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Sample records for safeguards acrs meeting

  1. 75 FR 27841 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-05-18

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR The ACRS Subcommittee on EPR will hold a meeting on May 21, 2010, Room T-2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The entire meeting will be open to public attendance. The agenda for...

  2. 77 FR 10786 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-02-23

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability and PRA; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability and PRA will hold a... Modeling Application Guide.'' The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with the NRC...

  3. 77 FR 74696 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on AP-1000...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-17

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on AP-1000; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on AP-1000 will hold a meeting on January 18, 2013, Room T-2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The entire meeting will be open to public...

  4. 75 FR 7633 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-22

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice of Meeting The ACRS U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) Subcommittee will hold a....S. EPR Design Certification Document Review. The Subcommittee will gather information, analyze...

  5. 75 FR 12804 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-17

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice of Meeting The ACRS U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) Subcommittee will hold a... Chapters 11 and 16 of the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items associated with the U.S. EPR Design...

  6. 76 FR 26775 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Cancellation to...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-09

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Cancellation to May 11, 2011, ACRS Meeting-- Federal Register Notice The Federal Register Notice for the ACRS Subcommittee Meeting on the design certification application review of the U.S...

  7. 75 FR 7634 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the Subcommittee on Power Uprates...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-22

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO...

  8. 75 FR 4882 - Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice of Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-29

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice of Meeting The ACRS U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) Subcommittee will hold a... with Open Items concerning the U.S. EPR Design Certification (DCD) Application and the Calvert Cliffs...

  9. 78 FR 8202 - Meeting of the Joint ACRS Subcommittees on Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena and Materials, Metallurgy...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-05

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Joint ACRS Subcommittees on Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena and Materials, Metallurgy and Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The Joint ACRS Subcommittees on Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena and Materials, Metallurgy and...

  10. 76 FR 60938 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-30

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on...) associated with the Nine Mile Point extended power uprate application. The [[Page 60939

  11. 76 FR 7883 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-02-11

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... will review the staff's evaluation of the Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Extended Power Uprate application... can be made. Thirty five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the...

  12. 76 FR 44964 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on U.S...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-27

    ... Subcommittee on U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (U.S. EPR) will hold a meeting on August 18, 2011, Room T-2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike... the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of...

  13. 77 FR 4585 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-30

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, extended power uprate application. The Subcommittee will hear presentations... possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or...

  14. 77 FR 28637 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-05-15

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on...) associated with the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 extended power uprate application. The Subcommittee... made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty...

  15. 76 FR 32240 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting on the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-03

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... Expanded Operating Domains-Power Distribution Validation and Pin-by-Pin Gamma Scan). The Subcommittee will... hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty minutes before the...

  16. 78 FR 70596 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-26

    ... Subcommittee on Power Uprates; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Uprates will hold a meeting on... hold discussions with the licensee, (Northern States Power Company of Minnesota), the NRC staff, and... made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty...

  17. 78 FR 53485 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-29

    ... conduct of the meeting. 8:35 a.m.-10:30 a.m.: Cyber Security Activities (Open/Closed)--The Committee will... cyber security activities. [Note: A portion of this meeting may be closed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(3... Committee during future ACRS Meetings, and matters related to the conduct of ACRS business, including...

  18. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards: Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R.; Morgan, James B.; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L.

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  19. 76 FR 16457 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-23

    ..., ``Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants,'' and Cyber Security Related... Systems of Nuclear Power Plants,'' the staff's resolution of public comments, and cyber security related... during future ACRS Meetings, and matters related to the conduct of ACRS business, including anticipated...

  20. 77 FR 74697 - Meeting of the ACRS, Subcommittee on U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor; Notice of Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-17

    ..., Subcommittee on U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (U.S. EPR) will hold a meeting on January 17, 2013, Room T-2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike... be made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty...

  1. 78 FR 31988 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Plant...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-28

    ... comments should notify the Designated Federal Official (DFO), Girija Shukla (Telephone 301-415-6855 or Email: Girija.Shukla@nrc.gov ) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate...

  2. 76 FR 71609 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Plant...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-18

    .../or written comments should notify the Designated Federal Official (DFO), Girija Shukla (Telephone (301) 415-6855 or Email: Girija.Shukla@nrc.gov ) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that...

  3. Material presented to advisory committee on reactor safeguards, subcommittee on extreme external phenomena, January 29-30, 1981, Los Angeles, California. Seismic safety margins research program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.D.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Bohn, M.P.; Chuang, T.Y.; Cummings, G.E.; Dong, R.G.; Johnson, J.J.; Wells, J.E.

    1981-01-01

    The January 29-30, 1981, meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Subcommittee on Extreme External Phenomena, mark the close of Phase I efforts on the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP). Presentations at the meeting focused on results produced. These included computer codes, response computations, failure and release probabilities, data bases, and fragilities and parameter characteristics

  4. Proposals for the 1989/90 Safeguards R and D programme and associated meetings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-07-01

    The R and D programme of the IAEA Department of Safeguards as carried out by or undertaken on behalf of the Division of Development and Technical Support, the Division of Safeguards Evaluation and the Division of Safeguards Information Treatment is set out in tables which give the objective of the programme elements, a description of the activities to be performed and a number of items of information required for assessment of the activities. The linkage between R and D activities and planned meetings on safeguards topics in 1989/90 is shown in a table too. 4 tabs

  5. IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    2005-01-01

    In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

  6. 78 FR 68867 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on US-APWR...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-15

    ... comments should notify the Designated Federal Official (DFO), Girija Shukla (Telephone 301-415-6855 or Email: Girija.Shukla@nrc.gov ) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate...

  7. 78 FR 59076 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on US-APWR...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-25

    ... comments should notify the Designated Federal Official (DFO), Girija Shukla (Telephone 301-415-6855 or Email: Girija.Shukla@nrc.gov ) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate...

  8. 77 FR 73497 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on US-APWR...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-10

    .../or written comments should notify the Designated Federal Official (DFO), Girija Shukla (Telephone 301-415-6855 or Email: Girija.Shukla@nrc.gov ) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that...

  9. 78 FR 20959 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on US-APWR

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-04-08

    .../or written comments should notify the Designated Federal Official (DFO), Girija Shukla (Telephone 301-415-6855 or Email: Girija.Shukla@nrc.gov ) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that...

  10. 77 FR 36581 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on U.S...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-19

    ... the Designated Federal Official (DFO), Mr. Girija Shukla (Telephone 301-415-6855 or Email: Girija.Shukla@nrc.gov ) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be...

  11. Outcome and Perspectives from the First IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Norman, C.; Binner, R.; Peter, N. J.; Wuester, J.; Zhao, K.; Krieger, T.; Walczak-Typke, A.C.; Richet, S.; Portaix, C.G.; Martin, K.; Bonner, E.R.

    2015-01-01

    Statistical and probabilistic methodologies have always played a fundamental role in the field of safeguards. In-field inspection approaches are based on sampling algorithms and random verification schemes designed to achieve a designed detection probability for defects of interest (e.g., missing material, indicators of tampering with containment and other equipment, changes of design). In addition, the evaluation of verification data with a view to drawing soundly based safeguards conclusions rests on the application of various advanced statistical methodologies. The considerable progress of information technology in the field of data processing and computational capabilities as well as the evolution of safeguards concepts and the steep increase in the volume of verification data in the last decades call for the review and modernization of safeguards statistical methodologies, not only to improve the efficiency of the analytical processes but also to address new statistical and probabilistic questions. Modern computer-intensive approaches are also needed to fully exploit the large body of verification data collected over the years in the increasing number and diversifying types of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the world. The first biennial IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards was held in Vienna from the 16 to 18 October 2013. Recommendations and a working plan were drafted which identify and chart necessary steps to review, harmonize, update and consolidate statistical methodologies for safeguards. Three major problem spaces were identified: Random Verification Schemes, Estimation of Uncertainties and Statistical Evaluation of Safeguards Verification Data for which a detailed list of objectives and actions to be taken were established. Since the meeting, considerable progress was made to meet these objectives. The actions undertaken and their outcome are presented in this paper. (author)

  12. Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mollah, A.S.

    2010-01-01

    treaties/protocols; and - Development of legislative system and national strategy for nuclear safeguards activities. A programme has been undertaken to develop the organizational infrastructure to carry out nuclear safeguards related activities in Bangladesh. The objective of this paper is to describe the main activities that are being carried out for meeting IAEA nuclear safeguards obligations. (author)

  13. 75 FR 16203 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on EPR; Notice...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-31

    ... hold a meeting on April 20-21, 2010, at 11545 Rockville Pike, T2- B1, Rockville, Maryland. The entire... review Chapters 4, 5 and 17 of the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items associated with the staff's... a.m.-5 p.m. The Subcommittee will review Chapter 12 of the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items...

  14. Summary of the ACRE inaugural meeting.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bloomgarden, Zachary T

    2009-01-01

    The charter meeting of the Association of Clinical Researchers and Educators (ACRE) provided a powerful set of arguments against assertions that physician-industry collaboration is harmful and represents a "conflict of interest." Such collaboration has, in fact, improved medical care for patients, a case made overwhelmingly by patients and patient advocacy groups at the meeting. The contentions that physician-industry collaboration is problematic are not based on evidence. They depend on unjustified generalization from inevitable, sometimes egregious, but vanishingly uncommon adverse outcomes of industry-physician interaction without reference to how so much more commonly these interactions add value. Furthermore, the claim that physician-industry collaboration is unprofessional is refuted by rational scrutiny. Indeed, the term "conflict of interest" itself is vague, inviting subjectivity and deserving to be rejected. The unwarranted success of conflict of interest regulation has prevailed because of the failure of physicians, educators, and innovators, through apathy and intimidation, to pay attention to its fallacies and resist its dangers. It has arisen from activist ambitions and from misalignment between the purposes of medical practitioners, educators, and innovators and those of administrators in medical journals and in academic medical centers. The media and politicians have not appreciated these misalignments and have accepted conflict of interest arguments at face value. Regulation emanating from conflict of interest criticism is confusing, onerous, expensive, disrespectful, and damaging. Prohibitions against speaking about medical products inhibit physician and patient education concerning rapidly emerging and complex therapies. Input by physicians cognizant of compliance requirements into such presentations should be encouraged. Restrictions to the free flow of corporate support of academic health centers, professional societies, and patient

  15. 75 FR 1831 - Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-13

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor... Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeks qualified candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... amended. ACRS provides independent expert advice on matters related to the safety of existing and proposed...

  16. International Atomic Energy Agency's advisory group meeting on safeguards related to the final disposal of waste and spent fuel, Vienna, Austria, September 12-16, 1988: Foreign trip report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    1988-10-01

    B.W. Moran traveled to Vienna, Austria, during the period of September 12--16, 1988, to serve as the technical advisor to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group Meeting on ''Safeguards Related to the Final Disposal of Nuclear Material in Waste and Spent Fuel.'' The goal of the US representatives to this meeting was to ensure that the advisory group's recommendations established (1) an effective IAEA safeguards approach for all radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities and (2) a safeguards approach that is appropriate for the US Federal Waste Management System. The principal concerns of the United States on entering the advisory group meeting were: criteria for the termination of safeguards on waste should not be established, but should be referred for further study, safeguards on spent fuel should not be terminated, and safeguards studies are required before IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel are established. The US representatives generally recommended that consultant meetings be convened to address the technical issues after the requisite safeguards related research and development tasks have been performed. These objectives of the US representatives were achieved, and the recommendations of the advisory group generally coincided with and extended the recommendations presented in the US position paper

  17. Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wonder, E.F.

    2010-01-01

    The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

  18. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  19. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitney, J.M.; LaMontagne, S.; Sunshine, A.; Lockwood, D.; Peranteau, D.; Dupuy, G.

    2010-01-01

    Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

  20. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  1. A compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1990 annual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-04-01

    This compilation contains 31 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) reports submitted to the Commission or to the Executive Director for Operations during calendar year 1990. It also includes a report to the Congress on the NRC Safety Research Program. All reports have been made available to the public through the NRC Public Document Room and the US Library of Congress. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subject. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and by chronological order within project name. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and by chronological order within subject area

  2. Nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampres, J.

    2010-01-01

    Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

  3. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  4. Seismic design features of the ACR Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elgohary, M.; Saudy, A.; Aziz, T.

    2003-01-01

    Through their worldwide operating records, CANDU Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) have repeatedly demonstrated safe, reliable and competitive performance. Currently, there are fourteen CANDU 6 single unit reactors operating or under construction worldwide. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) Advanced CANDU Reactor - the ACR. - is the genesis of a new generation of technologically advanced reactors founded on the CANDU reactor concept. The ACR is the next step in the evolution of the CANDU product line. The ACR products (ACR-700 and ACR-1000) are based on CANDU 6 (700 MWe class) and CANDU 9 (900 MWe class) reactors, therefore continuing AECL's successful approach of offering CANDU plants that appeal to a broad segment of the power generation market. The ACR products are based on the proven CANDU technology and incorporate advanced design technologies. The ACR NPP seismic design complies with Canadian standards that were specifically developed for nuclear seismic design and also with relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Design Standards and Guides. However, since the ACR is also being offered to several markets with many potential sites and different regulatory environments, there is a need to develop a comprehensive approach for the seismic design input parameters. These input parameters are used in the design of the standard ACR product that is suitable for many sites while also maintaining its economic competitiveness. For this purpose, the ACR standard plant is conservatively qualified for a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) with a peak horizontal ground acceleration of 0.3g for a wide range of soil/rock foundation conditions and Ground Response Spectra (GRS). These input parameters also address some of the current technical issues such as high frequency content and near field effects. In this paper, the ACR seismic design philosophy and seismic design approach for meeting the safety design requirements are reviewed. Also the seismic design

  5. A compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards: 1991 annual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-04-01

    This compilation contains 41 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) reports submitted to the Commission, Executive Director for Operations, or to the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, during calendar year 1991. It also includes a report to the Congress on the NRC Safety Research Program. All reports have been made available to the public through the NRC Public Document Room and the US Library of Congress. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and by chronological order within project name. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and by chronological order within subject area

  6. Future issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

  7. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 2. Project Reviews G-P

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order

  8. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  9. Measurement trends for future safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baloga, S.M.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1980-01-01

    Safeguards for future commercial-scale nuclear facilities may employ three materials control and accounting concepts: classical accounting, dynamic materials balancing, and independent verification of inventories and materials balances. Typical measurement needs associated with the implementation of these concepts at high-throughput facilities are discussed. Promising measurement methods for meeting these needs are described and recent experience is cited. General directions and considerations for meeting advanced safeguards systems needs through measurement technology development over the next decade are presented

  10. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  11. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 4. Generic Subjects A-G

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by subject name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume contains generic reports arranged alphabetically from A to G

  12. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 5. Generic Subjects H-R

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume presents generic subjects arranged alphabetically from H to R

  13. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 1. Project Reviews A-F

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume contains project reviews arranged alphabetically from A to F

  14. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 3. Project Reviews Q-Z

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Resports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume includes reports arranged alpbabetically from Q to Z

  15. ACR-1000TM Project - Licensing Opportunities and Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popov, N.; Doerffer, S.; Ion, R.; Hopwood, J.

