Baker, M.P.; Strittmatter, R.; Jain, M.; Evans, M.L.

    1979-01-01

    A selected set of nondestructive assay instruments for an international safeguards system at uranium enrichment plants is currently under development. These instruments are of three types: in-line enrichment meters for feed, product, and tails streams; area radiation monitors for direct detection of high-enriched uranium production, and an enrichment meter for spent alumina trap material. The current status of the development of each of these instruments is discussed, with supporting data, as well as the role each would play in a total international safeguards system. 5 figures

  15. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  16. Selected topics in special nuclear materials safeguard system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, L.L.; Thatcher, C.D.; Clarke, J.D.; Rodriguez, M.P.

    1991-01-01

    During the past two decades the improvements in circuit integration have given rise to many new applications in digital processing technology by continuously reducing the unit cost of processing power. Along with this increase in processing power a corresponding decrease in circuit volume has been achieved. Progress has been so swift that new classes of applications become feasible every 2 or 3 years. This is especially true in the application of proven new technology to special nuclear materials (SNM) safeguard systems. Several areas of application were investigated in establishing the performance requirements for the SNM safeguard system. These included the improvements in material control and accountability and surveillance by using multiple sensors to continuously monitor SNM inventory within the selected value(s); establishing a system architecture to provide capabilities needed for present and future performance requirements; and limiting operating manpower exposure to radiation. This paper describes two selected topics in the application of state-of-the-art, well-proven technology to SNM safeguard system design

  17. Tamper and radiation resistant instrumentation for safeguarding special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parsons, B.B.; Wells, J.L.

    1977-01-01

    A tamper-resistant liquid level/accountability instrumentation system for safeguards use has been developed and tested. The tests demonstrate the accuracy of liquid level measurement using TDR (Time Domain Reflectometry) techniques and the accuracy of differential pressure and temperature measurements utilizing a custom designed liquid level sensor probe. The calibrated liquid level, differential pressure, and temperature data provide sufficient information to accurately determine volume, density, and specific gravity. Test solutions used include ordinary tap water, diluted nitric acid in varying concentrations, and diluted uranium trioxide also in varying concentrations. System operations and preliminary test results conducted at the General Electric Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant and the National Bureau of Standards, respectively, suggest that the system will provide the safeguards inspector with an additional tool for real-time independent verification of normal operations and special nuclear materials accountancy data for chemical reprocessing plants. This paper discusses the system design concepts, including a brief description of the tamper and radiation resistant features, the preliminary test results, and the significance of the work

  18. Development of in-field monitoring techniques. Report on Task FIN A845 on the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Toivonen, H; Honkamaa, T; Kansanaho, A; Poellaenen, R [Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, Helsinki (Finland). Aerosol Lab.; Aarnio, P; Ala-Heikkilae, J; Nikkinen, M [Helsinki Univ. of Technology, Otaniemi (Finland). Nuclear Engineering Lab.

    1994-12-01

    Several in-field measuring techniques were identified for use in safeguards inspections. The radiation measurements play a major role in seeking environmetal signatures. A high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometer, either in-situ or in sample analysis, gives unequivocal evidence of nuclear activities on the site of interest. Although portable spectrometers are commercially available, hardware development and software tailoring seem to be necessary before efficient mobile measurements can be initiated. To understand trends and pattern of contamination, the results of the measurements have be displayed on digital maps. GPS-integration is an essential requirement for the equipment in environmental monitoring. (orig.) (14 refs., 5 figs., 17 tabs.).

  19. Development of in-field monitoring techniques. Report on Task FIN A845 on the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toivonen, H.; Honkamaa, T.; Kansanaho, A.; Poellaenen, R.; Aarnio, P.; Ala-Heikkilae, J.; Nikkinen, M.

    1994-12-01

    Several in-field measuring techniques were identified for use in safeguards inspections. The radiation measurements play a major role in seeking environmetal signatures. A high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometer, either in-situ or in sample analysis, gives unequivocal evidence of nuclear activities on the site of interest. Although portable spectrometers are commercially available, hardware development and software tailoring seem to be necessary before efficient mobile measurements can be initiated. To understand trends and pattern of contamination, the results of the measurements have be displayed on digital maps. GPS-integration is an essential requirement for the equipment in environmental monitoring. (orig.) (14 refs., 5 figs., 17 tabs.)

  20. Development of web monitoring radiation area monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jung, Hoon Jin; Lee, Jun Hee; Namkoong, Phil; Lee, Dong Hoon; Lee, Su Hong; Lee, Gun Bae

    2005-01-01

    Recently the increasing number of radioisotope industry and nuclear facility have ever raised the possibility of radiation safety accident. As such a result, radioisotope companies and nuclear facility operators have become to be much interested in radiation area monitoring for efficient radiation protection. At present, almost of the radiation area monitors which are imported products are outdated in aspect of their functions. Diversification of the monitoring work is urgently demanding additional functions to be added. Thus we have developed new-type digital area monitor which enables remote web monitoring with image and radiation dose rate value at distant places through using internet, the latest IT technology, and radiation measurement technology

  1. Monitoring REDD+: From Social Safeguards to Social Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ravikumar, A.; Andersson, K.

    2010-12-01

    Krister Andersson 1 and Ashwin Ravikumar 1 The UNFCCC requires countries that participate in the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries) program to monitor both forest carbon inventories as well as the governance of REDD+ activities and their social consequences. Exactly how this should be done, however, remains an open question. This paper addresses this question by drawing on existing research on social-ecological systems and new institutional economics. We make the case for a monitoring system that goes beyond a narrow focus of qualitative indicators of REDD+ governance that seek to provide social safeguards for international investors to create a more comprehensive monitoring system that is useful for social learning about how policies affect a variety of forest outcomes. We describe the defining characteristics of five existing approaches to monitoring REDD+ governance. Applying evaluative criteria of affordability, comprehensiveness, transparency, uncertainty specification, and explanatory potential, we analyze the extent to which each of the programs contribute to broader social learning processes in participating countries. Our analysis finds that it makes sense to move from the current narrow focus of monitoring for control to monitoring for social learning. Particularly valuable to participating REDD+ actors would be the creation of learning systems that can help policy makers to identify opportunities for policy improvements, with the ultimate goal of making REDD+ more effective, efficient, and equitable. Such learning is not possible, however, without timely and systematic collection of data on the relationships between forests and forest users. 1University of Colorado at Boulder, Environmental Studies Program, Boulder, CO 80309-0397

  2. Modular remote radiation monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lacerda, Fabio; Farias, Marcos S.; Aghina, Mauricio A.C.; Oliveira, Mauro V.

    2013-01-01

    The Modular Remote Radiation Monitor (MRRM) is a novel radiation monitor suitable for monitoring environmental exposure to ionizing radiation. It is a portable compact-size low-power microprocessor-based electronic device which provides its monitoring data to other electronic systems, physically distant from it, by means of an electronic communication channel, which can be wired or wireless according to the requirements of each application. Besides its low-power highly-integrated circuit design, the Modular Remote Radiation Monitor is presented in a modular architecture, which promotes full compliance to the technical requirements of different applications while minimizing cost, size and power consumption. Its communication capability also supports the implementation of a network of multiple radiation monitors connected to a supervisory system, capable of remotely controlling each monitor independently as well as visualizing the radiation levels from all monitors. A prototype of the MRRM, functionally equivalent to the MRA-7027 radiation monitor, was implemented and connected to a wired MODBUS network of MRA-7027 monitors, responsible for monitoring ionizing radiation inside Argonauta reactor room at Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear. Based on the highly positive experimental results obtained, further design is currently underway in order to produce a consumer version of the MRRM. (author)

  3. Gamma radiation detectors for safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.; Moeslinger, M.; Bourva, L.; Bass, C.; Zendel, M.

    2007-01-01

    The IAEA uses extensively a variety of gamma radiation detectors to verify nuclear material. These detectors are part of standardized spectrometry systems: germanium detectors for High-Resolution Gamma Spectrometry (HRGS); Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CZT) detectors for Room Temperature Gamma Spectrometry (RTGS); and NaI(Tl) detectors for Low Resolution Gamma Spectrometry (LRGS). HRGS with high-purity Germanium (HpGe) detectors cooled by liquid nitrogen is widely used in nuclear safeguards to verify the isotopic composition of plutonium or uranium in non-irradiated material. Alternative cooling systems have been evaluated and electrically cooled HpGe detectors show a potential added value, especially for unattended measurements. The spectrometric performance of CZT detectors, their robustness and simplicity are key to the successful verification of irradiated materials. Further development, such as limiting the charge trapping effects in CZT to provide improved sensitivity and energy resolution are discussed. NaI(Tl) detectors have many applications-specifically in hand-held radioisotope identification devices (RID) which are used to detect the presence of radioactive material where a lower resolution is sufficient, as they benefit from a generally higher sensitivity. The Agency is also continuously involved in the review and evaluation of new and emerging technologies in the field of radiation detection such as: Peltier-cooled CdTe detectors; semiconductor detectors operating at room temperature such as HgI 2 and GaAs; and, scintillator detectors using glass fibres or LaBr 3 . A final conclusion, proposing recommendations for future action, is made

  4. Finnish remote environmental monitoring field demonstration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toivonen, H.; Leppaenen, A.; Ylaetalo, S.; Lehtinen, J.; Hokkinen, J.; Tarvainen, M.; Crawford, T.; Glidewell, D.; Smartt, H.; Torres, J.

    1997-10-01

    Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Helsinki, Finland and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), working under the Finnish Support Program to IAEA Safeguards and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) funded International Remote Monitoring Program (Task FIN E 935), have undertaken a joint effort to demonstrate the use of remote monitoring for environmental air sampling and safeguards applications. The results of the task will be used by the IAEA to identify the feasibility, cost-effectiveness, reliability, advantages, and problems associated with remote environmental monitoring. An essential prerequisite for a reliable remote air sampling system is the protection of samples against tampering. Means must be developed to guarantee that the sampling itself has been performed as designed and the original samples are not substituted with samples produced with other equipment at another site. One such method is to label the samples with an unequivocal tag. In addition, the inspection personnel must have the capability to remotely monitor and access the automated environmental air sampling system through the use of various sensors and video imagery equipment. A unique aspect to this project is the network integration of remote monitoring equipment with a STUK radiation monitoring system. This integration will allow inspectors to remotely view air sampler radiation data and sensor/image data through separate software applications on the same review station. A sensor network and video system will be integrated with the SNL developed Modular Integrated Monitoring System (MIMS) to provide a comprehensive remote monitoring approach for safeguards purposes. This field trial system is being implemented through a multiphase approach for use by STUK, SNL, and for possible future use by the IAEA

  5. Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program

  6. FEMO, A FLOW AND ENRICHMENT MONITOR FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS AT A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gunning, John E.; Laughter, Mark D.; March-Leuba, Jose A.

    2008-01-01

    A number of countries have received construction licenses or are contemplating the construction of large-capacity gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The capability to independently verify nuclear material flows is a key component of international safeguards approaches, and the IAEA does not currently have an approved method to continuously monitor the mass flow of 235U in uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas streams. Oak Ridge National Laboratory is investigating the development of a flow and enrichment monitor, or FEMO, based on an existing blend-down monitoring system (BDMS). The BDMS was designed to continuously monitor both 235U mass flow and enrichment of UF6 streams at the low pressures similar to those which exists at GCEPs. BDMSs have been installed at three sites-the first unit has operated successfully in an unattended environment for approximately 10 years. To be acceptable to GCEP operators, it is essential that the instrument be installed and maintained without interrupting operations. A means to continuously verify flow as is proposed by FEMO will likely be needed to monitor safeguards at large-capacity plants. This will enable the safeguards effectiveness that currently exists at smaller plants to be maintained at the larger facilities and also has the potential to reduce labor costs associated with inspections at current and future plants. This paper describes the FEMO design requirements, operating capabilities, and development work required before field demonstration.

  7. Remote and unattended monitoring techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Whichello, J.

    1998-01-01

    In the last years, there has been a tremendous growth in the number of unattended assay and monitoring systems in the field. These systems have enabled reduced presence of inspectors while increasing the verification coverage. As part of the Strengthened safeguards System and in particular as part of the measures to improve the cost-effectiveness of safeguards, the possibility of remote transfer of authenticated and encrypted video surveillance, seals and radiation sensor data via telephone or special satellite links have been demonstrated and the necessary arrangements and infrastructure have been prepared. The evaluation of field trials of the remote monitoring systems have shown that the systems are effective in monitoring events of safeguards relevance in near real times. The systems are competitive from a cost standpoint when compared to current methods. The reduction of inspection efforts can be realized by application of remote monitoring technique with scheduled inspections and more effectively with the short notice or unannounced random inspections. It is expected that, upon completion of the necessary arrangements with the Member States authorities, the safeguards department will implement the technique widely before the year 2000

  8. Safeguard monitoring of direct electrolytic reduction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jurovitzki, Abraham L.

    Nuclear power is regaining global prominence as a sustainable energy source as the world faces the consequences of depending on limited fossil based, CO2 emitting fuels. A key component to achieving this sustainability is to implement a closed nuclear fuel cycle. Without achieving this goal, a relatively small fraction of the energy value in nuclear fuel is actually utilized. This involves recycling of spent nuclear fuel (SNF)---separating fissile actinides from waste products and using them to fabricate fresh fuel. Pyroprocessing is a viable option being developed for this purpose with a host of benefits compared to other recycling options, such as PUREX. Notably, pyroprocessing is ill suited to separate pure plutonium from spent fuel and thus has non-proliferation benefits. Pyroprocessing involves high temperature electrochemical and chemical processing of SNF in a molten salt electrolyte. During this batch process, several intermediate and final streams are produced that contain radioactive material. While pyroprocessing is ineffective at separating pure plutonium, there are various process misuse scenarios that could result in diversion of impure plutonium into one or more of these streams. This is a proliferation risk that should be addressed with innovative safeguards technology. One approach to meeting this challenge is to develop real time monitoring techniques that can be implemented in the hot cells and coupled with the various unit operations involved with pyroprocessing. Current state of the art monitoring techniques involve external chemical assaying which requires sample removal from these unit operations. These methods do not meet International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) timeliness requirements. In this work, a number of monitoring techniques were assessed for their viability as online monitoring tools. A hypothetical diversion scenario for the direct electrolytic reduction process was experimentally verified (using Nd2O3 as a surrogate for PuO2

  9. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  10. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron; Charlton, William; Bean, Robert

    2008-01-01

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of 'non-traditional' operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes

  11. Validation of gamma-ray detection techniques for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dewji, S.A., E-mail: dewjisa@ornl.gov [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1 Bethel Valley Road, MS-6335, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6335 (United States); Lee, D.L.; Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1 Bethel Valley Road, MS-6335, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6335 (United States); Hertel, N.E. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1 Bethel Valley Road, MS-6335, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6335 (United States); Nuclear and Radiological Engineering Program, Georgia Institute of Technology, 770 State Street, Atlanta, GA 30332-0745 (United States); Chapman, J.A.; McElroy, R.D.; Cleveland, S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1 Bethel Valley Road, MS-6335, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6335 (United States)

    2016-07-01

    Recent IAEA circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under the revised policy, IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed to develop and validate concepts of nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO{sub 2}(NO{sub 3}){sub 2}) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP), where gamma-ray spectroscopy was selected as the process monitoring tool. The Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was employed to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in an NUCP. Nondestructive assay techniques using gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely way. This work investigated gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluated various gamma-ray detector sensitivities to uranyl nitrate. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the uranyl nitrate gamma-ray signatures for spectrometers based on sodium iodide, lanthanum bromide, and high-purity germanium detectors. The results of measurements under static and dynamic operating conditions at concentrations ranging from 10–90 g U/L of natural uranyl nitrate are presented. A range of

  12. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  13. Development of safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Pearsall, C.; Chesnay, B.; Creusot, C.; Ehinger, M.; Kuhn, E.; Robson, N.; Higuchi, H.; Takeda, S.; Fujimaki, K.; Ai, H.; Uehara, S.; Amano, H.; Hoshi, K.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently undergoing construction and commissioning by the Japan Nuclear Fuels Limited (JNFL), is scheduled to begin active operations in 2005. The planned operating capacity is 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year containing approximately 8 tonnes of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japan safeguards authorities are working with JNFL to develop a Safeguards Approach that is both effective and efficient. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of advanced concepts are being introduced and many currently applied safeguards measures are being enhanced. These new and improved techniques and procedures will provide for more sensitive and reliable verification of nuclear material and facility operations while reducing the required inspection effort. The Safeguards Approach incorporates systematic Design Information Examination and Verification (DIE/DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. It incorporates installed, unattended radiation and solution measurement and monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. While many of the measurement systems will be independent-inspector controlled, others will require authentication of a split signal from operator controlled systems. The independent and/or authenticated data from these systems will be transmitted over a network to a central inspector center for evaluation. Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA) will be used for short period sequential analysis of the operator and inspector data which, when combined with Solution Monitoring data, will provide higher assurance in the verification of nuclear material for timeliness and of the operational status of the facility. Samples will be taken using a facility installed, but IAEA authenticated, automatic sampling system and will then be transferred to a jointly used IAEA-JSGO On-Site Laboratory (OSL). This paper provides an

  14. Implementation of ion based applications for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Martinez, R.L.; Johnson, C.S.

    1996-08-01

    The uses of the LON, `Local Operating Network,` developed by Echelon Corporation, Palo Alto, California, has been expanded to handle a number of safeguards applications. A magnetic and vibration sensor pack has been developed to monitor for magnetic fields and vibration. This sensor pack can be attached to any source that generates a magnetic field, such as electrical solenoids or motors, to detect when the source is activated. New network nodes that interface directly with the raw data of Sandia developed radiation sensors, for detecting the presence of radiation sources, have been developed. The capacity of the network has been expanded to allow the transmission of large data sets, specifically the transmission of digital video images from the Sandia-developed-Image Compression and Authentication Module (ICAM).

  15. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials Refs, figs, tabs

  16. Technology development for DUPIC process safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, J S; Kim, H D; Lee, Y G; Kang, H Y; Cha, H R; Byeon, K H; Park, Y S; Choi, H N [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-07-01

    As the strategy for DUPIC(Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU reactor) process safeguards, the neutron detection method was introduced to account for nuclear materials in the whole DUPIC process by selectively measuring spontaneous fission neutron signals from {sup 244}Cm. DSNC was designed and manufactured to measure the account of curium in the fuel bundle and associated process samples in the DUPIC fuel cycle. The MCNP code had response profile along the length of the CANDU type fuel bundle. It was found experimentally that the output signal variation due to the overall azimuthal asymmetry was less than 0.2%. The longitudinal detection efficiency distribution at every position including both ends was kept less than 2% from the average value. Spent fuel standards almost similar to DUPIC process material were fabricated from a single spent PWR fuel rod and the performance verification of the DSNC is in progress under very high radiation environment. The results of this test will be eventually benchmarked with other sources such as code simulation, chemical analysis and gamma analysis. COREMAS-DUPIC has been developed for the accountability management of nuclear materials treated by DUPIC facility. This system is able to track the controlled nuclear materials maintaining the material inventory in near-real time and to generate the required material accountability records and reports. Concerning the containment and surveillance technology, a focused R and D effort is given to the development of unattended continuous monitoring system. Currently, the component technologies of radiation monitoring and surveillance have been established, and continued R and D efforts are given to the integration of the components into automatic safeguards diagnostics. (author).

  17. Monitoring of radiation exposure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-02-01

    The guide specifies the requirements for the monitoring of radiation exposure in instances where radiation is used. In addition to workers, the guide covers students, apprentices and visitors. The guide shall also apply to exposure from natural radiation. However, the monitoring of radiation exposure in nuclear power plants is dealt with in YVL Guide 7.10 and 7.11. The guide defines the concepts relevant to the monitoring of radiation exposure and provides guidelines for determining the necessity of monitoring and subsequently arranging such in different operations. In addition, the guide specifies the criteria for the approval and regulatory control of the dosimetric service.

  18. Monitoring of radiation exposure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-02-01

    The guide specifies the requirements for the monitoring of radiation exposure in instances where radiation is used. In addition to workers, the guide covers students, apprentices and visitors. The guide shall also apply to exposure from natural radiation. However, the monitoring of radiation exposure in nuclear power plants is dealt with in YVL Guide 7.10 and 7.11. The guide defines the concepts relevant to the monitoring of radiation exposure and provides guidelines for determining the necessity of monitoring and subsequently arranging such in different operations. In addition, the guide specifies the criteria for the approval and regulatory control of the dosimetric service

  19. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-01-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future

  20. Remote monitoring in safeguards: Security of information and enhanced cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Galdoz, Erwin; Calzetta, Osvaldo; Fernández Moreno, Sonia; Llacer, Carlos; Díaz, Gustavo; Vigile, Sebastián; Brunhuber, Christoph

    2011-01-01

    Unattended systems with remote transmission capabilities (RM) have the potential to improve safeguards efficiency. Moreover, the evolution of technology and the steady growing of nuclear materials subject to control, lead modern safeguards increasingly utilizing unattended equipment with the capability to store relevant data for long periods of time coupled with the option of being remotely accessed and checked. Remote inspection is still a concept under development, but it may end to be a powerful more efficient verification modality in medium term future. An important part of drawing meaningful safeguards conclusions rests on authenticity and reliability of the information on nuclear material and facilities acquired through the various verification activities and measures applied by IAEA and regional safeguards organizations, like ABACC. The increasing utilization of such technology to further optimize safeguards responds to a multifaceted environment where security of information for all relevant parties is of utmost importance. From the point of view of the IAEA and ABACC, the use of any technology for safeguards application, and specially the use of RM, requires to ensure the security of data collected to guarantee the validity and veracity of such information throughout the whole process (e.g., from collecting to reviewing). This is also valid to the SSAC involved in the process. Information security is also relevant for States and Operators. Assurance should be given that the information could not be withdrawn by non-authorized entities and that facility data is also fully secured. Another important aspect related to RM that may also fall in the security aspect of safeguards relevant information that merits further consideration, is the sharing of information between organizations like ABACC and the IAEA as well as the possibility to make this data available for States authorities purposes. This paper discusses three main themes related to RM: (i) the extent

  1. Development of radiation alarm monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myung Jae Song; Myung Chan Lee; Jung Kwan Son

    1997-01-01

    The Radiation Alarm Monitor is developed domestically in order to protect radiation workers from over exposure. The Radiation Alarm Monitor with microprocessor installed can record the information of radiation field before and after accidents. It can also provide the data to analyze the accident and to set a counterplan. It features a wide detection range of radiation (I OmR/h - I OOR/h), radiation work and data storage, portability, high precision (5%) due to calibration, and adaptation of a powerful alarm system. In order to protect workers from over exposure, light and sound alarm had been designed to initiate when accident occurs such as an unexpected change of radiation field such as radiation rate and accumulated dosed between 90 min. before the alarm and 30 min. after the alarm. In addition, the Radiation Alarm Monitor interfaces with computer so that the accident can be analyzed. After the testing conditions in other countries for the Radiation Alarm Monitor were compared, the most stringent test, ANSI N42. 17-A, was selected. The performance testing was car-ried out under various conditions of temperature, humidity, vibration and electromagnetic wave hindrance by Korea Research Institute of Standards and Science (KRISS). As a result, the Radiation Alan-n Monitor passed all test. Also, for the Radiation Alarm Monitor, environmental adaptability tests under the environmental conditions of NPP sites had been performed. The Radiation Alan-n Monitor had been reviewed by radiation workers at NPPs and their opinions had been collected. Operating procedure will be written and distributed to every NPP sites. Radiation Alarm Monitor will be modified for use under the specific environmental conditions of each site. It will be distributed to NPP sites and will be used by radiation workers

  2. 7 CFR 4290.506 - Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 15 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls... Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures. ...

  3. Development of solution monitoring software for enhanced safeguards at a large scale reprocessing facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Van Handenhove, Carl; Breban, Domnica; Creusot, Christophe [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Dransart, Pascal; Dechamp, Luc [Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Ispra, Varese, (Italy); Jarde, Eric [Euriware, Equeurdreville (France)

    2011-12-15

    The implementation of an effective and efficient IAEA safeguards approach at large scale reprocessing facilities with large throughput and continuous flow of nuclear material requires the introduction of enhanced safeguards measures to provide added assurance about the absence of diversion of nuclear material and confirmation that the facility is operated as declared. One of the enhanced safeguards measures, a Solution Monitoring and Measurement System (SMMS), comprising data collection instruments, data transmission equipment and an advanced Solution Monitoring Software (SMS), is being implemented at a large scale reprocessing plant in Japan. SMS is designed as a tool to enable automatic calculations of volumes, densities and flow-rates in selected process vessels, including most of the vessels of the main nuclear material stream. This software also includes automatic features to support the inspectorate in verifying inventories and inventory changes. The software also enables one to analyze the flows of nuclear material within the process and of specified 'cycles' of operation, and, in order to provide assurance that the facility is being operated as declared to compare these with those expected (reference signatures). The configuration and parameterization work (especially the analytical and comparative work) for the implementation and configuration of the SMS has been carried out jointly between the IAEA, Euriware-France (the software developer) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC)-Ispra. This paper describes the main features of the SMS, including the principles underlying the automatic analysis functionalities. It then focuses on the collaborative work performed by the JRC-Ispra, Euriware and the IAEA for the parameterization of the software (vessels and cycles of operation), including the current status and the future challenges.

  4. Monitoring occupational exposure to ionizing radiation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Button, J.B.C.

    1997-01-01

    A brief overview is presented of methods of monitoring occupational exposure to ionizing radiation together with reasons for such monitoring and maintaining dose histories of radiation occupationally exposed persons. The various Australian providers of external radiation monitoring services and the types of dosemeters they supply are briefly described together with some monitoring results. Biological monitoring methods, are used to determine internal radiation dose. Whole body monitors, used for this purpose are available at Australian Radiation Lab., ANSTO and a few hospitals. Brief mention is made of the Australian National Radiation Dose Register and its objectives

  5. Monitoring, controlling and safeguarding radiochemical streams at spent fuel reprocessing facilities with optical and gamma-ray spectroscopic methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwantes, J.M.; Bryan, S.A.; Orton, C.R.; Levitskaia, T.G.; Fraga, C.G.

    2013-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MCA) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies based upon gamma-ray and optical spectroscopic measurements to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major stable flowsheet reagents using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. Multi-variate analysis is also applied to the optical measurements in order to quantify concentrations of analytes of interest within a complex array of radiochemical streams. This paper will provide an overview of these methods and reports on-going efforts to develop

  6. Radiation monitoring around accelerator facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sasaki, Shinichi [High Energy Accelerator Research Organization (KEK), Tsukuba, Ibaraki (Japan)

    2000-07-01

    The present status of a network of radiation monitors (NORM) working at KEK is described in detail. NORM consists of there parts; stand-alone radiation monitors (SARM), local-monitoring stations (STATION) and a central data-handling system (CENTER). NORM has developed to a large-scaled monitoring system in which more than 250 SARMs are under operation for monitoring the radiation fields and radioactivities around accelerators in KEK. (author)

  7. International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.

    1995-01-01

    The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies

  8. Monitoring occupational exposure to ionizing radiation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Button, J.B.C. [Radiation Safety Consultancy, Engadine, NSW (Australia)

    1997-12-31

    A brief overview is presented of methods of monitoring occupational exposure to ionizing radiation together with reasons for such monitoring and maintaining dose histories of radiation occupationally exposed persons. The various Australian providers of external radiation monitoring services and the types of dosemeters they supply are briefly described together with some monitoring results. Biological monitoring methods, are used to determine internal radiation dose. Whole body monitors, used for this purpose are available at Australian Radiation Lab., ANSTO and a few hospitals. Brief mention is made of the Australian National Radiation Dose Register and its objectives. 8 refs., 9 tabs.

  9. Citizen-based environmental radiation monitoring network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alemayehu, B.; Mckinzie, M.; Cochran, T.; Sythe, D.; Randrup, R.; Lafargue, E.

    2017-01-01

    This paper discusses a Citizen Radiation Monitoring project designed and implemented by the Natural Resources Defense Council . The goal of the project was to implement a radiation monitoring system that provides radiation data accessible to the public. The monitoring system consisted of usage of a radiation detector integrated with near real-time data collection and visualization. The monitoring systems were installed at five different locations and background radiation measurements were taken. The developed monitoring system demonstrated that citizen-based monitoring system could provide accessible radiation data to the general public and relevant to the area where they live. (author)

  10. Reusable radiation monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fanselow, D.L.; Ersfeld, D.A.

    1978-01-01

    An integrating, reusable device for monitoring exposure to actinic radiation is disclosed. The device comprises a substrate having deposited thereon at least one photochromic aziridine compound which is sealed in an oxygen barrier to stabilize the color developed by the aziridine compound in response to actinic radiation. The device includes a spectral response shaping filter to transmit only actinic radiation of the type being monitored. A color standard is also provided with which to compare the color developed by the aziridine compound

  11. USB-based radiation monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drndarevic, V.; Jevtic, N.; Djuric, R.

    2006-01-01

    The Universal Serial Bus has become a dominant interface for the connection of standard peripheral devices to a personal computer. This paper analyzes the possibilities of USB bus applications in the field of measurement and environmental monitoring. As a result, a gamma radiation monitor consisting of an USB-based universal peripheral device and a gamma probe with a GM counter, has been designed. For the interfacing monitor with the powerful and easy to use LabVIEW software package, an instrument driver as a set of virtual instruments has been developed. The proposed monitor is a flexible instrument which can be used for laboratory measurements, as an environmental radiation monitor or for training purposes. Connected to the laptop computer, the monitor becomes a portable instrument suitable for field measurements. Basic measurements and functionality properties of the radiation monitor are presented here

  12. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems

  13. Environmental γ radiation monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qu Xiaopeng

    1993-01-01

    The environmental γ radiation monitor is a kind of dose or dose rate measuring devices, which can be used for monitoring environmental γ radiation around a nuclear site when normal or even abnormal events occur. The monitor is controlled by a single-chip microcomputer so that it can acquire synchronously the data from four detectors and transfer the data to a central computer. The monitor has good temperature property due to the technique of temperature correction. The monitor has been used in the environment monitoring vehicle for Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant

  14. 13 CFR 107.506 - Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    .../Internal controls. 107.506 Section 107.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION... Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures. ...

  15. Radiation monitoring system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Aghina, Mauricio A.C.; Farias, Marcos S. de; Lacerda, Fabio de; Heimlich, Adino [Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (IEN/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2015-07-01

    Design of a portable low-power multichannel analyzer with wireless connectivity for remote radiation monitoring, powered from a solar panel with a internal battery to be operated in field. The multichannel analyzer is based on a single microcontroller which performs the digital functions and an analog signal processing board for implementing a Gaussian shaper preamplifier, a Gaussian stretcher, sample and hold, pile-up rejector and a 10 bit ADC. Now this design is to be used with a NaI(Ti) scintillator detector. This multichannel analyzer is designed to be a part of radiation monitoring network. All of them are connected, by radio in a radius of 10 kilometers, to a supervisor computer that collects data from the network of multichannel analyzers and numerically display the latest radiation measurements or graphically display measurements over time for all multichannel analyzers. Like: dose rate, spectra and operational status. Software also supports remotely configuring operating parameters (such as radiation alarm level) for each monitor independently. (author)

  16. Radiation monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aghina, Mauricio A.C.; Farias, Marcos S. de; Lacerda, Fabio de; Heimlich, Adino

    2015-01-01

    Design of a portable low-power multichannel analyzer with wireless connectivity for remote radiation monitoring, powered from a solar panel with a internal battery to be operated in field. The multichannel analyzer is based on a single microcontroller which performs the digital functions and an analog signal processing board for implementing a Gaussian shaper preamplifier, a Gaussian stretcher, sample and hold, pile-up rejector and a 10 bit ADC. Now this design is to be used with a NaI(Ti) scintillator detector. This multichannel analyzer is designed to be a part of radiation monitoring network. All of them are connected, by radio in a radius of 10 kilometers, to a supervisor computer that collects data from the network of multichannel analyzers and numerically display the latest radiation measurements or graphically display measurements over time for all multichannel analyzers. Like: dose rate, spectra and operational status. Software also supports remotely configuring operating parameters (such as radiation alarm level) for each monitor independently. (author)

  17. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1980-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

  18. Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Owens, L.; Smith, C.

    1996-01-01

    The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu

  19. Safeguards and security design guidelines for conceptual monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Byers, K.R.; Clark, R.G.; Harms, N.L.; Roberts, F.P.

    1984-07-01

    Existing safeguards/security regulations and licensing requirements that may be applicable to an MRS facility are not currently well-defined. Protection requirements consistent with the NRC-graded safeguards approach are identified, as a baseline safeguards system with a comparison of the impacts on safeguards and security of salient features of the different storage concepts. In addition, MRS facility design features and operational considerations are proposed that would enhance facility protection and provide additional assurance that protection systems and procedures would be effectively implemented. 3 figures

  20. ERMS - Environmental Radiation Monitoring System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vax, Eran; Sarusi, Benny; Sheinfeld, Mati; Levinson, Shmuel; Brandys, Irad; Sattinger, Danny; Wengrowicz, Udi; Tshuva, Avi; Tirosh, Dan

    2008-01-01

    A new Environmental Radiation Monitoring System (ERMS) has been developed in the NRCN as an extensive tool to be applied in case of nuclear malfunction or Nuclear Disposal Device (NDD) incident, as well as for routine radiation monitoring of the reactor's vicinity. The system collects real-time environmental data such as: gamma radiation, wind speed, wind direction, and temperature for monitoring purposes. The ERMS consists of a main Control Center and an array of monitoring stations. Fixed, environmental, gamma radiation monitoring stations are installed at the reactor's surroundings while portable stations can be posted rapidly along the wind direction, enhancing the spatial sampling of the radiation measurements and providing better hazard assessment at an emergency event. The presented ERMS, based on industrial standards for hardware and network protocols, is a reliable standalone system which upgrades the readiness to face a nuclear emergency event by supplying real-time, integrated meteorological and radiation data. (author)

  1. IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

  2. Development of DUPIC safeguards neutron counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Young Gil; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Ho Dong; Hong, Jong Sook; Kang, Hee Young

    1999-08-01

    KAERI, in cooperation with LANL, developed DSNC (DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter) for safeguards implementing on DUPIC process which is under development by KAERI for direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DSNC is a well-type neutron coincidence counter with substantial shielding to protect system from high gamma radiation of spent fuel. General development procedures in terms of design, manufacturing, fabrication, cold and hot test, performance test for DSNC authentication by KAERI-IAEA-LANL are described in this report. It is expected that the techniques related DSNC development and associated neutron detection and evaluation method could be applied for safeguards improvement. (Author). 20 refs., 16 tabs. 98 figs.

  3. Calibration of radiation monitoring instruments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    Radiation protection is dependent on good radiation monitoring, and properly calibrated instruments are essential for this work. Simple procedures for periodically checking and recalibrating different kinds of radiation monitoring instruments are shown in this training film

  4. Calibration of radiation monitoring instruments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-31

    Radiation protection is dependent on good radiation monitoring, and properly calibrated instruments are essential for this work. Simple procedures for periodically checking and recalibrating different kinds of radiation monitoring instruments are shown in this training film

  5. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  6. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-07-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

  7. International safeguards for critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ney, J.F.; Todd, J.L.

    1979-01-01

    A study was undertaken to investigate various approaches to provide international safeguards for critical facilities and to select an optimized system. Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. The goal of the study was to detect and confirm the protracted or abrupt diversion of 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately a week of the diversion. The general safeguards alternatives considered were (1) continuous inspections by resident inspectors, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, (2) periodic inspections by regional inspectors at varying time intervals, (3) unattended containment/surveillance measures, and (4) various combinations of the above. It was concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system can be achieved by employing a method of continuously monitoring facility activities which could lead to diversion. This is in addition to the routine inspections typical of current international safeguards. Monitoring detects inventory discrepancies and violations of agreed-upon procedural restrictions, as well as unauthorized removal of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). A special inventory is used following detection to confirm any suspected diversion. Comparison of 28 safeguards options led to the selection of a system for further development which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident IAEA personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and routine inventory sampling. A development programme is described which is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of several containment and surveillance measures proposed in the study. Included are a personnel portal and an instrument/material pass-through as well as associated recording and tamper-protection features. (author)

  8. Radiation monitoring at Pakistan research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ali, A.

    1984-05-01

    Area radiation monitoring is accomplished by using Tracer Lab. radiation monitor. Personnel monitoring is carried out using film badges, TLDs (Thermoluminescent Dosimeters) and pocket dosimeters. For the evaluation of monthly accumulated doses of radiation workers film badges/TLDs and for instantaneous/short term dose measurement in higher radiation zones pocket dosimeters are used in addition to film badge/TLD. Environmental monitoring is necessary to check the PARR operation effect on background radiation level in the vicinity of PINSTECH. (A.B.). 4 refs

  9. Computer-controlled radiation monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Homann, S.G.

    1994-01-01

    A computer-controlled radiation monitoring system was designed and installed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Multiuser Tandem Laboratory (10 MV tandem accelerator from High Voltage Engineering Corporation). The system continuously monitors the photon and neutron radiation environment associated with the facility and automatically suspends accelerator operation if preset radiation levels are exceeded. The system has proved reliable real-time radiation monitoring over the past five years, and has been a valuable tool for maintaining personnel exposure as low as reasonably achievable

  10. Future issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

  11. Radiation monitoring device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Toshifumi.

    1993-01-01

    The device of the present invention concerns a reactor start-up region monitor of a nuclear power plant. In an existent start-up region monitor, bias voltage is limited, if the reactor moves to a power region, in order to prevent degradation of radiation detectors. Accordingly, since the power is lower than an actual reactor power, the reactor power can not be monitored. The device of the present invention comprises a memory means for previously storing a Plateau's characteristic of the radiation detectors and a correction processing means for obtaining a correction coefficient in accordance with the Plateau's characteristic to correct and calculate the reactor power when the bias voltage is limited. With such a constitution, when the reactor power exceeds a predetermined value and the bias voltage is limited, the correction coefficient can be obtained by the memory means and the correction processing means. Corrected reactor power can also be obtained from the start-up region monitor by the correction coefficient. As a result, monitoring of the reactor power can be continued while preventing degradation of the radiation detector even if the bias voltage is limited. (I.S.)

