IAEA safeguards and classified materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

1997-01-01

The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

Safeguards and Security Research and Development progress report, October 1990--September 1991

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

1992-07-01

This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research And Development (R ampersand D) program from October 1990 through September 1991. The activities presented in the first three parts--Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, and Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support--were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS). The activities described in Part 4--International Safeguards--were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (OACN/IS). Part 5 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS or OACN/IS. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R ampersand D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published in 1991

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

An analysis of a regional nuclear safeguards organisation: the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the development of nuclear safeguards in Western Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Howlett, Darryl.

1988-08-01

This thesis argues that the nuclear safeguards system implemented by EURATOM in Western Europe has come to fruition as a result of a complex political process. This process has involved negotiations over the exact limits on safeguards interventions into the nuclear affairs of the European Community. There are two dimensions to these negotiations. On the one hand, they involve EURATOM and its member states over the necessary limits on safeguards intervention in member states' domestic nuclear affairs. On the other, there are negotiations between EURATOM and several actors outside the region, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency. The thesis concludes by arguing that international safeguards organisations, of which EURATOM is a regional example, have made important contributions to arms control and international security. In the process, certain kinds of precedents and procedures which have potential for broader application have been established. (author)

IAEA safeguards instrumentation: Development, implementation and control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rundquist, D.E.

1983-01-01

Extensive development efforts over the last 5 years have produced a number of new instruments to help the IAEA meet its safeguards obligations. Implementation of these new instruments is proceeding at a necessarily slower pace. To optimize the performance and reliability of the instrumentation systems when used in safeguards applications, increasing attention is needed to be spent on performance monitoring and control of the instruments. (author)

Elementary survey of nuclear safeguards problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobias, M.L.

1975-01-01

The discussion presented on nuclear safeguards is confined primarily to the subject of safeguards for fixed sites. The legal and quasi-legal requirements are briefly outlined. Preventive measures against theft, terrorism, sabotage, or irrational acts by employees and against sabotage by armed gangs are the aspects emphasized. Some of the cost aspects are indicated

The arms race control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nemo, J.

2010-01-01

Written in 1961, this paper presents the content of a book entitled 'The arms race control' where the author outlined the difference between disarmament and arms control, described the economic and moral role of arms race, the importance of force balance for international security. He wandered whether arms control could ensure this balance and whether nuclear balance meant force balance. Force balance then appears to be a precarious and unsteady component of international security. He commented the challenges of disarmament, recalled some arguments for a nuclear disarmament. Then he discussed what would be an arms control with or without disarmament (either nuclear or conventional)

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Doyle, James E.; Meek, Elizabeth

2009-01-01

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the

EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heppleston, M.

1999-01-01

This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

Powered manipulator control arm

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Le Mouee, Theodore; Vertut, Jean; Marchal, Paul; Germon, J.C.; Petit, Michel

1975-01-01

A remote operated control arm for powered manipulators is described. It includes an assembly allowing several movements with position sensors for each movement. The number of possible arm movements equals the number of possible manipulator movements. The control systems may be interrupted as required. One part of the arm is fitted with a system to lock it with respect to another part of the arm without affecting the other movements, so long as the positions of the manipulator and the arm have not been brought into complete coincidence. With this system the locking can be ended when complete concordance is achieved [fr

The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.

2011-01-01

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

The status of United States R and D programs in safeguards and physical protection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mangan, D.L.; Tape, J.W.

1993-01-01

The breakup of former Soviet Union and the strategic nuclear arms reduction agreements, START 1 and 2, when fully implemented, will result in the significant reduction and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. These events will produce the significant increase of stored nuclear materials requiring the utmost control and care for indefinite future. Some of these materials in addition to existing wastes and residues may need further processing. The control of nuclear materials through safeguards, both domestic and international, is one of only a few effective barriers to nuclear proliferation. The improved technology is the key to the cost effective safeguards of nuclear materials. The Department of Energy carries out the research and development programs at its national laboratories. As the most notable demonstration and training efforts of new technologies, there is International Training Courses on the State System of Accounting and Control and the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials. The Office of Research and Development of the Office of Intelligence and National Security Affairs, the Department of Energy, the Office of Safeguards and Security, International Safeguards Division and so on carry out the activities of the R and D on safeguards and physical protection. (K.I.)

Arms control and disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Acton, P.

1992-01-01

Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty commits each party to work towards nuclear disarmament and to negotiations to stop the nuclear arms race. All parties to the Treaty are included and a wide range of arms control and disarmament issues are covered. However the main focus at Treaty review conferences has been on nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states which are party to the Treaty. This has led to bilateral United States - Soviet Union negotiations resulting in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in July followed by unilateral arms control measures in September and October 1991. (UK)

Safeguard Verification as Cooperative Measure for Non Proliferation Control in Peru

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ramirez, R.

2010-01-01

Peru applies the safeguard measures on its nuclear activities based in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and the Additional Protocol which has been fully implemented becoming part of the Integrated Safeguard since 2005. In addition to international safeguard commitments Peru is also committed with the United Nations 1540 Resolution by which national controls has to be established for preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vector systems. The safeguards measures have become an important part of the verification activities related to this Resolution by analyzing of materials and equipment to be imported or that may be in transit across the country. These activities are part of those developed jointly with other governmental organizations. (author)

Security and arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kolodziej, E.A.; Morgan, P.M.

1989-01-01

This book attempts to clarify and define selected current issues and problems related to security and arms control from an international perspective. The chapters are organized under the following headings. Conflict and the international system, Nuclear deterrence, Conventional warfare, Subconventional conflict, Arms control and crisis management

Sequential probability ratio controllers for safeguards radiation monitors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fehlau, P.E.; Coop, K.L.; Nixon, K.V.

1984-01-01

Sequential hypothesis tests applied to nuclear safeguards accounting methods make the methods more sensitive to detecting diversion. The sequential tests also improve transient signal detection in safeguards radiation monitors. This paper describes three microprocessor control units with sequential probability-ratio tests for detecting transient increases in radiation intensity. The control units are designed for three specific applications: low-intensity monitoring with Poisson probability ratios, higher intensity gamma-ray monitoring where fixed counting intervals are shortened by sequential testing, and monitoring moving traffic where the sequential technique responds to variable-duration signals. The fixed-interval controller shortens a customary 50-s monitoring time to an average of 18 s, making the monitoring delay less bothersome. The controller for monitoring moving vehicles benefits from the sequential technique by maintaining more than half its sensitivity when the normal passage speed doubles

Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

U.S.-India safeguards dispute

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sweet, W.

1978-01-01

The current U.S.-India dispute over nuclear safeguards is likely to be the single most important test of the Carter administration's anti-proliferation policies. The Carter administration wants India to accept comprehensive safeguards that would bar further production of nuclear explosives. The Desai government wants to maintain unsafeguarded facilities, in effect keeping the weapons option open. It has been a basic tenet of Indian nuclear policy since the mid-1950s that the big powers must disarm if the small powers are to renounce acquisition of nuclear weapons. As a matter of practical policy, India is willing to forego a nuclear deterrent only if sustained world pressure keeps China's nuclear aspirations in check. As a matter of basic principle, India regards it as unfair and imperialistic that the heavily armed big powers ask for special assurances from the lightly armed small powers. India takes the position that it will cooperate with the United States only voluntarily and only if the nuclear weapon states or at least the superpowers start to clean up their own act. The superpowers must (1) negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty; (2) accept full-scope safeguards themselves, which would be tantamount to a ban on any further production of weapons-grade materials; and (3) make significant moves toward total nuclear disarmament. The dependence of India on the United States for nuclear supplies is almost negligible. India's major nuclear facilities in operation or under construction include five research reactors, seven power reactors and three reprocessing facilities. Of these 15 facilities, the United States supplied only one (the Tarapur reactor) and 12 of them are not under IAEA safeguards. The United States, in short, is threatening to terminate supplies of low-enriched uranium for just one reactor unless India places these 12 facilities under IAEA safeguards

The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitworth, A.

1996-01-01

The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

Safeguards research: assessing material control and accounting systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maimoni, A.

1977-01-01

The Laboratory is working for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to improve the safeguarding of special nuclear material at nuclear fuel processing facilities, to provide a basis for improved regulations for material control and accounting systems, and to develop an assessment procedure for verifying compliance with these regulations. Early work included setting up a hierarchy of safeguard objectives and a set of measurable parameters with which systems performance to meet those objectives can be measured. Present work has focused on developing a computerized assessment procedure. We have also completed a test bed (based on a plutonium nitrate storage area) to identify and correct problems in the procedure and to show how this procedure can be used to evaluate the performance of an applicant's material control and accounting system

Synergies across verification regimes: Nuclear safeguards and chemical weapons convention compliance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kadner, Steven P.; Turpen, Elizabeth

2001-01-01

In the implementation of all arms control agreements, accurate verification is essential. In setting a course for verifying compliance with a given treaty - whether the NPT or the CWC, one must make a technical comparison of existing information-gathering capabilities against the constraints in an agreement. Then it must be decided whether this level of verifiability is good enough. Generally, the policy standard of 'effective verification' includes the ability to detect significant violations, with high confidence, in sufficient time to respond effectively with policy adjustments or other responses, as needed. It is at this juncture where verification approaches have traditionally diverged. Nuclear safeguards requirements have taken one path while chemical verification methods have pursued another. However, recent technological advances have brought a number of changes affecting verification, and lately their pace has been accelerating. First, all verification regimes have more and better information as a result of new kinds of sensors, imagery, and other technologies. Second, the verification provisions in agreements have also advanced, to include on-site inspections, portal monitoring, data exchanges, and a variety of transparency, confidence-building, and other cooperative measures, Together these developments translate into a technological overlap of certain institutional verification measures such as the NPT's safeguards requirements and the IAEA and the CWC's verification visions and the OPCW. Hence, a priority of international treaty-implementing organizations is exploring the development of a synergistic and coordinated approach to WMD policy making that takes into account existing inter-linkages between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons issues. Specific areas of coordination include harmonizing information systems and information exchanges and the shared application of scientific mechanisms, as well as collaboration on technological developments

Safeguards on nuclear waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crawford, D.W.

1995-01-01

Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

Borehole tool outrigger arm displacement control mechanism

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, A.G.

1985-01-01

As the outrigger arms of a borehole logging tool are flexed inwardly and outwardly according to the diameter of the borehole opening through which they pass, the corresponding axial displacements of the ends of the arms are controlled to determine the axial positions of the arms relative to the tool. Specifically, as the arm ends move, they are caused to rotate by a cam mechanism. The stiffness of the arms causes the arm ends to rotate in unison, and the exact positions of the arms on the tool are then controlled by the differential movements of the arm ends in the cams

International security and arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ekeus, R.

2000-01-01

The end of the cold war also ended the focus on the bilateral approach to arms control and disarmament. Key concepts of security needed to be revisited, along with their implications for the disarmament and arms control agenda. Though there is currently a unipolar global security environment, there remain important tasks on the multilateral arms control agenda. The major task is that of reducing and eliminating weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. The author contends that maintaining reliance on the nuclear-weapons option makes little sense in a time when the major Powers are strengthening their partnerships in economics, trade, peacemaking and building. (author)

Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

Understanding national and international safeguards: an evolutionary process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Higinbotham, W.A.

1983-01-01

Domestic and international safeguards have been evolving and will continue to evolve. in the case of the United States, the concern was to protect the classified materials, at first. Then attention focussed on material accounting, then on measures to promptly detect theft by individuals with access, and later on physical protection to ward-off armed terrorists. The objective of the IAEA has always been to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not being diverted from the peaceful facilities that are under safeguards. The evolution has taken place in deciding how to provide this assurance, and in the definition of specific safeguards goals. In both cases the technology needed to meet the goals has improved due to R and D and to experience. A plea is made for more cooperation betwen those who develop and manage the policies, those who develop safeguards techniques, and those who are subject to national and IAEA safeguards. Some illustrations of the evolution of policies, inadequate coordination and general progress are given

ASEA-ATOM's URANUS system for production control, economic control and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mattson, J.C.

1983-01-01

ASEA-ATOM needs a system for production and economic control because: (1) the uranium is the valuable property of the customer; (2) short delivery times are a prime means of competition; (3) the manufacture of fuel necessitates frequent enrichment changes and much enrichment blending; (4) minimizing uranium stock reduces interest costs. A system which meets the above needs will with minor modifications meet safeguard requirements. URANUS is an integrated man/computer system with manual input and automatic data treatment and reporting of information. The man/computer interface is monitored by the automatic checking for plausibility of all input. An item is a quantity of material which is treated as a unit in production. Each item receives a unique identification number which may be used only once. If the qualitative properties of an item are changed a new item number is issued. Items are reported on forms and fed into URANUS by authorized personnel using personal passwords or are directly reported by terminal from certain operations. Pertinent information is entered for each project. The URANUS computer system consists of terminal activated on-line and batch modules which are briefly described. Output is information for planning, economic control and safeguards. Safeguards information consists of the following. For flow and blending control: delivery information; change of nominal enrichment; enrichment blending; internal transactions that change an enrichment/origin account; material status report (MSR); item inventory per MBA; general ledger. For physical inventory: material balance report (MBR); book item inventory per MBA; physical item inventory per MBA; uranium balance per origin and enrichment

Nuclear safeguards and security in a changing world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Badolato, E.V.

1986-01-01

Two major crises of 1986 - the Chernobyl nuclear accident and international terrorism have had the effect of making what everyone does even more critically important for U.S. national security and for the security of the world. Chernobyl can be a starting point for efforts to make nuclear power systems safer and more benign. It also poses very basic questions for nuclear arms control activities. A fundamental objective of the Administration's arms control policy is to achieve substantial and equitable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces with effective verification. However, Chernobyl served to remind the U.S. once again of the obsessive secretiveness of the Soviet Union and the difficulties of obtaining information on Soviet nuclear weapon activities. All of this points to the importance of developing improved monitoring technologies and obtaining Soviet agreement on on-site inspection. Nuclear safeguards and security developments in response to a changing world are the topic of discussion in this paper

Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wonder, E.F.

2010-01-01

The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

1995-01-01

In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

Design of a multi-arm randomized clinical trial with no control arm.

Science.gov (United States)

Magaret, Amalia; Angus, Derek C; Adhikari, Neill K J; Banura, Patrick; Kissoon, Niranjan; Lawler, James V; Jacob, Shevin T

2016-01-01

Clinical trial designs that include multiple treatments are currently limited to those that perform pairwise comparisons of each investigational treatment to a single control. However, there are settings, such as the recent Ebola outbreak, in which no treatment has been demonstrated to be effective; and therefore, no standard of care exists which would serve as an appropriate control. For illustrative purposes, we focused on the care of patients presenting in austere settings with critically ill 'sepsis-like' syndromes. Our approach involves a novel algorithm for comparing mortality among arms without requiring a single fixed control. The algorithm allows poorly-performing arms to be dropped during interim analyses. Consequently, the study may be completed earlier than planned. We used simulation to determine operating characteristics for the trial and to estimate the required sample size. We present a potential study design targeting a minimal effect size of a 23% relative reduction in mortality between any pair of arms. Using estimated power and spurious significance rates from the simulated scenarios, we show that such a trial would require 2550 participants. Over a range of scenarios, our study has 80 to 99% power to select the optimal treatment. Using a fixed control design, if the control arm is least efficacious, 640 subjects would be enrolled into the least efficacious arm, while our algorithm would enroll between 170 and 430. This simulation method can be easily extended to other settings or other binary outcomes. Early dropping of arms is efficient and ethical when conducting clinical trials with multiple arms. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Sensory-Feedback Exoskeletal Arm Controller

Science.gov (United States)

An, Bin; Massie, Thomas H.; Vayner, Vladimir

2004-01-01

An electromechanical exoskeletal arm apparatus has been designed for use in controlling a remote robotic manipulator arm. The apparatus, called a force-feedback exoskeleton arm master (F-EAM) is comfortable to wear and easy to don and doff. It provides control signals from the wearer s arm to a robot arm or a computer simulator (e.g., a virtual-reality system); it also provides force and torque feedback from sensors on the robot arm or from the computer simulator to the wearer s arm. The F-EAM enables the wearer to make the robot arm gently touch objects and finely manipulate them without exerting excessive forces. The F-EAM features a lightweight design in which the motors and gear heads that generate force and torque feedback are made smaller than they ordinarily would be: this is achieved by driving the motors to power levels greater than would ordinarily be used in order to obtain higher torques, and by providing active liquid cooling of the motors to prevent overheating at the high drive levels. The F-EAM (see figure) includes an assembly that resembles a backpack and is worn like a backpack, plus an exoskeletal arm mechanism. The FEAM has five degrees of freedom (DOFs) that correspond to those of the human arm: 1. The first DOF is that of the side-to-side rotation of the upper arm about the shoulder (rotation about axis 1). The reflected torque for this DOF is provided by motor 1 via drum 1 and a planar four-bar linkage. 2. The second DOF is that of the up-and-down rotation of the arm about the shoulder. The reflected torque for this DOF is provided by motor 2 via drum 2. 3. The third DOF is that of twisting of the upper arm about its longitudinal axis. This DOF is implemented in a cable remote-center mechanism (CRCM). The reflected torque for this DOF is provided by motor 3, which drives the upper-arm cuff and the mechanism below it. A bladder inflatable by gas or liquid is placed between the cuff and the wearer s upper arm to compensate for misalignment

Measurement approaches to support future warhead arms control transparency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olinger, C.T.; Frankle, C.M.; Johnson, M.W.; Poths, J.

1998-01-01

Transparency on warhead stockpiles, warhead dismantlement, and fissile material stockpiles in nuclear weapons states will become increasingly important in the move beyond START II toward lower quantities of warheads. Congressional support for further warhead reductions will likely depend on the degree of irreversibility, or in other words, the rapidity with which warhead inventories could be reconstituted. Whether irreversibility considerations can be satisfied will depend on monitoring dismantlement as well as constraining the available stockpile of fissile materials for possible refabrication into warheads. Measurement techniques designed to address the above problems will need to consider NPT Article 1 obligations as well as Russian and US classification regulations, which prohibit or restrict the transfer of nuclear warhead design information to other states. Classification considerations currently limit the potential completeness of future inspections of weapons materials. Many conventional international safeguards approaches are not currently viable for arms control applications because they would reveal weapons design information. The authors discuss a variety of technical measures that may help to improve transparence of warhead and fissile material stockpiles and may enable limited warhead dismantlement transparency

Simulation of neutron multiplicity measurements using Geant4. Open source software for nuclear arms control

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kuett, Moritz

2016-07-07

Nuclear arms control, including nuclear safeguards and verification technologies for nuclear disarmament typically use software as part of many different technological applications. This thesis proposes to use three open source criteria for such software, allowing users and developers to have free access to a program, have access to the full source code and be able to publish modifications for the program. This proposition is presented and analyzed in detail, together with the description of the development of ''Open Neutron Multiplicity Simulation'', an open source software tool to simulate neutron multiplicity measurements. The description includes physical background of the method, details of the developed program and a comprehensive set of validation calculations.

13 CFR 108.506 - Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... assets/Internal controls. 108.506 Section 108.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS... Requirements § 108.506 Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to... document describing your control procedures. ...

The arms race control; Le controle de la course aux armements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nemo, J.

2010-07-15

Written in 1961, this paper presents the content of a book entitled 'The arms race control' where the author outlined the difference between disarmament and arms control, described the economic and moral role of arms race, the importance of force balance for international security. He wandered whether arms control could ensure this balance and whether nuclear balance meant force balance. Force balance then appears to be a precarious and unsteady component of international security. He commented the challenges of disarmament, recalled some arguments for a nuclear disarmament. Then he discussed what would be an arms control with or without disarmament (either nuclear or conventional)

Process monitoring in modern safeguards applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.

1989-01-01

From the safeguards standpoint, regulatory requirements are finally moving into the modern world of communication and information processing. Gone are the days when the accountant with the green eye shade and arm bands made judgments on the material balance a month after the balance was closed. The most recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) orders have very strict standards for timeliness and sensitivity to loss or removal of material. The latest regulations recognize that plant operators have a lot of information on and control over the location and movement of material within their facilities. This information goes beyond that traditionally reported under accountability requirements. These new regulations allow facility operators to take credit for many of the more informal process controls

A technical analysis of the IAEA nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoon, J. W.

1998-01-01

In the post-Cold War era, the threats of horizontal nuclear proliferation emerge as the forefront security issue while the nuclear arms races among existing nuclear weapon states reduce to a remarkable extent. In this context, there arises lots of research attention to the IAEA nuclear safeguards which have been viewed as the core of international monitoring on the clandestine nuclear activities of potential proliferators. However, previous attention tended to highlight the political aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, centering on the possibilities and limitations of the IAEA's inspection authority. In contrast, this paper purports to focus on the technical aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, so it can show the intrinsic problems of those safeguards in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This paper mainly deals with the technical objectives and options of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, the technical indices of clandestine nuclear activities, and some measures to improve the efficacy of the IAEA nuclear safeguards. Hopefully, this paper is expected to lead us to approach the issue of the North Korean nuclear transparency from the technical perspective as well as the political one

Safeguards activities in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osabe, Takeshi

1998-01-01

Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

Nuclear material control and accounting safeguards in the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woltermann, H.A.; Rudy, C.R.; Rakel, D.A.; DeVer, E.A.

1982-01-01

Material control and accounting (MC and A) of special nuclear material (SNM) must supplement physical security to protect SNM from unlawful use such as terrorist activities. This article reviews MC and A safeguards of SNM in the United States. The following topics are covered: a brief perspective and history of MC and A safeguards, current MC and A practices, measurement methods for SNM, historical MC and A performance, a description of near-real-time MC and A systems, and conclusions on the status of MC and A in the United States

Quality control of MC and A system and integrated safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osabe, Takeshi

2000-01-01

In the integrated safeguards regime, co-operation with SSAC is a vital element to achieve efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining the effectiveness. However, the degree of co-operation fully depends upon the credibility, technical capability and the transparency of SSAC. Since the credibility of SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) depends heavily on effectiveness of facility operator's Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) practice, some measures to provide continuous assurance of the function and effectiveness of the system such as quality assurance program including periodical system audit (diagnostic) function ought to be established. This paper discusses quality assurance program for facility level MC and A including audit (diagnostic) method to maintain continuous assurance of the effectiveness. (author)

Department of energy defense programs perspectives on safeguards, security, and classification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eyck, E.Q.T.

1989-01-01

This paper discusses why national and international safeguards and the protection of sensitive information are important to the United States and to other nations. It demonstrates that while the opposite consequence appears logical these functions will probably become even more important if the major powers agree on further arms reductions. Some of the steps taken by the U.S. Department of Energy to improve the effectiveness of its safeguards, security, and classification programs are reviewed. The valuable contributions in these areas since 1968 and 1976, respectively by the Technical Support Organization and the International Safeguards Project Offoce at Brookhaven are noted

Robust coordinated control of a dual-arm space robot

Science.gov (United States)

Shi, Lingling; Kayastha, Sharmila; Katupitiya, Jay

2017-09-01

Dual-arm space robots are more capable of implementing complex space tasks compared with single arm space robots. However, the dynamic coupling between the arms and the base will have a serious impact on the spacecraft attitude and the hand motion of each arm. Instead of considering one arm as the mission arm and the other as the balance arm, in this work two arms of the space robot perform as mission arms aimed at accomplishing secure capture of a floating target. The paper investigates coordinated control of the base's attitude and the arms' motion in the task space in the presence of system uncertainties. Two types of controllers, i.e. a Sliding Mode Controller (SMC) and a nonlinear Model Predictive Controller (MPC) are verified and compared with a conventional Computed-Torque Controller (CTC) through numerical simulations in terms of control accuracy and system robustness. Both controllers eliminate the need to linearly parameterize the dynamic equations. The MPC has been shown to achieve performance with higher accuracy than CTC and SMC in the absence of system uncertainties under the condition that they consume comparable energy. When the system uncertainties are included, SMC and CTC present advantageous robustness than MPC. Specifically, in a case where system inertia increases, SMC delivers higher accuracy than CTC and costs the least amount of energy.