    2011-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has developed the Advanced CANDU Reactor TM 1 1000 (ACR-1000 TM ) as an evolutionary advancement of the current CANDU 6 reactor. The ACR-1000 design has evolved from AECL's in-depth knowledge of CANDU TM systems, components, and materials, as well as the experience and feedback received from owners and operators of CANDU plants. The ACR design retains the proven strengths and features of CANDU reactors, while incorporating innovations and state-of-the-art technology. It also features major improvements in economics, inherent safety characteristics, and performance, while retaining the proven benefits of the CANDU family of nuclear power plants. To ensure that the ACR design is compliant with Canadian and international requirements, regulatory pre-project reviews of the ACR-1000 (and ACR-700 TM 1 with lower output) were conducted early in the design work. The regulatory feedback from these pre-project regulatory reviews helped AECL to better understand regulatory expectations in Canada, US and the UK, and to make further advancements and improvements in the ACR design to meet the Canadian and international regulatory requirements. This paper provides an overview of the key design features of the ACR-1000 reactor design, and summary of the pre-project reviews by those above-mentioned regulatory bodies, demonstrating opportunities and challenges in licensing process of and pointing to the importance of efficient vendor-regulator interaction. (author)

  16. Safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fattah, A.

    2000-01-01

    substantially large. Change in social, economic, environmental and other scenarios might demand recovery of nuclear and other material from the repository sometime in the future. To this end, the Department of Safeguards has developed a policy paper to guide the planner, designer and operator to incorporate safeguards related features, as appropriate. In parallel, a programme for the Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR) was launched to foster technological advancement. The mission of SAGOR has been to ensure that the safeguards systems developed for the final disposal of spent fuel effectively meet the objectives of IAEA safeguards, optimise IAEA resources, and make best use of existing technologies while still meeting the requirements for safety and environmental protection. (author)

  17. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

  18. ACR-1000 design provisions for severe accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popov, N.K.; Santamaura, P.; Shapiro, H.; Snell, V.G.

    2006-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) developed the Advanced CANDU Reactor-700 (ACR-700) as an evolutionary advancement of the current CANDU 6 reactor. As a further advancement of the ACR design, AECL is currently developing the ACR-1000 for the Canadian and international market. The ACR-1000 is aimed at producing electrical power for a capital cost and a unit-energy cost significantly less than that of the current generation of operating nuclear plants, while achieving enhanced safety features, shorter construction schedule, high plant capacity factor, improved operations and maintenance, and increased operating life. The reference ACR-1000 plant design is based on an integrated two-unit plant, using enriched fuel and light-water coolant, with each unit having a nominal gross output of about 1200 MWe. The ACR-1000 design meets Canadian regulatory requirements and follows established international practice with respect to severe accident prevention and mitigation. This paper presents the ACR-1000 features that are designed to mitigate limited core damage and severe core damage states, including core retention within vessel, core damage termination, and containment integrity maintenance. While maintaining existing structures of CANDU reactors that provide inherent prevention and retention of core debris, the ACR-1000 design includes additional features for prevention and mitigation of severe accidents. Core retention within vessel in CANDU-type reactors includes both retention within fuel channels, and retention within the calandria vessel. The ACR-1000 calandria vessel design permits for passive rejection of decay heat from the moderator to the shield water. Also, the calandria vessel is designed for debris retention by minimizing penetrations at the bottom periphery and by accommodating thermal and weight loads of the core debris. The ACR-1000 containment is required to withstand external events such as earthquakes, tornados, floods and aircraft crashes

  19. Compilation of reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 1957-1984. Volume 6. Generic Subjects R-Z, Appendices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    This six-volume compilation contains over 1000 reports prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards from September 1957 through December 1984. The reports are divided into two groups: Part 1: ACRS Reports on Project Reviews, and Part 2: ACRS Reports on Generic Subjects. Part 1 contains ACRS reports alphabetized by project name and within project name by chronological order. Part 2 categorizes the reports by the most appropriate generic subject area and within subject area by chronological order. This volume contains the generic subjects with an alphabetical listing from R to Z

  20. Computerization of the safeguards analysis decision process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1990-01-01

    This paper reports that safeguards regulations are evolving to meet new demands for timeliness and sensitivity in detecting the loss or unauthorized use of sensitive nuclear materials. The opportunities to meet new rules, particularly in bulk processing plants, involve developing techniques which use modern, computerized process control and information systems. Using these computerized systems in the safeguards analysis involves all the challenges of the man-machine interface experienced in the typical process control application and adds new dimensions to accuracy requirements, data analysis, and alarm resolution in the regulatory environment

  1. Application of safeguards procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

  2. Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, D.A.

    1988-01-01

    In recent years considerable attention has been given to upgrading security education programs at facilities across the country. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), a Laboratory-wide Safeguard Awareness Training Program has been established in order to raise the cognizance of the entire staff with regard to safeguards issues and concerns. This aggressive safeguards program involves a strong interface of physical security measure and material control and accountability systems. Within PNL, four distinct audiences were defined and a needs assessment analysis performed for each to determine specific training requirements. The target audiences identified were: material balance area (MBA) custodians, managers of material balance areas, material handlers, and new employees. Five safeguards training courses were created to meet the needs of those audiences. This paper discusses the development of the Safeguards Awareness Program at PNL and its benefits to the Laboratory

  3. Authentication in the context of international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drayer, D.D.; Sonnier, C.S.; Augustson, R.

    1991-01-01

    The International atomic Energy Agency held its first Advisory Group meeting on the subject of authentication in 1981. This meeting concentrated on the application of authentication to in-plant Non-Destructive Assay equipment supplied by the Facility Operator/State. In the decade since this meeting, a considerable amount of interest has developed over the use of authentication technology as a vital element of effective International Safeguards. Attendant with this interest, confusion has developed over the meaning and the need for the application of the technology as it exists today, and it may exist in the future. This paper addresses the subject of authentication, with emphasis on its basic definition and the applications of authentication technology in International Safeguards

  4. The standing advisory group on safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.H.F.

    1982-09-01

    In 1975 the Director General of the IAEA called together ten persons from member states with nuclear programs at varying stages of development to form the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. The group was later expanded to twelve. The Director General asked the group to evaluate the technical objectives of Agency safeguards, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of specific safeguards operating methods in meeting these technical objectives, advise on techniques to be employed in safeguards operations, and recommend areas where further work is needed. This paper reviews the work of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation since its formation in 1975, summarizes the subjects that have been examined and the advice rendered, and outlines the problem areas requiring further study

  5. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

  6. An overview of artificial intelligence applications to safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.E.

    1987-01-01

    The rapidly growing discipline of artificial intelligence (AI) has delivered a number of expert systems that aid analyses of processes and procedures by emulating the analysis and decisions of experts. Expert systems have not reached the point of replacing experts, but can provide assistance in their absence. In narrow domains, expert systems can relieve the expert of less demanding analyses and decisions, freeing him/her for more important tasks. Safeguards experts are in great demand, and the decision processes they perform are not always well-defined. The general area of safeguards analysis is representative of the type of activity that benefits from the assistance provided by AI techniques. The American Nuclear Society is holding a topical meeting, Artificial Intelligence and Other Innovative Computer Applications in the Nuclear Industry, on August 31-September 2, 1987. The technical papers cover a number of applications of potential benefit to safeguards and the safeguards interface with facility operations. This paper is a technical review of papers presented at the topical meeting

  7. Modeling and simulation for process and safeguards system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutmacher, R.G.; Kern, E.A.; Duncan, D.R.; Benecke, M.W.

    1983-01-01

    A computer modeling and simulation approach that meets the needs of both the process and safeguards system designers is described. The results have been useful to Westinghouse Hanford Company process designers in optimizing the process scenario and operating scheme of the Secure Automated Fabrication line. The combined process/measurements model will serve as the basis for design of the safeguards system. Integration of the process design and the safeguards system design should result in a smoothly operating process that is easier to safeguard

  8. ACR-1000: Enhanced response to severe accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popov, N.K.; Santamaura, P.; Shapiro, H.; Snell, V.G.

    2006-01-01

    integrity maintenance is achieved through control of containment pressure, flammable gas control, and control/prevention of the core-concrete interaction. The ACR-1000 design will meet Canadian regulatory requirements and will follow established international practice with respect to severe accident prevention and mitigation

  9. Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

  10. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwyer, P.A.; Ervin, N.E.

    1988-02-01

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  11. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-01-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values, a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives, a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them, and a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs

  12. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

  13. Technical quality assessment of breast ultrasound according to American College of Radiology (ACR) Standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, Kyung Hee; Kim, Eun Kyung; Kim, Young Ah; Son, Eun Ju; Oh, Ki Keun; Chung, Sun Yang

    2003-01-01

    To evaluate the technical quality of breast ultrasound based on American College of Radiology(ACR) standards. Between March 2002 and July 2002, ninety three breast sonograms obtained from 73 institutions were evaluated based on ACR standards for the hardware, technical settings, labeling of the images and identification. Of 93 breast sonograms, a satisfactory compliance with all ACR standards in the performance of breast US examinations was documented in 31% while the remaining 69% did not fully meet all ACR standards. 4.3% of breast US examinations were performed with a convex transducers, and the focal zone was inappropriately positioned in 14.2%. Gray-scale gain was subjectively characterized as inappropriate in 26.9%, and the size of lesion was not measured in 7.5%. Anatomic location of lesions was inappropriately described in 9.3%. The orientation of an US transducer was not properly labeled on any images in 33.3%. Inadequate recording of patient's information was noted in 43.3%. 50% of sonograms at University medical centers and larger general hospitals fully met all ACR standards while 36.8% at radiologic clinics and 12.1% at other private clinics met all ACR standards. Overall, 69% of breast sonograms failed to meet the quality criteria of the ACR standards. Therefore, it is essential to educate the basic technical details in performing breast US for the quality control.

  14. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-07-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: (1) a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values; (2) a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives; (3) a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them; and (4) a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs. 6 references, 4 figures, 5 tables

  15. Steam generator design requirements for ACR-1000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subash, S.; Hau, K.

    2006-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has developed the ACR-1000 (Advanced CANDU Reactor-1000 ) to meet market expectations for enhanced safety of plant operation, high capacity factor, low operating cost, increased operating life, simple component replacement, reduced capital cost, and shorter construction schedule. The ACR-1000 design is based on the use of horizontal fuel channels surrounded by a heavy water moderator, the same feature as in all CANDU reactors. The major innovation in the ACR-1000 is the use of low enriched uranium fuel, and light water as the coolant, which circulates in the fuel channels. This results in a compact reactor core design and a reduction of heavy water inventory, both contributing to a significant decrease in capital cost per MWe produced. The ACR-1000 plant is a two-unit, integrated plant with each unit having a nominal gross output of about 1165 MWe with a net output of approximately 1085 MWe. The plant design is adaptable to a single unit configuration, if required. This paper focuses on the technical considerations that went into developing some of the important design requirements for the steam generators for the ACR-1000 plant and how these requirements are specified in the Technical Specification, which is the governing document for the steam generator (SG) detail design. Layout of these SGs in the plant is briefly described and their impacts on the SG design. (author)

  16. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scholz, M.; Irola, G.; Glynn, K.

    2015-01-01

    Since 2008, the Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogramme of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has supported the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals to meet the needs of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States. Specifically, HCD's efforts respond to data indicating that 82% of safeguards experts at U.S. Laboratories will have left the workforce within 15 years. This paper provides an update on the status of the subprogramme since its last presentation at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium in 2010. It highlights strengthened, integrated efforts in the areas of graduate and post-doctoral fellowships, young and midcareer professional support, short safeguards courses, and university engagement. It also discusses lessons learned from the U.S. experience in safeguards education and training as well as the importance of long-range strategies to develop a cohesive, effective, and efficient human capital development approach. (author)

  17. IAEA safeguards instrumentation: Development, implementation and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rundquist, D.E.

    1983-01-01

    Extensive development efforts over the last 5 years have produced a number of new instruments to help the IAEA meet its safeguards obligations. Implementation of these new instruments is proceeding at a necessarily slower pace. To optimize the performance and reliability of the instrumentation systems when used in safeguards applications, increasing attention is needed to be spent on performance monitoring and control of the instruments. (author)

  18. Meeting the safeguards challenges of a commercial reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Chesnay, B.; Pearsall, C.; Takeda, S.; Tomikawa, H.; Fujimaki, K.; Iwamoto, T.