  12. Advances in radiation protection monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The requirement to keep radiation exposure as low as reasonably achievable, linked with the growing number of workers whose exposure to radiation must be strictly controlled, requires intensified efforts directed towards the provision of adequate radiation monitoring programmes. This symposium was intended to review the advances that have been made in methods, techniques and instrumentation for radiation protection monitoring. Thus the symposium complemented the detailed consideration that had already been given to two closely related topics, that of environmental monitoring and of monitoring radioactive airborne and liquid discharges from nuclear facilities. The first topic had been dealt with in detail in an Agency symposium held in November 1973 in Warsaw and the second was treated in an Agency symposium held in September 1977 in Portoroz. The present symposium covered a broad range of topics under the following main headings: Monitoring of external exposure (three sessions),Contamination monitoring (three sessions), Radiation monitoring programmes (one session), Calibration, and use of computers (two sessions). An introductory paper described the purpose of radiation protection monitoring and its historical development. It drew attention to the gradual change from the threshold dose hypothesis to the hypothesis of direct proportionality between dose and effect and discussed practical implications of the recommendations recently issued by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). It became apparent that guidance on the application of these recommendations is urgently needed. This guidance is presently being prepared by ICRP

  13. Digital radiation monitor system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quan Jinhu; Zhai Yongchun; Guan Junfeng; Ren Dangpei; Ma Zhiyuan

    2003-01-01

    The article introduced digital radiation monitor system. The contents include: how to use advanced computer net technology to establish equipment net for nuclear facility, how to control and manage measuring instruments on field equipment net by local area net, how to manage and issue radiation monitoring data by internet

  14. Containment and surveillance - A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drayer, D.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-01-01

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future

  15. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  16. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron

    2008-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant's large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis

  17. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  18. On-Line Monitoring for Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Billing, Justin M.; Casella, Amanda J.; Johnsen, Amanda M.; Peterson, James M.

    2009-01-01

    Advanced techniques enabling enhanced safeguarding of the spent fuel reprocessing plants are urgently needed. Our approach is based on prerequisite that real time monitoring of the solvent extraction flowsheets provides unique capability to quickly detect unwanted manipulations with fissile isotopes present in the radiochemical streams during reprocessing activities. The methods used to monitor these processes must be robust and must be able to withstand harsh radiation and chemical environments. A new on-line monitoring system satisfying these requirements and featuring Raman spectroscopy combined with a Coriolis and conductivity probes, has been recently developed by our research team. It provides immediate chemical data and flow parameters of high-level radioactive waste streams with high brine content generated during retrieval activities from Hanford nuclear waste storage tanks. The nature of the radiochemical streams at the spent fuel reprocessing plant calls for additional spectroscopic information, which can be gained by the utilization of UV-vis-NIR capabilities. Raman and UV-vis-NIR spectroscopies are analytical techniques that have extensively been extensively applied for measuring the various organic and inorganic compounds including actinides. The corresponding spectrometers used under the laboratory conditions are easily convertible to the process-friendly configurations allowing remote measurements under the flow conditions. A fiber optic Raman probe allows monitoring of the high concentration species encountered in both aqueous and organic phases within the UREX suite of flowsheets, including metal oxide ions, such as uranyl, components of the organic solvent, inorganic oxo-anions, and water. The actinides and lanthanides are monitored remotely by UV-vis-NIR spectroscopy in aqueous and organic phases. In this report, we will present our recent results on spectroscopic measurements of simulant flowsheet solutions and commercial fuels available at

  19. Implementation of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Sierra Leone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    George, M.

    2015-01-01

    Sierra Leone under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) has enacted the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (NSRP) Act 2012 and has given numerous powers to the Authority to implement the above mentioned act fully. The NSRP Act 2012 established the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Authority which among other things to regulate, control and supervise the acquisition, importation, exportation, use, transportation and disposal of radioactive sources and devices emitting Ionizing Radiation. The Authority is bounded by law to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of Safeguards Agreement and any protocol thereto between Sierra Leone and the International Atomic Energy Agency including conducting inspections and providing any assistance or information required by designated IAEA inspectors in the fulfillment of their responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, Subsection 2, Article xvi of the NSRP Act 2012. The Authority is also granted powers to adopt all necessary measures including a system of licensing to control the export, re-export, transit and transhipment of any nuclear material, equipment or technology in order to protect the safety and security of Sierra Leone. The Regulatory Authority has established departments for the control of nuclear materials: One of which is The Regulatory Control Department; responsible for Inspections, Authorization and Enforcement actions for all radiation sources and nuclear materials. The Authority has been conducting inspections regularly on various facilities ranging from medical radiation generating equipment to industrial radiography sources. The methodology to be used is the issuance of the standard IAEA checklist which is consistent with the Regulatory Authority’s documents for inspection of sources and is in line with the General Safety Requirements(GSR)Part III. The expected outcomes would be increasing training of regulatory authority’s staff, the procurement of

  20. Assessment of Process Monitoring Techniques for Pyro processing Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Y. E.; Kim, C. M.; Yim, M. S. [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    PM technologies can be used to inspect normal/off-normal operation with various data obtained from facility operations in real time to meet safeguards objectives. To support the use of PM technologies for the purpose of pyroprocessing safeguards, this study aims at identifying technologies that could be useful for PM purposes and evaluating their applicability to a pyroprocessing facility. This paper describes the development of the assessment criteria to evaluate the practicality of candidate technologies for PM based on a variety of requirements and considerations. By using the developed assessment criteria, application of technologies in the oxide reduction process was assessed as a test case example. Research is necessary to validate the criteria according to the needs of each unit process, perhaps based on expert elicitation and/or international collaboration with other expert organization(s). These advanced assessment criteria will serve a useful guideline for selecting appropriate candidate PM technologies for pyroprocessing safeguards. Based on the results of using these evaluation criteria, the optimum technologies can be successfully selected for use at a large scale pyroprocessing facility.

  1. Basic principles for occupational radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Safety Guide sets forth the objectives of an adequate strategy for monitoring internal and external radiation exposures of workers. It covers individual monitoring, and workplace monitoring to the extent required for assessment and control of individual radiation doses. The responsibilities of authorities for organizing the monitoring of radiation workers are discussed, and brief descriptions are given of the rules governing the implementation of monitoring methods. The general principles to be considered in selecting instrumentation and appropriate monitoring techniques are described, as well as calibrating techniques, methods of record keeping and related aspects

  2. Radiation monitoring: an introduction. Rev. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hayward, P.; Arnott, D.

    1987-01-01

    This Greenpeace pamphlet has been produced in reponse to requests from members of the public wishing to set up monitoring groups. It lists some U.K. manufacturers of radiation monitoring equipment and the contributors have summarized information available from manufacturer's own catalogues describing the equipment, what it will and will not do and costing various programmes. Three types of monitoring are discussed: monitoring the level of background gamma radiation, monitoring radioactive contamination, (early warning systems), and monitoring food and environmental samples for very low levels of radiation. (UK)

  3. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  4. US enrichment safeguards program development activities with potential International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applications. Part 1. Executive summaries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swindle, D.W. Jr.

    1984-07-01

    The most recent progress, results, and plans for future work on the US Enrichment Safeguards Program's principal development activities are summarized. Nineteen development activities are reported that have potential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards applications. Part 1 presents Executive Summaries for these, each of which includes information on (1) the purpose and scope of the development activity; (2) the potential IAEA safeguards application and/or use if adopted; (3) significant development work, results, and/or conclusions to date; and where appropriate (4) future activities and plans for continued work. Development activities cover: measurement technology for limited-frequency-unannounced-access stategy inspections; integrated data acquisition system; enrichment-monitoring system; load-cell-based weighing system for UF 6 cylinder mass verifications; vapor phase versus liquid phase sampling of UF 6 cylinders; tamper-safing hardware and systems; an alternative approach to IAEA nuclear material balance verifications resulting from intermittent inspections; UF 6 sample bottle enrichment analyzer; crated waste assay monitor; and compact 252 Cf shuffler for UF 6 measurements

  5. Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX). An experience in international co-operation on safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, G.; Koizumi, T.; Higuchi, K.

    1983-01-01

    TASTEX stands for Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise, and was the joint programme of Japan, the United States of America, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency for developing, testing and evaluating advanced safeguards technology to be used in reprocessing facilities. The TASTEX programme, which started early in 1978 and successfully ended in May 1981, consisted of thirteen safeguards-technology-related tasks, from Task A to M. They were classified into four groups from the viewpoints of their usefulness and effectiveness: (1) Tasks technically feasible for international safeguards application in the near future: Tasks E, G, H and part of Task A (underwater CCTV and monitoring cameras); (2) Tasks which can be used in the future if research and development are continued: Tasks F, I, J, C and the other part of Task A (exclusive of the themes shown in (1)); (3) Tasks which may be used in future at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility if research and development are continued: Tasks K and L; and (4) Tasks which are difficult to be used at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility: Tasks B, D and M. The tasks classified under Group (1) are being developed further as part of the JASPAS (Japan Support Programme for Agency's Safeguards) project. (author)

  6. The project 'nuclear safeguards'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.

    1976-01-01

    A survey is given on the elaboration and implementation of a nuclear safeguards system which takes into account the economic needs of an expanding nuclear industry as well as the international monitoring commitments of the FRG under the Euratom and Non-Proliferation treaties. (RW) [de

  7. The new DMT SAFEGUARD low-cost GNSS measuring system and its application in the field of geotechnical deformation and movement monitoring

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schröder, Daniel

    2017-04-01

    epoch. Based on these requirements DMT has developed the new DMT SAFEGUARD GNSS. In this article the latest developments in the field of low-cost GNSS are shown by different examples from industry and authorities. By means of a detailed accuracy study the DMT SAFEGUARD GNSS system applicability will be demonstrated. The study shows possibilities to detect coordinate shifts on sub centimeter level by using suitable data processing approaches and permanent network solutions. In addition to the DMT SAFEGUARD GNSS system this article illustrates the combination with further relevant sensors to integrated multisensorial networks. Such networks include geodetic data, geophysical data, geotechnical data, video, audio etc. For the central integration of all sensor types DMT has developed a web-based monitoring system - DMT SAFEGUARD which offers individual customizing, sophisticated analysis tools as well as comprehensive reporting options.

  8. IAEA safeguards instrumentation: Development, implementation and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rundquist, D.E.

    1983-01-01

    Extensive development efforts over the last 5 years have produced a number of new instruments to help the IAEA meet its safeguards obligations. Implementation of these new instruments is proceeding at a necessarily slower pace. To optimize the performance and reliability of the instrumentation systems when used in safeguards applications, increasing attention is needed to be spent on performance monitoring and control of the instruments. (author)

  9. Safeguards approaches for conversion and gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanuch, C.; Whitaker, M.; Lockwood, D.; Boyer, B.

    2013-01-01

    This paper describes recent studies and investigations of new safeguards measures and inspection tools to strengthen international safeguards at GCEPs (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants) and conversion plants. The IAEA has indicated that continuous, unattended process monitoring should play a central role in future safeguards approaches for conversion plants and GCEPs. Monitoring safeguards relevant information from accountancy scales, process load cells, and unit header pipes can make existing safeguards approaches more efficient by replacing repetitive, routine, labor-intensive inspection activities with automated systems. These systems can make the safeguards approach more effective by addressing more completely the safeguards objectives at these facilities. Automated collection and analysis of the data can further enable the IAEA to move towards a fully-information driven inspection regime with randomized (from the operator's perspective), short-notice inspections. The reduction in repetitive on-site inspection activities would also be beneficial to plant operators, but only if sensitive and proprietary information can be protected and the new systems prove to be reliable. New facilities that incorporate Safeguards by Design into the earliest design stages can facilitate the effective DIV (Design Information Verification) of the plant to allow the inspectors to analyze the capacity of the plant, to project maximum production from the plant, and to provide a focus on the areas in the plant where credible diversion scenarios could be attempted. Facilitating efficient nuclear material accountancy by simplifying process pipework and making flow measurement points more accessible can allow for easier estimation of plant holdup and a potential reduction in the number of person-days of inspection. Lastly, a universal monitoring standard that tracks the location, movement, and use of UF 6 cylinders may enhance the efficiency of operations at industry sites and would

  10. Monitoring methods for nuclear fuel waste disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cooper, R B; Barnard, J W; Bird, G A [and others

    1997-11-01

    This report examines a variety of monitoring activities that would likely be involved in a nuclear fuel waste disposal project, during the various stages of its implementation. These activities would include geosphere, environmental, vault performance, radiological, safeguards, security and community socioeconomic and health monitoring. Geosphere monitoring would begin in the siting stage and would continue at least until the closure stage. It would include monitoring of regional and local seismic activity, and monitoring of physical, chemical and microbiological properties of groundwater in rock and overburden around and in the vault. Environmental monitoring would also begin in the siting stage, focusing initially on baseline studies of plants, animals, soil and meteorology, and later concentrating on monitoring for changes from these benchmarks in subsequent stages. Sampling designs would be developed to detect changes in levels of contaminants in biota, water and air, soil and sediments at and around the disposal facility. Vault performance monitoring would include monitoring of stress and deformation in the rock hosting the disposal vault, with particular emphasis on fracture propagation and dilation in the zone of damaged rock surrounding excavations. A vault component test area would allow long-term observation of containers in an environment similar to the working vault, providing information on container corrosion mechanisms and rates, and the physical, chemical and thermal performance of the surrounding sealing materials and rock. During the operation stage, radiological monitoring would focus on protecting workers from radiation fields and loose contamination, which could be inhaled or ingested. Operational zones would be established to delineate specific hazards to workers, and movement of personnel and materials between zones would be monitored with radiation detectors. External exposures to radiation fields would be monitored with dosimeters worn by

  11. Trade Analysis and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Schot, P.M.

    2010-01-01

    In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

  12. Maintenance of radiation monitoring systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aoyama, Kei

    2001-01-01

    As the safety and quality of atomic power facilities are more strongly required, the reliability improvement and preventive maintenance of radiation monitoring systems are important. This paper describes the maintenance of radiation monitoring systems delivered by Fuji Electric and the present status of preventive maintenance technology. Also it introduces the case that we developed a fault diagnosis function adopting a statistics technique and artificial intelligence (AI) and delivered a radiation monitoring system including this function. This system can output a fault analysis result and a countermeasure from the computer in real time. (author)

  13. Safeguards for the atom

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-10-15

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  14. Safeguards for the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1959-01-01

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  15. Continuous monitoring of plutonium solution in a conversion plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hassan, B.; Piana, M.; Mousalli, G.; Saukkonen, H.; Hosima, T.; Kawa, T.

    2000-01-01

    This paper describes the implementation of a safeguards Tank Monitoring System (TAMS) in a Plutonium Conversion Plant (PCP). TAMS main objective is to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (the Agency) with continuous data for safeguards evaluation and review of inventories and flows of plutonium solutions. It has been designed to monitor, in unattended mode, the inventory of each tank and transactions of solutions between tanks, as well as to confirm the absence of borrowing plutonium solutions from and to a neighboring reprocessing plant. The instrumentation consists of one electronic scanner that collects pressure data from electromanometers connected to the tank dip tubes, one uninterruptable power supply and one personal computer operating in a Windows-NT environment. The pressure data transmitted to the acquisition system is saved and converted to volume and density values, coupled with a graph capability to display events in each tank at intervals of 15 seconds. The system operation has not only strengthened the safeguards measures in PCP but also reduced inspection effort while minimizing intrusion to normal plant activities and radiation exposure to personnel. TAMS is a powerful, reliable tool that has significantly improved the effectiveness of safeguards implementation at PCP. The future combined use of TAMS with remote monitoring (RM) will further enhance efficiency of the safeguards measures at PCP. (author)

  16. Filtering with the Centered Moving Median to Effectively Monitor Solution Processes for Safeguard Purposes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richir, Patrice; Dzbikowicz, Zdzislaw [Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre (JRC), European Commission, Ispra, Varese (Italy)

    2012-06-15

    Reprocessing plants require continuous and integrated safeguards activities by inspectors of the IAEA and Euratom because of their proliferation-sensitivity as complex facilities handling large quantities of direct use nuclear material. In support of both organizations, the JRC has developed a solution monitoring software package (DAI, Data Analysis and Interpretation) which has been implemented in the main commercial European reprocessing plants and which allows enhanced monitoring of nuclear materials in the processed solutions. This tool treats data acquired from different sensor types (e.g. from pressure transducers monitoring the solution levels in tanks). Collected signals are often noisy because of the instrumentation itself and/or because of ambient and operational conditions (e.g. pumps, ventilation systems or electromagnetic interferences) and therefore require filtering. Filtering means reduction of information and has to be applied correctly to avoid misinterpretation of the process steps. This paper describes the study of some filters one of which is the centered moving median which has been revealed as a powerful tool for solution monitoring.

  17. Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howsley, R.; Burrows, B.; Longevialle, H. de; Kuroi, H.; Izumi, A.

    1997-01-01

    In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

  18. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-01-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

  19. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

  20. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  1. A new-generation radiation monitoring vehicle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gryc, Lubomir; Cespirova, Irena; Sury, Jan; Hanak, Vitezslav; Sladek, Petr

    2015-01-01

    A new radiation monitoring vehicle has been developed within the MOSTAR (Mobile and Stationary Radiation monitoring systems for a new generation of radiation monitoring network) Security Research project. The vehicle accommodates a system for radiation survey using scintillation detectors. Basic spectroscopy is performed with a sodium iodine crystal system, directional measurement is based on two side-mounted plastic detectors, logging dose rates, GPS coordinates and displaying results in a map. A semiconductor spectrometric chain for rapid qualitative and quantitative evaluation of environmental samples is also included. (orig.)

  2. Safeguards: the industry's role and views

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1975-01-01

    Possible improvements in the U. S. safeguards system are discussed: guard forces, physical protection, personnel clearance, accounting and monitoring in plants, communications, the command function, reinforcements, and intelligence information. (U.S.)

  3. Radiation monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takeuchi, Nobuyoshi; Fujimoto, Toshiaki; Nagama, Hideyo

    2007-01-01

    A positive outlook toward nuclear power plants and a higher level of technologies for using radiation in the medical field are trends that are spreading throughout the world, and as a consequence, demand is increasing for equipment and systems that measure and control radiation. Equipment ranging from radiation detection and measurement devices to computer-based radiation management systems will be set up in overseas. Products that depend on overseas specifications based on IEC and other international standards are being developed. Fuji Electric is advancing the overseas deployment of radiation monitoring systems by adopting measures that will ensure the reliability and traceability of radiation equipment. (author)

  4. Radiation monitoring by minicomputer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seamons, M.

    1977-01-01

    Radiation monitoring at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) ranges from measuring the potential build-up of alpha particle radiation in the offices and laboratories of LASL to the detection of radiation leakage from nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This paper describes PDP-11 based systems to accomplish both types of monitoring. In the first system, filter papers are collected from monitoring stations around LASL. One filter paper is placed under any of 128 photomultiplier (PM) tubes exposing it to alpha radiation. Alpha particle ''hits'' are recorded in a 64-word hardware FIFO, which interrupts and is read by the computer. The FIFO makes it possible to handle short aggregate alpha particle bursts of up to 10 6 hits/s in a computer that can only process 10 4 hits/s. In the second system, up to 100 current measuring radiation probes feed data from the site of the nuclear test(s) to the computer by microwave. The software system can support three tests simultaneously. Both systems offer a high degree of flexibility in configuring for a new test and in real-time control of such things as channel assignment, selective data retrieval, and output formatting

  5. Air and radiation monitoring stations

    CERN Multimedia

    AUTHOR|(SzGeCERN)582709

    2015-01-01

    CERN has around 100 monitoring stations on and around its sites. New radiation measuring stations, capable of detecting even lower levels of radiation, were installed in 2014. Two members of HE-SEE group (Safety Engineering and Environment group) in front of one of the new monitoring stations.

  6. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobey, William

    2008-01-01

    NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

  7. The safeguards active response inventory system (SARIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.; Hairston, L.A.; O'Callaghan, P.B.; Grambihler, A.J.; Ruemmler, W.P.

    1987-01-01

    The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) is a computerized accountability system developed for nuclear materials control that incorporates elements of process monitoring, criticality safety, physical inventory and safeguards. It takes data from the process operations, stores it in an on-line database and translates the information into the formats needed by the various users. It traces the material through the process from feed to product; including recycle, waste and scraps streams. It models the process as the material changes form to ensure that artificial losses are not created. It automatically generates input to Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), performs checks to prevent the possibility of a criticality accident, prepares an audit trail for Safeguards, prints labels for nuclear material containers, and produces DOE/NRC 741 forms. SARIS has been installed at three laboratories across the country

  8. Holdup-related issues in safeguarding of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-03-01

    Residual inventories of special nuclear materials (SNM) remaining in processing facilities (holdup) are recognized as an insidious problem for both safety and safeguards. This paper identifies some of the issues that are of concern to the safeguards community at-large that are related to holdup of SNM in large-scale process equipment. These issues range from basic technologies of SNM production to changing regulatory requirements to meet the needs of safeguarding nuclear materials. Although there are no magic formulas to resolve these issues, there are several initiatives that could be taken in areas of facility design, plant operation, personnel training, SNM monitoring, and regulatory guidelines to minimize the problems of holdup and thereby improve both safety and safeguards at nuclear material processing plants. 8 refs

  9. Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnston, R. G. (Roger G.); Warner, Jon S.; Garcia, A. R. E. (Anthony R. E.); Martinez, R. K. (Ronald K.); Lopez, L. N. (Leon N.); Pacheco, A. N. (Adam N.); Trujillo, S. J. (Sonia J.); Herrera, A. M. (Alicia M.); Bitzer, E. G. (Edward G.), III

    2005-01-01

    There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

  10. Radiation monitor training program at Rocky Flats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Medina, L.C.; Kittinger, W.D.; Vogel, R.M.

    The Rocky Flats Radiation Monitor Training Program is tailored to train new health physics personnel in the field of radiation monitoring. The purpose of the prescribed materials and media is to be consistent in training in all areas of Rocky Flats radiation monitoring job involvement

  11. Environmental radiation monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kato, Tsutomu; Shioiri, Masatoshi; Sakamaki, Tsuyoshi

    2007-01-01

    Environmental radiation monitoring systems are used to measure and monitoring gamma-rays at the observation boundaries of nuclear facilities and in the surrounding areas. In recent years, however, few new nuclear facilities have been constructed and the monitoring systems shift to renewal of existing systems. In addition, in order to increase public acceptance, the facilities are being equipped with communication lines to provide data to prefectural environmental centers. In this text, we introduce the latest technology incorporated in replacement of environmental radiation monitoring systems. We also introduce a replacement method that can shorten the duration during which environmental dose rate measurement is interrupted by enabling both the replacement system and the system being replaced to perform measurements in parallel immediately before and after the replacement. (author)

  12. Community Radiation Monitoring Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lucas, R.P. Jr.; Cooper, E.N.; McArthur, R.D.

    1990-05-01

    The Community Radiation Monitoring Program began its ninth year in the summer of 1989, continuing as an essential portion of the Environmental Protection Agency's long-standing off-site monitoring effort. It is a cooperative venture between the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the University of Utah (U of U), and the Desert Research Institute (DRI) of the University of Nevada System. The objectives of the program include enhancing and augmenting the collection of environmental radiation data at selected sites around the Nevada Test Site (NTS), increasing public awareness of that effort, and involving, in as many ways as possible, the residents of the off-site area in these and other areas related to testing nuclear weapons. This understanding and improved communication is fostered by hiring residents of the communities where the monitoring stations are located as program representatives, presenting public education forums in those and other communities, disseminating information on radiation monitoring and related subjects, and developing and maintaining contacts with local citizens and elected officials in the off-site areas. 8 refs., 4 figs., 4 tabs

  13. The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitworth, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

  14. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.C.; Tobin, S.; Smith, L.E.; Ehinger, M.; Dougan, A.; Cipiti, B.; Bakel, A.; Bean, R.

    2008-01-01

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  15. Personal radiation monitoring and assessment of doses received by radiation workers (1991)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris, N.D.

    1992-06-01

    The Australian Radiation Laboratory has operated a Personal Radiation Monitoring Service since the early 1930's so that people working with radiation can determine the radiation doses that they receive due to their occupation. Since late 1986, all persons monitored by the Service have been registered on a data base which maintains records of the doses received by each individual wearer. Ultimately, this data base will become a National Register of the doses received within Australia. At present, the Service regularly monitors approximately 20,000 persons, which is roughly 70 percent of those monitored in Australia, and maintains dose histories of over 35,000 people. The skin dose for occupationally exposed workers can be measured by using one of the four types of monitor issued by the Service: 1. Thermoluminescent Dosemeter (TLD monitor) 2. Finger TLD 3. Neutron Monitor 4. Special TLD. The technical description of the monitors is provided along with the method for calculating the radiation dose. 5 refs., 7 tabs., 4 figs

  16. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOE, J.

    2007-01-01

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders

  17. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF 6 feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load

  18. Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wonder, E.F.

    2010-01-01

    The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

  19. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  20. Improved IAEA safeguards for closed nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    The paper recognises the limitations of nuclear material accountancy in applying safeguards to future large scale processing plants. For those plants the following will be necessary: (i) The inclusion of safeguards requirements in design criteria. (ii) Extensive application of containment and surveillance with monitors on personnel and goods exits, pipework, tanks, etc. (iii) Continuous inspectorate measurement of input and output flows. Local IAEA laboratories to ensure timeliness. (iv) Upgrading of process control information to enable the inspectorate to monitor the in-process inventory. The inspectorates knowledge of the in-process inventory will be valuable in their assessment of any alarms given by the containment-surveillance system

  1. Technology Development of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-04-15

    The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

  2. Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

    1983-01-01

    A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

  3. Safeguards research at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunn, D.R.; Huebel, J.G.; Poggio, A.J.

    1980-01-01

    The LLL safeguards research program includes inspection methods, facility assessment methodologies, value-impact analysis, vulnerability analysis of accounting systems, compliance with regulations, process monitoring, etc. Each of those projects is described as are their goals and progress

  4. Radiation dose monitoring in the clinical routine

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Guberina, Nika [UK Essen (Germany). Radiology

    2017-04-15

    Here we describe the first clinical experiences regarding the use of an automated radiation dose management software to monitor the radiation dose of patients during routine examinations. Many software solutions for monitoring radiation dose have emerged in the last decade. The continuous progress in radiological techniques, new scan features, scanner generations and protocols are the primary challenge for radiation dose monitoring software systems. To simulate valid dose calculations, radiation dose monitoring systems have to follow current trends and stay constantly up-to-date. The dose management software is connected to all devices at our institute and conducts automatic data acquisition and radiation dose calculation. The system incorporates 18 virtual phantoms based on the Cristy phantom family, estimating doses in newborns to adults. Dose calculation relies on a Monte Carlo simulation engine. Our first practical experiences demonstrate that the software is capable of dose estimation in the clinical routine. Its implementation and use have some limitations that can be overcome. The software is promising and allows assessment of radiation doses, like organ and effective doses according to ICRP 60 and ICRP 103, patient radiation dose history and cumulative radiation doses. Furthermore, we are able to determine local diagnostic reference doses. The radiation dose monitoring software systems can facilitate networking between hospitals and radiological departments, thus refining radiation doses and implementing reference doses at substantially lower levels.

  5. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  6. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schanfein, Mark; Johnson, Shirley

    2012-01-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  7. Radiation protection and monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, P.

    1982-01-01

    The present paper deals with the following topics: - Radiological quantities and units - Principles of radiological protection - Limits of doses and activity uptake - Activity discharges and monitoring - Radiation exposure and its calculation - Environmental monitoring - Personnel dosimetry. (orig./RW)

  8. Radiation Protection and Safety Department - annual report 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kiefer, H.; Koelzer, W.

    1978-03-01

    The duties cover tasks relative to radiation protection and safety on behalf of the institutes and departments of Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe and environmental monitoring for the whole Nuclear Research Center as well as own research and development work, mainly performed under the Nuclear Research Center and the Nuclear Safeguards Project. The centers of interest of R and D activities were: investigation of the atmospheric diffusion in the micro- and meso-scale, study of the radiological consequences of accidents in reactors under probabilistic aspects, implementation of nuclear fuel safeguarding systems, improvements in radiation protection measurement technology. This report gives details of the different duties, indicates the results of 1977 routine measurements, and reports about new results of investigations and developments of the working groups of the department. (orig.) [de

  9. AUTOMATED PROCESS MONITORING: APPLYING PROVEN AUTOMATION TECHNIQUES TO INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS NEEDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Hara, Matthew J.; Durst, Philip C.; Grate, Jay W.; Devol, Timothy A.; Egorov, Oleg; Clements, John P.

    2008-01-01

    Identification and quantification of specific alpha- and beta-emitting radionuclides in complex liquid matrices is highly challenging, and is typically accomplished through laborious wet chemical sample preparation and separations followed by analysis using a variety of detection methodologies (e.g., liquid scintillation, gas proportional counting, alpha energy analysis, mass spectrometry). Analytical results may take days or weeks to report. Chains of custody and sample security measures may also complicate or slow the analytical process. When an industrial process-scale plant requires the monitoring of specific radionuclides as an indication of the composition of its feed stream or of plant performance, radiochemical measurements must be fast, accurate, and reliable. Scientists at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have assembled a fully automated prototype Process Monitor instrument capable of a variety of tasks: automated sampling directly from a feed stream, sample digestion/analyte redox adjustment, chemical separations, radiochemical detection and data analysis/reporting. The system is compact, its components are fluidically inter-linked, and analytical results could be immediately transmitted to on- or off-site locations. The development of a rapid radiochemical Process Monitor for 99Tc in Hanford tank waste processing streams, capable of performing several measurements per hour, will be discussed in detail. More recently, the automated platform was modified to perform measurements of 90Sr in Hanford tank waste stimulant. The system exemplifies how automation could be integrated into reprocessing facilities to support international nuclear safeguards needs

  10. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, H. D.; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I.

    2002-05-01

    DUPIC safeguards R and D in the second phase has focused on the development of nuclear material measurement system and its operation and verification, the development of nuclear material control and accounting system, and the development of remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system. Of them, the nuclear material measurement system was authenticated from IAEA and officially used for IAEA and domestic safeguards activities in DFDF. It was also verified that the system could be used for quality control of DUPIC process. It is recognised that the diagnostic software using neural network and remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system developed here could be key technologies to go into remote and near-real time monitoring system. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear fuel cycles like MOX and pyroprocessing facility as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material

  11. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krichinsky, Alan M.; Bates, Bruce E.; Chesser, Joel B.; Koo, Sinsze; Whitaker, J. Michael

    2009-01-01

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F and W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F and W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F and W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F and W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF 6 F and W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF 6 . The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under

  12. Safeguarding on-power fuelled reactors - instrumentation and techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waligura, A.; Konnov, Y.; Smith, R.M.; Head, D.A.

    1977-01-01

    Instrumentation and techniques applicable to safeguarding reactors that are fuelled on-power, particularly the CANDU type, have been developed. A demonstration is being carried out at the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station in Canada. Irradiated nuclear materials in certain areas - the reactor and spent fuel storage bays - are monitored using photographic and television cameras, and seals. Item accounting is applied by counting spent-fuel bundles during transfer from the reactor to the storage bay and by placing these spent-fuel bundles in a sealed enclosure. Provision is made for inspection and verification of the bundles before sealing. The reactor's power history is recorded by a track-etch power monitor. Redundancy is provided so that the failure of any single piece of equipment does not invalidate the entire safeguards system. Several safeguards instruments and devices have beeen developed and evaluated. These include a super-8 mm surveillance camera system, a television surveillance system, a spent-fuel bundle counter, a device to detect dummy fuel bundles, a cover for enclosing a stack of spent-fuel bundles, and a seal suitable for underwater installation and ultrasonic interrogation. The information provided by these different instruments should increase the effectiveness of Agency safeguards and, when used in combination with other measures, will facilitate inspection at reactor sites

  13. A technical analysis of the IAEA nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoon, J. W.

    1998-01-01

    In the post-Cold War era, the threats of horizontal nuclear proliferation emerge as the forefront security issue while the nuclear arms races among existing nuclear weapon states reduce to a remarkable extent. In this context, there arises lots of research attention to the IAEA nuclear safeguards which have been viewed as the core of international monitoring on the clandestine nuclear activities of potential proliferators. However, previous attention tended to highlight the political aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, centering on the possibilities and limitations of the IAEA's inspection authority. In contrast, this paper purports to focus on the technical aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, so it can show the intrinsic problems of those safeguards in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This paper mainly deals with the technical objectives and options of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, the technical indices of clandestine nuclear activities, and some measures to improve the efficacy of the IAEA nuclear safeguards. Hopefully, this paper is expected to lead us to approach the issue of the North Korean nuclear transparency from the technical perspective as well as the political one

  14. Biological monitoring of radiation exposure

    Science.gov (United States)

    Horneck, G.

    1998-11-01

    Complementary to physical dosimetry, biological dosimetry systems have been developed and applied which weight the different components of environmental radiation according to their biological efficacy. They generally give a record of the accumulated exposure of individuals with high sensitivity and specificity for the toxic agent under consideration. Basically three different types of biological detecting/monitoring systems are available: (i) intrinsic biological dosimeters that record the individual radiation exposure (humans, plants, animals) in measurable units. For monitoring ionizing radiation exposure, in situ biomarkers for genetic (e.g. chromosomal aberrations in human lymphocytes, germ line minisatellite mutation rates) or metabolic changes in serum, plasma and blood (e.g. serum lipids, lipoproteins, lipid peroxides, melatonin, antibody titer) have been used. (ii) Extrinsic biological dosimeters/indicators that record the accumulated dose in biological model systems. Their application includes long-term monitoring of changes in environmental UV radiation and its biological implications as well as dosimetry of personal UV exposure. (iii) Biological detectors/biosensors for genotoxic substances and agents such as bacterial assays (e.g. Ames test, SOS-type test) that are highly sensitive to genotoxins with high specificity. They may be applicable for different aspects in environmental monitoring including the International Space Station.

  15. NRC TLD Direct Radiation Monitoring Network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Struckmeyer, R.; McNamara, N.

    1992-06-01

    The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Direct Radiation Monitoring Network is operated by the NRC in cooperation with participating states to provide continuous measurement of the ambient radiation levels around licensed NRC facilities, primarily power reactors. Ambient radiation levels result from naturally occurring radionuclides present in the soil, cosmic radiation constantly bombarding the earth from outer space, and the contribution, if any, from the monitored facilities and other man-made sources. The Network is intended to measure radiation levels during routine facility operations and to establish background radiation levels used to assess the radiological impact of an unusual condition, such as an accident. This report presents the radiation levels measured around all facilities in the Network for the first quarter of 1992. All radiation measurements are made using small, passive detectors called thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), which provide a quantitative measurement of the radiation levels in the area in which they are placed. Each site is monitored by arranging approximately 40 to 50 TLD stations in two concentric rings extending to about five miles from the facility. All TLD stations are outside the site boundary of the facility

  16. Application of maximum radiation exposure values and monitoring of radiation exposure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The guide presents the principles to be applied in calculating the equivalent dose and the effective dose, instructions on application of the maximum values for radiation exposure, and instruction on monitoring of radiation exposure. In addition, the measurable quantities to be used in monitoring the radiation exposure are presented. (2 refs.)

  17. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source.

  18. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung

    2016-01-01

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source

  19. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-01-01

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R and D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  20. National Environmental Radiation Warning And Monitoring Network And Proposed Radiation Monitoring Programme For The 1st Nuclear Power Plant Ninth Thuan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vuong Thu Bac

    2011-01-01

    National Environmental Radiation Warning and Monitoring Network has been gradually setting up based on some of legislative documents which have been issued in recent years. Studies and surveys to build an environmental radiation monitoring program for nuclear power plant (NPP) have also been implemented. This paper aims to introduce National Environmental Radiation Warning and Monitoring Network in Vietnam which has been approved by the government, the draft program for environmental radiation monitoring Ninh Thuan NPP and some initial results of research about environmental radiation in the planning area for building first NPP in Vietnam. (author)

  1. RTP Radiation Monitoring System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alfred, S.L.; Mohd Fairus Abdul Farid; Ahmad Nabil Abdul Rahim; Nurhayati Ramli

    2015-01-01

    Radiation Monitoring System aiming to limiting dose exposed to personnel to the lowest level referring to the concept of ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable). Atomic Energy Licensing (Basic Safety Radiation Protection) Regulation 2010 (Act 304) is a baseline to control employee and public radiation protection program and guideline, as well as to meet the requirement of the Occupational Safety and Health 1994 (Act 514). (author)

  2. Integration of video and radiation analysis data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Howell, J.A.; Rodriguez, C.A.; Eccleston, G.W.; Beddingfield, D.; Smith, J.E.; Baumgart, C.W.

    1995-01-01

    For the past several years, the integration of containment and surveillance (C/S) with nondestructive assay (NDA) sensors for monitoring the movement of nuclear material has focused on the hardware and communications protocols in the transmission network. Little progress has been made in methods to utilize the combined C/S and NDA data for safeguards and to reduce the inspector time spent in nuclear facilities. One of the fundamental problems in the integration of the combined data is that the two methods operate in different dimensions. The C/S video data is spatial in nature; whereas, the NDA sensors provide radiation levels versus time data. The authors have introduced a new method to integrate spatial (digital video) with time (radiation monitoring) information. This technology is based on pattern recognition by neural networks, provides significant capability to analyze complex data, and has the ability to learn and adapt to changing situations. This technique has the potential of significantly reducing the frequency of inspection visits to key facilities without a loss of safeguards effectiveness

  3. Operations report 1985 of the Department of Safety and Radiation Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hille, R.; Frenkler, K.L.

