Review of the nuclear safeguards problem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poch, L.A.; Wolsko, T.D.

1979-10-01

The issues surrounding nuclear safeguards are proliferation and terrorism. Protecting the nuclear fuel cycle against nuclear materials diversion has been the function of the NPT and the IAEA. However, because all nations have not signed the NPT and IAEA safeguarding inspections are not foolproof, the fuel cycle itself has been looked to as a possible way to alleviate concerns over proliferation. A civilian nuclear industry is not needed to produce weapon material, since research reactors can provide the necessary weapon-grade uranium or plutonium much cheaper and easier than commercial power reactors. Thus, altering the nuclear fuel cycle does not necessarily reduce the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only strict enforcement of the NPT and of the safeguard guidelines of the IAEA can achieve nonproliferation. Changing the fuel cycle does not present terrorists from stealing highly radioactive material to be used for weapons or from sabotaging nuclear facilities. Policing a nuclear facility by using guards, alarms, barriers, and searching and screening of employees is the only way to protect against terrorism, but these actions raise questions regarding civil liberties

Partitioning and transmutation - Technical feasibility, proliferation resistance and safeguardability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schenkel, R.; Glatz, J.-P.; Magill, J.; Mayer, K.

2001-01-01

Full text: The advantages of partitioning and transmutation (P and T) of minor actinides and selected fission products are largely discussed and described in literature. The advantages of separation of the long-lived alpha-emitters for the long-term storage of highly radioactive waste have been highlighted. After separation, these nuclides shall be transmuted by means of a dedicated reactor or accelerator driven system into shorter-lived fission products that are less hazardous. This, however, requires the development and implementation of a P and T fuel cycle, involving chemical separation of the minor actinides and the fabrication of MA containing fuels or targets. Concepts for P and T fuel cycles have been developed and technical issues are being addressed in various research programs. With the recognition of the proliferation potential associated with the minor actinides by the IAEA, also the proliferation and safeguards aspects need to be addressed. It is important to raise these points at an early stage of process development, in order to identify potential problems and to develop appropriate solutions. The oxide fuels used worldwide in thermal reactor systems for energy production are reprocessed by aqueous techniques. Therefore these systems, primarily the PUREX process, are fully developed and implemented commercially. Furthermore, the safeguards approach is fully implemented in existing facilities, covering uranium and plutonium. Pyroprocess systems have largely been associated with fast reactors and metallic fuels and their development has therefore only reached the pilot-scale stage and the feasibility of minor actinide (MA) separation still needs to be demonstrated. Hydrometallurgical and pyrochemical reprocessing should however not be considered as competing but rather as complementary technologies. For instance in a so-called double strata concept (foreseen for instance in the Japanese OMEGA project), the PUREX process (first stratum) would be

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

2015-01-01

The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Broodryk, Alta

2001-01-01

South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

Safeguard Verification as Cooperative Measure for Non Proliferation Control in Peru

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ramirez, R.

2010-01-01

Peru applies the safeguard measures on its nuclear activities based in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and the Additional Protocol which has been fully implemented becoming part of the Integrated Safeguard since 2005. In addition to international safeguard commitments Peru is also committed with the United Nations 1540 Resolution by which national controls has to be established for preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vector systems. The safeguards measures have become an important part of the verification activities related to this Resolution by analyzing of materials and equipment to be imported or that may be in transit across the country. These activities are part of those developed jointly with other governmental organizations. (author)

Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kuno, Y. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear-Non-proliferation Science and Technology Centre (NPSTC), 2-4 Shirane Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, 319-1195 (Japan); University of Tokyo, Nuclear Engineering and Management, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656 (Japan)], E-mail: kuno.yusuke@jaea.go.jp; Inoue, N. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear-Non-proliferation Science and Technology Centre (NPSTC), 2-4 Shirane Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, 319-1195 (Japan); University of Tokyo, Nuclear Engineering and Management, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656 (Japan); Senzaki, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear-Non-proliferation Science and Technology Centre (NPSTC), 2-4 Shirane Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, 319-1195 (Japan)

2009-03-15

Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge.

Nuclear proliferation: prospects, problems, and proposals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1977-01-01

This issue of the ANNALS addresses itself to three aspects of nuclear proliferation: the prospect that new nuclear powers will come on the scene, the problems that their arrival may create, and ways of coping with those problems. In an introductory paper, ''Quo Vadimus,'' Joseph I. Coffey investigates the pros and cons of proliferation, concluding that it is not a question of whether there will be nuclear proliferation, but in what countries. Part I, Where We Are, contains five papers preceded by introductory comments by Joseph I. Coffey. The papers and their authors are: Why States Go--and Don't Go--Nuclear, William Epstein; How States Can ''Go Nuclear,'' Frank C. Barnaby; What Happens If. . .Terrorists, Revolutionaries, and Nuclear Weapons, David Kreiger; Safeguards Against Diversion of Nuclear Material: An Overview, Ryukichi Imai; and Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation, George H. Quester. Part II, And Where We May Go, again includes some introductory remarks by Joseph I. Coffey. The seven succeeding papers are: Nth Powers of the Future, Ashok Kapur; Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics, Lewis A. Dunn; Arms Control in a Nuclear Armed World, Colin Gray; The United Nations, the Superpowers, and Proliferation, Abraham Bargman; Proliferation and the Future: Destruction or Transformation, Frederick C. Thayer; Decision Making in a Nuclear Armed World, Michael Brenner; and The United States in a World of Nuclear Powers, Michael Nacht. This special report is concluded with a glossary

Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

2015-01-01

Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

Solution Monitoring Evaluated by Proliferation Risk Assessment and Fuzzy Optimization Analysis for Safeguards in a Reprocessing Process

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mitsutoshi Suzuki

2013-01-01

Full Text Available Solution monitoring (SM has been used in a nuclear reprocessing plant as an additional measure to provide assurance that the plant is operated as declared. The inline volume and density monitoring equipment with dip tubes is important for safety and safeguards purposes and is a typical example of safeguards by design (SBD. Recently safety, safeguards, and security by design (3SBD are proposed to promote an efficient and effective generation of nuclear energy. In 3SBD, proliferation risk assessment has the potential to consider likelihood of the incidence and proliferation risk in safeguards. In this study, risk assessment methodologies for safeguards and security are discussed and several mathematical methods are presented to investigate risk notion applied to intentional acts of facility misuse in an uncertainty environment. Proliferation risk analysis with the Markov model, deterrence effect with the game model, and SBD with fuzzy optimization are shown in feasibility studies to investigate the potential application of the risk and uncertainty analyses in safeguards. It is demonstrated that the SM is an effective measurement system using risk-informed and cost-effective SBD, even though there are inherent difficulties related to the possibility of operator’s falsification.

Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

2013-01-01

The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Safeguarding the atom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

1985-01-01

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Moore, L.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

1996-05-01

The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.

Proliferation risks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.

1998-09-01

The report gives an overview of different aspects related to safeguards of fissile materials. Existing treaties including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Tlatelolco and the Rarotonga Treaties are discussed. An overview of safeguards systems for the control of fissile materials as well as the role of various authorities is given. An overall overview of proliferation risks, the physical protection of fissile materials and the trade in fissile materials is given. Finally, the status in problem countries and de facto nuclear weapon states is discussed

A technical analysis of the IAEA nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoon, J. W.

1998-01-01

In the post-Cold War era, the threats of horizontal nuclear proliferation emerge as the forefront security issue while the nuclear arms races among existing nuclear weapon states reduce to a remarkable extent. In this context, there arises lots of research attention to the IAEA nuclear safeguards which have been viewed as the core of international monitoring on the clandestine nuclear activities of potential proliferators. However, previous attention tended to highlight the political aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, centering on the possibilities and limitations of the IAEA's inspection authority. In contrast, this paper purports to focus on the technical aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, so it can show the intrinsic problems of those safeguards in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This paper mainly deals with the technical objectives and options of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, the technical indices of clandestine nuclear activities, and some measures to improve the efficacy of the IAEA nuclear safeguards. Hopefully, this paper is expected to lead us to approach the issue of the North Korean nuclear transparency from the technical perspective as well as the political one

Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-06-01

This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-04-01

This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

ESARDA approach to facility oriented safeguards problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stewart, R.

1979-01-01

The paper outlines the brief history of a Working Group composed of nuclear fuel plant operators, safeguards research workers and safeguards inspectors who are examining facility orientated problems of nuclear materials control and verification activities. The working program is reviewed together with some examples of various problems and the way the group is collaborating to develop solutions by pooling resources and effort. Work in European low enriched uranium fabrication plants from UF 6 to finished fuel is discussed in connection with mesurement practices, real time accounting, error propagation and analysis, verification and surveillance

The third review conference of the parties of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recent developments concerning international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Richter, B.; Schlupp, C.; Stein, G.

1986-11-01

The non-proliferation activities and instruments are listed in a table. The two main instruments are the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards, which are supplemented by treaties of regional restricted effects, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the EURATOM treaty. The two-tier structure of the treaties, i.e. to provide for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and at the same time foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, has proven to have a particularly stabilizing effect, which was confirmed by the last Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. The conference members were particularly satisfied with the results of the IAEA Safeguards. Future developments towards improving international safeguards will concentrate on operator-friendly and financially reasonable safeguards measures, such as safeguards effectiveness evaluations and near-real-time accountancy. The results of the CAS discussions on the definition of principles and goals of co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are of importance also to the PUNE conference. The PUNE conference will be held in 1987 and is expected to yield points of orientation for further embedding the non-proliferation principle in the international co-operative activities and the nuclear business in the 1980s. (orig./HP) [de

Non-proliferation and international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blix, H.

1992-01-01

Full text: In my view, drastic nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon States could be coupled with universal commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear weapon States by 1995 when the extension of the NPT Will be discussed. The incentives and disincentives for making and stockpiling nuclear weapons are first of all in the political and security fields, (Global and regional detente reduce the incentive, With the cold war gone, the US and Russia are now agreeing on far-reaching cuts in their nuclear arsenals and at some point the other declared nuclear weapon States Will follow.In the regional fields, we have seen how Argentina and Brazil are about to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of the atom through the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty. And we have seen how South Africa has joined the NPT. A new wave of States adhering to the NPT may be expected from countries in the former Soviet Union. Some have already come, others are on the way. Detente in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent would improve the outlook for non-proliferation in these areas. A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions on sensitive nuclear material and equipment, Following the discoveries in Iraq, these restrictions are being strengthened in a large number of States. A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the economic and political consequences that would follow for a State if IAEA safeguards inspection revealed activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. These must have a high degree of reliability. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible for a closed, highly militarized State to hide nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world We are now drawing the lessons from this case. It is not physically possible for inspectors to look into every building and basement in vast countries, They must have information about where to look, and the IAEA is significantly strengthening its information basis. The IAEA has also re

Computerised safeguards in Kazakhstan and its problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yeligbayeva, G.Zh.

1999-01-01

Hereby will be described the Kazakhstan computerized safeguards system. Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency (KAEA) developed guides concerning of Y2K problem for facilities. The results of preliminary analyze of this problem are presented. (author)

University of Texas Safeguards by Design Problem Statement

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rauch, Eric Benton [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Scherer, Carolynn P. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Ruggiero, Christy E. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2018-01-22

This document describes the problem statement that students at the University of Texas will use for their senior level capstone design class. The purpose of this project is to introduce students to Safeguards by Design concepts as part of their capstone design course at the culmination of their degree program. This work is supported by Los Alamos National Laboratory with FY17 and FY18 programmatic funding from the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (INS), Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Resource Development Program, Safeguards by Design Project.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF SAFEGUARDING HEALTH ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

observes that problems of safeguarding health values and right to health in ... through organized strategies and new approaches deliberately instituted to ... conceptions of a group about what is bad, undesirable and improper towards their ...

Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system (Programme 93+2)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tani, Hiroshi

1999-01-01

Present safeguards systems against nuclear proliferation as well as their improvement activities for more effective results are reviewed. First, the mechanism of the NPT Safeguards System is explained, which is the grasp of inventories of nuclear materials through change and transfer booking starting with actual investigation. Then, other various safeguards systems are described, including TLATELOCO (Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America), VO (Voluntary Offer), OCA (Other Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement), PA (Project Agreement), US (Unilateral Submission), and OSA (Other Safeguards Agreement). Thirdly, the present status and problems of the nuclear proliferation prevention in the world are described, including competitive nuclear weapon development in India and Pakistan, and Iraq and North Korea problems. Lastly, the 93 + 2 plan to improve the present system is explained. (M.M.)

Principles in safeguards: A Canadian perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keen, L.J.

2007-01-01

L.J. Keen presented the Canadian perspective on safeguards. She noted that the IAEA safeguards system has responded well to challenges and has acted as the effective early warning system that it was intended to be. The exit from the non-proliferation regime by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has demonstrated how effective safeguards and verification are seen to be in detecting proliferation activity. The main areas of importance for Canada are effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. Effectiveness requires information and access, and assures citizens of the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Efficiency requires risk informed decisions for the sound allocation of resources and the early incorporation of proliferation resistance in design and construction, so that IAEA efforts can concentrate on where the risks are greatest. Openness and transparency include the public, and for the IAEA this includes its Member States since ultimately they control its activities and finances. Canada received its broader safeguards conclusion in 2005 and intends to maintain it. This will require continuous improvement in an era of rapid expansion of the nuclear industry. One problem foreseen is the adequate supply of qualified personnel, with the CNSC's resources growing at about 12%. The CNSC is looking at internal training programmes and internships

India and the nuclear safeguards controversy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poulose, T.T.