Safeguards resource management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.

1986-01-01

Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

The potential value of dynamic materials control in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.; Lovett, J.E.

1979-01-01

The difficulties inherent in conventional materials accountancy based on semi-annual or annual shutdown cleanout physical inventories have been recognized for many years. The increasing importance of international nuclear materials safeguards, coupled with the availability of advanced non-destructive measurement technology which could be installed on or near process lines, has led to the development of the concept of advanced or dynamic materials control. The potential benefits of dynamic materials control in terms of significantly improved detection capabilities (ranging from a few kilograms of plutonium down to perhaps a few hundred grams, even for large-scale bulk processing facilities), and even more dramatically improved detection timeliness (typically a few days, and potentially only a few hours, in advanced facilities), are reviewed. At least twelve major dynamic material control systems already in existence or in the process of being installed are noted, and some of the essential characteristics are discussed. Some currently unresolved questions are explored, and future prospects for the concept of dynamic material control in international safeguards are reviewed. (author)

Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

2015-01-01

The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

Strengthening regional safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

1996-01-01

Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

Safeguards resource management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.

1986-01-01

Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

US-Russian relations: the arms control agenda

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potter, W.

2001-01-01

At a time when US-Russian relations are widely regarded to be in a state of flux, it is appropriate to examine the degree of continuity and change in the sphere of nuclear arms control. More specifically, this brief essay identifies a number of propositions about nuclear weapons, arms control, and nonproliferation that increasingly reflect the conventional wisdom in Washington, although these propositions may be neither true nor wise; and assesses the prospects for arms control progress in the areas of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and nonproliferation in light of these prevailing views. (author)

US-Russian relations: the arms control agenda

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Potter, W

2001-07-01

At a time when US-Russian relations are widely regarded to be in a state of flux, it is appropriate to examine the degree of continuity and change in the sphere of nuclear arms control. More specifically, this brief essay identifies a number of propositions about nuclear weapons, arms control, and nonproliferation that increasingly reflect the conventional wisdom in Washington, although these propositions may be neither true nor wise; and assesses the prospects for arms control progress in the areas of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and nonproliferation in light of these prevailing views. (author)

Safeguards can not operate alone

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

2013-01-01

There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickman, D.A.

1986-10-01

Safeguarding our country's nuclear materials against theft or diversion is extremely important due to their significantly strategic value. In addition, nuclear materials also have an extremely high monetary value. The term ''safeguards'' is defined as an integrated system of physical protection, accountability, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession and use of special nuclear materials. An aggressive Safeguards program, therefore, employs both good security measures and a strong material control and accountability system. For effective internal control of nuclear materials, having people qualified in the many aspects of safeguards and accountability is essential. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), this goal is accomplished through a Laboratory-wide Safeguards Awareness Program. All PNL staff members receive a level of Safeguards training appropriate to their particular function within the Laboratory. This paper presents an overview of the unique training opportunities this topic provides and how the training goals are accomplished through the various training courses given to the staff members

Structure of safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.

1978-06-01

An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

1998-01-01

An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data

Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.

1976-01-01

With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

SIPRI's new conceptual approach to arms control and disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rotfeld, Adam Daniel

2000-01-01

The end of the cold war deprioritized arms control and disarmament, and progress in the field was no longer a measure of relations among the major powers. In that context, the future of arms control and disarmament was discussed at the Nobel Symposium in October 1999. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) views arms control as an instrument for shaping a new inclusive and cooperative security order. The author questions whether arms control challenges today can and should be resolved in the institutions established and the procedures elaborated in the bipolar framework. (author)

Nuclear export controls and nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sevini, F.

2013-01-01

The export control of dual use goods has developed since the early seventies to counter nuclear proliferation. The paper provides an overview of dual-use export control issues also in relation with the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which requires States to provide declarations of the export of the controlled items listed in its Annex II, derived from the Nuclear Suppliers Group Trigger list. Recommendations for improvement are proposed. On the EU level, the paper summarises the framework set by the European Council Regulation 428/2009, requiring Member States to impose control on exports, brokering and transit of dual use goods. The Regulation includes the so-called 'EU dual-use control list' integrating the lists of dual-use items defined by the international regimes and requires also the control on intangible technology transfers as foreseen by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. ESARDA has recently launched a new sub-Working Group on export control, which raised large interest and may evolve to a full-fledged working group. Export control may provide an opportunity of technical collaboration between ESARDA and INMM. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vaclav, J.

2010-01-01

The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

Synergy between Security and Safeguards in Uranium Concentrate Export Control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Soumana, T.

2010-01-01

This paper is a proposal to the government of Niger and all national institutions involved in the ISSAS and INSSERV Missions held in Niger to optimally coordinate they activities in nuclear field. It is essential to notice that Niger has significant nuclear activities, mainly in uranium prospecting, mining, milling, and export. In Niger, there are also many radioactive sources in non nuclear use. The safeguards agreement of Niger, infcirc/664, is in force since 16 February 2005 and its relating additional protocol since 2 May 2007. For the safeguards implementation in Niger, Government has requested to the IAEA an ISSAS Mission which was completed in February 2008. A main recommendation of this mission is to consider an overall plan for security measures and in this regards, an INSSERV Mission was completed in December 2008. Nuclear safeguards conclusions focus on correctness and completeness of declarations provided by operators. Nuclear security activities (prevention, detection and response) are useful contributions to confirm safeguards conclusions specially, a good detection strategy at national level can help to confirm the absence of undeclared activities in a country like Niger. Many governmental institutions are involved in nuclear activities and there are lacks of communication between them. Creating a synergy between safeguards and security can federate the mechanisms of control at national level and have impact in many aspects specially in (i) awareness of decision makers (ii) optimal use of the equipments (iii) organizing training activities and human resource management and (iv) designing national strategic plans. The institution which hosted the two IAEA consultative missions (Directorate of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Techniques-DUPTN for the ISSAS Mission and Civil Defence for INSSERV Mission) in consultation with other national institutions had to create a framework for this synergy. This framework must be submitted to the IAEA for observation and

Systematic classification of civil society contributions to nuclear safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kalinowski, Martin B. [Universitaet Hamburg, Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, Centre for Science and Peace Research (ZNF) Hamburg (Germany)

2012-06-15

Civil Society is increasingly involved in the policy area of international arms control. Their opportunities are very limited for compliance control in the nuclear nonproliferation regime due to its particular sensitivity. The severe gaps of nuclear safeguards with respect to the capabilities to detect clandestine facilities render marginal civil society contributions highly influential and controversial. More and more data get available for the civil society that can be used to expose potential violations of the NPT. A systematic framework is presented to classify civil society contributions that allows for a systematic study. This classification uses the two parameters (a) affected safeguards stage and (b) degree of integration with the official procedures. These parameters may have the following defined values: (a) The affected safeguards stage can be i. Development and demonstration of new methodologies and technologies ii. Fact finding and data gathering iii. Sharing and publication of data and information iv. Technical analysis of data and information v. Determination of non-compliance vi. Political interpretation (b) The degree of integration can be i. Without a relation ii. Indirect connection iii. Informal interaction iv. Official contribution or mandate. A prominent example for civil society contributions is the increasing availability and capability to acquire and analyze satellite images. An emerging field is environmental sampling, analysis and related atmospheric transport simulation. These and other opportunities are put in the systematic framework to discuss their demonstrated and potential impact. In particular, possible contributions that civil society may offer for improving the detectability of unreported facilities and activities are considered with their chances and risks.

Research on seal control systems for international nuclear safeguard and the vulnerability assessment on the seals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Hongjian; Liu Tianshu; Cao Fangfang; Xu Chunyan

2014-01-01

Safeguard seals, also called Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), are widely used to detect tampering or unauthorized entry in the international safeguard and security systems, Seal control systems consist of seal implementing plan, seal development and the vulnerability assessment on tbe seals, effective implementing procedures and methods of the seals. The vulnerability assessment contents of safeguard seals, thermo-shrinked film seals being as an example, and seals control systems in the implementation program are researched. The seal control systems discuss task assignment, seals management flow and seals program data flow to promote applying effectively seals. The vulnerability assessment program of seals studies assurance level to some different tampering techniques and measures. The researches must promote utilizing seals effectively for nuclear security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, radioactive waste management, and the nuclear material accounting and control. (authors)

Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

1991-01-01

Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Almeida, S.G. de

1986-01-01

The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

1976-01-01

Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hong, J. S.; Kim, B. K.; Kwack, E. H.

1996-12-01

17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

Computerized real-time materials accountability system for safeguards material control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Spencer, W.F.; Affel, R.G.; Austin, H.C.; Nichols, J.P.; Stoutt, B.H.; Wachter, J.W.

1975-01-01

A real-time, computer-based system is described which provides safeguards material control at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Originally installed in 1972 to provide computerized real-time fissile materials accountability for criticality control purposes, the system has been expanded to provide accountability of all source and nuclear materials (SNM) and to utilize the on-line inventory files in support of the Laboratory physical protection and surveillance procedures. (auth)

Organization of octopus arm movements: a model system for studying the control of flexible arms.

Science.gov (United States)

Gutfreund, Y; Flash, T; Yarom, Y; Fiorito, G; Segev, I; Hochner, B

1996-11-15

Octopus arm movements provide an extreme example of controlled movements of a flexible arm with virtually unlimited degrees of freedom. This study aims to identify general principles in the organization of these movements. Video records of the movements of Octopus vulgaris performing the task of reaching toward a target were studied. The octopus extends its arm toward the target by a wave-like propagation of a bend that travels from the base of the arm toward the tip. Similar bend propagation is seen in other octopus arm movements, such as locomotion and searching. The kinematics (position and velocity) of the midpoint of the bend in three-dimensional space were extracted using the direct linear transformation algorithm. This showed that the bend tends to move within a single linear plane in a simple, slightly curved path connecting the center of the animal's body with the target location. Approximately 70% of the reaching movements demonstrated a stereotyped tangential velocity profile. An invariant profile was observed when movements were normalized for velocity and distance. Two arms, extended together in the same behavioral context, demonstrated identical velocity profiles. The stereotyped features of the movements were also observed in spontaneous arm extensions (not toward an external target). The simple and stereotypic appearance of the bend trajectory suggests that the position of the bend in space and time is the controlled variable. We propose that this strategy reduces the immense redundancy of the octopus arm movements and hence simplifies motor control.

Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 36. annual meeting: Proceedings. Volume 24

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1995-01-01

The sessions at this meeting covered the following topics: international safeguards; physical protection; material control and accountability (MC and A) training; waste overview; nonproliferation and arms control -- US/former Soviet Union; MC and A/physical protection -- SNM storage; spent fuel storage; physical protection -- intrusion sensors and access delay; MC and A -- gamma ray and holdup measurements; MC and A -- neutron based measurements; MC and A/nonproliferation and arms control -- fissile materials disposition; low level waste; packaging and transportation; international safeguards and nonproliferation and arms control -- IAEA verification in the US; international safeguards and physical protection -- video systems; poster and demonstrations; international safeguards and physical protection -- T.I.D.'s, tags and seals; high level wastes and mixed waste; MC and A -- bulk measurements; MC and A and physical protection -- policy; nonproliferation and arms control -- detection and monitoring techniques; nonproliferation and arms control -- US-Russian lab-to-lab safeguards cooperation; MC and A -- information systems; physical protection and MC and A -- vulnerability assessments; waste management -- measurement; international safeguards -- integrated and remote monitoring systems; MC and A -- material control and accountability and indicators; nonproliferation and arms control -- treaties and analysis; nonproliferation and arms control -- plutonium/HEU nonproliferation; MC and A -- measurement control and verification; and international safeguards and nonproliferation and arms control -- environmental monitoring and export control. Separate abstracts were prepared for some of the papers in this volume

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Gaudet, Rachel N.

2016-01-01

In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is ''to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.'' The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division; Gaudet, Rachel N. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division

2016-09-30

In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

The purposes, achievements, and priorities of arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, P.S.

1987-09-01

Arms control purposes include strengthening the framework of deterrence and reducing the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, reducing the dangers of attack and accidental nuclear war, and allowing more resources for the civilian economy. The paper briefly describes achievements in arms control since World War II. These include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)-SALT I, SALT II, Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), and Nuclear-Free Zones treaties. The author also discusses his views on what the priorities of arms control activities should be

Nonproliferation issues. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First and Second Sessions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1976-01-01

Twelve days of hearings were held over an 18-month period to discuss issues relating to the Nonproliferation Treaty and its effectiveness. Nuclear weapons are no longer confined to those nations with economic and technical capability, a fact which jeopardizes the security of all nations. Critics of the treaty felt that it was more the result of maneuvering than negotiation. The committee examined issues raised by the Vladivostok Accords, which limits the nuclear arms race, promotes detente, and allows progress in arms control. Witnesses responded to criticism that the Accords (1) did not limit a qualitative arms race, (2) allowed both sides to modernize all 2,400 permitted delivery vehicles, (3) did not equalize throw weight, and (4) allow extensive new deployment of MIRV's, especially in the Soviet Union. Witnesses representing government, universities, industry, and foreign countries considered the range of weapons, safeguards and control agreements, estimates of war damage, and the Treaty's intended benefits of security assurance and information exchange

Beyond arms control? Looking for the lost paradigm.

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dahan, P.

2002-01-01

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the international relations have become more complex and the arms control concept, born during the cold war and implemented during the 3 last decades is today marking time. Disarmament and non-proliferation, which were the keystones of arms control and international negotiations, are today undergoing erosion. This article analyzes the change of situation between the end of the 20. century and the beginning of the 21. century. Three steps are defined by the author: a 'flux' step with the signature of a huge number of international agreements about non-proliferation and arms control, a stagnation step marked by the difficulties of implementing some of the existing treaties and by the violation by some states of some of them, and a 'reflux' step marked by a freezing up of the bilateral US-Russian disarmament process and a general renouncement of the multilateral arms control concept. (J.S.)

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-07-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

Reactor safeguards

CERN Document Server

Russell, Charles R

1962-01-01

Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

Beyond arms control? Looking for the lost paradigm..; Au-dela de l'arms control? A la recherche du paradigme perdu..

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dahan, P

2002-07-01

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the international relations have become more complex and the arms control concept, born during the cold war and implemented during the 3 last decades is today marking time. Disarmament and non-proliferation, which were the keystones of arms control and international negotiations, are today undergoing erosion. This article analyzes the change of situation between the end of the 20. century and the beginning of the 21. century. Three steps are defined by the author: a 'flux' step with the signature of a huge number of international agreements about non-proliferation and arms control, a stagnation step marked by the difficulties of implementing some of the existing treaties and by the violation by some states of some of them, and a 'reflux' step marked by a freezing up of the bilateral US-Russian disarmament process and a general renouncement of the multilateral arms control concept. (J.S.)

Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

2010-01-01

After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) as safeguard regional agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alvim, C.F.

1994-01-01

The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC applies regional safeguards on nuclear materials in Brazil and Argentina. The framework of international agreements concerning ABACC is presented, and the characteristics and requirements that a regional nuclear safeguards organization must fulfill are discussed. (author). 2 refs, 1 tab

Safeguards for nuclear material transparency monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MacArthur, D.A.; Wolford, J.K.

1999-01-01

The US and the Russian Federation are currently engaged in negotiating or implementing several nuclear arms and nuclear material control agreements. These involve placing nuclear material in specially designed containers within controlled facilities. Some of the agreements require the removal of nuclear components from stockpile weapons. These components are placed in steel containers that are then sealed and tagged. Current strategies for monitoring the agreements involve taking neutron and gamma radiation measurements of components in their containers to monitor the presence, mass, and composition of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, as well as other attributes that indicate the use of the material in a weapon. If accurate enough to be useful, these measurements will yield data containing information about the design of the weapon being monitored. In each case, the design data are considered sensitive by one or both parties to the agreement. To prevent the disclosure of this information in a bilateral or trilateral inspection scenario, so-called information barriers have evolved. These barriers combine hardware, software, and procedural safeguards to contain the sensitive data within a protected volume, presenting to the inspector only the processed results needed for verification. Interlocks and volatile memory guard against disclosure in case of failure. Implementing these safeguards requires innovation in radiation measurement instruments and data security. Demonstrating their reliability requires independent testing to uncover any flaws in design. This study discusses the general problem and gives a proposed solution for a high resolution gamma ray detection system. It uses historical examples to illustrate the evolution of other successful systems

Kinematic feedback control laws for generating natural arm movements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Donghyun; Jang, Cheongjae; Park, Frank C

2014-01-01

We propose a stochastic optimal feedback control law for generating natural robot arm motions. Our approach, inspired by the minimum variance principle of Harris and Wolpert (1998 Nature 394 780–4) and the optimal feedback control principles put forth by Todorov and Jordan (2002 Nature Neurosci. 5 1226–35) for explaining human movements, differs in two crucial respects: (i) the endpoint variance is minimized in joint space rather than Cartesian hand space, and (ii) we ignore the dynamics and instead consider only the second-order differential kinematics. The feedback control law generating the motions can be straightforwardly obtained by backward integration of a set of ordinary differential equations; these equations are obtained exactly, without any linear–quadratic approximations. The only parameters to be determined a priori are the variance scale factors, and for both the two-DOF planar arm and the seven-DOF spatial arm, a table of values is constructed based on the given initial and final arm configurations; these values are determined via an optimal fitting procedure, and consistent with existing findings about neuromuscular motor noise levels of human arm muscles. Experiments conducted with a two-link planar arm and a seven-DOF spatial arm verify that the trajectories generated by our feedback control law closely resemble human arm motions, in the sense of producing nearly straight-line hand trajectories, having bell-shaped velocity profiles, and satisfying Fitts Law. (paper)

Control of octopus arm extension by a peripheral motor program.

Science.gov (United States)

Sumbre, G; Gutfreund, Y; Fiorito, G; Flash, T; Hochner, B

2001-09-07

For goal-directed arm movements, the nervous system generates a sequence of motor commands that bring the arm toward the target. Control of the octopus arm is especially complex because the arm can be moved in any direction, with a virtually infinite number of degrees of freedom. Here we show that arm extensions can be evoked mechanically or electrically in arms whose connection with the brain has been severed. These extensions show kinematic features that are almost identical to normal behavior, suggesting that the basic motor program for voluntary movement is embedded within the neural circuitry of the arm itself. Such peripheral motor programs represent considerable simplification in the motor control of this highly redundant appendage.

Challenges for development and provision of metrological quality control tools in nuclear safeguards, nuclear forensics and nuclear security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aregbe, Y.; Richter, S.; Jakopic, R.; Bauwens, J.; Truyens, J.; Sturm, M.; Bujak, R.; Eykens, R.; Kehoe, F.; Kuehn, H.; Hennessy, C.

2013-01-01

Joint advancements in quality control tools and measurement sciences of international reference and safeguards laboratories include: -) successful integration of the Modified Total Evaporation technique (MTE) as a new tool for routine thermal ionization mass spectrometry in nuclear safeguards and security, -) research and feasibility studies for the development of new materials standard, particularly for nuclear forensics (Certified Reference Materials - CRMs for age-dating), -) quality control tools to support the additional protocol and nuclear security (particle CRMs, NUSIMEP (inter-laboratory comparisons for U particle analysis), and -) scientific/technical advice, training and knowledge transfer. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and the CETAMA Commission from the French Commission of Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies (CEA/CETAMA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Meetings are the platforms to exchange views on the needs and challenges for new Quality Control tools for nuclear safeguards and security. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-10-01

Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brenner, L.M.; McDowell, S.C.T.

1989-01-01

In discussing the U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development, five significant eras are identified. The period ending January 1, 1947, may be called the first era. Safeguards as known today did not exist and the classic military approach of security protection applied. The second era covers the period from 1947 to 1954 (when the Atomic Energy Act was completely rewritten to accommodate the then foreseen Civil uses Program and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the first steps were taken by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish material accounting records for all source and fissionable materials on inventory. The third era covers the period 1954 through 1968, which focused on nuclear safeguards in its domestic activities and made major policy changes in its approach to material control and accountability. The fourth era, 1968 to 1972 saw a quantum jump in the recognition and need for a significant safeguards research and development program, answered by the formation of a safeguards technical support organization at Brookhaven National Laboratory and a safeguards Laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the development and application of non-destructive assay technology. The fifth era had its beginning in 1972 with the burgeoning of international terrorism. The corresponding need for a strong physical protection research and development support program was responded to by the Sandia National Laboratory

Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2012-07-01

The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

Control of information as an element of nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Green, J.N.

1982-03-01

Control of information as an element of physical protection has a long history in the field of national security. The nuclear industry is familiar with the constraints on proprietary information; and, with an effective date of October 1, 1980 for Parts 25 and 95 in Title 10 of the code of Federal Regulations, certain activities had to cope with rules for safeguarding of classified information. In applying the rules it is important to understand the differences between national security information and restricted data, and how guidance is promulgated both by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and by the Department of Energy. More recently, with a fully effective date of January 20, 1982, the NRC published rules for the protection of unclassified safeguards information. The scope is much broader than for the classified information. For example, the rules are applicable to power reactors. In this paper the directives which provide the details for compliance with all these rules are identified, and their application is discussed. NRC inspectors will be checking for compliance with the rules. Once problems of compliance are resolved, the more difficult question of evaluating the impact of information control procedures on the effectiveness of a physical protection system can be addressed

Some developments in safeguards techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beets, C.

1977-01-01

The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

1977-04-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given

Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

1977-04-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given.

A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chatelus, Renaud [Consultant, Export Control and IAEA Safeguards Specialist, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))

2012-06-15

The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the 'trigger list', as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, Renaud; )

2012-01-01

The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the “trigger list”, as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

International nuclear safeguards 1994: Vision for the future. V.1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

Since the last IAEA symposium on this subject, held eight years ego in 1986, the world of safeguards has experienced a number of momentous changes which have opened a new period of intensive development in safeguards. The important events were: The discoveries in Iraq during activities under United Nations Security Council resolutions, South Africa's decision to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the IAEA-Argentina-Brazil-ABACC Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement, the break-up of the former USSR into newly independent States, and the problems encountered in the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The consequences for international safeguards of these events were presented in papers at this symposium, with special emphasis on verification of a State's declaration as well as on detection of undeclared activities. Other fundamental changes stem from converging relationships between nuclear arms reductions and the civil use of plutonium, and the international debate on the associated issues. Furthermore, the review and extension of the NPT is due in 1995. Events have opened the possibility for ambitious new concepts for verification regimes. These matters were addressed at the symposium in the opening session and in the closing panel discussion. Refs, figs and tabs

Safeguards systems concepts for nuclear material transportation. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baldonado, O.C.; Kevany, M.; Rodney, D.; Pitts, D.; Mazur, M.

1977-09-01

The report describes the development of system concepts for the safeguarding of special strategic nuclear materials (SNM) against malevolent adversary action during the interfacility transport of the SNM. The methodology used includes techniques for defining, classifying, and analyzing adversary action sequences; defining safeguards system components; assessing the vulnerability of various safeguards systems and their component parts to the potential adversary action sequences, and conceptualizing system design requirements. The method of analysis is based primarily on a comparison of adversary actions with safeguards measures, to estimate vulnerability. Because of the paucity of the data available for assessing vulnerability, the Delphi approach was used to generate data: values were estimated in a structured exercise by a panel of experts in the safeguards and terrorist fields. It is concluded that the probability of successful attack against a truck/escort convoy manned by well-trained, well-armed personnel is low enough to discourage all but the strongest adversaries. Secrecy of operations and careful screening of personnel are very important. No reliance should be placed on current capabilities of local law enforcement agencies. The recommendation of the study is the use of road transport in the near future and air transport at a later time when the number of shipments reaches a level to justify it, and when present safety problems are resolved

Arms control, nonproliferation, and US national security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, J.F.

1985-01-01

The continuation of the arms race and the failure of arms control and disarmament negotiations lend support to the belief that US and Soviet power, prestige, and security depend upon nuclear weapons. Therefore, the argument goes, the non-nuclear-weapon states (particularly those that are not allied with nuclear-weapon states and do not share their nuclear shield) may conclude that they would be well served by possession of these weapons. In this sense, the failure of nuclear arms reductions could create incentives for further proliferation

Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

1987-01-01

The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iwanaga, Masayuki

2000-01-01

The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

International safeguards problem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.; Curtis, H.B.