    1986-04-01

    Under the heading 'Licensing' the report deals with licensing procedures and the handling of nuclear-fuels and radioactive materials. Operational radiation protection is concerned with operational and personnel monitoring, mathematical methods and safety analyses. Environmental protection deals with emission control, immission monitoring and meteorological measurements, and safety technology with α/β-analysis, dosimetry, equipment servicing and mechanics, nuclear material safeguards. Other subdepartments take care of industrial safety, physical protection, emergency protection and training. Subjects dealt with, too, are dispersion pollutants in atmosphere and environment, further development of radiation protection methods, and the bibliography of radiation protection in KFA. (HK) [de

  4. RadNet: Open network protocol for radiation data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rees, B.; Olson, K.; Beckes-Talcott, J.; Kadner, S.; Wenderlich, T.; Hoy, M.; Doyle, W.; Koskelo, M.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards instrumentation is increasingly being incorporated into remote monitoring applications. In the past, vendors of radiation monitoring instruments typically provided the tools for uploading the monitoring data to a host. However, the proprietary nature of communication protocols lends itself to increased computer support needs and increased installation expenses. As a result, a working group of suppliers and customers of radiation monitoring instruments defined an open network protocol for transferring packets on a local area network from radiation monitoring equipment to network hosts. The protocol was termed RadNet. While it is now primarily used for health physics instruments, RadNet's flexibility and strength make it ideal for remote monitoring of nuclear materials. The incorporation of standard, open protocols ensures that future work will not render present work obsolete; because RadNet utilizes standard Internet protocols, and is itself a non-proprietary standard. The use of industry standards also simplifies the development and implementation of ancillary services, e.g. E-main generation or even pager systems

  5. Radiation contamination monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kato, Tsutomu; Iba, Hiroshi; Sato, Hiroshi

    1999-01-01

    To make sure of no contamination on people, used articles and working uniforms coming out of the radiation controlled area, nuclear power plants are equipped with radioactive contamination monitors. This paper outlines the basic specifications and advantages of our personnel surface contamination monitors to inspect whole-body surface contamination of people coming out, article surface contamination monitors to inspect the surface and inside contamination of used articles brought out, laundry monitors to inspect surface contamination of working uniforms used in the area before and after a wash, and whole-body counters to inspect and measure the internal contamination of a person out of the area. (author)

  6. Safeguards for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the Olkiluoto site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.

    2003-05-01

    The final disposal of the nuclear material shall introduce new safeguards concerns which have not been addressed previously in IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel. The encapsulation plant to be built at the site will be the final opportunity for verification of spent fuel assemblies prior to their transfer to the geological repository. Moreover, additional safety and safeguards measures are considered for the underground repository. Integrated safeguards verification systems will also concentrate on environmental monitoring to observe unannounced activities related to possible diversion schemes at the repository site. The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formation will begin in Finland within 10 years. After the geological site investigations and according to legal decision made in 2001, the final repository of the spent nuclear fuel shall be located at the Olkiluoto site in Eurajoki. The next phase of site investigations contains the construction of an underground facility, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation purposes. The excavation of the ONKALO is scheduled to start in 2004. Later on, the ONKALO may form a part of the final repository. The plans to construct the underground facility for nuclear material signify that the first safeguards measures, e.g. baseline mapping of the site area, need to take prior to the excavation phase. In order to support the development and implementation of the regulatory control of the final disposal programme, STUK established an independent expert group, LOSKA. The group should support the STUK in the development of the technical safeguards requirements, in the implementation of the safeguards and in the evaluation of the plans of the facility operator. This publication includes four background reports produced by this group. The first of these 'NDA verification of spent fuel, monitoring of disposal canisters, interaction of the safeguards and safety issues in the final disposal' describes the new

  7. Centralized environmental radiation monitoring system in JAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katagiri, Hiroshi; Kobayashi, Hideo

    1993-03-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) has continued the radiation background survey and environmental radiation monitoring to ensure the safety of the residents around the Institute. For the monitoring of β and γ radiations and α and β radioactivities in air, the centralized automatic environmental radiation monitoring system (EMS) applying a computer with monitoring stations (MS) was established. The system has been renewed twice in 1973 and 1988. In 1962, a new concept emergency environmental γ-ray monitoring system (MP) was begun to construct and completed in 1965 independent of EMS. The first renewal of the EMS was carried out by focusing on the rapid and synthetic judgement and estimation of the environmental impacts caused by radiation and radioactive materials due to the operation of nuclear facilities by centralizing the data measured at MS, MP, a meteorological station, stack monitors and drainage monitoring stations under the control of computer. Present system renewed in 1988 was designed to prevent the interruption of monitoring due to computer troubles, communication troubles and power failures especially an instant voltage drop caused by thunder by reflecting the experiences through the operation and maintenance of the former system. Dual telemeters whose power is constantly supplied via batteries (capable of 10 min. monitoring after power failure) are equipped in the monitoring center to cope with telemeter troubles, which has operated successfully without any suspension being attributable to the power failures and telemeter troubles. (J.P.N.)

  8. Safeguards techniques and equipment. 2003 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    -destructive analysis (NDA) techniques, and compare their findings with the declared figures and the operator's records. The next level of verification has the aim of detecting whether a fraction of a declared amount is missing (partial defect) and may involve the weighing of items and measurements with NDA techniques such as neutron counting or gamma-ray spectrometry. For detecting bias defects, which would arise if small amounts of material were diverted over a protracted length of time, it is necessary to sample some of the items and to apply physical and chemical analysis techniques having the highest possible accuracy, typically less than one per cent. In order to apply these destructive analysis (DA) techniques, the IAEA requires access to laboratories which use such accurate techniques on a routine basis. Containment and surveillance (C/S) techniques, which are complementary to nuclear material accountancy techniques, are applied in order to maintain continuity of the knowledge gained through IAEA verification, by giving assurance that nuclear material follows predetermined routes, that the integrity of its containment remains unimpaired and that the material is accounted for at the correct measurement points. They also lead to savings in the safeguards inspection effort, e.g. by reducing the frequency of accountancy verification. A variety of C/S techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. In remote monitoring, the unattended equipment transmits the data off-site. For unattended and remote monitoring, additional criteria must be met, including high reliability and authentication of the data source. Data communication costs have dropped dramatically in recent years. Data security is an important feature of unattended and remote monitoring systems. Environmental sampling, which allows detection of minute traces of nuclear material, was added to the IAEA's verification measures in the early 1990s as a powerful tool for detecting indications of undeclared

  9. Radiation monitoring system based on EPICS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Weizhen; Li Jianmin; Wang Xiaobing; Hua Zhengdong; Xu Xunjiang

    2008-01-01

    Shanghai Synchrotron Radiation Facility (SSRF for short) is a third-generation light source building in China, including a 150 MeV injector, 3.5 GeV booster, 3.5 GeV storage ring and an amount of beam line stations. During operation, a mass of Synchrotron Radiation will be produced by electrons in the booster and the storage ring. Bremsstrahlung and neutrons will also be produced as a result of the interaction between the electrons, especially the beam loss, and the wall of the vacuum beam pipe. SSRF Radiation Monitoring System is established for monitoring the radiation dosage of working area and environment while SSRF operating. The system consists of detectors, intelligent data-collecting modules, monitoring computer, and managing computer. The software system is developed based on EPICS (Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System), implementing the collecting and monitoring the data output from intelligent modules, analyzing the data, and so on. (authors)

  10. Multi-detector environmental radiation monitor with multichannel data communication for Indian Environmental Radiation Monitoring Network (IERMON)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patel, M.D.; Ratheesh, M.P.; Prakasha, M.S.; Salunkhe, S.S.; Vinod Kumar, A.; Puranik, V.D.; Nair, C.K.G.

    2011-01-01

    A solar powered system for online monitoring of environmental radiation with multiple detectors has been designed, developed and produced. Multiple GM tube detectors have been used to extend the range of measurement from 50 nano Gy/hr to 20 Gy/hr and to enhance the reliability of the system. Online data communication using GSM based and direct LAN based communication has been incorporated. Options for use of power supply from mains powered and battery powered have been enabled. Care has been taken to make it weather-proof, compact, elegant and reliable. The development is a part of the ongoing program of country-wide deployment of radiation monitors under 'Indian Environmental Radiation MOnitoring Network' (IERMON). (author)

  11. Routine sanitary radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marej, A.N.

    1984-01-01

    Hygienic bases and organization principles of radiation monitoring realized in the process of operation of nuclear power engineering enterprises are considered. The monitoring is aimed at prevention from a negative effect of ionizing radiations on public heath. It is achieved by solution of the following tasks: realization of control over radioactive waste disposal into environment, control over the level of radioactive substance content in evironmental objects, control over external and internal irradiation of population assessment of environmental radiactivity of certain regions and of the territory of the country with the subsequent informing the corresponding organizations and population

  12. Radiation portal evaluation parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, R.L.

    1998-01-01

    The detection of the unauthorized movement of radioactive materials is one of the most effective nonproliferation measures. Automatic special nuclear material (SNM) portal monitors are designed to detect this unauthorized movement and are an important part of the safeguard systems at US nuclear facilities. SNM portals differ from contamination monitors because they are designed to have high sensitivity for the low energy gamma-rays associated with highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. These instruments are now being installed at international borders to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination an SNM. In this paper the parameters important to evaluating radiation portal monitors are discussed. (author)

  13. Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

  14. Centralized environmental radiation monitoring system in JAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katagiri, H.; Kobalyashi, H.

    1993-01-01

    JAERI has continued the environmental radiation background survey and monitoring to ensure the safety of the peoples around the institute since one year before the first criticality of JRR-1 (Japan Research Reactor No.1) in August 1957. Air absorbed doses from β and γ radiation, α and β radioactivity in air and the radioactivities in environmental samples were the monitoring items. For the monitoring of β and γ radiation and α and β radioactivity in air, monitoring station and the centralized automatic environmental radiation monitoring system applying a computer were established as a new challenging monitoring system for nuclear facility, which was the first one not only in Japan but also in the would in 1960 and since then the system has been renewed two times (in 1973 and 1988) by introducing the latest technology in the fields of radiation detection and computer control at each stage. Present system renewed in 1988 was designed to prevent the interruption of monitoring due to computer troubles, communication troubles and power failures especially an instant voltage drop arisen from thunder by reflecting the experiences through the operation and maintenance of the former system. Dual telemeters whose power is constantly supplied via batteries (capable of 10 min monitoring after power failure) are equipped in the monitoring center to cope with telemeter troubles, which has operated successfully without any suspension being attributable to the power failures and telemeter troubles

  15. Occupational radiation exposure monitoring among radiation workers in Nepal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bhatt, Chhavi Raj; Shrestha, Shanta Lall; Khanal, Tara; Ween, Borgny

    2008-01-01

    Nepal was accepted as a member of the IAEA in 2007. Nepal is one of the world's least developed countries and is defined in Health Level IV. The population counted 26.4 millions in 2007. The health care sector increases with new hospitals and clinics, however, Nepal has no radiation protection authority or radiation protection regulation in the country until now. The radiation producing equipment in the health sector includes conventional X-ray and dental X-ray equipment, fluoroscopes, mammography, CT, catheterization laboratory equipment, nuclear medicine facilities, a few linear accelerators, Co 60 teletherapy and High Dose Rate brachytherapy sources. The situation regarding dosimetry service for radiation workers is unclear. A survey has been carried out to give an overview of the situation. The data collection of the survey was performed by phone call interviews with responsible staff at the different hospitals and clinics. Data about different occupationally exposed staff, use of personal radiation monitoring and type of dosimetry system were collected. In addition, it was asked if dosimetry reports were compiled in files or databases for further follow-up of staff, if needed. The survey shows that less of 25% of the procedures performed on the surveyed hospitals and clinics are performed by staff with personnel radiation monitoring. Radiation monitoring service for exposed staff is not compulsory or standardized, since there is no radiation protection authority. Nepal has taken a step forward regarding radiation protection, with the IAEA membership, although there are still major problems that have to be solved. An evaluation of the existing practice of staff dosimetry can be the first helpful step for further work in building a national radiation protection authority. (author)

  16. An Approach to Safeguards by Design (SBD) for Fuel Cycle Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sankaran Nair, P.; Gangotra, S.; Karanam, R.

    2015-01-01

    Implementation of safeguards in bulk handling facilities such as fuel fabrication facilities and reprocessing facilities are a challenging task. This is attributed to the nuclear material present in the facility in the form of powder, pellet, green pellet, solution and gaseous. Additionally material hold up, material unaccounted for (MUF) and the operations carried out round the clock add to the difficulties in implementing safeguards. In facilities already designed or commissioned or operational, implementation of safeguards measures are relatively difficult. The authors have studied a number of measures which can be adopted at the design stage itself. Safeguard By Design (SBD) measures can help in more effective implementation of safeguards, reduction of cost and reduction in radiological dose to the installation personnel. The SBD measures in the power reactors are comparatively easier to implement than in the fuel fabrication plants, since reactors are item counting facilities while the fuel fabrication plants are bulk handling type of facilities and involves much rigorous nuclear material accounting methodology. The safeguards measures include technical measures like dynamic nuclear material accounting, near real time monitoring, remote monitoring, use of automation, facility imagery, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tagging, reduction of MUF in bulk handling facilities etc. These measures have been studied in the context of bulk handling facilities and presented in this paper. Incorporation of these measures at the design stage (SBD) is expected to improve the efficiency of safeguardability in such bulk handling and item counting facilities and proliferation resistance of nuclear material handled in such facilities. (author)

  17. Towards Compact Antineutrino Detectors for Safeguarding Nuclear Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meijer, R.J. de; Smit, F.D.; Woertche, H.J.

    2010-01-01

    In 2008 the IAEA Division of Technical Support convened a Workshop on Antineutrino Detection for Safeguards Applications. Two of the recommendations expressed that IAEA should consider antineutrino detection and monitoring in its current R and D program for safeguarding bulk-process reactors, and consider antineutrino detection and monitoring in its Safeguards by Design approaches for power and fissile inventory monitoring of new and next generation reactors. The workshop came to these recommendations after having assessed the results obtained at the San Onofre Nuclear Generator Station (SONGS) in California. A 600 litre, 10% efficiency detector, placed at 25m from the core was shown to record 300 net antineutrino events per day. The 2*2.5*2.5 m 3 footprint of the detector and the required below background operation, prevents an easy deployment at reactors. Moreover it does not provide spatial information of the fissile inventory and, because of the shape of a PBMR reactor, would not be representative for such type of reactor. A solution to this drawback is to develop more efficient detectors that are less bulky and less sensitive to cosmic and natural radiation backgrounds. Antineutrino detection in the SONGS detector is based on the capture of antineutrinos by a proton resulting in a positron and neutron. In the SONGS detector the positron and neutron are detected by secondary gamma-rays. The efficiency of the SONGS detector is largely dominated by the low efficiency for gamma detection high background sensitivity We are investigating two methods to resolve this problem, both leading to more compact detectors, which in a modular set up also will provide spatial information. One is based on detecting the positrons on their slowdown signal and the neutrons by capturing in 10 B or 6 Li, resulting in alpha-emission. The drawback for standard liquid scintillators doped with e.g. B is the low flame point of the solvent and the strong quenching of the alpha signal. Our

  18. Offsite environmental monitoring report: Radiation monitoring around United States nuclear test areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    This report describes the Offsite Radiation Safety Program conducted during 1990 by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory -- Las Vegas. This laboratory operates an environmental radiation monitoring program in the region surrounding the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and at former test sites in Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico. The surveillance program is designed to measure levels and trends of radioactivity, if present, in the environment surrounding testing areas to ascertain whether current radiation levels and associated doses to the general public are in compliance with existing radiation protection standards. The surveillance program additionally has the responsibility to take action to protect the health and well being of the public in the event of any accidental release of radioactive contaminants. Offsite levels of radiation and radioactivity are assessed by sampling milk, water, and air; by deploying thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and using pressurized ion chambers (PICs); and by biological monitoring of animals, food crops, and humans. Personnel with mobile monitoring equipment are placed in areas downwind from the test site prior to each nuclear weapons test to implement protective actions, provide immediate radiation monitoring, and obtain environmental samples rapidly after any occurrence of radioactivity release

  19. Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

  20. Environmental radiation monitoring of Vizag City

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sreekanth, B.; Narsaiah, M.V.R.; Saindane, Shashank; Pujari, Raju; Krishna, N.S.; Sambamurthy, T.; Chaudhury, Probal; Pradeepkumar, K.S.

    2014-01-01

    Radiological impact assessment is to be carried out following any radiological emergency to implement the required counter measures. A ground based environmental radiation monitoring of Vizag city has been carried out by installing various radiation monitoring instruments in a vehicle to generate the base line radiation data. It also helps to check the illicit trafficking of radioactive sources and also identifying the orphan sources. The average background radiation level observed in Vizag city was 80 nGy/h. Database of baseline radiation level with GPS location at all important locations of the whole city has been developed. No illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and orphan sources were detected during the survey. All the detectors used in the survey shown good correlation in their response. The study showed that mobile monitoring methodology will be useful in the quick assessment of radiological impact and strengthens the decision makers in reducing consequences by initiating immediate counter measures

  1. Safeguards System for the Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ho-dong; Lee, T.H.; Yoon, J.S.; Park, S.W; Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Menlove, H.; Miller, M.C.; Tolba, A.; Zarucki, R.; Shawky, S.; Kamya, S.

    2007-01-01

    The advanced spent fuel conditioning process (ACP) which is a part of a pyro-processing has been under development at Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since 1997 to tackle the problem of an accumulation of spent fuel. The concept is to convert spent oxide fuel into a metallic form in a high temperature molten salt in order to reduce the heat energy, volume, and radioactivity of a spent fuel. Since the inactive tests of the ACP have been successfully implemented to confirm the validity of the electrolytic reduction technology, a lab-scale hot test will be undertaken in a couple of years to validate the concept. For this purpose, the KAERI has built the ACP Facility (ACPF) at the basement of the Irradiated Material Examination Facility (IMEF) of KAERI, which already has a reserved hot-cell area. Through the bilateral arrangement between US Department of Energy (DOE) and Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for safeguards R and D, the KAERI has developed elements of safeguards system for the ACPF in cooperation with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The reference safeguards design conditions and equipment were established for the ACPF. The ACPF safeguards system has many unique design specifications because of the particular characteristics of the pyro-process materials and the restrictions during a facility operation. For the material accounting system, a set of remote operation and maintenance concepts has been introduced for a non-destructive assay (NDA) system. The IAEA has proposed a safeguards approach to the ACPF for the different operational phases. Safeguards measures at the ACPF will be implemented during all operational phases which include a 'Cold Test', a 'Hot Test' and at the end of a 'Hot test'. Optimization of the IAEA's inspection efforts was addressed by designing an effective safeguards approach that relies on, inter alia, remote monitoring using cameras, installed NDA instrumentation, gate monitors and seals

  2. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  3. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

  4. Maintenance experiences with hand and foot monitor for monitoring alpha and beta radiation of personnel in NFC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramachandra Rao, A.; Kulkarni, R.S.; Banerjee, P.K.

    2010-01-01

    NFC is producing natural uranium and enriched uranium fuels for various reactors including PHWR etc. Monitoring of α and β radiations in the active plants of NFC is very much essential in many aspects. The personnel who are handling radiation materials have to be monitored for α radiation of hands and cloths and β radiation of feet. So the Alpha and Beta Monitor became important monitoring equipment for monitoring α and β radiations of persons working in active plants of NFC. Many Alpha and Beta Monitors of make, ECIL, PLA, and Nucleonix etc. were being used in active plants in NFC. Basically α and β radiation monitors consists of four PMT (Photo Multiplier Tubes) for detection of radiation of hands and one PMT for monitoring clothes. The PMT use ZnS (Ag) as the scintillator for detection of α radiation. GM tubes are used to detect β radiation of feet. The latest Hand and Foot Monitors have been incorporated with PC based monitoring system along with software for making the monitoring process more efficient and user friendly. As an instrumentation maintenance team for these monitors, our experiences are varied. These monitors are to be periodically maintained and tested for its effective functioning in monitoring the nuclear radiation. The monitors procured from M/s. ECIL were being used since long time in these areas. The instrumentation maintenance had faced some problems with these monitors such as frequent failure of High Voltage cards, Amplifier and Counter PCB cards. Modifications were made in the circuits of High Voltage and Counter cards to minimize the failure rate and for loading of Display and Monitoring Software through Hard disk instead of from floppy disk. So the availability of monitors for monitoring radiation got improved. Later the introduction of more sophisticated α and β radiation monitors of M/s. PLA make in these areas further improved monitoring of radiation of personnel working in active areas. These monitors are more user

  5. Safeguards instrumentation: past, present, future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    1982-01-01

    Instruments are essential for accounting, for surveillance and for protection of nuclear materials. The development and application of such instrumentation is reviewed, with special attention to international safeguards applications. Active and passive nondestructive assay techniques are some 25 years of age. The important advances have been in learning how to use them effectively for specific applications, accompanied by major advances in radiation detectors, electronics, and, more recently, in mini-computers. The progress in seals has been disappointingly slow. Surveillance cameras have been widely used for many applications other than safeguards. The revolution in TV technology will have important implications. More sophisticated containment/surveillance equipment is being developed but has yet to be exploited. On the basis of this history, some expectations for instrumentation in the near future are presented

  6. Application of maximum radiation exposure values and monitoring of radiation exposure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    According to the Section 32 of the Radiation Act (592/91) the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety gives instructions concerning the monitoring of the radiation exposure and the application of the dose limits in Finland. The principles to be applied to calculating the equivalent and the effective doses are presented in the guide. Also the detailed instructions on the application of the maximum exposure values for the radiation work and for the natural radiation as well as the instructions on the monitoring of the exposures are given. Quantities and units for assessing radiation exposure are presented in the appendix of the guide

  7. Design of Kartini reactor radiation monitor system using lab view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adi Abimanyu; Jumari; Achmad Fahrul Aji; Muhammad Khoiri

    2014-01-01

    Kartini Reactor operation will result in radiation exposure. Gamma radiation exposure rate at the Kartini Reactor monitored by several radiation monitors (Ludlum) that integrate with the computer, so that the rate of radiation exposure is always monitored. Current monitoring system combines six radiation monitor in one computer monitor radiation, and monitoring performed by operators and supervisors to see how the radiation exposure rate measured in the area around the reactor core in a periodic time manually. This research will develop a system to monitor radiation exposure in Kartini reactor based ATMega8 micro controller for interface between radiation monitor and computer and also Graphical User Interface (GUI) develop using Lab view software that makes monitoring is easier and documented regularly. This system is testing by simulation, it is done by replacing the function of the radiation monitoring devices (Ludlum) in Kartini Reactor with computers that send serial data with the same format with a format that is sent by Ludlum. The results show that the interface system has the ability to operate in a range of baud rate 1,200 bps, 2,400 bps, 4,800 bps, 9,600 bps, 14,400 bps, 19,200 bps and 38,400 bps, with the ability to provide realtime information every 6 seconds and able to document the rate of exposure to radiation in the form of logbook. (author)

  8. The structure of nuclear safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulter, C.A.

    1989-01-01

    Safeguards systems for facilities that handle special nuclear material combine procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements to prevent and/or detect sabotage and diversion or theft of material. Because most of the discussion in this course is devoted to materials accounting topics only, this chapter provides a brief introduction to some of the procedural and protective elements of safeguards systems, placing the materials accounting system in its proper context. The chapter begins by reviewing certain pertinent DOE definitions and then surveys some protection requirements and technology - protective personnel, personnel identification systems, barriers, detectors, and communication systems. Considered next are the procedures of personnel selection and monitoring, definition and division of job functions, and operation. The chapter then describes the way the procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements can be combined, becoming a total safeguards system. Although such a system necessarily requires elements of procedure, protection, and materials accounting, only the materials accounting gives positive assurance that nuclear material is not diverted or stolen

  9. Radiation monitoring at Sizewell B PWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hills, O.C.

    1992-01-01

    Radiation monitoring in Sizewell-B Power Station most significantly differs from that in existing UK Power Stations in two respects: firstly in the large number of on-line radiation monitors and secondly in the way that the monitors are linked into a fully-integrated, centralised data acquisition and display system, which can be accessed and viewed by the operators. An overview is given of how full process data is transmitted along data links between the Auxiliary Shut-Down Room, Technical Support Centre and Main Control Room, enabling Health Physics and other staff to access information from any radiation monitor. The permanently installed monitors together with the safety category, type and location are listed. As part of the Sizewell-B Process Plant control and instrumentation contract, NEI is to supply the Health Physics Instrumentation (HPI) and Process and Effluent Activity Monitoring System (PEAMS) (excluding the Primary Protection System) plus the Nuclear Sampling System (NSS). This paper concentrates on the HPI, and parts of the PEAMS and NSS for which NEI have the responsibility for system design, detail design, manufacture, site installation and commissioning. Section 2 briefly describes the sources of radiation at Sizewell-B; Sections 3, 4 and 5 describe the PEAMS, HPI and NSS respectively. Section 6 details the design of two of the Sizewell-B PEAMS subsystems. (Author)

  10. International safeguards 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1979-01-01

    First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

  11. Designing a safeguards approach for the transfer and storage of used fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benjamin, Robert; Truong, Q.S. Bob; Keeffe, Richard; Whiting, Neville; Green, Brian

    2001-01-01

    Full text: To provide needed space in the bays for continued CANDU reactor discharges, used fuel must be moved from the bays to dry storage facilities, which are built on site. Over the next decades, used fuel in the bays in Canada will be loaded into containers or transfer flasks and moved to the dry storage facilities. The IAEA currently verifies the transfer of used fuel to dry storage at the Point Lepreau and Gentilly and Pickering CANDU reactor stations. When the Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility starts operating in 2002 followed by the Darlington Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility in 2007-2009 increased Agency safeguards resources will be required. Safeguarding these new facilities and the flow of fuel to them would place additional demand on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, were used. In a continuous search for more efficient approaches, the IAEA, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the facility operators are working together to develop a safeguards scheme that depends less upon inspectors and more upon instruments, operator activity and remote monitoring. This paper describes the current approach to safeguarding used fuel in transit and in storage at the Pickering site and how that approach might be applied to the Bruce site. Alternative approaches are also discussed and their application to existing and future used fuel dry storage facilities is considered. Safeguards approaches under existing Safeguards Criteria are compared with approaches that might be possible under a safeguards regime strengthened by the Additional Protocol, and with approaches optimised under Integrated Safeguards. The technologies being considered to safeguard used fuel include position tracking using Global Positioning System (GPS), Geospatial Information System (GIS), radio frequency techniques, electronic seals, operator activity and remote surveillance and monitoring. (author)

  12. Analysis of food radiation monitoring system in Belarus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    Food radiation monitoring system in Belarus due to the Chernobyl accident is analysed. Structure of radiation monitoring network, instrumentation and modern developments. Information on permissible concentration levels in foodstuffs and water is presented and calculations of radionuclide intake for man are performed. Proposals on the creation of social centres of food radiation monitoring for Belarussian population are considered. 4 tabs

  13. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

  14. Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Qun

    2001-01-01

    Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For

  15. Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

  16. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. These concepts identify ways in which material accounting systems can be used to enable effective monitoring of authorized movement of nuclear material through physical protection boundaries. Concepts are also discussed for monitoring user access to nuclear material and for tagging user identification to material accounting transactions through physical protection functions. These result in benefits in detecting diversion and in positively tracing material movement. Finally, coordination of safeguards information from both subsystems in such an integrated system through a safeguards coordination center is addressed with emphasis on appropriate response in case of discrepancies

  17. Sensitivity analysis of high resolution gamma-ray detection for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dewji, S.A., E-mail: dewjisa@ornl.gov [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, PO Box 2008 MS-6335, Oak Ridge TN 37831 (United States); Georgia Institute of Technology, 770 State Street, Atlanta, GA 30332-0745 (United States); Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, PO Box 2008 MS-6335, Oak Ridge TN 37831 (United States); Hertel, N.E. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, PO Box 2008 MS-6335, Oak Ridge TN 37831 (United States); Georgia Institute of Technology, 770 State Street, Atlanta, GA 30332-0745 (United States)

    2017-03-11

    Under the policies proposed by recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulars and policy papers, implementation of safeguards exists when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed in previous work to develop and validate gamma-ray nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO{sub 2}(NO{sub 3}){sub 2}) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP). Passive nondestructive assay techniques using high resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely manner. Building upon the aforementioned previous validation work on detector sensitivity to varying concentrations of uranyl nitrate via a series of dilution measurements, this work investigates detector response parameter sensitivities to gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate. The full energy peak efficiency of a detection system is dependent upon the sample, geometry, absorption, and intrinsic efficiency parameters. Perturbation of these parameters translates into corresponding variations of the 185.7 keV peak area of the {sup 235}U in uranyl nitrate. Such perturbations in the assayed signature impact the quality or versatility of the safeguards conclusions drawn. Given the potentially high throughput of uranyl nitrate in NUCPs, the ability to assay 1 SQ of material requires

  18. Status of radiation detector and neutron monitor technology

    CERN Document Server

    Kim, Y K; Ha, J H; Han, S H; Hong, S B; Hwang, I K; Lee, W G; Moon, B S; Park, S H; Song, M H

    2002-01-01

    In this report, we describe the current states of the radiation detection technology, detectors for industrial application, and neutron monitors. We also survey the new technologies being applied to this field. The method to detect radiation is the measurement of the observable secondary effect from the interaction between incident radiation and detector material, such as ionization, excitation, fluorescence, and chemical reaction. The radiation detectors can be categorized into gas detectors, scintillation detectors, and semiconductor detectors according to major effects and main applications. This report contains the current status and operational principles of these detectors. The application fields of radiation detectors are industrial measurement system, in-core neutron monitor, medical radiation diagnostic device, nondestructive inspection device, environmental radiation monitoring, cosmic-ray measurement, security system, fundamental science experiment, and radiation measurement standardization. The st...

  19. Development and evaluation of methods for safeguards use of solution monitoring data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.; Wangen, L.

    1996-09-01

    This report describes the effort to develop, implement, and evaluate data analysis methods for solution-monitoring measurements in the plutonium nitrate storage at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP). The intent is to address TRP-specific issues to some extent, as well as to anticipate the data analysis needs at future reprocessing plants (especially the new Rokkasho reprocessing plant (RRP)) in Japan. The essential difference between a plant like TRP and a more modern plant like RRP is that one expects more and better instrumentation in the tanks in a modern plant. Because the TRP solution monitoring hardware is scheduled to be upgraded, the authors de-emphasized the effort to handle information-poor plants like TRP. This report mostly describes the analysis methods and software for finding and identifying all key tank events. To a large extent they have to experiment with several candidate methods for implementing their analysis objectives. Therefore, they chose to use a prototyping software system called S-PLUS, which is an object-oriented statistical programming and graphics package. The intent is to eventually implement selected portions of their current solution-monitoring toolkit in a more robust and user-friendly system. The authors describe their current software system as being far more than they needed for their own in-house use (menus are provided for the user who doesn't want to type any S-PLUS commands), but less than is needed for a fieldable system. Mostly as a result of working on this project, they have come to conclude that solution monitoring is a potentially very valuable asset to nuclear safeguards at a modern reprocessing plant

  20. Lessons learned in testing of Safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, Susan; Farnitano, Michael; Carelli, Joseph

    2001-01-01

    Full text: During the 1990s, the IAEA Department of Safeguards began a transition from analog to digital equipment. This included surveillance equipment, seals, NDA measurement systems, and other instruments. The transition to digital equipment was intended to facilitate compatibility between and integration of instruments, remote communication of data, improved data storage, and modernization. Many of the instruments are designed to operate on battery power during loss of facility power, and therefore, are designed to consume minimal power. In 2000, the IAEA experienced a number of failures in digital image surveillance (DIS) equipment. A study of the performance data revealed that the failures occurred in 'high risk' environments where the systems were exposed to neutrons. As a supporter of IAEA equipment development and implementation, the U.S. Support Program worked with the IAEA, the equipment designer, and the equipment manufacturer in special meetings on DIS to determine the cause of the failures. It was as a result of these meetings that single event upset (SEU) was determined to be the root cause of the failures. The meeting participants also identified a list of actions to improve the reliability of DIS systems. As a result of the DIS meetings and the identified actions, the U.S. Support Program approved a request from the IAEA and established Task E.125, 'Remote Monitoring and Unattended Digital Surveillance Systems.' This task is an umbrella task intended to provide a mechanism for response to IAEA needs related to improving the reliability of unattended, remote monitoring and DIS equipment. Subtasks approved under this task include: E.125.1, 'SDIS Software Consolidation and DCM-14 Audit' - This subtask involves the consolidation of a number of individual upgrades to the SDIS and review of the DCM-14 software. As the sponsor of the design of the DCM-14 by Dr. Neumann, the German Support Program is also a participant in this subtask; E.125.2, 'DIS

  1. Advanced-safeguards systems development for chemical-processing plants. Final report for FY 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cartan, F.O.

    1981-04-01

    The program is installing a computer system to test and evaluate process monitoring as a new Safeguards function to supplement the usual physical security and accountability functions. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) provide information via a data acquisition system to a Safeguards analysis computer. The monitoring function can significantly enhance current material control (accountability) and containment surveillance capabilities for domestic and international Safeguards uses. Installation of sensors and instruments in the ICPP was more than 75% complete in FY-1980. Installation work was halted at the request of ICPP operations near the end of the year to eliminate possible conflict with instrument calibrations prior to plant startup. Some improvements to the computer hardware were made during FY-1980. Sensor and instrument development during FY-1980 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications. Pressure transducers, pressure switches, a bubble flowmeter, and load cells were tested; an ultrasonic liquid-in-line sensor was developed and tested. Work on the portable, isotope-ratio mass spectrometer led to the comparison of the HP quadrupole instrument with a small magnetic instrument and to the selection of the quadrupole

  2. Personal radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Julius, H.W.

    1976-01-01

    This report reviews the context of a primary university course in individual radiation monitoring. A brief account of the regulations and permissible doses is given. The principles and design of film dosemeters, thermoluminescent dosemeters and the whole-body counting technique are treated

  3. A unique radiation area monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphy, P.C.; Allen, G.C.

    1978-01-01

    The Remote Area Monitoring Systems (RAMS) monitors four radiation areas with two independent systems in each area. Each system consists of power supplies, four ionization chambers, and four analog and digital circuits. The first system controls the warning beacons, horns, annunciation panel and interlocks. The second system presents a quantitative dose rate indication at the console and in the radiation area

  4. NRC TLD Direct Radiation Monitoring Network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Struckmeyer, R.

    1994-03-01

    This report presents the results of the NRC Direct Radiation Monitoring Network for the fourth quarter of 1993. It provides the ambient radiation levels measured in the vicinity of 75 sites throughout the United States. In addition, it describes the equipment used, monitoring station selection criteria, characterization of the dosimeter response, calibration procedures, statistical methods, intercomparison, and quality assurance program

  5. NRC TLD Direct Radiation Monitoring Network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Struckmeyer, R.; McNamara, N.

    1993-03-01

    This report present the results of the NRC Direct Radiation Monitoring Network for the fourth quarter of 1992. It provides the ambient radiation levels measured in the vicinity of 75 sites throughout the United States. In addition, it describes the equipment used, monitoring station selection criteria, characterization of the dosimeter response, calibration procedures, statistical methods, intercomparison, and quality assurance program

  6. Atomics International environmental monitoring and facility effluent annual report, 1976

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, J.D.

    1977-01-01

    Environmental and facility effluent radioactivity monitoring at Atomics International (AI) is performend by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Unit of the Health, Safety, and Radiation Services Department. Soil, vegetation, and surface water are routinely sampled to a distance of 10 miles from AI sites. Continuous ambient air sampling and thermoluminescent dosimetry are performed on site for monitoring airborne radioactivity and site ambient radiation levels. Radioactivity in effluents discharged to the atmosphere from AI facilities is continuously sampled and monitored to ensure that levels released to unrestricted areas are within appropriate limits, and to identify processes which may require additional engineering safeguards to minimize radioactivity levels in such effluents. In addition, selected nonradioactive constituents in surface water discharged to unrestricted areas are determined. This report summarizes and discusses monitoring results for 1976. The results of a special soil plutonium survey performed during the year are also summarized

  7. Safeguarding on-power fuelled reactors - instrumentation and techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waligura, A.; Konnov, Y.; Smith, R.M.; Head, D.A.

    1977-05-01

    Instrumentation and techniques applicable to safeguarding reactors that are fuelled on-power, particularly the CANDU type, have been developed. A demonstration is being carried out at the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station in Canada. Irradiated nuclear materials in certain areas - the reactor and spent fuel storage bays - are monitored using photographic and television cameras, and seals. Item accounting is applied by counting spent-fuel bundles during transfer from the reactor to the storage bay and by placing these spent-fuel bundles in a sealed enclosure. Provision is made for inspection and verification of the bundles before sealing. The reactor's power history is recorded by a Track-Etch power monitor. Redundancy is provided so that the failure of any single piece of equipment does not invalidate the entire safeguards system. Several safeguards instruments and devices have been developed and evaluated. These include a super-8-mm surveillance camera system, a television surveillance system, a spent-fuel bundle counter, a device to detect dummy fuel bundles, a cover for enclosing a stack of spent-fuel bundles, and a seal suitable for underwater installation and ultrasonic interrogation. (author)

  8. Standalone, battery powered radiation monitors for accelerator electronics

    CERN Document Server

    Wijnands, T; Spiezia, G

    2009-01-01

    A technical description of the design of a new type of radiation monitors is given. The key point in the design is the low power consumption inferior to 17 mW in radiation sensing mode and inferior to 0.3 mW in standby mode. The radiation monitors can operate without any external power or signal cabling and measure and store radiation data for a maximum period of 800 days. To read the radiation data, a standard PC can be connected via a USB interface to the device at any time. Only a few seconds are required to read out a single monitor. This makes it possible to survey a large network of monitoring devices in a short period of time, for example during a stop of the accelerator.

  9. Advanced safeguards systems development for chemical processing plants. Final report for Fiscal Year 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.E.