1979-01-01

A brief account of the origin and development of the safeguards system to prevent diversion of nuclear material from its peaceful uses to production of nuclear explosives is given. India is firmly opposed to the discriminatory characteristics of the system. The IAEA safeguards apply to those nations (most of them developing nations) seeking Agency aid and not to the nuclear weapons powers and other advanced nuclear powers who do not need Agency aid. Even though the Tarapur Agreement does not provide for full scope safeguards, U.S.A., particularly after 1974 Pokharan explosion, is pressurisinq India to accept them by delaying the supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur Power Plant. As is assumed by the Americans, India is not indifferent to the problem of proliferation. On the other hand, it has renounced nuclear weapons as an instrument of national policy and is committed to non-proliferation. India has all along since independence advocated universal and non-discriminating full scope safeguards system applicable to all nations, both nuclear and non-nuclear powers and to all nuclear facilities. (M.G.B.)

Proliferation resistance characteristics of advanced nuclear energy systems: a safeguard ability point of view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sevini, F.; Cojazzi, G.G.M.; Renda, G.

2008-01-01

Among the international community there is a renewed interest in nuclear power systems as a major source for energy production in the near to mid future. This is mainly due to concerns connected with future availability of conventional energy resources, and with the environmental impact of fossil fuels. International initiatives have been set up like the Generation 4. International Forum (GIF), the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA-INPRO), and, partially, the US driven Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), aimed at defining and evaluating the characteristics, in which future innovative nuclear energy systems (INS) will have to excel. Among the identified characteristics, Proliferation Resistance plays an important role for being able to widely deploy nuclear technology worldwide in a secure way. Studies having the objective to assess Proliferation Resistance of nuclear fuel cycles have been carried out since the nineteen seventies, e.g., the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) and the Non-proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) initiatives, and all agree in stating that absolute intrinsic proliferation resistance, although desirable, is not achievable in the foreseeable future. The above finding is still valid; as a consequence, every INS will have to comply with agreements related to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and will require safeguards measures, implemented through extrinsic measures. This consideration led to a renewed interest in the Safeguard ability concept which can be seen as a bridge between intrinsic features and extrinsic features and measures.

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-07-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

Safeguards systems parameters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

1979-01-01

In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

Proliferation risks; Proliferatierisico's

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Carchon, R

1998-09-01

The report gives an overview of different aspects related to safeguards of fissile materials. Existing treaties including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Tlatelolco and the Rarotonga Treaties are discussed. An overview of safeguards systems for the control of fissile materials as well as the role of various authorities is given. An overall overview of proliferation risks, the physical protection of fissile materials and the trade in fissile materials is given. Finally, the status in problem countries and de facto nuclear weapon states is discussed.

How safe are nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sullivan, E.

1979-01-01

Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nye, J.S.

1984-01-01

The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xavier, Roberto Salles

2014-01-01

The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

1981-04-01

Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems

International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

1981-04-01

Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems.

Probabilistic risk analysis: its possible use in safeguards problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rasmussen, N.C.

1976-01-01

This paper reviews the methodology which was used in the Reactor Safety Study and in the WASH-1400 report. Its application to the safeguards problem is discussed. It is concluded that, while there are possible applications, an overall quantitative risk assessment of the safeguards issues is at present beyond the capability of the methodology

Some problems relating to application of safeguards in the future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tolchenkov, D.L.

1983-01-01

By the end of this century there will have been a considerable increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA will therefore be faced with problems due to the increased volume of safeguards activity, the application of safeguards to new types of facility and to large facilities, the optimization of the existing IAEA safeguards system and so on. The authors analyse the potential growth in the IAEA's safeguards activities up to the year 2000 and consider how to optimize methods for the application of safeguards, taking into account a number of factors relating to a State's nuclear activity, the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards etc. On the basis of a hypothetical model of the nuclear fuel cycle that allows for the factors considered as part of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the authors assess the possible risk of diversion as a function of a full-scope safeguards effort. They also examine possible conceptual approaches to safeguarding large-scale facilities such as fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants. (author)

Panel on nuclear export and proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kimel, W.R.

1977-01-01

Summaries of six panelists' remarks make the following points: one cannot suppress nuclear weapons by suppressing nuclear power; a proliferated world would be extremely dangerous; US supports IAEA safeguards; plutonium shouldn't be recycled in power reactors; and the problem of nonproliferation is a social and institutional problem, not a technological one. Viewographs showing the semantics of proliferation, ways to get nuclear weapons materials, etc. are included

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

2006-06-01

This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of Safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

2006-06-01

This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.

1998-01-01

Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment of a SFR Metal Fuel Manufacturing Facility (SFMF) using the INPRO Methodology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chang, H. L.; Ko, W. I.; Park, S. H.; Kim, H. D.; Park, G. I. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

To illustrate the proposed Prosta process, to demonstrate its usefulness, and to provide input to a revision of the INPRO manual in the area of proliferation resistance, a case study has been carried out with a conceptually designed sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR) metal fuel manufacturing facility (SFMF), representing novel technology still in the conceptual design phase. A coarse acquisition path analysis has been carried out of the SFMF to demonstrate the assessment process with identified different target materials. The case study demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed PROSA PR assessment process and the interrelationship of the PR assessment with the safeguards-by-design process, identifying potential R and D needs. The PROSA process has been applied to a conceptually designed SFMF, representing novel technology that is still in the conceptual design phase at KAERI. The case study demonstrated that the proposed PROSA process is simpler and easier to perform than the original INPRO methodology and can be applied from the early stage of design showing the relationship of PR assessment to the safeguard-by-design process. New evaluation questionnaire for UR1 is more logical and comprehensive, and provides the legal basis enabling the IAEA to achieve its safeguards objectives including the detection of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. NES information catalogue replacing UR2 was a useful modification and supports safeguardability assessment at the NES and facility level. The proposed PROSA process is also capable to identify strengths and weaknesses of a system in the area of proliferation resistance in a generally understandable form, including R and D gaps that need to be filled in order to meet the criteria for proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system.

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2004-01-01

This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

ElBaradei, M

2004-06-21

This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards.

ESARDA - safeguards in the wake of politics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehrfeld, U.

1983-01-01

As the number of facilities to be put under safeguards control in accordance with non-proliferation aspects increases, the scope and priorities of surveillance measures are becoming more and more of a politica issue. This problem also arises for ESARDA, the association of European research centers and operators of nuclear facilities working on research and development in the safeguards field with the participation of Euratom. It involves the need to keep politics out of this scientific and technical field, also because of the composition of ESARDA. (orig.) [de

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

1976-01-01

Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

Nuclear power and nuclear weapon proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Apold, A.

1978-01-01

The theme of Dr. Marshall's lecture was that it is, from the viewpoint of prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons,preferable to use plutonium as a fuel in FBR reactors rather than store it in what, in effect, would be plutonium mines. The true threat of proliferation lies in uranium enrichment. The FBR reactor is misunderstood and the US policy is not against breeders as such. Safeguards against the misuse of plutonium by leaving a residue of radioactivity after reprocessing is quite feasible, despite certain practical problems and extra costs. Weapon proliferation is subject to political objectives and intentions. Definite proposals are, (a) a limited number of reprocessing centres, (b) an accelerated development of FBR reactors, (c) a new FBR fuel cycle, (d) stop storage of spent thermal reactor fuel, (e) reinforced safeguards. (JIW)

IAEA safeguards: Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons. As the world's nuclear inspectorate, the IAEA performs an indispensable role in furthering nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Following the completion of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, the IAEA has become the instrument with which to verify that the peaceful use commitments made under the NPT or similar agreements are kept through performing what is known as its safeguards role. Under the NPT, governments around the world have committed to three common objectives: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; pursuing nuclear disarmament; and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has made it obligatory for all its non-nuclear weapon State parties to submit all nuclear material in nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. With all but a handful of the world community as State parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to legal agreement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The IAEA takes account of all source and special fissionable material in countries under safeguards. Monitoring and verification activities focus on those types of nuclear material that are the most crucial and relevant to nuclear weapons manufacturing. This includes plutonium-239, uranium-233 and -235 and any material containing one or more of these. Safeguards activities are applied routinely at over 900 facilities in 71 countries. In 2001 alone, more than 21,000 calendar days in the field were devoted to verifying hundreds of tons of special fissionable material by more than IAEA 250 inspectors

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), combines the statutory office of Director of Safeguards with that of Director, Chemical Weapons Convention Office (CWCO). The Director General also performs the functions of the Director, Australian Comprehensive Test-Ban Office (ACTBO) on an informal basis, as the relevant legislation has not yet come into effect. Throughout the year, ASNO made a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Additional Protocol enters general application, as well as the specific arrangements which will apply in Australia. In the latter context, ASNO offers the IAEA a safeguards-friendly environment, together with constructive critique, to assist in the development and testing of new techniques. This work is important in ensuring the effective implementation of strengthened safeguards elsewhere. Substantial progress were made on several new bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements. An agreement with the US covering transfer of the Silex laser enrichment technology came into force, and ASNO is now working with US authorities to develop the detailed administrative arrangements required to give effect to this agreement. Also concluded during the year was an agreement with New Zealand covering transfers of uranium for non-nuclear use (as a colouring agent in glass manufacture). ASNO was also working closely with ANSTO to ensure that nuclear material accountancy and control at Lucas Heights accords with best international practice, particularly having regard to the requirements of the IAEA under integrated safeguards. Excellent professional relationship were maintained with the OPCW and counterpart national authorities

Comments on fuel cycle concepts and impacts on nonproliferation and safeguards concerns

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1997-01-01

Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of proliferation risk profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the proliferation risk concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces the proliferation risk concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the proliferation risk characteristics of fuel cycles concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on proliferation characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring development of advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures

Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

2015-01-01

Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

Geography, prospects, problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.A.V.

1982-01-01

In assessing the application of IAEA safeguards to the world's nuclear industry it is shown that the continuing success of the system depends to a large degree on the political will of the Agency's Member States and of other parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in ensuring both that adequate resources are provided for the safeguards operation and also that safeguards are effectively and impartially applied. The present positions concerning NPT membership, non-NPT safeguards and future prospects with respect to the operation of safeguarded and unsafeguarded facilities are discussed. Political problems which impede the effective application of safeguards are considered. (U.K.)

Safeguards activities in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osabe, Takeshi

1998-01-01

Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

The Canadian safeguards program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

1981-12-01

In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

Application of safeguards procedures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

2011-12-15

Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

Problem statement: international safeguards for a light-water reactor fuels reprocessing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.; Hakkila, E.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Darby, J.L.

1979-03-01

This report considers the problem of developing international safeguards for a light-water reactor (LWR) fuel reprocessing/conversion facility that combines the Purex process with conversion of plutonium nitrate to the oxide by means of plutonium (III) oxalate precipitation and calcination. Current international safeguards systems are based on the complementary concepts of materials accounting and containment and surveillance, which are designed to detect covert, national diversion of nuclear material. This report discusses the possible diversion threats and some types of countermeasures, and it represents the first stage in providing integrated international safeguards system concepts that make optimum use of available resources. The development of design methodology to address this problem will constitute a significant portion of the subsequent effort. Additionally, future technology development requirements are identified. 8 figures, 1 table

Key Nuclear Verification Priorities: Safeguards and Beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

2010-01-01

In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

2010-01-01

In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

The evolution of IAEA safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-01

This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

The evolution of IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Hebditch, David; Morgan, Jim; Meppen, Bruce; DeMuth, Scott; Ehinger, Michael; Hockert, John

2008-01-01

The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing 'nuclear security' risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as 'the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,' with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: (sm b ullet) Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, (sm b ullet) Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, (sm b ullet) Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of 'nuclear security' considerations as 'full and equal' partners in the design process, (sm b ullet) Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and (sm b ullet) Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic

More efficient integrated safeguards by applying a reasonable detection probability for maintaining low presence probability of undetected nuclear proliferating activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Otsuka, Naoto

2013-01-01

Highlights: • A theoretical foundation is presented for more efficient Integrated Safeguards (IS). • Probability of undetected nuclear proliferation activities should be maintained low. • For nations under IS, the probability to start proliferation activities is very low. • The fact can decrease the detection probability of IS by dozens of percentage points. • The cost of IS per nation can be cut down by reducing inspection frequencies etc. - Abstract: A theoretical foundation is presented for implementing more efficiently the present International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) integrated safeguards (ISs) on the basis of fuzzy evaluation of the probability that the evaluated nation will continue peaceful activities. It is shown that by determining the presence probability of undetected nuclear proliferating activities, nations under IS can be maintained at acceptably low proliferation risk levels even if the detection probability of current IS is decreased by dozens of percentage from the present value. This makes it possible to reduce inspection frequency and the number of collected samples, allowing the IAEA to cut costs per nation. This will contribute to further promotion and application of IS to more nations by the IAEA, and more efficient utilization of IAEA resources from the viewpoint of whole IS framework

IAEA safeguards related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons- T.N.P. and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America-Tlatelolco

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodrigues, M.D.F.