1977-01-01

To recognize the limitations of safeguards as a barrier to nuclear proliferation is not to deny their essential role in the effort to contain that problem. Without a safeguards system, international nuclear commerce and development would not, indeed could not, be what they are today. The problems evoked in the discussion of the spread of sensitive nuclear technology underscore the importance of ensuring that activities do not outpace our ability to control them. To sustain a global nuclear economy requires a readiness to live within the constraints that such an economy requires. Enhanced safeguards and strengthened national commitments to facilitate their application are key elements of those constraints. So also may be a prepardness by many nations to forego explicitly national control over all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle while still sharing fully and equally in the benefits of the peaceful atom. The challenge of the coming years will be to craft mechanisms and institutions enabling the continued growth of peaceful nuclear activity without further impairing international security. The constraints that such an outcome entails are not limited to nations lacking sophisticated nuclear technology; they apply to the most advanced nuclear nations as well--partly through adherence to the safeguards system that these countries call upon others to adopt, and partly through greater willingness to entertain solutions that may involve greater international involvement in, and control over, their own peaceful nuclear productive activities. With time, the relative incompatibility of nuclear energy with full national sovereignty, and the far-sighted wisdom of the Baruch Plan, are becoming increasingly clear. 1 table, 10 references

Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

2015-01-01

Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

A video imaging system and related control hardware for nuclear safeguards surveillance applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whichello, J.V.

1987-03-01

A novel video surveillance system has been developed for safeguards applications in nuclear installations. The hardware was tested at a small experimental enrichment facility located at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories. The system uses digital video techniques to store, encode and transmit still television pictures over the public telephone network to a receiver located in the Australian Safeguards Office at Kings Cross, Sydney. A decoded, reconstructed picture is then obtained using a second video frame store. A computer-controlled video cassette recorder is used automatically to archive the surveillance pictures. The design of the surveillance system is described with examples of its operation

New Horizons and New Strategies in Arms Control

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brown, J. editor

1998-12-04

In the last ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, remarkable progress in arms control and disarmament has occurred. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CWC) are indicative of the great strides made in the non- proliferation arena. Simultaneously, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), all associated with US-Soviet Union (now Russia) relations have assisted in redefining European relations and the security landscape. Finally, it now appears that progress is in the offing in developing enhanced compliance measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In sum, all of these achievements have set the stage for the next round of arms control activities, which may lead to a much broader, and perhaps more diffused multilateral agenda. In this new and somewhat unpredictable international setting, arms control and disarmament issues will require solutions that are both more creative and innovative than heretofore.

Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

2010-07-01

The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

Analysis of hypothetical loss-of-control-arm accidents in HIFAR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Connolly, J.W.; Clark, N.

1986-11-01

The reactor power transient produced in the HIFAR materials testing reactor upon severance of a central coarse control arm connecting rod and the subsequent pivoting of the arm out of the core has been calculated for a range of reactor conditions likely to be encountered in normal operation. It is concluded that as long as the remaining arms of the control arm bank can be relied on to suppress the post power peak oscillations in power, the reactor will withstand the consequences of such an accident

Neurobiology: motor control of flexible octopus arms.

Science.gov (United States)

Sumbre, Germán; Fiorito, Graziano; Flash, Tamar; Hochner, Binyamin

2005-02-10

Animals with rigid skeletons can rely on several mechanisms to simplify motor control--for example, they have skeletal joints that reduce the number of variables and degrees of freedom that need to be controlled. Here we show that when the octopus uses one of its long and highly flexible arms to transfer an object from one place to another, it employs a vertebrate-like strategy, temporarily reconfiguring its arm into a stiffened, articulated, quasi-jointed structure. This indicates that an articulated limb may provide an optimal solution for achieving precise, point-to-point movements.

Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

1983-01-01

A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP): overview

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chapman, L.D; Engi, D.

1979-08-01

Nuclear safeguards systems provide physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The outputs provided by the SNAP simulation program supplements the safeguards analyst's evaluative capabilities and supports the evaluation of existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

Admittance Control of a Multi-Finger Arm Based on Manipulability of Fingers

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jian Huang

2011-09-01

Full Text Available In the previous studies, admittance control and impedance control for a finger-arm robot using the manipulability of the finger were studied and methods of realizing the controls have been proposed. In this study, two 3-DOF fingers are attached to the end-effector of a 6-DOF arm to configure a multi-finger arm robot. Based on the previous methods, the authors have proposed an admittance control for a multi-finger arm robot using the manipulability of the fingers in this study. Algorithms of the averaging method and the mini-max method were introduced to establish a manipulability criterion of the two fingers in order to generate a cooperative movement of the arm. Comparison of the admittance controls combined with the top search method and local optimization method for the multi-finger arm robot was made and features of the control methods were also discussed. The stiffness control and damping control were experimentally evaluated to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

Arm coordination in octopus crawling involves unique motor control strategies.

Science.gov (United States)

Levy, Guy; Flash, Tamar; Hochner, Binyamin

2015-05-04

To cope with the exceptional computational complexity that is involved in the control of its hyper-redundant arms [1], the octopus has adopted unique motor control strategies in which the central brain activates rather autonomous motor programs in the elaborated peripheral nervous system of the arms [2, 3]. How octopuses coordinate their eight long and flexible arms in locomotion is still unknown. Here, we present the first detailed kinematic analysis of octopus arm coordination in crawling. The results are surprising in several respects: (1) despite its bilaterally symmetrical body, the octopus can crawl in any direction relative to its body orientation; (2) body and crawling orientation are monotonically and independently controlled; and (3) contrasting known animal locomotion, octopus crawling lacks any apparent rhythmical patterns in limb coordination, suggesting a unique non-rhythmical output of the octopus central controller. We show that this uncommon maneuverability is derived from the radial symmetry of the arms around the body and the simple pushing-by-elongation mechanism by which the arms create the crawling thrust. These two together enable a mechanism whereby the central controller chooses in a moment-to-moment fashion which arms to recruit for pushing the body in an instantaneous direction. Our findings suggest that the soft molluscan body has affected in an embodied way [4, 5] the emergence of the adaptive motor behavior of the octopus. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Defining the questions: a research agenda for nontraditional authentication in arms control

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hauck, Danielle K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mac Arthur, Duncan W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Morag K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Thron, Jonathan L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01

Many traditional authentication techniques have been based on hardware solutions. Thus authentication of measurement system hardware has been considered in terms of physical inspection and destructive analysis. Software authentication has implied hash function analysis or authentication tools such as Rose. Continuity of knowledge is maintained through TIDs and cameras. Although there is ongoing progress improving all of these authentication methods, there has been little discussion of the human factors involved in authentication. Issues of non-traditional authentication include sleight-of-hand substitutions, monitor perception vs. reality, and visual diversions. Since monitor confidence in a measurement system depends on the product of their confidences in each authentication element, it is important to investigate all authentication techniques, including the human factors. This paper will present an initial effort to identify the most important problems that traditional authentication approaches in safeguards have not addressed and are especially relevant to arms control verification. This will include a survey of the literature and direct engagement with nontraditional experts in areas like psychology and human factors. Based on the identification of problem areas, potential research areas will be identified and a possible research agenda will be developed.

Visual Recognition and Its Application to Robot Arm Control

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jih-Gau Juang

2015-10-01

Full Text Available This paper presents an application of optical word recognition and fuzzy control to a smartphone automatic test system. The system consists of a robot arm and two webcams. After the words from the control panel that represent commands are recognized by the robot system, the robot arm performs the corresponding actions to test the smartphone. One of the webcams is utilized to capture commands on the screen of the control panel, the other to recognize the words on the screen of the tested smartphone. The method of image processing is based on the Red-Green-Blue (RGB and Hue-Saturation-Luminance (HSL color spaces to reduce the influence of light. Fuzzy theory is used in the robot arm’s position control. The Optical Character Recognition (OCR technique is applied to the word recognition, and the recognition results are then checked by a dictionary process to increase the recognition accuracy. The camera which is used to recognize the tested smartphone also provides object coordinates to the fuzzy controller, then the robot arm moves to the desired positions and presses the desired buttons. The proposed control scheme allows the robot arm to perform different assigned test functions successfully.

Four Degree Freedom Robot Arm with Fuzzy Neural Network Control

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Şinasi Arslan

2013-01-01

Full Text Available In this study, the control of four degree freedom robot arm has been realized with the computed torque control method.. It is usually required that the four jointed robot arm has high precision capability and good maneuverability for using in industrial applications. Besides, high speed working and external applied loads have been acting as important roles. For those purposes, the computed torque control method has been developed in a good manner that the robot arm can track the given trajectory, which has been able to enhance the feedback control together with fuzzy neural network control. The simulation results have proved that the computed torque control with the neural network has been so successful in robot control.

Nuclear physicist, arms control advocate

CERN Multimedia

Chang, K

2002-01-01

Victor F. Weisskopf, a nuclear physicist who worked on the Manhattan Project to build the first atomic bomb in World War II and later became an ardent advocate of arms control, died Monday at his home in Newton, MA, USA. He was 93 (1 page).

Disarmament and arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Elzen, B.

1979-01-01

This report discusses how far science and technology can provide methods of making arms control and disarmament agreements more controlable in an objective way. Two case studies have been considered, the test ban treaty and the verification of the number of strategic nuclear weapons. These lead to the conclusion that both science and politics are closely interwoven and that within what appear to be scientific arguments, political positions are being defended. Consequently scientists and technologists and the contexts in which they work, play a prominent role. (C.F.)

Implementing The Safeguards-By-Design Process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitaker, J. Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D.; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

2010-01-01

The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC and A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

Admittance Control of a Multi-Finger Arm Based on Manipulability of Fingers

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Takayuki Hori

2011-09-01

Full Text Available In the previous studies, admittance control and impedance control for a finger‐arm robot using the manipulability of the finger were studied and methods of realizing the controls have been proposed. In this study, two 3‐DOF fingers are attached to the end‐effector of a 6‐DOF arm to configure a multi‐finger arm robot. Based on the previous methods, the authors have proposed an admittance control for a multi‐finger arm robot using the manipulability of the fingers in this study. Algorithms of the averaging method and the mini‐max method were introduced to establish a manipulability criterion of the two fingers in order to generate a cooperative movement of the arm. Comparison of the admittance controls combined with the top search method and local optimization method for the multi‐finger arm robot was made and features of the control methods were also discussed. The stiffness control and damping control were experimentally evaluated to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

Safeguards on nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

2001-01-01

The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

The importance of domestic law to international arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lehman, R.F. II.

1993-11-01

Studies of arms control and disarmament tend to focus on political, military, and diplomatic processes. Recently, in the context of the conversion of defense activities to civilian use, the economic aspects of arms control have also received renewed interest. The legal dimension, however, is in need of fresh examination. Both international and domestic law are sailing increasingly in uncharted waters. Recent arms control agreements and related developments in international peacekeeping have expanded the scope of international law and altered how one perceives certain fundamentals, including the principle of national sovereignty. Still, the nation state is largely unchallenged as the primary actor in international affairs. National governments retain near absolute sovereign rights and responsibilities even in an age of trans-national economic integration and codified international norms for human rights, freedom of the press, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Indeed, the role of domestic law in arms control and disarmament may be more significant now than ever before. A brief review of relationships between arms control and domestic law should illustrate ways in which ones thinking has been underestimating the importance of domestic law. Hopefully, this survey will set the stage properly for the excellent, more detailed case studies by Elinor Hammarskjold and Alan Crawford. Toward that end, this paper will highlight a number of more general, and sometimes provocative, themes. These themes should be kept in mind when those two complementary presentations are considered

The importance of domestic law to international arms control

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lehman, R.F. II

1993-11-01

Studies of arms control and disarmament tend to focus on political, military, and diplomatic processes. Recently, in the context of the conversion of defense activities to civilian use, the economic aspects of arms control have also received renewed interest. The legal dimension, however, is in need of fresh examination. Both international and domestic law are sailing increasingly in uncharted waters. Recent arms control agreements and related developments in international peacekeeping have expanded the scope of international law and altered how one perceives certain fundamentals, including the principle of national sovereignty. Still, the nation state is largely unchallenged as the primary actor in international affairs. National governments retain near absolute sovereign rights and responsibilities even in an age of trans-national economic integration and codified international norms for human rights, freedom of the press, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Indeed, the role of domestic law in arms control and disarmament may be more significant now than ever before. A brief review of relationships between arms control and domestic law should illustrate ways in which ones thinking has been underestimating the importance of domestic law. Hopefully, this survey will set the stage properly for the excellent, more detailed case studies by Elinor Hammarskjold and Alan Crawford. Toward that end, this paper will highlight a number of more general, and sometimes provocative, themes. These themes should be kept in mind when those two complementary presentations are considered.

Kinematic equations for resolved-rate control of an industrial robot arm

Science.gov (United States)

Barker, L. K.

1983-01-01

An operator can use kinematic, resolved-rate equations to dynamically control a robot arm by watching its response to commanded inputs. Known resolved-rate equations for the control of a particular six-degree-of-freedom industrial robot arm and proceeds to simplify the equations for faster computations are derived. Methods for controlling the robot arm in regions which normally cause mathematical singularities in the resolved-rate equations are discussed.

ARIES pit disassembly-safeguards issues for transparency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fearey, B.L.; Cremers, T.L.

1995-01-01

Historic changes are now occurring in U.S. nonproliferation and arms control policy. The quantity of nuclear weapons required to provide a deterrence has decreased (especially with the end of the Cold War). Further, various bilateral and multilateral treaties now require the removal of numerous nuclear weapons from the U.S. stockpile. Although the removal of such weapons appears straightforward, the final disposition of the surplus weapons-grade nuclear material must be carefully considered. Domestically, several plutonium disposition plans are now under consideration concerning long-term safety, materials accounting, environmental impact, accessibility, and long-term containment. The Automated Retirement and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) currently under development at Los Alamos National Laboratory is one such disposition method for the disassembly of plutonium weapons components (pits). The ARIES system integrates and automates several features: disassembly of pits, consolidation of the plutonium material, on-line measurement of final products, waste streams, and long-term packaging. Clearly, in any plutonium disposition plan, the safeguards aspects of materials control and accounting and the security aspects must be carefully considered and evaluated

Monitoring and Controlling an Underwater Robotic Arm

Science.gov (United States)

Haas, John; Todd, Brian Keith; Woodcock, Larry; Robinson, Fred M.

2009-01-01

The SSRMS Module 1 software is part of a system for monitoring an adaptive, closed-loop control of the motions of a robotic arm in NASA s Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory, where buoyancy in a pool of water is used to simulate the weightlessness of outer space. This software is so named because the robot arm is a replica of the Space Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS). This software is distributed, running on remote joint processors (RJPs), each of which is mounted in a hydraulic actuator comprising the joint of the robotic arm and communicating with a poolside processor denoted the Direct Control Rack (DCR). Each RJP executes the feedback joint-motion control algorithm for its joint and communicates with the DCR. The DCR receives joint-angular-velocity commands either locally from an operator or remotely from computers that simulate the flight like SSRMS and perform coordinated motion calculations based on hand-controller inputs. The received commands are checked for validity before they are transmitted to the RJPs. The DCR software generates a display of the statuses of the RJPs for the DCR operator and can shut down the hydraulic pump when excessive joint-angle error or failure of a RJP is detected.

Dual arm master controller development

Science.gov (United States)

Kuban, D. P.; Perkins, G. S.

1985-01-01

The advanced servomanipulator (ASM) slave was designed with an anthropomorphic stance gear/torque tube power drives, and modular construction. These features resulted in increased inertia, friction, and backlash relative to tape driven manipulators. Studies were performed which addressed to human factor design and performance tradeoffs associated with the corresponding master controller best suited for the ASM. The results of these studies, as well as the conceptual design of the dual arm master controller, are presented.

EEG Mind Controlled Smart Prosthetic Arm – A Comprehensive Study

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Taha Beyrouthy

2017-06-01

Full Text Available Recently, the field of prosthetics has seen many accomplishments especially with the integration of technological advancements. In this paper, different arm types (robotic, surgical, bionic, prosthetic and static are analyzed in terms of resistance, usage, flexibility, cost and potential. Most of these techniques have some problems; they are extremely expensive, hard to install and maintain and may require surgery. Therefore, our work introduces the initial design of an EEG mind controlled smart prosthetic arm. The arm is controlled by the brain commands, obtained from an electroencephalography (EEG headset, and equipped with a network of smart sensors and actuators that give the patient intelligent feedback about the surrounding environment and the object in contact. This network provides the arm with normal hand functionality, smart reflexes and smooth movements. Various types of sensors are used including temperature, pressure, ultrasonic proximity sensors, accelerometers, potentiometers, strain gauges and gyroscopes. The arm is completely 3D printed built from various lightweight and high strength materials that can handle high impacts and fragile elements as well. Our project requires the use of nine servomotors installed at different places in the arm. Therefore, the static and dynamic modes of servomotors are analyzed. The total cost of the project is estimated to be relatively cheap compared to other previously built arms. Many scenarios are analyzed corresponding to the actions that the prosthetic arm can perform, and an algorithm is created to match these scenarios. Experimental results show that the proposed EEG Mind-controlled Arm is a promising alternative for current solutions that require invasive and expensive surgical procedures.

Photoelectric radar servo control system based on ARM+FPGA

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Kaixuan; Zhang, Yue; Li, Yeqiu; Dai, Qin; Yao, Jun

2016-01-01

In order to get smaller, faster, and more responsive requirements of the photoelectric radar servo control system. We propose a set of core ARM + FPGA architecture servo controller. Parallel processing capability of FPGA to be used for the encoder feedback data, PWM carrier modulation, A, B code decoding processing and so on; Utilizing the advantage of imaging design in ARM Embedded systems achieves high-speed implementation of the PID algorithm. After the actual experiment, the closed-loop speed of response of the system cycles up to 2000 times/s, in the case of excellent precision turntable shaft, using a PID algorithm to achieve the servo position control with the accuracy of + -1 encoder input code. Firstly, This article carry on in-depth study of the embedded servo control system hardware to determine the ARM and FPGA chip as the main chip with systems based on a pre-measured target required to achieve performance requirements, this article based on ARM chip used Samsung S3C2440 chip of ARM7 architecture , the FPGA chip is chosen xilinx's XC3S400 . ARM and FPGA communicate by using SPI bus, the advantage of using SPI bus is saving a lot of pins for easy system upgrades required thereafter. The system gets the speed datas through the photoelectric-encoder that transports the datas to the FPGA, Then the system transmits the datas through the FPGA to ARM, transforms speed datas into the corresponding position and velocity data in a timely manner, prepares the corresponding PWM wave to control motor rotation by making comparison between the position data and the velocity data setted in advance . According to the system requirements to draw the schematics of the photoelectric radar servo control system and PCB board to produce specially. Secondly, using PID algorithm to control the servo system, the datas of speed obtained from photoelectric-encoder is calculated position data and speed data via high-speed digital PID algorithm and coordinate models. Finally, a

Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickman, D.A.

1988-01-01

In recent years considerable attention has been given to upgrading security education programs at facilities across the country. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), a Laboratory-wide Safeguard Awareness Training Program has been established in order to raise the cognizance of the entire staff with regard to safeguards issues and concerns. This aggressive safeguards program involves a strong interface of physical security measure and material control and accountability systems. Within PNL, four distinct audiences were defined and a needs assessment analysis performed for each to determine specific training requirements. The target audiences identified were: material balance area (MBA) custodians, managers of material balance areas, material handlers, and new employees. Five safeguards training courses were created to meet the needs of those audiences. This paper discusses the development of the Safeguards Awareness Program at PNL and its benefits to the Laboratory

Co-Simulation Control of Robot Arm Dynamics in ADAMS and MATLAB

OpenAIRE

Luo Haitao; Liu Yuwang; Chen Zhengcang; Leng Yuquan

2013-01-01

The main objective of this study is how to quickly establish the virtual prototyping model of robot arm system and effectively solve trajectory tracking control for a given signal. Taking the 2-DOF robot arm as an example, a co-simulation control method is introduced to research multi-body dynamics. Using Newton-Euler and Lagrange method, respectively establish the dynamics model of robot arm and verify the correctness of equations. Firstly, the physical model of robot arm was built by PROE a...

Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

Safeguards agreement and additional protocol - IAEA instruments for control of nuclear materials distribution and their application in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nasrulloev, Kh.; Mirsaidov, U.

2010-01-01

Full text: It is known that IAEA plays an important role in facilitation of nuclear non-proliferation as international authority which carries out nuclear inspections. Republic of Tajikistan in 1997 signed nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty. Then in 2004 Safeguards agreement, additional protocol and small quantity protocol were signed. During 5 years Republic of Tajikistan submits information on its nuclear activity as declarations, foreseen in article 2.3 of Additional protocol to Safeguards agreement. Currently 66 declarations are submitted. Information required in accordance with Safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol is figured on that IAEA could compile more detailed and exact conception about nuclear activity in Tajikistan and it has the following purpose: information will lead to more transparency, and make it possible to IAEA to ensure with high extent of confidence that in the framework of declared program, any unstated nuclear activity is concealed; the more exact and comprehensive information, the rare is questions and discrepancies are originating; required information is the basis for effective planning and IAEA activity realization, related not only with safeguards implementation in regard to declared nuclear material but also ensuring of confidence in absence of undeclared nuclear activity in Tajikistan. IAEA inspection mission consisting of Messrs. N.Lazarev and F. Coillou visited Dushanbe in 2008 for verification of republic’s declarations on account for and control of nuclear materials under Additional protocol and Small quantity protocol, as well as consultations were provided on correct declaration completing and providing information on all nuclear materials. Besides, in 2006, the training course was conducted in Chkalovsk with participation of Commonwealth of Independent States countries on Safeguards agreement and Additional protocol. These visits and events will facilitate to strengthening of weapons of mass destruction non

Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

Work Group 1: Future Directions for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Casterton, J.; Meylemans, P.

2013-01-01

The State-Level Concept (SLC) is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States with safeguards agreements. It is based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a State level approach for each State, including a specific combination of safeguards measures. It is executed through an annual implementation plan. The SLC has the value of considering the State as a whole. It provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into account through all stages of safeguards implementation. The implementation of the SLC permits the IAEA to be responsive to all kinds of changes arising from continuous analysis. As a result the safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date. The SLC is implemented by the IAEA as a continuous process involving three major components: establishing knowledge about the State and drawing conclusions, determining the specific State level approach, and planning and implementing safeguards activities. The major products that emerge from this process are the State level approach, the annual implementation plan that is the basis for implementing safeguards activities in a State on an annual basis, and the safeguards conclusions, which are set out in the Safeguards Implementation Report on an annual basis. A better cooperation between IAEA and SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material), RSAC (Regional State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material is important for developing and implementing SLC. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

The Implications of a New ERa in Arms Control -- Perspectives and Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mladineo, Stephen V.; Durbin, Karyn R.; Indusi, Joseph P.; Smoot, John L.; Vannoni, Michael G.; Satkowiak, Lawrence J.

2004-01-01

On November 13, 2003 the INMM hosted a workshop in Washington, DC entitled 'The Implications of a New Era in Arms Control on Regional Nonproliferation and Nuclear Materials Management'. In this paper we summarize the workshop's highlights and provide our analysis of the dominant themes. Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), delivered the keynote address and focused on four points that are key to understanding the new era: (1) The demise of traditional East/West arms control; (2) The new strategic relationship between Russia and the United States; (3) The blurring of the distinction between nonproliferation and counter-terrorism; (4) The growing recognition that the nonproliferation regime is no longer adequate and needs to be strengthened. He issued a set of challenges to the workshop participants: if his premises were right, what should replace the lexicon of arms control? He described a four-part strategy for nuclear materials protection in Russia, and asked if that model should be replicated globally - potentially by leveraging the new relationship with Russia. Should it be through the IAEA, bilaterally, or some other mechanism? Asserting that the old Nonproliferation Treaty regime was inadequate, he asked what should replace it, and how do we bring it about? Three panel discussions were presented: (1) Implications of a New Era in US/Russia Arms Control Agreements; (2) Implications of a New in Arms Control Upon Regional Nuclear Nonproliferation: South Asia/East Asia/Middle East; and (3) Nuclear Materials Management in a New Era of Arms Control In the first panel, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association argued that arms control agreements provided predictability in the reduction of arms, and had been successful in advancing the methods of verification. Lucas Fischer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control at the US State Department acknowledged that INF and START provide a basis

Robot-Arm Dynamic Control by Computer

Science.gov (United States)

Bejczy, Antal K.; Tarn, Tzyh J.; Chen, Yilong J.