    1980-01-01

    A computer system is being installed by INEL to test and evaluate safeguards monitoring concepts in an operating nuclear fuel processing plant. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the ICPP provide plant information to a computer data acquisition and analysis system. Objective of the system is to collect data from process and safeguards sensors and show how this data can be analyzed to detect diversion operations or improper plant operation, and to test the performance of the monitoring devices. Approximately one-third of the installation designs and one-eighth of the installations were completed in FY 1979. The ICPP processing schedule for FY 1980 permits installation of the remaining monitoring devices before process startup in the fourth quarter of FY 1980. All computer hardware was delivered and checked out in FY 1979. Computer software system designs were completed with the majority of the programming scheduled for FY 1980. Sensor and instrument development in FY 1979 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications

  10. Fish welfare assurance system: initial steps to set up an effective tool to safeguard and monitor farmed fish welfare at a company level

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Vis, van de J.W.; Poelman, M.; Lambooij, E.; Bégout, M.L.; Pilarczyk, M.

    2012-01-01

    The objective was to take a first step in the development of a process-oriented quality assurance (QA) system for monitoring and safeguarding of fish welfare at a company level. A process-oriented approach is focused on preventing hazards and involves establishment of critical steps in a process

  11. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

  12. Technology of remote monitoring for nuclear activity monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwack, Ehn Ho; Kim, Jong Soo; Yoon, Wan Ki; Park, Sung Sik; Na, Won Woo; An, Jin Soo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Jung Soo

    2000-05-01

    In a view of safeguards monitoring at nuclear facilities, the monitoring is changing to remote method so that this report is described to remote monitoring(RM) applying on commercial NPP in Korea. To enhance IAEA safeguards efficiency and effectiveness, IAEA is taking into account of remote monitoring system(RMS) and testing as a field trial. IRMP(International Remote Monitoring Project) in participating many nations for development of RMS is proceeding their project such as technical exchange and research etc. In case of our country are carrying out the research relevant RM since acceptance RMS at 7th ROK-IAEA safeguards implementation review meeting. With a view to enhancement the RMS, installation location and element technology of the RM equipment are evaluated in a view of safeguards in Korea LWRs, and proposed a procedure for national inspection application through remote data evaluation from Younggwang-3 NPP. These results are large valuable to use of national inspection at time point extending installation to all Korea PWR NPP. In case of CANDU, neutron, gamma measurement and basic concept of network using optical fiber scintillating detector as remote verification method for dry storage canister are described. Also RM basic design of spent fuel transfer campaign is described that unattended RM without inspector instead of performing in participating together with IAEA and national inspector. The transfer campaign means the spent fuel storage pond to dry storage canister for about two months every year. Therefore, positively participation of IAEA strength safeguards project will be increased transparency for our nuclear activity as well as contributed to national relevant industry

  13. Technology of remote monitoring for nuclear activity monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kwack, Ehn Ho; Kim, Jong Soo; Yoon, Wan Ki; Park, Sung Sik; Na, Won Woo; An, Jin Soo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Jung Soo

    2000-05-01

    In a view of safeguards monitoring at nuclear facilities, the monitoring is changing to remote method so that this report is described to remote monitoring(RM) applying on commercial NPP in Korea. To enhance IAEA safeguards efficiency and effectiveness, IAEA is taking into account of remote monitoring system(RMS) and testing as a field trial. IRMP(International Remote Monitoring Project) in participating many nations for development of RMS is proceeding their project such as technical exchange and research etc. In case of our country are carrying out the research relevant RM since acceptance RMS at 7th ROK-IAEA safeguards implementation review meeting. With a view to enhancement the RMS, installation location and element technology of the RM equipment are evaluated in a view of safeguards in Korea LWRs, and proposed a procedure for national inspection application through remote data evaluation from Younggwang-3 NPP. These results are large valuable to use of national inspection at time point extending installation to all Korea PWR NPP. In case of CANDU, neutron, gamma measurement and basic concept of network using optical fiber scintillating detector as remote verification method for dry storage canister are described. Also RM basic design of spent fuel transfer campaign is described that unattended RM without inspector instead of performing in participating together with IAEA and national inspector. The transfer campaign means the spent fuel storage pond to dry storage canister for about two months every year. Therefore, positively participation of IAEA strength safeguards project will be increased transparency for our nuclear activity as well as contributed to national relevant industry.

  14. Radiation environmental real-time monitoring and dispersion modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacik, A.; Bartokova, I.; Omelka, J.; Melicherova, T.

    2014-01-01

    The system of real-time radiation monitoring provided by MicroStep-MIS is a turn-key solution for measurement, acquisition, processing, reporting, archiving and displaying of various radiation data. At the level of measurements, the monitoring stations can be equipped with various devices from radiation probes, measuring the actual ambient gamma dose rate, to fully automated aerosol monitors, returning analysis results of natural and manmade radionuclides concentrations in the air. Using data gathered by our radiation probes RPSG-05 integrated into monitoring network of Crisis Management of the Slovak Republic and into monitoring network of Slovak Hydrometeorological Institute, we demonstrate its reliability and long-term stability of measurements. Data from RPSG-05 probes and GammaTracer probes, both of these types are used in the SHI network, are compared. The sensitivity of RPSG-05 is documented on data where changes of dose rate are caused by precipitation. Qualities of RPSG-05 probe are illustrated also on example of its use in radiation monitoring network in the United Arab Emirates. A more detailed information about radioactivity of the atmosphere can be obtained by using spectrometric detectors (e.g. scintillation detectors) which, besides gamma dose rate values, offer also a possibility to identify different radionuclides. However, this possibility is limited by technical parameters of detector like energetic resolution and detection efficiency in given geometry of measurement. A clearer information with less doubts can be obtained from aerosol monitors with a built-in silicon detector of alpha and beta particles and with an electrically cooled HPGe detector dedicated for gamma-ray spectrometry, which is performed during the sampling. Data from a complex radiation monitoring network can be used, together with meteorological data, in radiation dispersion model by MicroStep-MIS. This model serves for simulation of atmospheric propagation of radionuclides

  15. Strategic plan for the development of IAEA safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, N.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The need for a top-down Safeguards Strategy to focus departmental objectives was recognized by the Programme Performance Appraisal System (PPAS) performed on the Equipment Development Project in 1999. The Department of Safeguards prepared at the end of 2000 a 5-year Strategic Plan to identify the changes and improvements expected to take place over the 2001-2005 period. Those Strategic Objectives were supposed to be used to properly plan IAEA Safeguards activities and define appropriate and coherent R and D programmes. The present paper describes the strategic directions that the IAEA will follow in the area of equipment development in order to meet the Safeguards Department long-term objectives for 2001-2005. The paper, which is derived from the IAEA Strategic Equipment Development Plan, prepared by the Division of Technical Support, includes two parts: general principles and policies applicable to all equipment development tasks; specific strategic guidance. The paper will not describe the detailed plans which are prepared based on the strategic plan on a biannual basis. Equipment development activities have been divided in five major projects (NDA, Seals, Surveillance, Unattended Monitoring and Remote Monitoring). Strategic directions for each of these projects will be described in the paper. Separate sections will deal with equipment development strategic guidance in the area of additional protocol inspections, JNFL projects, illicit trafficking and Trilateral Initiative. (author)

  16. NRC TLD Direct Radiation Monitoring Network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Struckmeyer, R.; McNamara, N.

    1991-04-01

    This report presents the results of the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] Direct Radiation Monitoring Network for the fourth quarter of 1990. It provides the ambient radiation levels measured in the vicinity of 75 sites throughout the United States. In addition, it describes the equipment used, monitoring station selection criteria, characterization of the dosimeter response, calibration procedures, statistical methods, intercomparison, and quality assurance program. 3 figs., 4 tabs

  17. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  18. Operations monitoring concept. Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerr, H.T.

    1985-01-01

    Operations monitoring is a safeguards concept which could be applied in future fuel cycle facilities to significantly enhance the effectiveness of an integrated safeguards system. In general, a variety of operations monitoring techniques could be developed for both international and domestic safeguards application. The goal of this presentation is to describe specific examples of operations monitoring techniques as may be applied in a fuel reprocessing facility. The operations monitoring concept involves monitoring certain in-plant equipment, personnel, and materials to detect conditions indicative of the diversion of nuclear material. An operations monitoring subsystem should be designed to monitor operations only to the extent necessary to achieve specified safeguards objectives; there is no intent to monitor all operations in the facility. The objectives of the operations monitoring subsystem include: verification of reported data; detection of undeclared uses of equipment; and alerting the inspector to potential diversion activities. 1 fig

  19. Suggestions for the Improvement of Environmental Radiation Monitoring in Kenya

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shadrack, A. K.

    2012-01-01

    Environmental radiation monitoring in Kenya was started in 1990 following the 1979 Three Mile Island and the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plants accidents. The main purpose was to measure the radioactivity of foodstuffs imported from oversees and to carry out environmental radiation monitoring of soil, rock, water and air sample to check for contamination. Through environmental radiation monitoring, the Food and Environmental Monitoring Section (FEM) of the Kenya Radiation Protection Board (RPB) works to protect the public and environment from hazards associated with ionizing radiation. The purpose of this paper was to highlight suggestions for the improvement of environmental radiation monitoring in Kenya with respect to protecting the public and the environment against undue radiation risk by ensuring that potential exposures are kept As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). The suggestions for improvement will serve as a guideline for the strengthening of environmental radiation monitoring program in Kenya

  20. Nuclear safeguards: power tool for ensuring nuclear safety and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramakumar, K.L.

    2016-01-01

    The quantitative measurement of fissile nuclear materials through independent measurements is one of the cornerstones of the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NUMAC) edifice. The verification of the accountancy also represents one of the key elements of international nuclear materials Safeguards. The very basis of NUMAC is to ensure safeguarding nuclear material and to state with confidence, “no significant amount of nuclear material has been withdrawn from its intended civilian use.” Thus, materials accounting systems are designed to account for or keep track of the amounts and locations of sensitive nuclear materials by periodic measurements. The purpose of this activity is to detect missing items (gross defects). A variety of C/S techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. These measures serve to back up nuclear material accountancy by providing means by which access to nuclear material can be monitored. Unattended monitoring is a special mode of application of NDA or C/S techniques, or a combination of these, that operates for extended periods of time. The complexity and diversity of facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material require a correspondingly diverse set of verification techniques and equipment. The equipment and techniques used in safeguards are briefly described in this talk

  1. A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

    2011-12-15

    Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

  2. Radiation environmental real-time monitoring and dispersion modelling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacik, Andrej; Bartokova, Ivana; Melicherova, Terezia; Omelka, Jozef

    2015-01-01

    The MicroStep-MIS system of real-time radiation monitoring, which provides a turn-key solution for measurement, acquisition, processing, reporting, archiving and displaying of various radiation data, is described and discussed in detail. The qualities, long-term stability of measurement and sensitivity of the RPSG-05 probe are illustrated on its use within the radiation monitoring network of the Slovak Hydrometeorological Institute and within the monitoring network in the United Arab Emirates. (orig.)

  3. Process monitoring in modern safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1989-01-01

    From the safeguards standpoint, regulatory requirements are finally moving into the modern world of communication and information processing. Gone are the days when the accountant with the green eye shade and arm bands made judgments on the material balance a month after the balance was closed. The most recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) orders have very strict standards for timeliness and sensitivity to loss or removal of material. The latest regulations recognize that plant operators have a lot of information on and control over the location and movement of material within their facilities. This information goes beyond that traditionally reported under accountability requirements. These new regulations allow facility operators to take credit for many of the more informal process controls

  4. All-Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferguson, Matthew; Norman, Claude

    2010-01-01

    All source information analysis enables proactive implementation of in-field verification activities, supports the State Evaluation process, and is essential to the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. Information sources include State-declared nuclear material accounting and facility design information; voluntarily supplied information such as nuclear procurement data; commercial satellite imagery; open source information and information/results from design information verifications (DIVs), inspections and complementary accesses (CAs). The analysis of disparate information sources directly supports inspections, design information verifications and complementary access, and enables both more reliable cross-examination for consistency and completeness as well as in-depth investigation of possible safeguards compliance issues. Comparison of State-declared information against information on illicit nuclear procurement networks, possible trafficking in nuclear materials, and scientific and technical information on nuclear-related research and development programmes, provides complementary measures for monitoring nuclear developments and increases Agency capabilities to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. Likewise, expert analysis of commercial satellite imagery plays a critical role for monitoring un-safeguarded sites and facilities. In sum, the combination of these measures provides early identification of possible undeclared nuclear material or activities, thus enhancing deterrence of safeguards system that is fully information driven, and increasing confidence in Safeguards conclusions. By increasing confidence that nuclear materials and technologies in States under Safeguards are used solely for peaceful purposes, information-driven safeguards will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system. Key assets for Agency collection, processing, expert analysis, and integration of these information sources are the Information Collection and Analysis

  5. Personal radiation monitoring and assessment of doses received by radiation workers (1996)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris, N.D.

    1996-12-01

    Since late 1986, all persons monitored by the Australian Radiation Laboratory have been registered on a data base which maintains records of the doses received by each individual wearer. At present, the Service regularly monitors approximately 30,000 persons, which is roughly 90 percent of those monitored in Australia, and maintains dose histories of over 75,000 people. The skin dose for occupationally exposed workers can be measured by using one of the five types of monitor issued by the Service: Thermoluminescent Dosemeter (TLD monitor), Finger TLD 3, Neutron Monitor, Special TLD and Environmental monitor. The technical description of the monitors is provided along with the method for calculating the radiation dose. 5 refs., 7 tabs., 5 figs

  6. A radiation monitoring system for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwai, Masaru; Nakamori, S.; Ikeda, H.; Oda, M.

    1974-01-01

    Safety with respect to radiation is vital factor, particularly in view of the increasing number of nuclear power plants. For this purpose, a radiation monitoring system is provided to perform constant supervision. This article describes the purpose, installation location, specifications and circuitry of a system which is divided into three units: the process monitor, area monitor and off-site monitor. (auth.)

  7. Unattended safeguards instrumentation at centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, L. Eric; Lebrun, Alain R.; Labella, Rocco

    2014-01-01

    As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants, particularly high‑capacity plants, while working within budgetary constraints. New safeguards approaches should meet the high‑level verification objectives for such facilities (i.e., timely detection of: diversion of declared material, excess production beyond declared amounts, and production of enrichment levels higher than declared), but should also strive for efficiency advantages in implementation, for both the IAEA and operators. Under the Agency’s State- level approach to safeguards implementation, the Agency needs a flexible toolbox of technologies, allowing tailoring of safeguards measures for each individual enrichment facility. In this paper, the potential roles and development status for three different types of unattended measurement instrumentation are discussed. On‑Line Enrichment Monitors (OLEM) could provide continuous enrichment measurement for 100% of the declared gas flowing through unit header pipes. Unattended Cylinder Verification Stations (UCVS) could provide unattended verification of the declared uranium mass and enrichment of 100% of the cylinders moving through the plant, but also apply and verify an ‘NDA Fingerprint’ to preserve verification knowledge on the contents of each cylinder throughout its life in the facility. Sharing of the operator’s load cell signals from feed and withdrawal stations could count all cylinders introduced to the process and provide periodic monitoring of the uranium mass balance for in‑process material. The integration of load cell, OLEM and UCVS data streams offers the possibility for 100% verification of declared cylinder flow, and enables the periodic verification of the declared 235 U mass balance in the plant. These new capabilities would enhance the IAEA

  8. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center Monitoring Manual Volume 2, Radiation Monitoring and Sampling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Aerial Measurement Systems

    2012-07-31

    The FRMAC Monitoring and Sampling Manual, Volume 2 provides standard operating procedures (SOPs) for field radiation monitoring and sample collection activities that are performed by the Monitoring group during a FRMAC response to a radiological emergency.

  9. Past, present and future of safeguards implementation for the on-load RMBK-1500 reactors in Ignalina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zendel, M.; Yim, S.; Monticone, C.; Kurselis, S.

    1999-01-01

    The on-load refueled RBMKs ('Reactor Bolshoy Moschnosti Kanalniy - Large Power Channel Type Reactor') are very different from all other power reactors which the Agency has been safeguarding over the past decades. Distinct differences in fuel properties and handling necessitated the formulation of separate, facility specific approaches. The spent fuel management at the RBMKs in Ignalina uses hot cells to cut each spent fuel assembly into two subassemblies. A large number of subassemblies are subsequently stored in large capacity, compact storage baskets at the spent fuel storage ponds adjacent to the reactor hall. The development of the safeguards approach is presented considering limitation in core access, technological feasibility, operation mode and financial as well as human resources of the Agency. The safeguards approach is based on a quarterly inspection scheme using Containment and Surveillance (C/S) measures, verification of fresh and spent fuel by Non Destructive Assay (NDA), establishing of flow balances to complement the material accountancy and the application of neutron/gamma monitors in a continuous, unattended mode. The implementation of these safeguards measures is discussed and actual inspection experience with an emphasis on the application of the neutron/gamma monitors is given. The neutron/gamma monitors serve multiple safeguards functions, such as monitoring shipments of waste from cutting operations for irradiated fuel in the hot cells, confirming the unloading history for the on-load reactors, complementing C/S by detecting movements of irradiated fuel materials in the reactor halls and verifying the operational status and the power output of the reactors. Actual measurement results are presented to demonstrate their effectiveness. Power Considerations are given for future safeguards implementation matters at Ignalina Nuclear plant (INPP) including measures for the Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS). (author)

  10. Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

    2015-01-01

    There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

  11. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  12. Radiation protection monitoring for #betta#-radiation at the Juelich Nuclear Research Centre

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keller, M.; Heinzelmann, M.

    1983-01-01

    A complete system for radiation protection monitoring also includes #betta#-radiation monitoring. This requires suitable dose rate meters, personal dosemeters and last but not least detailed information about possible radiation exposure due to #betta#-radiation. Since there are at present no suitable #betta#-dosemeters available on the market yet, a large nuclear research centre such as the KFA Juelich, where radioactive substances are being handled by more than 1600 persons, has the task of developing and deploying suitable dosemeters. The centre's accomplishments in this area are described

  13. Radiation protection monitoring. Proceedings of a regional seminar for Asia and the Far East on radiation protection monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1969-01-01

    Proceedings of a regional seminar for Asia and the Far East jointly organized by the IAEA and the World Health Organization, and held in Bombay, 9-13 December 1968. The meeting was attended by 83 participants from 12 countries In the region, and by eight experts from countries outside the region who presented review papers. Contents: Purpose of radiation protection monitoring (4 papers); Radiation monitoring and dosimetry (7 papers); Monitoring of the working environment (12 papers); Individual monitoring (14 papers); Monitoring instruments (7 papers); Calibration and maintenance of instruments (3 papers); List of participants; Author index. All papers, which are preceded by an abstract, as well as the discussions, are in English

  14. The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

    2015-01-01

    Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

  15. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  16. Development of an advanced safeguards system as a proliferation deterrent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayers, A.A.; Barnes, L.D.

    1978-11-01

    The Advanced Safeguards System consists of Computerized Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting System, Physical Protection System, and Safeguards Coordination Center (SCC). Should all the computer-based monitoring systems be overcome (i.e., the NMC computer programmed not to recognize a materials inventory change, the SCC computer programmed to accept a falsified area and personnel authorization, and the physical security system programmed not to alarm for area intrusion), the requirements of the physical security system remain formidable barriers to successful theft since all SNM is separated from the uncontrolled areas by at least one entry control portal. An egress from the protected area--by either a vehicle through the vehicle access portal, or on foot through the personnel access portal--requires that the individuals be subjected to a search for metal and SNM before egress is permitted. The material access areas are further controlled by an interior access portal imposing the same SNM and metal search criteria. The portal search criteria are not subject to computer interpretation, but direct positive--negative indications to the portal patrolman. The physical security system then provides an independent backup should the computerized systems be defeated. Thus, the computer systems themselves will not, if defeated, guarantee an adversary success. The corollary also holds true; a defeat of the physical search elements of the physical security system will not guarantee adversary success because of the monitoring/surveillance function of the computerized systems. The complementary and overlapping nature of the safeguards systems is intended to provide multiple layers of safeguards, each layer providing an effective element of protection. Tests to date indicate that it appears feasible to meet operational objectives and maintain a high safeguards performance level using these concepts which are being incorporated into the Advanced Safeguards System.None

  17. Environmental radiation monitoring system in nuclear power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsuoka, Sadazumi; Tadachi, Katsuo; Endo, Mamoru; Yuya, Hiroshi

    1983-01-01

    At the time of the construction of nuclear power stations, prior to their start of operation, the state of environmental radiation must be grasped. After the start of the power stations, based on those data, the system of environmental radiation monitoring is established. Along with the construction of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. jointly with Fujitsu Ltd. has developed a high-reliability, environmental radiation monitoring system, and adopted ''optical data highways'' using optical fiber cables for communication. It consists of a central monitoring station and 11 telemeter observation points, for collecting both radiation and meteorological data. The data sent to the central station through the highways are then outputted on a monitoring panel. They are analyzed with a central processor, and the results are printed out. (Mori, K.)

  18. Radiation monitoring in high energy research facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyajima, Mitsuhiro

    1975-01-01

    In High Energy Physics Research Laboratory, construction of high energy proton accelerator is in progress. The accelerator is a cascaded machine comprising Cockcroft type (50 keV), linac (20 MeV), booster synchrotron (500 MeV), and synchrotron (8-12 GeV). Its proton beam intensity is 1x10 13 photons/pulse, and acceleration is carried out at the rate of every 2 minutes. The essential problems of radiation control in high energy accelerators are those of various radiations generated secondarily by proton beam and a number of induced radiations simultaneously originated with such secondary particles. In the Laboratory, controlled areas are divided into color-coded four regions, red, orange, yellow and green, based on each dose-rate. BF 3 counters covered with thick paraffin are used as neutron detectors, and side-window GM tubes, NaI (Tl) scintillators and ionization chambers as γ-detectors. In red region, however, ionization chambers are applied to induced radiation detection, and neutrons are not monitored. NIM standards are adopted for the circuits of all above monitors considering easy maintenance, economy and interchangeability. Notwithstanding the above described systems, these monitors are not sufficient to complete the measurement of whole radiations over wide energy region radiated from the accelerators. Hence separate radiation field measurement is required periodically. An example of the monitoring systems in National Accelerator Laboratory (U.S.) is referred at the last section. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

  19. Increase in Efficiency of Use of Pedestrian Radiation Portal Monitors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Solovev, D. B.; Merkusheva, A. E.

    2017-11-01

    Most international airports in the world use radiation portal monitors (RPM) for primary radiation control organization. During the exploitation pedestrian radiation portal monitors operators (in the Russian Federation it is a special subdivision of customs officials) have certain problems related to the search of an ionizing radiation source causing the alarm signal of a radiation monitor. Radiation portal monitors at standard (factory) settings have to find out the illegal moving of the radioisotopes moved by physical persons passing through a controlled zone and having a steady radiation by the gamma or neutron channel. The problem is that recently the number of the ownerships who underwent treatment or medical diagnostics with the use of radio pharmaceuticals considerably increased, i.e,. ownerships represent such an ionizing radiation source. The operator of the radiation portal monitor has to define very quickly whether the ownership is a violator (takes unsolved radioisotopes illegally) or is just a patient of the clinic who underwent treatment/diagnostics with the use of radio pharmaceuticals. The research showing the radioisotopes which are most often used in the medical purposes are given in article, it is offered to use the new software developed by the authors allowing the operator of the radiation portal monitor to define the location of the ownership which has such ionizing radiation source by the activity of radiation similar to the radiation from radio pharmaceuticals.

  20. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-01-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  1. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  2. Monitoring of radiation exposure and registration of doses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The Section 32 of the Finnish Radiation Act (592/91) defines the requirements to be applied to the monitoring of the radiation exposure and working conditions in Finland. The concepts relevant to the monitoring and guidelines for determining the necessity of the monitoring as well as its organizing are given in the guide. Instructions for reporting doses to the Dose Register of the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK) are given, also procedures for situations leading to exceptional exposures are described. (9 refs.)

  3. Integrated nuclear radiation detector and monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biehl, B.L.; Lieberman, S.I.

    1982-01-01

    A battery powered device which can continuously monitor and detect nuclear radiation utilizing fully integrated circuitry and which is provided with an alarm which alerts persons when the radiation level exceeds a predetermined threshold

  4. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

  5. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

  6. Nuclear Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, T.

    2015-01-01

    The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

  7. Towards a novel modular architecture for CERN radiation monitoring

    CERN Document Server

    Boukabache, Hamza; Ducos, Gael; Cardines, Nicola; Bellotta, Antonio; Toner, Ciarán; Perrin, Daniel; Forkel-Wirth, Doris

    2017-01-01

    The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) has the legal obligation to protect the public and the people working on its premises from any unjustified exposure to ionising radiation. In this context, radiation monitoring is one of the main concerns of the Radiation Protection Group. After 30 y of reliable service, the ARea CONtroller (ARCON) system is approaching the end of its lifecycle, which raises the need for new, more efficient radiation monitors with a high level of modularity to ensure better maintainability. Based on these two main principles, new detectors are currently being developed that will be capable of measuring very low dose rates down to 50 nSv h−1, whilst being able to measure radiation over an extensive range of 8 decades without any auto scaling. To reach these performances, CERN Radiation MOnitoring Electronics (CROME), the new generation of CERN radiation monitors, is based on the versatile architecture that includes new read-out electronics developed by the Instrumentation...

  8. Coupling a transient solvent extraction module with the separations and safeguards performance model.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    DePaoli, David W. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Birdwell, Joseph F. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Gauld, Ian C. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Cipiti, Benjamin B.; de Almeida, Valmor F. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN)

    2009-10-01

    A number of codes have been developed in the past for safeguards analysis, but many are dated, and no single code is able to cover all aspects of materials accountancy, process monitoring, and diversion scenario analysis. The purpose of this work was to integrate a transient solvent extraction simulation module developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The SSPM was designed for materials accountancy and process monitoring analyses, but previous versions of the code have included limited detail on the chemical processes, including chemical separations. The transient solvent extraction model is based on the ORNL SEPHIS code approach to consider solute build up in a bank of contactors in the PUREX process. Combined, these capabilities yield a more robust transient separations and safeguards model for evaluating safeguards system design. This coupling and initial results are presented. In addition, some observations toward further enhancement of separations and safeguards modeling based on this effort are provided, including: items to be addressed in integrating legacy codes, additional improvements needed for a fully functional solvent extraction module, and recommendations for future integration of other chemical process modules.

  9. Radiation monitoring - the role of local authorities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duggan, Michael

    1988-01-01

    Seven reports of papers given at a symposium on the role of local authorities in radiation monitoring are given. The main theme is concerned with radiation monitoring, how to interpret the information and how it should be disseminated. The individual experiences in the aftermath of the Chernobyl reactor accident are used to illustrate several of the papers. (U.K.)

  10. Technological developments and safeguards instrumentation: Responding to new challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naito, K.; Rundquist, D.E.

    1994-01-01

    Entering the 1990s, technological tools that were in the research and development stage not so long ago are changing the way inspectors are able to verify nuclear materials at many facilities around the world. Many new instruments - ranging from advanced video monitoring systems to miniature detectors and analysers - already are in place. In some cases, they have been custom-made for specific safeguards tasks, or for placement in locations, such as underwater storage pools for spent reactor fuel, where inspectors cannot go. Standing behind the development of many of these new safeguards instruments are a number of factors. They include: technological advances In computer related fields, such as microprocessing and electronics, and specific areas of instrumentation; technical developments in the nuclear industry and Efficiency improvements and efforts to reduce the costs of safeguards implementation

  11. 1988 annual work report of the Department for Safety and Radiation Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hille, R.

    1989-03-01

    The Department for Safety and Radiation Protection continues to be responsible for coordinating radiation protection, safety and protection at the KFA. It supports the other institutes and departments in performing the safety tasks allotted to them. The principal tasks of the Department are in administrative and technical assistance to these organization units and in safeguards. Administrative assistance involves, for example, regulation of the radiation protection organization in the institutes, including the appointment of radiation protection officers (Strahlenschutzbeauftragte). Furthermore, this includes the central handling of the registration system with the authorities and dealing with outside firms thus considerably relieving the institutes of their administrative tasks. Handling licensing procedures and the central accountancy of radioactive materials is also to be mentioned in this context. Technical assistance largely consists of developing, maintaining and repairing radiation measuring instruments and in the monitoring of personnel by evaluating personnel dosimeters and incorporation controls for radioactive sources. The safeguards tasks of the Department concern the very staff-intensive physical protection, as well as environmental protection and industrial safety. (orig.) [de

  12. Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design for Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgan, James B.; Kovacic, Donald N.; Whitaker, J. Michael

    2008-01-01

    Safeguards for nuclear facilities can be significantly improved by developing and implementing methodologies for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized into a country's regulatory structure similar to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved to assure a facility's reliable and safe operations will reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state level. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis (IPRA) process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

  13. GSM module for wireless radiation monitoring system via SMS

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rahman, Nur Aira Abd; Hisyam Ibrahim, Noor; Lombigit, Lojius; Azman, Azraf; Jaafar, Zainudin; Arymaswati Abdullah, Nor; Hadzir Patai Mohamad, Glam

    2018-01-01

    A customised Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) module is designed for wireless radiation monitoring through Short Messaging Service (SMS). This module is able to receive serial data from radiation monitoring devices such as survey meter or area monitor and transmit the data as text SMS to a host server. It provides two-way communication for data transmission, status query, and configuration setup. The module hardware consists of GSM module, voltage level shifter, SIM circuit and Atmega328P microcontroller. Microcontroller provides control for sending, receiving and AT command processing to GSM module. The firmware is responsible to handle task related to communication between device and host server. It process all incoming SMS, extract, and store new configuration from Host, transmits alert/notification SMS when the radiation data reach/exceed threshold value, and transmits SMS data at every fixed interval according to configuration. Integration of this module with radiation survey/monitoring device will create mobile and wireless radiation monitoring system with prompt emergency alert at high-level radiation.

  14. Integrated monitoring and reviewing systems for the Rokkasho Spent Fuel Receipt and Storage Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yokota, Yasuhiro; Ishikawa, Masayuki; Matsuda, Yuji

    1998-01-01

    The Rokkasho Spent Fuel Receipt and Storage (RSFS) Facility at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) in Japan is expected to begin operations in 1998. Effective safeguarding by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Japan Atomic Energy Bureau (JAEB) inspectors requires monitoring the time of transfer, direction of movement, and number of spent fuel assemblies transferred. At peak throughput, up to 1,000 spent fuel assemblies will be accepted by the facility in a 90-day period. In order for the safeguards inspector to efficiently review the resulting large amounts of inspection information, an unattended monitoring system was developed that integrates containment and surveillance (C/S) video with radiation monitors. This allows for an integrated review of the facility's radiation data, C/S video, and operator declaration data. This paper presents an outline of the integrated unattended monitoring hardware and associated data reviewing software. The hardware consists of a multicamera optical surveillance (MOS) system radiation monitoring gamma-ray and neutron detector (GRAND) electronics, and an intelligent local operating network (ILON). The ILON was used for time synchronization and MOS video triggers. The new software consists of a suite of tools, each one specific to a single data type: radiation data, surveillance video, and operator declarations. Each tool can be used in a stand-alone mode as a separate ion application or configured to communicate and match time-synchronized data with any of the other tools. A data summary and comparison application (Integrated Review System [IRS]) coordinates the use of all of the data-specific review tools under a single-user interface. It therefore automates and simplifies the importation of data and the data-specific analyses

  15. Development of multi copter based autonomous unmanned aerial radiation monitoring system for the remote impact assessment of radiation emergencies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jose, Jis Romal; Gupta, Ashutosh; Bahadur, Shuchita; Chaudhury, Probal; Pradeepkumar, K.S.

    2016-01-01

    During any radiation emergency, the level and extent of radioactive contamination need to be monitored for the timely and effective implementation of countermeasures to reduce the radiation exposure to public. In such a scenario, radiation surveillance can be carried out using either ground based mobile monitoring techniques or aerial radiation monitoring. Aerial radiation monitoring is quick and capable of scanning the areas which are not easily accessible by the ground based mobile monitoring. Compact unmanned aerial vehicle based radiation surveillance system is ideal in above mentioned radiation emergency scenarios as it can be rapidly deployed in the affected area and radiation exposure to the monitoring personal can be totally avoided. This paper describes development of multi copter based autonomous unmanned aerial radiation monitoring system for the remote impact assessment of radiation emergencies

  16. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  17. Special nuclear material radiation monitors for the 1980's

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1985-01-01

    During the two decades that automatic gamma-radiation monitors have been applied to detecting special nuclear material (SNM), little attention has been devoted to how well the monitors perform in plant environments. Visits to 11 DOE facilities revealed poor information flow between developers, manufacturers, and maintainers of SNM radiation monitors. To help users achieve best performance from their monitors or select new ones, Los Alamos National Laboratory developed a hand-held monitor user's guide, calibration manuals for some commercial SNM pedestrian monitors, and an application guide for SNM pedestrian monitors. In addition, Los Alamos evaluated new commercial SNM monitors, considered whether to apply neutron detection to SNM monitoring, and investigated the problem of operating gamma-ray SNM monitors in variable plutonium gamma-radiation fields. As a result, the performance of existing SNM monitors will improve and alternative monitoring methods will become commerciallly available during the 1980s. 9 refs., 6 figs., 1 tab

  18. Safeguards implementation in UP3 reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laurent, J.P.; Regnier, J.; Talbourdet, Y.; De Jong, P.

    1991-01-01

    The implementation of safeguards in a large size reprocessing plant is a challenge, considering the high throughput of nuclear material and the sophisticated automation of such facilities. In the case of UP3, a pragmatic and realistic approach has been devised and is applied through an efficient cooperation between the safeguards organizations, the french national authorities and the operator. In essence, they consist in verification of every significant inputs and outputs, in timely analysis by NDA (e.g. solutions of dissolution through an on site k-edge equipment), in monitoring selected parts of the inprocess inventory and in specific containment/surveillance systems for the spent fuel storage ponds and the PuO2 storage. (author)

  19. Radiation monitor system for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu Bingzhe; Guo Shusheng

    1990-12-01

    The system has 8 kinds of radiation monitors and 2 stage microcomputers designed for processing the data from each monitor, storaging the information, printing out and displaying on the colour CRT. The function of the system includes high-value alarm, warm alarm and failure alarm, so called t hree-level alarms . Two functions of the alarms are the threshold alarm and the tendency alarm, so that this system is an intelligency system. This system has high reliability and very wide range when LOCA accident takes place. It is aseismic and immune to industrial interference. The system can meet IEC-761-1 standard and is of nuclear safety 3rd class. Also the following monitors were designed: 133 Xe monitor, 131 I monitor, low-level liquid monitor and high radiation γ area monitor. The system can meet the requirements of nuclear power plants

  20. Safeguards '85

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1981-01-01

    IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

  1. Occupational radiation exposure in Germany: many monitored persons = high exposure?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nitschke, J.

    1996-01-01

    Natural radiation affects the entire population in Germany, and most of Germany's inhabitants are exposed to medical radiation in their lifetime. Occupational radiation exposure, however, is a kind of exposure affecting only a limited and well-defined group of the population, and this radiation exposure has been recorded and monitored as precisely as technically possible ever since the radiation protection laws made occupational radiation exposure monitoring a mandatory obligation. Official personal dosimetry applying passive dosemeters in fact does not offer direct protection against the effects of ionizing radiation, as dosemeter read-out and dose calculation is a post-exposure process. But it nevertheless is a rewarding monitoring duty under radiation protection law, as is shown by the radiation exposure statistics accumulated over decades: in spite of the number of monitored persons having been increasing over the years, the total exposure did not, due to the corresponding improvements in occupational radiation protection. (orig.) [de

  2. Radiation monitoring network of the Czech Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drabova, D.; Prouza, Z.; Malatova, I.; Bucina, I.

    1996-01-01

    Radiation Monitoring Network of the Czech Republic (RMN) was established after the Chernobyl accident. It consists of technical centers, laboratories and monitoring groups of State Office for Nuclear Safety, National Radiation Protection Institute, nuclear power plants, hydrometeorological service, army and Civil Defense, research institutes and other institutions. The structure of RMN, its basic components and responsible institutions are described. (author)

  3. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-01

    broaden the IAEA safeguards toolbox, the study recommends that the Agency consider closing potential gaps in safeguards coverage by, among other things: 1) adapting its safeguards measures based on a case-by-case assessment; 2) using more frequent and expanded/enhanced mailbox declarations (ideally with remote transmission of the data to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna) coupled with short-notice or unannounced inspections; 3) putting more emphasis on the collection and analysis of environmental samples at hot cells and waste storage tanks; 4) taking Safeguards by Design into account for the construction of new research reactors and best practices for existing research reactors; 5) utilizing fully all legal authorities to enhance inspection access (including a strengthened and continuing DIV process); and 6) utilizing new approaches to improve auditing activities, verify reactor operating data history, and track/monitor the movement and storage of spent fuel.

  4. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  5. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

  6. NRC TLD Direct Radiation Monitoring Network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Struckmeyer, R.; McNamara, N.

    1991-12-01

    This report provides the status and results of the NRC Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) Direct Radiation Monitoring Network. It presents the radiation levels measured in the vicinity of NRC licensed facilities throughout the country for the third quarter of 1991

  7. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  8. Radiation protection monitoring at the JOYO experimental fast reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ouchi, S.; Endo, K.; Susaki, T.