1978-04-01

The application of safeguards, focusing mainly the causes that gave origin to this type of control, is studied. The safeguard procedures used by the IAEA are also given, relative to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons - T.N.P. and the Euratom safeguards. Some consideration is given to the organizations related to safeguards application such as IAEA, OPANAL and Euratom, their functions and aims. (F.E.) [pt

Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wonder, E.F.

2010-01-01

The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

Technology development for safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

2005-04-01

The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vaclav, J.

2010-01-01

The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

The international framework for safeguarding peaceful nuclear energy programs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mazer, B.M.

1980-01-01

International law, in response to the need for safeguard assurances, has provided a framework which can be utilized by supplier and recipient states. Multilateral treaties have created the International Atomic Energy Agency which can serve a vital role in the establishment and supervision of safeguard agreements for nuclear energy programs. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has created definite obligations on nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to alleviate some possibilities of proliferation and has rejuvenated the function of the IAEA in providing safeguards, especially to non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the Non-Proliferation treaty. States which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty may receive nuclear energy co-operation subject to IAEA safeguards. States like Canada, have insisted through the bilateral nuclear energy co-operation agreements that either individual or joint agreement be reached with the IAEA for the application of safeguards. Trilateral treaties among Canada, the recipient state and the IAEA have been employed and can provide the necessary assurances against the diversion of peaceful nuclear energy programs to military or non-peaceful uses. The advent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its guidlines has definitely advanced the cause of ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ultimate objective should be the creation of an international structure incorporating the application of the most comprehensive safeguards which will be applied universally to all nuclear energy programs

International nuclear proliferation: multilateral diplomacy and regional aspects

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kapur, A.

1979-01-01

Confidential interviews with about 200 officials at 18 nuclear research sites around the world form the background for this discussion of the proliferation issues as they affect the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Critics of the NPT cite its narrow focus on horizontal proliferation and its failures in the areas of vertical proliferation, nuclear technology transfers, heavy-water-reactor systems, and safeguards. The international negotiations necessary to resolve these issues and the difficulty of reaching a global consensus indicate a need to restructure the U.S. decision process before diplomacy can progress. The book discusses the history and nature of proliferation and its relationship to multinational diplomacy; the problems of permanent and workable safeguards; and regional political ramifications in the creeping dependencies of South Asia, apartheid in South Africa, militarization in Japan, and the nuclearization of Brazil and Argentina. The analysis concludes that central issues were not settled by the NPT and that U.S. failures to speak without consulting allies may mean that a bilateral rather than multinational approach should be tried. 105 references, 5 figures, 12 tables. (DCK)

Analysis of UREX+1a and Pyroprocessing Technologies from Safeguards Aspects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Musembi, Mutava Victor; Jeong, Seung Young; Kwon, Eun Ha

2013-01-01

Various advanced and more easily safeguard-able reprocessing technologies have been proposed and are currently at different stages of development. This paper briefly analyses two proposed next generation reprocessing technologies, i. e. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing. It goes on to suggest various measures that can be taken to safeguard these technologies against nuclear proliferation. Due to the significant proliferation risks associated with PUREX, more proliferation resistant technologies are required in spent fuel reprocessing. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be suitable replacements since Pu is not separated from other TRUs after reprocessing. Implementations of technology specific safeguard measures can help enhance the proliferation resistance of these technologies. Since there is no technology which is foolproof, a MUF uncertainty estimation/quantification technology needs to be developed. These uncertainty estimates can then be used in a safeguards probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) system to quantify the risks associated with a particular reprocessing technology. To further safeguard these technologies, additional safeguard measures are needed for defense in depth. This may include implementation of multiple, independent, and redundant layers of defense such that no single layer, no matter how robust, is solely relied upon. Quantification of safeguard uncertainties related to UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be used to benchmark these technologies against PUREX and between themselves for policy making

Analysis of UREX+1a and Pyroprocessing Technologies from Safeguards Aspects

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Musembi, Mutava Victor [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Jeong, Seung Young [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kwon, Eun Ha [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2013-10-15

Various advanced and more easily safeguard-able reprocessing technologies have been proposed and are currently at different stages of development. This paper briefly analyses two proposed next generation reprocessing technologies, i. e. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing. It goes on to suggest various measures that can be taken to safeguard these technologies against nuclear proliferation. Due to the significant proliferation risks associated with PUREX, more proliferation resistant technologies are required in spent fuel reprocessing. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be suitable replacements since Pu is not separated from other TRUs after reprocessing. Implementations of technology specific safeguard measures can help enhance the proliferation resistance of these technologies. Since there is no technology which is foolproof, a MUF uncertainty estimation/quantification technology needs to be developed. These uncertainty estimates can then be used in a safeguards probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) system to quantify the risks associated with a particular reprocessing technology. To further safeguard these technologies, additional safeguard measures are needed for defense in depth. This may include implementation of multiple, independent, and redundant layers of defense such that no single layer, no matter how robust, is solely relied upon. Quantification of safeguard uncertainties related to UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be used to benchmark these technologies against PUREX and between themselves for policy making.

Survey of nuclear safeguards in the European Community

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.

1992-01-01

The control of the peaceful use of nuclear energy comprises activities related to nuclear safety, to the protection of persons and of the environment, to physical protection of the nuclear materials against theft or terrorism and to nuclear safeguards. Nuclear safeguards means the set of measures performed by the IAEA in the context of non-proliferation safeguards and, in the framework of the Euratom Treaty, those measures enabling the European Commission to satisfy itself that the nuclear material is not diverted from its intended and declared uses (particularly to unlawful non-peaceful applications) and that the obligations arising from International Agreements are complied with. This contribution to the International Conference on Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy at Liege briefly reviews the history of nuclear safeguards in Europe since the early 1960ies. It also notes the practical aspects for, constraints and impacts to the nuclear operators imposed on them by the European law such as inspections, accountancy, reporting and describes the trend of the future development of the safeguards operation. The paper finally addresses non-proliferation issues and, notably, the relations between the IAEA and Euratom which in an exemplary way resulted in effective international safeguards and high non-proliferation credentials of the European Community. (author)

Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design for Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morgan, James B.; Kovacic, Donald N.; Whitaker, J. Michael

2008-01-01

Safeguards for nuclear facilities can be significantly improved by developing and implementing methodologies for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized into a country's regulatory structure similar to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved to assure a facility's reliable and safe operations will reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state level. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis (IPRA) process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

The IAEA safeguards information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

1976-01-01

The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

2009-09-01

The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

2011-09-01

During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

Redefining interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Irie, Kazutomo

2012-01-01

Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having “aggressors” as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests “SSN” which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called “SSST” in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. (author)

Technology Development of Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

2007-04-15

The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

Part 7. Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amundson, P.I.; Rusch, G.K.

1980-01-01

This report describes fissile nuclear material safeguards technology, both current and developmental, and discusses the possible application of this technology to FBR systems. The proliferation risks associated with both subnational and national-level diversion are addressed

Elementary survey of nuclear safeguards problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobias, M.L.

1975-01-01

The discussion presented on nuclear safeguards is confined primarily to the subject of safeguards for fixed sites. The legal and quasi-legal requirements are briefly outlined. Preventive measures against theft, terrorism, sabotage, or irrational acts by employees and against sabotage by armed gangs are the aspects emphasized. Some of the cost aspects are indicated

Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.

1976-01-01

With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

A view to the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tsuboi, Hiroshi

2000-01-01

The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

2010-07-01

The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of alternative fuel cycle concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1997-01-01

Timely visibility on the development, evaluation and optimization of fuel cycle concepts with respect to nonproliferation characteristics should be emphasized in the early stage of planning a civilian nuclear power program, by fuel cycle developers, reviewers and decision makers. Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of nonproliferation characteristic profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the nonproliferation concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces these concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the nonproliferation characteristics of fuel cycle concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring the need to develop advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures. (author)

Redefining interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Irie, Kazutomo

2011-01-01

Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of the 3Ss is now emphasized to countries which are newly introducing nuclear power generation. However, as role models for those newcomers, existing nuclear power countries are also required to strengthen their regulatory infrastructure for the 3Ss. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having 'aggressors' as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests 'SSN' which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called 'SSST' in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. Recently, it becomes quite difficult to clearly demarcate these policy tools. As nuclear security concept is expanding, the denotation of nuclear security measures is also expanding. Nuclear security measures are more and more

Building safeguards infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

2010-01-01

Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) primary focus is national security-verification and treaty compliance across several regimes addressing weapons of mass destruction-linked to a major facilitation role in regard to industry compliance. The key aspect here is ensuring Australia's treaty commitments are met. Additionally, ASNO's activities are central to Government policy on the mining and export of uranium. Throughout the past year, ASNO continued to make a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. Australia played a key role in the negotiations leading to the adoption by the IAEA in 1997 of the Model Protocol, which provides the IAEA Secretariat with the authority to implement strengthened safeguards measures. In December 1997, Australia was the first country to bring into effect a Protocol with the IAEA based on this model. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Protocol enters general application. ASNO's As mentioned above, ASNO has developed and implemented new safeguards arrangements in Australia under the Protocol for strengthened safeguards, including facilitation of IAEA verification activities at the Ranger uranium mine-this is the first time the IAEA (under the Protocol) has visited a uranium mine and the lessons learned will help the IAEA develop its procedures. One major activity for ASNO is monitoring the progress of the Silex project to ensure that, as soon as appropriate, the technology is declared 'associated technology' and controlled in accordance with relevant legislative and Treaty requirements. In anticipation of this, ASNO has taken steps to protect the Silex technology against unauthorised access. Over the past 12 months, ASNO has established itself as the provisional

Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

1997-01-01

In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-01-01

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-07-12

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Abstracts of reports of the International conference on non-proliferation problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

1997-01-01

On August 21, 1947, the USSR Council of Ministers made a decision on creating Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (STS). The first Nuclear Test on the Test Site was conducted on August 29, 1949, the last one was made on October 19, 1989. In all during 40 years on Semipalatinsk Test Site 116 ground and air and 340 underground nuclear tests were conducted. They brought much damage to health and lives of thousands of people who involuntarily participated in those events. On August 29, 1991, by Kazakstan President's decree STS was closed but the problems of people's rehabilitation, natural landscapes recovering, test-site infrastructure conversion remained. These problems are being solved under direct state programs, intergovernmental agreements of Kazakstan with Russia and the USA, cooperation with different international and foreign organizations, enterprises, scientific-research centers. Kazakstan subsequently constantly pursues the policy of nonproliferation, takes measures on ellimination of nuclear tests consequences and relative infrastructure. The Republic is not involved into military nuclear programs. From its territory all the nuclear weapon was taken away. Kazakstan joined the Agreement on Non-proliferation, signed the Agreement on Safeguards to all Nuclear activity on Kazakh territory with the IAEA

Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment - Preliminary Assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Coles, Garill A.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Brothers, Alan J.; Thompson, Sandra E.

2009-06-01

This Preliminary Assessment draft report will present the results of a literature search and preliminary assessment of the body of research, analysis methods, models and data deemed to be relevant to the Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment research. This report will provide: 1) a description of the problem space and the kinds of information pertinent to the problem space, 2) a discussion of key relevant or representative literature, 3) a discussion of models and modeling approaches judged to be potentially useful to the research, and 4) the next steps of this research that will be pursued based on this preliminary assessment. This draft report represents a technical deliverable for the NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling (SAM) program. Specifically this draft report is the Task 1 deliverable for project PL09-UtilSocial-PD06, Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment. This project investigates non-traditional use of social and cultural information to improve nuclear proliferation assessment, including nonproliferation assessment, proliferation resistance assessments, safeguards assessments and other related studies. These assessments often use and create technical information about the State’s posture towards proliferation, the vulnerability of a nuclear energy system to an undesired event, and the effectiveness of safeguards. This project will find and fuse social and technical information by explicitly considering the role of cultural, social and behavioral factors relevant to proliferation. The aim of this research is to describe and demonstrate if and how social science modeling has utility in proliferation assessment.

Building safeguards infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

2009-01-01

Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

Update of the INPRO Collaborative Project, Proliferation Resistance and Safeguard ability Assessment (Prosta) Tools

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chang, H. L.; Kwon, E. H.; Ahn, S. K.; Ko, W. I.; Kim, H. D. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

The objectives of the INPRO Collaborative Project, Proliferation Resistance and Safeguard ability Assessment (PROSA) Tools are to make the INPRO proliferation resistance (PR) assessment methodology simpler and easier to use, to allow for different users and depths of analysis, to demonstrate the value and its usefulness of the refined assessment methodology to potential users, through a test with a reference case, and to provide input to a revision of the INPRO PR assessment manual. A summary of the project is described herein, including the procedure of PR assessment process and a case study using a SFR metal fuel manufacturing facility (SFMF) which is currently in the conceptual design phase at KAERI. The PROSA process with questionnaire approach is simpler and easier to perform that the original INPRO PR methodology with qualitative scale from 'weak' to 'very strong' to be determined by expert judgment. The PROSA process can be applied from the early stage of design showing the relationship of PR assessment to the SBD process.