    2004-01-01

    Never before has the IAEA taken on such a large challenge as implementing a safeguards system at a commercial reprocessing plant. The challenges lay in a wide range of areas. This paper will present an overview of how specific challenges are being met in: Providing an initial and continuing design verification approach that maintains continuity of knowledge for the life-time of the plant; Providing a robust safeguards approach, including added assurance measures to confirm the operational conditions of the facility; Providing verification systems with the highest sensitivity and reliability, while also being cost efficient; Providing timely and accurate analytical laboratory results; Providing sufficient authentication to joint-use, unattended verification systems to assure that independent conclusions can be reached; Providing a comprehensive integrated software system that allows for remote inspector data handling and evaluation and thus reducing inspection effort. A primary prerequisite to developing and implementing a safeguards approach of this magnitude is the transparent and interactive cooperation of the State and the operator. The JNFL Project has been a model example of this cooperation. This cooperation has been in the areas of system security, operational modifications, schedule adjustments, technical development and financial support. (author)

  19. Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

    2015-01-01

    analysis), and the identification of safeguards tools and measures to meet facility or activity specific safeguards objectives. The usefulness of this approach has been preliminary tested and demonstrated in a case study performed by KAERI. (author)

  20. Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

  1. Holdup-related issues in safeguarding of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-03-01

    Residual inventories of special nuclear materials (SNM) remaining in processing facilities (holdup) are recognized as an insidious problem for both safety and safeguards. This paper identifies some of the issues that are of concern to the safeguards community at-large that are related to holdup of SNM in large-scale process equipment. These issues range from basic technologies of SNM production to changing regulatory requirements to meet the needs of safeguarding nuclear materials. Although there are no magic formulas to resolve these issues, there are several initiatives that could be taken in areas of facility design, plant operation, personnel training, SNM monitoring, and regulatory guidelines to minimize the problems of holdup and thereby improve both safety and safeguards at nuclear material processing plants. 8 refs

  2. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  3. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  4. Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

    1982-06-01

    The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments

  5. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.C.; Tobin, S.; Smith, L.E.; Ehinger, M.; Dougan, A.; Cipiti, B.; Bakel, A.; Bean, R.

    2008-01-01

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  6. Office of Safeguards and Security - Operational Interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammond, G.A.

    1987-01-01

    The mission of the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), Department of Energy (DOE) is to: Develop policy and programs to protect DOE facilities, nuclear materials, and classified information; Provide oversight for safeguards and security operations; Direct research and development (RandD) to support the protection program; and Strengthen international safeguards in support of nonproliferation policy. Objectives are to maintain an integrated safeguards and security system that is effective against a wide range of threats, and do so in a manner to minimize impacts on facility operation. Implementation is the responsibility of field offices and contractors operating DOE facilities. The OSS-operational interface is the focus of this discussion with emphasis on RandD to meet user needs. The scope and project selection process will be discussed along with information required for evaluation, and field operational planning and budgeting commitments to permit implementation of successful RandD results

  7. Safeguards Implementation in Kazakhstan: Experience and Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhantikin, T.

    2015-01-01

    Experience of Kazakhstan joined the NPT in 1993, just after desintegration of USSR, and enforced Safeguards Agreement in 1995 can be interesting in implementation of safeguards in non-standard cases. Having weapon materials and test infrastructure legacy, the country together with IAEA and several donor countries found acceptable approaches to meet NPT provisions. One of challenges was to provide protection of sensitive information that could be accidentally disclosed in safeguards activities. With support of several weapon countries in close cooperation with the IAEA Kazakhstan liquidated test infrastructure in Semipalatinsk, implemented projects on elimination and minimization of use of HEU in civil sector, decommissioning of BN-350 fast breeder reactor. Now the IAEA LEU Bank is going to be established in Kazakhstan, and more challenges are coming in implementation of safeguards. Some technical and organizational details will be described from the experience of Kazakhstan in these projects. (author)

  8. Understanding national and international safeguards: an evolutionary process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    1983-01-01

    Domestic and international safeguards have been evolving and will continue to evolve. in the case of the United States, the concern was to protect the classified materials, at first. Then attention focussed on material accounting, then on measures to promptly detect theft by individuals with access, and later on physical protection to ward-off armed terrorists. The objective of the IAEA has always been to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not being diverted from the peaceful facilities that are under safeguards. The evolution has taken place in deciding how to provide this assurance, and in the definition of specific safeguards goals. In both cases the technology needed to meet the goals has improved due to R and D and to experience. A plea is made for more cooperation betwen those who develop and manage the policies, those who develop safeguards techniques, and those who are subject to national and IAEA safeguards. Some illustrations of the evolution of policies, inadequate coordination and general progress are given

  9. A report from the American college of rheumatology/association of rheumatology health professionals (ACR/ARHP) - 2012 annual meeting (November 9-14, 2012 - Washington, D.C., USA).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Croasdell, G

    2013-02-01

    The annual meeting of the American College of Rheumatology (ACR), jointly held with the Association of Rheumatology Health Professionals (ARHP), brought together attendees focused on all aspects of rheumatology, including researchers looking into treatment options and various services around the care of rheumatologic conditions. As well as networking opportunities at the meeting, there were a wide range of symposia and posters available covering various conditions and levels of research. There were also educational and meet-the-professor sessions. This report will cover a selection of interesting talks from poster and oral sessions on the latest preclinical and clinical research. Copyright 2013 Prous Science, S.A.U. or its licensors. All rights reserved.

  10. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  11. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schanfein, Mark; Johnson, Shirley

    2012-01-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  12. Development of an international safeguards approach to the final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphey, W.M.; Moran, B.W.; Fattah, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently pursuing development of an international safeguards approach for the final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories through consultants meetings and through the Program for Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR). The consultants meetings provide policy guidance to IAEA; SAGOR recommends effective approaches that can be efficiently implemented by IAEA. The SAGOR program, which is a collaboration of eight Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), was initiated in July 1994 and has identified 15 activities in each of three areas (i.e. conditioning facilities, active repositories, and closed repositories) that must be performed to ensure an efficient, yet effective safeguards approach. Two consultants meetings have been held: the first in May 1991 and the last in November 1995. For nuclear materials emplaced in a geological repository, the safeguards objectives were defined to be (1) to detect the diversion of spent fuel, whether concealed or unconcealed, from the repository and (2) to detect undeclared activities of safeguards concern (e.g., tunneling, underground reprocessing, or substitution in containers)

  13. Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J.

    2010-01-01

    The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

  14. Evolution of a safeguards support program: POTAS past and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kessler, J.C.; Reisman, A.W.

    1992-01-01

    When the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) became for the first time responsible for implementing full-scope safeguards in many countries, including countries with large and sophisticated nuclear programs. The IAEA's Department of Safeguards did not have the safeguards technology appropriate for these rapidly expanding responsibilities, nor did it have a research and development program to respond to that need. In response to this situation, the United States initiated the US Program of Technical Assitance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) in 1977. This program was originally intended to be a 5-yr, $5 million program. As the United States and the IAEA began to implement this program, several things rapidly became clear. Meeting the evolving safeguards technology needs would require much more than $5 million; within the first 5 yr, the United States allocated more than $20 million. This paper summarizes the policies activities, and practices POTAS has employed in support of IAEA safeguards program

  15. Objectives and techniques of an advanced safeguards system for the CANDU reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.M.; Zarecki, C.W.; Head, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    In 1975, Canada began to actively assist the IAEA with manpower and research and development efforts to meet this requirement for CANDU reactors. This paper describes various aspects of the CANDU safeguards scheme, including the containment and surveillance equipment that has been developed. It includes consideration of the following: objectives of the safeguards system, role of equipment in meeting system objectives, cost and maintenance of equipment, capabilities and limitations of equipment, and effectiveness of the scheme and equipment in providing assurance of diversion detection. 11 refs

  16. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  17. Innovative audit program for today's safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lillpop, J.W. Jr.

    1975-01-01

    An internal safeguards audit program was developed and implemented at GE facilities to meet the need for effective audit and accurate, timely reporting to management. The concepts from which the program was evolved are summarized. The documentation and reporting mechanism has worked well for both the auditee and management

  18. Agreement reached on integrated safeguards in European Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with the European Commission, has reached agreement on arrangements to implement 'integrated safeguards' in all non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union with significant nuclear activities. 'This important milestone is the result of the constructive common efforts of all parties concerned. It is a clear signal of the importance attributed by the EU and its Member States, as well as the IAEA, to the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime,' said Andris Piebalgs, Member of the European Commission in charge of Energy. 'Once we have sufficient confidence that a State' s nuclear activities are purely peaceful, we can apply safeguards measures in a less prescriptive, more customised manner. This reduces the inspection burden on the State and the inspection effort of the IAEA, while enabling the IAEA to maintain the conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities,' said Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General and Head of IAEA Safeguards Department. Background The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the main international Treaty prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It entrusts the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices through the application of 'safeguards'. IAEA safeguards include comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols that enable the IAEA to conclude that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State. Integrated Safeguards refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency ' s safeguards obligations. In the European Union, nuclear safeguards are implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty and trilateral agreements between Euratom, its Member States and the IAEA

  19. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

  20. 76 FR 30404 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-25

    ... Room T2-B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 8:30 a.m.-8:35 a.m.: Opening Remarks by the ACRS... Alloy Cladding.'' 10:45 a.m.-11:45 a.m.: Revised Safety Evaluation Report Associated with the License... to the safety evaluation report associated with the license renewal application for the Hope Creek...

  1. Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, Pierre

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

  2. 75 FR 25303 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Regulatory...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-05-07

    ...: Wednesday, May 19, 2010--1 p.m. until 5 p.m. The Subcommittee will review Draft Final Regulatory Guide 1.216 (previously DG-1203) ``Containment Structural Integrity Evaluation for Internal Pressure Loadings Above Design... the time allotted to present oral statements can be obtained from the website cited above or by...

  3. 77 FR 68162 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Regulatory...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-11-15

    ... discuss Regulatory Guide 1.79, ``Preoperational Testing of Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Pressurized Water Reactors,'' Revision 2, and Regulatory Guide 1.79.1, ``Initial Test Program of Emergency Core...

  4. 77 FR 64148 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Regulatory...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-18

    ... Regulatory Guides (RG) RG 1.79, ````Preoperational Testing of Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Pressurized Water Reactors,'' Revision 2 and RG 1.79.1, ``Initial Test Program of Emergency Core Cooling Systems for...

  5. 77 FR 5063 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Thermal...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-02-01

    ... Regulatory Guide (1.79), ``Preoperational Testing of Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Pressurized Water Reactors,'' and Draft Guide DG-1277, ``Initial Test Program of Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Boiling...

  6. National viewpoints: Views on strengthened safeguards from Australia, Cuba and South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biggs, I.; Saburido, E.F.; Mxakato-Diseko, N.J.

    1999-01-01

    This paper presents views of Australia, Cuba and South Africa concerned with strengthened safeguards regime. Australia has been involved with the IAEA safeguards system since the first plenary meeting of the Conference on the IAEA Statute in 1956, joined the NPT in 1973 and began concluding bilateral safeguards agreements in 1977. Australia has the greatest respect for the IAEA coordinated efforts started in 1998 to strengthen and integrate the safeguards system. Cuba has always attached special importance to nuclear safeguards activities, recognizing their high priority as well as the important role they have in respect to international disarmament and security. South Africa supports the efforts in strengthening the safeguards activities and remains hopeful that the international community will address the challenges posed by the Trilateral Initiative between Russian federation, USA and IAEA in a mature and cooperative way

  7. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities: Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    traditional focus of safeguards is detection capability. Here, the greatest single priority is improving the capability to detect undeclared nuclear programs. Another key priority is greater efficiency in safeguards implementation, to meet an expanding workload. Other priorities include addressing innovative fuel cycle developments, and maintaining safeguards skills and knowledge. As important as these priorities are, it is essential to also address issues of confidence and deterrence. Failures in these areas will undermine the value of the safeguards system and constrain the development of future nuclear verification missions. This paper takes a broader view in discussing the key nuclear verification priorities. (author)

  8. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    traditional focus of safeguards is detection capability. Here, the greatest single priority is improving the capability to detect undeclared nuclear programs. Another key priority is greater efficiency in safeguards implementation, to meet an expanding workload. Other priorities include addressing innovative fuel cycle developments, and maintaining safeguards skills and knowledge. As important as these priorities are, it is essential to also address issues of confidence and deterrence. Failures in these areas will undermine the value of the safeguards system and constrain the development of future nuclear verification missions. This paper takes a broader view in discussing the key nuclear verification priorities. (author)

  9. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information to the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement and is furthered through a common understanding of the respective rights and obligations of States and the IAEA. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published IAEA Services Series No. 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding and improving cooperation in safeguards implementation. To meet their safeguards obligations, States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up their infrastructure to meet their specific needs. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to differences in the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes, their regulatory framework and other factors. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. This SIP Guide addresses the important topic of the provision of information by States to the IAEA. Declarations by States form the basis for IAEA verification activities, and the quality and timeliness of such declarations impact significantly the efficiency of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and their use is voluntary. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

  10. The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitworth, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

  11. Safeguarding research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Powers, J.A.

    1983-03-01

    The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

  12. Safeguards and nonproliferation aspects of a dry fuel recycling technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory undertook an independent assessment of the proliferation potentials and safeguardability of a dry fuel recycling technology, whereby spent pressurized-water reactor (PWR) fuels are used to fuel canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. Objectives of this study included (1) the evaluation of presently available technologies that may be useful to safeguard technology options for dry fuel recycling (2) and identification of near-term and long-term research needs to develop process-specific safeguards requirements. The primary conclusion of this assessment is that like all other fuel cycle alternatives proposed in the past, the dry fuel recycle entails prolfferation risks and that there are no absolute technical fixes to eliminate such risks. This study further concludes that the proliferation risks of dry fuel recycling options are relatively minimal and presently known safeguards systems and technologies can be modified and/or adapted to meet the requirements of safeguarding such fuel recycle facilities

  13. Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

    1983-01-01

    A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

  14. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  15. NRC study of control room habitability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hayes, J.J. Jr.; Muller, D.R.; Gammill, W.P.