    1979-01-01

    This paper describes the radiation protection monitoring programme for the JOYO experimental fast reactor and some of the health physics problems experienced during the low-power nuclear tests. These include: a detailed description of the centralized radiation monitoring system; the methods and results of the individual monitoring systems; the results of operational monitoring for the handling of new plutonium fuel subassemblies; the evaluation of the external radiation dose rate around the primary coolant system; and the results of an experiment on the thermal dependence of some personnel dose meters. (author)

  9. Incident involving radioactive material at IAEA Safeguards Laboratory - No radioactivity released to environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Full text: Pressure build-up in a small sealed sample bottle in a storage safe resulted in plutonium contamination of a storage room at about 02:30 today at the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf. All indications are that there was no release of radioactivity to the environment. Further monitoring around the laboratory will be undertaken. No one was working in the laboratory at the time. The Laboratory's safety system detected plutonium contamination in the storage room where the safe was located and in two other rooms - subsequently confirmed by a team of IAEA radiation protection experts. The Laboratory is equipped with multiple safety systems, including an air-filtering system to prevent the release of radioactivity to the environment. There will be restricted access to the affected rooms until they are decontaminated. A full investigation of the incident will be conducted. The IAEA has informed the Austrian regulatory authority. The IAEA's Laboratory in Seibersdorf is located within the complex of the Austrian Research Centers Seibersdorf (ARC), about 35 km southeast of Vienna. The laboratory routinely analyses small samples of nuclear material (uranium or plutonium) as part of the IAEA's safeguards verification work. (IAEA)

  10. Environmental radiation monitoring from the decommission of TRIGA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Geun Sik; Lee, Chang Woo

    2000-03-01

    Environmental radiation monitoring was carried out with measurement of environmental radiation and environmental radioactivity analysis around TRIGA Research Reactor. The results of environmental radiation monitoring around TRIGA Research Reactor are the follows: The average level of environmental radiation measured by potable ERM and accumulated radiation dose by TLD was almost same level compared with thepast years. Gross {beta} radioactivity in environmental samples showed a environmental level. {gamma}-radionuclides in water samples were not detected. but only radionuclide K-40, which is natural radionuclide, was detected in the all samples and Cs-137 was detected in the surface soil and discharge sediment. (author)

  11. Analysis on the status of the application of satellite remote sensing technology to nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tao Zhangsheng; Zhao Yingjun

    2008-01-01

    Based on the application status of satellite remote sensing technology to nuclear safeguards, advantage of satellite remote sensing technology is analyzed, main types of satellite image used in nuclear safeguards are elaborated and the main application of satellite images is regarded to detect, verify and monitor nuclear activities; verify additional protocol declaration and design information, support performing complementary access inspections; investigate alleged undeclared activities based on open source or the third party information. Application examples of satellite image in nuclear safeguards to analyze nuclear facilities by other countries, the ability of remote sensing technology in nuclear safeguards is discussed. (authors)

  12. Safeguards on nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

  13. Safeguarding the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

    1985-01-01

    Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

  14. Universal Authenticated Item Monitoring System (AIMS) second generation equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schoeneman, J.L.; Baumann, M.J.; Fox, L.J.; Jenkins, C.D.; Perlinsk, A.W.

    1992-01-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is in the final stages of developing a Universal Authenticated Item Monitoring System (AIMS). When completed, AIMS will provide applicable agencies in the US government, and those in the International arena, with a secure and convenient method of monitoring the physical status of selected items. The benefit derived from this development activity will be the commercial availability of an item monitoring system with the capability for ''quick set-up'' monitoring, as well as long-term unattended monitoring. The AIMS includes a variety of sensors, a robust and authenticated radio frequency (RF) communication link, a Receiver Processing Unit (RPU), and an inspector-friendly personal computer (PC) interface for collecting, sorting, viewing and archiving pertinent event histories. The system will provide the capability to monitor selected items in a real-time mode, a remotely interrogated mode, and a stand-alone, unattended data collection mode. The sensor suite under development includes advanced motion sensors, interior volumetric intrusion sensors, Re-usable, In-situ Verifiable Authenticated (RIVA) fiber-optic seal sensors, generic utility sensors (to accommodate contact closure inputs), and radiation and environmental sensors. A new generation authentication algorithm recently has been developed that provides a high degree of system security 121. The AIMS has potential safeguards applications in the areas of arms control and treaty verification military asset control, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom safeguards verification activities, as well as domestic nuclear safeguard activities. Commercial applications could include high-value inventory control and security systems. This paper describes the second-generation AIMS along with its recently expanded sensor suite and enhanced data collection capabilities

  15. REMOTE AREA RADIATION MONITORING (RARM) ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NELSON RL

    2008-01-01

    The Remote Area Radiation Monitoring (RARM) system will be used to provide real-time radiation monitoring information to the operations personnel during tank retrieval and transfer operations. The primary focus of the system is to detect potential anomalous (waste leaks) or transient radiological conditions. This system will provide mobile, real-time radiological monitoring, data logging, and status at pre-selected strategic points along the waste transfer route during tank retrieval operations. The system will provide early detection and response capabilities for the Retrieval and Closure Operations organization and Radiological Control personnel

  16. The regulations for delivery of subsidies to radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This rule is established under the provisions of the law for the proper execution of budgets of subsidies and the enforcement ordinance for this law, and to carry out these provisions. This rule is applied to the grant of subsidies for the expenses of installing and operating radiation monitoring equipment in the surrounding areas of atomic power generating facilities. Basic terms are defined, such as atomic power generating facilities, redevelopment works for radiation monitoring facilities, preliminary survey works for radiation monitoring, radiation monitoring works, place of business and expected date of beginning operation, etc. The Director General of the Science and Technology Agency delivers subsidies to appropriate for all or a part of expenses required for the redevelopment works for radiation monitoring facilities, preliminary survey works for radiation monitoring and radiation monitoring works. Subsidies are given to those prefectures, where atomic power generating facilities are established or expected to be established, or the prefectures in their neighborhood, and to each place of business as a unit. The term of grant is stipulated for each of these places of business. The amount of subsidies for one place of business ranges from 224.4 million yen for the whole period to 20 million yen for each fiscal year according to the kinds of business. Prefectures which intend to request the grant of subsidies shall file to the Director General specified application attaching operation plans and the general explanation of atomic power generating facilities. The decision and the conditions of delivery, the reports on operation and business results, etc. are defined, respectively. (Okada, K.)

  17. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a fuel reprocessing plant. Volume I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Augustson, R.H.; Barnes, J.W.

    1977-09-01

    A materials management system is described for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a fuel-reprocessing plant. Recently developed nondestructive-analysis techniques and process-monitoring devices are combined with conventional chemical analyses and process-control instrumentation for improved materials accounting data. Unit-process accounting based on dynamic material balances permits localization of diversion in time and space, and the application of advanced statistical methods supported by decision-analysis theory ensures optimum use of accounting information for detecting diversion. This coordinated safeguards system provides maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimum process interference. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to evaluate the sensitivity of the system to single and multiple thefts and to compare various safeguards options. The study identifies design criteria that would improve the safeguardability of future plants

  18. 1989 annual work report of the KFA Department for Safety and Radiation Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hille, R.; Frenkler, K.L.

    1990-03-01

    The Department for Safety and Radiation Protection continues to be responsible for coordinating radiation protection, safety and protection at the KFA. It supports the other institutes and departments in performing the safety tasks allotted to them. The principal tasks of the Department are in administrative and technical assistance to these organization units and in safeguards. Administrative assistance involves, for example, regulation of the radiation protection organization in the institutes, including the appointment of radiation protection officers (Strahlenschutzbeauftrage). Furthermore, this includes the central handling of the registration system with the authorities and dealing with outside firms thus considerably relieving the institutes of their administrative tasks. Handling licensing procedures and the central accountancy of radioactive materials is also to be mentioned in this context. Technical assistance largely consists of developing, maintaining and repairing radiation measuring instruments and in the monitoring of personnel by evaluating personnel dosimeters and incorporation controls for radioactive sources. The safeguards tasks of the Department concern the very staff-intensive physical protection, as well as environmental protection and industrial safety. (orig.) [de

  19. BAKNET - Communication network for radiation monitoring devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cohen, Y.; Wengrowicz, U.; Tirosh, D.; Barak, D.

    1997-01-01

    A system, based on a new concept of controlling and monitoring distributed radiation monitors, has been developed and approved at the NRCN. The system, named B AKNET Network , consists of a series of communication adapters connected to a main PC via an RS-485 communication network (see Fig. 1). The network's maximal length is 1200 meters and it enables connection of up to 128 adapters. The BAKNET adapters are designed to interface output signals of different types of stationary radiation monitors to a main PC. The BAKNET adapters' interface type includes: digital, analog, RS-232, and mixed output signals. This allows versatile interfacing of different stationary radiation monitors to the main computer. The connection to the main computer is via an RS-485 network, utilizing an identical communication protocol. The PC software, written in C ++ under MS-Windows, consists of two main programs. The first is the data collection program and the second is the Human Machine Interface (HMI). (authors)

  20. Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

  1. A suite of standards for radiation monitors and their revisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noda, Kimio

    1991-01-01

    A suite of standards for radiation monitors applied in nuclear facilities in Japan was compiled mainly by Health Physicists in Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development (PNC) and Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), and issued in 1971 as 'The Standard for Radiation Monitors'. PNC facilities such as Reprocessing Plant and Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility, as well as other nuclear industries have applied the standard, and contributed improvement of practical maintenability and availability of the radiation monitors. Meanwhile, the radiation monitors have remarkably progressed in its application and size of the monitors is growing. Furthermore, manufacturing techniques have significantly progressed especially in the field of system concepts and electronics elements. These progresses require revision of the standards. 'The Standard for Radiation Monitors' has been revised considering the problems in practical application and data processing capability. Considerations are given to keep compatibility of old and new modules. (author)

  2. Mobile environmental radiation monitoring station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Assido, H.; Shemesh, Y.; Mazor, T.; Tal, N.; Barak, D.

    1997-01-01

    A mobile environmental radiation monitoring station has been developed and established for the Israeli Ministry of Environment. The radiation monitoring station is ready for immediate placing in any required location, or can be operated from a vehicle. The station collects data Tom the detector and transfers it via cellular communication network to a Computerized Control Center for data storage, processing, and display . The mobile station is fully controlled from the. Routinely, the mobile station responses to the data request accumulated since the last communication session. In case of fault or alarm condition in the mobile station, a local claim is activated and immediately initiates communication with the via cellular communication network. (authors)

  3. Inventory of safeguards software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

    2009-03-01

    The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

  4. Workplace monitoring for radiation and contamination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Ionizing radiations cannot be seen, felt or sensed by the human body in any way but excessive exposure to them may have adverse health effects. In order to avoid excessive exposure, appropriate and efficient radiation measuring instruments are needed. This Module explains the basic terminology associated with such measuring instruments and describes the principal types, their construction and typical applications in the workplace. It is important to ensure not only that monitoring is carried out where there is a potential radiation exposure but also that the monitoring instrument is appropriate to the task and that the user places correct interpretations on the results obtained. The Manual will be of most benefit if it forms part of more comprehensive training or is supplemented by the advice of a qualified expert in radiation protection. Some of the instrument tests and calibrations described in this Module require the services of a qualified expert

  5. The regulations for delivery of subsidies to radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The regulations provide for subsidies for equipment and operation of a radiation monitoring facility around a nuclear power generating facility. Subsidies are provided to the prefectures concerned for equipment, etc. required in radiation monitoring, pre-service radiation monitoring and in-service radiation monitoring conducted by a prefecture. The contents are as follows: terms of subsidy allocations, the sum of subsidy allocations, applications for subsidies, decisions on the allocation of subsidies, withdrawal of applications, conditions of the allocations, a report on the work proceedings, a report on the results, confirmation on the sum of the subsidies, withdrawal of the decision for subsidies, limitations for disposal of the properties, payment of the subsidy, accounting of the subsidy operations, and a record on the subsidy. (Kubozono, M.)

  6. The regulations for delivery of subsidies to radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The regulations provide for subsidies for equipment and operation of a radiation monitoring facility around a nuclear power generating facility. Subsidies are provided to the prefectures concerned for equipment, etc. required in radiation monitoring, pre-service radiation monitoring and in-service radiation monitoring conducted by a prefecture. The contents are as follows: terms of subsidy allocations, the sum of subsidy allocations, applications for subsidies, decisions on the allocation of subsidies, withdrawal of applications, conditions of the allocations, a report on the work proceedings, a report on the results, confirmation on the sum of the subsidies, withdrawal of the decision for subsidies, limitations for disposal of the properties, payment of the subsidy, accounting of the subsidy operations, and a record on the subsidy. (Mori, K.)

  7. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE's Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL

  8. Radiation Monitoring System in Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    You, Gil Sung; Kook, D. H.; Choung, W. M.; Ku, J. H.; Cho, I. J.; You, G. S.; Kwon, K. C.; Lee, W. K.; Lee, E. P

    2006-09-15

    The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process is under development for effective management of spent fuel by converting UO{sub 2} into U-metal. For demonstration of this process, {alpha}-{gamma} type new hot cell was built in the IMEF basement . To secure against radiation hazard, this facility needs radiation monitoring system which will observe the entire operating area before the hot cell and service area at back of it. This system consists of 7 parts; Area Monitor for {gamma}-ray, Room Air Monitor for particulate and iodine in both area, Hot cell Monitor for hot cell inside high radiation and rear door interlock, Duct Monitor for particulate of outlet ventilation, Iodine Monitor for iodine of outlet duct, CCTV for watching workers and material movement, Server for management of whole monitoring system. After installation and test of this, radiation monitoring system will be expected to assist the successful ACP demonstration.

  9. Radiation Monitoring System in Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    You, Gil Sung; Kook, D. H.; Choung, W. M.; Ku, J. H.; Cho, I. J.; You, G. S.; Kwon, K. C.; Lee, W. K.; Lee, E. P.

    2006-09-01

    The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process is under development for effective management of spent fuel by converting UO 2 into U-metal. For demonstration of this process, α-γ type new hot cell was built in the IMEF basement . To secure against radiation hazard, this facility needs radiation monitoring system which will observe the entire operating area before the hot cell and service area at back of it. This system consists of 7 parts; Area Monitor for γ-ray, Room Air Monitor for particulate and iodine in both area, Hot cell Monitor for hot cell inside high radiation and rear door interlock, Duct Monitor for particulate of outlet ventilation, Iodine Monitor for iodine of outlet duct, CCTV for watching workers and material movement, Server for management of whole monitoring system. After installation and test of this, radiation monitoring system will be expected to assist the successful ACP demonstration

  10. Environmental radiation monitoring system with GPS (global positioning system)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Komoto, Itsuro

    2000-01-01

    This system combines a radiation monitoring car with GPS and a data processor (personal computer). It distributes the position information acquired through GPS to the data such as measured environmental radiation dose rate and energy spectrum. It also displays and edits the data for each measuring position on a map. Transmitting the data to the power station through mobile phone enables plan managers to easily monitor the environmental radiation dose rate nearby and proper emergency monitoring. (author)

  11. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  12. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  13. Coupling a Transient Solvent Extraction Module with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    de Almeida, Valmor F [ORNL; Birdwell Jr, Joseph F [ORNL; DePaoli, David W [ORNL; Gauld, Ian C [ORNL

    2009-10-01

    A past difficulty in safeguards design for reprocessing plants is that no code existed for analysis and evaluation of the design. A number of codes have been developed in the past, but many are dated, and no single code is able to cover all aspects of materials accountancy, process monitoring, and diversion scenario analysis. The purpose of this work was to integrate a transient solvent extraction simulation module developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the SSPM Separations and Safeguards Performance Model, developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The SSPM was designed for materials accountancy and process monitoring analyses, but previous versions of the code have included limited detail on the chemical processes, including chemical separations. The transient solvent extraction model is based on the ORNL SEPHIS code approach to consider solute build up in a bank of contactors in the PUREX process. Combined, these capabilities yield a much more robust transient separations and safeguards model for evaluating safeguards system design. This coupling and the initial results are presented. In addition, some observations toward further enhancement of separations and safeguards modeling based on this effort are provided, including: items to be addressed in integrating legacy codes, additional improvements needed for a fully functional solvent extraction module, and recommendations for future integration of other chemical process modules.

  14. IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    2005-01-01

    In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

  15. Evolution of safeguards systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-01-01

    Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

  16. Workplace monitoring for radiation and contamination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Ionizing radiations cannot be seen, felt or sensed by the human body in any way but excessive exposure to them may have adverse health effects. Radiation measuring instruments are needed in order to detect the presence of such radiations and avoid excessive exposure. The use of appropriate and efficient instruments enables exposures to be controlled and the doses received to be kept as low as reasonably achievable. This Manual explains the basic terminology associated with such measuring instruments and describes the principal types, their construction and typical applications in the workplace. It is important to ensure not only that monitoring is carried out where there is a potential radiation exposure but also that the monitoring instrument is appropriate to the task and that the user places correct interpretations on the results obtained. The Manual will be of most benefit if it forms part of more comprehensive training or is supplemented by the advice of a qualified expert in radiation protection. Some of the instrument tests and calibrations described in this Manual require the services of a qualified expert

  17. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-01-01

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  18. A quadrupole mass spectrometer system for nuclear safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, P.J.

    1987-12-01

    An on-line enrichment monitor for nuclear safeguards-related surveillance of a pilot-scale gas centrifuge plant is described. This monitor utilises a quadrupole mass spectrometer to measure the isotopic composition of UF 6 in the feed and product gas streams. Details of the design and construction are given, and several difficulties are identified and discussed. Finally, the performance of this system is illustrated with typical results

  19. Health and radiation: Surveillance and monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reitan, J.B.; Langmark, F.

    1988-01-01

    Assuming a zero risk of low-dose radiation would allow society to save a lot of resources currently used in radiation protection. If this assumption should turn out to be wrong, however, the society would face a serious cancer problem within 20-40 years. Thus, the present resources allocated to radiation protection seem justified from an ethical and moral point of view. Such radiation protection should also include monitoring of naturally enhanced radiation and possibilities of contamination, and ecological changes from energy production, waste deposition and fertilizing. The weaker parts of establishing the dose/effect relationship are radiation biology and radiation medicine. Therefore, continued research in these disciplines should be encouraged

  20. Radiation Monitoring - A Key Element in a Nuclear Power Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hussein, A.S.; El-dally, T.A.

    2008-01-01

    For a nuclear power plant, radiation is especially of great concern to the public and the environment. Therefore, a radiation monitoring program is becoming a critical importance. This program covers all phases of the nuclear plant including preoperational, normal operation, accident and decommissioning. The fundamental objective of radiation monitoring program is to ensure that the health and safety of public inside and around the plant and to confirm the radiation doses are below the dose limits for workers and the public. This paper summarizes the environmental radiation monitoring program for a nuclear power plant

  1. Environmental radiation monitoring from the decommission of TRIGA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi Geun Sik; Lee, Chang Woo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea)

    1999-02-01

    Environmental Radiation Monitoring was carried out with measurement of environment radiation and environment radioactivity analysis around TRIGA Research Reactor. The results of environmental radiation monitoring around TRIGA Research Reactor are the follows: The average level of environmental radiation dose measured by potable ERM and accumulated radiation dose by TLD was almost same level compared with the past years. Gross {beta} radioactivity in environmental samples showed a environmental level. v-radionuclides in water samples were not detected. But only radionuclide K-40, which is natural radionuclide, was detected in the all samples and Cs-137 was detected in the surface soil and discharge sediment. 37 refs., 12 figs., 31 tabs. (Author)

  2. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

    1976-01-01

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

  3. Radiation area monitor device and method

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vencelj, Matjaz; Stowe, Ashley C.; Petrovic, Toni; Morrell, Jonathan S.; Kosicek, Andrej

    2018-01-30

    A radiation area monitor device/method, utilizing: a radiation sensor; a rotating radiation shield disposed about the radiation sensor, wherein the rotating radiation shield defines one or more ports that are transparent to radiation; and a processor operable for analyzing and storing a radiation fingerprint acquired by the radiation sensor as the rotating radiation shield is rotated about the radiation sensor. Optionally, the radiation sensor includes a gamma and/or neutron radiation sensor. The device/method selectively operates in: a first supervised mode during which a baseline radiation fingerprint is acquired by the radiation sensor as the rotating radiation shield is rotated about the radiation sensor; and a second unsupervised mode during which a subsequent radiation fingerprint is acquired by the radiation sensor as the rotating radiation shield is rotated about the radiation sensor, wherein the subsequent radiation fingerprint is compared to the baseline radiation fingerprint and, if a predetermined difference threshold is exceeded, an alert is issued.

  4. RadNet (Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System)

    Data.gov (United States)

    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency — RadNet, formerly Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS), is a national network of monitoring stations that regularly collect air, precipitation,...

  5. Evaluation of the radiation monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    The Radiation Monitor is an information bulletin produced every three months by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and published in five local newspapers in the Durham Region of Ontario. The bulletin reports on the radiation doses to the public due to emissions from Pickering and Darlington nuclear generating stations. Comparative information on dose levels from other sources is also provided. To measure the communications effectiveness of the bulletin, the AECB contracted for a door-to-door survey of residents living near the two nuclear stations and within the circulation areas of the five local papers. The objectives of the survey were to measure the public's awareness of the existence of the Radiation Monitor, evaluate ease in understanding the information, assess the perceived usefulness of the bulletin, and assess the perceived accessibility of the AECB as an information source. The survey found that 61 per cent of adults had heard of the AECB, and 60 per cent of those correctly identified it as a regulator of the nuclear industry. Six per cent of the surveyed population had accurate unaided recall of the Radiation Monitor, while 26 per cent recognized the bulletin when shown a copy. Most respondents to the survey seemed content with the way technical details are presented in the bulletin, and 85 per cent of all persons interviewed found the information it contained to be useful. Thirty-six per cent said that it was very useful. For many, the bulletin was seen to put radiation in perspective and to reassure residents of the low risk. It was also judged by most to be factual and easy to understand. Suggestions for improvement focus largely on improving distribution. 14 tabs

  6. Evaluation of the radiation monitor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-05-01

    The Radiation Monitor is an information bulletin produced every three months by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and published in five local newspapers in the Durham Region of Ontario. The bulletin reports on the radiation doses to the public due to emissions from Pickering and Darlington nuclear generating stations. Comparative information on dose levels from other sources is also provided. To measure the communications effectiveness of the bulletin, the AECB contracted for a door-to-door survey of residents living near the two nuclear stations and within the circulation areas of the five local papers. The objectives of the survey were to measure the public`s awareness of the existence of the Radiation Monitor, evaluate ease in understanding the information, assess the perceived usefulness of the bulletin, and assess the perceived accessibility of the AECB as an information source. The survey found that 61 per cent of adults had heard of the AECB, and 60 per cent of those correctly identified it as a regulator of the nuclear industry. Six per cent of the surveyed population had accurate unaided recall of the Radiation Monitor, while 26 per cent recognized the bulletin when shown a copy. Most respondents to the survey seemed content with the way technical details are presented in the bulletin, and 85 per cent of all persons interviewed found the information it contained to be useful. Thirty-six per cent said that it was very useful. For many, the bulletin was seen to put radiation in perspective and to reassure residents of the low risk. It was also judged by most to be factual and easy to understand. Suggestions for improvement focus largely on improving distribution. 14 tabs.

  7. Environmental radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watanabe, Isao

    2011-01-01

    The samples, pretreatment method, and measurement methods of 'Environmental radioactivity level by prefecture' of Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Education (MEXT) is explained. It consists of 1), 'Environmental radioactivity level by prefecture' in normal period, 2) 'Strengthening of Monitoring of Environmental Radioactivity Level by Prefecture' of MEXT at emergency 3) strengthening of monitoring by Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, 4) radiation monitoring around the nuclear facility, 5) strengthening of monitoring by MEXT, and 6) quality of monitoring. The survey item and samples etc., of 'Environmental radioactivity level by prefecture', monitoring post, NaI (Tl) scintillation survey meter, sampling and pretreatment methods for radionuclide analysis in normal period, an example of germanium semiconductor detector, gamma ray spectrum of spaghetti from Italy by germanium semiconductor detector, flow chart of radionuclide analysis of fallout in normal period and emergency by germanium semiconductor detector, example of analytical method of radioactive strontium ( ion exchange method), outline of plutonium analytical method for emergency, sampling and pretreatment methods of radionuclides for strengthening, monitoring result around Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant from June 23 to 24, 2011, change of air dose rate of monitoring post in Mito city from March 14 to 26, 2011, concentration of I-131 and Cs-137 in fallout in Hitachinaka city from March 19 to April 30, 2011, and change of concentration of I-131, Cs-134 and Cs-137 in tap water of Iitate village from March 20 to April 30, 2011, are illustrated. (S.Y.)

  8. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

    1985-01-01

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is an on-line accountability system used by Rocky Flats Plant to provide accountability control of its nuclear material inventory. The system is also used to monitor and evaluate the use of the nuclear material inventory against programmatic objectives for materials management. The SAN system utilizes two Harris 800 Computers as central processing units. Enhancement plans are currently being formulated to provide automated data collection from process operations on the shop floor and from non-destructive analysis safeguards instrumentation. SAN, discussed in this paper, is an excellent system for basic accountability control of nuclear materials inventories and is a quite useful tool in evaluating the efficient use of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant

  9. Regulatory requirements and quality assurance of radiation monitoring instruments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Narasimharao, K.L.; Sharma, Ranjit

    2005-01-01

    The successful utilisation of radiation sources in the fields of medicine and industry requires the accurate measurement of activity, exposure rate and dose. Many varieties of instruments are in use for measurement of these parameters and new ones are being developed. The criteria for the design of the radiation monitoring instrument include the type and intensity of the radiation, purpose of measurement and ruggedness of the instrument. Quality and reliability of radiation monitoring instruments ensure that individuals are adequately protected. Accuracy, response time and ruggedness are required to be as per the approved/ prescribed guidelines. Regulatory authorities outline the design and performance criteria for radiation monitoring instruments and prescribe the recommendations of international agencies such as IAEA, ICRU and ISO for radiological measurement assurance programme. National Standards Laboratories all over the world prescribe procedures for calibration of various radiation monitoring instruments. The instruments should be calibrated as per these guidelines and should be traceable to national standards. The calibration traceable to national/ international standards and documentation as well as limits stipulated by the competent authority ensures the expected performance of the instrument. (author)

  10. The development of wireless radiation dose monitoring using smart phone

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jin Woo; Jeong, Gyo Seong; Lee, Yun Jong [Advanced Radiation Technology Institute, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Jeongeup (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Chong Yeal [Chonbuk National University, Jeonju (Korea, Republic of); Lim, Chai Wan [REMTECH, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-11-15

    Radiation workers at a nuclear facility or radiation working area should hold personal dosimeters. some types of dosimeters have functions to generate audible or visible alarms to radiation workers. However, such devices used in radiation fields these days have no functions to communicate with other equipment or the responsible personnel. our project aims at the development of a remote wireless radiation dose monitoring system that can be utilized to monitor the radiation dose for radiation workers and to notify the radiation protection manager of the dose information in real time. We use a commercial survey meter for personal radiation measurement and a smart phone for a mobile wireless communication tool and a Beacon for position detection of radiation workers using Blue tooth communication. In this report, the developed wireless dose monitoring of cellular phone is introduced.

  11. The Juno Radiation Monitoring (RM) Investigation

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Becker, H. N.; Alexander, J. W.; Adriani, A.

    2017-01-01

    The Radiation Monitoring Investigation of the Juno Mission will actively retrieve and analyze the noise signatures from penetrating radiation in the images of Juno’s star cameras and science instruments at Jupiter. The investigation’s objective is to profile Jupiter’s > 10-MeV electron environmen...

  12. Environmental radiation monitoring around the nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Chang Woo; Choi, Geun Sik and others

    2001-02-01

    Environmental Radiation Monitoring was carried out with measurement of environment. Radiation and environmental radioactivity analysis around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul Research Reactor. The results of environmental radiation monitoring around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul Research Reactor are the follows : The average level of environmental radiation dose measured by NaI scintillation counter and accumulated radiation dose by TLD was almost same level compared with the past years. Gross {alpha}, {beta} radioactivity in environmental samples showed a environmental level. {gamma}-radionuclides in water samples were not detected. But only radionuclide K-40, which is natural radionuclide, was detected in the all samples and Cs-137 was detected in the surface soil and discharge sediment. The average level of environmental radiation dose around Seoul Research Reactor was almost same level compared with the past years, and Be-7 and Cs-137 were detected in some surface soil and discharge sediment by {gamma}-spectrometry.

  13. Environmental radiation monitoring around the nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang Woo; Choi, Young Ho

    2000-02-01

    Environmental radiation monitoring was carried out with measurement of environment radiation and environmental radioactivity analysis around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul Research Reactor. The results of environmental radiation monitoring around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul Research Reactor are the follows: The average level of environmental radiation dose measured by NaI scintillation counter and accumulated radiation dose by TLD was almost some level compared with the past years. Gross α, β radioactivity in environmental samples showed a environmental level. γ-radionuclides in water sample were not detected. But only radionuclide K-40, which is natural radionuclide, was detected in the all samples and Cs-137 was detected in the surface soil and discharge sediment. The average level of environmental radiation dose around Seoul Research Reactor was almost same level compared with the past years, and Be-7 and Cs-137 were detected in some surface soil and discharge sediment by γ-spectrometry. (author)

  14. Environmental radiation monitoring around the nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Chang Woo; Choi, Young Ho

    2000-02-01

    Environmental radiation monitoring was carried out with measurement of environment radiation and environmental radioactivity analysis around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul Research Reactor. The results of environmental radiation monitoring around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul Research Reactor are the follows: The average level of environmental radiation dose measured by NaI scintillation counter and accumulated radiation dose by TLD was almost some level compared with the past years. Gross {alpha}, {beta} radioactivity in environmental samples showed a environmental level. {gamma}-radionuclides in water sample were not detected. But only radionuclide K-40, which is natural radionuclide, was detected in the all samples and Cs-137 was detected in the surface soil and discharge sediment. The average level of environmental radiation dose around Seoul Research Reactor was almost same level compared with the past years, and Be-7 and Cs-137 were detected in some surface soil and discharge sediment by {gamma}-spectrometry. (author)

  15. Environmental radiation monitoring around the nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Chang Woo; Choi, Young Ho; Lee, M.H. [and others

    1999-02-01

    Environmental radiation monitoring was carried out with measurement of environment radiation and environmental radioactivity analysis around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul research reactor. The results of environmental radiation monitoring around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul research reactor are the follows : The average level of environmental radiation dose measured by NaI scintillation counter and accumulated radiation dose by TLD was almost same level compared with the past years. Gross {alpha}, {beta} radioactivity in environmental samples showed a environmental level. {gamma}-radionuclides in water samples were not detected. But only radionuclide K-40, which is natural radionuclide, was detected in the all samples and Cs-137 was detected in the surface soil and discharge sediment. The average level of environmental radiation dose around Seoul research reactor was almost same level compared with the past years, and Be-7 and Cs-137 were detected in some surface soil and discharge sediment by {gamma}-spectrometry. (author). 3 refs., 50 tabs., 12 figs.

  16. Environmental radiation monitoring around the nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang Woo; Choi, Geun Sik and others

    2001-02-01

    Environmental Radiation Monitoring was carried out with measurement of environment. Radiation and environmental radioactivity analysis around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul Research Reactor. The results of environmental radiation monitoring around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul Research Reactor are the follows : The average level of environmental radiation dose measured by NaI scintillation counter and accumulated radiation dose by TLD was almost same level compared with the past years. Gross α, β radioactivity in environmental samples showed a environmental level. γ-radionuclides in water samples were not detected. But only radionuclide K-40, which is natural radionuclide, was detected in the all samples and Cs-137 was detected in the surface soil and discharge sediment. The average level of environmental radiation dose around Seoul Research Reactor was almost same level compared with the past years, and Be-7 and Cs-137 were detected in some surface soil and discharge sediment by γ-spectrometry

  17. Environmental radiation monitoring around the research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang Woo; Lee, Hyun Duk; Kim, Sam Rang; Choi, Yong Ho; Kim, Jeong Moo; Lee, Myeon Joo; Lee, Myeong Ho; Hong, Kwang Hee; Lim, Moon Ho; Lee, Won Yoon; Park, Do Won; Choi, Sang Do

    1993-04-01

    Environmental radiation monitoring was carried out measurement of environmental radiation and environmental radioactivity analysis around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul research reactor. The results of environmental radiation monitoring around KAERI nuclear facilities and Seoul research reactor are the follows : The average level of environmental radiation dose measured by NaI scintillation counter and accumulated radiation dose by TLD was almost same level compared with the past years. Gross α, β radioactivity in environmental sample was not found abnormal data. γ-radionuclides in water samples were not detected. But only radionuclide K-40, which is natural radionuclide, was detected in the all samples and Cs-137 was detected in the surface soil and discharge sediment. The average level of environmental radiation dose around Seoul research reactor was almost same level compared with the past years, and Be-7 and Cs-137 were detected in some surface soil and discharge sediment by γ-spectrometry. (Author)

  18. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

  19. Radiation monitoring program at nuclear scientific experimental and educational center - IRT-Sofia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mladenov, A.; Stankov, D.; Marinov, K.; Nonova, T.; Krezhov, K.

    2012-01-01

    Ensuring minimal risk of personnel exposure without exceeding the dose limits is the main task of the General Program for Radiation Monitoring of Nuclear Scientific Experimental and Education Centre (NSEEC) with research reactor IRT. Since 2006 the IRT-Sofia is equipped with a new and modern Radiation Monitoring System (RMS). All RMS detectors are connected to the server RAMSYS. They have online (real-time) visualization in two workstations with RAMVISION software. The RMS allows the implementation of technological and environmental monitoring at the nuclear facility site. Environmental monitoring with the RMS external system includes monitoring of dose rate; alpha and beta activity; radon activity; Po-218, Po-214, Po-212 activity; gamma control of vehicles. Technological control of reactor gases includes: Alpha beta particulate monitor; Iodine monitor; Noble gases monitor; Stack flow monitor. The General Program based on the radiation monitoring system allows real-time monitoring and control of radiation parameters in the controlled area and provides for a high level of radiation protection of IRT staff and users of its facilities. This paper presents the technical and functional parameters of the radiation monitoring system and radiation protection activities within the restricted zone in IRT facilities. (authors)

  20. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  1. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  2. Portable radiation monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Masui, Kaoru; Ishikura, Takeshi; Inui, Daisuke

    2007-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of typical portable radiation monitors and introduces Fuji Electric's latest models. The overview describes the types, uses and performance of ion chamber survey meters, GM survey meters and neutron ambient dose equivalent rate meters. Fuji Electric's new model of a wide-energy-range X/gamma ray survey meter which measures low energy X-rays up to 8 keV, a battery-powered environmental dosemeter system which measures dose history and is capable of continuous measurement with batteries over a year, and a portable monitoring post which measures dose rates from background to 10 8 nGy/h and transmits data by cellular phone are introduced, and their specifications and performance are described. (author)

  3. The problem of creation of radiation monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilipchak, S.I.

    1990-01-01

    The review of problem of radiation monitoring system (RMS) in the territory of the country is presented. Unsolved problems are discussed which are divided into three groups: the organization of structures in RMS; implementation of automated RMS; the solution of scientific problems of global monitoring of radiation situation. 12 refs.; 1 tab

  4. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1983-01-01

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  5. Safeguards Licensing Aspects of a Future Gen IV Test Facility - a Case Study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lindell, M. Aberg; Grape, S.; Hakansson, A.; Svaerd, S. Jacobsson

    2010-01-01

    The scope of this study covers safeguards licensing aspects of a possible future Gen IV demonstration facility. As a basis for the investigation, the facility was assumed to be located in Sweden, comprising a lead-cooled fast reactor and a reprocessing plant with fuel fabrication. The aim has been to identify safeguards requirements that may be set by the IAEA and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, and also to suggest how the safeguards system could be implemented in practice. The changed usage and handling of nuclear fuel, as compared to that of today, has been examined in order to determine how today's safeguards measures can be modified and extended to meet the needs of the demonstration facility. This work is part of GENIUS, the Swedish Gen IV research and development programme, which emphasizes lead-cooled fast reactors. (author)

  6. Technical implementation in support of the IAEA's remote monitoring field trial at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corbell, B.H.; Moran, B.W.; Pickett, C.A.; Whitaker, J.M.; Resnik, W.; Landreth, D.

    1996-01-01

    A remote monitoring system (RMS) field trial will be conducted for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on highly enriched uranium materials in a vault at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. Remote monitoring technologies are being evaluated to verify their capability to enhance the effectiveness and timeliness of IAEA safeguards in storage facilities while reducing the costs of inspections and burdens on the operator. Phase one of the field trial, which involved proving the satellite transmission of sensor data and safeguards images from a video camera activated by seals and motion sensors installed in the vault, was completed in September 1995. Phase two involves formal testing of the RMS as a tool for use by the IAEA during their tasks of monitoring the storage of nuclear material. The field trial to be completed during early 1997 includes access and item monitoring of nuclear materials in two storage trays. The RMS includes a variety of Sandia, Oak Ridge, and Aquila sensor technologies that provide video monitoring, radiation attribute measurements, and container identification to the on-site data acquisition system (DAS) by way of radio-frequency and Echelon LONWorks networks. The accumulated safeguards information will be transmitted to the IAEA via satellite (COMSAT/RSI) and international telephone lines

  7. New technologies for monitoring nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    1993-01-01

    This paper describes new technologies for monitoring the continued presence of nuclear materials that are being evaluated in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to reduce the effort, cost, and employee exposures associated with conducting nuclear material inventories. These technologies also show promise for the international safeguarding of process systems and nuclear materials in storage, including spent fuels. The identified systems are based on innovative technologies that were not developed for safeguards applications. These advanced technologies include passive and active sensor systems based on optical materials, inexpensive solid-state radiation detectors, dimensional surface characterization, and digital color imagery. The passive sensor systems use specialized scintillator materials coupled to optical-fiber technologies that not only are capable of measuring radioactive emissions but also are capable of measuring or monitoring pressure, weight, temperature, and source location. Small, durable solid-state gamma-ray detection devices, whose components are estimated to cost less than $25 per unit, can be implemented in a variety of configurations and can be adapted to enhance existing monitoring systems. Variations in detector design have produced significantly different system capabilities. Dimensional surface characterization and digital color imaging are applications of developed technologies that are capable of motion detection, item surveillance, and unique identification of items

  8. Distributed Radiation Monitoring System for Linear Accelerators based on CAN Bus

    CERN Document Server

    Kozak, T; Napieralski, A

    2010-01-01

    Abstract—Gamma and neutron radiation is produced during the normal operation of linear accelerators like Free-Electron Laser in Hamburg (FLASH) or X-ray Free Electron Laser (X-FEL). Gamma radiation cause general degeneration of electronics devices and neutron fluence can be a reason of soft error in memories and microcontrollers. X-FEL accelerator will be built only in one tunnel, therefore most of electronic control systems will be placed in radiation environment. Exposing control systems to radiation may lead to many errors and unexpected failure of the whole accelerator system. Thus, the radiation monitoring system able to monitor radiation doses produced near controlling systems is crucial. Knowledge of produced radiation doses allows to detect errors caused by radiation, make plans of essential exchange of control systems and prevent accelerator from serious damages. The paper presents the project of radiation monitoring system able to monitor radiation environment in real time.