Nuclear proliferation and safeguards. Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-03-01

This comprehensive analysis of the technological, economic, and political factors affecting the potential spread of nuclear weapons proved useful in the congressional debate which culminated in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The report was subsequently published commercially and has been a frequently cited reference in the literature on proliferation and nuclear power. Despite developments since 1977, the information in the OTA report is still useful to those wishing to obtain an indepth understanding of the issues. Included is an analysis of why a nation might want nuclear weapons development program and the various sources of nuclear material are discussed. The control of proliferation is considered as well as its relation to the nuclear industry

Some developments in safeguards techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beets, C.

1977-01-01

The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

Psychology of nuclear safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

1978-08-17

it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zieger, G.

1975-01-01

An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

Development of an advanced safeguards system as a proliferation deterrent

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ayers, A.A.; Barnes, L.D.

1978-11-01

The Advanced Safeguards System consists of Computerized Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting System, Physical Protection System, and Safeguards Coordination Center (SCC). Should all the computer-based monitoring systems be overcome (i.e., the NMC computer programmed not to recognize a materials inventory change, the SCC computer programmed to accept a falsified area and personnel authorization, and the physical security system programmed not to alarm for area intrusion), the requirements of the physical security system remain formidable barriers to successful theft since all SNM is separated from the uncontrolled areas by at least one entry control portal. An egress from the protected area--by either a vehicle through the vehicle access portal, or on foot through the personnel access portal--requires that the individuals be subjected to a search for metal and SNM before egress is permitted. The material access areas are further controlled by an interior access portal imposing the same SNM and metal search criteria. The portal search criteria are not subject to computer interpretation, but direct positive--negative indications to the portal patrolman. The physical security system then provides an independent backup should the computerized systems be defeated. Thus, the computer systems themselves will not, if defeated, guarantee an adversary success. The corollary also holds true; a defeat of the physical search elements of the physical security system will not guarantee adversary success because of the monitoring/surveillance function of the computerized systems. The complementary and overlapping nature of the safeguards systems is intended to provide multiple layers of safeguards, each layer providing an effective element of protection. Tests to date indicate that it appears feasible to meet operational objectives and maintain a high safeguards performance level using these concepts which are being incorporated into the Advanced Safeguards System.None

United States non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.

1978-01-01

U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

Safeguards for geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fattah, A.

2000-01-01

Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

Some reflections on nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Campbell, Ross.

1981-01-01

The author doubts whether, in view of the 1976 policy of requiring adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent IAEA safeguards, Canada still needs the 1974 policy of bilateral safeguards on technology as well as material. The opinion is expressed that bilateral safeguards create difficulties for the IAEA, and are resented by some potential customers. Much better, if it were achievable, would be a code agreed by a convention of vendors and customers alike, to include sanctions against transgressors. The author expresses confidence in the IAEA, but perceives a need for more men and money. Also needed are better instruments to account for materials

Problems of the nuclear non-proliferation policy. Contributions to the international discussion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blix, H.; Butler, P. von; Fischer, W.; Caccia Dominioni, F.; Frick, H.; Gmelin, W.; Haeckel, E.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

1994-01-01

The volume assembles a number of essays wherein basic problems of nonproliferation are identified and discussed in view of recent developments and future policy requirements. What is the role of multilateral institutions in the containment of nuclear proliferation? How are Western Europe's security needs to be reconciled with the tenets of the global nonproliferation regime? How can international safeguards be upgraded so as to increase confidence among states? What kinds of disciplinary instruments are needed for the international community to prevent an unco-operative state from gaining access to nuclear weapons? What kinds of obstacles stand in the way of smooth co-operation between the European Union and the United States in the nuclear field? How does the demise of global bipolarity impinge on the need to pursue an international nuclear order? The essays in this volume seek to combine structural analysis of conceptual issues with substantive policy recommendations. (orig./HP) [de

Agreement reached on integrated safeguards in European Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with the European Commission, has reached agreement on arrangements to implement 'integrated safeguards' in all non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union with significant nuclear activities. 'This important milestone is the result of the constructive common efforts of all parties concerned. It is a clear signal of the importance attributed by the EU and its Member States, as well as the IAEA, to the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime,' said Andris Piebalgs, Member of the European Commission in charge of Energy. 'Once we have sufficient confidence that a State' s nuclear activities are purely peaceful, we can apply safeguards measures in a less prescriptive, more customised manner. This reduces the inspection burden on the State and the inspection effort of the IAEA, while enabling the IAEA to maintain the conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities,' said Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General and Head of IAEA Safeguards Department. Background The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the main international Treaty prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It entrusts the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices through the application of 'safeguards'. IAEA safeguards include comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols that enable the IAEA to conclude that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State. Integrated Safeguards refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency ' s safeguards obligations. In the European Union, nuclear safeguards are implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty and trilateral agreements between Euratom, its Member States and the IAEA

Safeguards and nonproliferation aspects of a dry fuel recycling technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.

1993-01-01

Los Alamos National Laboratory undertook an independent assessment of the proliferation potentials and safeguardability of a dry fuel recycling technology, whereby spent pressurized-water reactor (PWR) fuels are used to fuel canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. Objectives of this study included (1) the evaluation of presently available technologies that may be useful to safeguard technology options for dry fuel recycling (2) and identification of near-term and long-term research needs to develop process-specific safeguards requirements. The primary conclusion of this assessment is that like all other fuel cycle alternatives proposed in the past, the dry fuel recycle entails prolfferation risks and that there are no absolute technical fixes to eliminate such risks. This study further concludes that the proliferation risks of dry fuel recycling options are relatively minimal and presently known safeguards systems and technologies can be modified and/or adapted to meet the requirements of safeguarding such fuel recycle facilities

International nuclear safeguards 1994: Vision for the future. V.1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

Since the last IAEA symposium on this subject, held eight years ego in 1986, the world of safeguards has experienced a number of momentous changes which have opened a new period of intensive development in safeguards. The important events were: The discoveries in Iraq during activities under United Nations Security Council resolutions, South Africa's decision to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the IAEA-Argentina-Brazil-ABACC Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement, the break-up of the former USSR into newly independent States, and the problems encountered in the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The consequences for international safeguards of these events were presented in papers at this symposium, with special emphasis on verification of a State's declaration as well as on detection of undeclared activities. Other fundamental changes stem from converging relationships between nuclear arms reductions and the civil use of plutonium, and the international debate on the associated issues. Furthermore, the review and extension of the NPT is due in 1995. Events have opened the possibility for ambitious new concepts for verification regimes. These matters were addressed at the symposium in the opening session and in the closing panel discussion. Refs, figs and tabs

Controlling nuclear proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sweet, W.

1981-01-01

Nuclear non-proliferation policy depends on the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which countries promise not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for open access to peaceful nuclear technology, and a system of international safeguards that are imposed on exported nuclear equipment and facilities operated by parties to the treaty. Critics have feared all along that non-nuclear countries might circumvent or exploit the system to obtain nuclear weapons and that the Atoms for Peace plan would spread the very technology it sought to control. The nuclear weapons states would like everyone else to believe that atomic bombs are undesirable, but they continue to rely on the bombs for their own defense. Israel's raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor focused world attention on the proliferation problem and helped to broaden and sterengthen its prospects. It also highlighted the weakness that there are no effective sanctions against violators. Until the international community can ageee on enforcement measures powerful enough to prevent nuclear proliferation, individual countries may be tempted to follow Israel's example, 19 references

The text of the Agreement between Turkey and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-02-01

The full text of the agreement between Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rezniczek, A.

2013-01-01

Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1978-01-01

An appropriate non-proliferation treaty should not discriminate among the non-weapon states, but should seek a cooperative approach with all countries seeking nuclear power and willing to accept international safeguards. Near-term proliferation problems, represented by nations already on the threshold of weapon capability, should not be confused with the long-term problem of world-wide nuclear development. The first can be handled with incentives and disincentives imposed on specific countries, while the latter involves the distribution of plutonium on the basis of alternative fuel cycles. To retain world leadership, U.S. efforts along these lines should be to encourage a dialogue between suppliers and recipients and to coordinate the economic and security issues of its own non-proliferation and foreign policies. One option is a U.S. commitment to a multinational fuel storage and reprocessing facility. Technical evaluation and demonstration of alternative fuel cycles to reach an international consensus would be a parallel activity

Implementing The Safeguards-By-Design Process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitaker, J. Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D.; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

2010-01-01

The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC and A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

The project 'nuclear safeguards'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gupta, D.

1976-01-01

A survey is given on the elaboration and implementation of a nuclear safeguards system which takes into account the economic needs of an expanding nuclear industry as well as the international monitoring commitments of the FRG under the Euratom and Non-Proliferation treaties. (RW) [de

Paying tribute to 25 years of safeguards leadership

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

After phases of intensive development in the 1970s and consolidation in the 1980s, the IAEA's international safeguards system is now in a phase of transition. The 1990s look to be a time when verification activities are further expanded in response to global developments and challenges in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. How far have safeguards come, and where are they headed? This article offers some thoughts and perspectives on the main challenges and opportunities facing IAEA safeguards, in the context of some recent developments and the overall evolution of the safeguards system

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The system of international safeguards carried out by the IAEA is designed to verify that governments are living up to pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes under the NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and similar agreements. The film illustrates the range of field inspections and analytical work involved. It also shows how new approaches are helping to strengthen the system

Nuclear safeguards - a new profession

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thorne, L.

1984-01-01

Early moves to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons are described together with the application of vigorous scientific techniques to the political framework of international treaties. Technical criteria for safeguards and verification methods are discussed. (U.K.)

Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

2010-01-01

IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

2006-01-01

Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-13

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-19

The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-02-22

The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-05-01

Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

Annual report of the Director of Safeguards 1988-1989

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

The Australian Safeguards Office (ASO) operates Australia's state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It also contributes to the IAEA safeguards network, in support of the Australian Government's committment to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Activities carried out during the year ended 30 June 1989 in each of these areas are reviewed. It is reported that 54 export shipments of uranium ore concentrates containing 5061 tonnes of uranium oxide were made by Australia's three producers and that no unreconcilied differences in quantities of Australian obligated nuclear material, wherever situated, or nuclear material within Australia, regardless of origin, as at 30 June 1989. The report also includes copies of IAEA's statements related to the verification inspections pursuant to the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement

Welcome from ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and Development Association)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Van der Meer, K.

2015-01-01

ESARDA, on the one hand being part of that European family and on the other hand working in practice to support peace by the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, can be considered as a perfect representative of that European peace process. Going now from the European to the global perspective, peace should be our motivating force and this is also expressed in the basis of safeguards: the non-proliferation Treaty. Several articles of the Treaty deal with not developing nuclear weapons and not supporting the development of nuclear weapons by other countries, and one article (Article VI) deals with the general and complete nuclear disarmament. What is ESARDA doing in practice- First we provide a forum to exchange scientific information for the benefit of all safeguards stakeholders. The most important forum is the biannual open ESARDA safeguards symposium that will be held next year from 19-21 May in Manchester. Next to the ESARDA symposia, we coordinate European safeguards research via our ESARDA Working Groups. Also non-members are welcome in these WG as observers. JRC Ispra maintains the ESARDA website that also supports exchange of safeguards information

2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Koltysheva, G I; Perepelkin, I G [eds.

1999-12-31

On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session `History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem` and three sections: (1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests`; (2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex`; (3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences`

2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

1998-01-01

On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session 'History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem' and three sections: 1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests'; 2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex'; 3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences'

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

Proliferation of massive destruction weapons: fantasy or reality?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duval, M.

2001-01-01

This article evaluates the threat of massive destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical, biological) for Europe and recalls the existing safeguards against the different forms of nuclear proliferation: legal (non-proliferation treaty (NPT), comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT) etc..), technical (fabrication of fissile materials, delays). However, all these safeguards can be overcome as proven by the activities of some countries. The situation of proliferation for the other type of massive destruction weapons is presented too. (J.S.)

The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1972-11-17

The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1972-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip Casey; Hockert, John; Morgan, James

2010-01-01

Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC and A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many - owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: (1) In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. (2) Life-cycle cost

IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

2014-07-01

The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

2008-10-22

In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998 [fr

Trade Analysis and Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, R.; Schot, P.M.

2010-01-01

In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-05-18

The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-07-10

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

Nuclear safeguards in the Federal Republic of Germany by the Commission of the European Communities, EURATOM, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brueckner, C.

1979-10-01

The author reviews the developement of the legal and contractual bases for nuclear safeguards. In doing so, he deals with the EURATOM treaty, the non-proliferation treaty, the verification treaty; adjustment of control by means of the EURATOM regulation no. 3222/76 and the implementary law on the verification treaty. In the second part, he examines the control concept which is based on keeping books on materials, making-out balance sheets and on balance-sheet auditing. He sees problems arising as nuclear safeguards are introduced in nuclear installations in the endeavour to develop nuclear safeguards any further. (HSCH) [de

IAEA safeguards glossary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, P.

1999-01-01

For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

Future non-proliferation challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yelchenko, Volodymyr

2008-01-01

Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

Future issues in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

1991-01-01

The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-01

The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun

2015-01-01

But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice

Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

1983-01-01

Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR and PP case study results

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boyer, Brian D.