1987-01-01

Feedforward and feedback schemes linearize responses to control inputs. Method for control of robot arm based on computed nonlinear feedback and state tranformations to linearize system and decouple robot end-effector motions along each of cartesian axes augmented with optimal scheme for correction of errors in workspace. Major new feature of control method is: optimal error-correction loop directly operates on task level and not on joint-servocontrol level.

Arms control agency faces uncertain future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ember, L.

1993-01-01

National security cognoscenti are busy sifting tea leaves trying to puzzle out the fate of arms control and nonproliferation policy in the new Administration. Of special concern to these policy gurus is the future of the semiautonomous Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA's existence as a separate entity on the executive branch's organization chart is precarious. The agency has never functioned as intended since Congress created it in 1961. Its stock over the decades has ebbed and flowed, paralleling the prominence and clout of its director. And except for a few notable successes--the conclusion of the chemical weapons treaty being one--the agency's authority has plummeted in the past 14 years. Today, almost every interested party agrees that something has to be done, that the agency cannot continue as it now functions. Several recent studies have called for its rejuvenation. Still other studies have suggested that ACDA be dismantled, and those activities relevant to national security in a post-Cold War environment be shifted to and integrated into the State Department. Observers expect ACDA to evolve into an agency whose primary focus is on problems of proliferation. In a world in which tighter export controls on dual-use technologies, restraint on arms transfers, and economic assistance conditional on a recipients's security behavior will be the norm for security and stability, a role for ACDA as the U.S.'s nonproliferation nanny is not a bad one

Dynamic model of the octopus arm. II. Control of reaching movements.

Science.gov (United States)

Yekutieli, Yoram; Sagiv-Zohar, Roni; Hochner, Binyamin; Flash, Tamar

2005-08-01

The dynamic model of the octopus arm described in the first paper of this 2-part series was used here to investigate the neural strategies used for controlling the reaching movements of the octopus arm. These are stereotypical extension movements used to reach toward an object. In the dynamic model, sending a simple propagating neural activation signal to contract all muscles along the arm produced an arm extension with kinematic properties similar to those of natural movements. Control of only 2 parameters fully specified the extension movement: the amplitude of the activation signal (leading to the generation of muscle force) and the activation traveling time (the time the activation wave takes to travel along the arm). We found that the same kinematics could be achieved by applying activation signals with different activation amplitudes all exceeding some minimal level. This suggests that the octopus arm could use minimal amplitudes of activation to generate the minimal muscle forces required for the production of the desired kinematics. Larger-amplitude signals would generate larger forces that increase the arm's stability against perturbations without changing the kinematic characteristics. The robustness of this phenomenon was demonstrated by examining activation signals with either a constant or a bell-shaped velocity profile. Our modeling suggests that the octopus arm biomechanics may allow independent control of kinematics and resistance to perturbation during arm extension movements.

Analyst Tools and Quality Control Software for the ARM Data System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Moore, S.T.

2004-12-14

ATK Mission Research develops analyst tools and automated quality control software in order to assist the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) Data Quality Office with their data inspection tasks. We have developed a web-based data analysis and visualization tool, called NCVweb, that allows for easy viewing of ARM NetCDF files. NCVweb, along with our library of sharable Interactive Data Language procedures and functions, allows even novice ARM researchers to be productive with ARM data with only minimal effort. We also contribute to the ARM Data Quality Office by analyzing ARM data streams, developing new quality control metrics, new diagnostic plots, and integrating this information into DQ HandS - the Data Quality Health and Status web-based explorer. We have developed several ways to detect outliers in ARM data streams and have written software to run in an automated fashion to flag these outliers.

SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kempf, C.R.

1994-01-01

A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report

Cold War Arms Control Motivations and Techniques - A Guide for the Future?

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

White, Elmer

1996-01-01

.... This paper provides a brief historical account of some of the arms control agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, examines their major motivations to enter into negotiations, and illustrates some successful negotiation techniques. The author hypothesizes on the utility of this Cold War arms control experience as a useful guide for arms control in a single superpower world.

Dual arm master controller concept

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuban, D.P.; Perkins, G.S.

1984-01-01

The Advanced Servomanipulator (ASM) slave was designed with an anthropomorphic stance, gear/torque tube power drives, and modular construction. These features resulted in increased inertia, friction, and backlash relative to tape-driven manipulators. Studies were performed which addressed the human factors design and performance trade-offs associated with the corresponding master controller best suited for the ASM. The results of these studies, as well as the conceptual design of the dual arm master controller, are presented. 6 references, 3 figures

The effect of the development of theatre missile defences on the arms control structure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liu Min

1998-01-01

Th arms control structure usually refers to current and past results of the efforts by the USA and former Soviet Union to negotiate strategic arms control agreements. The structure is to be represented by the various arms control agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the strategic Reduction Talks (START). Whatever the motives of the parties to these agreements, today people commonly regard the structure as the best way to achieve strategic stability. The profile od arms control and the impact of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, to understand how the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) program affects the arms control structure

Regional safeguards arrangements: The Argentina-Brazil experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marzo, M.; Gonzales, H.L.; Iskin, M.C.L.; Vicens, H.

1997-01-01

A Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC) was established by Argentina and Brazil in July 1992. It is a full scope safeguard's system in both countries. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created to apply the SCCC. The main elements of the SCCC are presented. The main safeguards' procedures are described. A brief discussion of the inspection methodology and its impact for facility operators is performed. The safeguard's implementation from the operator's point of view is commented, taking as example a fuel fabrication plant in Argentina and a uranium enrichment plant in Brazil. (author)

Reporting of safeguards events

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dwyer, P.A.; Ervin, N.E.

1988-02-01

On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

International safeguards 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.

1979-01-01

First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, H D; Ko, W I; Song, D Y [and others

2000-03-01

During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

The future of U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control

Science.gov (United States)

Pifer, Steven

2017-11-01

Nuclear arms control has long made contributions to U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian security, but the current regime is at risk. The 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty may be headed for collapse. Both the United States and Russia are modernizing their strategic forces, and the fate of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is unclear. In the unlikely case that the sides are prepared to go beyond New START, there are ways to address further reductions and related issues. A collapse of the arms control regime, on the other hand, would mean the end of constraints on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, a significant loss of transparency, and potential costs to U.S. security.

The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

1991-05-01

The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Peace Newsletters.

Science.gov (United States)

Atkins, Stephen

1986-01-01

Considers the research value of four types of newsletters on arms control, disarmament, and peace: direct-action, informational, scholarly, and single-issue. An annotated list of 58 newsletters includes those considered most significant of their type and recommended for library collections. (EM)

Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

1995-01-01

The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards

Association of hand and arm disinfection with asthma control in US nurses.

Science.gov (United States)

Dumas, Orianne; Varraso, Raphäelle; Boggs, Krislyn M; Descatha, Alexis; Henneberger, Paul K; Quinot, Catherine; Speizer, Frank E; Zock, Jan-Paul; Le Moual, Nicole; Camargo, Carlos A

2018-05-01

To investigate the association between occupational exposure to disinfectants/antiseptics used for hand hygiene and asthma control in nurses. In 2014, we invited female nurses with asthma drawn from the Nurses' Health Study II to complete two supplemental questionnaires on their occupation and asthma (cross-sectional study, response rate: 80%). Among 4055 nurses (mean age: 59 years) with physician-diagnosed asthma and asthma medication use in the past year, we examined asthma control, as defined by the Asthma Control Test (ACT). Nurses were asked about the daily frequency of hand hygiene tasks: 'wash/scrub hands with disinfectants/hand sanitizers' (hand hygiene) and 'wash/scrub arms with disinfecting products' (surrogate of surgical hand/arm antisepsis). Analyses were adjusted for age, race, ethnicity, smoking status and body mass index. Nurses with partly controlled asthma (ACT: 20-24, 50%) and poorly controlled asthma (ACT ≤19, 18%) were compared with nurses with controlled asthma (ACT=25, 32%). In separate models, both hand and arm hygiene were associated with poorly controlled asthma. After mutual adjustment, only arm hygiene was associated with poorly controlled asthma: OR (95% CI) for arm hygiene tasks (never to >10 times/day) and poor asthma control. Associations persisted after further adjustment for surfaces/instruments disinfection tasks. Frequency of hand/arm hygiene tasks in nurses was associated with poor asthma control. The results suggest an adverse effect of products used for surgical hand/arm antisepsis. This potential new occupational risk factor for asthma warrants further study. © Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.

Legalizing euthanasia or assisted suicide: the illusion of safeguards and controls

Science.gov (United States)

Pereira, J.

2011-01-01

Euthanasia or assisted suicide—and sometimes both—have been legalized in a small number of countries and states. In all jurisdictions, laws and safeguards were put in place to prevent abuse and misuse of these practices. Prevention measures have included, among others, explicit consent by the person requesting euthanasia, mandatory reporting of all cases, administration only by physicians (with the exception of Switzerland), and consultation by a second physician. The present paper provides evidence that these laws and safeguards are regularly ignored and transgressed in all the jurisdictions and that transgressions are not prosecuted. For example, about 900 people annually are administered lethal substances without having given explicit consent, and in one jurisdiction, almost 50% of cases of euthanasia are not reported. Increased tolerance of transgressions in societies with such laws represents a social “slippery slope,” as do changes to the laws and criteria that followed legalization. Although the initial intent was to limit euthanasia and assisted suicide to a last-resort option for a very small number of terminally ill people, some jurisdictions now extend the practice to newborns, children, and people with dementia. A terminal illness is no longer a prerequisite. In the Netherlands, euthanasia for anyone over the age of 70 who is “tired of living” is now being considered. Legalizing euthanasia and assisted suicide therefore places many people at risk, affects the values of society over time, and does not provide controls and safeguards. PMID:21505588

Legalizing euthanasia or assisted suicide: the illusion of safeguards and controls.

Science.gov (United States)

Pereira, J

2011-04-01

Euthanasia or assisted suicide-and sometimes both-have been legalized in a small number of countries and states. In all jurisdictions, laws and safeguards were put in place to prevent abuse and misuse of these practices. Prevention measures have included, among others, explicit consent by the person requesting euthanasia, mandatory reporting of all cases, administration only by physicians (with the exception of Switzerland), and consultation by a second physician.The present paper provides evidence that these laws and safeguards are regularly ignored and transgressed in all the jurisdictions and that transgressions are not prosecuted. For example, about 900 people annually are administered lethal substances without having given explicit consent, and in one jurisdiction, almost 50% of cases of euthanasia are not reported. Increased tolerance of transgressions in societies with such laws represents a social "slippery slope," as do changes to the laws and criteria that followed legalization. Although the initial intent was to limit euthanasia and assisted suicide to a last-resort option for a very small number of terminally ill people, some jurisdictions now extend the practice to newborns, children, and people with dementia. A terminal illness is no longer a prerequisite. In the Netherlands, euthanasia for anyone over the age of 70 who is "tired of living" is now being considered. Legalizing euthanasia and assisted suicide therefore places many people at risk, affects the values of society over time, and does not provide controls and safeguards.

Safeguarding the functions and performance of instrumentation and control systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koehler, M.; Schoerner, O.

1996-01-01

Based on an analysis of the existing nuclear power plant control technology, the necessity of providing in the medium-term advanced and future-oriented, digital control system, both for normal operation and for safety-relevant tasks of the reactor and safety control systems. Siemens KWU has been promoting the development, review and marketing of the digital instrumentation and control systems called TELEPERM XS and TELEPERM XP in addition to the measures taken for safeguarding the functions of existing, wired systems. The paper briefly explains the performance and advantages of digital systems and the progress in approval and pioneering of the TELEPERM XS safety control system. Many examples discussed show the diversity of applications of the systems both in new reactor plants and as retrofitting measures, for KWU power plants and those of other manufacturers. (orig.) [de

International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included

Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, H. D.; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I.

2002-05-01

DUPIC safeguards R and D in the second phase has focused on the development of nuclear material measurement system and its operation and verification, the development of nuclear material control and accounting system, and the development of remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system. Of them, the nuclear material measurement system was authenticated from IAEA and officially used for IAEA and domestic safeguards activities in DFDF. It was also verified that the system could be used for quality control of DUPIC process. It is recognised that the diagnostic software using neural network and remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system developed here could be key technologies to go into remote and near-real time monitoring system. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear fuel cycles like MOX and pyroprocessing facility as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material

Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun

2015-01-01

But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice

Cooperative Mmonitoring Center Occasional Paper/5: Propspects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gupta, Amit; Kamal, Nazir

1998-11-01

The intensely adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by military rivalry, mutual distrust, and suspicion. The most dividing disagreement has been over the Kashmir region. An inability to discuss the Kashmir issue has prevented discussion on other important issues. Since there is little prospect of detente, at least in the near-term, the question is whether this rivalry can be contained by other means, such as arms control approaches. Conventional arms control has been applied flexibly and successfully in some regions to reduce threat-perceptions and achieve reassuring military stability. Some lessons from other international models might be applied to the India/Pakistan context. This paper discusses the status of conventional arms control in South Asia, the dominant Indian and Pakistani perceptions about arms control, the benefits that could be derived from arms control, as well as the problems and prospects of arms control. It also discusses existing conventional arms control agreements at the regional and global levels as well as the potential role of cooperative monitoring technology.

Report of the Material Control and Material Accounting Task Force: the role of material control and material accounting in the safeguards program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-03-01

Results are presented of NRC Task Force investigations to identify the functions of a safeguards program in relation to the NRC safeguards objective, define the role and objectives of material control and material accounting systems within that program, develop goals for material control and material accounting based on those roles and objectives, assess current material control and material accounting requirements and performance levels in the light of the goals, and recommend future actions needed to attain the proposed goals. It was found that the major contribution of material accounting to the safeguards program is in support of the assurance function. It also can make secondary contributions to the prevention and response functions. In the important area of loss detection, a response measure, it is felt that limitations inherent in material accounting for some fuel cycle operations limit its ability to operate as a primary detection system to detect a five formula kilogram loss with high assurance (defined by the Task Force as a probability of detection of 90 percent or more) and that, in those cases, material accounting can act only in a backup role. Physical security and material control must make the primary contributions to the prevention and detection of theft, so that safeguards do not rely primarily for detection capabilities on material accounting. There are several areas of accounting that require more emphasis than is offered by the current regulatory base. These areas include: timely shipper-receiver difference analysis and reconciliation; a demand physical inventory capability; improved loss localization;discard measurement verification; timely recovery of scrap; improved measurement and record systems; and limits on cumulative inventory differences and shipper-receiver differences. An increased NRC capability for monitoring and analyzing licensee accounting data and more timely and detailed submittals of data to NRC by licensees are recommended

Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.

1998-01-01

Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-12-31

Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included Refs, figs, 1 tab

U.S. – Russia Relations And Arms Control: Breating The Clinch

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

N. I. Bubnova

2017-01-01

Full Text Available The article examines the new U.S. administration’s outlook on arms control, analyses the existing problems in this field and possible ways for their resolution, compares Donald Trump’s statements on military and political issues with the president’s first steps in this area, and offers forecasts and recommendations on the prospects for U.S.-Russia cooperation in arms limitations and reductions. The author proceeds from the assumption that arms control is a key component in measures to ensure international security. Even if the current tense U.S.- Russian relations provide little room for maneuver and the internal political struggle in DC sets limits on the possible bilateral measures, Moscow should nevertheless take initiative in putting forward a set of proposals to reduce weapons, especially in the very sensitive and risk-prone nuclear field. This will allow in future negotiations to proceed from options that will take into account Russian interests and the specifics of Russia’s weapons systems, while at the same time showing the resolve of the nuclear superpowers to reduce existing threats through negotiations and leading the way for other countries to join. Taking into account the importance of arms control, all efforts should be made to enforce the existing treaties, consolidate the current international treaty-based legal system, and work further on new arms control and arms reduction agreements.

A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

2011-12-15

Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Terada, Hiromi; Akiba, Mitsunori; Ando, Hisataka; Okazaki, Shuji; Irikura, Masatoshi; Kurihara, Hiroyoshi

2000-01-01

With domestic application of the IAEA new measures (program 93+2) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Nuclear Regulation Laws was amended for implementation of the new measures based upon the Additional Protocol, and also the new Designated Organization System was introduced to the SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) for safeguards implementation in Japan since beginning of January 2000. On the basis of accumulated experiences of the state safeguards implementation for more than 20 years and then established standardization of the inspection procedures, the Japan's Government is able to utilize the expertise of private organizations for the safeguards implementation. Any capable organizations can be designated by the Government as the Designated Organization for all or a part of safeguards implementations on behalf of the Government. According to the amended Law, the Prime Minister can make the Designated Organization implement safeguards implementations that are defined firstly as safeguards inspections which can be done along the Government instructions without any discussions and decisions, secondarily as destructive analysis of safeguards samples, and thirdly as technical research on advanced safeguards measures. The amendment of the Law was approved by the National Diet on June 9th 1999 and entered into force on December 16th 1999. The Additional Protocol also entered into force in Japan at the same time. The NMCC (Nuclear Material Control Center) was designated as the Organization on December 27th 1999 and started the safeguards implementation in January 7th 2000. In order to prepare for the Designated Organization, the NMCC rearranged the organizational system and kept capable human resources enough for the safeguards implementations. Also the NMCC carried out many programs of education and training for the inspectors. Furthermore, manuals and criteria for the

Research on the man in the loop control system of the robot arm based on gesture control

Science.gov (United States)

Xiao, Lifeng; Peng, Jinbao

2017-03-01

The Man in the loop control system of the robot arm based on gesture control research complex real-world environment, which requires the operator to continuously control and adjust the remote manipulator, as the background, completes the specific mission human in the loop entire system as the research object. This paper puts forward a kind of robot arm control system of Man in the loop based on gesture control, by robot arm control system based on gesture control and Virtual reality scene feedback to enhance immersion and integration of operator, to make operator really become a part of the whole control loop. This paper expounds how to construct a man in the loop control system of the robot arm based on gesture control. The system is a complex system of human computer cooperative control, but also people in the loop control problem areas. The new system solves the problems that the traditional method has no immersion feeling and the operation lever is unnatural, the adjustment time is long, and the data glove mode wears uncomfortable and the price is expensive.

Learning and Control Model of the Arm for Loading

Science.gov (United States)

Kim, Kyoungsik; Kambara, Hiroyuki; Shin, Duk; Koike, Yasuharu

We propose a learning and control model of the arm for a loading task in which an object is loaded onto one hand with the other hand, in the sagittal plane. Postural control during object interactions provides important points to motor control theories in terms of how humans handle dynamics changes and use the information of prediction and sensory feedback. For the learning and control model, we coupled a feedback-error-learning scheme with an Actor-Critic method used as a feedback controller. To overcome sensory delays, a feedforward dynamics model (FDM) was used in the sensory feedback path. We tested the proposed model in simulation using a two-joint arm with six muscles, each with time delays in muscle force generation. By applying the proposed model to the loading task, we showed that motor commands started increasing, before an object was loaded on, to stabilize arm posture. We also found that the FDM contributes to the stabilization by predicting how the hand changes based on contexts of the object and efferent signals. For comparison with other computational models, we present the simulation results of a minimum-variance model.

Interface Based on Electrooculography for Velocity Control of a Robot Arm

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Eduardo Iáñez

2010-01-01

Full Text Available This paper describes a technique based on electrooculography to control a robot arm. This technique detects the movement of the eyes, measuring the difference of potential between the cornea and the retina by placing electrodes around the ocular area. The processing algorithm developed to obtain the position of the eye at the blink of the user is explained. The output of the processing algorithm offers, apart from the direction, four different values (zero to three to control the velocity of the robot arm according to how much the user is looking in one direction. This allows controlling two degrees of freedom of a robot arm with the eyes movement. The blink has been used to mark some targets in tests. In this paper, the experimental results obtained with a real robot arm are shown.

Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

2015-01-01

There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

JPRS Report Arms Control

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

1993-01-01

Table of Contents: (1) COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES - (A) GENERAL Flaws in U.S.-Russian SSD Agreement Viewed, Khariton - Espionage Not Crucial in Soviet Nuclear Arms Development, Further on Espionage Role in Nuclear Arms Projects...

Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

Dual arm master controller development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuban, D.P.; Perkins, G.S.

1985-01-01

The advanced servomanipulator (ASM) slave was designed with an anthropomorphic stance, gear/torque tube power drives, and modular construction. These features resulted in increased inertia, friction, and backlash relative to tape-driven manipulators. Studies were performed which addressed the human factors design and performance trade-offs associated with the corresponding master controller best suited for the ASM. The results of these studies, as well as the conceptual design of the dual arm master controller, are presented. This work was performed as part of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 5 refs., 7 figs., 1 tab

Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

Implementation of Safeguards for Romania National LOFs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Popovici, I.

2015-01-01

The safe deployment of nuclear activities in Romania is provided by Law no. 111/1996. The Law was republished based on the provisions of Article II of Law no. 63/2006 for the amendment and addition and was modified and completed by the Law no. 378/2013. The competent national authority in the nuclear field, which has responsibilities of regulation, authorization and control as stipulated in this Law, is the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). According to art. 2c), provisions of the Nuclear Law shall apply to production, sitting and construction, supply, leasing, transfer, handling, possession, processing, treatment, use, temporary storage or final disposal, transport, transit, import and export of radiological installations, nuclear and radioactive materials, including nuclear fuel, radioactive waste and ionizing radiation generating devices. With regards to the small holders of nuclear materials, the Romanian legislation takes into account the following safeguards objectives: · Establishing provisions governing the possession, use, transfer, import and export of nuclear materials; · Ensuring the implementation of the safeguards system for accountancy and control of nuclear materials: · Ensuring that all nuclear materials are reported under the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement; · Ensuring that all nuclear activities are declared under the provisions of the Additional Protocol; · Developing and implementing nuclear material accounting and control procedures at all small holders of nuclear materials; · Ensuring training for safeguards staff at all small holders. Based on the provision of Law no. 111/1996 CNCAN has issued a Guidelines for applying of the safeguards by the small holders of nuclear materials from Romania. The guidelines provide specific regulations regarding the movement of the nuclear materials, the accountancy and control of nuclear materials, the containment and surveillance systems for small holders of nuclear

Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

1982-06-01

The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments

Technical basis of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buechler, C.

1975-01-01

Definition of nuclear materials control. Materials accountancy and physical control as technical possibilities. Legal possibilities and levels of responsibility: material holders, national and international authority. Detection vs. prevention. Physical security and containment surveillance. Accountancy: materials balance concept. Materials measurement: inventory taking, flow determination. IAEA safeguards; verification of operator's statement. (HP) [de

A biologically inspired neural network controller for ballistic arm movements

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Schmid Maurizio

2007-09-01

Full Text Available Abstract Background In humans, the implementation of multijoint tasks of the arm implies a highly complex integration of sensory information, sensorimotor transformations and motor planning. Computational models can be profitably used to better understand the mechanisms sub-serving motor control, thus providing useful perspectives and investigating different control hypotheses. To this purpose, the use of Artificial Neural Networks has been proposed to represent and interpret the movement of upper limb. In this paper, a neural network approach to the modelling of the motor control of a human arm during planar ballistic movements is presented. Methods The developed system is composed of three main computational blocks: 1 a parallel distributed learning scheme that aims at simulating the internal inverse model in the trajectory formation process; 2 a pulse generator, which is responsible for the creation of muscular synergies; and 3 a limb model based on two joints (two degrees of freedom and six muscle-like actuators, that can accommodate for the biomechanical parameters of the arm. The learning paradigm of the neural controller is based on a pure exploration of the working space with no feedback signal. Kinematics provided by the system have been compared with those obtained in literature from experimental data of humans. Results The model reproduces kinematics of arm movements, with bell-shaped wrist velocity profiles and approximately straight trajectories, and gives rise to the generation of synergies for the execution of movements. The model allows achieving amplitude and direction errors of respectively 0.52 cm and 0.2 radians. Curvature values are similar to those encountered in experimental measures with humans. The neural controller also manages environmental modifications such as the insertion of different force fields acting on the end-effector. Conclusion The proposed system has been shown to properly simulate the development of

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-01-01

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-07-12

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Measures for regional security and arms control in the South-East Asian area

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Uren, R.T.