  9. The Canadian Safeguards Support Program - A future outlook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keeffe, R.; Truong, Q.S. Bob

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Canadian Safeguards Support Program (CSSP) is one of the first safeguards support programs with an overall objective to assist the IAEA by providing technical assistance and other resources and by developing equipment to improve the effectiveness of international safeguards. This paper provides a brief discussion of the evolution of the CSSP, from the beginning when the program was under joint management between the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a Canadian crown corporation, until recent years when the AECB became responsible for all projects and financial management. Recently, new legislation came into force and the AECB became the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). However, the mandate and management of the CSSP under the CNSC remain fundamentally unchanged. Major CSSP activities are devoted to the following areas: (a) Human resource assistance through the provision of cost-free experts (CFEs) to the IAEA; (b) Training of IAEA inspectors and facility operators, development of training resources and integrated approaches for training; (c) System studies, e.g. the development of integrated safeguards approach for CANDU reactors, geological repository, and physical model; (d) Equipment development, e.g. the VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor, Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device, seals, remote monitoring, encryption and authentication; (e) Information technology which includes satellite imagery, Geographical Information System (GIS), and position tracking of spent fuel containers. The CSSP has continued to evolve during the past 25 years. Although formerly larger the CSSP budget has settled to a stable level of just slightly above (Canadian) $2M. Leveraging of the CSSP budget through collaborations with several Member State Support Programs and Canadian government departments has provided mutual benefits for all parties involved and useful results that have been put into practical use by the IAEA. (author)

  10. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  11. Calibration method of radiation monitoring system at TQNPC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Zhengshan; Zhang Qingli; Liu Jinjin; Miao Yuxing; Geng Lixin; Zhuang Yun; Dong Jianfeng; He Change

    2009-04-01

    The calibration methods and calibration device for standard monitor of radioactive particulate, iodine, noble gas and so on are not yet set up at home. On consideration of the present situation of the radiation monitoring system at the Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Co. Ltd., we have studied the calibration method of these radiation monitoring instruments used for measuring the waste liquid, particulate, iodine and noble gas produced during the operation of nuclear reactor. Through the check against these instruments during the No. 202 and No. 103 overhaul, we got initially the method of the calibration and obtained the transfer coefficient of calibration when secondary solid sources are used for calibration. Through the testing and calibration, the credibility of the radiation monitoring system is enhanced. And at the same time, the problems existing in the calibration are discussed. (authors)

  12. Radiation monitoring in interventional cardiology: a requirement

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rivera, T.; Uruchurtu, E. S.

    2017-01-01

    The increasing of procedures using fluoroscopy in interventional cardiology procedures may increase medical and patients to levels of radiation that manifest in unintended outcomes. Such outcomes may include skin injury and cancer. The cardiologists and other staff members in interventional cardiology are usually working close to the area under examination and they receive the dose primarily from scattered radiation from the patient. Mexico does not have a formal policy for monitoring and recording the radiation dose delivered in hemodynamic establishments. Deterministic risk management can be improved by monitoring the radiation delivered from X-ray devices. The objective of this paper is to provide cardiologist, techniques, nurses, and all medical staff an information on DR levels, about X-ray risks and a simple a reliable method to control cumulative dose.

  13. Implementation of Safeguards for Romania National LOFs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popovici, I.

    2015-01-01

    The safe deployment of nuclear activities in Romania is provided by Law no. 111/1996. The Law was republished based on the provisions of Article II of Law no. 63/2006 for the amendment and addition and was modified and completed by the Law no. 378/2013. The competent national authority in the nuclear field, which has responsibilities of regulation, authorization and control as stipulated in this Law, is the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). According to art. 2c), provisions of the Nuclear Law shall apply to production, sitting and construction, supply, leasing, transfer, handling, possession, processing, treatment, use, temporary storage or final disposal, transport, transit, import and export of radiological installations, nuclear and radioactive materials, including nuclear fuel, radioactive waste and ionizing radiation generating devices. With regards to the small holders of nuclear materials, the Romanian legislation takes into account the following safeguards objectives: · Establishing provisions governing the possession, use, transfer, import and export of nuclear materials; · Ensuring the implementation of the safeguards system for accountancy and control of nuclear materials: · Ensuring that all nuclear materials are reported under the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement; · Ensuring that all nuclear activities are declared under the provisions of the Additional Protocol; · Developing and implementing nuclear material accounting and control procedures at all small holders of nuclear materials; · Ensuring training for safeguards staff at all small holders. Based on the provision of Law no. 111/1996 CNCAN has issued a Guidelines for applying of the safeguards by the small holders of nuclear materials from Romania. The guidelines provide specific regulations regarding the movement of the nuclear materials, the accountancy and control of nuclear materials, the containment and surveillance systems for small holders of nuclear

  14. IAEA Safeguards: Cost/benefit analysis of commercial satellite imagery

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, Christer

    1999-03-01

    A major milestone in the efforts to strengthen the Safeguards System was reached in May 1997 when the Board of Governors approved a 'Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements'. The Protocol provides the legal basis necessary to enhance the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities by using information available from open sources to complement the declarations made by Member States. Commercially available high-resolution satellite data has emerged as one potential complementary open information source to support the traditional and extended Safeguard activities of IAEA. This document constitutes a first report from SSC Satellitbild giving the Agency tentative and initial estimates of the potential cost and time-savings possible with the new proposed technology. The initial cost/benefit simulation will be further finalised in the following 'Implementation Blueprint' study. The general foundation and starting point for the cost/benefit calculation is to simulate a new efficient and relatively small 'imagery unit' within the IAEA, capable of performing advanced image processing as a tool for various safeguards tasks. The image processing capacity is suggested to be task- and interpretation-oriented. The study was performed over a period of 1,5 weeks in late 1998, and is based upon interviews of IAEA staff, reviews of existing IAEA documentation as well as from SSC Satellitbild's long-standing experience of satellite imagery and field missions. The cost/benefit analysis is based on a spreadsheet simulation of five potential applications of commercial satellite imagery: Reference information; Confirmation of Agency acquired and Member State supplied data; Change detection and on-going monitoring; Assessing open source information available to the Agency; Detecting undeclared activities and undeclared sites. The study confirms that the proposed concept of a relatively small 'imagery unit' using high-resolution data will be a sound and

  15. Radiation monitoring system for astronauts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomson, I.; MacKay, G.; Ng, A.; Tomi, L.

    1996-01-01

    Astronauts in space are constantly under the bombardment of radiation particles from trapped electrons, and trapped proton. In addition, cosmic rays, while penetrating the spacecraft shell, generate secondary radiation of neutrons. As astronauts' stay in space is getting longer, the need for a real-time radiation monitoring device has become critical. Thermoluminescent dosemeter (TLD), used onboard both the MIR and the Space Transportation System (STS), cannot provide real-time dose reading. This paper describes a real-time direct read-out device, currently under development, which can measure skin, eye, and Blood Forming Organ (BFO) doses separately. (author)

  16. Implementation of safeguards at modular vault dry store at Paks NPP in Hungary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Safar, J.; Czoch, I.; Szoellosi, E.F.; Janov, J.; Sannie, G.; Daniel, G.; Szabo, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A safeguards system has been implemented at the GEC-Alsthom designed Modular Vault Dry Store at Paks NPP in Hungary without previous safeguards related experience for this type of spent fuel storage. C/S measures and sealing have primary importance. In addition. spent fuel attribute signatures are detected by a fuel transfer monitor at the cask load/unload port. These are complemented with the corresponding accounting measures. (author)

  17. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Bowersox, D.F.

    1977-09-01

    The conceptual design of a materials management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility is developed and evaluated. Dynamic material balances are drawn from information provided by nondestructive-analysis techniques, process-control instrumentation, and conventional chemical analyses augmented by process-monitoring devices. Powerful statistical methods, cast in the framework of decision analysis and applied to unit-process accounting areas, ensure adequate spatial and temporal quantification of possible diversion with minimal process disruption. Modeling and simulation techniques assist in evaluating the sensitivity of the system to various diversion schemes and in comparing safeguards strategies. Features that would improve the safeguardability of the conversion process are discussed

  18. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

  19. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  20. International Atomic Energy agency use of facility calorimeters for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mcrae, L.P.

    1996-01-01

    The IAEA is performing nuclear materials safeguards on an inventory of pure and scrap plutonium oxide powder materials held in Vault 3 of the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site,Washington State. The IAEA uses qualitative and quantitative techniques (weighing, sampling, and destructive analyses) to verify the presence and quantity of the nuclear materials under safeguards. In contrast, the plant operator generally uses non-destructive plutonium assay based on gamma spectrometry and calorimetry for its most accurate plutonium powder container measurements. Recent results have shown that the operator's calorimeter system achieves measurement variabilities comparable with, or better than, the destructive analyses, particularly for scrap. The results are achieved more quickly and economically,with less waste and lower radiation exposure and contamination hazard, by calorimetry than by classical destructive analyses.Techniques, including authentication methods, are being jointly developed to permit use of the operator's calorimeter system for international safeguards purposes. The authentication is to ensure the independence of, and to substantiate the validity of,calorimeter measurements for international safeguards. The authentication methods considered and being developed are discussed

  1. New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwanaga, Masayuki

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

  2. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  3. Development of multimedia computer-based training for VXI integrated fuel monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keeffe, R.; Ellacott, T.; Truong, Q.S.

    1999-01-01

    The Canadian Safeguards Support Program has developed the VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor (VFIM) which is based on the international VXI instrument bus standard. This equipment is a generic radiation monitor which can be used in an integrated mode where several detection systems can be connected to a common system where information is collected, displayed, and analyzed via a virtual control panel with the aid of computers, trackball and computer monitor. The equipment can also be used in an autonomous mode as a portable radiation monitor with a very low power consumption. The equipment has been described at previous international symposia. Integration of several monitoring systems (bundle counter, core discharge monitor, and yes/no monitor) has been carried out at Wolsong 2. Performance results from one of the monitoring systems which was installed at CANDU nuclear stations are discussed in a companion paper at this symposium. This paper describes the development of an effective multimedia computer-based training package for the primary users of the equipment; namely IAEA inspectors and technicians. (author)

  4. Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

    1991-01-01

    Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

  5. Update on the independent radiation monitor (IRM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kroening, P.M.; Mucha, R.

    1976-01-01

    The new independent radiation monitor (IRM), unlike its predecessor, is a reliable and sensitive safety device for any radiation therapy room. It shows unequivocally that the beam is on, and it is inexpensive and simple to construct

  6. Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mendez, Carmen Margarita; Rochau, Gary Eugene; Cleary, Virginia D.

    2008-01-01

    The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework

  7. Coordination of Croatian National Legislative with EU Commission Regulation on the Application of Euratom Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilijas, B.; Medakovic, S.

    2012-01-01

    Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in the view of increasing quantities of nuclear materials produced, used, carried and recycled in the Community, and also development of trade in these materials, especially in the scope of the successive enlargements of the EU, it is essential to ensure effectiveness of safeguards. Commission Regulation on the application of Euratom safeguards of 8 February 2005 is a comprehensive regulation dealing with basic technical characteristics and particular safeguard provisions of installations for the production, separation, reprocessing, storage or other use of source material or special fissile material, as well as nuclear material accountancy, transfer between states and some specific provisions. Croatia signed the 'Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)' and a few years later 'Protocol Additional' to this Agreement that stipulates strict obligations of the Republic of Croatia under Safeguards in connection with NPT. Also, in Croatia is on power 'Act on Radiological and Nuclear Safety' which, beside others, establishes measures for ensuring the safe performance of practices involving ionising radiation sources, nuclear activities, radioactive waste disposal and the physical protection of ionising radiation sources and nuclear facilities. But on power is also 'Ordinance on control of the nuclear materials and special equipment' which refers to an old 'Act on nuclear safety', and also takes into account provisions of the NPT and 'Protocol Additional' regarding safeguards. A new ordinance should be promulgated in accordance with new act. As a new act also should be corrected before Croatia joins EU, an extensive job must be done in adjusting Croatian national legislative to Euratom safeguards.(author).

  8. New developments in radiation protection instrumentation via active electronic methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Umbarger, C.J.

    1981-01-01

    New developments in electronics and radiation detectors are improving on real-time data acquisition of radiation exposure and contamination conditions. Recent developments in low power circuit designs, hybrid and integrated circuits, and microcomputers have all contributed to smaller and lighter radiation detection instruments that are, at the same time, more sensitive and provide more information (e.g., radioisotope identification) than previous devices. New developments in radiation detectors, such as cadmium telluride, gas scintillation proportional counters, and imaging counters (both charged particle and photon) promise higher sensitivities and expanded uses over present instruments. These developments are being applied in such areas as health physics, waste management, environmental monitoring, in vivo measurements, and nuclear safeguards

  9. IAEA monitoring field trials workshop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ross, H.H.; Cooley, J.N.; Belew, W.L.

    1995-01-01

    Recent safeguards inspections in Iraq and elsewhere by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have led to the supposition that environmental monitoring can aid in verifying declared and in detecting undeclared nuclear activities or operations. This assumption was most recently examined by the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), in their reports to the IAEA Board of Governors. In their reports, SAGSI suggested that further assessment and development of environmental monitoring would be needed to fully evaluate its potential application to enhanced IAEA safeguards. Such an inquiry became part of the IAEA ''Programme 93+2'' assessment of measures to enhance IAEA safeguards. In March, 1994, the International Safeguards Group at Oak Ridge hosted an environmental monitoring field trial workshop for IAEA inspectors to train them in the techniques needed for effective environmental sampling. The workshop included both classroom lectures and actual field sampling exercises. The workshop was designed to emphasize the analytical infrastructure needed for an environmental program, practical sampling methods, and suggested procedures for properly planning a sampling campaign. Detailed techniques for swipe, vegetation, soil, biota, and water associated sampling were covered. The overall approach to the workshop, and observed results, are described

  10. Programmes and Systems for Source and Environmental Radiation Monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The discharge of radionuclides to the atmosphere and aquatic environments is a legitimate practice in the nuclear and other industries, hospitals and research. Where appropriate, monitoring of the discharges and of relevant environmental media is an essential regulatory requirement in order to ensure appropriate radiation protection of the public. Such monitoring provides information on the actual amounts of radioactive material discharged and the radionuclide concentrations in the environment, and is needed to demonstrate compliance with authorized limits, to assess the radiation exposure of members of the public and to provide data to aid in the optimization of radiation protection. Uncontrolled releases of radionuclides to the atmosphere and aquatic environments may occur as a result of a nuclear or radiological accident. Again, monitoring at the source of the release and of the environment is necessary. In this case, monitoring is used both to assess the radiation exposure of members of the public and to determine the actions necessary for public protection, including longer term countermeasures. Source and environmental monitoring associated with the release of radionuclides to the environment is the subject of a number of IAEA Safety Standards, particularly IAEA Safety Standard RS-G-1.8 (Environmental and Source Monitoring for Purposes of Radiation Protection). This publication is intended to complement this Safety Guide and, by so doing, replaces Safety Series No. 41 (Objectives and Design of Environmental Monitoring Programmes for Radioactive Contaminants) and Safety Series No. 46 (Monitoring of Airborne and Liquid Radioactive Releases from Nuclear Facilities to the Environment). Like Safety Standard RS-G-1.8, this Safety Report deals with monitoring at the source and in the environment associated with authorized releases of radionuclides to the environment. It also deals with the general issues of emergency monitoring during and in the aftermath of an

  11. Offsite environmental monitoring report: Radiation monitoring around United States nuclear test areas, calendar year 1991

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaloud, D.J.; Dicey, B.B.; Mullen, A.A.; Neale, A.C.; Sparks, A.R.; Fontana, C.A.; Carroll, L.D.; Phillips, W.G.; Smith, D.D.; Thome, D.J.

    1992-01-01

    This report describes the Offsite Radiation Safety Program conducted during 1991 by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory-Las Vegas. This laboratory operates an environmental radiation monitoring program in the region surrounding the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and at former test sites in Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico. The surveillance program is designed to measure levels and trends of radioactivity, if present, in the environment surrounding testing areas to ascertain whether current radiation levels and associated doses to the general public are in compliance with existing radiation protection standards. The surveillance program additionally has the responsibility to take action to protect the health and well being of the public in the event of any accidental release of radioactive contaminants. Offsite levels of radiation and radioactivity are assessed by sampling milk, water, and air; by deploying thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and using pressurized ion chambers (PICs); and by biological monitoring of animals, food crops, and humans. Personnel with mobile monitoring equipment are placed in areas downwind from the test site prior to each nuclear weapons test to implement protective actions, provide immediate radiation monitoring, and obtain environmental samples rapidly after any occurrence of radioactivity release. Comparison of the measurements and sample analysis results with background levels and with appropriate standards and regulations indicated that there was no radioactivity detected offsite by the various EPA monitoring networks and no exposure above natural background to the population living in the vicinity of the NTS that could be attributed to current NTS activities. Annual and long-term trends were evaluated in the Noble Gas, Tritium, Milk Surveillance, Biomonitoring, TLD, PIC networks, and the Long-Term Hydrological Monitoring Program

  12. Modification of GNPS environment radiation monitoring network system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jiang Lili; Cao Chunsheng

    1999-01-01

    GNPS Environment Radiation Continuous Monitoring System (KRS), the only real time on-line system of site radiation monitoring, was put into service in 1993 prior to the first loading the the plant. It is revealed through several years of operation that this system has some deficiencies such as inadequate real time monitoring means, no figure and diagram display function on the central computer, high failures, frequent failure warning signals, thus making the availability of the system at a low level. In recent years, with the rapid development of computer network technology and increasingly strict requirements on the NPP environment protection raised by the government and public, KRS modification had become necessary and urgent. In 1996, GNPS carried out modification work on the measuring geometry condition of γ radiation monitoring sub-station and lightening protection. To enhance the functions of real time monitoring and data auto-processing, further modification of the system was made in 1998, including the update of the software and hardware of KRS central processor, set-up of system computer local network and database. In this way, the system availability and monitoring quality are greatly improved and effective monitoring and analysis means are provided for gaseous release during normal operation and under accident condition

  13. IAEA safeguards assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

    1981-01-01

    This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

  14. Quality assurance of radiation protection monitoring instruments in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tripathi, S.M.; Daniel, Liji; Rao, Suresh; Sharma, D.N.

    2008-01-01

    Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) is the National Metrology Institute (NMI) for developing, maintaining and disseminating standards for ionizing radiation in India. Radiation Safety Systems Division (RSSD) of BARC has the requisite infrastructure in the form of experts, trained manpower, laboratories, equipment and facilities for providing calibration services to users and ascertaining traceability to international standards. It periodically participates in various international inter-comparisons. RSSD maintains reference radiation fields that are required for calibrating Radiation Protection Monitoring Instruments that form the backbone of the radiation monitoring programme for harnessing the benefits of nuclear energy and ionizing radiations. These instruments are type-tested and periodically calibrated at standard reference radiation fields to ensure their healthy working condition and fitness for their intended use. This paper describes the details of the standardization procedures adopted for reference radiation fields and infrastructure established and maintained at RSSD, BARC in accordance with the recommendations of ISO-4037. The paper describes the various tests that are carried out for radiation protection monitoring instrument to study the variation of the calibration factor with influencing quantities like linearity of response, energy response, angular dependence and overload characteristics. The results of these tests for typical instruments are also discussed. The present work also describes various types of indigenously developed radiation protection monitoring instruments and their performance characteristics. Adaptability of these instruments for the implementation of operational quantities are discussed briefly. It also dwells on the IAEA Quality Audit for radiation protection level calibrations, which RSSD has been participating since 2001. Our results of the quality audit are well within the acceptance limit (±7%) set by IAEA for the

  15. Safeguards as an evolutionary system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1998-01-01

    NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

  16. Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR and PP case study results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boyer, Brian D.

    2009-01-01

    The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design

  17. Ultra Secure High Reliability Wireless Radiation Monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cordaro, J.; Shull, D.; Farrar, M.; Reeves, G.

    2011-01-01

    Radiation monitoring in nuclear facilities is essential to safe operation of the equipment as well as protecting personnel. In specific, typical air monitoring of radioactive gases or particulate involves complex systems of valves, pumps, piping and electronics. The challenge is to measure a representative sample in areas that are radioactively contaminated. Running cables and piping to these locations is very expensive due to the containment requirements. Penetration into and out of an airborne or containment area is complex and costly. The process rooms are built with thick rebar-enforced concrete walls with glove box containment chambers inside. Figure 1 shows high temperature radiation resistance cabling entering the top of a typical glove box. In some case, the entire processing area must be contained in a 'hot cell' where the only access into the chamber is via manipulators. An example is shown in Figure 2. A short range wireless network provides an ideal communication link for transmitting the data from the radiation sensor to a 'clean area', or area absent of any radiation fields or radioactive contamination. Radiation monitoring systems that protect personnel and equipment must meet stringent codes and standards due to the consequences of failure. At first glance a wired system would seem more desirable. Concerns with wireless communication include latency, jamming, spoofing, man in the middle attacks, and hacking. The Department of Energy's Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has developed a prototype wireless radiation air monitoring system that address many of the concerns with wireless and allows quick deployment in radiation and contamination areas. It is stand alone and only requires a standard 120 VAC, 60 Hz power source. It is designed to be mounted or portable. The wireless link uses a National Security Agency (NSA) Suite B compliant wireless network from Fortress Technologies that is considered robust enough to be used for classified data

  18. ULTRA SECURE HIGH RELIABILITY WIRELESS RADIATION MONITOR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cordaro, J.; Shull, D.; Farrar, M.; Reeves, G.

    2011-08-03

    Radiation monitoring in nuclear facilities is essential to safe operation of the equipment as well as protecting personnel. In specific, typical air monitoring of radioactive gases or particulate involves complex systems of valves, pumps, piping and electronics. The challenge is to measure a representative sample in areas that are radioactively contaminated. Running cables and piping to these locations is very expensive due to the containment requirements. Penetration into and out of an airborne or containment area is complex and costly. The process rooms are built with thick rebar-enforced concrete walls with glove box containment chambers inside. Figure 1 shows high temperature radiation resistance cabling entering the top of a typical glove box. In some case, the entire processing area must be contained in a 'hot cell' where the only access into the chamber is via manipulators. An example is shown in Figure 2. A short range wireless network provides an ideal communication link for transmitting the data from the radiation sensor to a 'clean area', or area absent of any radiation fields or radioactive contamination. Radiation monitoring systems that protect personnel and equipment must meet stringent codes and standards due to the consequences of failure. At first glance a wired system would seem more desirable. Concerns with wireless communication include latency, jamming, spoofing, man in the middle attacks, and hacking. The Department of Energy's Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has developed a prototype wireless radiation air monitoring system that address many of the concerns with wireless and allows quick deployment in radiation and contamination areas. It is stand alone and only requires a standard 120 VAC, 60 Hz power source. It is designed to be mounted or portable. The wireless link uses a National Security Agency (NSA) Suite B compliant wireless network from Fortress Technologies that is considered robust enough to be

  19. Radiation monitoring policy at the advanced light source

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donahue, R.; Heinzelman, K.; Perdue, G.

    1998-01-01

    When the accelerator first began operation it was decided that, until we had the necessary dosimetry data to decide otherwise, we would badge the entire worker and experimental population. Each person was issued a dosimetry badge that contained 4 TLD elements. Badges were processed on a monthly basis. After three years of analyzing a total of 65,000 TLD elements, the decision was made to modify the radiation monitoring policy at the ALS. Only those individuals in the workforce that have any potential for exposure, no matter how small, would be badged. Subsequently, DOE conducted an independent review of the ALS radiation monitoring and dosimetry program. This review concluded that the ALS program, if expanded as proposed, would be adequate under the 10 CFR 835 Rule to establish radiation exposures to an acceptable level of confidence. The review team recommended the ALS provide more comprehensive documentation on the basis for its radiation protection and monitoring program. This document describes the technical justification for that program

  20. Nuclear Research Centre Juelich. 1986 annual work report of the Department for Safety and Radiation Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hille, R.; Frenkler, K.L.

    1986-02-01

    The Department for Safety and Radiation Protection continues to be responsible for coordinating radiation protection, safety and protection at the KFA. It supports the other institutes and departments in performing the safety tasks allotted to them. The principal tasks of the Department are in administrative and technical assistance to these organization units and in safeguards. Administrative assistance involves, for example, regulation of the radiation protection organization in the institutes, including the appointment of radiation protection officers (Strahlenschutzbeauftragte). Furthermore, this includes the central handling of the registration system with the authorities and dealing with outside firms thus considerably relieving the institutes of their administrative tasks. Handling licensing procedures and the central accountancy of radioactive materials is also to be mentioned in this context. Technical assistance largely consists of developing, maintaining and repairing radiation measuring instruments and in the monitoring of personnel by evaluating personnel dosimeters and incorporation controls for radioactive sources. The safeguards tasks of the Department concern the very staff-intensive physical protection, as well as environmental protection and industrial safety. (orig./HP) [de

  1. Nuclear Research Centre Juelich. 1987 annual work report of the Department for Safety and Radiation Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hille, R.

    1988-03-01

    The Department for Safety and Radiation Protection continues to be responsible for coordinating radiation protection, safety and protection at the KFA. It supports the other institutes and departments in performing the safety tasks allotted to them. The principal tasks of the Department are in administrative and technical assistance to these organization units and in safeguards. Administrative assistance involves, for example, regulation of the radiation protection organization in the institutes, including the appointment of radiation protection officers (Strahlenschutzbeauftragte). Furthermore, this includes the central handling of the registration system with the authorities and dealing with outside firms thus considerably relieving the institutes of their administrative tasks. Handling licensing procedures and the central accountancy of radioactive materials is also to be mentioned in this context. Technical assistance largely consists of developing, maintaining and repairing radiation measuring instruments and in the monitoring of personnel by evaluating personnel dosimeters and incorporation controls for radioactive sources. The safeguards tasks of the Department concern the very staff-intensive physical protection, as well as environmental protection and industrial safety. (orig./HP) [de

  2. Radiation monitoring instrumentation for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bharath Kumar, M.

    2013-01-01

    Measurement of nucleonic signals is required to control and operate the reactor in a safe and reliable manner. To achieve this, parameters like Neutron flux, other radiation fields, contamination levels, source strength, release thru stack etc. are required to be monitored and controlled. The above are required to be monitored throughout the life of the reactor whether it is operational or in shutdown condition. In addition such monitoring is also required during decommissioning phase of the reactor as needed. To measure these parameters a large number of instruments are used in Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) which includes sensors and electronics for detecting alpha, beta, gamma and neutron radiation with qualification to withstand harsh environment

  3. Nuclear energy - Radioprotection - Procedure for radiation protection monitoring in nuclear installations for external exposure to weakly penetrating radiation, especially to beta radiation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This International Standard specifies a procedure for radiation protection monitoring in nuclear installations for external exposure to weakly penetrating radiation, especially to beta radiation and describes the procedure in radiation protection monitoring for external exposure to weakly penetrating radiation in nuclear installations. This radiation comprises β - radiation, β + radiation and conversion electron radiation as well as photon radiation with energies below 15 keV. This International Standard describes the procedure in radiation protection planning and monitoring as well as the measurement and analysis to be applied. It applies to regular nuclear power plant operation including maintenance, waste handling and decommissioning. The recommendations of this International Standard may also be transferred to other nuclear fields including reprocessing, if the area-specific issues are considered. This International Standard may also be applied to radiation protection at accelerator facilities and in nuclear medicine, biology and research facilities

  4. Intercomparisons in the radiation monitoring network of the Czech Republic

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tuckova, S; Malatova, I [National Radiation Protection Inst., Prague (Czech Republic); Drabova, D [State Office for Nuclear Safety, Prague (Czech Republic)

    1996-12-31

    In Czech Republic, altogether 11 laboratories, equipped by semiconductor gamma spectrometry supply regularly to the Centre of Radiation Monitoring Network the measured data about the radionuclide activity concentration in different environmental samples, participating thus in monitoring of radiation situation in the country. The Center of Radiation Monitoring Network of Czech Republic periodically organizes through its reference laboratories interlaboratory comparison tests ensuring thus quality of the measurements within the radiation monitoring network. A ring intercomparison test was organized in 1994. The piece of steel rather highly contaminated by {sup 60}Co was used. In the intercomparison test 1994-1995 of pulverized concrete breeze-block containing fly ash with natural radionuclides were used. Results of this measurement is given as an example (authors).

  5. Radiation monitoring of PET staff

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trang, A.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: Positron emission tomography (PET) is becoming a common diagnostic tool in hospitals, often located in and employing staff from the Nuclear Medicine or Radiology departments. Although similar in some ways, staff in PET departments are commonly found to have the highest radiation doses in the hospital environment due to unique challenges which PET tracers present in administration as well as production. The establishment of a PET centre with a dedicated cyclotron has raised concerns of radiation protection to the staff at the WA PET Centre and the Radiopharmaceutical Production and Development (RAPID) team. Since every PET centre has differing designs and practices, it was considered important to closely monitor the radiation dose to our staff so that improvements to practices and design could be made to reduce radiation dose. Electronic dosimeters (MGP DMC 2000XB), which have a facility to log time and dose at 10 second intervals, were provided to three PET technologists and three PET nurses. These were worn in the top pocket of their lab coats throughout a whole day. Each staff member was then asked to note down their duties throughout the day and also note the time they performed each duty. The duties would then correlate with the dose with which the electronic monitor recorded and an estimate of radiation dose per duty could be given. Also an estimate of the dose per day to each staff member could be made. PET nurses averaged approximately 20 μ8v per day getting their largest dose from caring for occasional problematic patients. Smaller doses of a 1-2 μ8v were recorded for injections and removing cannulas. PET technologists averaged approximately 15 μ8v per day getting their largest dose of 1-5μ8v mainly from positioning of patients and sometimes larger doses due to problematic patients. Smaller doses of 1-2 μ5v were again recorded for injections and removal of cannulas. Following a presentation given to staff, all WA PET Centre and RAPID staff

  6. Evolution of the Nuclear Safeguards Performance Laboratory PERLA on the Ispra Site of the Institute for Transuranium Elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berndt, R.; Abbas, K.; Berthou, V.; De Almeida Carrapico, C.; Forcina, V.; Mayorov, V.; Mortreau, P.; Mosconi, M.; Pedersen, B.; Peerani, P.; Rosas, F.; Tagziria, H.; Tomanin, A.; Rozite, A.; Marin-Ferrer, M.; Crochemore, J.-M.; Roesgen, E.; Janssens, W.A.M.; )

    2015-01-01

    Based upon the experience of many years of operation, the safeguards Performance Laboratory PERLA will be reshaped in the near future (and relocated on the Ispra site such as not to interfere with decommissioning activities). During almost 30 years of successfully operating nuclear facilities in Ispra for supporting nuclear safeguards inspectorates with R&D, equipment development and training for in the meantime more than 1250 trainees, this laboratory is the main work-horse in this field and has functioned very frequently in the last years as easily accessible nuclear laboratory for external users. Even if a constant evolution took place in the last years, and additional facilities like the active neutron laboratory PUNITA or the ITRAP test laboratory for nuclear security R&D, testing and training have been taken in service, this step-change will allow refiguring the laboratory to face also new user expectations. NDA for safeguards continues to be a cornerstone of the measurement capacities complemented by experimental and advanced approaches, such as using active neutron interrogation, automation of measurements, complemented by Monte-Carlo simulations for neutron and gamma radiation. The tendency is also to integrate multiple plant signals (not only NDA measurements) in an overall assessment scheme and we envisage offering training and exercising capabilities for the inspectors also in this direction in the future. This paper will thus provide some insight in the concepts for the future use of the nuclear facilities on the Ispra site, which is complementary to two other contributions to this symposium, i.e., one describing the activities of our sister unit in Karlsruhe on NDA Safeguards Training and another on the new Advanced Safeguards Measurement, Monitoring and Modelling Laboratory (AS3ML) being built currently in Ispra. (author)

  7. Quality assurance of environmental gamma radiation monitoring in Slovenia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stuhec, M.; Zorko, B.; Mitic, D.; Miljanic, S.; Ranogajec-Komor, M.

    2006-01-01

    Environmental gamma radiation monitoring established in Slovenia consists of a network of multifunctional gamma monitors (MFMs) based on pairs of Geiger-Mueller counters and a network of measuring sites with high-sensitive thermoluminescence dosemeters. The measuring points are evenly spread across Slovenia, located at the meteorological stations and more densely on additional locations around the Krsko NPP. The MFM network has a 2-fold function with one sensor used for the purpose of early warning system in near surroundings of the NPP and the other, more sensitive, for natural radiation monitoring. The paper summarises activities to establish quality assurance of the environmental gamma radiation measurements in Slovenia, with a critical view of the results in comparison with the international standards and recommendations. While the results of linearity and energy dependence tests were satisfying, on-field intercomparison showed that the inherent signal of one of the monitors (MFM) has to be taken into account in the range of environmental background radiation. (authors)

  8. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  9. Monitoring of radiation exposure and registration of doses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The guide defines the concepts relevant to the monitoring of radiation exposure and working conditions and provides guidelines for determining the necessity of monitoring and subsequently organizing it. In addition, instructions are given for reporting doses to the Dose Register of the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK). Also the procedures are described for situations leading to exceptional exposures. (10 refs., 1 tab.)

  10. TOWARDS A NOVEL MODULAR ARCHITECTURE FOR CERN RADIATION MONITORING.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boukabache, Hamza; Pangallo, Michel; Ducos, Gael; Cardines, Nicola; Bellotta, Antonio; Toner, Ciarán; Perrin, Daniel; Forkel-Wirth, Doris

    2017-04-01

    The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) has the legal obligation to protect the public and the people working on its premises from any unjustified exposure to ionising radiation. In this context, radiation monitoring is one of the main concerns of the Radiation Protection Group. After 30 y of reliable service, the ARea CONtroller (ARCON) system is approaching the end of its lifecycle, which raises the need for new, more efficient radiation monitors with a high level of modularity to ensure better maintainability. Based on these two main principles, new detectors are currently being developed that will be capable of measuring very low dose rates down to 50 nSv h-1, whilst being able to measure radiation over an extensive range of 8 decades without any auto scaling. To reach these performances, CERN Radiation MOnitoring Electronics (CROME), the new generation of CERN radiation monitors, is based on the versatile architecture that includes new read-out electronics developed by the Instrumentation and Logistics section of the CERN Radiation Protection Group as well as a reconfigurable system on chip capable of performing complex processing calculations. Beside the capabilities of CROME to continuously measure the ambient dose rate, the system generates radiation alarms, provides interlock signals, drives alarm display units through a fieldbus and provides long-term, permanent and reliable data logging. The measurement tests performed during the first phase of the development show very promising results that pave the way to the second phase: the certification. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press.

  11. U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brenner, L.M.; McDowell, S.C.T.

    1989-01-01

    In discussing the U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development, five significant eras are identified. The period ending January 1, 1947, may be called the first era. Safeguards as known today did not exist and the classic military approach of security protection applied. The second era covers the period from 1947 to 1954 (when the Atomic Energy Act was completely rewritten to accommodate the then foreseen Civil uses Program and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the first steps were taken by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish material accounting records for all source and fissionable materials on inventory. The third era covers the period 1954 through 1968, which focused on nuclear safeguards in its domestic activities and made major policy changes in its approach to material control and accountability. The fourth era, 1968 to 1972 saw a quantum jump in the recognition and need for a significant safeguards research and development program, answered by the formation of a safeguards technical support organization at Brookhaven National Laboratory and a safeguards Laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the development and application of non-destructive assay technology. The fifth era had its beginning in 1972 with the burgeoning of international terrorism. The corresponding need for a strong physical protection research and development support program was responded to by the Sandia National Laboratory

  12. Radiation safety assessment and development of environmental radiation monitoring technology

    CERN Document Server

    Choi, B H; Kim, S G

    2002-01-01

    The Periodic Safety Review(PSR) of the existing nuclear power plants is required every ten years according to the recently revised atomic energy acts. The PSR of Kori unit 1 and Wolsong unit 1 that have been operating more than ten years is ongoing to comply the regulations. This research project started to develop the techniques necessary for the PSR. The project developed the following four techniques at the first stage for the environmental assessment of the existing plants. 1) Establishment of the assessment technology for contamination and accumulation trends of radionuclides, 2) alarm point setting of environmental radiation monitoring system, 3) Development of Radiation Safety Evaluation Factor for Korean NPP, and 4) the evaluation of radiation monitoring system performance and set-up of alarm/warn set point. A dynamic compartment model to derive a relationship between the release rates of gas phase radionuclides and the concentrations in the environmental samples. The model was validated by comparing ...

  13. Offsite environmental monitoring report: Radiation monitoring around United States nuclear test areas, calendar year 1991

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chaloud, D.J.; Dicey, B.B.; Mullen, A.A.; Neale, A.C.; Sparks, A.R.; Fontana, C.A.; Carroll, L.D.; Phillips, W.G.; Smith, D.D.; Thome, D.J.