    1985-01-01

    Since 1980, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has held several meetings with the NRC staff to discuss the subject of control room habitability. Several meetings between the ACRS and the staff have resulted in ACRS letters that express specific concerns, and the staff has provided responses in reports and meetings. In June of 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations directed the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Inspection and Enforcement to develop a plan to handle the issues raised by the ACRS and to report to him specific proposed courses of action to respond to the ACRS's concerns. The NRC control room habitability working group has reviewed the subject in such areas as NRR review process, transformation of control room habitability designs to as-built systems, and determination of testing protocol. The group has determined that many of the ACRS concerns and recommendations are well founded, and has recommended actions to be taken to address these as well as other concerns which were raised independent of the ACRS. The review has revealed significant areas where the approach presently utilized in reviews should be altered

  16. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  17. Dynamic analysis of nuclear safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson, J.R.; Rasmuson, D.M.; Tingey, F.H.

    1978-01-01

    The assessment of the safeguards/adversary system poses a unique challenge as evolving technology affects the capabilities of both. The method discussed meets this challenge using a flexible analysis which can be updated by system personnel. The automatically constructed event tree provides a rapid overview analysis for initial assessment, evaluation of changes, cost/benefit study and inspection and audit

  18. Unattended safeguards instrumentation at centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, L. Eric; Lebrun, Alain R.; Labella, Rocco

    2014-01-01

    As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants, particularly high‑capacity plants, while working within budgetary constraints. New safeguards approaches should meet the high‑level verification objectives for such facilities (i.e., timely detection of: diversion of declared material, excess production beyond declared amounts, and production of enrichment levels higher than declared), but should also strive for efficiency advantages in implementation, for both the IAEA and operators. Under the Agency’s State- level approach to safeguards implementation, the Agency needs a flexible toolbox of technologies, allowing tailoring of safeguards measures for each individual enrichment facility. In this paper, the potential roles and development status for three different types of unattended measurement instrumentation are discussed. On‑Line Enrichment Monitors (OLEM) could provide continuous enrichment measurement for 100% of the declared gas flowing through unit header pipes. Unattended Cylinder Verification Stations (UCVS) could provide unattended verification of the declared uranium mass and enrichment of 100% of the cylinders moving through the plant, but also apply and verify an ‘NDA Fingerprint’ to preserve verification knowledge on the contents of each cylinder throughout its life in the facility. Sharing of the operator’s load cell signals from feed and withdrawal stations could count all cylinders introduced to the process and provide periodic monitoring of the uranium mass balance for in‑process material. The integration of load cell, OLEM and UCVS data streams offers the possibility for 100% verification of declared cylinder flow, and enables the periodic verification of the declared 235 U mass balance in the plant. These new capabilities would enhance the IAEA

  19. Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Terada, Hiromi; Akiba, Mitsunori; Ando, Hisataka; Okazaki, Shuji; Irikura, Masatoshi; Kurihara, Hiroyoshi

    2000-01-01

    inspectors to implement safeguards inspections were provided for various types of facilities in Japan. The practical progress of the safeguards implementations by the NMCC will be presented in the annual meeting of the INMM Japan Chapter in December 2000. (author)

  20. A data management system for safeguards applications (DMSSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu Yuan

    1994-09-01

    Implementation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) in China has begun since 1989. DESSA serves as an automated tool to provide the quality Accounting Reports to the IAEA as well as to perform the data management of safeguards database. It is implemented on an IBM-compatible PC. The system is characterized as a single-user, small-scale system with cost-effective and easy-to-use feature. It consists of a data manipulating system and a database specially designed for safeguards applications. It involves several functions such as: Report Edit, Quality Control, Auditing and Data Verification, Information Retrieval and Film Management, Database Querying and so on. All functions of the system are used in an interactive mode and organized in a pull-down menu. The general design consideration of the system is that it should completely meet the requirements of the safeguards activities to provide the basis for the application of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement between China and IAEA

  1. A data management system for safeguards applications (DMSSA)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yuan, Wu [Beijing Inst. of Nuclear Engineering (China)

    1994-09-01

    Implementation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) in China has begun since 1989. DESSA serves as an automated tool to provide the quality Accounting Reports to the IAEA as well as to perform the data management of safeguards database. It is implemented on an IBM-compatible PC. The system is characterized as a single-user, small-scale system with cost-effective and easy-to-use feature. It consists of a data manipulating system and a database specially designed for safeguards applications. It involves several functions such as: Report Edit, Quality Control, Auditing and Data Verification, Information Retrieval and Film Management, Database Querying and so on. All functions of the system are used in an interactive mode and organized in a pull-down menu. The general design consideration of the system is that it should completely meet the requirements of the safeguards activities to provide the basis for the application of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement between China and IAEA.

  2. 78 FR 25769 - Notice of Meeting; Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-02

    ... Containments to Early Failure from Hydrogen Combustion during a Severe Accident'' (Open)--The Committee will... Combustion during a Severe Accident.'' 4:45 p.m.-7:00 p.m.: Preparation of ACRS Reports (Open)--The Committee...

  3. Report on the September 2011 Meeting of the Next Generation Safegaurds Professional Network

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gitau, Ernest TN; Benz, Jacob M.

    2011-12-19

    The Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN) was established in 2009 by Oak Ridge National Laboratory targeted towards the engagement of young professionals employed in safeguards across the many national laboratories. NGSPN focuses on providing a mechanism for young safeguards professionals to connect and foster professional relationships, facilitating knowledge transfer between current safeguards experts and the next generation of experts, and acting as an entity to represent the interests of the international community of young and mid-career safeguards professionals. This is accomplished in part with a yearly meeting held at a national laboratory site. In 2011, this meeting was held at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This report documents the events and results of that meeting.

  4. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-01-01

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  5. The Agency programme for the development of safeguards techniques and instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopez-Menchero, E.; Waligura, A.J.

    1976-01-01

    The programme of the Division of Development concentrates attention upon a variety of technical problems and tasks to enable the Agency safeguards system to achieve its safeguards objectives most economically for the Agency, the Member States and the nuclear facility operators. The programme must take into account the changes which may occur in the Agency's tasks as a consequence of implementation of safeguards in States with important nuclear activities. This paper attempts to summarize where the Agency methods and techniques development programme stands on meeting defined technical objectives, to point out where the main problems lie and to offer some guidelines for their solution. (author)

  6. Safeguarding a future industrial reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    This paper is submitted to Working Group 5, Sub-Group B for information. It is being submitted to Working Group 4 for discussion at their meeting in January 1979 and shows that by a combination of accountancy, surveillance and containment a reliable safeguards system can be designed for the reprocessing of fuels of the BWR and PWR type. Its arguments can, in general terms, be applied to plants for reprocessing LMFBR fuels, with due allowance for future advances which should improve our overall knowledge of the reliability of safeguards systems. In the reprocessing of fast reactor (LMFBR) fuels, as compared with LWR fuels, the main differences are the higher plutonium concentration and lower heavy metal throughput in the early stages of the reprocessing operations. At later stages in the process (after plutonium/uranium separation) the plants could be similar and have similar safeguarding problems. Plants for reprocessing LMFBR on a commercial scale will not be in operation for a number of years. In these plants greater attention may have to be paid to safeguards at the early stages, especially to waste/raffinate streams, than in the PWR/BWR reprocessing plant. The actual balance between containment, surveillance and accountancy adopted will depend on the status of the technology of safeguards and reprocessing. It can be anticipated that improvements to measurement systems will be made which may allow greater reliance on actual measurement. Treatment and recycle of solid wastes will advance and could therefore lead to improvements in accountancy in, for example, the ''head-end''

  7. Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jarman, Kenneth D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Joslyn, Cliff A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kreyling, Sean J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sayre, Amanda M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Schanfein, Mark J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); West, Curtis L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Winters, Samuel T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2017-02-07

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies as well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.

  8. 75 FR 4428 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Revised Meeting Notice

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-27

    ..., 2010 (75 FR 3501-3502). The discussion on the Draft Final Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.141... site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html or http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ACRS...

  9. Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

  10. Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

  11. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-12-15

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  12. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  13. Policy and technical issues for international safeguards in nuclear weapons states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Stanbro, W.D.

    1994-01-01

    Expansion of international safeguards into the military and commercial fuel cycles of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) -- the subject of previous proposals in international safeguards discussions and of studies in the safeguards literature -- has been given impetus by recent US government initiatives for safeguards on excess weapons materials and a verified fissile materials production cutoff. These proposals, if implemented, would have implications on the safeguards objectives, approaches, and technologies that are traditionally employed in international safeguards. This paper examines the modifications and innovations that might be required to the current international safeguards regime in meeting these proposed new roles. Although the examples given are in the context of the US materials and facilities, many of the conclusions are valid for other NWS. None of the statements in this paper represent official US position on policy for international safeguards in weapons states. Instead, the purpose is to identify policy and technical issues and to offer, where possible, options for their resolution. This paper limits consideration to the potential role of the IAEA in verifying these proposed initiatives for declared facilities, recognizing that there may also be a role for bilateral, multilateral, or regional verification regimes. Indeed, in some cases verification of weapons materials may be more appropriate for a bilateral arrangement. Because traditional IAEA safeguards may not be admissible for weapons materials, the concept of ''transparency'' is suggested as a less intrusive alternative providing some confidence that materials are as declared

  14. 76 FR 44377 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on AP1000...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-25

    ..., 2011-1 p.m. until 5 p.m. The Subcommittee will review technical updates in Revision 19 to the AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD). The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with the... statements can be obtained from the website cited above or by contacting the identified DFO. Moreover, in...

  15. 76 FR 11525 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on U.S...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-02

    ...: Wednesday, March 23, 2011--8:30 a.m. until 5 p.m. The Subcommittee will continue its review of Chapter 15 of the U.S. EPR Document Control Design (DCD) Safety Evaluation Report (SER) with Open Items. The... from the website cited above or by contacting the identified DFO. Moreover, in view of the possibility...

  16. Application of a portable briefcase personal computer to research reactor safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryan, R.D.

    1985-01-01

    The Kookaburra Portable Briefcase Personal Computer (PBPC) has been applied to safeguards inspections at the HIFAR research reactor. A complete portable measuring system provides for non-destructive assay on both fresh and spent fuel. Application programs developed for the PBPC make it possible to immediately analyse the results of the measurements to verify the amounts of nuclear material declared by the operator. This contributes significantly to meeting the essential safeguards criteria of timely detection of diversion

  17. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient

  18. INL Human Resource Development and the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gouveia, Fernando; Metcalf, Richard Royce Madison

    2010-07-01

    It is the stated goal of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to promote the development of a strengthened nuclear safeguards base, one with the potential to advance the secure and peaceful implementation of nuclear energy world-wide. To meet this goal, the initiative, among other things, has sought to develop a revitalized effort to ensure the continued availability of next generation safeguards professionals. Accordingly, this paper serves to outline the human capital building strategies taken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in line with the NGSI. Various components are presented in detail, including INL’s efforts directed at university outreach, in particular the laboratory’s summer internship program, along with the development of various innovative training programs and long-term oriented strategies for student professional development. Special highlights include a video training series, developed by INL in cooperation with LLNL and other laboratories, which sought to expose students and entry-level professionals to the concept and practice of international nuclear safeguards.

  19. International safeguards 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1979-01-01

    First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

  20. Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

  1. AECL's advanced CANDU reactor - the ACR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alizadeh, Ala; Allsop, Peter; Hedges, Ken; Hopwood, Jerry; Yu, Stephen

    2003-01-01

    The ACR, the next generation CANDU design, represents the next step in development of the CANDU family of designs. AECL has achieved significant incremental improvements to the mid-size CANDU 6 nuclear power plant through successive projects, both in design and in project delivery. Building on this knowledge base, AECL is continuing to adapt the CANDU design to develop the ACR. This paper summarizes the ACR design features, which include major improvements in economics, inherent safety characteristics, performance and construction methods. Aimed at producing electrical power at a capital cost significantly less than that of the current reactor designs, the ACR is an evolutionary design based on the very successful CANDU 6 reactor. The new ACR product is specifically designed to produce power at a cost competitive with other forms of power generation while achieving short construction times, improved safety, international licensability, high investor returns, and low investor risk. It achieves these targets by taking advantage of the latest advances in both pressure-tube and pressure-vessel reactor technologies and experience. The flexibility and development potential of the fuel channel approach also enables designs to be developed that address priorities identified in international long-term specification programs such as the US Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored Generation IV program and IAEA hosted INPRO program. ACR-700 can be built in 36 months with a 48 month project duration, and deliver a lifetime capacity factor in excess of 90%. Overall, the ACR design represents a balance of proven design basis and innovations to give step improvements in safety, reliability and economics. The ACR development program, now well into the detail design stage, includes parallel formal licensing in the USA and Canada. Based on the status of the ACR design and AECL's on-going experience delivering reactor projects on-time and on-budget, the first ACR could be in service by

  2. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert S.; Hockert, John W.; Hebditch, David J.

    2009-01-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  3. Combating obsolescence - ACR digital control systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tikku, S.; Raiskums, G.

    2006-01-01

    The ever increasing use of digital technologies and products to meet the control, automation and monitoring needs of the nuclear power plant - even though justified by the benefits it provides - comes with an increased risk of technological obsolescence happening through the course of the plant life. Some well considered strategies are being employed in the ACR design process to minimise this risk and alleviate the consequence if it happens. These include application of a modular overall architecture, adoption of international widely accepted standards to harmonise equipment qualification and software practices, production of control functional specifications that are not influenced by target platform, and careful selection of technologies and products. (author)

  4. The ACR Model

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bec, Frederique; Rahbek, Anders Christian; Shephard, Neil

    2008-01-01

    This paper proposes and analyses the autoregressive conditional root (ACR) time-series model. This multivariate dynamic mixture autoregression allows for non-stationary epochs. It proves to be an appealing alternative to existing nonlinear models, e.g. the threshold autoregressive or Markov...... switching class of models, which are commonly used to describe nonlinear dynamics as implied by arbitrage in presence of transaction costs. Simple conditions on the parameters of the ACR process and its innovations are shown to imply geometric ergodicity, stationarity and existence of moments. Furthermore...