1992-01-01

The subject of regional security and arms control in the South-East Asia raises some new and difficult issues. No approach to ensuring regional security could be complete without military dimension including the following categories: regional arms control; global arms control measure; confidence building measures that are designed to enhance the transparency of defense policies; confidence building measures that encourage cooperation among the military forces in the region

Development of Measurement Techniques For Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Badawy, I.

2007-01-01

The strategy of nuclear safeguards is based on the accounting and control of nuclear materials, nuclear technologies and activities in a State in order to attain its ''Legal'' goals of the application of atomic energy. The present paper investigates the development in the measurement techniques used in the verification and control of NMs for the purpose of strengthening safeguards. Its focus is to review the recent nuclear measurement techniques used for the identification and verification of nuclear materials.The different levels of verification and the accuracy of these techniques are discussed. The implementation of stregthened safeguards; and nuclear materials verification and control in the world are mentioned. Also, the recently proposed measures to enhance the ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials, nuclear activities and facilities that would need advanced measurement techniques are indicated.

Arms control verification costs: the need for a comparative analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MacLean, G.; Fergusson, J.

1998-01-01

The end of the Cold War era has presented practitioners and analysts of international non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) the opportunity to focus more intently on the range and scope of NACD treaties and their verification. Aside from obvious favorable and well-publicized developments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, progress also has been made in a wide variety of arenas, ranging from chemical and biological weapons, fissile material, conventional forces, ballistic missiles, to anti-personnel landmines. Indeed, breaking from the constraints imposed by the Cold War United States-Soviet adversarial zero-sum relationship that impeded the progress of arms control, particularly on a multilateral level, the post Cold War period has witnessed significant developments in NACD commitments, initiatives, and implementation. The goals of this project - in its final iteration - will be fourfold. First, it will lead to the creation of a costing analysis model adjustable for uses in several current and future arms control verification tasks. Second, the project will identify data accumulated in the cost categories outlined in Table 1 in each of the five cases. By comparing costs to overall effectiveness, the application of the model will demonstrate desirability in each of the cases (see Chart 1). Third, the project will identify and scrutinize 'political costs' as well as real expenditures and investment in the verification regimes (see Chart 2). And, finally, the project will offer some analysis on the relationship between national and multilateral forms of arms control verification, as well as the applicability of multilateralism as an effective tool in the verification of international non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament agreements. (author)

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

2008-10-22

In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.

1987-01-01

This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

Nuclear Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Findlay, T.

2015-01-01

The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palacios, E.

1998-01-01

Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

Peaceful nuclear development and the three 'S' ('Safety', 'Security' and 'Safeguards')

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Julio Gonzalez, Abel; Abel Gonzalez, Martin

2010-01-01

We should agree on a comprehensive solution for a commensurate international control of both nuclear and radioactive material designed to ensure that peaceful nuclear developments will not cause harm to humanity. The concept of an international security system is clouded by the confusing semantics of its parts: the English concepts 'safeguards', 'safety' and 'security', on one hand, and nuclear and radioactive materials on the other hand. The objectives should be: to ensure, through appropriate safeguards, that nuclear materials are not diverted to non-peaceful activities; to prevent, through appropriate security, the unauthorized possession or use, illegal or malicious, of nuclear and radioactive materials; and, to ensure, through appropriate safety, that the use of nuclear and radioactive material will not cause harm to people and the environment. Security must be understood as an integral part of safeguards and safety, because materials that are secure are not necessarily safeguarded or safe, and materials may not be safeguarded or safe unless they are secure. Security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for safeguards and safety; security is an important but subsidiary condition of safeguards and safety; security is necessary but not sufficient to ensure nuclear control via safeguards and safety. In conclusion an International Treaty for the Control ('safeguards', 'safety' and 'security') of the Peaceful Development of Nuclear Energy and its Byproducts is proposed. It should clearly regulate the obligations and (non-compliance) penalties of the Parties, and, based on existing agreements, should be clear, logical, rational, fundamental, methodical, systematic, universal, equitable, impartial, fair and non discriminatory. (author)

Disposition scenarios and safeguardability of fissile materials under START Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.

1993-01-01

Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) signed in 1991 and the Lisbon Protocol of 1992, a large inventory of fissile materials will be removed from the weapons fuel cycles of the United States and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The Lisbon Protocol calls for Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Byelarus to become nonnuclear members of the treaty and for Russia to assume the responsibility of the treaty as a nuclear weapons state. In addition, the START-II Treaty, which was signed in 1993 by the United States and Russia, further reduces deployed nuclear warheads and adds to the inventory of excess special nuclear materials (SNM). Because storage of in-tact warheads has the potential for a open-quotes breakout,close quotes it would be desirable to dismantle the warheads and properly dispose of the SNMs under appropriate safeguards to prevent their reentry into the weapons fuel cycle. The SNM recovered from dismantled warheads can be disposed of in several ways, and the final choices may be up to the country having the title to the SNM. Current plans are to store them indefinitely, leaving serious safeguards concerns. Recognizing that the underlying objective of these treaties is to prevent the fissile materials from reentering the weapons fuel cycle, it is necessary to establish a verifiable disposal scheme that includes safeguards requirements. This paper identifies some realistic scenarios for the disposal of SNM from the weapons fuel cycle and examines the safeguardability of those scenarios

Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dugan, V.L.; Chapman, L.D.

1977-01-01

A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dugan, V.L.; Chapman, L.D.

1977-08-01

A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

Swedish experiences in implementing national and international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nilsson, A.; Elborn, M.; Grahn, P.

1991-01-01

This paper reports that international safeguards have been applied in Sweden since the early 70s. Experiences have been achieved from exclusive bilateral and trilateral control followed by NPT safeguards in 1975. The Swedish State System for accountancy and Control (SSAC) includes all regulations that follows from prevailing obligations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear material. The system has been developed in cooperation between the national authority, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish nuclear industry. The paper presents experiences from the practical implementation of the SSAC and the IAEA safeguards system, gained by the SKI and the nuclear industry, respectively. Joint approaches and solutions to some significant safeguards issues are presented. The cooperation between the nuclear industry and the authority in R and D activities, in particular with respect to the Swedish Support Program is highlighted, e.g. the use of nuclear facilities in development or training tasks. some of the difficulties encountered with the system are also touched upon

20 years of the implementation of the safeguards agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ramirez Quijada, Renan

2001-01-01

Peru has signed an INFIRC/153 type safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1979. The paper describes the nuclear material under control and outlines the organization and the activities related to the implementation of the safeguards agreements

Building safeguards infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

2009-01-01

Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

Conventional arms control negotiations in Europe (CFE, March 1989-April 1990)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buerstedde, L.

1992-01-01

This paper reports that for those of us who labored in the salt mines of arms control talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), it is truly an invigorating experience to have been reincarnated as conventional arms controllers at the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), in session in Vienna since March 1989, against the background of the breathtaking and unprecedented changes sweeping across Eastern Europe. The negotiations have made remarkable progress, proceeding to a point where a treaty drastically cutting the level of conventional armaments in Europe is not just a possibility but actually in prospect

Redefining interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Irie, Kazutomo

2012-01-01

Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having “aggressors” as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests “SSN” which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called “SSST” in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. (author)

Safeguards '85

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1981-01-01

IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

1989-01-01

The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

U.S. N.R.C. special safeguards study on nuclear material control and accounting

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, G.D.

1976-01-01

In Feb. 1975, NRC directed that an effort be made to determine a safeguards program for Pu recycle. This paper summarizes results of individual contractor evaluations of upgrading material control and accounting concepts as applied to strategically important special nuclear material and describes staff interpretations of these results as applied to future high-throughput fuel-cycle facilities. Real-time material control, design for physical inventory, Pu isotopics control and calorimetry, and material control and accounting for highly enriched uranium fuel materials were the concepts studied. 1 table, 15 references

IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

Trade Analysis and Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, R.; Schot, P.M.

2010-01-01

In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

27 CFR 479.193 - Arms Export Control Act.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

..., AND EXPLOSIVES, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION MACHINE GUNS, DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, AND CERTAIN OTHER FIREARMS Other Laws Applicable § 479.193 Arms Export Control Act. For provisions relating to...

The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Synetos, Sotiris

2013-01-01

Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

1990-11-01

From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

Arms control in space: workshop proceedings, Washington, DC, January 30-31, 1984

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-05-01

In late 1982 and early 1983, the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on space weapons and arms control. To explore these issues further in a discussion format not easily achieved in hearings, Sen. Larry Pressler, Chairman of the Subcommittee, asked OTA to conduct a workshop focusing on antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as one aspect of space arms control. The workshop held in Washington, DC on January 30 and 31, 1984, provided an opportunity for technical, diplomatic, military, and policy-analysis experts to interact, think out loud, and build each other's ideas. The workshop was organized into six sessions, although issues involving anti-satellite weapons and arms control are not easily compartmentalized into distinct subject areas. Each session was introduced by a 10- or 15-minute informal oral presentation which set the stage for further discussion. This workshop proceedings volume is organized along the same divisions as the sessions, with some rearrangement

Developing and modeling of voice control system for prosthetic robot arm in medical systems

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Koksal Gundogdu

2018-04-01

Full Text Available In parallel with the development of technology, various control methods are also developed. Voice control system is one of these control methods. In this study, an effective modelling upon mathematical models used in the literature is performed, and a voice control system is developed in order to control prosthetic robot arms. The developed control system has been applied on four-jointed RRRR robot arm. Implementation tests were performed on the designed system. As a result of the tests; it has been observed that the technique utilized in our system achieves about 11% more efficient voice recognition than currently used techniques in the literature. With the improved mathematical modelling, it has been shown that voice commands could be effectively used for controlling the prosthetic robot arm. Keywords: Voice recognition model, Voice control, Prosthetic robot arm, Robotic control, Forward kinematic

Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

2010-01-01

IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

Executive summary of the special safeguards study on material control and accounting systems. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

This report assesses the feasibility of real-time systems applied to mixed-oxide fuel rod fabrication. Their interaction with other material control and accounting measures are considered. Economics, effectiveness, and acceptance factors are discussed. A cost-benefit evaluation is made and recommendations given for safeguards improvements

Process monitoring for reprocessing plant safeguards: a summary review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kerr, H.T.; Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.

1986-10-01

Process monitoring is a term typically associated with a detailed look at plant operating data to determine plant status. Process monitoring has been generally associated with operational control of plant processes. Recently, process monitoring has been given new attention for a possible role in international safeguards. International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) Task C.59 has the goal to identify specific roles for process monitoring in international safeguards. As the preliminary effort associated with this task, a review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts mentioned concepts and a few specific applications. None were comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report summarizes the basic elements that must be developed in a comprehensive process monitoring application for safeguards. It then summarizes the significant efforts that have been documented in the literature with respect to the basic elements that were addressed

Coordinated Resolved Motion Control of Dual-Arm Manipulators with Closed Chain

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tianliang Liu

2016-05-01

Full Text Available When applied to some tasks, such as payload handling, assembling, repairing and so on, the two arms of a humanoid robot will form a closed kinematic chain. It makes the motion planning and control for dual-arm coordination very complex and difficult. In this paper, we present three types of resolved motion control methods for a humanoid robot during coordinated manipulation. They are, respectively, position-level, velocity-level and acceleration-level resolved motion control methods. The desired pose, velocity and acceleration of each end-effector are then resolved according to the desired motion of the payload and the constraints on the closed-chain system without consideration of the internal force. Corresponding to the three cases above, the joint variables of each arm are then calculated using the inverse kinematic equations, at position-level, velocity-level or acceleration-level. Finally, a dynamic modelling and simulation platform is established based on ADAMS and Matlab software. The proposed methods are verified by typical cases. The simulation results show that the proposed control strategy can realize the dual-arm coordinated operation and the internal force of the closed chain during the operation is controlled in a reasonable range at the same time.

Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

1976-01-01

Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. A facilities safeguards system suitable for a production plant is described in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides an information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

1978-06-01

Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially-severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. This paper describes a facilities safeguards system suitable for production plant, in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely-coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

Isotopic safeguards data bank (ISTLIB) and control program (MISTY)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Timmerman, C.L.

1978-09-01

As part of the U.S. program to provide technical assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has developed a computer code and data bank to aid in the safeguards verification of spent fuel content at the head end of a reprocessing facility. A description and user instructions that uses isotopic safeguards techniques are presented for MISTY, a computer program for analyzing an isotopic data base (ISTLIB). The input, operating procedures, and output from MISTY are explained in detail. An output listing of an example computer run is provided to illustrate the program's operation. The contents of the data bank are summarized, and show the isotopic data sets that are available

The safeguards active response inventory system (SARIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, R.L.; Hairston, L.A.; O'Callaghan, P.B.; Grambihler, A.J.; Ruemmler, W.P.

1987-01-01

The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) is a computerized accountability system developed for nuclear materials control that incorporates elements of process monitoring, criticality safety, physical inventory and safeguards. It takes data from the process operations, stores it in an on-line database and translates the information into the formats needed by the various users. It traces the material through the process from feed to product; including recycle, waste and scraps streams. It models the process as the material changes form to ensure that artificial losses are not created. It automatically generates input to Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), performs checks to prevent the possibility of a criticality accident, prepares an audit trail for Safeguards, prints labels for nuclear material containers, and produces DOE/NRC 741 forms. SARIS has been installed at three laboratories across the country

Norm in the matter of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Saavedra, Analia; Maceiras, Elena; Valentino, Lucia; Chiliutti, Mauro

2001-01-01

The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), through its norm, establishes requirements in the matter of safeguards that allow him to control the fulfillment of the objectives established at national level and the international commitments that the Argentine Republic has assumed in the scope of Nuclear Non-proliferation. The measures of fortification of the safeguards proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), will imply new obligations for the country and consequently it will require the update of the effective norm in the matter. The objective of this work is to describe the reach of the update of the norm in the matter of safeguards and their relation with some procedures of application in the scope of the radiological protection and the nuclear security

Computerization of the safeguards analysis decision process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.

1990-01-01

This paper reports that safeguards regulations are evolving to meet new demands for timeliness and sensitivity in detecting the loss or unauthorized use of sensitive nuclear materials. The opportunities to meet new rules, particularly in bulk processing plants, involve developing techniques which use modern, computerized process control and information systems. Using these computerized systems in the safeguards analysis involves all the challenges of the man-machine interface experienced in the typical process control application and adds new dimensions to accuracy requirements, data analysis, and alarm resolution in the regulatory environment

Inventory of safeguards software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

2009-03-01

The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

Measurement trends for future safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baloga, S.M.; Hakkila, E.A.

1980-01-01

Safeguards for future commercial-scale nuclear facilities may employ three materials control and accounting concepts: classical accounting, dynamic materials balancing, and independent verification of inventories and materials balances. Typical measurement needs associated with the implementation of these concepts at high-throughput facilities are discussed. Promising measurement methods for meeting these needs are described and recent experience is cited. General directions and considerations for meeting advanced safeguards systems needs through measurement technology development over the next decade are presented

Safeguards and security issues for the disposition of fissile materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Tolk, K.M.; Rutherford, D.; Fearey, B.; Moore, L.

1995-01-01

The Department of Energy's Office of Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials, preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), preparing for a record of decision (ROD) regarding this material and conducting other activities. The primary security objectives of this program are to reduce major security risks and strengthen arms reduction and nonproliferation (NP). To help achieve these objectives, a safeguards and security (S ampersand S) team consisting of participants from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established. The S ampersand S activity for this program is a cross-cutting task which addresses all of the FMD program options. It includes both domestic and international safeguards and includes areas such as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will discuss the activities of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) S ampersand S team as well as some specific S ampersand S issues associated with various FMDP options/facilities. Some of the items to be discussed include the threat, S ampersand S requirements, S ampersand S criteria for assessing risk, S ampersand S issues concerning fissile material processing/facilities, and international and domestic safeguards

Overview: Mechanism and Control of a Prosthetic Arm.

Science.gov (United States)

Kulkarni, Tushar; Uddanwadiker, Rashmi

2015-09-01

Continuous growth in industrialization and lack of awareness in safety parameters the cases of amputations are growing. The search of safer, simpler and automated prosthetic arms for managing upper limbs is expected. Continuous efforts have been made to design and develop prosthetic arms ranging from simple harness actuated to automated mechanisms with various control options. However due the cost constraints, the automated prosthetic arms are still out of the reach of needy people. Recent data have shown that there is a wide scope to develop a low cost and light weight upper limb prosthesis. This review summarizes the various designs methodologies, mechanisms and control system developed by the researchers and the advances therein. Educating the patient to develop acceptability to prosthesis and using the same for the most basic desired functions of human hand, post amputation care and to improve patient's independent life is equally important. In conclusion it can be interpreted that there is a wide scope in design in an adaptive mechanism for opening and closing of the fingers using other methods of path and position synthesis. Simple mechanisms and less parts may optimize the cost factor. Reduction in the weight of the prosthesis may be achieved using polymers used for engineering applications. Control system will remain never ending challenge for the researchers, but it is essential to maintain the simplicity from the patients perspective.

IAEA Safeguards: Present status and experience gained

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thorne, L.; Buechler, C.; Haegglund, E.

1983-01-01

IAEA safeguards are at the present under critical review with regard to their purpose and effectiveness. This paper describes the development of the IAEA Safeguards System from the early days, when procedures were developed on an ad hoc basis, to the present day. The development of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), and of sophisticated instrumentation, has been necessary to deal with the rapid growth in the quantities of nuclear material and in the number of facilities under safeguards. The paper also discusses some of the managerial and organizational issues that are inherent in such a large international inspectorate. (author)

Redefining interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Irie, Kazutomo

2011-01-01

Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of the 3Ss is now emphasized to countries which are newly introducing nuclear power generation. However, as role models for those newcomers, existing nuclear power countries are also required to strengthen their regulatory infrastructure for the 3Ss. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having 'aggressors' as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests 'SSN' which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called 'SSST' in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. Recently, it becomes quite difficult to clearly demarcate these policy tools. As nuclear security concept is expanding, the denotation of nuclear security measures is also expanding. Nuclear security measures are more and more

Safeguards and nuclear forensics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gangotra, Suresh

2016-01-01

Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

Middle term prospects for Japan's safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ogawa, T.

2001-01-01

Japan has responded to IAEA requirements on reinforced safeguard regulations. The IAEA additional protocol entered in force in Japan on December 1999. Japan submitted a preliminary information report to IAEA on June 2000 after joint works with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) of Japan. The first annual report was submitted to IAEA on May 2001. Another activity for the additional protocol is complementary accesses. The total 36 accesses to facilities have been done from November 2000 to September 2001. Procedures of access to managements are under discussion. MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has been constructing the Rokkasho Safeguards On-Site Laboratory from 1997, and the Rokkasho Safeguards Center from 2000. The Design Information Verification (DIV) is now ongoing. Much more personal resources will be needed for future inspections. Therefore, the budget for safeguards is increasing in contrast to the flat base budget for the total atomic energy. As for future activity, a MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuels) fuel processing plant is one of the issues for discussion. The construction of the MOX processing plant is supposed to begin on around 2004. The conclusion of additional protocol will be given by IAEA until end of 2002. Shift to integrated safeguards are under discussions by MEXT, NMCC and utilities of Japan parallel with IAEA. Key issues of discussion are cost saving for safeguards, development of personal resources for inspectors and the role of NMCC. (Y. Tanaka)

Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang Qun

2001-01-01

Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For

Twenty Years of Regional Safeguards: the ABACC System and the Synergy with the National Nuclear Material Control Systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dias, Fabio C.; Palhares, Lilia C.; De Mello, Luiz A.; Vicens, Hugo E.; Maceiras, Elena; Terigi, Gabriel

2011-01-01

As result of the nuclear integration between Brazil and Argentina, in July 1991 the Agreement for Peaceful Uses of the Nuclear Energy (Bilateral Agreement) was signed and the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accountancy and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) was created [1]. The main role assigned to ABACC was the implementation and administration of the regional control system and the coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in all nuclear activities of Argentina and Brazil. In December 1991 the IAEA, ABACC, Argentina and Brazil signed the Quadripartite Agreement (INFCIRC/435) [2]. The agreement establishes obligations similar to those established by model INFCIRC/153 comprehensive agreements. The Bilateral Agreement establishes that the Parties should make available financial and technical capabilities to support ABACC activities. In order to accomplish this challenge, the National Systems had to improve their structure and capabilities. Through the close interaction with the IAEA and ABACC, the national systems have been enriched by adopting new methodologies, implementing innovative safeguards approaches and providing specialized training to the regional inspectors. All of this also resulted in relevant technical improvements to the regional system as a whole. The approach of both neighborhoods controlling each other increased the confidence between the partners and permitted a better knowledge of their potentialities. The recognized performance of the regional system in the implementation of innovative, efficient and credible safeguards measures increased the confidence of the international community on the implementation of nuclear safeguards in Argentina and Brazil. In this paper, after twenty years of the creation of the ABACC System, the view of the Brazilian and Argentine National Authorities is presented. (authors)

IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moran, B.W.

2005-01-01

In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

Evolution of safeguards systems design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

1979-01-01

Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

Measuring Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2011-01-01

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

Fuzzy Logic and PID control of a 3 DOF Robotic Arm

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Korhan Kayışlı

2017-12-01

Full Text Available The robotic arms are used in many industrial applications at the present time. At this point, high precision control is required for robotics used in fields such as healthcare area. Therefore, the control method applied to robots is also important. In this study, a force was applied to the end function of a three degree-of-freedom robot and the robustness of the controllers are tested. PID and Fuzzy Logic control method are used for this process. The control process of robotic arm which is designed and simulated is obtained by using Fuzzy Logic and classical PID controllers and the results are presented comparatively

The present status of safeguards in Turkey

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yilmazer, A.; Yuecel, A.

2001-01-01

Republic of Turkey signed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in Vienna, Austria on January 28, 1969 and the Treaty was ratified by Turkish Parliament on March 29, 1979. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Republic of Turkey signed the Safeguards Agreement on June 30, 1981. Turkey accepted the international safeguards administered by IAEA and at the same time its subsidiary arrangements and Facility attachments were enforced for all nuclear facilities as an Non-Nuclear-Weapon State party to NPT. Regulation on Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control, which was prepared in accordance with Agreement Between the Government of Turkey and IAEA for the application of Safeguard in Connection with the Treaty on NPT, has been put into force since it was published in Official Gazette on September 10, 1997. This study presents the essential futures of national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Turkey

A data management system for safeguards applications (DMSSA)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wu Yuan

1994-09-01

Implementation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) in China has begun since 1989. DESSA serves as an automated tool to provide the quality Accounting Reports to the IAEA as well as to perform the data management of safeguards database. It is implemented on an IBM-compatible PC. The system is characterized as a single-user, small-scale system with cost-effective and easy-to-use feature. It consists of a data manipulating system and a database specially designed for safeguards applications. It involves several functions such as: Report Edit, Quality Control, Auditing and Data Verification, Information Retrieval and Film Management, Database Querying and so on. All functions of the system are used in an interactive mode and organized in a pull-down menu. The general design consideration of the system is that it should completely meet the requirements of the safeguards activities to provide the basis for the application of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement between China and IAEA

A data management system for safeguards applications (DMSSA)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Yuan, Wu [Beijing Inst. of Nuclear Engineering (China)

1994-09-01

Implementation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) in China has begun since 1989. DESSA serves as an automated tool to provide the quality Accounting Reports to the IAEA as well as to perform the data management of safeguards database. It is implemented on an IBM-compatible PC. The system is characterized as a single-user, small-scale system with cost-effective and easy-to-use feature. It consists of a data manipulating system and a database specially designed for safeguards applications. It involves several functions such as: Report Edit, Quality Control, Auditing and Data Verification, Information Retrieval and Film Management, Database Querying and so on. All functions of the system are used in an interactive mode and organized in a pull-down menu. The general design consideration of the system is that it should completely meet the requirements of the safeguards activities to provide the basis for the application of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement between China and IAEA.

Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

1975-01-01

The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

Process data in safeguards at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehinger, M.H.

1988-01-01

The desire to improve timeliness and sensitivity of material control and accounting capabilities is the basis for evaluation and upgrade of regulatory requirements throughout the nuclear industry. Improvements invariably require better measurement capabilities and more frequent measurements. Operating plants typically include a broad range of measurements and equipment devoted to process control. How can these measurements be used to benefit safeguards? A part of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory has focused on the use of process data for safeguards. This report discusses recent safeguards demonstrations and current activities in a test facility at Oak Ridge

Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards: Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R.; Morgan, James B.; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L.

2011-01-01

The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

The international safeguards system and physical protection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Lauppe, W.D.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

1990-02-01

The report summarizes and explains facts and aspects of the IAEA safeguards performed within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and shows perspectives to be discussed by the NPT Review Conferences in 1990 and 1995. The technical background of potential misuse of nuclear materials for military purposes is explained in connection with the physical protection regime of the international safeguards, referring to recent developments for improvement of technical measures for material containment and surveillance. Most attention is given to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their surveillance by the IAEA safeguards, including such new technologies and applications as controlled nuclear fusion, laser techniques for uranium enrichment, and particle accelerators. The report's concluding analyses of the current situation show potentials for improvement and desirable or necessary consequences to be drawn for the international safeguards system, also taking into account recent discussions on the parliamentary level. (orig./HP) [de

Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat. Theft and sabotage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeMuth, Scott; Mullen, Mark; Pan, Paul

2011-01-01

In recent years, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept has received significant interest with respect to international (IAEA) safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic (or national) Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses domestic requirements for material control and accounting (MC and A) and for physical protection, such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic material control and accounting (MC and A) and physical protection are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and more specifically its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts for international safeguards sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA. This paper identifies the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e., MC and A and physical protection) and explains how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems. (author)

IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1983-01-01

The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

Review of potential technology contributions to safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sellers, T.A.

1977-01-01

Separate, uncoordinated approaches to nuclear facility safeguards such as physical security and accounting are no longer adequate. A comprehensive, integrated strategy for improved in-depth protection of nuclear facilities with acceptable operational impact is needed. The safeguards system concept, analysis techniques, and hardware required to implement such a strategy are presented in this paper. Handbooks for intrusion detection, entry control systems, barrier, etc. are described briefly. 17 figures

Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

2004-01-01

Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

2. JAPAN-IAEA workshop on advanced safeguards technology for the future nuclear fuel cycle. Abstracts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

This international workshop addressed issues and technologies associated with safeguarding the future nuclear fuel cycle. The workshop discussed issues of interest to the safeguards community, facility operators and State Systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials. Topic areas covered were as follows: Current Status and Future Prospects of Developing Safeguards Technologies for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, Technology and Instrumentation Needs, Advanced Safeguards Technologies, Guidelines on Developing Instrumentation to Lead the Way for Implementing Future Safeguards, and Experiences and Lessons learned. This workshop was of interest to individuals and organizations concerned with future nuclear fuel cycle technical developments and safeguards technologies. This includes representatives from the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, safeguards inspectorates, State systems of accountancy and control, and Member States Support Programmes

Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rezniczek, A.

2013-01-01

Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

2011-07-01

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

Industrial Control System Cyber Security: Questions And Answers Relevant To Nuclear Facilities, Safeguards And Security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, Robert S.; Schanfein, Mark; Bjornard, Trond; Moskowitz, Paul

2011-01-01

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

Gorbachev’s Arms Control Strategy.

Science.gov (United States)

1987-01-22

on- site inspection for verifying nuclear tests as well as for dismantling missiles on Soviet territory. Clearlv Gorbachev wants an arms , -4- control...bring its seismological test equipment to what he called the "holy of holies", the area adjoining the Soviet proving ground near Semipalatinsk to offer...prenotification and observation of military exercises including on- site inspection on Soviet territory. But on the big issues--- nuclear testing , strategic weapons

Noninvasive Electroencephalogram Based Control of a Robotic Arm for Reach and Grasp Tasks

Science.gov (United States)

Meng, Jianjun; Zhang, Shuying; Bekyo, Angeliki; Olsoe, Jaron; Baxter, Bryan; He, Bin

2016-01-01

Brain-computer interface (BCI) technologies aim to provide a bridge between the human brain and external devices. Prior research using non-invasive BCI to control virtual objects, such as computer cursors and virtual helicopters, and real-world objects, such as wheelchairs and quadcopters, has demonstrated the promise of BCI technologies. However, controlling a robotic arm to complete reach-and-grasp tasks efficiently using non-invasive BCI has yet to be shown. In this study, we found that a group of 13 human subjects could willingly modulate brain activity to control a robotic arm with high accuracy for performing tasks requiring multiple degrees of freedom by combination of two sequential low dimensional controls. Subjects were able to effectively control reaching of the robotic arm through modulation of their brain rhythms within the span of only a few training sessions and maintained the ability to control the robotic arm over multiple months. Our results demonstrate the viability of human operation of prosthetic limbs using non-invasive BCI technology. PMID:27966546

Measuring Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2011-07-19

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

Position Control Method For Pick And Place Robot Arm For Object Sorting System

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Khin Moe Myint

2015-08-01

Full Text Available The more increase the number of industries in developing countries the more require labourers or workers in that. To reduce the cost of labour force and to increase the manufacturing capacity of industries the advanced robot arms are more needed. The aim of this journal is to eliminate the manual control for object sorting system.Robot arm design in this research uses two joints three links and servo motors to drive. Microcontroller is used to generate required PWM signal for servo motors. In this research the position control of robot arm was designed by using kinematic control methods. There are two types of kinematic control methods which are forward and reverse kinematic methods. In forward kinematic method the input parameters are the joint angles and link length of robot arm and then the output is the position at XYZ coordinate of tool or gripper. In inverse kinematic the input parameters are position at XYZ coordinate of gripper and the link length of robot arm and then the output parameters are the joint angles. So kinematic methods can explain the analytical description of the geometry motion of the manipulator with reference to a robot coordinate system fixed to a frame without consideration of the forces or the moments causing the movements. For sorting system Metal detector is used to detect the metal or non-metal. This position control of pick and place robot arm is fully tested and the result is obtained more precisely.

National safeguards system operations at a bulk-handling facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1981-01-01

The presentation centers on the State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) for bulk-handling facilities in the licenses sector of the US nuclear community. Details of those material control and accounting measures dealing with the national safeguards program are discussed in Session 6a. The concept and role of the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan are discussed with the participants. In Session 6b, the lecture focusses on the international safeguards program of the US SSAC. The relationship of the national and international requirements is discussed as they relate to the IAEA INFCIRC/153 document. The purpose of this session is to enable participants to: (1) understand the basic MC and A elements in an SSAC; (2) understand which MC and A elements serve the country's national interests and those that serve IAEA safeguards

Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haginoya, Tohru

1997-01-01

INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.

1988-01-01

Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

High-Resolution Fast-Neutron Spectrometry for Arms Control and Treaty Verification

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David L. Chichester; James T. Johnson; Edward H. Seabury

2012-07-01

Many nondestructive nuclear analysis techniques have been developed to support the measurement needs of arms control and treaty verification, including gross photon and neutron counting, low- and high-resolution gamma spectrometry, time-correlated neutron measurements, and photon and neutron imaging. One notable measurement technique that has not been extensively studied to date for these applications is high-resolution fast-neutron spectrometry (HRFNS). Applied for arms control and treaty verification, HRFNS has the potential to serve as a complimentary measurement approach to these other techniques by providing a means to either qualitatively or quantitatively determine the composition and thickness of non-nuclear materials surrounding neutron-emitting materials. The technique uses the normally-occurring neutrons present in arms control and treaty verification objects of interest as an internal source of neutrons for performing active-interrogation transmission measurements. Most low-Z nuclei of interest for arms control and treaty verification, including 9Be, 12C, 14N, and 16O, possess fast-neutron resonance features in their absorption cross sections in the 0.5- to 5-MeV energy range. Measuring the selective removal of source neutrons over this energy range, assuming for example a fission-spectrum starting distribution, may be used to estimate the stoichiometric composition of intervening materials between the neutron source and detector. At a simpler level, determination of the emitted fast-neutron spectrum may be used for fingerprinting 'known' assemblies for later use in template-matching tests. As with photon spectrometry, automated analysis of fast-neutron spectra may be performed to support decision making and reporting systems protected behind information barriers. This paper will report recent work at Idaho National Laboratory to explore the feasibility of using HRFNS for arms control and treaty verification applications, including simulations

Nuclear safeguards policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1982-01-01

Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

2007-01-01

Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

Costs of disarmament - Rethinking the price tag: A methodological inquiry into the costs and benefits of arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Willett, S.

2002-06-01

The growing number of arms control and disarmament treaties agreed on over the past decades as well as rising concerns about harmful environmental and public health effects of weapons disposal, have understandably led to an increase in the cost of implementing arms control agreements. As a result, the expenses associated with treaty compliance have emerged as a contentious issue within the realm of arms control and disarmament discussions. In particular, opponents of arms control and disarmament point to perceived rising costs of meeting current and proposed treaty obligations in an attempt to limit and undermine such activities. Yet determining just how much arms control and disarmament cost remains very much an ambiguous task. In Costs of Disarmament - Rethinking the Price Tag: A Methodological Inquiry into the Costs and Benefits of Arms Control, Susan Willett addresses the question of how the cost of arms control ought to be measured. Emphasizing the proper allocation of costs associated with arms control treaty implementation to the life cycle costs of weapon systems and their correct weighing against the benefits they procure in terms of averted arms races and increased international security, Willett argues for a revised methodology of costing arms control and disarmament that gives a more accurate - and significantly lower - estimate of the latter. Adopting such a revised methodology concludes the author, might dispel considerable misunderstanding and help point decisions over arms control and disarmament in the right direction

Status and prospects of nuclear arms control study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sun Xiangli; Wang Deli

1995-01-01

Some main issues and problems involved in nuclear arms control study, such as nuclear policy, NPT regime, verification technologies for a CTBT and disposal of military nuclear materials are introduced, in which both the current state and prospects of these issues are analyzed

Tour of safeguards equipment van

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, B.W.; Fager, J.E.

1984-01-01

Increasing use is being made of nondestructive assay instruments for identification and measurements of nuclear materials. Important advantages of NDA are: timeliness, portability, and ease of use. Recent development in computer systems and NDA allow for the integration of sample planning, control of NDA, and data analysis into one transportable system. This session acquainted the course participants with the use of mobile NDA safeguards measurement systems. This session considered the practical problems and the type of results that can be expected from field use of NDA instruments. An existing mobile safeguards system was used to demonstrate some of the differences between field and laboratory conditions

A Vibration Control Method for the Flexible Arm Based on Energy Migration

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yushu Bian

2015-01-01

Full Text Available A vibration control method based on energy migration is proposed to decrease vibration response of the flexible arm undergoing rigid motion. A type of vibration absorber is suggested and gives rise to the inertial coupling between the modes of the flexible arm and the absorber. By analyzing 1 : 2 internal resonance, it is proved that the internal resonance can be successfully created and the exchange of vibration energy is existent. Due to the inertial coupling, the damping enhancement effect is revealed. Via the inertial coupling, vibration energy of the flexible arm can be dissipated by not only the damping of the vibration absorber but also its own enhanced damping, thereby effectively decreasing vibration. Through numerical simulations and analyses, it is proven that this method is feasible in controlling nonlinear vibration of the flexible arm undergoing rigid motion.

IAEA safeguards assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

1981-01-01

This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

Safeguards as an evolutionary system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1998-01-01

NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

Formalization of the Access Control on ARM-Android Platform with the B Method

Science.gov (United States)

Ren, Lu; Wang, Wei; Zhu, Xiaodong; Man, Yujia; Yin, Qing

2018-01-01

ARM-Android is a widespread mobile platform with multi-layer access control mechanisms, security-critical in the system. Many access control vulnerabilities still exist due to the course-grained policy and numerous engineering defects, which have been widely studied. However, few researches focus on the mechanism formalization, including the Android permission framework, kernel process management and hardware isolation. This paper first develops a comprehensive formal access control model on the ARM-Android platform using the B method, from the Android middleware to hardware layer. All the model specifications are type checked and proved to be well-defined, with 75%of proof obligations demonstrated automatically. The results show that the proposed B model is feasible to specify and verify access control schemes in the ARM-Android system, and capable of implementing a practical control module.

Survey of nuclear safeguards in the European Community

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.

1992-01-01

The control of the peaceful use of nuclear energy comprises activities related to nuclear safety, to the protection of persons and of the environment, to physical protection of the nuclear materials against theft or terrorism and to nuclear safeguards. Nuclear safeguards means the set of measures performed by the IAEA in the context of non-proliferation safeguards and, in the framework of the Euratom Treaty, those measures enabling the European Commission to satisfy itself that the nuclear material is not diverted from its intended and declared uses (particularly to unlawful non-peaceful applications) and that the obligations arising from International Agreements are complied with. This contribution to the International Conference on Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy at Liege briefly reviews the history of nuclear safeguards in Europe since the early 1960ies. It also notes the practical aspects for, constraints and impacts to the nuclear operators imposed on them by the European law such as inspections, accountancy, reporting and describes the trend of the future development of the safeguards operation. The paper finally addresses non-proliferation issues and, notably, the relations between the IAEA and Euratom which in an exemplary way resulted in effective international safeguards and high non-proliferation credentials of the European Community. (author)

Regional dialogue and multilateral arms control efforts today

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Graham, T. Jr.

1994-01-01

The significance of arms control and non-proliferation tasks is stressed emphasising what has been done, and-more important-what must still be done. Although tangible developments at the regional level may seem at times to be slow in coming, it is important to remember that the United States-Soviet transition from voluntary declarations to detailed arms control agreements with intrusive verification regimes spanned the entire length of cold war. Given the instabilities afflicting these regions, establishing a regional dialogue is itself a confidence-building measure. The experience of the United States and the former Soviet Union amply demonstrates that mere existence of regular dialogue can reduce tension by providing a platform for communication among military and Government participants even when political crisis prevents diplomatic contacts at senior levels. The international community should be encouraged by the progress that has been made to date to address regional instabilities. Such steps are an integral part of the international effort, carried out both at the United Nations and elsewhere, to adopt acceptable levels of conventional military forces and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Given the instabilities afflicting these regions, establishing a regional dialogue is itself a confidence-building measure. World changes, while potentially dangerous and certainly challenging, offer the hope of replacing antagonism with cooperation, creating a progressively more democratic global environment, preventing proliferation, and dampening regional conflicts. Continuing to make effective use of the entire mix of arms control and confidence-building tools will help to realize these hopes

A Remote Controlled Robotic Arm That Reads Barcodes and Handles Products

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Zhi-Ying Chen

2018-03-01

Full Text Available In this study, a 6-axis robotic arm, which was controlled by an embedded Raspberry Pi with onboard WiFi, was developed and fabricated. A mobile application (APP, designed for the purpose, was used to operate and monitor a robotic arm by means of a WiFi connection. A computer vision was used to read common one-dimensional barcode (EAN code for the handling and identification of products such as milk tea drinks, sodas and biscuits. The gripper on the end of the arm could sense the clamping force and allowed real-time control of the amount of force used to hold and handle the products. The packages were all made of different material and this control allowed them to be handled without danger of damage or deformation. The maximum handling torque used was ~1.08 Nm and the mechanical design allowed the force of the gripper to be uniformly applied to the sensor to ensure accurate measurement of the force.

Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holzemer, Michael; Carvo, Alan

2012-01-01

Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S and S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

Hand Gesture Based Wireless Robotic Arm Control for Agricultural Applications

Science.gov (United States)

Kannan Megalingam, Rajesh; Bandhyopadhyay, Shiva; Vamsy Vivek, Gedela; Juned Rahi, Muhammad

2017-08-01

One of the major challenges in agriculture is harvesting. It is very hard and sometimes even unsafe for workers to go to each plant and pluck fruits. Robotic systems are increasingly combined with new technologies to automate or semi automate labour intensive work, such as e.g. grape harvesting. In this work we propose a semi-automatic method for aid in harvesting fruits and hence increase productivity per man hour. A robotic arm fixed to a rover roams in the in orchard and the user can control it remotely using the hand glove fixed with various sensors. These sensors can position the robotic arm remotely to harvest the fruits. In this paper we discuss the design of hand glove fixed with various sensors, design of 4 DoF robotic arm and the wireless control interface. In addition the setup of the system and the testing and evaluation under lab conditions are also presented in this paper.

Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

Robotic arm

Science.gov (United States)

Kwech, Horst

1989-04-18

A robotic arm positionable within a nuclear vessel by access through a small diameter opening and having a mounting tube supported within the vessel and mounting a plurality of arm sections for movement lengthwise of the mounting tube as well as for movement out of a window provided in the wall of the mounting tube. An end effector, such as a grinding head or welding element, at an operating end of the robotic arm, can be located and operated within the nuclear vessel through movement derived from six different axes of motion provided by mounting and drive connections between arm sections of the robotic arm. The movements are achieved by operation of remotely-controllable servo motors, all of which are mounted at a control end of the robotic arm to be outside the nuclear vessel.

Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Owens, L.; Smith, C.

1996-01-01

The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu

Walking Pattern Generation of Dual-Arm Mobile Robot Using Preview Controller

OpenAIRE

P. Wu; W. Wu

2012-01-01

Based on the stability request of robot’s moving on the ground, the motion planning of dual-arm mobile robot when moving on the ground is studied and the preview control system is applied in the robot walking pattern generation. Direct question of robot kinematics in the extended task space is analyzed according to Degrees of Freedom configuration of the dual-arm mobile robot. It is proved that the preview control system could be used in the generation of robot Center of Mass forward trajecto...

Conventional arms control and the nuclear weapons dilemma in Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hopmann, P.T.

1988-01-01

This paper sets forth some fundamental propositions about the role of conventional arms control in connection with the nuclear weapons dilemma in Europe. A fundamental underlying premise of this analysis is that nuclear and non-nuclear issues in European security are inextricably linked with one another. Therefore, they should not be separated either conceptually or at the level of policy analysis and prescription. An additional basic assumption is that the attainment of an appropriate security regime in Europe is hindered by the security dilemma, in which measures that enhance the security of one side in the East-West conflict are often perceived by the other as detracting from their own security. Therefore, a regime intended to enhance common security throughout the continent must be designed so as to reduce rather than exacerbate this dilemma. The analysis of the requirements for confidence-building measures and arms control rests on several propositions that have been introduced by numerous other authors in this volume. These propositions will be summarized here briefly in order to lay the foundation for the subsequent analysis of confidence-building and arms control initiatives

Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-07-01

The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

Recent advances in safeguards operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

1983-01-01

The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

Considerations on safeguards approach for small centrifuge enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vicens, Hugo E.; Marzo, Marco A.; Nunes, Vitorio E.

2004-01-01

The safeguards' objectives for enrichment facilities encompass the detection of the diversion of declared nuclear material and of facility misuse. The safeguard's approach presently applied for commercial centrifuge enrichment facilities is based on the Hexa partite Project and seems not to be directly applicable to cases of small plants. Since ABACC started its operation one of the main problems faced was the application of safeguards to small centrifuge enrichment plants for testing centrifuges in cascade mode or for small LEU production. These plants consist of a few fully independent cascades, does not operate in a routine basis and panels prevent visual access to the centrifuges and their surroundings for preserving sensitive information. For such plants misuse scenarios seems to dominate, particularly those associated with feeding the plant with undeclared LEU. This paper presents a concise analysis of misuse strategies in small centrifuge facility and alternative safeguard's approach, describing the main control elements to be applied. The particularities arising from the existence of panels or boxes covering the centrifuges are specifically addressed. Two alternatives approaches based on the application of a transitory perimeter control to increase the effectiveness of unannounced inspection and on the application of permanent perimeter control are presented. (author)

Designing and evaluating conventional arms control measures: The case of the Korean peninsula

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Han Yongsup.

1991-01-01

As a method of designing and evaluating arms control measures, this study takes a combined approach of qualitative analysis and military simulation. Three qualitative criteria derived from the case studies on the Korean and European arms control are used to examine whether these measures are legally binding, verifiable, and negotiable. One quantifiable criterion is used to test against the base case scenario (a one-day surprise attach by North Korea) whether arms control measures will stabilize or destabilize the military status quo on the Peninsula in terms of North Korea's extent of penetration in the actual war situations. Four alternative measures are derived from the analysis: (1) Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs); (2) Establishment of Asymmetric Non-Deployment Zone (NDZ); (3) Reduction of the joint US-South Korean 'Team Spirit' exercises and North Korea's Forward Deployed Forces; and, (4) Reduction of South Korean and US forces and North Korean Forces. Findings indicate that establishment of the NDZ and a North Korean unilateral reduction are estimated to best achieve the goal of South Korean arms control

The Canadian safeguards program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

1981-12-01

In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

IAEA safeguards glossary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report ending March 31, 1996

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Davis, B.; Davis, G.; Johnson, D.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

1996-04-01

LLNL carries out safeguards and security activities for DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and other organizations within and outside DOE. LLNL is supporting OSS in 6 areas: safeguards technology, safeguards and materials accountability, computer security--distributed systems, complex-wide access control, standardization of security systems, and information technology and security center. This report describes the activities in each of these areas.

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-12-01

The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

DOE assessment guide for safeguards and security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.; Christorpherson, W.E.; Clark, R.J.; Martin, F.; Hodges, Jr.

1978-04-01

DOE operations are periodically assessed to assure that special nuclear material, restricted data, and other classified information and DOE facilities are executed toward continuing the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. A guide to describe the philosophy and mechanisms through which these assessments are conducted is presented. The assessment program is concerned with all contractor, field office, and Headquarters activities which are designed to assure that safeguards and security objectives are reached by contractors at DOE facilities and operations. The guide takes into account the interlocking relationship between many of the elements of an effective safeguards and security program. Personnel clearance programs are a part of protecting classified information as well as nuclear materials. Barriers that prevent or limit access may contribute to preventing theft of government property as well as protecting against sabotage. Procedures for control and surveillance need to be integrated with both information systems and procedures for mass balance accounting. Wherever possible, assessment procedures have been designed to perform integrated inspection, evaluation, and follow-up for the safeguards and security program

Robotic arm

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwech, H.

1989-01-01

A robotic arm positionable within a nuclear vessel by access through a small diameter opening and having a mounting tube supported within the vessel and mounting a plurality of arm sections for movement lengthwise of the mounting tube as well as for movement out of a window provided in the wall of the mounting tube is disclosed. An end effector, such as a grinding head or welding element, at an operating end of the robotic arm, can be located and operated within the nuclear vessel through movement derived from six different axes of motion provided by mounting and drive connections between arm sections of the robotic arm. The movements are achieved by operation of remotely-controllable servo motors, all of which are mounted at a control end of the robotic arm to be outside the nuclear vessel. 23 figs

Space nonweaponization. An urgent task for arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Du Xiangwan; Pan Jusheng; Zhang Xinwei; Du Shuhua; Xu Changgen

1990-05-01

The authors attempt to expound the basic points of veiw and put forward a proposal on the space nonweaponization. The authors analyse the nature of space weaponry and its impact on arms race and point out that the space nonweaponization is an urgent task for arms control. The relations between prohibition of space and ASAT weapons, between prohibition of space weapons and reduction of nuclear weapons and between space weapon and nuclear test are all analysed. The inadequacy of the existing space treaties is made clear based on the evaluation. It is hoped that a verifiable treaty on the prohibition of space weapons should be made and international cooperation on peaceful use of outer space is necessary

Design a Fuzzy Logic Controller for a Rotary Flexible Joint Robotic Arm

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jalani Jamaludin

2018-01-01

Full Text Available The purpose of this research is to design a fuzzy logic feedback controller (FLC in order to control a desired tip angle position a rotary flexible joint robotic arm. The FLC is also employed to dampen the vibration emanated from a rotary flexible joint robotic arm when reaching a desired tip angle position. The performance of FLC is tested in simulation and experiment. It is found that the FLC is successfully designed, applied and tested. The results show that fuzzy logic controller performed satisfactorily control a desired tip angle position and reduce the oscillations.