2009-01-01

The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design

Safeguards resource management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.

1986-01-01

Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Howsley, R.; Burrows, B.; Longevialle, H. de; Kuroi, H.; Izumi, A.

1997-01-01

In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1972-03-24

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1972-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Norm in the matter of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Saavedra, Analia; Maceiras, Elena; Valentino, Lucia; Chiliutti, Mauro

2001-01-01

The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), through its norm, establishes requirements in the matter of safeguards that allow him to control the fulfillment of the objectives established at national level and the international commitments that the Argentine Republic has assumed in the scope of Nuclear Non-proliferation. The measures of fortification of the safeguards proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), will imply new obligations for the country and consequently it will require the update of the effective norm in the matter. The objective of this work is to describe the reach of the update of the norm in the matter of safeguards and their relation with some procedures of application in the scope of the radiological protection and the nuclear security

Psychology of nuclear safeguards. [Cannot guarantee preventing diversion, only deter

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Parker, L

1978-08-17

There is an essential confusion in the way we look at safeguards. They cannot guarantee to prevent diversions: at best, they can deter. While successful acts of deterrence pass unnoticed, failures will be widely publicized. Therefore, we will judge safeguards systems not on a fair balance between their successes and failures, but exclusively on what we believe to be their failures. Effectively, we will be demanding an impossibly high standard of performance, and safeguards authorities will be tempted to conceal diversions rather than disappoint our expectations. Perhaps it is appropriate that safeguards are primarily psychological instruments: Parker argues that their essence is credibility, and that this does not necessarily depend on the hard reality of their performance. Brian Johnson claimed (New Scientist, vol 74, p 189) that safeguards have engendered a sense of security by linking the commitment of many states not to develop nuclear weapons, and that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped condition domestic political attitudes against starting up nuclear weapons programs. Perhaps the common view that safeguards are legal instruments has served the psychological purpose of supplying a language in which states with widely differing interests can explore the fundamental incompatibility between non-proliferation and the search for convenient energy sources. If this is true then it cannot be said that the NPT is a failure, merely that its success does not correspond to its apparent purposes.

Safeguards resource management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.

1986-01-01

Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuroi, Hideo

1986-01-01

This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

Lessons from post-war Iraq for the international full-scope safeguards regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.

1993-01-01

The discovery after the Gulf War of the extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon program severely shook public confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the safeguards program of the IAEA under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular. Iraq provided the justification for evaluating the safeguards regime under new political circumstances, so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken when necessary. It is now up to the individual states within the international system to take advantage of this opportunity

Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-09-01

The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

The text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-04-01

The full text of the agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

The text of the agreement of 11 June 1971 between Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Finland, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 11 June 1971, which entered into force on 9 February 1972, between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been suspended

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-09-14

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000.

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-08-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

Some major challenges: Nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear terrorism. Vienna, 29 October 2001. Statement to the symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2001-01-01

The main topics dealt with the ensuring of an effective, universal and adequately financed system for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation, namely as follows: Effectiveness of the system; Participation in the system ; Financing of the system; Making Progress in Nuclear Arms Control; Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2000, the Agency was able to conclude that for all 140 states with safeguards agreements in place the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. The Agency currently safeguards over 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately US $80 million per year. Turning to the major recent challenge, protection against nuclear terrorism, the IAEA has long been active in encouraging States to make security an integral part of the management of their nuclear programmes. The recent attacks in the United States were, however, a wake-up call to all that more can and must be done. In the week immediately following the tragedy, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution which requested a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism

The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-06-10

The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-13

The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walker, R.A.

1998-01-01

The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Garcia, Humberto; Desmond, William; Demuth, Scott

2010-01-01

International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

Energy-efficiency and proliferation-resistance assessment factors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-02-01

Assessment factors suggested with regard to energy efficiency are: preservation of natural non-renewable resources: the degree of security of supply which can be achieved; the availability of necessary raw materials and technology; economic feasibility; and acceptability of a fuel cycle from environmental and safety views. In the area of proliferation resistance, it is suggested that the basic element is the political commitment by a Government not to use imported nuclear materials and equipment to manufacture nuclear explosives. 100% proliferation resistance is considered unattainable in practice. The role of international safeguards in detering possible diversion through the risk of early detection is described, and it is argued that efficient safeguards will force a Government willing to go nuclear to withdraw from its safeguards agreements. The second assessment factor, accordingly, is to consider different fuel cycles with regard to the efficient and rapid building up of a nuclear weapons capacity once the country has withdrawn from its safeguards commitments

Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

1980-01-01

The scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues: (1) global safeguards effectiveness or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on the first issue, while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed towards the second. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example. 4 refs

AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

2008-12-31

The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

Safeguard sleuths

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lowry, D.

1989-01-01

A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

The international safeguards system and physical protection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Lauppe, W.D.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

1990-02-01

The report summarizes and explains facts and aspects of the IAEA safeguards performed within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and shows perspectives to be discussed by the NPT Review Conferences in 1990 and 1995. The technical background of potential misuse of nuclear materials for military purposes is explained in connection with the physical protection regime of the international safeguards, referring to recent developments for improvement of technical measures for material containment and surveillance. Most attention is given to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their surveillance by the IAEA safeguards, including such new technologies and applications as controlled nuclear fusion, laser techniques for uranium enrichment, and particle accelerators. The report's concluding analyses of the current situation show potentials for improvement and desirable or necessary consequences to be drawn for the international safeguards system, also taking into account recent discussions on the parliamentary level. (orig./HP) [de

The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-05-14

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-10-29

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-06

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-07-01

The document informs that the Czech Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-07-01

The document informs that the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

The ‘Landscape’ of Nuclear Safeguards: A Comparative Analysis of the International and Regional Systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Colussi, I.A.

2015-01-01

The notion of “nuclear non-proliferation” is twofold. It refers to: (a) reduction of the number of existing arsenals (vertical non-proliferation), and (b) containment of the number of States that possess nuclear weapons, or control of non-state actors (horizontal non-proliferation). At the international law level, as vertical non-proliferation, there are bilateral or multilateral agreements that ban weapons of mass destruction in certain areas (e.g.: Nuclear–Weapon– Free Zones treaties). With respect to horizontal non-proliferation, beyond the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones approach, the main legal text for addressing the issue is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For the implementation of the principles contained in the NPT, a “nuclear safeguards” system has been created, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been assigned the role of the nuclear “watchdog” for the NPT. However, along with this international system of safeguards, there are regional safeguards bodies: (a) the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) model is the cornerstone of non-proliferation in the EU, while (b) the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) controls nuclear activities in Brazil and Argentina. Moreover, the existing nuclear weapons free-zone treaties contain safeguards provisions that are additional or complementary to IAEA safeguards. For instance, (a) the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) works for the implementation of Tlatelolco Treaty, (b) the African Commission on Nuclear Energy relates to Pelindaba Treaty, and (c) a Consultative Committee of the Parties is appointed in the context of Raratonga Treaty. The paper aims at critically analysing the different safeguards systems adopted at the international and regional level, through the adoption of a comparative approach. (author)

Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

1975-01-01

The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitney, J.M.; LaMontagne, S.; Sunshine, A.; Lockwood, D.; Peranteau, D.; Dupuy, G.

2010-01-01

Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment - Preliminary Findings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coles, Garill A.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Brothers, Alan J.; Thompson, Sandra E.

2009-01-01

Often the methodologies for assessing proliferation risk are focused around the inherent vulnerability of nuclear energy systems and associated safeguards. For example an accepted approach involves ways to measure the intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to potential proliferation. This paper describes preliminary investigation into non-traditional use of social and cultural information to improve proliferation assessment and advance the approach to assessing nuclear material diversion. Proliferation resistance assessment, safeguard assessments and related studies typically create technical information about the vulnerability of a nuclear energy system to diversion of nuclear material. The purpose of this research project is to find ways to integrate social information with technical information by explicitly considering the role of culture, groups and/or individuals to factors that impact the possibility of proliferation. When final, this work is expected to describe and demonstrate the utility of social science modeling in proliferation and proliferation risk assessments.

Reactor safeguards

CERN Document Server

Russell, Charles R

1962-01-01

Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

Transit Matching for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

2015-01-01

In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

Implications for Advanced Safeguards Derived from PR and PP Case Study Results

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Nuclear Nonproliferation Division, N-4, Safeguards and Security Group, P. O. Box 1663, N-4, Mail Stop E541, Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 (United States)

2009-06-15

The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyro-processing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyro-processing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material because of keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRU products that should provide a radiation barrier that slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel and by the process if it intrinsically will take major modification to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. This is an issue that the ESFR design must answer to state it has valuable

Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

The Text of the Agreement between Iceland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Iceland to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement between Iceland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Iceland to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

1984-01-01

An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values, a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives, a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them, and a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs

Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards; Accountability e regime de nao proliferacao nuclear: uma avaliacao do modelo de vigilancia mutua brasileiro-argentina de salvaguardas nucleares

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Xavier, Roberto Salles

2014-08-01

The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

International safeguards and international nuclear trade

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Felten, P.

1991-01-01

A particular feature of nuclear trade is the need to ensure a good equilibrium between technology transfer and the requirements linked to non proliferation of nuclear weapons. The recent dramatic changes that occurred on the international scene have particularly underlined the difficulty to reach this equilibrium, reminding us the fragility of the existing order and the responsibility of the nuclear community in the field of non-proliferation. Consequently, there is a need for an international thorough review of the actual non proliferation tools developed until now. This review could lead to reconsider some of the dogmas upon which the present safeguard system is based

Safeguarding nuclear energy in the Pacific: the role of Australia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Indyk, M.

1980-01-01

Measures necessary for the establishment of an effective safeguards regime are outlined. These include the establishment of multinational institutions to control and limit the number of sensitive facilities, the establishment of regional spent fuel storage sites and regional plutonium banks to be placed under international control, the establishment of international uranium banks to provide fuel assurances to cooperating countries and the cooperation between suppliers and consumers in improving safeguard techniques. The possibility of a Pacific regional non-proliferation initiative and the role Australia is likely to play in such an initiative are considered. From the public record, the Australian Government would appear to be a deeply committed supporter of international measures to control reprocessing, to store spent fuel and plutonium, to strengthen safeguards and to provide fuel assurances to consumers. However, the Government's actions are not as consistent. It is concluded that Australia will be willing to support non-proliferation efforts as long as they do not unduly jeopardise uranium exports

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-10-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000.

Nuclear weapons proliferation problem: can we lead without leadership

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stathakis, G.J.

1977-01-01

The immediate problem facing us with respect to proliferation and nuclear power involves reprocessing and the availability of plutonium from reprocessing plants. One solution supported by the Atomic Industrial Forum is that reprocessing centers be restricted to locations in those industrial nations already having weapons capability and that the energy of the reprocessed plutonium be returned to the user nation in the form of low enriched uranium. Thus, the plutonium would remain where it would not add to problems of proliferation

The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-13

The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

Against the spread of nuclear weapons: IAEA Safeguards in the 1990s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-12-01

This booklet describes the role of IAEA verification activities, or safeguards, in the non-proliferation regime and shows how safeguards provide confidence that States fulfill the obligations they have undertaken in relation to the peaceful use of atomic energy. It also describes ways in which this role could develop in the future

Recent advances in safeguards operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

1983-01-01

The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

1984-07-01

An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: (1) a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values; (2) a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives; (3) a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them; and (4) a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs. 6 references, 4 figures, 5 tables

Evolution of a safeguards support program: POTAS past and future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kessler, J.C.; Reisman, A.W.

1992-01-01

When the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) became for the first time responsible for implementing full-scope safeguards in many countries, including countries with large and sophisticated nuclear programs. The IAEA's Department of Safeguards did not have the safeguards technology appropriate for these rapidly expanding responsibilities, nor did it have a research and development program to respond to that need. In response to this situation, the United States initiated the US Program of Technical Assitance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) in 1977. This program was originally intended to be a 5-yr, $5 million program. As the United States and the IAEA began to implement this program, several things rapidly became clear. Meeting the evolving safeguards technology needs would require much more than $5 million; within the first 5 yr, the United States allocated more than $20 million. This paper summarizes the policies activities, and practices POTAS has employed in support of IAEA safeguards program

The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-01-24

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

Improving NPT safeguards. Particularly at the natural uranium starting point

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, J.; Klerk, P. de

1996-03-01

According to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) all nuclear material is subject to safeguards, but according to INFCIRC/153 the full range of safeguards is only applied beyond the 'starting point of safeguards', that is: The point at which nuclear material has reached a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or enrichment. This paper addresses the two questions: (a) is the starting point adequately defined, and (b) what mesures could be applied to nuclear material before the starting point? Those questions have been asked before, some of the answers in this paper are new. (orig.)

Improving NPT safeguards. Particularly at the natural uranium starting point

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, J. [Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN), Petten (Netherlands); Klerk, P. de [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague (Netherlands)

1996-03-01

According to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) all nuclear material is subject to safeguards, but according to INFCIRC/153 the full range of safeguards is only applied beyond the `starting point of safeguards`, that is: The point at which nuclear material has reached a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or enrichment. This paper addresses the two questions: (a) is the starting point adequately defined, and (b) what mesures could be applied to nuclear material before the starting point? Those questions have been asked before, some of the answers in this paper are new. (orig.).