  5. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  6. 76 FR 66889 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safeguarding Unclassified DoD Information...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-10-28

    ...). ACTION: Notice of meeting. SUMMARY: DoD is hosting a public meeting to initiate a dialogue with industry... not presently address the safeguarding of unclassified DoD information within industry, nor does it... processed through security in a timely fashion. Prior registrants will be given priority if room constraints...

  7. U.S. next generation safeguards initiative: the human capital development program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scholz, M.A.

    2013-01-01

    The Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogram of the U.S. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is developing sustainable academic and technical programs that support the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals. This wide-ranging HCD effort endeavors to develop additional human resources to address current shortfalls, encourage U.S. experts to seek employment at the IAEA, and identify and train a new cadre of safeguards experts to meet the needs of both the United States and the IAEA for decades to come. In recent years, a convergence of factors has challenged the IAEA's ability to carry out its safeguards mission effectively. A staffing study shows that less than 20% of the international safeguards specialists in the U.S. workforce are 44 years of age or younger and that over 80% of the international safeguards specialists at the National Laboratories will be retired or otherwise resigned within 15 years. An aging workforce nearing retirement and growing workload, coupled with a safeguards budget that has remained essentially flat in real terms for nearly two decades, have posed particular challenges to the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Recognizing the trends, the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) launched NGSI in the fall of 2007. Since that time, the HCD subprogram of NGSI has sponsored over 300 safeguards internships at U.S. National Labs, organized eight annual short safeguards policy and technical courses, worked with ten universities to develop new undergraduate and graduate course-work on international safeguards and nonproliferation, established a highly competitive graduate fellowship program, and completed a human capital requirements study that closely examined the safeguards workforce within the U.S. National Lab complex. Of past NGSI students and interns, nearly four in ten pursue multiple NGSI

  8. A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

    2011-12-15

    Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

  9. Proceedings, annual meeting - Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 21st, 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1980-01-01

    This meeting proceedings contains 84 papers by various authors. Some of the topics discussed are: safeguards today and tomorrow; physical protection-requirements and rules; safeguards measurement technology; nonproliferation and international safeguards; analysis and interpretation of materials accounting data; physical protection; safeguards evaluation methodologies; public information; emergency response for accounting and physical security systems; materials control and accountability systems; and safeguards measurements technology. 78 papers are separately indexed

  10. The Use of Performance Metrics for the Assessment of Safeguards Effectiveness at the State Level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bachner K. M.; George Anzelon, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Yana Feldman, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Mark Goodman,Department of State, Washington, DC Dunbar Lockwood, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC Jonathan B. Sanborn, JBS Consulting, LLC, Arlington, VA.

    2016-07-24

    In the ongoing evolution of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the state level, many safeguards implementation principles have been emphasized: effectiveness, efficiency, non-discrimination, transparency, focus on sensitive materials, centrality of material accountancy for detecting diversion, independence, objectivity, and grounding in technical considerations, among others. These principles are subject to differing interpretations and prioritizations and sometimes conflict. This paper is an attempt to develop metrics and address some of the potential tradeoffs inherent in choices about how various safeguards policy principles are implemented. The paper carefully defines effective safeguards, including in the context of safeguards approaches that take account of the range of state-specific factors described by the IAEA Secretariat and taken note of by the Board in September 2014, and (2) makes use of performance metrics to help document, and to make transparent, how safeguards implementation would meet such effectiveness requirements.

  11. Consultants' report on meeting for development of technical criteria for termination of safeguards for material categorized as measured discards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1990-03-15

    The following view is held by the consultants. The Agency should have criteria which can be used in the field and which can be used by an inspector to answer the question of whether a particular batch of material presented for termination of safeguards does, in fact, qualify for the termination of safeguards. To maintain the credibility of safeguards, the criteria of termination should be such that termination of waste is not the weak link in the safeguards system. That is, that given a choice, a potential diverter would choose to obtain nuclear material he needs from a source other than recovery from waste upon which safeguards has been terminated

  12. Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

    2015-01-01

    There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

  13. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PEPPER, S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-01-01

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R and D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  14. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  15. ACR-1000: Operator - based development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shalaby, B.; Alizadeh, A.

    2007-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has adapted the successful features of CANDU * reactors to establish Generation III + Advanced CANDU Reactor T M (ACR T M) technology. The ACR-1000 T M nuclear power plant is an evolutionary product, starting with the strong base of CANDU reactor technology, coupled with thoroughly-demonstrated innovative features to enhance economics, safety, operability and maintainability. The ACR-1000 benefits from AECL's continuous-improvement approach to design, that enabled the traditional CANDU 6 product to compile an exceptional track record of on-time, on budget product delivery, and also reliable, high capacity-factor operation. The ACR-1000 engineering program has completed the basic plant design and has entered detailed pre-project engineering and formal safety analysis to prepare the preliminary (non-project-specific) safety case. The engineering program is strongly operator-based, and encompasses much more than traditional pre-project design elements. A team of utility-experienced operations and maintenance experts is embedded in the engineering team, to ensure that all design decisions, at the system and the component level, are taken with the owner-operator interest in mind. The design program emphasizes formal review of operating feedback, along with extensive operator participation in program management and execution. Design attention is paid to layout and access of equipment, to component and material selection, and to ensuring maximum ability for on-line maintenance. This enables the ACR-1000 to offer a three-year interval between scheduled maintenance outages, with a standard 21-day outage duration. SMART CANDU T M technology allows on-line monitoring and diagnostics to further enhance plant operation. Modules of the Advanced CANDU SMART technologies are already being back-fitted to current CANDU plants. As well as reviewing the ACR-1000 design features and their supporting background, the paper describes the status of

  16. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  17. IAEA Safeguards and technical support programs: POTAS in the 1990s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kessler, C.J.

    1991-01-01

    The US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) has since 1978 provided technology and technical assistance to the IAEA to support its nuclear safeguards activities. The present level of support, $6.9 million per year, equals 10% of the Department of Safeguards annual budget. During the next decade, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will face new technical challenges in carrying out its verification activities. To help the IAEA acquire the technology and other technical support that it will require in the 1990s, POTAS expects to continue its assistance, both in the areas established in the past and in additional areas dictated by newly identified IAEA safeguards requirements. This paper will look at the political and policy context within which the Department of Safeguards, and hence POTAS, operates, and how that context is expected to evolve over the next decade. The roles and functions of POTAS will be identified and discussed in terms of their historical evolution. Lastly, the paper will consider how POTAS is expected to change during the 1990s, both to maintain effectiveness in existing roles and functions, and to meet the challenge of the changing policy context. 5 refs

  18. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-01-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  19. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  20. Developing the Next Generation of International Safeguards and Nonproliferation Experts: Highlights of Select Activities at the National Laboratories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reed, J; Mathews, C; Kirk, B; Lynch, P; Doyle, J; Meek, E; Pepper, S; Metcalf, R

    2010-03-31

    With many safeguards experts in the United States at or near retirement age, and with the growing and evolving mission of international safeguards, attracting and educating a new generation of safeguards experts is an important element of maintaining a credible and capable international safeguards system. The United States National Laboratories, with their rich experience in addressing the technical and policy challenges of international safeguards, are an important resource for attracting, educating, and training future safeguards experts. This presentation highlights some of the safeguards education and professional development activities underway at the National Laboratories. These include university outreach, summer courses, internships, mid-career transition, knowledge retention, and other projects. The presentation concludes with thoughts on the challenge of interdisciplinary education and the recruitment of individuals with the right balance of skills and backgrounds are recruited to meet tomorrow's needs.

  1. Safeguards Licensing Aspects of a Future Gen IV Test Facility - a Case Study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lindell, M. Aberg; Grape, S.; Hakansson, A.; Svaerd, S. Jacobsson

    2010-01-01

    The scope of this study covers safeguards licensing aspects of a possible future Gen IV demonstration facility. As a basis for the investigation, the facility was assumed to be located in Sweden, comprising a lead-cooled fast reactor and a reprocessing plant with fuel fabrication. The aim has been to identify safeguards requirements that may be set by the IAEA and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, and also to suggest how the safeguards system could be implemented in practice. The changed usage and handling of nuclear fuel, as compared to that of today, has been examined in order to determine how today's safeguards measures can be modified and extended to meet the needs of the demonstration facility. This work is part of GENIUS, the Swedish Gen IV research and development programme, which emphasizes lead-cooled fast reactors. (author)

  2. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

  3. Nuclear Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, T.

    2015-01-01

    The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

  4. Safeguards research: assessing material control and accounting systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maimoni, A.

    1977-01-01

    The Laboratory is working for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to improve the safeguarding of special nuclear material at nuclear fuel processing facilities, to provide a basis for improved regulations for material control and accounting systems, and to develop an assessment procedure for verifying compliance with these regulations. Early work included setting up a hierarchy of safeguard objectives and a set of measurable parameters with which systems performance to meet those objectives can be measured. Present work has focused on developing a computerized assessment procedure. We have also completed a test bed (based on a plutonium nitrate storage area) to identify and correct problems in the procedure and to show how this procedure can be used to evaluate the performance of an applicant's material control and accounting system

  5. Keynote Address: ACR-NEMA standards and their implications for teleradiology

    Science.gov (United States)

    Horii, Steven C.

    1990-06-01

    The ACR-NEMA Standard was developed initially as an interface standard for the interconnection of two pieces of imaging equipment Essentially the Standard defmes a point-to-point hardware connection with the necessary protocol and data structure so that two differing devices which meet the specification will be able to communicate with each other. The Standard does not defme a particular PACS architecture nor does it specify a database structure. In part these are the reasons why implementers have had difficulty in using the Standard in a full PACS. Recent activity of the Working Groups formed by the Committee overseeing work on the ACR-NEMA Standard has changed some of the " flavor" of the Standard. It was realized that connection of PACS with hospital and radiology information systems (HIS and RIS) is necessary if a PACS is ever to be succesful. The idea of interconnecting heterogeneous computer systems has pushed Standards development beyond the scope of the original work. Teleradiology which inherenfly involves wide-area networking may be a direct beneficiary of the new directions taken by the Standards Working Groups. This paper will give a brief history of the ACR-NEMA effort describe the " parent" Standard and its " offspring" and describe the activity of the current Working Groups with particular emphasis on the potential impacts on teleradiology.

  6. 78 FR 32476 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Digital I&C...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-30

    ..., June 4, 2013--1:00 p.m. Until 5:00 p.m. The Subcommittee will review and discuss all cyber security... Flint North building, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. After registering with security, please...

  7. 78 FR 27443 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Digital I&C...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-10

    ... Electronics Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants;'' 5. Proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.173... Power Plants.'' The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with the NRC staff and... appropriate arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be...

  8. Safeguards By Design - As applied to the Sellafield Product and Residue Store (SPRS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chare, Peter; Lahogue, Yves; Schwalbach, Peter; Smejkal, Andreas; Patel, Bharat [European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, Directorate E - Nuclear Safeguards, Euroforum, Luxembourg (Luxembourg)

    2011-12-15

    Sellafield Product and Residue Store (SPRS) is a new facility that has been constructed on the site of Sellafield. The design work started in early 2001 and active commissioning commenced with the introduction of the first nuclear material which arrived in the building early 2011. The store has been designed for the long term storage of Plutonium product (PuO2) from Thorp and Magnox, MOX residue powder from Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) as well as pellet, powder or granular PuO2 residues from the older stores on the Sellafield site. This paper describes the application of Safeguards By Design commencing at the early design stage based upon the Safeguards Approach to be applied by DG ENER at the Sellafield Product and Residue Store (SPRS). The approach had been developed based upon the requirements for implementing Commission Regulation 302(2005) and the technical measures to be implemented in order to meet Article 77(a) of the Euratom Treaty. In order to meet these requirements a close dialogue was established between the different interested parties and the design team for the installation of instrumentation with associated cabling in order to implement the agreed safeguards measures. Early contacts at the design stage facilitated the inclusion of installed safeguards supplied instrumentation into the overall design and facility construction. The equipment and cabling supplied by Euratom was incorporated into the planning and construction phases. This ensured that upon plant completion the safeguards tools were commissioned and ready for the verification of the first nuclear material to be introduced into SPRS. Detailed discussions at the early stages of the design phase raised the profile of nuclear material safeguards and made certain that the necessary instrumentation infrastructure was incorporated into the plant infrastructure.

  9. MO-AB-207-04: ACR Update in Mammography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berns, E.

    2015-01-01

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program

  10. MO-AB-207-02: ACR Update in MR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Price, R.

    2015-01-01

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program

  11. MO-AB-207-04: ACR Update in Mammography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berns, E. [University of Colorado Health Science (United States)

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  12. MO-AB-207-02: ACR Update in MR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Price, R. [Vanderbilt Medical Center (United States)

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  13. MO-AB-207-01: ACR Update in CT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McNitt-Gray, M. [UCLA School of Medicine (United States)

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  14. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  15. Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopatin, S.