    1992-01-01

    This report describes the Offsite Radiation Safety Program conducted during 1991 by the Environmental Protection Agency`s (EPA`s) Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory-Las Vegas. This laboratory operates an environmental radiation monitoring program in the region surrounding the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and at former test sites in Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico. The surveillance program is designed to measure levels and trends of radioactivity, if present, in the environment surrounding testing areas to ascertain whether current radiation levels and associated doses to the general public are in compliance with existing radiation protection standards. The surveillance program additionally has the responsibility to take action to protect the health and well being of the public in the event of any accidental release of radioactive contaminants. Offsite levels of radiation and radioactivity are assessed by sampling milk, water, and air; by deploying thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and using pressurized ion chambers (PICs); and by biological monitoring of animals, food crops, and humans. Personnel with mobile monitoring equipment are placed in areas downwind from the test site prior to each nuclear weapons test to implement protective actions, provide immediate radiation monitoring, and obtain environmental samples rapidly after any occurrence of radioactivity release. Comparison of the measurements and sample analysis results with background levels and with appropriate standards and regulations indicated that there was no radioactivity detected offsite by the various EPA monitoring networks and no exposure above natural background to the population living in the vicinity of the NTS that could be attributed to current NTS activities. Annual and long-term trends were evaluated in the Noble Gas, Tritium, Milk Surveillance, Biomonitoring, TLD, PIC networks, and the Long-Term Hydrological Monitoring Program.

  14. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  15. Paper on operation and maintenance experiences on radiation monitoring instrumentation at NAPS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, J.P.; Vinod Kumar; Sen, S.K.; Malhotra, S.

    2005-01-01

    Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS) is the first standardized Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor in India commissioned in the year 1989. Many new Radiation Monitoring Systems like Portal Monitors and Ventilation Exhaust Activity Monitors were first time introduced at NAPS. All the Personnel Contamination Monitors and Area Radiation Monitors used at NAPS were designed and developed by Electronics Division, BARC. Only the Portal Monitor was supplied by M/S Herfurth, Germany. The paper highlights the operation and maintenance experiences on Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation at NAPS in the last 15 years of operation. The paper also highlights the different problems faced in Radiation Instruments and our suggestions for improvement in their design for their better availability and long term reliability. (author)

  16. Integrated safeguards: Australian views and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.; Bragin, V.; Leslie, R.

    2001-01-01

    accesses, which in most cases have been undertaken at the Lucas Heights site. Under the integrated safeguards regime now being applied, the timeliness period for irradiated fuel has been changed from three months to 12 months, eliminating quarterly interim inspections. The four inspections each year have been replaced by one PIV (including comprehensive Design Information Verification activities), and an average of one unannounced inspection. The objectives of unannounced inspections include, to verify the fresh and spent fuel inventory and if possible the core fuel, and to confirm facility design information, the declared operation of the reactor, and the absence of undeclared activities. The term 'average' is important - to maintain deterrence, once an unannounced inspection has taken place, there will always be the possibility of a further unannounced inspection in the same year. Where possible, fuel transfers will be verified during the PIV or unannounced inspection(s), but the IAEA has indicated that if necessary additional inspections may be undertaken for this purpose. In addition to the inspections outlined above, there are five or six complementary accesses each year, mainly at the Lucas Heights site, but also encompassing uranium mines and LOFs (locations other than facilities). In most circumstances it is expected that complementary accesses would be carried out when inspectors are in Australia for routine inspections. The overall savings in inspection effort are expected to be about 45% (a reduction from 18 to 10 PDI) a year. However, this depends on whether additional inspections are required to verify fuel transfers - an area where Australia considers remote monitoring could be very useful. The paper discusses implementation issues such as the participation of national inspectors in inspections and complementary access, and the conduct of unannounced inspections. The value of unannounced inspections - i.e. inspections whose timing is unpredictable to the

  17. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

    1981-12-01

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  18. IAEA safeguards glossary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

  19. Radiation monitoring of uranium workers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-12-01

    In order to manage radiological hazards in the workplace, it is necessary to have reliable measurements of workplace radiation levels and estimates of exposures and doses to workers. Over the past several years there have been many changes not only to the science of monitoring and dose assessment, but also to the regulatory framework. New International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommendations on dose in ICRP Publication 60 (1991) and the implications of the ICRP's new respiratory tract model in ICRP Publication 66 (1994) are of particular importance. In addition, triggered by the act establishing the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), which will replace the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), there is considerable activity in the review and development of regulatory guidance. Concurrent with these activities is the introduction of innovative mining procedures in Saskatchewan in order to extract uranium ore of particularly high grade. In view of these developments, the ACRP considered that a formal review of current monitoring practices would benefit both the CNSC and its licensees. In this report, 'uranium workers' refers to workers at uranium mines and mills, and workers at natural-uranium refineries, conversion, and fuel fabrication facilities; issues relating to long-term tailings management and to the handling of enriched materials are not addressed in this document. The report will have some relevance to workers in non-uranium mines and in industries handling naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) since, in some circumstances, these activities can present similar workplace radiation hazards. The report outlines the radiological hazards encountered in the Canadian uranium industry, and reviews current radiological monitoring practices and options; appendices include a glossary, a more technical discussion of monitoring methods, and an examination of errors and uncertainties in measurements of radon progeny and long

  20. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R.

    2010-10-01

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  1. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de

    1986-01-01

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

  2. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  3. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  4. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  5. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  6. Modernization of WWER-1000 radiation monitoring systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, T [General Atomics, San Diego, CA (United States)

    1996-12-31

    A modernization scheme of the radiation monitoring system for WWER-1000 is proposed. It has a purpose to comply with international standards and to reduce operational and maintenance cost by deleting obsolete components and reducing the number of detector channels. Detailed layouts of I/C system architecture, digital radiation monitoring system (DRAMS) architecture and LRP block diagram are presented. If planned and implemented properly, this program can provide cost savings by reducing time required to access and display data and maintenance cost by deleting obsolete parts and decreasing the number of detector channels. 3 figs.

  7. Modernization of WWER-1000 radiation monitoring systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, T.

    1995-01-01

    A modernization scheme of the radiation monitoring system for WWER-1000 is proposed. It has a purpose to comply with international standards and to reduce operational and maintenance cost by deleting obsolete components and reducing the number of detector channels. Detailed layouts of I/C system architecture, digital radiation monitoring system (DRAMS) architecture and LRP block diagram are presented. If planned and implemented properly, this program can provide cost savings by reducing time required to access and display data and maintenance cost by deleting obsolete parts and decreasing the number of detector channels. 3 figs

  8. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  9. International safeguards for fast critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gunderson, D.O.; Todd, J.L.

    1978-12-01

    It was concluded that practical routine inventory verification techniques can be effective in detecting protracted diversion but will not meet the seven-day timeliness criteria either for protracted or large one-time diversions. An effective international safeguards system requires a method of continuously monitoring facility activities either with instrumentation, inspectors, or a combination thereof. It was also concluded that a resident inspector is required at this type of facility because of the many nonroutine operations. However, a single inspector cannot adequately monitor all activities to assure that no diversion is taking place. The use of existing structural features and unattended monitoring at portals as well as surveillance by a resident inspector can provide an effective detection capability. A rapid special inventory verification is required following detection to verify any suspected diversion

  10. Radiation monitoring methodologies and their applications at BARC site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Divkar, J.K.; Chatterjee, M.K.; Patra, R.P; Morali, S.; Singh, Rajvir

    2016-01-01

    Radiation monitoring methodology can be planned for various objectives during normal as well as emergency situations. During radiological emergency, radiation monitoring data provides useful information required for management of the abnormal situation. In order to assess the possible consequences accurately and to implement adequate measure, the emergency management authorities should have a well-prepared monitoring strategy in readiness. Fixed monitoring method is useful to analyze the behavior of nuclear plant site and to develop holistic model for it mobile monitoring is useful for quick impact assessment and will be the backbone of emergency response, particularly in case of non availability of fixed monitoring system caused due to natural disaster like floods, earthquake and tsunami

  11. Development of infrared communication in radiation protection and monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thakur, Vaishali M.; Choithramani, S.J.; Sharma, D.N.; Abani, M.C.

    2003-01-01

    Infra-red communication has many important applications in instrumentation and control. Different types of nuclear instruments are used for radiation protection and surveillance program. The application of this mode of communication in these instruments helps in monitoring of inaccessible or high radiation field areas by avoiding undue exposure to the occupational worker. The demand for remotely controlled monitoring instruments and wireless data communication in the mobile computing environment has rapidly increased. This is due to the increasing need for on-line radiological data analysis with minimum human interventions, especially so if the monitoring is in hazardous environment. The wireless communication can be achieved using different communication methodology for short and long range communication. The infrared based communication is used for different applications for short range up to 9-10 meters. The use of this mode of communication has been implemented in some of the radiation monitoring instruments developed in house. The evaluation of data communication using this mode was conducted for the systems like Environmental Radiation Monitor (ERM) and results showed that data communication error is less than 0.1% up to 10 meter distance. (author)

  12. Radiation damage monitoring in the ATLAS pixel detector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seidel, Sally

    2013-01-01

    We describe the implementation of radiation damage monitoring using measurement of leakage current in the ATLAS silicon pixel sensors. The dependence of the leakage current upon the integrated luminosity is presented. The measurement of the radiation damage corresponding to an integrated luminosity 5.6 fb −1 is presented along with a comparison to a model. -- Highlights: ► Radiation damage monitoring via silicon leakage current is implemented in the ATLAS (LHC) pixel detector. ► Leakage currents measured are consistent with the Hamburg/Dortmund model. ► This information can be used to validate the ATLAS simulation model.

  13. International conference on individual monitoring of ionising radiation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vanhavere, Filip

    2016-01-01

    This special issue of the journal Radiation Protection Dosimetry is dedicated to the Proceedings of the International Conference on Individual Monitoring of Ionising Radiation (IM2015), which is the fifth of a series of conferences dealing with individual monitoring. This conference series is initiated by EURADOS, the European Radiation Dosimetry Group, and is organised every 5 years. In 2015, the conference was jointly organised by the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK.CEN), AV Controlatom, and the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. It brought together scientists from regulatory authorities, individual monitoring services (IMS), research bodies, European networks and companies, for the purpose of facilitating the dissemination of knowledge, exchanging experiences and promoting new ideas in the field of individual monitoring. After the conference, 124 papers were submitted for publication in these peer-reviewed proceedings. From these, 103 were finally accepted for publication. The help of the numerous referees and the guest editors is very much appreciated. These proceedings provide a full image of the IM2015 conference. The high-level publications will be useful to improve the state of individual monitoring all over the world and aim to inspire many scientists to continue their work on a better monitoring of radiologically exposed workers

  14. Operational facility-integrated computer system for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armento, W.J.; Brooksbank, R.E.; Krichinsky, A.M.

    1980-01-01

    A computer system for safeguards in an active, remotely operated, nuclear fuel processing pilot plant has been developed. This sytem maintains (1) comprehensive records of special nuclear materials, (2) automatically updated book inventory files, (3) material transfer catalogs, (4) timely inventory estimations, (5) sample transactions, (6) automatic, on-line volume balances and alarmings, and (7) terminal access and applications software monitoring and logging. Future development will include near-real-time SNM mass balancing as both a static, in-tank summation and a dynamic, in-line determination. It is planned to incorporate aspects of site security and physical protection into the computer monitoring

  15. Biological monitoring of radiation using indicator plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jin Kyoo; Chun, Ki Jung; Kim, Kook Chan; Kim, In Kyoo; Song, Heui Sub

    1994-12-01

    Some clones of Tradescantia had dose response relationship involving somatic mutations such as appearance of pink, colorless or giant cell, and/or loss of reproductive integrity of stamen hair cells when exposed to radiation. Since Tradescantia could respond to radiation level as low as human being could be exposed to, it could play an important role as scientific tool of botanical tester for radiation. Especially TSH system can be easily applied to in situ monitoring of radiation by virtue of its excellent radiation indicator ship and simpleness in detection of mutations by radiation. 10 figs, 6 tabs, 19 refs. (Author)

  16. Biological monitoring of radiation using indicator plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jin Kyoo; Chun, Ki Jung; Kim, Kook Chan; Kim, In Kyoo; Song, Heui Sub [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1994-12-01

    Some clones of Tradescantia had dose response relationship involving somatic mutations such as appearance of pink, colorless or giant cell, and/or loss of reproductive integrity of stamen hair cells when exposed to radiation. Since Tradescantia could respond to radiation level as low as human being could be exposed to, it could play an important role as scientific tool of botanical tester for radiation. Especially TSH system can be easily applied to in situ monitoring of radiation by virtue of its excellent radiation indicator ship and simpleness in detection of mutations by radiation. 10 figs, 6 tabs, 19 refs. (Author).

  17. The regulations for delivery of subsidies to radiation monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The regulations are defined under the law concerning subsidies and the provisions of the order for execution of the law. Basic terms are explained, such as: nuclear power generating facilities; arrangement business of radiation monitoring facilities; pre-research business of radiation monitoring; radiation monitoring business; place of enterprise; and expected time of beginning of the use. The Director General of Science and Technology Agency delivers subsidies to those prefectures where nuclear power generating facilities are or are expected to be established, or their neighboring prefectures. Subsidies are paid for each place of enterprise to support all or a part of expenses necessary for arrangement, pre-research or radiation monitoring business. Limits of subsidies for a place of enterprise in a prefecture are 155.6 million yen for a term for arrangement business, 16 million yen for each fiscal year for pre-research and 16 million yen for each fiscal year for radiation monitoring. An application for subsidies shall be filed by a prefecture to the Director General with the business program and gists of nuclear power generating facilities according to the forms attached. Receiving the application, the Director General shall examine it and notify without delay to the applicant the decision of delivery and its conditions in writing, when such settlement is made. Terms and conditions of delivery and reports, etc. are prescribed respectively. (Okada, K.)

  18. TH-E-209-00: Radiation Dose Monitoring and Protocol Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    Radiation dose monitoring solutions have opened up new opportunities for medical physicists to be more involved in modern clinical radiology practices. In particular, with the help of comprehensive radiation dose data, data-driven protocol management and informed case follow up are now feasible. Significant challenges remain however and the problems faced by medical physicists are highly heterogeneous. Imaging systems from multiple vendors and a wide range of vintages co-exist in the same department and employ data communication protocols that are not fully standardized or implemented making harmonization complex. Many different solutions for radiation dose monitoring have been implemented by imaging facilities over the past few years. Such systems are based on commercial software, home-grown IT solutions, manual PACS data dumping, etc., and diverse pathways can be used to bring the data to impact clinical practice. The speakers will share their experiences with creating or tailoring radiation dose monitoring/management systems and procedures over the past few years, which vary significantly in design and scope. Topics to cover: (1) fluoroscopic dose monitoring and high radiation event handling from a large academic hospital; (2) dose monitoring and protocol optimization in pediatric radiology; and (3) development of a home-grown IT solution and dose data analysis framework. Learning Objectives: Describe the scope and range of radiation dose monitoring and protocol management in a modern radiology practice Review examples of data available from a variety of systems and how it managed and conveyed. Reflect on the role of the physicist in radiation dose awareness.

  19. TH-E-209-00: Radiation Dose Monitoring and Protocol Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2016-06-15

    Radiation dose monitoring solutions have opened up new opportunities for medical physicists to be more involved in modern clinical radiology practices. In particular, with the help of comprehensive radiation dose data, data-driven protocol management and informed case follow up are now feasible. Significant challenges remain however and the problems faced by medical physicists are highly heterogeneous. Imaging systems from multiple vendors and a wide range of vintages co-exist in the same department and employ data communication protocols that are not fully standardized or implemented making harmonization complex. Many different solutions for radiation dose monitoring have been implemented by imaging facilities over the past few years. Such systems are based on commercial software, home-grown IT solutions, manual PACS data dumping, etc., and diverse pathways can be used to bring the data to impact clinical practice. The speakers will share their experiences with creating or tailoring radiation dose monitoring/management systems and procedures over the past few years, which vary significantly in design and scope. Topics to cover: (1) fluoroscopic dose monitoring and high radiation event handling from a large academic hospital; (2) dose monitoring and protocol optimization in pediatric radiology; and (3) development of a home-grown IT solution and dose data analysis framework. Learning Objectives: Describe the scope and range of radiation dose monitoring and protocol management in a modern radiology practice Review examples of data available from a variety of systems and how it managed and conveyed. Reflect on the role of the physicist in radiation dose awareness.

  20. Radiation monitoring of nuclear census intelligent data management and mobile monitoring data acquisition system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huang Libin; Zhong Zhijing; Zhou Yinhang; Guo Hongbo

    2014-01-01

    The system, employing advanced intelligent terminal, mobile applications, database technology, can achieve all kinds of field monitoring, mobile radiation monitoring data collected for laboratory analysis; employing GPS technology, can achieve the geographic information of the radiation monitoring data, time tagging and other anti-cheating measures; the system also established a mass database management system; the system is suitable for all types of nuclear-related units with special adaptive functions; system will be extended to GIS-based management capabilities of nuclear contamination distribution in latter stage. (authors)

  1. Safeguards instrument to monitor spent reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nicholson, N.; Dowdy, E.J.; Holt, D.M.; Stump, C.

    1981-01-01

    A hand-held instrument for monitoring irradiated nuclear fuel inventories located in water-filled storage ponds has been developed. This instrument provides sufficient precise qualitative and quantitative information to be useful as a confirmatory technique to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, and is believed to be of potential use to nuclear fuel managers and to operators of spent-fuel storage facilities, both at reactor and away-from-reactor, and to operators of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Because the Cerenkov radiation glow can barely be seen by the unaided eye under darkened conditions, a night vision device is incorporated to aid the operator in locating the fuel assembly to be measured. Beam splitting optics placed in front of the image intensifier and a preset aperture select a predetermined portion of the observed scene for measurement of the light intensity using a photomultiplier (PM) tube and digital readout. The PM tube gain is adjusted by use of an internal optical reference source, providing long term repeatability and instrument-to-instrument cnsistency. Interchangeable lenses accommodate various viewing and measuring conditions

  2. IAEA Safeguards: Cost/benefit analysis of commercial satellite imagery

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, Christer [SSC Satellitbild AB, Kiruna (Sweden)

    1999-03-01

    A major milestone in the efforts to strengthen the Safeguards System was reached in May 1997 when the Board of Governors approved a `Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements`. The Protocol provides the legal basis necessary to enhance the Agency`s ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities by using information available from open sources to complement the declarations made by Member States. Commercially available high-resolution satellite data has emerged as one potential complementary open information source to support the traditional and extended Safeguard activities of IAEA. This document constitutes a first report from SSC Satellitbild giving the Agency tentative and initial estimates of the potential cost and time-savings possible with the new proposed technology. The initial cost/benefit simulation will be further finalised in the following `Implementation Blueprint` study. The general foundation and starting point for the cost/benefit calculation is to simulate a new efficient and relatively small `imagery unit` within the IAEA, capable of performing advanced image processing as a tool for various safeguards tasks. The image processing capacity is suggested to be task- and interpretation-oriented. The study was performed over a period of 1,5 weeks in late 1998, and is based upon interviews of IAEA staff, reviews of existing IAEA documentation as well as from SSC Satellitbild`s long-standing experience of satellite imagery and field missions. The cost/benefit analysis is based on a spreadsheet simulation of five potential applications of commercial satellite imagery: Reference information; Confirmation of Agency acquired and Member State supplied data; Change detection and on-going monitoring; Assessing open source information available to the Agency; Detecting undeclared activities and undeclared sites. The study confirms that the proposed concept of a relatively small `imagery unit` using high-resolution data will be a sound and

  3. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  4. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

    2010-01-01

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  5. INL Active Interrogation Testing In Support of the GNEP Safeguards Campaign

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    David L. Chichester

    2008-01-01

    Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. Work at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in the area of active interrogation, using neutron and photon sources, has been under way for many years to develop methods for detecting and quantifying nuclear material for national and homeland security research areas. This research knowledge base is now being extended to address nuclear safeguards and process monitoring issues related to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). As a first step in this area preliminary scoping studies have been performed to investigate the usefulness of using active neutron interrogation, with a low-power electronic neutron generator, to assay Department of Transportation 6M shipping drums containing uranium oxide fuel rodlets from INL's zero power physics reactor. Using the paired-counting technique during the die-away time period of interrogation, a lower detection limit of approximately 4.2 grams of enriched uranium (40% 235U) was calculated for a 40 minute measurement using a field portable 2.5 MeV neutron source and an array of 16 moderated helium-3 neutron tubes. Future work in this area, including the use of a more powerful neutron source and a better tailored detector array, would likely improve this limit to a much lower level. Further development work at INL will explore the applicability of active interrogation in association with the nuclear safeguards and process monitoring needs of the advanced GNEP facilities under consideration. This work, which will include both analyses and field demonstrations, will be performed in collaboration with colleagues at INL and elsewhere that have expertise in nuclear fuel reprocessing as well as active interrogation and its use for nuclear material analyses

  6. Autonomous Radiation Monitoring of Small Vessels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fabris, Lorenzo; Hornback, Donald Eric

    2010-01-01

    Small private vessels are one avenue by which nuclear materials may be smuggled across international borders. While one can contemplate using the terrestrial approach of radiation portal monitors on the navigable waterways that lead to many ports, these systems are ill-suited to the problem. They require vehicles to pass at slow speeds between two closely-spaced radiation sensors, relying on the uniformity of vehicle sizes to space the detectors, and on proximity to link an individual vehicle to its radiation signature. In contrast to roadways where lanes segregate vehicles, and motion is well controlled by inspection booths; channels, inlets, and rivers present chaotic traffic patterns populated by vessels of all sizes. We have developed a unique solution to this problem based on our portal-less portal monitor instrument that is designed to handle free-flowing traffic on roadways with up to five-traffic lanes. The instrument uses a combination of visible-light and gamma-ray imaging to acquire and link radiation images to individual vehicles. It was recently tested in a maritime setting. In this paper we present the instrument, how it functions, and the results of the recent tests.

  7. New technologies for item monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Abbott, J.A. [EG & G Energy Measurements, Albuquerque, NM (United States); Waddoups, I.G. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1993-12-01

    This report responds to the Department of Energy`s request that Sandia National Laboratories compare existing technologies against several advanced technologies as they apply to DOE needs to monitor the movement of material, weapons, or personnel for safety and security programs. The authors describe several material control systems, discuss their technologies, suggest possible applications, discuss assets and limitations, and project costs for each system. The following systems are described: WATCH system (Wireless Alarm Transmission of Container Handling); Tag system (an electrostatic proximity sensor); PANTRAK system (Personnel And Material Tracking); VRIS (Vault Remote Inventory System); VSIS (Vault Safety and Inventory System); AIMS (Authenticated Item Monitoring System); EIVS (Experimental Inventory Verification System); Metrox system (canister monitoring system); TCATS (Target Cueing And Tracking System); LGVSS (Light Grid Vault Surveillance System); CSS (Container Safeguards System); SAMMS (Security Alarm and Material Monitoring System); FOIDS (Fiber Optic Intelligence & Detection System); GRADS (Graded Radiation Detection System); and PINPAL (Physical Inventory Pallet).

  8. New technologies for item monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abbott, J.A.; Waddoups, I.G.

    1993-12-01

    This report responds to the Department of Energy's request that Sandia National Laboratories compare existing technologies against several advanced technologies as they apply to DOE needs to monitor the movement of material, weapons, or personnel for safety and security programs. The authors describe several material control systems, discuss their technologies, suggest possible applications, discuss assets and limitations, and project costs for each system. The following systems are described: WATCH system (Wireless Alarm Transmission of Container Handling); Tag system (an electrostatic proximity sensor); PANTRAK system (Personnel And Material Tracking); VRIS (Vault Remote Inventory System); VSIS (Vault Safety and Inventory System); AIMS (Authenticated Item Monitoring System); EIVS (Experimental Inventory Verification System); Metrox system (canister monitoring system); TCATS (Target Cueing And Tracking System); LGVSS (Light Grid Vault Surveillance System); CSS (Container Safeguards System); SAMMS (Security Alarm and Material Monitoring System); FOIDS (Fiber Optic Intelligence ampersand Detection System); GRADS (Graded Radiation Detection System); and PINPAL (Physical Inventory Pallet)

  9. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  10. Achievements to date in strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    There is substantial progress in developing and implementing measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Safeguards System. The measures comprise those to be implemented pursuant to the Agency's legal authority conferred by existing safeguards agreements as well as those to be implemented under the complementary legal authority conferred by Additional Protocols concluded on the basis of Document INFCIRC/540(Corrected). Activities on implementing measures under existing legal authority, particularly with respect to the evaluation of States' nuclear programmes, environmental sampling and the use of remote monitoring for safeguards purposes had been carried continuously ion the recent post. In 1998, additional protocols entered into force with four States (the Holy See, Jordan, New Zealand and Uzbekistan). Additional protocols with a further 27 States were approved by the Board and were awaiting ratification by the respective States. The additional protocol with Australia, which entered into force in December 1997, was being implemented following receipt of its Article 2 declaration. Agency consultations on concluding additional protocols take place with a number of States on a regular basis. As of 1 October 1999, Additional Protocols had been concluded and approved by the Board of Governors with a total of 45 States. Of these, Additional Protocols with 44 States had been signed and five had entered into force. (author)

  11. Application of neural network and pattern recognition software to the automated analysis of continuous nuclear monitoring of on-load reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Howell, J.A.; Eccleston, G.W.; Halbig, J.K.; Klosterbuer, S.F. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Larson, T.W. [California Polytechnic State Univ., San Luis Obispo, CA (US)

    1993-08-01

    Automated analysis using pattern recognition and neural network software can help interpret data, call attention to potential anomalies, and improve safeguards effectiveness. Automated software analysis, based on pattern recognition and neural networks, was applied to data collected from a radiation core discharge monitor system located adjacent to an on-load reactor core. Unattended radiation sensors continuously collect data to monitor on-line refueling operations in the reactor. The huge volume of data collected from a number of radiation channels makes it difficult for a safeguards inspector to review it all, check for consistency among the measurement channels, and find anomalies. Pattern recognition and neural network software can analyze large volumes of data from continuous, unattended measurements, thereby improving and automating the detection of anomalies. The authors developed a prototype pattern recognition program that determines the reactor power level and identifies the times when fuel bundles are pushed through the core during on-line refueling. Neural network models were also developed to predict fuel bundle burnup to calculate the region on the on-load reactor face from which fuel bundles were discharged based on the radiation signals. In the preliminary data set, which was limited and consisted of four distinct burnup regions, the neural network model correctly predicted the burnup region with an accuracy of 92%.

  12. Response of radiation monitors for ambient dose equivalent, H*(10)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grecco, Claudio Henrique dos Santos

    2001-01-01

    Radiation monitors are used all over the world to evaluate if places with presence of ionising radiation present safe conditions for people. Radiation monitors should be tested according to international or national standards in order to be qualified for use. This work describes a methodology and procedures to evaluate the energy and angular responses of any radiation monitor for ambient dose equivalent, H*(10), according to the recommendations of ISO and IEC standards. The methodology and the procedures were applied to the Monitor Inteligente de Radiacao MIR 7026, developed by the Instituto em Engenharia Nuclear (IEN), to evaluate and to adjust its response for H*(10), characterizing it as an ambient dose equivalent meter. The tests were performed at the Laboratorio Nacional de Metrologia das Radiacoes Ionizantes (LNMRI), at Instituto de Radioprotecao e Dosimetria (IRD), and results showed that the Monitor Inteligente de Radiacao MIR 7026 can be used as an EI*(10) meter, in accordance to the IEC 60846 standard requirements. The overall estimated uncertainty for the determination of the MIR 7026 response, in all radiation qualities used in this work, was 4,5 % to a 95 % confidence limit. (author)

  13. Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean

    2010-09-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

  14. IAEA symposium on international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

  15. Radiation protection and monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruecher, L.; Langmueller, G.; Tuerschmann, G.

    1997-01-01

    The safety, the quality and efficiency of the radiological monitoring systems for block one and two of the NPP Mochovce, designed and delivered by the general designer, should be increased by EUCOM Siemens. Modern, accident resistant and/or more powerful monitoring systems have been designed by Siemens will be added to the existing systems. To achieve this radiation measuring units will be installed inside the hermetic zone, in the reactor hall, at the stack, at the release water system and in the environment in the vicinity of the NPP. The presentation, the storage distribution and the processing of all measuring results also will be optimised by installing a modern high-performance computer system, the so-called Central Radiological Computer System 'CRCS', featuring a high availability. The components will be installed in the relevant control rooms all over the plant. With this computer system it is easy to control the radiation level inside and outside the NPP during normal operation and during and after an accident. Special programs, developed by Siemens support the staff by interpreting the consequences of radioactive releases into the environment and by initiating protection procedures during and after an accident. All functions of the system are available for emergency protection drills and training the staff interruption of the normal control procedure. For the personal protection a digital personal dosimetry system completely considering with the requirements of ICRP 60 and several contamination monitors will be installed. (authors)

  16. Background compensation for a radiation level monitor

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keefe, D.J.

    1975-12-01

    Background compensation in a device such as a hand and foot monitor is provided by digital means using a scaler. With no radiation level test initiated, a scaler is down-counted from zero according to the background measured. With a radiation level test initiated, the scaler is up-counted from the previous down-count position according to the radiation emitted from the monitored object and an alarm is generated if, with the scaler having crossed zero in the positive going direction, a particular number is exceeded in a specific time period after initiation of the test. If the test is initiated while the scale is down-counting, the background count from the previous down- count stored in a memory is used as the initial starting point for the up-count.

  17. Radiation environmental real-time monitoring and dispersion modeling: A comprehensive solution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacik, A.; Bartokova, I.; Omelka, J.; Melicherova, T.

    2014-01-01

    The system of real-time radiation monitoring provided by MicroStep-MIS is a turn-key solution for measurement, acquisition, processing, reporting, archiving and displaying of various radiation data. At the level of measurements, the monitoring stations can be equipped with various devices from radiation probes, measuring the actual ambient gamma dose rate, to fully automated aerosol monitors, returning analysis results of natural and manmade radionuclides concentrations in the air. Using data gathered by our radiation probes RPSG-05 integrated into monitoring network of Crisis Management of the Slovak Republic and into monitoring network of Slovak Hydrometeorological Institute, we demonstrate its reliability and long-term stability of measurements. Data from RPSG-05 probes and GammaTracer probes, both of these types are used in the SHI network, are compared. The sensitivity of RPSG-05 is documented on data where changes of dose rate are caused by precipitation. Qualities of RPSG-05 probe are illustrated also on example of its use in radiation monitoring network in the United Arab Emirates. A more detailed information about radioactivity of the atmosphere can be obtained by using spectrometric detectors (e.g. scintillation detectors) which, besides gamma dose rate values, offer also a possibility to identify different radionuclides. However, this possibility is limited by technical parameters of detector like energetic resolution and detection efficiency in given geometry of measurement. A clearer information with less doubts can be obtained from aerosol monitors with a built-in silicon detector of alpha and beta particles and with an electrically cooled HPGe detector dedicated for gamma-ray spectrometry, which is performed during the sampling. Data from a complex radiation monitoring network can be used, together with meteorological data, in radiation dispersion model by MicroStep-MIS. This model serves for simulation of atmospheric propagation of radionuclides

  18. Development of integrated containment and surveillance system for fast critical facility FCA. Portal and penetration monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mukaiyama, Takehiko; Ogawa, Hironobu; Yokota, Yasuhiro.

    1998-01-01

    Manpower and radiation exposure problems, accompanied by frequent Non Destructive Assay (NDA) based inspections at the Fast Critical Facility FCA of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), are a burden for both the inspectorates and the facility operator. In the hope of alleviating these burdens, the development of containment and surveillance measures for the FCA was initiated in 1979. The integrated containment and surveillance system consists of a portal monitor and a penetration monitor. The reactor building provides an ideal containment measure because of its explosion-proof, airtight structure and limited number of penetrations. The function of the portal monitor is to detect undeclared removal of nuclear material from the reactor building through the doorway. The penetration monitor is designed for surveillance of diversion routes through containment boundaries, and of safeguards related activities for bypassing the portal monitor. The combination of monitoring by the penetration monitor of containment boundaries and all their penetrations except for the doorway, and monitoring by the portal monitor, provides complete coverage of realistic diversion routes. The development of the system was completed in 1988 and the field trial test was conducted for the period of twelve running months. The final report on the field trial was concluded on January 1990. The major conclusion of the report was that the system is effective, reliable and efficient. Following this successful conclusion, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) accepted the system for meeting its safeguards goals at the FCA on condition that an independent IAEA authentication equipment is provided. The development of the authentication equipment is accomplished as an separate Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards (JASPAS) task. (author)

  19. Monitoring and crisis system of radiation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bartok, J.; Borovansky, P.; Macica, J.; Petrovicova, M.

    2005-01-01

    In this paper we have briefly described our practical experiences with the most complex Radiation Monitoring System we have designed. This system consists of number of stations; those data are collected in the main crisis center of the whole system. The main center integrates RMS Central Database, the IMS Model Suite workstation and the Graphics workstation. The radiations probes of the RP series are the base for stationary , portable sets and for sets measuring underwater radiation. The radiation and meteorological data, which are necessary for reasonable interpretation of radiation data, are archived in RMS Central database. The Lagrangian trajectory model from the IMS Model Suite serves for radiation dispersion modeling. (authors)

  20. A Radiation-Triggered Surveillance System for UF6 Cylinder Monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Curtis, Michael M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Myjak, Mitchell J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2016-09-23

    This report provides background information and representative scenarios for testing a prototype radiation-triggered surveillance system at an operating facility that handles uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders. The safeguards objective is to trigger cameras using radiation, or radiation and motion, rather than motion alone, to reduce significantly the number of image files generated by a motion-triggered system. The authors recommend the use of radiation-triggered surveillance at all facilities where cylinder paths are heavily traversed by personnel. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has begun using surveillance cameras in the feed and withdrawal areas of gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The cameras generate imagery using elapsed time or motion, but this creates problems in areas occupied 24/7 by personnel. Either motion-or-interval-based triggering generates thousands of review files over the course of a month. Since inspectors must review the files to verify operator material-flow-declarations, a plethora of files significantly extends the review process. The primary advantage of radiation-triggered surveillance is the opportunity to obtain full-time cylinder throughput verification versus what presently amounts to part-time verification. Cost savings should be substantial, as the IAEA presently uses frequent unannounced inspections to verify cylinder-throughput declarations. The use of radiation-triggered surveillance allows the IAEA to implement less frequent unannounced inspections for the purpose of flow verification, but its principal advantage is significantly shorter and more effective inspector video reviews.

  1. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  2. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2010-10-15

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  3. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-01-01

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  4. Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

    2015-01-01

    Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

  5. Radiation monitoring data representation for duty personnel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gavrilov, S.L.; Kiselev, V.P.; Krasnoperov, S.N.; Kudeshov, E.V.; Maslov, S.Y.; Semin, N.N.; Sirotinskiy, S.E.; Yakovlev, V.Y. [Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (NSI RAS), Moscow (Russian Federation)

    2014-07-01

    Currently, Web-GIS technologies are widely used to generate a reliable and intuitive web-based interface to monitor the current radiation situation in various regions of the Russian Federation. The developed 'Server Web-Monitoring' web-application is intended for duty personnel and can operate not only on desktop computers but also on mobile devices. The subsystem of duty personnel notification about any Off-Normal Situation (ONS) (such as: critical threshold exceedances or failures in operation of monitoring systems) is also considered in the paper. Three types of Automated Radiation Monitoring Systems (ARMS) are available for monitoring: - regional ARMS; - facility-level ARMS; - ARMS of nuclear power plant surveillance areas. Google Maps and Google Maps API toolbox are used as the cartographic basis. In the general-monitoring window only general information on each of the local systems is available. Next, the operator can move to monitoring of local ARMS he is interested in. The operator can either view a list of Radiation Situation Monitoring Posts (RSMP) showing the current data in the right frame or hide it and use the map only. Viewing the log of critical threshold exceedances for 24 hours and a report on all RSMPs of a given system over the last 7 days is also possible. The report contains maximum values of measurements for every day and for each RSMP. The developed web-application includes: - monitoring of the radiation situation and its changes on the general map of the Russian Federation and on maps of local ARMS; - displaying 7-day reports for all RSMPs of the selected ARMS; - displaying the log of critical threshold exceedances recorded over the past day. The notification subsystem informs duty personnel on all ONS, namely, on critical threshold exceedances in the incoming data and failures in operation of monitoring systems. The key features of the notification subsystem are: - round-the-clock functioning; - automatic notification in case of

  6. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  7. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beets, C.

    1977-01-01

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  8. Structure of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1978-06-01

    An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

  9. International Remote Monitoring Project Embalse Nuclear Power Station, Argentina Embalse Remote Monitoring System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, Sigfried L.; Glidewell, Donnie D.; Bonino, Anibal; Bosler, Gene; Mercer, David; Maxey, Curt; Vones, Jaromir; Martelle, Guy; Busse, James; Kadner, Steve; White, Mike; Rovere, Luis

    1999-01-01

    The Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear of Argentina (ARN), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ABACC, the US Department of Energy, and the US Support Program POTAS, cooperated in the development of a Remote Monitoring System for nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This system was installed at the Embalse Nuclear Power Station last year to evaluate the feasibility of using radiation sensors in monitoring the transfer of spent fuel from the spent fuel pond to dry storage. The key element in this process is to maintain continuity of knowledge throughout the entire transfer process. This project evaluated the fundamental design and implementation of the Remote Monitoring System in its application to regional and international safeguard efficiency. New technology has been developed to enhance the design of the system to include storage capability on board sensor platforms. This evaluation has led to design enhancements that will assure that no data loss will occur during loss of RF transmission of the sensors

  10. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  11. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

  12. Radiation monitoring considerations for radiobiology facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland, T.W.; McFall, E.D.

    1976-01-01

    Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, conducts a wide variety of radiobiology and radioecology research in a number of facilities on the Hanford Reservation. Review of radiation monitoring problems associated with storage, plant and animal experiments, waste handling and sterile facilities shows that careful monitoring, strict procedural controls and innovative techniques are required to minimize occupational exposure and control contamination. Although a wide variety of radioactivity levels are involved, much of the work is with extremely low level materials. Monitoring low level work is mundane and often impractical but cannot be ignored in today's ever tightening controls

  13. Study of the response of radiation protection monitors in terms of H*(10) in X radiation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nonato, Fernanda B.C.; Carvalho, Valdir S.; Vivolo, Vitor; Caldas, Linda V.E.