The future for safeguards technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zykov, S.

2013-01-01

The present paper presents some elements of an emerging vision of a new and updated potential role for safeguard instrumentation in the overall process of deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The paper focusses on installed, transportable and portable measurement systems and in-situ techniques for maintaining continuity of knowledge. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [ru

The next generation safeguards initiative

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobey, William

2008-01-01

NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

Non proliferation 1980 - INFCE and TnP

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rainer, R.

1981-01-01

The TNP (non-proliferation agreement of nuclear weapons), its non proliferation policy and the peaceful use of fuel cycle are described, as well as the safeguards of IAEA. It is also mentioned the functions of INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation). (A.B.T.) [pt

The voluntary safeguards offer of the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Houck, F.S.

1985-01-01

During negotiations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concerns were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States that their acceptance of Agency safeguards would put them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the nuclear-weapon States. To allay these concerns, the United States and the United Kingdom in December 1967 made voluntary offers to accept Agency safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. Subsequently, France made a voluntary offer, the safeguards agreement for which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in February 1978, with a view to encouraging acceptance of Agency safeguards by additional States. More recently, in February 1985 the Board approved the safeguards agreement for the voluntary offer of the USSR, made inter alia to encourage further acceptance of Agency safeguards. These safeguards agreements with nuclear-weapon-States have two important features in common: Namely, they result from voluntary offers to accept safeguards rather than from multilateral or bilateral undertakings, and they give the Agency the right but generally not an obligation to apply its safeguards. The agreements differ in certain respects, the most noteworthy of which is the scope of the nuclear activities covered by each offer. The agreements of the United States and United Kingdom are the broadest, covering all peaceful nuclear activities in each country. The safeguards agreement for the US voluntary offer has been in force since December 1980. Now is an appropriate time to review the experience with the agreement's implementation during its first four years, as well as its history and salient features

Non Proliferation of Nuclear

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bambang S Irawan

2004-01-01

Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons is the international community's efforts to maintain the security of the world, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear technology and the use of nuclear weapons, promoting cooperation for the use of nuclear peaceful purposes, build mutual trust (Confidence Building Measures) as well as to achieve the ultimate goal of disarmament overall (General and Complete Disarmament). Addressing the post-WTC tragedy, 11 September 2001, the Indonesian government should set up a National Measures (National Action Plan), among others formed the National Security Council and NBC Counter Proliferation Unit, or the National Authority for Nuclear Treaty, preparing national legislation, to prevent the abuse nuclear materials for terrorist acts, prevent Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear materials, developed a National Preparedness and Emergency Response Management in the event of a nuclear accident or attack by the use of nuclear terrorism. Importance of a National Action Plan meant the existence of a national commitment in the context of compliance with treaties and conventions which have been ratified relating to safety, security, safeguards towards a general and complete disarmament, to safeguard national security and maintain peace (safeguards) international

Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

The text of the agreement of 29 February 1988 between Nigeria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-10-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 29 February 1988 and of the Protocol thereto, between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Nigeria to accept safeguards on all sources or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement and the Protocol entered into force on 29 February 1988

IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jennekens, J.

1988-01-01

The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

J. Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

Like many drugs, poisons, and explosives in common use in our society today, nuclear materials are dangerous. This was recognised well before the advent of nuclear power, and precautions have been taken to isolate the substances from the environment. The expected expansion of nuclear power generation, and consequent proliferation of the materials, has caused opponents of the industry to voice pessimism over the ability of the authorities to contain these substances. The author discusses the dangers associated with the illicit use of nuclear materials, and the safeguards employed to minimise the risks arising from the commercial exploitation of nuclear power

Nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1990-01-01

This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vidaurre-Henry, Jaime

2001-01-01

For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-10-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-12-16

The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The text of the agreement of 5 December 1974 between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1978-04-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 5 December 1974, and the Protocol thereto, between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agreement entered into force on 21 February 1978

The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation : 60 Years of IAEA and EURATOM

CERN Document Server

Abousahl, Said; Plastino, Wolfango

2018-01-01

This open access book examines key aspects of international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and non-proliferation, thereby assisting in development and maintenance of the verification regime and fostering progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world. The book opens by addressing important political, institutional, and legal dimensions. Current challenges are discussed and attempts made to identify possible solutions and future improvements. Subsequent sections consider scientific developments that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of implementation of international regimes, particularly in critical areas, technology foresight, and the ongoing evaluation of current capabilities. The closing sections examine scientific and technical challenges and discuss the role of international cooperation and actions of the scientific community in leading the world toward peace and security. The book – which celebrates 60 years of IAEA Atoms for Peace and Development and the EURA...

Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.; Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.

1975-06-01

There has been much discussion and public debate concerning the effectiveness of the national system of safeguards against malevolent acts involving nuclear materials. Useful dialogue on this subject has been hampered by the lack of well-defined objectives, system parameters and boundary conditions as a framework for communication. This study provides such a framework. Expressing the safeguards objective in terms of societal risk represents a change in focus, rather than intent, from the earlier view of safeguards as a system for protecting nuclear material against theft or diversion. The study defines both the safeguards problem and the safeguards system in terms that can be related to the general safeguards objective. It is axiomatic that the first step to an effective solution is a careful definition of the problem. The significant and immediate value of this study lies in the rigorous definition and systematic organization of recognized elements into a coherent and comprehensive pattern. Although the title specifically addresses design and evaluation, the framework provided by the study will be a useful management tool for safeguards implementation and administration as well. (U.S.)

IAEA safeguards and classified materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

1997-01-01

The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gyane, E.

2010-01-01

Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R.J.S.

1996-03-01

Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.).

IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1996-03-01

Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.)

Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-03-01

The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one.

Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-03-01

The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [fr

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

Fissile material proliferation risk

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A.

1996-01-01

The proliferation risk of a facility depends on the material attractiveness, level of safeguards, and physical protection applied to the material in conjunction with an assessment of the impact of the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment. Proliferation risk is a complementary extension of proliferation resistance. The authors believe a better determination of nuclear proliferation can be achieved by establishing the proliferation risk for facilities that contain nuclear material. Developing a method that incorporates the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment inherent to each country enables a global proliferation assessment. To effectively reduce the nuclear danger, a broadly based set of criteria is needed that provides the capability to relatively assess a wide range of nuclear related sites and facilities in different countries and still ensure a global decrease in proliferation risk for fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium)

The Text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Senegal to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The Text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Senegal to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, Astrid

1998-12-31

The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, Astrid

1999-12-31

The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

The present status of safeguards in Turkey

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yilmazer, A.; Yuecel, A.

2001-01-01

Republic of Turkey signed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in Vienna, Austria on January 28, 1969 and the Treaty was ratified by Turkish Parliament on March 29, 1979. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Republic of Turkey signed the Safeguards Agreement on June 30, 1981. Turkey accepted the international safeguards administered by IAEA and at the same time its subsidiary arrangements and Facility attachments were enforced for all nuclear facilities as an Non-Nuclear-Weapon State party to NPT. Regulation on Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control, which was prepared in accordance with Agreement Between the Government of Turkey and IAEA for the application of Safeguard in Connection with the Treaty on NPT, has been put into force since it was published in Official Gazette on September 10, 1997. This study presents the essential futures of national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Turkey

The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1978-07-15

The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-07-01

The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 between Ethiopia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-07-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 and of the Protocol thereto between Ethiopia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 December 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Durst, Philip Casey; Bean, Robert

2010-01-01

In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

1980-01-01

Generally, the scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues, (1) global safeguards effectiveness, or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on (1) while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed at (2). SAFE addresses (1) in that it considers the entire facility, i.e., the composite system of hardware and human components, in one global analysis. SNAP addresses (2) by providing a safeguards modeling symbology sufficiently flexible to represent quite complex scenarios from the standpoint of hardware interfaces while also accounting for a rich variety of human decision making. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example

Nuclear proliferation and terrorism

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1977-01-01

This section of the book, Part III, has two chapters (9 and 10). Chapter 9, Nuclear Power and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is disucssed under these subjects: nuclear nonproliferation: origins and status; requirements for nuclear weapons manufacture; current nuclear programs and proliferation capabilities; encouraging decisions to forego weapons; arms control; safeguards; attitudes and expectations. Chapter 10, Nuclear Terrorism, discusses these areas: theft of nuclear materials; attacks on nuclear reactors; responding to nuclear terrorism; security and civil liberties

The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1971-11-19

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-12

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-07-10

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-02-19

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-02-15

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Lesotho and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 12 June 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1971-10-27

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1971-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document

The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1971-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

Japan-IAEA Workshops on Advanced Safeguards for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffheins, B.; Hori, M.; Suzuki, M.; Kuno, Y.; Kimura, N.; Naito, K.; Hosoya, M.; Khlebnikov, N.; Whichello, J.; Zendel, M.

2010-01-01

Beginning in 2007, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards initiated a workshop series focused on advanced safeguards technologies for the future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). The goals for these workshops were to address safeguards challenges, to share implementation experiences, to discuss fuel cycle plans and promising research and development, and to address other issues associated with safeguarding new fuel cycle facilities. Concurrently, the workshops also served to promote dialog and problem solving, and to foster closer collaborations for facility design and planning. These workshops have sought participation from IAEA Member States' support programmes (MSSP), the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, state systems of accounting and control (SSAC), regulators and inspectorates to ensure that all possible stakeholder views can be shared in an open process. Workshop presentations have covered, inter alia, national fuel cycle programs and plans, research progress in proliferation resistance (PR) and safeguardability, approaches for nuclear measurement accountancy of large material throughputs and difficult to access material, new and novel radiation detectors with increased sensitivity and automation, and lessons learned from recent development and operation of safeguards systems for complex facilities and the experiences of integrated safeguards (IS) in Japan. Although the title of the workshops presumes an emphasis on technology, participants recognized that early planning and organization, coupled with close cooperation among stakeholders, that is, through the application of 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) processes that include nuclear safety and security coordination, 'Remote Inspections' and 'Joint-Use of Equipment (JUE)' would be required to enable more successful implementations of safeguards at future NFC facilities. The needs to cultivate the future workforce, effectively preserve

Holdup-related issues in safeguarding of nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.

1988-03-01

Residual inventories of special nuclear materials (SNM) remaining in processing facilities (holdup) are recognized as an insidious problem for both safety and safeguards. This paper identifies some of the issues that are of concern to the safeguards community at-large that are related to holdup of SNM in large-scale process equipment. These issues range from basic technologies of SNM production to changing regulatory requirements to meet the needs of safeguarding nuclear materials. Although there are no magic formulas to resolve these issues, there are several initiatives that could be taken in areas of facility design, plant operation, personnel training, SNM monitoring, and regulatory guidelines to minimize the problems of holdup and thereby improve both safety and safeguards at nuclear material processing plants. 8 refs

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fishbone, L.G.

1988-09-28

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.

1988-01-01

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

An improved safeguards system and its application to large backend facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-12-01

The evaluation criteria, which are commonly applicable to both Material Accountancy (MA) and Containment and Surveillance (C/S) and applicable to a large backend facilities, are discussed. It is analyzed that substantial increase of the proliferation resistance can be expected by improving the presently existing safeguards systems. The improved safeguards system described in this paper is expected to be applicable to large-scaled backend facilities without giving unnecessary economical and technical burdens. The main purpose of this approach is to move away from the present trend of too much reliance on MA and to develop the synthetical safeguards effects by harmonizing C/S and continuing MA effectively

SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron; Charlton, William; Bean, Robert

2008-01-01

The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of 'non-traditional' operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes

Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Canada written notification that Canada's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 8 September 2000

International nuclear material safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Syed Azmi Syed Ali

1985-01-01

History can be a very dull subject if it relates to events which have long since lost their relevance. The factors which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), however, are as important and relevant today as they were when the Agency was first created. Without understanding these factors it is impossible to realise how important the Agency is in the present world or to understand some of the controversies surrounding its future. Central to these controversies is the question of how best to promote the international transfer of nuclear technology without contributing further to the problem of proliferating nuclear explosives or explosive capabilities. One effective means is to subject nuclear materials (see accompanying article in box), which forms the basic link between the manufacture of nuclear explosives and nuclear power generation, to international safeguards. This was realized very early in the development of nuclear power and was given greater emphasis following the deployment of the first two atomic bombs towards the end of World War II. (author)

Accountability and Transparency: Essential Underpinnings of Quality Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Everton, C.; Floyd, R.