    2010-01-01

    Strengthening of SSAC is a necessary condition for application of integrated safeguards. Ukrainian State System has been working since 1994 and passed several stages in its development: At the early stage it allowed us to conclude the first Safeguards Agreement; In 2003 SSAC covered also all nuclear material at locations outside facilities; In 2006 Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force. The significant contribution to strengthening of SSAC has been made by ISSAS mission carried out in Ukraine in 2007. The mission helped us to evaluate the State Safeguards System, provided us recommendations on improving of legislation, in particular to establish the system of personnel training. Cooperation between the IAEA and Ukrainian SSAC is carried out in following directions. Annual meeting of Safeguards Implementation Review Group takes place in Kiev. Participants discuss current tasks or problem issues of Safeguards implementation and work out Action Plan in order to resolve a problem or find a way for improving situation. Ukrainian State inspectors organize and take part in each IAEA inspection and complementary access. Ukraine has got considerable experience in the AP implementation, to a certain extent determined by peculiarities of Ukraine as a former part of a nuclear weapon state. For 5 years we have accumulated a significant amount of AP information and it became a problem to keep track of it. Due to Protocol Reporter software has limited possibilities there was a need to develop additional software for AP information management. The transmission of encrypted data on nuclear materials from surveillance systems installed at all NPPs directly to the IAEA Headquarters has started recently. Since September 2010 the IAEA plans to use these data for drawing conclusion of safeguards implementation that will allow to reduce the number of IAEA inspections to the Ukrainian NPPs. While implementing the AP we got a question about correspondence of efforts spent for

  16. State Regulatory Authority (SRA) Coordination of Safety, Security, and Safeguards of Nuclear Facilities: A Framework for Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mladineo, S.; Frazar, S.; Kurzrok, A.; Martikka, E.; Hack, T.; Wiander, T.

    2013-01-01

    In November 2012 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sponsored a Technical Meeting on the Interfaces and Synergies in Safety, Security, and Safeguards for the Development of a Nuclear Power Program. The goal of the meeting was to explore whether and how safeguards, safety, and security systems could be coordinated or integrated to support more effective and efficient nonproliferation infrastructures. While no clear consensus emerged, participants identified practical challenges to and opportunities for integrating the three disciplines’ regulations and implementation activities. Simultaneously, participants also recognized that independent implementation of safeguards, safety, and security systems may be more effective or efficient at times. This paper will explore the development of a framework for conducting an assessment of safety-security-safeguards integration within a State. The goal is to examine State regulatory structures to identify conflicts and gaps that hinder management of the three disciplines at nuclear facilities. Such an analysis could be performed by a State Regulatory Authority (SRA) to provide a self-assessment or as part of technical cooperation either with a newcomer State, or to a State with a fully developed SRA.

  17. Safeguards '85

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1981-01-01

    IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

  18. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  19. Safeguards on nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

  20. Safeguarding the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

    1985-01-01

    Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

  1. Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

  2. Inventory of safeguards software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

    2009-03-01

    The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

  3. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  4. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  5. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source.

  6. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung

    2016-01-01

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source

  7. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  8. Evolution of safeguards systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-01-01

    Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

  9. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-01-01

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  10. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

    1976-01-01

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

  11. Implementation of safeguards in Spanish NPPs: advantages of cooperation and coordination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampes Blanch, J.; Recio Santamaria, M.

    2007-01-01

    In 2002 the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITYC) informed the operators of the soon entry into force of the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Safeguards Agreement, once its ratification by the Member States of the EU were completed and the Community and national legislations were adapted to the new requirements. The Spanish association for the electrical industry (UNESA) responded to that announcement setting up the UNESA's Safeguards Working Group (USWG), made up of staff of the NPPs in charge of nuclear material accountancy. The USWG was mandated to ensure coordinated implementation of the new safeguards obligation of the Additional Protocol in close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITYC), Spanish authority for safeguards implementation follow up. Although the group was initially meant only for NPPs, later on representatives of other main nuclear facilities (i.e. ENUSA's fuel fabrication facility, the national rad waste company ENRESA, and CIEMAT national research centre) have been also participating in the group's meeting and activities when general discussion points on the entry into force of the AP were dealt with. From 2003 on, the USWG has met periodically with the aim of exchanging experiences in the field of safeguards implementation and jointly dealing with changes to EURATOM and IAEA safeguards systems lately introduced to reinforce their effectiveness and efficiency in response to the challenges posed to the international community by the recent discovery of undeclared nuclear programmes. Along the operation of the USWG, presence of Spanish nuclear industry representatives in international for a dealing with safeguards has remarkably grown up. Moreover, representatives of the USWG have also maintained an active participation in the ESARDA working groups on integrated safeguards (ISWG) and nuclear material accountancy and audit focus group (NMAC-AF)

  12. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  13. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Programs Summary Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, M.; Anzelon, G.; Essner, J.; Dougan, A.; Doyle, J.; Boyer, B.; Hypes, P.; Sokova, E.; Wehling, F.

    2008-01-01

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A and M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students

  14. Methodology for predicting ultimate pressure capacity of the ACR-1000 containment structure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saudy, A.M.; Awad, A.; Elgohary, M.

    2006-01-01

    The Advanced CANDU Reactor or the ACR-1000 is developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to be the next step in the evolution of the CANDU product line. It is based on the proven CANDU technology and incorporates advanced design technologies. The ACR containment structure is an essential element of the overall defense in depth approach to reactor safety, and is a physical barrier against the release of radioactive material to the environment. Therefore, it is important to provide a robust design with an adequate margin of safety. One of the key design requirements of the ACR containment structure is to have an ultimate pressure capacity that is at least twice the design pressure Using standard design codes, the containment structure is expected to behave elastically at least up to 1.5 times the design pressure. Beyond this pressure level, the concrete containment structure with reinforcements and post-tension tendons behaves in a highly non-linear manner and exhibits a complex response when cracks initiate and propagate. To predict the structural non-linear responses, at least two critical features are involved. These are: the structural idealization by the geometry and material property models, and the adopted solution algorithm. Therefore, detailed idealization of the concrete structure is needed in order to accurately predict its ultimate pressure capacity. This paper summarizes the analysis methodology to be carried out to establish the ultimate pressure capacity of the ACR containment structure and to confirm that the structure meets the specified design requirements. (author)

  15. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

  16. Experience of Brazilian safeguards analytical laboratory in DA analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bezerra, J.H.B.; Araujo, R.M.S.; Pereira, J.C.A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Brazilian Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, inaugurated in September 1983, performs uranium analysis in samples of nuclear materials taken during national safeguards inspections as well as in samples taken during ABACC's inspections performed in Argentina. The Laboratory analyzes Intercomparison samples provided by IAEA, NBL, ABACC, CEN and EQRAIN. The method used to perform uranium analysis is the Davies and Gray/NBL. All the steps of the analytical procedures, such as chemical kinetics of the reactions and instrumental parameters, are rigorously controlled. An internal Quality Control of the measurements is made by means of analysis of Certified Reference Materials and the performance of the results meets the ESARDA's Target Values for Random and Systematic Components both in Intercomparison Samples and in samples taken during inspections. The typical precision, expressed as relative standard deviation, and accuracy obtained in a routine basis for nuclear grade materials is 0.1% and 0.14% respectively. The performance of the results obtained are comparable to the best international laboratories which perform uranium analysis in nuclear materials for safeguards purposes. (author)

  17. Assessment of Process Monitoring Techniques for Pyro processing Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Y. E.; Kim, C. M.; Yim, M. S. [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    PM technologies can be used to inspect normal/off-normal operation with various data obtained from facility operations in real time to meet safeguards objectives. To support the use of PM technologies for the purpose of pyroprocessing safeguards, this study aims at identifying technologies that could be useful for PM purposes and evaluating their applicability to a pyroprocessing facility. This paper describes the development of the assessment criteria to evaluate the practicality of candidate technologies for PM based on a variety of requirements and considerations. By using the developed assessment criteria, application of technologies in the oxide reduction process was assessed as a test case example. Research is necessary to validate the criteria according to the needs of each unit process, perhaps based on expert elicitation and/or international collaboration with other expert organization(s). These advanced assessment criteria will serve a useful guideline for selecting appropriate candidate PM technologies for pyroprocessing safeguards. Based on the results of using these evaluation criteria, the optimum technologies can be successfully selected for use at a large scale pyroprocessing facility.

  18. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  19. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  20. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1983-01-01

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  1. Results of the joint ESARDA/INMM workshop on science and modern technology for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Dupree, S.; Sonnier, C.

    1997-01-01

    The Joint ESARDA/INMM Workshop on Science and Modem Technology for Safeguards was held in Arona, Italy, October 28-31, 1996. It was attended by some 120 participants, consisting principally of scientists from various disciplines and safeguards experts from the inspectorates. The Workshop provided a full discussion on the near and far term scientific technologies that may be applied to safeguards. In addition, there were extended discussions on the social and political aspects surrounding the areas of Nonproliferation, International Safeguards, and Regional Safeguards. The general opinion was that the Workshop met and exceeded its goals, setting the stage for future workshops of this type. One of the outstanding characteristics of this Workshop was the ample amount of time allowed for full discussion of each presentation, both for technical issues and social/political issues. This procedure was substantially different from the usual ESARDA and INMM meetings. This paper will discuss the organization and conduct of the Workshop, as well as the results as reported by the four Working Group Chairs and the Workshop Co-chairs

  2. Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Qun

    2001-01-01

    Full text: China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a multi-disciplinary institute under the leadership of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards was established at CIAE in 1991 to develop safeguards technology and to provide technical assistance to competent authorities for nuclear material management and control, which became one of the key laboratories approved by CNNC in 1993. The main research works for safeguards at CIAE include: nuclear material control and accounting, facilities license review and assessment, domestic inspection, NDA and DA analysis, physical protection and technical training. Research and development of equipment and technique for safeguards has been continuing at CIAE. A variety of NDA equipment that has different resolution and analysis capability has been developed. Method of NDA measurement has been investigated for nuclear material with different characteristics. Mathematics method such as Monte Carlo simulation is applied in NDA. Advanced destructive analysis (DA) instrument is installed at laboratory of CIAE, such as TIMS, ICP-MS and electronic chemistry analyzing system. The high accuracy results of element analysis and isotopic analysis for nuclear material can be obtained. It is possible to measure the types and quantities of nuclear material in a given area by means of NDA and DA. Physical protection system has also been developed. It consists of access control and management, various alarm (including perimeter alarm, intrusion alarms, fire alarms), video and audio monitors, intercommunication set and central console. The system can meet technical requirement for safeguards of first rank. Nuclear material accounting is an important aspect of safeguards research at CIAE. The computer software related to material accounting has been developed. It is the important task for scientists at CIAE to design and review nuclear accounting systems in various facilities. For

  3. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  4. MO-AB-207-03: ACR Update in Nuclear Medicine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harkness, B.

    2015-01-01

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program

  5. MO-AB-207-03: ACR Update in Nuclear Medicine

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harkness, B. [Henry Ford Hospital System (United States)

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  6. Charting the social order of meetings

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ravn, Ib

    , with its cumbersome rules safeguarding formal-democratic decision-making, (3) the collective–egalitarian style of community-type meetings where anyone can speak anytime about anything, and (4) the facilitative style, in which a facilitator guides the meeting conversation with a firm hand such that all...

  7. Use of Equipment Information System (EQUIS) to determine priority for purchasing safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silberberg, S.

    1988-01-01

    To manage its large world-wide inventory of safeguards equipment, the IAEA Safeguards department uses a computerized Equipment Information System (EQUIS). EQUIS data have been analyzed using Queueing Theory to determine if inventory is adequate to meet inspector demands and in those cases where it is inadequate, to indicate how many additional units should be procured. Results are tabulated for various types of non-destructive analysis (NDA) equipment. For equipment where there is a high turnover and hence a large amount of data, the analysis provides a powerful tool for assisting procurement decisions

  8. Impact of modules on the ACR construction schedule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choy, Ed; Elgohary, Medhat; Fairclough, Neville; Yu, Stephen; Murayama, Kouichi; Miura, Jun; Kawahata, Junichi

    2003-01-01

    The ACR (Advanced CANDU Reactor), developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), is designed with constructability considerations as a major requirement during all project phases from the concept design stage to the detail design stage. For ACR-700, a project schedule of 48 months has been developed for the nth replicated unit with a 36 month construction period duration from First Concrete to Fuel Load. AECL, recognizing the immense benefit of collective experience, is partnering with Hitachi Ltd in the development of the ACR power plant design. AECL has gained valuable experience in implementing new construction methods at the Qinshan (Phase III) twin unit CANDU 6 plant in China, and Hitachi likewise has enjoyed success in modular construction of ABWRs in Japan. Utilizing these experiences, AECL is developing the ACR nuclear steam plant (NSP) and Hitachi is developing the Turbine Building. An overall construction strategy, which builds on the success of these construction methods from the nuclear power plant developments in China and Japan, has been developed for the ACR. The overall construction strategy comprises the 'Open Top' construction technique using a Very Heavy Lift crane, parallel construction activities, with extensive modularization and prefabrication. Modules and prefabrications are major features of the ACR design, resulting in an excess of 80% of Reactor Building internal work being completed as modules or as very streamlined traditional construction. This paper reviews the ACR construction strategy and provides examples of modules and how they impact on the ACR construction schedule. In conclusion, the ACR-700 is designed using the latest, proven construction methods to achieve a 36 month construction period for the nth replicated unit. (author)

  9. Strategic plan for the development of IAEA safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, N.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The need for a top-down Safeguards Strategy to focus departmental objectives was recognized by the Programme Performance Appraisal System (PPAS) performed on the Equipment Development Project in 1999. The Department of Safeguards prepared at the end of 2000 a 5-year Strategic Plan to identify the changes and improvements expected to take place over the 2001-2005 period. Those Strategic Objectives were supposed to be used to properly plan IAEA Safeguards activities and define appropriate and coherent R and D programmes. The present paper describes the strategic directions that the IAEA will follow in the area of equipment development in order to meet the Safeguards Department long-term objectives for 2001-2005. The paper, which is derived from the IAEA Strategic Equipment Development Plan, prepared by the Division of Technical Support, includes two parts: general principles and policies applicable to all equipment development tasks; specific strategic guidance. The paper will not describe the detailed plans which are prepared based on the strategic plan on a biannual basis. Equipment development activities have been divided in five major projects (NDA, Seals, Surveillance, Unattended Monitoring and Remote Monitoring). Strategic directions for each of these projects will be described in the paper. Separate sections will deal with equipment development strategic guidance in the area of additional protocol inspections, JNFL projects, illicit trafficking and Trilateral Initiative. (author)

  10. Current Status of J-MOX Safeguards Design and Future Prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sampei, T.; Hiruta, K.; Shimizu, J.; Ikegame, K.