    2009-01-01

    The ambient dose equivalent, H * (10), is an operational quantity recommended by the International Commission of radiation Units and Measurements Report 39 for measurements in area monitoring. However, most of the monitoring instruments used in radiation protection in Brazil still use the old quantities exposure rate and absorbed dose rate. Therefore, it is necessary to study how to change the operational quantity to H * (10). In this work, the response of radiation protection monitoring detectors was studied in terms of H * (10) for different energies using standard X-rays (narrow beams) at the Calibration Laboratory of IPEN. (author)

  14. Monitoring of low level environmental gamma exposure by the centralized radiation monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katagiri, Hiroshi; Kobayashi, Hideo; Obata, Kazuichi; Kokubu, Morinobu; Itoh, Naoji

    1981-07-01

    In the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), a centralized automatic radiation monitoring system developed 20 years ago has recently been improved to monitor low level gamma radiation more accurately in normal operation of the nuclear facilities and to detect abnormal radioactive releases more effectively. The present state of the system is described. This system puts together environmental monitoring data such as gamma exposure rate (20 points), radioactive concentration in the air (4 points) and in water (2 drains), and meteorological items (14 including wind directions, wind speeds, solar radiation and air temperatures at a observation tower of 40 m height). Environmental monitoring around the JAERI site is carried out effectively using the system. Data processing system consists of a central processing unit, a magnetic disk, a magnetic tape, a line printer and a console typewriter. The data at respective monitoring points are transmitted to the central monitoring room by wireless or telephone line. All data are printed out and field in magnetic disk and magnetic tape every 10 minutes. When the emergency levels are exceeded, however, the data are automatically output on a line printer every 2 minute. This system can distinguish very low gamma exposure due to gaseous effluents, about 1 mR/y, from the background. Even in monthly exposures, calculated values based on the data of release amount and meteorology are in good agreement with the measured ones. (author)

  15. Safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fattah, A.

    2000-01-01

    Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

  16. Advanced Nuclear Measurements - Sensitivity Analysis Emerging Safeguards, Problems and Proliferation Risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, J.S.

    1999-01-01

    During the past year this component of the Advanced Nuclear Measurements LDRD-DR has focused on emerging safeguards problems and proliferation risk by investigating problems in two domains. The first is related to the analysis, quantification, and characterization of existing inventories of fissile materials, in particular, the minor actinides (MA) formed in the commercial fuel cycle. Understanding material forms and quantities helps identify and define future measurement problems, instrument requirements, and assists in prioritizing safeguards technology development. The second problem (dissertation research) has focused on the development of a theoretical foundation for sensor array anomaly detection. Remote and unattended monitoring or verification of safeguards activities is becoming a necessity due to domestic and international budgetary constraints. However, the ability to assess the trustworthiness of a sensor array has not been investigated. This research is developing an anomaly detection methodology to assess the sensor array

  17. Offsite environmental monitoring report. Radiation monitoring around United States nuclear test areas, calendar year 1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, M.G.; Flotard, R.D.; Fontana, C.A.; Hennessey, P.A.; Maunu, H.K.; Mouck, T.L.; Mullen, A.A.; Sells, M.D.

    1999-01-01

    This report describes the Offsite Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (OREMP) conducted during 1997 by the US Environmental Protection Agency's (EPAs), Radiation and Indoor Environments National Laboratory, Las Vegas, Nevada. This laboratory operated an environmental radiation monitoring program in the region surrounding the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and at former test sites in Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico. The surveillance program is designed to measure levels and trends of radioactivity, if present, in the environment surrounding testing areas to ascertain whether current radiation levels and associated doses to the general public are in compliance with existing radiation protection standards. The surveillance program additionally has the responsibility to take action to protect the health and well being of the public in the event of any accidental release of radioactive contaminants. Offsite levels of radiation and radioactivity are assessed by sampling and analyzing milk, water, and air; by deploying and reading thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs); and using pressurized ionization chambers (PICs) to measure ambient gamma exposure rates with a sensitivity capable of detecting low level exposures not detected by other monitoring methods

  18. Offsite environmental monitoring report: Radiation monitoring around United States nuclear test areas, calendar year 1997

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davis, M.G.; Flotard, R.D.; Fontana, C.A.; Hennessey, P.A.; Maunu, H.K.; Mouck, T.L.; Mullen, A.A.; Sells, M.D.

    1999-01-01

    This report describes the Offsite Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (OREMP) conducted during 1997 by the US Environmental Protection Agency`s (EPAs), Radiation and Indoor Environments National Laboratory, Las Vegas, Nevada. This laboratory operated an environmental radiation monitoring program in the region surrounding the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and at former test sites in Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico. The surveillance program is designed to measure levels and trends of radioactivity, if present, in the environment surrounding testing areas to ascertain whether current radiation levels and associated doses to the general public are in compliance with existing radiation protection standards. The surveillance program additionally has the responsibility to take action to protect the health and well being of the public in the event of any accidental release of radioactive contaminants. Offsite levels of radiation and radioactivity are assessed by sampling and analyzing milk, water, and air; by deploying and reading thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs); and using pressurized ionization chambers (PICs) to measure ambient gamma exposure rates with a sensitivity capable of detecting low level exposures not detected by other monitoring methods.

  19. Offsite environmental monitoring report: Radiation monitoring around United States nuclear test areas, calendar year 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaloud, D.J; Daigler, D.M.; Davis, M.G.

    1996-06-01

    This report describes the Offsite Radiation Safety Program conducted during 1993 by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory - Las Vegas (EMSL-LV). This laboratory operates an environmental radiation monitoring program in the region surrounding the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and at former test sites in Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico. The surveillance program is designed to measure levels and trends of radioactivity, if present, in the environment surrounding testing areas to ascertain whether current radiation levels and associated doses to the general public are in compliance with existing radiation protection standards. The surveillance program additionally has the responsibility to take action to protect the health and well being of the public in the event of any accidental release of radioactive contaminants. Offsite levels of radiation and radioactivity are assessed by sampling milk, water, and air; by deploying thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and using pressurized ionization chambers (PICs); by biological monitoring of foodstuffs including animal tissues and food crops; and by measurement of radioactive material deposited in humans

  20. Offsite environmental monitoring report: Radiation monitoring around United States nuclear test areas, calendar year 1993

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chaloud, D.J; Daigler, D.M.; Davis, M.G. [and others

    1996-06-01

    This report describes the Offsite Radiation Safety Program conducted during 1993 by the Environmental Protection Agency`s (EPA`s) Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory - Las Vegas (EMSL-LV). This laboratory operates an environmental radiation monitoring program in the region surrounding the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and at former test sites in Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico. The surveillance program is designed to measure levels and trends of radioactivity, if present, in the environment surrounding testing areas to ascertain whether current radiation levels and associated doses to the general public are in compliance with existing radiation protection standards. The surveillance program additionally has the responsibility to take action to protect the health and well being of the public in the event of any accidental release of radioactive contaminants. Offsite levels of radiation and radioactivity are assessed by sampling milk, water, and air; by deploying thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and using pressurized ionization chambers (PICs); by biological monitoring of foodstuffs including animal tissues and food crops; and by measurement of radioactive material deposited in humans.

  1. Fast Enrichment Screening for Safeguards Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, A.; McElhaney, S.

    2010-01-01

    Methods for rapid non-destructive uranium enrichment classification of large containers are of importance to safeguards and counter-terrorism agencies. There is a need to quickly categorize and segregate suspect items as 'depleted' or 'enriched' on a 'Go/No Go' basis. Recent improvements in gamma spectroscopy technologies have provided the capability to perform rapid field analysis using portable and hand-held devices such as battery-operated medium and high resolution detectors (including lanthanum halide and high purity germanium). Furthermore a new generation of portal monitors are currently under development with advanced spectroscopic capabilities. Instruments and technologies that were previously the domain of complex lab systems are now widely available as touch-screen 'off-the-shelf' units. Despite such advances, the task of enrichment analysis remains a complex exercise. This is particularly so when surveying large items such as drums and crates containing debris of unknown density and composition contaminated with uranium. The challenge is equally applicable to safeguards inspectors evaluating large items and for interdiction of illicit special nuclear materials in mass transport e.g. shipping containers at ports and borders. The variable shielding, container size, lack of matrix knowledge, wall thickness and self-shielding compound this problem. Performing an accurate assessment within the short count time window demanded of the field operative, leads to the need for a reliable method that can adapt to such conditions and is robust to a wide dynamic range of counting statistics. Several methods are evaluated with reference to the performance metrics defined in applicable standards. The primary issue is to minimize the bias that can result from attenuation effects, particularly as the gamma emissions from U235 are low energy and therefore highly susceptible to absorption in large containers with metal scrap. Use of other radiometric signatures such as

  2. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  3. Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

    1983-01-01

    Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

  4. Development of radiation safety monitoring system at gamma greenhouse gamma facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hairul Nizam Idris; Azimawati Ahmad, Ahmad Zaki Hussain; Ahmad Fairuz Mohd Nasir

    2009-01-01

    This paper is discussing about installation of radiation safety monitoring system at Gamma Greenhouse Gamma facility, Agrotechnology and Bioscience Division (BAB). This facility actually is an outdoor type irradiation facility, which first in Nuclear Malaysia and the only one in Malaysia. Source Cs-137 (801 Curie) was use as radiation source and it located at the centre of 30 metres diameter size of open irradiation area. The radiation measurement and monitoring system to be equipped in this facility were required the proper equipment and devices, specially purpose for application at outside of building. Research review, literature study and discussion with the equipment manufacturers was being carried out, in effort to identify the best system should be developed. Factors such as tropical climate, environment surrounding and security were considered during selecting the proper system. Since this facility involving with panoramic radiation type, several critical and strategic locations have been fixed with radiation detectors, up to the distance at 200 meter from the radiation source. Apart from that, this developed system also was built for capable to provide the online real-time reading (using internet). In general, it can be summarized that the radiation safety monitoring system for outdoor type irradiation facility was found much different and complex compared to the system for indoor type facility. Keyword: radiation monitoring, radiation safety, Gamma Greenhouse, outdoor irradiation facility, panoramic radiation. (Author)

  5. Emergency monitoring strategy and radiation measurements document of the NKS project emergency management and radiation monitoring in nuclear and radiological accidents (EMARAD)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lahtinen, J. [Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) (Finland)

    2006-04-15

    This report is one of the deliverables of the NKS Project Emergency management and radiation monitoring in nuclear and radiological accidents (EMARAD) (20022005). The project and the overall results are briefly described in the NKS publication 'Emergency Management and Radiation Monitoring in Nuclear and Radiological Accidents. Summary Report on the NKS Project EMARAD' (NKS-137, April 2006). In a nuclear or radiological emergency, all radiation measurements must be performed efficiently and the results interpreted correctly in order to provide the decision-makers with adequate data needed in analysing the situation and carrying out countermeasures. Managing measurements in different situations in a proper way requires the existence of pre-prepared emergency monitoring strategies. Preparing a comprehensive yet versatile strategy is not an easy task to perform because there are lots of different factors that have to be taken into account. The primary objective of this study was to discuss the general problematics concerning emergency monitoring strategies and to describe a few important features of an efficient emergency monitoring system as well as factors affecting measurement activities in practise. Some information concerning the current situation in the Nordic countries has also been included. (au)

  6. The development of remote wireless radiation dose monitoring system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jin-woo [KAERI - Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Jeongup-si (Korea, Republic of); Chonbuk National University, Jeonjoo-Si (Korea, Republic of); Jeong, Kyu-hwan [KINS - Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon-Si (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Jong-il [Chonbuk National University, Jeonjoo-Si (Korea, Republic of); Im, Chae-wan [REMTECH, Seoul-Si (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-07-01

    Internet of things (IoT) technology has recently shown a large flow of IT trends in human life. In particular, our lives are now becoming integrated with a lot of items around the 'smart-phone' with IoT, including Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC), Beacons, WiFi, and Global Positioning System (GPS). Our project focuses on the interconnection of radiation dosimetry and IoT technology. The radiation workers at a nuclear facility should hold personal dosimeters such as a Thermo-Luminescence Dosimeter (TLD), an Optically Stimulated Luminescence Dosimeter (OSL), pocket ionization chamber dosimeters, an Electronic Personal Dosimeter (EPD), or an alarm dosimeter on their body. Some of them have functions that generate audible or visible alarms to radiation workers in a real working area. However, such devices used in radiation fields these days have no functions for communicating with other areas or the responsible personnel in real time. In particular, when conducting a particular task in a high dose area, or a number of repair works within a radiation field, radiation dose monitoring is important for the health of the workers and the work efficiency. Our project aims at the development of a remote wireless radiation dose monitoring system (RWRD) that can be used to monitor the radiation dose in a nuclear facility for radiation workers and a radiation protection program In this project, a radiation dosimeter is the detection device for personal radiation dose, a smart phone is the mobile wireless communication tool, and, Beacon is the wireless starter for the detection, communication, and position of the worker using BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy). In this report, we report the design of the RWRD and a demonstration case in a real radiation field. (authors)

  7. The development of remote wireless radiation dose monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jin-woo; Jeong, Kyu-hwan; Kim, Jong-il; Im, Chae-wan

    2015-01-01

    Internet of things (IoT) technology has recently shown a large flow of IT trends in human life. In particular, our lives are now becoming integrated with a lot of items around the 'smart-phone' with IoT, including Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC), Beacons, WiFi, and Global Positioning System (GPS). Our project focuses on the interconnection of radiation dosimetry and IoT technology. The radiation workers at a nuclear facility should hold personal dosimeters such as a Thermo-Luminescence Dosimeter (TLD), an Optically Stimulated Luminescence Dosimeter (OSL), pocket ionization chamber dosimeters, an Electronic Personal Dosimeter (EPD), or an alarm dosimeter on their body. Some of them have functions that generate audible or visible alarms to radiation workers in a real working area. However, such devices used in radiation fields these days have no functions for communicating with other areas or the responsible personnel in real time. In particular, when conducting a particular task in a high dose area, or a number of repair works within a radiation field, radiation dose monitoring is important for the health of the workers and the work efficiency. Our project aims at the development of a remote wireless radiation dose monitoring system (RWRD) that can be used to monitor the radiation dose in a nuclear facility for radiation workers and a radiation protection program In this project, a radiation dosimeter is the detection device for personal radiation dose, a smart phone is the mobile wireless communication tool, and, Beacon is the wireless starter for the detection, communication, and position of the worker using BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy). In this report, we report the design of the RWRD and a demonstration case in a real radiation field. (authors)

  8. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  9. Personal monitoring and assessment of doses received by radiation workers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swindon, T.N.; Morris, N.D.

    1981-12-01

    The Personal Radiation Monitoring Service operated by the Australian Radiation Laboratory is outlined and the types of monitors used for assessment of doses received by radiation workers are described. The distribution of doses received by radiation workers in different occupational categories is determined. From these distributions, the average doses received have been assessed and the maximum likely additional increase in cancer deaths in Australia as a result of occupational exposure estimated. This increase is shown to be very small. There is, however, a considerable spread of doses received by individuals within occupational groups

  10. Monitoring, Analyzing and Assessing Radiation Belt Loss and Energization

    Science.gov (United States)

    Daglis, I.; Balasis, G.; Bourdarie, S.; Horne, R.; Khotyaintsev, Y.; Mann, I.; Santolik, O.; Turner, D.; Anastasiadis, A.; Georgiou, M.; Giannakis, O.; Papadimitriou, C.; Ropokis, G.; Sandberg, I.; Angelopoulos, V.; Glauert, S.; Grison, B., Kersten T.; Kolmasova, I.; Lazaro, D.; Mella, M.; Ozeke, L.; Usanova, M.

    2013-09-01

    We present the concept, objectives and expected impact of the MAARBLE (Monitoring, Analyzing and Assessing Radiation Belt Loss and Energization) project, which is being implemented by a consortium of seven institutions (five European, one Canadian and one US) with support from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme. The MAARBLE project employs multi-spacecraft monitoring of the geospace environment, complemented by ground-based monitoring, in order to analyze and assess the physical mechanisms leading to radiation belt particle energization and loss. Particular attention is paid to the role of ULF/VLF waves. A database containing properties of the waves is being created and will be made available to the scientific community. Based on the wave database, a statistical model of the wave activity dependent on the level of geomagnetic activity, solar wind forcing, and magnetospheric region will be developed. Multi-spacecraft particle measurements will be incorporated into data assimilation tools, leading to new understanding of the causal relationships between ULF/VLF waves and radiation belt dynamics. Data assimilation techniques have been proven as a valuable tool in the field of radiation belts, able to guide 'the best' estimate of the state of a complex system. The MAARBLE (Monitoring, Analyzing and Assessing Radiation Belt Energization and Loss) collaborative research project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-SPACE-2011-1) under grant agreement no. 284520.

  11. Safeguards evolution towards unattended c/s (containment and surveillance) systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valentino, Lucia I.; Saavedra, Analia D.; Castro, Laura B.; Maceiras, Elena; Llacer, Carlos D.; Vicens, Hugo E.; Mairal, Maria L.; Fernandez Moreno, Sonia

    2000-01-01

    This paper shows the development and evolution of safeguards towards the use of different containment and surveillance (C/S) systems, which involve the possibility of working unattended. They are designed to transmit safeguards relevant data remotely. It is believed that they would increase safeguards efficiency while maintaining or even enhancing their effectiveness. At present, unattended C/S systems with or without remote transmission are in place at several installations. In addition, some other possible applications are being tested. One of these is the Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) field trial at Embalse nuclear power plant to cover the transfers of spent fuel from the ponds to the dry storage. Some of the matters to be addressed are of general nature (i.e. applicable to any unattended/remote system) while others depend on the specific application in a nuclear installation. Among others, the following are particularly important: -) Sharing of data with the SSAC; -) Impact of a failure of the RMS on the operator, IAEA and the SSAC; -) Provision of relevant operational and accounting information; -) Review of the current safeguard approach for the selected installation; -) RMS cost-effectiveness assessment. This paper describes the status of the RMS field trial as well as the current C/S system in place at Embalse nuclear power plant. (authors)

  12. Radiation monitoring network of the Slovak Hydrometeorological Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Melicherova, T.

    2005-01-01

    In 2000 Centre of Partial monitoring system 'Radioactivity of environment' was established on Slovak Hydrometeorology Institute (SHMI). Radiation monitoring network is one part of Radiation monitoring network of the Slovak Republic. At present SHMI operates in its monitoring network 23 detectors GammaTracer fy Genitron, one mobile detector and one stan by detector. All active detectors are placed in the professional meteorological stations in the selected parts of Slovakia. First one of these detectors was installed in 1999 and they replaced former type of detector (FAG). Last two detectors were installed in 2002. Detector GammaTracer has range of measurement from 20 nSv/h to 10 Sv/h. The detectors are calibrated every 2 years in the Slovak Institute of Metrology in compliance with the calibration plan. SHMI operates 4 aerosol monitors in Hurbanovo, Lucenec, Stropkov and Liesek. Filter 8 from these monitors are analysed in the Institute of Public Health (Cs-137, Be-7). On the base of bilateral agreement between the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water-Management and the Slovak Ministry of Environment Austrian side gave into the ownership of the Slovak side an automatic aerosol monitor AMS-02 including container and weather station. This monitor was installed in meteorological station Jaslovske Bohunice on 4-th October 2001. The Slovak Ministry of Environment provides the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water-Management with the readings of this monitor, free of charge, for at least 3 years and vice versa, the Austrian side gives the readings of the Austrian aerosol monitors to the Slovak Ministry of Environment free of charge. At present national monitoring center in Bratislava-Koliba is connected via ISDN line with Jaslovske Bohunice and Austrian center providing the data exchange. Radiation data (dose rate in the unit nSv/h) are collected via the Institute network to the MSS (message switch system) in the

  13. Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

    2015-01-01

    Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

  14. Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anttila, M.

    2000-08-01

    Finland under the national and international safeguards is very limited, the main objects under control being four light-water reactors with a once-through uranium based fuel cycle. On the other hand, the national safeguards system is strong and competent. Therefore, Finland should be able to fulfill the provisions of the Additional Protocol fast and well. Also the state-level evaluation of Finland by the IAEA can be assumed to be quite straightforward. An IS system suitable to the Finnish conditions would put an end to the interim routine inspections and to the use of permanent camera surveillance. On the other hand, the IAEA could carry out one unannounced or short-notice inspection per year in Finland. The Agency would also get continuously up-to-date information of all nuclear activities in the country. The Finnish SSAC is assumed to be maintained and further developed also in the future. The national safeguards inspections and measurements by Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) would be continued. The implementation of the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the application of the IS system in Finland requires good cooperation, mutual trust and division of work between four actors of the play: the operators of the nuclear facilities, STUK, Euratom and the IAEA. Each of them shall have the well-specified roles and functional responsibilities. The international safeguards agencies should utilise the national resources more effectively than before. (orig.)

  15. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1987-01-01

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

  16. Current technical issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.

    1977-01-01

    Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

  17. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  18. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

  19. Analysis of facility-monitoring data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Howell, J.A.

    1996-09-01

    This paper discusses techniques for analysis of data collected from nuclear-safeguards facility-monitoring systems. These methods can process information gathered from sensors and make interpretations that are in the best interests of the facility or agency, thereby enhancing safeguards while shortening inspection time.

  20. Radiation survey meters used for environmental monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjerke, H.; Sigurdsson, T.; Meier Pedersen, K.; Grindborg, J.-E.; Persson, L.; Siiskonen, T.; Hakanen, A.; Kosunen, A.

    2012-01-01

    The Nordic dosimetry group set up the GammaRate project to investigate how its expertise could be used to assure appropriate usage of survey meters in environmental monitoring. Considerable expertise in calibrating radiation instruments exists in the Nordic radiation protection authorities. The Swedish, Finnish, Danish and Norwegian authorities operate Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratories (SSDLs) that provide users with calibration traceable to internationally recognised primary standards. These authorities together with the Icelandic authorities have formally cooperated since 2002 in the field of radiation dosimetry. Dosimetry is the base for assesment of risk from ionising radiation and calibration of instruments is an imported part in dosimetry. The Nordic dosimetry group has been focused on cancer therapy. This work extends the cooperation to the dosimetry of radiation protection and environmental monitoring. This report contains the formal, theoretical and practical background for survey meter measurements. Nordic standards dosimetry laboratories have the capability to provide traceable calibration of instruments in various types of radiation. To verify and explore this further in radiation protection applications a set of survey instruments were sent between the five Nordic countries and each of the authority asked to provide a calibration coefficient for all instruments. The measurement results were within the stated uncertainties, except for some results from NRPA for the ionchamber based instrument. The comparison was shown to be a valuable tool to harmonize the calibration of radiation protection instruments in the Nordic countries. Dosimetry plays an important role in the emergency situations, and it is clear that better traceability and harmonised common guidelines will improve the emergency preparedness and health. (Author)

  1. Radiation survey meters used for environmental monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bjerke, H. (ed.) (Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, NRPA (Norway)); Sigurdsson, T. (Icelandic Radiation Safety Authority, Geislavarnir Rikisins, GR (IS)); Meier Pedersen, K. (National Board of Health, Statens Institut for Straalebeskyttelse (SIS) (Denmark)); Grindborg, J.-E.; Persson, L. (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, Straalsaekerhetsmyndigheten (SSM) (Sweden)); Siiskonen, T.; Hakanen, A.; Kosunen, A. (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Saeteilyturvakeskus (STUK) (Finland))

    2012-01-15

    The Nordic dosimetry group set up the GammaRate project to investigate how its expertise could be used to assure appropriate usage of survey meters in environmental monitoring. Considerable expertise in calibrating radiation instruments exists in the Nordic radiation protection authorities. The Swedish, Finnish, Danish and Norwegian authorities operate Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratories (SSDLs) that provide users with calibration traceable to internationally recognised primary standards. These authorities together with the Icelandic authorities have formally cooperated since 2002 in the field of radiation dosimetry. Dosimetry is the base for assesment of risk from ionising radiation and calibration of instruments is an imported part in dosimetry. The Nordic dosimetry group has been focused on cancer therapy. This work extends the cooperation to the dosimetry of radiation protection and environmental monitoring. This report contains the formal, theoretical and practical background for survey meter measurements. Nordic standards dosimetry laboratories have the capability to provide traceable calibration of instruments in various types of radiation. To verify and explore this further in radiation protection applications a set of survey instruments were sent between the five Nordic countries and each of the authority asked to provide a calibration coefficient for all instruments. The measurement results were within the stated uncertainties, except for some results from NRPA for the ionchamber based instrument. The comparison was shown to be a valuable tool to harmonize the calibration of radiation protection instruments in the Nordic countries. Dosimetry plays an important role in the emergency situations, and it is clear that better traceability and harmonised common guidelines will improve the emergency preparedness and health. (Author)

  2. Japan-IAEA Workshops on Advanced Safeguards for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffheins, B.; Hori, M.; Suzuki, M.; Kuno, Y.; Kimura, N.; Naito, K.; Hosoya, M.; Khlebnikov, N.; Whichello, J.; Zendel, M.

    2010-01-01

    Beginning in 2007, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards initiated a workshop series focused on advanced safeguards technologies for the future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). The goals for these workshops were to address safeguards challenges, to share implementation experiences, to discuss fuel cycle plans and promising research and development, and to address other issues associated with safeguarding new fuel cycle facilities. Concurrently, the workshops also served to promote dialog and problem solving, and to foster closer collaborations for facility design and planning. These workshops have sought participation from IAEA Member States' support programmes (MSSP), the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, state systems of accounting and control (SSAC), regulators and inspectorates to ensure that all possible stakeholder views can be shared in an open process. Workshop presentations have covered, inter alia, national fuel cycle programs and plans, research progress in proliferation resistance (PR) and safeguardability, approaches for nuclear measurement accountancy of large material throughputs and difficult to access material, new and novel radiation detectors with increased sensitivity and automation, and lessons learned from recent development and operation of safeguards systems for complex facilities and the experiences of integrated safeguards (IS) in Japan. Although the title of the workshops presumes an emphasis on technology, participants recognized that early planning and organization, coupled with close cooperation among stakeholders, that is, through the application of 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) processes that include nuclear safety and security coordination, 'Remote Inspections' and 'Joint-Use of Equipment (JUE)' would be required to enable more successful implementations of safeguards at future NFC facilities. The needs to cultivate the future workforce, effectively preserve

  3. Monitoring radiation use in cardiac fluoroscopy imaging procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Nathaniel T.; Steiner, Stefan H.; Smith, Ian R.; MacKay, R. Jock

    2011-01-01

    Purpose: Timely identification of systematic changes in radiation delivery of an imaging system can lead to a reduction in risk for the patients involved. However, existing quality assurance programs involving the routine testing of equipment performance using phantoms are limited in their ability to effectively carry out this task. To address this issue, the authors propose the implementation of an ongoing monitoring process that utilizes procedural data to identify unexpected large or small radiation exposures for individual patients, as well as to detect persistent changes in the radiation output of imaging platforms. Methods: Data used in this study were obtained from records routinely collected during procedures performed in the cardiac catheterization imaging facility at St. Andrew's War Memorial Hospital, Brisbane, Australia, over the period January 2008-March 2010. A two stage monitoring process employing individual and exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) control charts was developed and used to identify unexpectedly high or low radiation exposure levels for individual patients, as well as detect persistent changes in the radiation output delivered by the imaging systems. To increase sensitivity of the charts, we account for variation in dose area product (DAP) values due to other measured factors (patient weight, fluoroscopy time, and digital acquisition frame count) using multiple linear regression. Control charts are then constructed using the residual values from this linear regression. The proposed monitoring process was evaluated using simulation to model the performance of the process under known conditions. Results: Retrospective application of this technique to actual clinical data identified a number of cases in which the DAP result could be considered unexpected. Most of these, upon review, were attributed to data entry errors. The charts monitoring the overall system radiation output trends demonstrated changes in equipment performance

  4. Monitoring radiation use in cardiac fluoroscopy imaging procedures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stevens, Nathaniel T.; Steiner, Stefan H.; Smith, Ian R.; MacKay, R. Jock [Department of Statistics and Actuarial Sciences, Business and Industrial Statistics Research Group, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 (Canada); St. Andrew' s Medical Institute, St. Andrew' s War Memorial Hospital, Brisbane, Queensland 4000 (Australia); Department of Statistics and Actuarial Sciences, Business and Industrial Statistics Research Group, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 (Canada)

    2011-01-15

    Purpose: Timely identification of systematic changes in radiation delivery of an imaging system can lead to a reduction in risk for the patients involved. However, existing quality assurance programs involving the routine testing of equipment performance using phantoms are limited in their ability to effectively carry out this task. To address this issue, the authors propose the implementation of an ongoing monitoring process that utilizes procedural data to identify unexpected large or small radiation exposures for individual patients, as well as to detect persistent changes in the radiation output of imaging platforms. Methods: Data used in this study were obtained from records routinely collected during procedures performed in the cardiac catheterization imaging facility at St. Andrew's War Memorial Hospital, Brisbane, Australia, over the period January 2008-March 2010. A two stage monitoring process employing individual and exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) control charts was developed and used to identify unexpectedly high or low radiation exposure levels for individual patients, as well as detect persistent changes in the radiation output delivered by the imaging systems. To increase sensitivity of the charts, we account for variation in dose area product (DAP) values due to other measured factors (patient weight, fluoroscopy time, and digital acquisition frame count) using multiple linear regression. Control charts are then constructed using the residual values from this linear regression. The proposed monitoring process was evaluated using simulation to model the performance of the process under known conditions. Results: Retrospective application of this technique to actual clinical data identified a number of cases in which the DAP result could be considered unexpected. Most of these, upon review, were attributed to data entry errors. The charts monitoring the overall system radiation output trends demonstrated changes in equipment

  5. Safeguards systems parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

    1979-01-01

    In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

  6. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  7. Safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, H. S.

    2010-01-01

    Although the safeguards system of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) seems similar to that of Light Water Reactor (LWR), it was raised safeguards challenges of SFR that resulted from the visual opacity of liquid sodium, chemical reactivity of sodium and other characteristics of fast reactor. As it is the basic concept stage of the safeguards of SFR in Korea, this study tried to analyze the latest similar study of safeguards issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) at Joyo and Monju in Japan. For this reason, this study is to introduce some potential safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor. With this analysis, future study could be to address the safeguards challenges of SFR in Korea

  8. Radiation monitor reporting requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bates, W.F.

    1993-01-01

    Within High-Level Waste Management (HLWM), CAMs and VAMPs are currently considered Class B equipment, therefore, alarm conditions associated with the CAMs and VAMPs result in an Unusual Occurrence or Off-Normal notification and subsequent occurrence reporting. Recent equipment difficulties associated with Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs) and Victoreen Area Radiation Monitors (VAMPs) have resulted in a significant number of notification reports. These notification have the potential to decrease operator sensitivity to the significance of specific CAM and VAMP failures. Additionally, the reports are extremely costly and are not appropriate as a means for tracking and trending equipment performance. This report provides a technical basis for a change in Waste Management occurrence reporting categorization for specific CAM and VAMP failure modes

  9. International Atomic Energy Agency use of facility calorimeters for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McRae, L.P.; Delegard, C.H.; Hamilton, R.A.; Westsik, G.A.; Moriarty, T.F.; Lemaire, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is performing nuclear materials safeguards on an inventory of pure and scrap plutonium oxide powder materials held in Vault 3 of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, operated by the Westinghouse Hanford Company for the US Department of Energy at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses qualitative and quantitative techniques to verify the presence and quantity of the nuclear materials under safeguards. The Agency uses weighing, sampling, and destructive analyses to obtain the most accurate verification measurements of containers of plutonium powders. In contrast, the plant operator generally uses non-destructive plutonium assay based on gamma spectrometry and calorimetry for its most accurate plutonium powder container measurements. Recent results have shown that the operator''s calorimeter system achieves measurement variabilities comparable with, or better than, the destructive analyses, particularly for scrap. The results are achieved more quickly and economically, with less waste and lower radiation exposure and contamination hazard, by calorimetry than by classical destructive analyses. Techniques, including authentication methods, are being jointly developed to permit use of the operator''s calorimeter system for international safeguards purposes. The authentication is to ensure the independence of, and to substantiate the validity of, calorimeter measurements for international safeguards. The authentication methods considered and being developed are discussed

  10. Safeguards can not operate alone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

    2013-01-01

    There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  11. The international remote monitoring project and implication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-01-01

    The future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards system is analyzed. Problems of an update on the International Remote Monitoring Project are considered. The Project allows to remotely transmit safeguards-relevant data directly to IAEA from nuclear facilities worldwide. Description of integrated monitoring system (IMS) is given. A key element of state-of-art of IMS is modular nodal system which accepts information from sensors and provides information to both a data storage unit and a transmitter. Remote Monitoring Systems of Australia and Sweden are presented. 3 figs

  12. Development of a Compact Gamma-ray Detector for a Neural-Network Radiation Monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H. S.; Ha, J. H.; Lee, K. H. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, C. H. [Hanyang Univ., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-03-15

    Radiation monitoring is very important to secure safety in nuclear-related facilities and against nuclear terrorism. For wide range of radiation monitoring, neutral network system of radiation detection is most efficient way. Thus, a compact radiation detector is useful to install in wide range to be concerned. A compact gamma-ray detector was fabricated by using a CsI(Tl) scintillator, which was matched with the formerly developed PIN photodiode, for a neural network radiation monitoring. At room temperature, the fabricated compact gamma-ray detector demonstrates an energy resolution of 13.3 % for 662 keV 6.9% for 1330 keV. The compactness, the low-voltage power consumption and the physical hardness are very useful features for a neural network radiation monitoring. In this study, characteristics of a fabricated compact gamma-ray detector were presented. An important aspect to consider in a neural-network radiation monitoring such as reaction probability of the fabricated compact detector for angle of incident gamma-ray was also addressed.

  13. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  14. Application of safeguards procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

  15. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  16. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  17. Personnel radiation monitoring by thermoluminescence dosimetry (2000-2001)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mi-Cho-Cho, Daw; Hla-Hla-Win, Daw; Thin-Thin-Kraing

    2001-01-01

    Thermoluminescence dosimetry service was introduced in 1991. Personnel who exposed directly or indirectly to radiation is monitored by thermoluminescent dosimeter. TL materials used for thermoluminescent dosimeter are in the form of thin disc. Personnel whole-body and extremity doses are measured by thermoluminescence dosimetry. The Harshaw Model 4500 TLD reader and Vinten 654E TLD reader are used for TLD evaluation. At present about 600 radiation workers are provided with TLD for routine monitoring. It was found that most personnel had received within permissible dose recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). (author)

  18. Spectroscopic methods of process monitoring for safeguards of used nuclear fuel separations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Warburton, Jamie Lee

    To support the demonstration of a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel processing plant, techniques and instrumentation to allow the real-time, online determination of special nuclear material concentrations in-process must be developed. An ideal materials accountability technique for proliferation resistance should provide nondestructive, realtime, on-line information of metal and ligand concentrations in separations streams without perturbing the process. UV-Visible spectroscopy can be adapted for this precise purpose in solvent extraction-based separations. The primary goal of this project is to understand fundamental URanium EXtraction (UREX) and Plutonium-URanium EXtraction (PUREX) reprocessing chemistry and corresponding UV-Visible spectroscopy for application in process monitoring for safeguards. By evaluating the impact of process conditions, such as acid concentration, metal concentration and flow rate, on the sensitivity of the UV-Visible detection system, the process-monitoring concept is developed from an advanced application of fundamental spectroscopy. Systematic benchtop-scale studies investigated the system relevant to UREX or PUREX type reprocessing systems, encompassing 0.01-1.26 M U and 0.01-8 M HNO3. A laboratory-scale TRansUranic Extraction (TRUEX) demonstration was performed and used both to analyze for potential online monitoring opportunities in the TRUEX process, and to provide the foundation for building and demonstrating a laboratory-scale UREX demonstration. The secondary goal of the project is to simulate a diversion scenario in UREX and successfully detect changes in metal concentration and solution chemistry in a counter current contactor system with a UV-Visible spectroscopic process monitor. UREX uses the same basic solvent extraction flowsheet as PUREX, but has a lower acid concentration throughout and adds acetohydroxamic acid (AHA) as a complexant/reductant to the feed solution to prevent the extraction of Pu. By examining

  19. Radiation monitoring network in Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grabowski, D.; Kurowski, W.; Muszynski, W.; Rubel, B.; Smagala, G.; Swietochowska, J.

    2001-01-01

    In Poland the radioactive contamination of the environment and food has been controlled since the early sixties by the Service for Measurements of Radioactive Contamination (SPSP). The service comprises a network of measuring stations and the Centre of Radioactive Contamination Measurements (COPSP). Actually, there are 100 measurement stations. The main task of such station is systematic measurement of radioactivity level in samples of environment components and food. Nine stations of SPSP acting within meteorological stations, ten stations of low level air radioactivity measurements (Aerosols Sampling Stations-500) and eleven permanent monitoring stations (PMS) form the radiation monitoring warning system in Poland. (author)

  20. Autonomous radiation monitoring of small vessels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ziock, K.P.; Cheriyadat, A.; Fabris, L.; Goddard, J.; Hornback, D.; Karnowski, T.; Kerekes, R.; Newby, J.

    2011-01-01

    Small private vessels are one avenue by which nuclear materials may be smuggled across international borders. While one can contemplate using the land-based approach of radiation portal monitors on the navigable waterways that lead to many ports, these systems are ill-suited to the problem. In contrast to roadways, where lanes segregate vehicles, and motion is well controlled by inspection booths; channels, inlets, and rivers present chaotic traffic patterns populated by vessels of all sizes. A unique solution to this problem is based on a portal-less portal monitor designed to handle free-flowing traffic on roadways with up to five-traffic lanes. The instrument uses a combination of visible-light and gamma-ray imaging to acquire and link radiation images to individual vehicles. This paper presents the results of a recent test of the system in a maritime setting.