2015-01-01

The fundamental purpose of IAEA safeguards is to maintain confidence in the international community of the compliance of States with their respective non-proliferation commitments. The safeguards system for ensuring this compliance produces the most important output, the IAEA's compliance findings. Confidence in the findings of any compliance verification system requires some basic elements such as independence, accountability, transparency, and quality management systems. Quality management systems are an internal set of documents and procedures that, while clearly important, need to incorporate an external communication component in order to engender confidence as to how compliance is being managed and ensured. This paper will explore the importance of these fundamentals to confidence in IAEA safeguards compliance conclusions, with a focus on the external communication elements of accountability and transparency. Accountability and transparency will be considered with different communication channels through which safeguards implementation matters are explained and reported and at different levels, facility, State, regional, and the IAEA. This will include communications by: the IAEA and State authorities to the general public; State authorities to peers in other national safeguards authorities (regional and beyond); and, the IAEA and State authorities to the international community as represented through the Board of Governors and General Conference. Examples will be presented of good practices in these areas to encourage greater accountability and transparency in the work of safeguards. (author)

Proliferation resistance considerations for remote small modular reactors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Whitlock, J., E-mail: whitlockj@aecl.ca [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada); Sprinkle, J., E-mail: j.sprinkle@iaea.org [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

2013-07-01

Remotely located Small Modular Reactors at the low end of energy production (on the order of 10 MWe, referenced here as Very Small Modular Reactors or VSMRs) present unique proliferation resistance advantages and challenges. Addressing these challenges in the most efficient manner may not only be desirable, but necessary, for development of this technology. Incorporation of safeguards considerations early in the design process (Safeguards by Design) along with safety, security, economics and other key drivers, is of importance. Operational Transparency may become an essential aspect of the safeguards approach for such systems. (author)

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Morocco to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

The Text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-11-01

The text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 14 June 1979.

The Text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-06-16

The text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation

Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-12-31

The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation Refs, figs, tabs

Safeguarding aspects of large-scale commercial reprocessing plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-03-01

The paper points out that several solutions to the problems of safeguarding large-scale plants have been put forward: (1) Increased measurement accuracy. This does not remove the problem of timely detection. (2) Continuous in-process measurement. As yet unproven and likely to be costly. (3) More extensive use of containment and surveillance. The latter appears to be feasible but requires the incorporation of safeguards into plant design and sufficient redundancy to protect the operators interests. The advantages of altering the emphasis of safeguards philosophy from quantitative goals to the analysis of diversion strategies should be considered

Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

1981-12-01

This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility

Which future for the nuclear counter-proliferation?; Quel avenir pour la contre-proliferation nucleaire?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Duval, M

2004-10-01

After a recall of the permanent data about proliferation and of the safeguards implemented by the international community, the author demonstrates that proliferation has moved towards Asia where a real 'black market' has been created. Then he analyzes the consequences of this change on the future of nuclear deterrent. Finally, he expresses his nostalgia in front of this drift and worries about the future uselessness of the means devoted to this 'pacifying' strategy. (J.S.)

The Text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-11-19

The text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 May 1974, pursuant to Article 25 thereof.

Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, A.

1997-12-31

The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, A

1998-12-31

The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forland, A.

1997-01-01

The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs

The standing advisory group on safeguards implementation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jennekens, J.H.F.

1982-09-01

In 1975 the Director General of the IAEA called together ten persons from member states with nuclear programs at varying stages of development to form the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. The group was later expanded to twelve. The Director General asked the group to evaluate the technical objectives of Agency safeguards, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of specific safeguards operating methods in meeting these technical objectives, advise on techniques to be employed in safeguards operations, and recommend areas where further work is needed. This paper reviews the work of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation since its formation in 1975, summarizes the subjects that have been examined and the advice rendered, and outlines the problem areas requiring further study

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B. (comp.)

1984-09-01

From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1984-09-01

From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert Bean; Casey Durst

2009-10-01

This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S.

2003-01-01

The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection

International safeguards for spent fuel storage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

1981-08-01

This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems

Safeguards policy and strategies: An IAEA perspective for spent fuel in geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fattah, A.

2002-01-01

Safeguards for nuclear materials in geologic repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been backfilled and sealed. The nuclear materials disposed in a geologic repository may pose a higher and long-term proliferation risk because the inventory is many times the 'significant quantity' needed safeguards. The safeguards measures must be flexible enough to respond to the changing development of technology and changing need for current as well as future generations. Change in social, economic, environmental and other scenarios might demand recovery of nuclear and other materials from the repository sometime in the future. (author)

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.; Bennett, C.A.

1975-01-01

A comprehensive rationale for safeguards design and evaluation, and a framework for continuing systematic assessment of the system's effectiveness and efficient allocation of available safeguards resources for balanced protection, were developed. The societal risk approach employed considers the likelihood of successful destructive acts involving nuclear materials or facilities and the magnitude of the effects on society. The safeguards problem is described in terms of events affecting societal risk and adversary actions. Structure of the safeguards system and the evaluation of its adequacy are discussed. Adversary characteristics are also discussed

Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richardson, J.M.

1982-03-01

Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures

Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

1997-05-01

This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

1997-05-01

This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-12-24

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia`s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Mali and the Agency, i.e. on 12 September 2002

Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Application of Safeguards-by-Design to a Reactor Design Process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitlock, J.J.

2010-01-01

The application of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) to a reactor design process is described. The SBD concept seeks to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards by incorporating the needs of safeguards at an early stage of reactor design. Understanding and accommodating safeguards in the design process requires a set of 'design requirements for safeguards'; however, such requirements (a) do not traditionally exist, and (b) must exist alongside other more traditional design requirements based upon compliance and operational goals. In the absence of design requirements, a 'Design Guide' for safeguards was created, consisting of recommendations based on best practices. To acquire an understanding of safeguards requirements at the design level, a systematic accounting of diversion pathways was required. However, because of the crowded field of other design requirements, this process needed a methodology that was also flexible in interpretation. The GenIV Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR and PP) methodology (Rev.5, 2005) was chosen for this exercise. The PR and PP methodology is a general approach and therefore it was necessary to restrict its application; in effect, turning 'off' various options so as to simplify the process. The results of this exercise were used to stimulate discussions with the design team and initiate changes that accommodate safeguards without negatively impacting other design requirements. The process yielded insights into the effective application of SBD, and highlighted issues that must be resolved for effective incorporation of an 'SBD culture' within the design process. (author)

Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-01-01

This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

Exports and experts:proliferation risks from the new Commonwealth

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potter, W.C.

1992-01-01

Ironically, given the Cold War history and Western stereotypes about Soviet misbehavior, the long-standing experience of US-Soviet cooperation on nonproliferation may have made US policy-makers less attentive to, and less concerned about, signs of change in Soviet nuclear export policy. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the nuclear inheritance of its successor states belatedly focused Western attention on the proliferation risks posed by the disintegration of central authority. Most concern to date, however, has continued to emphasize the problems of nuclear command and control. But the nonproliferation threats associated with the unregulated export of sensitive nuclear material, technology, and equipment may be equally great, and present problems that are already real. At the same time, the new nation-building process in the Soviet successor states presents opportunities for expanding the NPT and international safeguards, containing the nuclear brain drain, promoting the cleanup of hazardous nuclear waste, enhancing international capabilities for monitoring proliferation, and building new communities of nonproliferation specialists. A rare occasion now exists for Western policy-makers to have a direct impact on the long-term nuclear export and non-proliferation behavior of the successor states to the Soviet Union. The speed and seriousness with which the West undertakes this task will largely determine how much ground, if any, will be lost from its decades-long effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons

Fissile material disposition and proliferation risk

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). NIS Div.

1996-05-01

The proliferation risk of a facility is dependent on the material attractiveness, level of safeguards, and physical protection applied to the material in conjunction with an assessment of the impact of the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment. Proliferation risk is a complementary extension of proliferation resistance. The authors believe a better determination of nuclear material proliferation can be achieved by establishing the proliferation risk for facilities that contain nuclear material. Developing a method that incorporates the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment inherent to each country enables a global proliferation assessment. In order to effectively reduce the nuclear danger, a broadly based set of criteria is needed that provides the capability to relatively assess a wide range of disposition options/facilities in different countries and still ensure a global decrease in proliferation risk for plutonium.

Fissile material disposition and proliferation risk

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A.

1996-01-01

The proliferation risk of a facility is dependent on the material attractiveness, level of safeguards, and physical protection applied to the material in conjunction with an assessment of the impact of the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment. Proliferation risk is a complementary extension of proliferation resistance. The authors believe a better determination of nuclear material proliferation can be achieved by establishing the proliferation risk for facilities that contain nuclear material. Developing a method that incorporates the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment inherent to each country enables a global proliferation assessment. In order to effectively reduce the nuclear danger, a broadly based set of criteria is needed that provides the capability to relatively assess a wide range of disposition options/facilities in different countries and still ensure a global decrease in proliferation risk for plutonium

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 14 September 2004. It was signed on 9 December 2004 in Vienna

U.S.-India safeguards dispute

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sweet, W.

1978-01-01

The current U.S.-India dispute over nuclear safeguards is likely to be the single most important test of the Carter administration's anti-proliferation policies. The Carter administration wants India to accept comprehensive safeguards that would bar further production of nuclear explosives. The Desai government wants to maintain unsafeguarded facilities, in effect keeping the weapons option open. It has been a basic tenet of Indian nuclear policy since the mid-1950s that the big powers must disarm if the small powers are to renounce acquisition of nuclear weapons. As a matter of practical policy, India is willing to forego a nuclear deterrent only if sustained world pressure keeps China's nuclear aspirations in check. As a matter of basic principle, India regards it as unfair and imperialistic that the heavily armed big powers ask for special assurances from the lightly armed small powers. India takes the position that it will cooperate with the United States only voluntarily and only if the nuclear weapon states or at least the superpowers start to clean up their own act. The superpowers must (1) negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty; (2) accept full-scope safeguards themselves, which would be tantamount to a ban on any further production of weapons-grade materials; and (3) make significant moves toward total nuclear disarmament. The dependence of India on the United States for nuclear supplies is almost negligible. India's major nuclear facilities in operation or under construction include five research reactors, seven power reactors and three reprocessing facilities. Of these 15 facilities, the United States supplied only one (the Tarapur reactor) and 12 of them are not under IAEA safeguards. The United States, in short, is threatening to terminate supplies of low-enriched uranium for just one reactor unless India places these 12 facilities under IAEA safeguards

Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2012-07-01

The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

2003-10-01

The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection.

The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

2003-07-01

This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

Authentication method for safeguards instruments securing data transmission

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Neumann, G.; Gartner, K.J.

1986-01-01

Because of the worldwide increase in nuclear fuel cycle activities, the need arises to reduce inspection effort by increasing the inspection efficiency per facility. Therefore, more and more advanced safeguards instruments will be designed for automatic operation. In addition, sensoring and recording devices may be well separated from each other within the facility, while the data transmission medium is a cable. The basic problem is the authenticity of the transmitted information. It has to be ensured that no potential adversary is able to falsify the transmitted safeguards data, i.e. the data transmission is secured. At present, predominantly C/S-devices are designed for automatic and remote interrogation. Also in other areas of safeguards instrumentation authentication will become a major issue, in particular, where the facility operator may offer his process instrumentation to be used also for safeguards purposes. In this paper possibilities to solve the problem of authentication are analysed

The role of IAEA Safeguards in connection with nuclear trade

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Imai, R.

1977-01-01

IAEA safeguards is one of the means to prevent proliferation of military and/or explosive utilization of nuclear material. As such; safeguards can be a potent instrument, and its characteristics are primarily technical. Other means may include; a) political incentives which make possession of nuclear weapons unnecessary and undescribable; b) an extent of trade restrictions regarding certain sensitive material, equipment and technology; and c) accompanying requirements of physical protection. Peaceful nuclear industry has an aspect which naturally calls for international exchange. The technology itself represents one of the most advanced in our times, and therefore, should be shared throughout the world. Uranium resources of economic grades are found only in a limited number of countries. Many of the components of the industry, including reactor manufacture and fuel cycle, are very capital-intensive and technology-intensive, so that it would be natural that a relatively limited number of manufacturing or processing capabilities should serve the rest of the world. It is useful to look at the existing pattern of nuclear trade, as well as to forecast the effects of increasing trade volume. Regarding technology, the problem divides itself into three in order that safeguards should be effective and non-intrusive. There is a need to decrease international shipper/receiver difference by means of containment/surveillance as well as quick and accurate reporting. Obviously, its effectiveness will be maximized if all the world's trading partners should participate in a system of coordination. Improving technical effectiveness of safeguards is very important, once nuclear material is in a country. Thirdly, in addition to nuclear material accountancy, new techniques may be employed to recognize characteristic patterns of a nations's nuclear activities, or deviation from such a pattern. Tracing nuclear trade might become important input to such an analysis

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-12-15

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anttila, M.

2000-08-01

The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the LAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INF-CIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the LAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle in

Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-05-04

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001.

A study on the national safeguards system -Current status and suggested development-

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Wan Su; Kwack, Eun Ho; An, Jong Sung; Kim, Hyun Tae; Min, Kyung Sik; Park, Chan Sik

1995-03-01

In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system (SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. 14 tabs., 15 figs., 29 refs. (Author)

A day in the life of a safeguards inspector

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Henriques, Sasha

2016-01-01

Walking several miles through the winding, narrow corridors of a nuclear facility in protective gear while carrying heavy equipment, often escorted by facility operator personnel: welcome to the life of an IAEA safeguards inspector. Safeguards inspectors are an essential part of the global non-proliferation regime, carrying out verification activities, so the IAEA can provide assurances to States worldwide that other countries are not diverting nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes or misusing nuclear technology. One important activity is the inspection of declared stocks of nuclear material: the IAEA is the only organization in the world with the mandate to verify the use of nuclear material and technology globally.