Protocol to suspend the application of safeguards pursuant to the Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol of 16 October 1998 suspending the application of safeguards under the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/237) of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA. The Protocol entered into force on 21 October 1999

Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1977-12-01

The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

Optimal arm posture control and tendon traction forces of a coupled tendon-driven manipulator

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ma, Shugen

1997-01-01

In this study, the optimum arm posture of a coupled tendon-driven multijoint manipulator arm (or CT Arm) at maximum payload output was derived and the corresponding tendon traction forces were also analyzed, during management of a heavy payload by the manipulator in a gravity environment. The CT Arm is special tendon traction transmission mechanism in which a pair of tendons used to drive a joint is pulled from base actuators via pulleys mounted on the base-side joints. This mechanism enables optimal utilization of the coupled drive function of tendon traction forces and thus enables the lightweight manipulator to exhibit large payload capability. The properties of the CT Arm mechanism are elucidated by the proposed optimal posture control scheme. Computer simulation was also executed to verify the validity of the proposed control scheme. (author)

The Development of Control System Design for 5 DOF Nuclear Malaysia Robot Arm v2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mohd Zaid Hassan; Anwar Abdul Rahman; Rosli Darmawan; Mohd Arif Hamzah

2011-01-01

This paper describes a general design and implementation approach used for programming and controlling robotic systems such as remotely operated robotic manipulator systems. A hierarchical approach to control system design is adopted. The hierarchical design is translated into a component-based software design. A low-cost robotic arm and controller system is presented. The controller is a modular model of the robotic arm with the same degrees of freedom whose joints are equipped with sensors. The system takes advantage of the low cost and wide availability of control components and uses a low-cost, easy-to-program microprocessor. Furthermore, it presents the design and the construction of electronic systems for the control of an articulated robot developed for research and development related with instrumentation and control. The system is simple but it is designed the motor to move the robot arm to proper angular position according to the input controller. Limitations of the micro controller are discussed, and suggestions for further development of the robot arm and control are made. (author)

Reach and grasp by people with tetraplegia using a neurally controlled robotic arm

Science.gov (United States)

Hochberg, Leigh R.; Bacher, Daniel; Jarosiewicz, Beata; Masse, Nicolas Y.; Simeral, John D.; Vogel, Joern; Haddadin, Sami; Liu, Jie; Cash, Sydney S.; van der Smagt, Patrick; Donoghue, John P.

2012-01-01

Paralysis following spinal cord injury (SCI), brainstem stroke, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and other disorders can disconnect the brain from the body, eliminating the ability to carry out volitional movements. A neural interface system (NIS)1–5 could restore mobility and independence for people with paralysis by translating neuronal activity directly into control signals for assistive devices. We have previously shown that people with longstanding tetraplegia can use an NIS to move and click a computer cursor and to control physical devices6–8. Able-bodied monkeys have used an NIS to control a robotic arm9, but it is unknown whether people with profound upper extremity paralysis or limb loss could use cortical neuronal ensemble signals to direct useful arm actions. Here, we demonstrate the ability of two people with long-standing tetraplegia to use NIS-based control of a robotic arm to perform three-dimensional reach and grasp movements. Participants controlled the arm over a broad space without explicit training, using signals decoded from a small, local population of motor cortex (MI) neurons recorded from a 96-channel microelectrode array. One of the study participants, implanted with the sensor five years earlier, also used a robotic arm to drink coffee from a bottle. While robotic reach and grasp actions were not as fast or accurate as those of an able-bodied person, our results demonstrate the feasibility for people with tetraplegia, years after CNS injury, to recreate useful multidimensional control of complex devices directly from a small sample of neural signals. PMID:22596161

Safeguard sleuths

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lowry, D.

1989-01-01

A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

Safeguards system testing WSRC Insider Exercise Program (U)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Robichaux, J.J.

1991-01-01

One of the major concerns related to the control and accountability of nuclear material located at DOE facilities is the theft or diversion of material by an insider. Many complex safeguards and security systems have been installed to provide timely detection and prevention of the removal of nuclear materials. The Westinghouse Savannah River Company's (WSRC) Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) section has implemented an insider exercise program designed to evaluate the effectiveness of these safeguards systems. Exercises consist of limited scope performance test. This paper describes the structure and controls for the insider exercise program at the Savannah River Site, the lessons learned over the past several years, and methods being utilized to improve the program

International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-12-01

The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control

International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1980-12-01

The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

Enrichment plant management and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hurt, N.H.

1978-01-01

The next increment of enrichment at Portsmouth will be gas centrifuge. The safeguards program at Portsmouth is discussed, including the DYMCAS system, the computerization, and the detectors. Control of the material access areas is discussed. The licensee material surveillance and verification program is also described

Destructive and nondestructive methods for controlling nuclear materials for the purpose of safeguards in the CSSR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Krivanek, M.; Krtil, J.; Moravec, J.; Pacak, P.; Sus, F.

1977-01-01

Central Control Laboratory (CCL) of the Nuclear Research Institute was charged with the control of nuclear materials in CSSR within the framework of the safeguards system. The CCL has been directed by the Department of nuclear safety and safeguards of CAEC according to a long-term plan, elaborated for controlling nuclear material in CSSR. The CCL has mainly been performing independent, rapid, accurate, and reliable analyses of nuclear materials, using destructive as well as non-destructive methods; the analyses of samples taken in MBA's in CSSR are mentioned, concerning the determinations of U, Pu, and Th contents, isotopic compositions of U and Pu, and burn up. The results of the analyses have served for the material and isotopic balances of fissile materials and the control of fuel reprocessing under laboratory conditions. The methods for sampling and sample transport as well as sample treatment before the analysis are described. The experience is given, obtained at CCL during a routine application of chemical methods for highly precise determinations of U, Pu, and Th (titration-based methods), mass-spectrometric determinations of U and Pu (isotopic composition, IDA using 233 U and 242 Pu), and burn-up determinations based on radioactive fissile products (Cs, Ru, Ce) and stable Nd isotopes. Some non-destructive methods for controlling nuclear materials (passive gamma-spectrometry) are discussed

Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Malek, Z.

1980-10-01

The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

Who's bound by the former Soviet Union's arms control treaties?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rhinelander, J.B.; Bunn, G.

1991-01-01

A crucial issue raised by the disintegration of the Soviet central government is what happens to Soviet arms control obligations. As the Soviet government transforms or collapses in the wake of the failed August coup, which of the resulting entities will be bound by the treaties the Soviet Union entered into? Under international law, the obligations of a state are not affected by even such dramatic changes in government. No one yet knows, however, what the end result of the ongoing devolution of power in the erstwhile Soviet Union will be. As illustrations of what could happen to Soviet arms control obligations - not predictions of the future - the authors pose two alternative scenarios. In the first, they assume that most of the current 12 republics, including all of the big four where substantial nuclear forces and the largest conventional forces are located (Russia, Ukraine, Khazakhstan, and Belarus), ultimately form a loose confederation with sufficient central authority to be called a nation-state and to carry out the essence of Soviet obligations under major arms control treaties. In the second, they assume that the union disintegrates further, with these four key republics seceding entirely and recognizing one another as independent states - a step which is apparently one of the US criteria for granting its own recognition. In this scenario, the Russian republic maintains its basic territory and replaces the central government as the power center for military and foreign affairs. In each of these cases, they will describe the general issues affecting the Soviet Union's international obligations, and consider specifically the two most important arms control agreements now in force - the multilateral nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the bilateral Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

Optimal Control of Holding Motion by Nonprehensile Two-Cooperative-Arm Robot

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Changan Jiang

2016-01-01

Full Text Available Recently, more researchers have focused on nursing-care assistant robot and placed their hope on it to solve the shortage problem of the caregivers in hospital or nursing home. In this paper, a nonprehensile two-cooperative-arm robot is considered to realize holding motion to keep a two-rigid-link object (regarded as a care-receiver stable on the robot arms. By applying Newton-Euler equations of motion, dynamic model of the object is obtained. In this model, for describing interaction behavior between object and robot arms in the normal direction, a viscoelastic model is employed to represent the normal forces. Considering existence of friction between object and robot arms, LuGre dynamic model is applied to describe the friction. Based on the obtained model, an optimal regulator is designed to control the holding motion of two-cooperative-arm robot. In order to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method, simulation results are shown.

IAEA symposium on international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

Principles in safeguards: A Canadian perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keen, L.J.

2007-01-01

L.J. Keen presented the Canadian perspective on safeguards. She noted that the IAEA safeguards system has responded well to challenges and has acted as the effective early warning system that it was intended to be. The exit from the non-proliferation regime by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has demonstrated how effective safeguards and verification are seen to be in detecting proliferation activity. The main areas of importance for Canada are effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. Effectiveness requires information and access, and assures citizens of the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Efficiency requires risk informed decisions for the sound allocation of resources and the early incorporation of proliferation resistance in design and construction, so that IAEA efforts can concentrate on where the risks are greatest. Openness and transparency include the public, and for the IAEA this includes its Member States since ultimately they control its activities and finances. Canada received its broader safeguards conclusion in 2005 and intends to maintain it. This will require continuous improvement in an era of rapid expansion of the nuclear industry. One problem foreseen is the adequate supply of qualified personnel, with the CNSC's resources growing at about 12%. The CNSC is looking at internal training programmes and internships

An Approach to Naval Arms Control

Science.gov (United States)

1989-07-01

commentary pro and con on the control of SLCM’s has 9 I: been uttered by people not known to be expert on maritime strategy and the roles of navies in crisis ... transcultural misunderstanding is indeed deep and widespread (e.g., witness the surprise on the part of America’s leading television pundits that China’s...force on behalf of (U.S definition of) international order in situations short of war; 0 alliance cohesion; 37 i * crisis , arms race, and political

CONTROL SYSTEM FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH ROBOTICS ARM

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alexei A. Margun

2014-11-01

Full Text Available The paper deals with the problem of control system synthesis for multi rotational UAV equipped with robotics arm. Control algorithm is proposed based on the method of feedback linearization and synthesis of proportional-differential controller with the real time computation of the inertia tensor and center of mass changes and compensation of the reactive torque generated by the dynamics of the manipulator. Quadrocopter with attached articulated manipulator is selected as a model of the control object. Systems of equations describing the behavior of considered dynamical system are obtained according to the Newton and Euler-Lagrange laws. Expressions are offered, defining the inertia tensor and the position of the system center of mass depending on the current position of the manipulator, and the torque acting on the quadrocopter from the manipulator. Feedback linearization with arm influence compensation on quadrocopter is applied for the resulting nonlinear coupled system. As a result, robot dynamics equations have been converted to a linear stationary system. Converted system control is achieved by a proportional-differential controller. Examined system simulation is done with control method described in the paper and the classical method based on a proportional-differential controller. Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach and demonstrate that the proposed approach provides higher accuracy of the tracking error, than control method by means of proportional-differential regulator.

SNAP/SOS: a package for simulating and analyzing safeguards systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant, F.H. III; Polito, J.; Sabuda, J.

1983-01-01

The effective analysis of safeguards systems at nuclear facilities requires significant effort. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) and the SNAP Operating System (SOS) reduce that effort to a manageable level. SNAP provides a detailed analysis of site safeguards for tactical evaluation. SOS helps the analyst organize and manage the SNAP effort effectively. SOS provides a database for model storage, automatic model generation, and computer graphics. The SOS/SNAP combination is a working example of a simulation system including executive-level control, database system, and facilities for model creation, editing, and output analysis

Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

1986-02-01

The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification

Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O' Brien, J.

1986-02-01

The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

An Electromechanical Pendulum Robot Arm in Action: Dynamics and Control

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

A. Notué Kadjie

2017-01-01

Full Text Available The authors numerically investigate the dynamics and control of an electromechanical robot arm consisting of a pendulum coupled to an electrical circuit via an electromagnetic mechanism. The analysis of the dynamical behavior of the electromechanical device powered by a sinusoidal power source is carried out when the effects of the loads on the arm are neglected. It is found that the device exhibits period-n T oscillations and high amplitude oscillations when the electric current is at its smallest value. The specific case which considers the effects of the impulsive contact force caused by an external load mass pushed by the arm is also studied. It is found that the amplitude of the impulse force generates several behaviors such as jump of amplitude and distortions of the mechanical vibration and electrical signal. For more efficient functioning of the device, both piezoelectric and adaptive backstepping controls are applied on the system. It is found that the control strategies are able to mitigate the signal distortion and restore the dynamical behavior to its normal state or reduce the effects of perturbations such as a short time variation of one component or when the robot system is subject to noises.

Technology development for safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

2005-04-01

The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

Nuclear weapon relevant materials and preventive arms control. Uranium-free fuels for plutonium elimination and spallation neutron sources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liebert, Wolfgang; Englert, Matthias; Pistner, Christoph

2009-01-01

Today, the most significant barrier against the access to nuclear weapons is to take hold on sufficient amounts of nuclear weapon-relevant nuclear materials. It is mainly a matter of fissionable materials (like highly enriched uranium and plutonium) but also of fusionable tritium. These can be used as reactor fuel in civil nuclear programmes but also in nuclear weapon programmes. To stop or to hinder nuclear proliferation, in consequence, there is not only a need to analyse open or covered political objectives and intentions. In the long term, it might be more decisive to analyse the intrinsic civil-military ambivalence of nuclear materials and technologies, which are suitable for sensitive material production. A farsighted strategy to avoid proliferation dangers should take much more account to technical capabilities as it is done in the political debate on nuclear non-proliferation so far. If a technical option is at a state's disposal, it is extremely difficult and lengthy to revert that again. The dangers, which one has to react to, are stemming from already existing stocks of nuclear weapon-relevant materials - in the military as well as in the civil realm - and from existing or future technologies, which are suitable for the production of such materials (cf. info 1 and 2). Therefore, the overall approach of this research project is to strive for a drastic reduction of the access to nuclear weapon-relevant material and its production capabilities. Thus, on one hand the nuclear proliferation by state actors could be answered more effectively, on the other hand by that approach a decisive barrier against the access on nuclear weapons by sub-national groups and terrorists could also be erected. For this purpose, safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other measures of physical accountancy will remain indispensable elements of arms control. However, one has to consider that the goal of nuclear non-proliferation could not be achieved and

Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

2015-01-01

Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

How safe are nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sullivan, E.

1979-01-01

Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

Cooperative Remote Monitoring, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Fourth quarter 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alonzo, G M [ed.

1995-01-01

The DOE`s Cooperative Remote Monitoring programs integrate elements from research and development and implementation to achieve DOE`s objectives in arms control and nonproliferation. The contents of this issue are: cooperative remote monitoring--trends in arms control and nonproliferation; Modular Integrated Monitoring System (MIMS); Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring Systems (ATMS); Tracking and Nuclear Materials by Wide-Area Nuclear Detection (WAND); Cooperative Monitoring Center; the International Remote Monitoring Project; international US and IAEA remote monitoring field trials; Project Dustcloud: monitoring the test stands in Iraq; bilateral remote monitoring: Kurchatov-Argonne-West Demonstration; INSENS Sensor System Project.

Development of an advanced safeguards system as a proliferation deterrent

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ayers, A.A.; Barnes, L.D.

1978-11-01

The Advanced Safeguards System consists of Computerized Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting System, Physical Protection System, and Safeguards Coordination Center (SCC). Should all the computer-based monitoring systems be overcome (i.e., the NMC computer programmed not to recognize a materials inventory change, the SCC computer programmed to accept a falsified area and personnel authorization, and the physical security system programmed not to alarm for area intrusion), the requirements of the physical security system remain formidable barriers to successful theft since all SNM is separated from the uncontrolled areas by at least one entry control portal. An egress from the protected area--by either a vehicle through the vehicle access portal, or on foot through the personnel access portal--requires that the individuals be subjected to a search for metal and SNM before egress is permitted. The material access areas are further controlled by an interior access portal imposing the same SNM and metal search criteria. The portal search criteria are not subject to computer interpretation, but direct positive--negative indications to the portal patrolman. The physical security system then provides an independent backup should the computerized systems be defeated. Thus, the computer systems themselves will not, if defeated, guarantee an adversary success. The corollary also holds true; a defeat of the physical search elements of the physical security system will not guarantee adversary success because of the monitoring/surveillance function of the computerized systems. The complementary and overlapping nature of the safeguards systems is intended to provide multiple layers of safeguards, each layer providing an effective element of protection. Tests to date indicate that it appears feasible to meet operational objectives and maintain a high safeguards performance level using these concepts which are being incorporated into the Advanced Safeguards System.None

Europe, arms control and American security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burns, W.F.

1992-01-01

What has come to be called the Revolution of 1989 has swept away longstanding political and economic arrangements in Eastern Europe. Perhaps more important, it has also called into question the fundamental underpinnings of European security created during the nonpeace that followed World War II. In June 1990, the Warsaw Treaty Organization abandoned the notion that NATO was the ideological enemy. At the same time, NATO ministers agreed at Tunberry, Scotland, to consider defining the Atlantic Alliance as more of a partner of the Soviet Union than as an enemy. The Washington summit of May 1990 between president Mikhail Gorbachev and president George Bush further highlighted the recent changes in the Soviet Union and its former satellites. Issues going to the heart of the viability of the Soviet Union and the communist system of political and economic organization competed with German reunification as central themes. Arms control issues, particularly as they pertain in European military stability, became contingent and dependent on the development of a broader political and economic framework for a new Europe. Whether this framework is viable remains an open question as Gorbachev's role is challenged more and more within the Soviet Union. This paper deals with European arms control issues from the point of view of the United States and its own security interests. The United States involved its security inextricably with that of Western Europe as a conscious decision in the turmoil following World War II

The Office of Safeguards and Security Nonproliferation Support Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Desmond, W.J.

1996-01-01

The Nonproliferation Support Program was established in the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security on october 1, 1995. its mission includes providing assistance to Departmental efforts for improved international material protection, control and accounting programs by coordinating and leveraging domestic safeguards and security policy, practice and experience into the international arena. A major objective of the program is to balance US national security requirements with global support of the nonproliferation objectives. This paper describes the organization of the Office of Safeguards and Security and the Nonproliferation Support Program role and responsibility, and presents some of the current areas of program emphasis and activity

Novel technologies for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1965-01-01

On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

ESARDA approach to facility oriented safeguards problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stewart, R.

1979-01-01

The paper outlines the brief history of a Working Group composed of nuclear fuel plant operators, safeguards research workers and safeguards inspectors who are examining facility orientated problems of nuclear materials control and verification activities. The working program is reviewed together with some examples of various problems and the way the group is collaborating to develop solutions by pooling resources and effort. Work in European low enriched uranium fabrication plants from UF 6 to finished fuel is discussed in connection with mesurement practices, real time accounting, error propagation and analysis, verification and surveillance

ESARDA - safeguards in the wake of politics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehrfeld, U.

1983-01-01

As the number of facilities to be put under safeguards control in accordance with non-proliferation aspects increases, the scope and priorities of surveillance measures are becoming more and more of a politica issue. This problem also arises for ESARDA, the association of European research centers and operators of nuclear facilities working on research and development in the safeguards field with the participation of Euratom. It involves the need to keep politics out of this scientific and technical field, also because of the composition of ESARDA. (orig.) [de

The Rise and Fall of Safeguard:Anti‐Ballistic Missile Technology and the Nixon Administration

OpenAIRE

Spinardi, Graham

2010-01-01

The Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system was the first (and up until 2002 the only) system deployed to defend the USA from nuclear-armed ballistic missile attack. It was finally declared operational in September 1975 after many years of development and fierce controversy over both its feasibility and its desirability. However, almost immediately Congress voted to close the system down and it was dismantled within a few months. This paper draws on documents available in the Nixon archives t...

Controlling robot arm with the mind

National Science Foundation

2017-05-31

Full Text Available Research test subjects at the University of Minnesota who were fitted with a specialized noninvasive brain cap were able to move a robotic arm just by imagining moving their own arms.

Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

1985-01-01

The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is an on-line accountability system used by Rocky Flats Plant to provide accountability control of its nuclear material inventory. The system is also used to monitor and evaluate the use of the nuclear material inventory against programmatic objectives for materials management. The SAN system utilizes two Harris 800 Computers as central processing units. Enhancement plans are currently being formulated to provide automated data collection from process operations on the shop floor and from non-destructive analysis safeguards instrumentation. SAN, discussed in this paper, is an excellent system for basic accountability control of nuclear materials inventories and is a quite useful tool in evaluating the efficient use of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant

Safeguards for geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fattah, A.

2000-01-01

Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

1983-01-01

Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

Nuclear safeguards research and development

Science.gov (United States)

Henry, C. N.

1981-11-01

The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

Material control and accounting at a CANDU reactor: the instrumented safeguards scheme

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stirling, A.J.; Payne, E.

1985-01-01

While CANDU reactors differ from LWRs quite markedly in the way they operate, the principles of materials accounting and safeguards are equally applicable. Indeed, since CANDU fuel is not reprocessed, the relatively simple procedure of item accounting is sufficient for CANDUs. However, on-power refueling means that automatic item counting is needed to independently confirm operator records. Surveillance and sealing techniques for spent fuel are needed for a practical system. The equipment developed has allowed the IAEA to apply safeguards at reasonable cost and with minimal interference to the utility operating the station

Safeguarding nuclear energy in the Pacific: the role of Australia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Indyk, M.

1980-01-01

Measures necessary for the establishment of an effective safeguards regime are outlined. These include the establishment of multinational institutions to control and limit the number of sensitive facilities, the establishment of regional spent fuel storage sites and regional plutonium banks to be placed under international control, the establishment of international uranium banks to provide fuel assurances to cooperating countries and the cooperation between suppliers and consumers in improving safeguard techniques. The possibility of a Pacific regional non-proliferation initiative and the role Australia is likely to play in such an initiative are considered. From the public record, the Australian Government would appear to be a deeply committed supporter of international measures to control reprocessing, to store spent fuel and plutonium, to strengthen safeguards and to provide fuel assurances to consumers. However, the Government's actions are not as consistent. It is concluded that Australia will be willing to support non-proliferation efforts as long as they do not unduly jeopardise uranium exports

Health Information Security in Hospitals: the Application of Security Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

Mehraeen, Esmaeil; Ayatollahi, Haleh; Ahmadi, Maryam

2016-02-01

A hospital information system has potentials to improve the accessibility of clinical information and the quality of health care. However, the use of this system has resulted in new challenges, such as concerns over health information security. This paper aims to assess the status of information security in terms of administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals. This was a survey study in which the participants were information technology (IT) managers (n=36) who worked in the hospitals affiliated to the top ranked medical universities (university A and university B). Data were collected using a questionnaire. The content validity of the questionnaire was examined by the experts and the reliability of the questionnaire was determined using Cronbach's coefficient alpha (α=0.75). The results showed that the administrative safeguards were arranged at a medium level. In terms of the technical safeguards and the physical safeguards, the IT managers rated them at a strong level. According to the results, among three types of security safeguards, the administrative safeguards were assessed at the medium level. To improve it, developing security policies, implementing access control models and training users are recommended.

IAEA safeguard system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pontes, B.C.

1987-01-01

The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reynolds, D.A.

1981-01-01

Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

Current technical issues in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, C.A.

1977-01-01

Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

2013-01-01

In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Domestic politics, citizen activism, and U.S. nuclear arms control policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Knopf, J.W.