    2015-01-01

    The construction of JNFL MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant (J-MOX) is proceeding toward active test using uranium and MOX in July 2017, and completion of construction in October 2017. Although the construction schedule is largely impacted by progress of licencing, according to domestic law, JNFL is making every effort to get necessary permission of business licence and authorization of design and construction method as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is desirable that integrated safeguards approach is effective, efficient and consistent with J-MOX facility features. Discussion about the approach is going on among IAEA, Japan Safeguards Office (JSGO) and JNFL, and IAEA is planning to introduce the measures into the approach such as application of Near Real-Time Accountancy with frequent declaration from operator, Containment/Surveillance measures to storages, internal flow verification with 100%, random interim inspection (RII) and so on. RII scheme is intended to increase efficiency without compromising effectiveness and makes interruption of facility operation minimum. Also newly developed and improved safeguards equipment will be employed and it is possible to realize to increase credibility and efficiency of inspection by introduction of unattended/automatic safeguards equipment. Especially IAEA and JSGO share the development of non-destructive assay systems which meet the requirements from both parties. These systems will be jointly utilized at the flow verification, RII and PIV. JNFL will continue to provide enough design information in a timely manner toward early establishment of safeguards approach for J-MOX. Also JNFL will implement the coordination of installation and commissioning of safeguards equipment, and Design Information Verification activities for completion of construction in October 2017

  11. Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haginoya, Tohru

    1997-01-01

    INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

  12. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

  13. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  14. New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwanaga, Masayuki

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

  15. A selection of recent achievements and future challenges in safeguards R and D as identified by the European safeguards research and development association

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens, W.A.M.; Sevini, F.; Bril, L.V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.G.A.; Goncalves, J.G.M.; Peerani, P.; Autrusson, B.; Boella, M.; Martikka, E.; Toivonen, H.; Mayer, K.; Rezniczek, A.; Richard, M.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Weh, R.

    2010-01-01

    In the year of its 40. anniversary, ESARDA can look back on a wealth of achievements in the European safeguards area, to which its members have substantially contributed. Also today, ESARDA is more active then ever, both due to an extended partnership (with many new members joining in recent years) and a pro-active attitude to tackle new and upcoming issues through its many Working Groups. ESARDA constitutes today of 9 working groups: Non Destructive Analysis (NDA), Destructive Analysis (DA), Containment and Surveillance (C/S), Verification Technologies and Methodologies (VTM), Implementation of Safeguards (IS), Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Audit Group (NMACAG), Training and Knowledge Management (TKM), Editorial Committee (EDC) and the newly established Novel technologies and approaches (NT/NA). The Fuel Fabrications Plants WG has recently been stopped and part of the activities possibly moved into IS WG. Most of these working groups organise regular meetings in which they discuss the progress, achievements, problems, challenges and future needs for R and D. They jointly work out solutions to problems and stay abreast of the latest safeguards R and D aspects. This paper will provide an overview of some most relevant recent achievements of the ESARDA Working Groups and will provide an insight in the challenges identified for safeguards R and D in the near and medium term future. (authors)

  16. Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

    1991-01-01

    Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

  17. 7 CFR 1412.21 - Election of base acres.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Election of base acres. 1412.21 Section 1412.21... CROP REVENUE ELECTION PROGRAM FOR THE 2008 AND SUBSEQUENT CROP YEARS Establishment of Base Acres for a Farm for Covered Commodities § 1412.21 Election of base acres. (a) Subject to adjustments in paragraph...

  18. Integrated safeguards and security for the INEL Special Isotope Separation Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warner, G.F.; Zack, N.R.

    1990-01-01

    This paper describes the development of the safeguards and security system that was to be used for the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) Production Plant. The US Department of Energy has postponed the construction of the SIS Plant that was to be built at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) site near Idaho Falls, Idaho. The Plant was designed to produce weapons grade plutonium from DOE owned fuel grade plutonium by converting off-spec. plutonium dioxide into metal buttons that would meet required chemical and isotopic specifications. Because this was to be a completely new facility there was a unique opportunity to provide an in-depth, ''state-of-the- art'' safeguards and security system without attempting to overlay upon an existing, older system. This facility was being designed to be in complete compliance with the new DOE Orders by integrating safeguards and security into the plant operating system and by providing graded protection to the areas of varying sensitivity within the plant

  19. IAEA safeguards assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

    1981-01-01

    This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

  20. Safeguards as an evolutionary system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1998-01-01

    NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

  1. The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1998-01-01

    An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data

  2. How the Office of Safeguards and Security Technology development program facilitates safeguarding and securing the DOE complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smoot, W.

    1995-01-01

    The technology development program's (TDP's) mission is to provide technologies or methodologies that address safeguards and security requirements throughout the U.S. DOE complex as well as to meet headquarters' policy needs. This includes developing state-of-the-art technologies or modifying existing technologies in physical security, material control and accountability, information security, and integrated safeguards systems. The TDP has an annual process during which it solicits user requirements from the field. These requirements are analyzed by DOE headquarters and laboratory personnel for technical merit. The requirements are then prioritized at headquarters, and the highest priorities are incorporated into our budget. Although this user-needs process occurs formally once a year, user requirements are accepted at any time. The status of funded technologies is communicated through briefings, programs reviews, and various documents that are available to all interested parties. Participants in several interagency groups allows our program to benefit from what others are doing and to prevent duplications of efforts throughout the federal community. Many technologies are transferred to private industry

  3. 7 CFR 1412.44 - Notification of base acres.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Notification of base acres. 1412.44 Section 1412.44... through 2012 § 1412.44 Notification of base acres. The operator and owners of record of a farm will be notified in writing of the number of base acres eligible for enrollment in a contract, unless such operator...

  4. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  5. Establishment of IAEA knowledge of integrity of the geological repository boundaries and disposed spent fuel assemblies in the context of the Finnish geological repository. Experts' Group meeting Report on Task JNT/C 1204 of the Member States' Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.

    2004-05-01

    The Geological Repository Safeguards Experts Group (Member State Support Programme tasks JNT/C1204 and C1226), agreed that annual meetings should be held to address interface issues between IAEA safeguards and radioactive waste management and to explore the use of safety and operational information to make International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards more effective and efficient for geological repository facilities. It has also been recognised that the safeguards measures for geological repositories are to be developed site-specifically. To address these issues to the planned Olkiluoto repository in Finland a meeting of experts in safety, geological repository operations,and safeguards from 6 States, European Commission, and IAEA was held in Olkiluoto and Rauma, Finland, during September 29 - October 4, 2003. The pre-operational phase of the Olkiluoto repository should be efficiently used by the parties involved in safeguards. The applicability and reliability of the potential new techniques and the efficient practices must be developed and proven before their implementation as safeguards measures to be applied at the subsequent stages of the repository development. The visit to the location of the proposed Olkiluoto repository and neighbouring areas and subsequent presentations enabled the working groups to discuss the various issues with reference to actual site conditions. The working groups were thus able to identify potential measurement and monitoring techniques and research and development requirements for consideration by the Finnish authorities, in addition to making recommendations to the IAEA on planned activities for carrying out before and during the early investigation phase of the proposed Olkiluoto repository. It was understood that all parties shall take good care of the implementation of the planned activities to ensure that proven means, approaches and the required verified information is at hand at the time the projected facility will

  6. Advanced construction methods in ACR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elgohary, M.; Choy, E.; Yu, S.K.W.

    2002-01-01

    The ACR - Advanced CANDU Reactor, developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), is designed with constructability considerations as a major requirement during all project phases from the concept design stage to the detail design stage. This necessitated a much more comprehensive approach in including constructability considerations in the design to ensure that the construction duration is met. For the ACR-700, a project schedule of 48 months has been developed for the nth replicated unit with a 36 month construction period duration from First Concrete to Fuel Load. An overall construction strategy that builds on the success of the construction methods that are proven in the construction of the Qinshan CANDU 6 project has been developed for the ACR. The overall construction strategy comprises the 'Open Top' construction technique using a Very Heavy Lift crane, parallel construction activities, with extensive modularization and prefabrication. In addition, significant applications of up to date construction technology will be implemented, e.g. large volume concrete pours, prefabricated rebar, use of climbing forms, composite structures, prefabricated permanent formwork, automatic welding, and utilization of the latest electronic technology tools such as 3D CADDs modelling yields a very high quality, clash free product to allow construction to be completed 'right the first time' and eliminates rework. Integration of 3D CADDs models and scheduling tools such as Primavera has allowed development of actual construction sequences and an iterative approach to schedule verification and improvement. Modularization and prefabrication are major features of the ACR design in order to achieve the project schedule. For the reactor building approximately 80% of the volume will be installed as modules or prefabricated assembles. This ensures critical path activities are achieved. This paper examines the advanced construction methods implemented in the design in order to

  7. The organisation of interagency training to safeguard children in England: a case study using realistic evaluation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Demi Patsios

    2010-11-01

    Full Text Available Background: Joint training for interagency working is carried out by Local Safeguarding Children Boards in England to promote effective local working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.Purpose: This paper reports on the findings of the outputs and outcomes of interagency training to safeguard children in eight Local Safeguarding Children Boards.Methods: A review of Local Safeguarding Children Board documentation, observations of Local Safeguarding Children Board training sub-group meetings and a series of interviews with training key stakeholders in each Local Safeguarding Children Board were used to assess how partner agencies in the Local Safeguarding Children Boards carried out their statutory responsibilities to organise interagency training. 'Realistic Evaluation' was used to evaluate the mechanisms by which a central government mandate produced particular inter-agency training outputs (number of courses, training days and joint working outcomes (effective partnerships, within particular Local Safeguarding Children Board contexts.Results: The 'mandated partnership' imposed on Local Safeguarding Children Boards by central government left little choice but for partner agencies to work together to deliver joint training, which in turn affected the dynamics of working partnerships across the various sites. The effectiveness of the training sub group determined the success of the organisation and delivery of training for joint working. Despite having a central mandate, Local Safeguarding Children Boards had heterogeneous funding and training arrangements. These resulted in significant variations in the outputs in terms of the number of courses per 'children in need' in the locality and in the cost per course.Conclusions: Interagency training which takes account of the context of the Local Safeguarding Children Board is more likely to produce better trained staff, effective partnership working, and lead to better integrated

  8. U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brenner, L.M.; McDowell, S.C.T.

    1989-01-01

    In discussing the U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development, five significant eras are identified. The period ending January 1, 1947, may be called the first era. Safeguards as known today did not exist and the classic military approach of security protection applied. The second era covers the period from 1947 to 1954 (when the Atomic Energy Act was completely rewritten to accommodate the then foreseen Civil uses Program and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the first steps were taken by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish material accounting records for all source and fissionable materials on inventory. The third era covers the period 1954 through 1968, which focused on nuclear safeguards in its domestic activities and made major policy changes in its approach to material control and accountability. The fourth era, 1968 to 1972 saw a quantum jump in the recognition and need for a significant safeguards research and development program, answered by the formation of a safeguards technical support organization at Brookhaven National Laboratory and a safeguards Laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the development and application of non-destructive assay technology. The fifth era had its beginning in 1972 with the burgeoning of international terrorism. The corresponding need for a strong physical protection research and development support program was responded to by the Sandia National Laboratory

  9. ACR-700 advanced technologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tapping, R.L.; Turner, C.W.; Yu, S.K.W.; Olmstead, R.; Speranzini, R.A.

    2004-01-01

    A successful advanced reactor plant will have optimized economics including reduced operating and maintenance costs, improved performance, and enhanced safety. Incorporating improvements based on advanced technologies ensures cost, safety and operational competitiveness of the ACR-700. These advanced technologies include modern configuration management; construction technologies; operational technology for the control centre and information systems for plant monitoring and analysis. This paper summarizes the advanced technologies used to achieve construction and operational improvements to enhance plant economic competitiveness, advances in the operational technology used for reactor control, and presents the development of the Smart CANDU suite of tools and its application to existing operating reactors and to the ACR-700. (author)

  10. The DOE safeguards and security technology development program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cherry, R.C.; Wheelock, A.J.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that strategic planning for safeguards and security within the Department of Energy emphasizes the contributions of advanced technologies to the achievement of Departmental protection program goals. The Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program provides state-of-the-art technologies, systems and technical services in support of the policies and programmatic requirements for the protection of Departmental assets. The Program encompasses research and development in physical security, nuclear material control and accountability, information security and personnel security, and the integration of these disciplines in advanced applications. Technology development tasks serve goals that range from the maintenance of an effective technology base to the development, testing and evaluation of applications to meet field needs. A variety of factors, from the evolving threat to reconfiguration of the DOE complex and the technical requirements of new facilities, are expected to influence safeguards and security technology requirements and development efforts. Implementation of the Program is based on the systematic identification, prioritization and alignment of technology development tasks and needs. Initiatives currently underway are aimed at enhancing technology development project management. Increased management attention is also being placed on efforts to promote the benefits of the Program through technology transfer and interagency liaison

  11. Development of an advanced safeguards system as a proliferation deterrent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayers, A.A.; Barnes, L.D.