Safeguards agreement and additional protocol - IAEA instruments for control of nuclear materials distribution and their application in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nasrulloev, Kh.; Mirsaidov, U.

2010-01-01

Full text: It is known that IAEA plays an important role in facilitation of nuclear non-proliferation as international authority which carries out nuclear inspections. Republic of Tajikistan in 1997 signed nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty. Then in 2004 Safeguards agreement, additional protocol and small quantity protocol were signed. During 5 years Republic of Tajikistan submits information on its nuclear activity as declarations, foreseen in article 2.3 of Additional protocol to Safeguards agreement. Currently 66 declarations are submitted. Information required in accordance with Safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol is figured on that IAEA could compile more detailed and exact conception about nuclear activity in Tajikistan and it has the following purpose: information will lead to more transparency, and make it possible to IAEA to ensure with high extent of confidence that in the framework of declared program, any unstated nuclear activity is concealed; the more exact and comprehensive information, the rare is questions and discrepancies are originating; required information is the basis for effective planning and IAEA activity realization, related not only with safeguards implementation in regard to declared nuclear material but also ensuring of confidence in absence of undeclared nuclear activity in Tajikistan. IAEA inspection mission consisting of Messrs. N.Lazarev and F. Coillou visited Dushanbe in 2008 for verification of republic’s declarations on account for and control of nuclear materials under Additional protocol and Small quantity protocol, as well as consultations were provided on correct declaration completing and providing information on all nuclear materials. Besides, in 2006, the training course was conducted in Chkalovsk with participation of Commonwealth of Independent States countries on Safeguards agreement and Additional protocol. These visits and events will facilitate to strengthening of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation

Global proliferation concerns

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpkins, R.

1978-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAGA Safeguards System are discussed. President Carter's program to defer commercial reprocessing and recycle, to restructure the breeder program, to develop alternative fuel cycles, to increase US uranium enrichment capability, to provide fuel assurance for consumer nations, to continue the embargo of sensitive technology and equipment and to develop the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program is outlined

Safeguards and an internationalized nuclear fuel cycle for East Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olsen, John

2005-01-01

Concerns about nuclear proliferation by means of illicit enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium suggest limiting those technologies to a few, large facilities. In turn, countries that renounce acquiring those capabilities would be guaranteed fuel cycle services. Interdependence might lead to an Internationalized Nuclear Fuel Cycle (IFC), which could be formalized in voluntary regional compacts to share management of certain facilities. An IFC could add managerial oversight to strengthen the nonproliferation culture in the region and offer cost and efficiency benefits to participating countries, as well. An East Asian IFC would present opportunities to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards by consolidating inspection requirements into relatively few facilities. This may be an opportune time to consider an IFC before the growing national industries each invest in separate facilities. An East Asian IFC regime could minimize international safeguards burdens, strengthen regional non-proliferation cooperation, and help manage future energy costs. (author)

Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-02-09

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997.

Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2001. It was signed in Vienna on 5 December 2001

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997

The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitworth, A.

1996-01-01

The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 5 July 2000. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Azerbaijan written notification that Azerbaijan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 29 November 2000

University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bachner K. M.; Pepper, S.; Gomera, J.; Einwechter, M.; Toler, L. T.

2016-07-24

BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects. Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to

Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-09-01

This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-12-01

This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-09-01

This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 28 September 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from the Czech Republic written notification that the Czech Republic's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 1 July 2002

Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bean, Robert S.; Hockert, John W.; Hebditch, David J.

2009-01-01

There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

1983-01-01

A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

Implementation of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Sierra Leone

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

George, M.

2015-01-01

Sierra Leone under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) has enacted the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (NSRP) Act 2012 and has given numerous powers to the Authority to implement the above mentioned act fully. The NSRP Act 2012 established the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Authority which among other things to regulate, control and supervise the acquisition, importation, exportation, use, transportation and disposal of radioactive sources and devices emitting Ionizing Radiation. The Authority is bounded by law to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of Safeguards Agreement and any protocol thereto between Sierra Leone and the International Atomic Energy Agency including conducting inspections and providing any assistance or information required by designated IAEA inspectors in the fulfillment of their responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, Subsection 2, Article xvi of the NSRP Act 2012. The Authority is also granted powers to adopt all necessary measures including a system of licensing to control the export, re-export, transit and transhipment of any nuclear material, equipment or technology in order to protect the safety and security of Sierra Leone. The Regulatory Authority has established departments for the control of nuclear materials: One of which is The Regulatory Control Department; responsible for Inspections, Authorization and Enforcement actions for all radiation sources and nuclear materials. The Authority has been conducting inspections regularly on various facilities ranging from medical radiation generating equipment to industrial radiography sources. The methodology to be used is the issuance of the standard IAEA checklist which is consistent with the Regulatory Authority’s documents for inspection of sources and is in line with the General Safety Requirements(GSR)Part III. The expected outcomes would be increasing training of regulatory authority’s staff, the procurement of

Overview of IAEA guidelines for state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: objectives, diversion of nuclear material, and the IAEA safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buechler, C.

1984-01-01

Topics discussed include IAEA safeguards statutes, project and transfer agreements, agreements pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, implementation of IAEA safeguards, diversion strategies, accountancy and surveillance systems, and verification

EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heppleston, M.

1999-01-01

This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B. (comp.)

1986-01-01

From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1986-01-01

From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Proliferation Risks of Fusion Energy: Clandestine Production, Covert Production, and Breakout

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldston, R.J.; Glaser, A.; Ross, A.F.

2009-01-01

Nuclear proliferation risks from fusion associated with access to weapon-usable material can be divided into three main categories: (1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, (2) covert production of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and (3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state begins production of fissile material without concealing the effort. In this paper we address each of these categories of risk from fusion. For each case, we find that the proliferation risk from fusion systems can be much lower than the equivalent risk from fission systems, if commercial fusion systems are designed to accommodate appropriate safeguards

Safeguards and security. Progress report, August 1982-January 1983

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1983-11-01

Activities are described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats a relatively new set of Los Alamos activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shipley, J.P. (comp.)

1982-09-01

From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.

1982-09-01

From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer

Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopatin, S.

2010-01-01

Strengthening of SSAC is a necessary condition for application of integrated safeguards. Ukrainian State System has been working since 1994 and passed several stages in its development: At the early stage it allowed us to conclude the first Safeguards Agreement; In 2003 SSAC covered also all nuclear material at locations outside facilities; In 2006 Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force. The significant contribution to strengthening of SSAC has been made by ISSAS mission carried out in Ukraine in 2007. The mission helped us to evaluate the State Safeguards System, provided us recommendations on improving of legislation, in particular to establish the system of personnel training. Cooperation between the IAEA and Ukrainian SSAC is carried out in following directions. Annual meeting of Safeguards Implementation Review Group takes place in Kiev. Participants discuss current tasks or problem issues of Safeguards implementation and work out Action Plan in order to resolve a problem or find a way for improving situation. Ukrainian State inspectors organize and take part in each IAEA inspection and complementary access. Ukraine has got considerable experience in the AP implementation, to a certain extent determined by peculiarities of Ukraine as a former part of a nuclear weapon state. For 5 years we have accumulated a significant amount of AP information and it became a problem to keep track of it. Due to Protocol Reporter software has limited possibilities there was a need to develop additional software for AP information management. The transmission of encrypted data on nuclear materials from surveillance systems installed at all NPPs directly to the IAEA Headquarters has started recently. Since September 2010 the IAEA plans to use these data for drawing conclusion of safeguards implementation that will allow to reduce the number of IAEA inspections to the Ukrainian NPPs. While implementing the AP we got a question about correspondence of efforts spent for

Which future for the nuclear counter-proliferation?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duval, M.

2004-01-01

After a recall of the permanent data about proliferation and of the safeguards implemented by the international community, the author demonstrates that proliferation has moved towards Asia where a real 'black market' has been created. Then he analyzes the consequences of this change on the future of nuclear deterrent. Finally, he expresses his nostalgia in front of this drift and worries about the future uselessness of the means devoted to this 'pacifying' strategy. (J.S.)

Proliferation resistance of advanced sustainable nuclear fuel cycles

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Garcia, H.E.; Lineberry, M.J.; Aumeier, S.E.; McFarlane, H.F. [Argonne National Lab.-West (United States)

2001-07-01

Intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation barriers of a pyro-process-based nuclear fuel cycle are discussed. While technical characteristics of the process raise new challenges for safeguards, others naturally facilitate the implementation of more integrated schemes for unattended continuous monitoring. In particular, the concept of operations accountability and model-assisted methods are revisited. While traditional safeguards constructs, such as material control and accountability, place greater emphasis on input/output characterization of nuclear processes, a model- based discrete event accountability approach could explicitly verify not only facility use but also internal operational dynamics. Under the proposed remote integral safeguards approach, transparency can be achieved efficiently, without divulging competitive or national security sensitive information. (author)

Proliferation resistance of advanced sustainable nuclear fuel cycles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Garcia, H.E.; Lineberry, M.J.; Aumeier, S.E.; McFarlane, H.F.

2001-01-01

Intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation barriers of a pyro-process-based nuclear fuel cycle are discussed. While technical characteristics of the process raise new challenges for safeguards, others naturally facilitate the implementation of more integrated schemes for unattended continuous monitoring. In particular, the concept of operations accountability and model-assisted methods are revisited. While traditional safeguards constructs, such as material control and accountability, place greater emphasis on input/output characterization of nuclear processes, a model- based discrete event accountability approach could explicitly verify not only facility use but also internal operational dynamics. Under the proposed remote integral safeguards approach, transparency can be achieved efficiently, without divulging competitive or national security sensitive information. (author)

Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courteix, Simone.

1978-01-01

Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

Managing threats from emerging technologies: can safeguards show the way?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leffer, Teri N.

2014-01-01

The system of international nuclear safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is primarily a means of verification of states’ commitments under various legal instruments, principally the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to utilize controlled nuclear fission for peaceful purposes only. However, the safeguards system can also be seen as a mechanism through which states acted to reduce the threat posed by a new technology that had a transformative impact on existing national security paradigms when it emerged in the twentieth century. In the twenty‑first century, new technologies with equally profound national security implications are emerging. These include biotechnology and synthetic biology, nano technology, information technology, cognitive science, robotics and artificial intelligence. Throughout its history, the safeguards system has evolved to accommodate new technologies, new undertakings and new threats. Because multiple emerging technologies now constitute potential national security threats, it is appropriate to consider whether and how the lessons and successes of the safeguards system, including its capacity to evolve in response to changing requirements, could be leveraged to mitigate the threat posed by these new technologies. This paper addresses the possibility of re‑imagining safeguards in a way that makes them applicable to a broader range of technology‑based threats without compromising their effectiveness for their original purpose.

Plutonium, proliferation, and the price of reprocessing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilinsky, V.

1978-01-01

France and Britain disagree with the US on whether deferring fuel reprocessing that provides plutonium for export can help contain proliferation. The US has veto power over reprocessing of US-supplied fuels for non-EURATOM countries, but exceptions will be made for movement within the EURATOM community. Political issues will be influenced by the magnitude of the financial investments, however, and commercial considerations have until recently dominated and complicated international safeguards. The author notes that US policy was reversed by the gradual acknowledgment that the same international inspection of plutonium stockpiles would not work as it had for low-enriched fuel and that economic interests must have a lower priority to avoiding proliferation. He cites the combination of sudden policy shifts, failure to prove that present reactors are best, and long-term distrust of US economic motives as failing to persuade either the French or British, who feel the best safeguard is provided by their high-security reprocessing facilities. Still to be resolved are the conditions under which plutonium must be returned to its owners, a problem that must determine safe international transport and storage and international management. Technical fixes, such as the CIVEX process, cannot contribute to the solution for several decades, while reprocessing is no longer considered a first step in waste disposal and would be more expensive and complicated than present waste disposal procedures. The author concedes merit in President Carter's requirement of separating ''the legitimate and necessary use of uranium'' and nuclear fuels that are also explosives

Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

This Act of 30 June 1978 gives effect to the Agreement concluded on 6 September 1976 between the United Kingdom, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the territory of the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear Weapons. It also deals with the financial support provided by the State for the generating station at Drax. (NEA) [fr

Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-08-01

The document reproduces the text of the Exchange of Letters with the Commonwealth of Dominica in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean, which constitutes an agreement confirming that the Safeguards Agreement of 3 May 1996 (IAEA-INFCIRC-513) concluded between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) and the IAEA pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) satisfies the obligation of Dominica under Article 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA

Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-03-28

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001.

Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cartan, F.O.

1982-05-01

This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-09-01

During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PEPPER, S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

2007-01-01

The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R and D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Annual report 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haemaelaeinen, M.; Karhu, P.

2008-04-01

Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards

Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-04-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-05-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-04-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994.

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-05-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000.

Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-07-28

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000.

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-06-20

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000.

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-04-18

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, Jan; Kinley, David III

2002-09-01

One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-11-29

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 between Sudan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-06-10

The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 and of the Protocol thereto, between Sudan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 January 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975 between Swaziland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-12-18

The text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Swaziland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 July 1975, pursuant to Article 24 thereof. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977 between Afghanistan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-04-01

The text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Afghanistan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 February 1978. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Morocco and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 18 February 1975, pursuant to Article 25. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.