1991-01-01

The author seeks to ascertain whether and how citizens' movements concerning nuclear arms control and disarmament affect US arms control policy. The author employs a comparative case study methodology. He examines cases of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations during the period of protest against nuclear testing, and the Reagan Administration during the nuclear weapons freeze campaign and the subsequent campaign for a comprehensive test ban. He hows there are four mechanisms through which public advocacy efforts can influence arms control policy, identifies the conditions under which each can be effective, and details the type of impact each mechanism has. Domestic activism interacts with broader public opinion in a way that creates electoral pressure; with elite-level debates in a way that removes a consensus behind presidential policy or changes the winning coalition in Congress; with bureaucratic politics, by generating ideas that have utility for some agents within the Executive; or with the public diplomacy of foreign governments, especially the Soviet Union. Citizens' movements had an impact on policy in each of the cases studied. The type and extent of impact, and the mechanisms involved in giving activism influence, are different for each case

Passivity-Based Control of Rotational and Translational Timoshenko Arms

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Minoru Sasaki

2012-01-01

Full Text Available It is shown that the alternate passivity-based control schemes can be designed which explicitly exploit the passivity properties of the Timoshenko model. This approach has the advantage over the conventional methods in the respect that it allows one to deal directly with the system's partial differential equations without resorting to approximations. Numerical results for the tracking control of a translational and rotational flexible Timoshenko arm are presented and compared. They verify that the proposed control schemes are effective at controlling flexible dynamical systems.

The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

2015-01-01

Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

Unilateral versus bilateral robot-assisted rehabilitation on arm-trunk control and functions post stroke: a randomized controlled trial.

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Ching-Yi; Yang, Chieh-Ling; Chen, Ming-de; Lin, Keh-Chung; Wu, Li-Ling

2013-04-12

Although the effects of robot-assisted arm training after stroke are promising, the relative effects of unilateral (URT) vs. bilateral (BRT) robot-assisted arm training remain uncertain. This study compared the effects of URT vs. BRT on upper extremity (UE) control, trunk compensation, and function in patients with chronic stroke. This was a single-blinded, randomized controlled trial. The intervention was implemented at 4 hospitals. Fifty-three patients with stroke were randomly assigned to URT, BRT, or control treatment (CT). Each group received UE training for 90 to 105 min/day, 5 days/week, for 4 weeks. The kinematic variables for arm motor control and trunk compensation included normalized movement time, normalized movement units, and the arm-trunk contribution slope in unilateral and bilateral tasks. Motor function and daily function were measured by the Wolf Motor Function Test (WMFT), Motor Activity Log (MAL), and ABILHAND Questionnaire. The BRT and CT groups elicited significantly larger slope values (i.e., less trunk compensation) at the start of bilateral reaching than the URT group. URT led to significantly better effects on WMFT-Time than BRT. Differences in arm control kinematics and performance on the MAL and ABILHAND among the 3 groups were not significant. BRT and URT resulted in differential improvements in specific UE/trunk performance in patients with stroke. BRT elicited larger benefits than URT on reducing compensatory trunk movements at the beginning of reaching. In contrast, URT produced better improvements in UE temporal efficiency. These relative effects on movement kinematics, however, did not translate into differential benefits in daily functions. ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT00917605.

Filtering sensory information with XCSF: improving learning robustness and robot arm control performance.

Science.gov (United States)

Kneissler, Jan; Stalph, Patrick O; Drugowitsch, Jan; Butz, Martin V

2014-01-01

It has been shown previously that the control of a robot arm can be efficiently learned using the XCSF learning classifier system, which is a nonlinear regression system based on evolutionary computation. So far, however, the predictive knowledge about how actual motor activity changes the state of the arm system has not been exploited. In this paper, we utilize the forward velocity kinematics knowledge of XCSF to alleviate the negative effect of noisy sensors for successful learning and control. We incorporate Kalman filtering for estimating successive arm positions, iteratively combining sensory readings with XCSF-based predictions of hand position changes over time. The filtered arm position is used to improve both trajectory planning and further learning of the forward velocity kinematics. We test the approach on a simulated kinematic robot arm model. The results show that the combination can improve learning and control performance significantly. However, it also shows that variance estimates of XCSF prediction may be underestimated, in which case self-delusional spiraling effects can hinder effective learning. Thus, we introduce a heuristic parameter, which can be motivated by theory, and which limits the influence of XCSF's predictions on its own further learning input. As a result, we obtain drastic improvements in noise tolerance, allowing the system to cope with more than 10 times higher noise levels.

A MYOELECTRIC PROSTHETIC ARM CONTROLLED BY A SENSOR-ACTUATOR LOOP

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Patrik Kutílek

2014-06-01

Full Text Available This paper describes new methods and systems designed for application in upper extremity prostheses. An artificial upper limb with this system is a robot arm controlled by EMG signals and a set of sensors. The new multi-sensor system is based on ultrasonic sensors, infrared sensors, Hall-effect sensors, a CO2 sensor and a relative humidity sensor. The multi-sensor system is used to update a 3D map of objects in the robot’s environment, or it directly sends information about the environment to the control system of the myoelectric arm. Occupancy grid mapping is used to build a 3D map of the robot’s environment. The multi-sensor system can identify the distance of objects in 3D space, and the information from the system is used in a 3D map to identify potential collisions or a potentially dangerous environment, which could damage the prosthesis or the user. Information from the sensors and from the 3D map is evaluated using a fuzzy expert system. The control system of the myoelectric prosthetic arm can choose an adequate reaction on the basis of information from the fuzzy expert system. The systems and methods were designed and verified using MatLab/Simulink. They are aimed for use as assistive technology for disabled people.

JACoW A dual arms robotic platform control for navigation, inspection and telemanipulation

CERN Document Server

Di Castro, Mario; Ferre, Manuel; Gilardoni, Simone; Losito, Roberto; Lunghi, Giacomo; Masi, Alessandro

2018-01-01

High intensity hadron colliders and fixed target experiments require an increasing amount of robotic tele-manipulation to prevent excessive exposure of maintenance personnel to the radioactive environment. Telemanipulation tasks are often required on old radioactive devices not conceived to be maintained and handled using standard industrial robotic solutions. Robotic platforms with a level of dexterity that often require the use of two robotic arms with a minimum of six degrees of freedom are instead needed for these purposes. In this paper, the control of a novel robust robotic platform able to host and to carry safely a dual robotic arm system is presented. The control of the arms is fully integrated with the vehicle control in order to guarantee simplicity to the operators during the realization of the robotic tasks. A novel high-level control architecture for the new robot is shown, as well as a novel low level safety layer for anti-collision and recovery scenarios. Preliminary results of the system comm...

Fuzzy-Genetic Optimal Control for Four Degreeof Freedom Robotic Arm Movement

OpenAIRE

V. K. Banga; R. Kumar; Y. Singh

2009-01-01

In this paper, we present optimal control for movement and trajectory planning for four degrees-of-freedom robot using Fuzzy Logic (FL) and Genetic Algorithms (GAs). We have evaluated using Fuzzy Logic (FL) and Genetic Algorithms (GAs) for four degree-of-freedom (4 DOF) robotics arm, Uncertainties like; Movement, Friction and Settling Time in robotic arm movement have been compensated using Fuzzy logic and Genetic Algorithms. The development of a fuzzy genetic optimizatio...

Safeguards systems parameters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

1979-01-01

In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

Licensee safeguards contingency plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1978-01-01

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

Safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ko, H. S.

2010-01-01

Although the safeguards system of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) seems similar to that of Light Water Reactor (LWR), it was raised safeguards challenges of SFR that resulted from the visual opacity of liquid sodium, chemical reactivity of sodium and other characteristics of fast reactor. As it is the basic concept stage of the safeguards of SFR in Korea, this study tried to analyze the latest similar study of safeguards issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) at Joyo and Monju in Japan. For this reason, this study is to introduce some potential safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor. With this analysis, future study could be to address the safeguards challenges of SFR in Korea

Safeguards for the atom

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1959-10-15

agreements. Agency is currently preparing a manual which will describe the methods of accounting , stock-taking, storehousing and measuring nuclear material that may be in various plants under Agency direction. The general principles for control of the hazards to health and safety at the plants due to radiation, radioactive contamination, criticality, or fire, will also be discussed. This manual is expected to become a valuable source book on internal safeguards procedures for all countries embarking on atomic energy programmes. France and the United States for the development of techniques for the non-destructive analysis of irradiated fuel elements

Safeguards for the atom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1959-01-01

agreements. Agency is currently preparing a manual which will describe the methods of accounting , stock-taking, storehousing and measuring nuclear material that may be in various plants under Agency direction. The general principles for control of the hazards to health and safety at the plants due to radiation, radioactive contamination, criticality, or fire, will also be discussed. This manual is expected to become a valuable source book on internal safeguards procedures for all countries embarking on atomic energy programmes. France and the United States for the development of techniques for the non-destructive analysis of irradiated fuel elements

Implementation of a Strengthened International Safeguards System. ABACC 15 Years

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vicens, H.R.; Maceiras, E.; Dominguez, C.A.

2011-01-01

The purpose of the paper is to explain how the system of a regional safeguard has been operating and developing in the framework of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and control of nuclear Materials (ABACC), and how the international recommendations of radiological protection must be taken into account in the safeguards implementation and its impact in the international context.

The next generation safeguards initiative

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobey, William

2008-01-01

NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

A Comparison between Two Force-Position Controllers with Gravity Compensation Simulated on a Humanoid Arm

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Giovanni Gerardo Muscolo

2013-01-01

Full Text Available The authors propose a comparison between two force-position controllers with gravity compensation simulated on the DEXTER bioinspired robotic arm. The two controllers are both constituted by an internal proportional-derivative (PD closed-loop for the position control. The force control of the two systems is composed of an external proportional (P closed-loop for one system (P system and an external proportional-integrative (PI closed-loop for the other system (PI system. The simulation tests performed with the two systems on a planar representation of the DEXTER, an eight-DOF bioinspired arm, showed that by varying the stiffness of the environment, with a correct setting of parameters, both systems ensure the achievement of the desired force regime and with great precision the desired position. The two controllers do not have large differences in performance when interacting with a lower stiffness environment. In case of an environment with greater rigidity, the PI system is more stable. The subsequent implementation of these control systems on the DEXTER robotic bioinspired arm gives guidance on the design and control optimisation of the arms of the humanoid robot named SABIAN.

Content and structure of knowledge base used for virtual control of android arm motion in specified environment

Science.gov (United States)

Pritykin, F. N.; Nebritov, V. I.

2018-01-01

The paper presents the configuration of knowledge base necessary for intelligent control of android arm mechanism motion with different positions of certain forbidden regions taken into account. The present structure of the knowledge base characterizes the past experience of arm motion synthesis in the vector of velocities with due regard for the known obstacles. This structure also specifies its intrinsic properties. Knowledge base generation is based on the study of the arm mechanism instantaneous states implementations. Computational experiments connected with the virtual control of android arm motion with known forbidden regions using the developed knowledge base are introduced. Using the developed knowledge base to control virtually the arm motion reduces the time of test assignments calculation. The results of the research can be used in developing control systems of autonomous android robots in the known in advance environment.

Application of safeguards procedures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

Safeguards by Design Challenge

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-09-13

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Safeguards by Design Challenge

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise

2016-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anttila, M.

2000-08-01

The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the LAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INF-CIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the LAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle in

On nonlinear dynamics and control of a robotic arm with chaos

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Felix J. L. P.

2014-01-01

Full Text Available In this paper a robotic arm is modelled by a double pendulum excited in its base by a DC motor of limited power via crank mechanism and elastic connector. In the mathematical model, a chaotic motion was identified, for a wide range of parameters. Controlling of the chaotic behaviour of the system, were implemented using, two control techniques, the nonlinear saturation control (NSC and the optimal linear feedback control (OLFC. The actuator and sensor of the device are allowed in the pivot and joints of the double pendulum. The nonlinear saturation control (NSC is based in the order second differential equations and its action in the pivot/joint of the robotic arm is through of quadratic nonlinearities feedback signals. The optimal linear feedback control (OLFC involves the application of two control signals, a nonlinear feedforward control to maintain the controlled system to a desired periodic orbit, and control a feedback control to bring the trajectory of the system to the desired orbit. Simulation results, including of uncertainties show the feasibility of the both methods, for chaos control of the considered system.

Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards: Common technologies and challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.

1989-01-01

Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards have much in common, including the basic physical phenomena and technologies involved as well as the commitments and challenges posed by expanding nuclear programs in many countries around the world. The unique characteristics of the fission process -- such as prompt and delayed neutron and gamma ray emission -- not only provide the means of sustaining and controlling the fission chain reaction, but also provide unique ''signatures'' that are essential to quantitative measurement and effective safeguarding of key nuclear materials (notably 239 Pu and 235 U) against theft, loss, or diversion. In this paper, we trace briefly the historical emergence of safeguards as an essential component of the expansion of the nuclear enterprise worldwide. We then survey the major categories of passive and active nondestructive assay techniques that are currently in use or under development for rapid, accurate measurement and verification of safe-guarded nuclear materials in the many forms in which they occur throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. 23 refs., 14 figs

Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bean, Robert S.; Hockert, John W.; Hebditch, David J.

2009-01-01

There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

Control and Management of Small Quantity Nuclear Material (SQNM) on Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Jae Hwan; Shin, Byung Woo; Park, Jae Beom

2009-01-01

Small Quantity Nuclear Material (SQNM) is defined as the nuclear material that is below the amount approved in atomic energy act. SQNM generally lists depleted uranium (DU) used as a catalyst or shielding material in exposure devices in industries. The SQNM users have a duty to report information on possessing and using SQNM regularly to the government. All nuclear materials must be included in IAEA reporting lists according to safeguards agreement and additional protocol regardless of amount. However, it is difficult to investigate the status of nuclear material possessed in industries because SQNM is excepted regulation item list in atomic energy act. Most SQNM user industries are small companies so they have some problems like the loss of nuclear material after bankruptcy. Even though the damage of radiation leakage is very low, loss or careless management of nuclear material causes confusion. Thus, developing a control and management system for SQNM is essential. This paper discusses the present condition and prospect of control and management SQNM in Korea

IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khlebnikov, Nikolai

2001-01-01

IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

A study on the national safeguards system -Current status and suggested development-

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Wan Su; Kwack, Eun Ho; An, Jong Sung; Kim, Hyun Tae; Min, Kyung Sik; Park, Chan Sik

1995-03-01

In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system (SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. 14 tabs., 15 figs., 29 refs. (Author)

Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

Nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Estrampres, J.

2010-01-01

Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

Evaluating safeguards effectiveness against protracted theft of special nuclear material by insiders

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.; Sicherman, A.

1991-01-01

The new draft DOE Material Control and Accountability Order 5633.3 requires that facilities handling special nuclear material (SNM) evaluate their effectiveness against provided theft of SNMProtracted theft means repeated thefts of small quantities of material to accumulate a goal quanfity. To evaluate the safeguards effectiveness against pro thefts, one must addresses several issues: (1) defining relevant time frames for various threat scenarios and delayed detection safeguards: (2) identifying which safeguards come into play more than once because of repeated adversary actions or because of periodic occurrence during the theft time frame (e.g., daily administrative check on presence of material): (3) considering whether the second and subsequent applications of safeguards are different in effectiveness from the first; (4)synthesizing how physical security, material control, and material accountability safeguards combine to provide protection against protracted theft scenarios. In this paper we discuss these issues and describe how we are augmenting the Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) to provide the user with a tool for evaluating effectiveness against protracted theft. Currently, the Insider module of ASSESS focuses on evaluating the ''timely'' detection of abrupt theft attempts by various types of single nonviolent insiders. In this paper we describe the approach we're implementing to augment ASSESS to handle various cases of protracted theft attempts

A hybrid BMI-based exoskeleton for paresis: EMG control for assisting arm movements.

Science.gov (United States)

Kawase, Toshihiro; Sakurada, Takeshi; Koike, Yasuharu; Kansaku, Kenji

2017-02-01

Brain-machine interface (BMI) technologies have succeeded in controlling robotic exoskeletons, enabling some paralyzed people to control their own arms and hands. We have developed an exoskeleton asynchronously controlled by EEG signals. In this study, to enable real-time control of the exoskeleton for paresis, we developed a hybrid system with EEG and EMG signals, and the EMG signals were used to estimate its joint angles. Eleven able-bodied subjects and two patients with upper cervical spinal cord injuries (SCIs) performed hand and arm movements, and the angles of the metacarpophalangeal (MP) joint of the index finger, wrist, and elbow were estimated from EMG signals using a formula that we derived to calculate joint angles from EMG signals, based on a musculoskeletal model. The formula was exploited to control the elbow of the exoskeleton after automatic adjustments. Four able-bodied subjects and a patient with upper cervical SCI wore an exoskeleton controlled using EMG signals and were required to perform hand and arm movements to carry and release a ball. Estimated angles of the MP joints of index fingers, wrists, and elbows were correlated well with the measured angles in 11 able-bodied subjects (correlation coefficients were 0.81  ±  0.09, 0.85  ±  0.09, and 0.76  ±  0.13, respectively) and the patients (e.g. 0.91  ±  0.01 in the elbow of a patient). Four able-bodied subjects successfully positioned their arms to adequate angles by extending their elbows and a joint of the exoskeleton, with root-mean-square errors  exoskeleton, successfully carried a ball to a goal in all 10 trials. A BMI-based exoskeleton for paralyzed arms and hands using real-time control was realized by designing a new method to estimate joint angles based on EMG signals, and these may be useful for practical rehabilitation and the support of daily actions.

A hybrid BMI-based exoskeleton for paresis: EMG control for assisting arm movements

Science.gov (United States)

Kawase, Toshihiro; Sakurada, Takeshi; Koike, Yasuharu; Kansaku, Kenji

2017-02-01

Objective. Brain-machine interface (BMI) technologies have succeeded in controlling robotic exoskeletons, enabling some paralyzed people to control their own arms and hands. We have developed an exoskeleton asynchronously controlled by EEG signals. In this study, to enable real-time control of the exoskeleton for paresis, we developed a hybrid system with EEG and EMG signals, and the EMG signals were used to estimate its joint angles. Approach. Eleven able-bodied subjects and two patients with upper cervical spinal cord injuries (SCIs) performed hand and arm movements, and the angles of the metacarpophalangeal (MP) joint of the index finger, wrist, and elbow were estimated from EMG signals using a formula that we derived to calculate joint angles from EMG signals, based on a musculoskeletal model. The formula was exploited to control the elbow of the exoskeleton after automatic adjustments. Four able-bodied subjects and a patient with upper cervical SCI wore an exoskeleton controlled using EMG signals and were required to perform hand and arm movements to carry and release a ball. Main results. Estimated angles of the MP joints of index fingers, wrists, and elbows were correlated well with the measured angles in 11 able-bodied subjects (correlation coefficients were 0.81  ±  0.09, 0.85  ±  0.09, and 0.76  ±  0.13, respectively) and the patients (e.g. 0.91  ±  0.01 in the elbow of a patient). Four able-bodied subjects successfully positioned their arms to adequate angles by extending their elbows and a joint of the exoskeleton, with root-mean-square errors  exoskeleton, successfully carried a ball to a goal in all 10 trials. Significance. A BMI-based exoskeleton for paralyzed arms and hands using real-time control was realized by designing a new method to estimate joint angles based on EMG signals, and these may be useful for practical rehabilitation and the support of daily actions.

Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip Casey; Hockert, John; Morgan, James

2010-01-01

Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC and A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many - owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: (1) In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. (2) Life-cycle cost

Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Varjoranta, Tero

2016-01-01

IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

2014-07-01

The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Price, Mary Alice

2010-01-01

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC and A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC and A program. The MC and A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design for Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morgan, James B.; Kovacic, Donald N.; Whitaker, J. Michael

2008-01-01

Safeguards for nuclear facilities can be significantly improved by developing and implementing methodologies for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized into a country's regulatory structure similar to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved to assure a facility's reliable and safe operations will reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state level. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis (IPRA) process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

1978-01-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

1979-02-01

Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

1980-01-01

This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walske, C.

1975-01-01

Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

Nuclear material data management and integration. A safeguard perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilkey, David D.; Martin, H.R.; O'Leary, Jerry

1999-01-01

This paper is a discussion of the use of available data in the performance of nuclear material (NM) safeguards. The discussion considers the various sources of data and system requirements for collecting and managing that data, and is preliminary concerned with domestic safeguards requirements such as those specified by the US Department of Energy. The preferred configuration for integrated data management does not necessarily require a single computer system; however, separate computerized systems with direct inter-system connections is preferred. Use of all relevant data NM accounting, NM control, physical protection, and non-safeguards) is necessary to assure the most effective protection for the NM inventories. Where direct exchange of data is not possible, a systematic program to implement indirect exchange is essential [ru

Measurements Matter in Nuclear Safeguards & Security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aregbe, Y.; Jakopic, R.; Richter, S.; Schillebeeckx, P.; Hult, M.

2015-01-01

The deliverable of any laboratory is a measurement result with stated uncertainty and traceability (ISO/IEC 17025: 2005). Measurement results, particularly in safeguards, have to be accurate, comparable and traceable to a stated reference, preferably to the SI. Results provided by operator-, safeguards- or network laboratories have to be in compliance with specific quality goals for nuclear material and environmental sample analysis. Metrological quality control tools are prerequisites to build up confidence in measurement results that have to be translated into meaningful safeguards conclusions or to demonstrate conformity of findings with declared processes. The European Commission—Joint Research Centre (EC–JRC) has dedicated facilities, laboratories and projects to provide certified nuclear reference materials (CRM), to develop reference methods and to organize inter-laboratory comparisons (ILC) in compliance with ISO Guide 34, ISO17025 and ISO17043, including respective training. Recent examples are: – cooperation with the JAEA to investigate on the application of Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) to quantify the amount of special nuclear material in particlelike debris of melted fuel as formed in the nuclear accident in Fukushima – training in metrology and gamma-ray spectrometry for EURATOM safeguards inspectors – development of uranium reference particle standards under a new EC support task to the IAEA. Currently, the JRC puts major efforts in producing CRMs and conformity assessment tools for “age-dating” of uranium and plutonium samples. They are needed for method validation in determining the date of the last chemical separation of uranium or plutonium from their daughter nuclides. These type of CRMs are not only needed in nuclear safeguards and forensics, but could support in the future a possible new type of “verification mechanism” as part of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), since measurements and measurement standards

Research on ARM Numerical Control System

Science.gov (United States)

Wei, Xu; JiHong, Chen

Computerized Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools is the foundation of modern manufacturing systems, whose advanced digital technology is the key to solve the problem of sustainable development of machine tool manufacturing industry. The paper is to design CNC system embedded on ARM and indicates the hardware design and the software systems supported. On the hardware side: the driving chip of the motor control unit, as the core of components, is MCX314AL of DSP motion control which is developed by NOVA Electronics Co., Ltd. of Japan. It make convenient to control machine because of its excellent performance, simple interface, easy programming. On the Software side, the uC/OS-2 is selected as the embedded operating system of the open source, which makes a detailed breakdown of the modules of the CNC system. Those priorities are designed according to their actual requirements. The ways of communication between the module and the interrupt response are so different that it guarantees real-time property and reliability of the numerical control system. Therefore, it not only meets the requirements of the current social precision machining, but has good man-machine interface and network support to facilitate a variety of craftsmen use.

Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume 8, Number 2, Spring 1972. A Quarterly Bibliography with Abstracts and Annotations

Science.gov (United States)

Contents: Preface; The international political environment; The strategic environment; Institutions and means for the maintenance of peace; Arms control--general discussion; Arms control--specific problems and measures; Author index ; Subject index.

Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

1980-01-01

The scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues: (1) global safeguards effectiveness or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on the first issue, while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed towards the second. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example. 4 refs

Building safeguards infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

2010-01-01

Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

2012-08-01

Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

1987-01-01

This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

2006-01-01

Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

Proposal of a national system to supervise nuclear installations out of international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rosa, L.P.

1990-01-01

It is proposed a national system to safeguard, supervise and inspect nuclear facilities in Brazil, apart from international safeguards. It discusses also the military nuclear activities and the uranium enrichment plants. The system should be controlled by Brazilian CNEN. (A.C.A.S.)

Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

2001-01-01

SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

NNSA's next generation safeguards initiative to define an effective state system of accounting and control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)