    1978-11-01

    The Advanced Safeguards System consists of Computerized Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting System, Physical Protection System, and Safeguards Coordination Center (SCC). Should all the computer-based monitoring systems be overcome (i.e., the NMC computer programmed not to recognize a materials inventory change, the SCC computer programmed to accept a falsified area and personnel authorization, and the physical security system programmed not to alarm for area intrusion), the requirements of the physical security system remain formidable barriers to successful theft since all SNM is separated from the uncontrolled areas by at least one entry control portal. An egress from the protected area--by either a vehicle through the vehicle access portal, or on foot through the personnel access portal--requires that the individuals be subjected to a search for metal and SNM before egress is permitted. The material access areas are further controlled by an interior access portal imposing the same SNM and metal search criteria. The portal search criteria are not subject to computer interpretation, but direct positive--negative indications to the portal patrolman. The physical security system then provides an independent backup should the computerized systems be defeated. Thus, the computer systems themselves will not, if defeated, guarantee an adversary success. The corollary also holds true; a defeat of the physical search elements of the physical security system will not guarantee adversary success because of the monitoring/surveillance function of the computerized systems. The complementary and overlapping nature of the safeguards systems is intended to provide multiple layers of safeguards, each layer providing an effective element of protection. Tests to date indicate that it appears feasible to meet operational objectives and maintain a high safeguards performance level using these concepts which are being incorporated into the Advanced Safeguards System.None

  12. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

    1981-12-01

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  13. IAEA safeguards glossary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

  14. Gamma techniques for IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards at centrifuge enrichment cascades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aaldijk, J.K.; de Betue, P.A.C.; van der Meer, K.; Harry, R.J.S.

    1987-01-01

    On February 4, 1983, the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP) concluded that the safeguards approach involving limited frequency unannounced access (LFUA) by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to cascades areas together with inspection activities outside the cascade areas meets the IAEA safeguards objectives in an effective and efficient way. In this way, the risks of revealing sensitive information were also minimized. The approach has been defined clearly and unambiguously, and it should be applied equally to all technology holders. One of the conclusions of the HSP was that a nondestructive assay go/no-go technique should be used during the LFUA inspections in the cascade areas of centrifuge enrichment plants. The purpose is to verify that the enrichment of the product UF 6 gas is in the range of low-enriched uranium (LEU), i.e., the enrichment is below 20%

  15. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de

    1986-01-01

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

  16. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  17. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  18. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  19. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  20. Functional relevance of AcrB Trimerization in pump assembly and substrate binding.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wei Lu

    Full Text Available AcrB is a multidrug transporter in the inner membrane of Escherichia coli. It is an obligate homotrimer and forms a tripartite efflux complex with AcrA and TolC. AcrB is the engine of the efflux machinery and determines substrate specificity. Active efflux depends on several functional features including proton translocation across the inner membrane through a proton relay pathway in the transmembrane domain of AcrB; substrate binding and migration through the substrate translocation pathway; the interaction of AcrB with AcrA and TolC; and the formation of AcrB homotrimer. Here we investigated two aspects of the inter-correlation between these functional features, the dependence of AcrA-AcrB interaction on AcrB trimerization, and the reliance of substrate binding and penetration on protein-protein interaction. Interaction between AcrA and AcrB was investigated through chemical crosslinking, and a previously established in vivo fluorescent labeling method was used to probe substrate binding. Our data suggested that dissociation of the AcrB trimer drastically decreased its interaction with AcrA. In addition, while substrate binding with AcrB seemed to be irrelevant to the presence or absence of AcrA and TolC, the capability of trimerization and conduction of proton influx did affect substrate binding at selected sites along the substrate translocation pathway in AcrB.

  1. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  2. Tracking and position recognition applied to remote monitoring to be used in integrated safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bonino, Anibal D; Perez, Adrian C; Krimer, Mario J; Teira, Ruben O; Vigile, Rodolfo S; Valentino, Lucia I; Giordano, Luis A; Ferro, Juan M [Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

    2001-07-01

    In the framework of the Strengthening and integrated Safeguards Systems new measures and tools are available to meet the safeguards objective. The credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities derived from the implementation of the Additional Protocol has an impact on the current safeguards approach to declared facilities thus their through review is advisable. Among these tools, a more intensive use of unattended systems and remote transmission of safeguards relevant information are considered, specifically for On Load Reactors (ORLs). A Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) to cover the transfers of spent fuels from the ponds to a dry storage is being tested at Embalse nuclear power plant. In connection with the RMS, this paper describes some of the technologies involved: the Global Position System (GPS) and the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), which were implemented due to the requirement to ascertain the position of valuable elements. The main objective of this design aimed at safeguarding the spent fuels transfers from the welding cell to the silos field by a strict surveillance of the whereabouts. The bases for the development were settled by the specifications imposed by the integrated Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Argentina. The resultant tracking and position recognition system is based on GPS receivers operating in Differential Mode, with the aid of Radio Frequency Identification. In compliance with the safeguard requirement the whole system is able to operate in a continuous and remote mode, what means without human being attention. (author)

  3. Use of curium neutron flux from head-end pyroprocessing subsystems for the High Reliability Safeguards methodology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Borrelli, R.A., E-mail: r.angelo.borrelli@gmail.com

    2014-10-01

    The deployment of nuclear energy systems (NESs) is expanding around the world. Nations are investing in NESs as a means to establish energy independence, grow national economies, and address climate change. Transitioning to the advanced nuclear fuel cycle can meet growing energy demands and ensure resource sustainability. However, nuclear facilities in all phases of the advanced fuel cycle must be ‘safeguardable,’ where safety, safeguards, and security are integrated into a practical design strategy. To this end, the High Reliability Safeguards (HRS) approach is a continually developing safeguardability methodology that applies intrinsic design features and employs a risk-informed approach for systems assessment that is safeguards-motivated. Currently, a commercial pyroprocessing facility is used as the example system. This paper presents a modeling study that investigates the neutron flux associated with processed materials. The intent of these studies is to determine if the neutron flux will affect facility design, and subsequently, safeguardability. The results presented in this paper are for the head-end subsystems in a pyroprocessing facility. The collective results from these studies will then be used to further develop the HRS methodology.

  4. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  5. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

    2010-01-01

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  6. Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

  7. Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

  8. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  9. 7 CFR 1412.23 - Base acres and Conservation Reserve Program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Base acres and Conservation Reserve Program. 1412.23... Base Acres for a Farm for Covered Commodities § 1412.23 Base acres and Conservation Reserve Program. (a... year, adjust the base acres for covered commodities and peanuts with respect to the farm by the number...

  10. Evaluation of the ACR and SLICC classification criteria in juvenile-onset systemic lupus erythematosus: a longitudinal analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lythgoe, H; Morgan, T; Heaf, E; Lloyd, O; Al-Abadi, E; Armon, K; Bailey, K; Davidson, J; Friswell, M; Gardner-Medwin, J; Haslam, K; Ioannou, Y; Leahy, A; Leone, V; Pilkington, C; Rangaraj, S; Riley, P; Tizard, E J; Wilkinson, N; Beresford, M W

    2017-10-01

    Objectives The Systemic Lupus International Collaborating Clinics (SLICC) group proposed revised classification criteria for systemic lupus erythematosus (SLICC-2012 criteria). This study aimed to compare these criteria with the well-established American College of Rheumatology classification criteria (ACR-1997 criteria) in a national cohort of juvenile-onset systemic lupus erythematosus (JSLE) patients and evaluate how patients' classification criteria evolved over time. Methods Data from patients in the UK JSLE Cohort Study with a senior clinician diagnosis of probable evolving, or definite JSLE, were analyzed. Patients were assessed using both classification criteria within 1 year of diagnosis and at latest follow up (following a minimum 12-month follow-up period). Results A total of 226 patients were included. The SLICC-2012 was more sensitive than ACR-1997 at diagnosis (92.9% versus 84.1% p < 0.001) and after follow up (100% versus 92.0% p < 0.001). Most patients meeting the SLICC-2012 criteria and not the ACR-1997 met more than one additional criterion on the SLICC-2012. Conclusions The SLICC-2012 was better able to classify patients with JSLE than the ACR-1997 and did so at an earlier stage in their disease course. SLICC-2012 should be considered for classification of JSLE patients in observational studies and clinical trial eligibility.

  11. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H.; Miller, Karen A.; Ianakiev, Kiril D.; Reimold, Benjamin A.; Ward, Steven L.; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235 U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  12. IAEA symposium on international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

  13. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  14. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-01-01

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  15. ACRE: Absolute concentration robustness exploration in module-based combinatorial networks

    KAUST Repository

    Kuwahara, Hiroyuki; Umarov, Ramzan; Almasri, Islam; Gao, Xin

    2017-01-01

    To engineer cells for industrial-scale application, a deep understanding of how to design molecular control mechanisms to tightly maintain functional stability under various fluctuations is crucial. Absolute concentration robustness (ACR) is a category of robustness in reaction network models in which the steady-state concentration of a molecular species is guaranteed to be invariant even with perturbations in the other molecular species in the network. Here, we introduce a software tool, absolute concentration robustness explorer (ACRE), which efficiently explores combinatorial biochemical networks for the ACR property. ACRE has a user-friendly interface, and it can facilitate efficient analysis of key structural features that guarantee the presence and the absence of the ACR property from combinatorial networks. Such analysis is expected to be useful in synthetic biology as it can increase our understanding of how to design molecular mechanisms to tightly control the concentration of molecular species. ACRE is freely available at https://github.com/ramzan1990/ACRE.

  16. ACRE: Absolute concentration robustness exploration in module-based combinatorial networks

    KAUST Repository

    Kuwahara, Hiroyuki

    2017-03-01

    To engineer cells for industrial-scale application, a deep understanding of how to design molecular control mechanisms to tightly maintain functional stability under various fluctuations is crucial. Absolute concentration robustness (ACR) is a category of robustness in reaction network models in which the steady-state concentration of a molecular species is guaranteed to be invariant even with perturbations in the other molecular species in the network. Here, we introduce a software tool, absolute concentration robustness explorer (ACRE), which efficiently explores combinatorial biochemical networks for the ACR property. ACRE has a user-friendly interface, and it can facilitate efficient analysis of key structural features that guarantee the presence and the absence of the ACR property from combinatorial networks. Such analysis is expected to be useful in synthetic biology as it can increase our understanding of how to design molecular mechanisms to tightly control the concentration of molecular species. ACRE is freely available at https://github.com/ramzan1990/ACRE.

  17. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  18. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beets, C.

    1977-01-01

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  19. Structure of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1978-06-01

    An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

  20. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  1. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

  2. ACRES At-Risk Task Force: Dropout Survey.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bull, Kay S.; And Others

    This paper describes a study by the American Council on Rural Special Education (ACRES) to determine its membership's opinions on priorities and expertise regarding the dropout problem. ACRES members, primarily rural special-education teachers, parents, and collateral service workers, were surveyed about the dropout problem and what research they…

  3. The Automated Conflict Resolution System (ACRS)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kaplan, Ted; Musliner, Andrew; Wampler, David

    1993-01-01

    The Automated Conflict Resolution System (ACRS) is a mission-current scheduling aid that predicts periods of mutual interference when two or more orbiting spacecraft are scheduled to communicate with the same Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) at the same time. The mutual interference predicted has the potential to degrade or prevent communications. Thus the ACRS system is a useful tool for aiding in the scheduling of Space Network (SN) communications.

  4. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Education at Russian Universities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.; Duncan, Cristen L.

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy is assisting key Russian universities in developing safeguards and security degree programs to prepare the next generation of specialists who will be responsible for protecting nuclear material from illicit use. These programs include course and laboratory work in nuclear material measurements, vulnerability analysis, exterior and interior sensors, and legal aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) has graduated nine classes of masters students, most of who are working in government agencies, research organizations, or pursuing their PhD. With DOE support, MEPhI has also established a 5 1/2-year engineering degree program in safeguards and security. This is a hands-on degree that more closely meets the needs of nuclear facilities. The first class graduated in February 2007, marking a major milestone in Russian nonproliferation education. A second engineering degree program has been established at Tomsk Polytechnic University and is designed to reach those students east of the Ural Mountains, where many nuclear facilities are located. The first class will graduate in February 2009. This paper describes current development of these education programs, new initiatives, and sustainability efforts to ensure their continued viability after DOE support ends. The paper also describes general nonproliferation education activities supported by DOE that complement the more technical safeguards and security education programs.

  5. Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D.

    2009-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF 6 cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

  6. Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D. [Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramer Strasse 5, A1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2009-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF{sub 6} cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

  7. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  8. Comparison of Urine Albumin-to-Creatinine Ratio (ACR) Between ACR Strip Test and Quantitative Test in Prediabetes and Diabetes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cho, Seon; Kim, Suyoung; Cho, Han-Ik

    2017-01-01

    Background Albuminuria is generally known as a sensitive marker of renal and cardiovascular dysfunction. It can be used to help predict the occurrence of nephropathy and cardiovascular disorders in diabetes. Individuals with prediabetes have a tendency to develop macrovascular and microvascular pathology, resulting in an increased risk of retinopathy, cardiovascular diseases, and chronic renal diseases. We evaluated the clinical value of a strip test for measuring the urinary albumin-to-creatinine ratio (ACR) in prediabetes and diabetes. Methods Spot urine samples were obtained from 226 prediabetic and 275 diabetic subjects during regular health checkups. Urinary ACR was measured by using strip and laboratory quantitative tests. Results The positive rates of albuminuria measured by using the ACR strip test were 15.5% (microalbuminuria, 14.6%; macroalbuminuria, 0.9%) and 30.5% (microalbuminuria, 25.1%; macroalbuminuria, 5.5%) in prediabetes and diabetes, respectively. In the prediabetic population, the sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, negative predictive value, and overall accuracy of the ACR strip method were 92.0%, 94.0%, 65.7%, 99.0%, and 93.8%, respectively; the corresponding values in the diabetic population were 80.0%, 91.6%, 81.0%, 91.1%, and 88.0%, respectively. The median [interquartile range] ACR values in the strip tests for measurement ranges of 300 mg/g were 9.4 [6.3-15.4], 46.9 [26.5-87.7], and 368.8 [296.2-575.2] mg/g, respectively, using the laboratory method. Conclusions The ACR strip test showed high sensitivity, specificity, and negative predictive value, suggesting that the test can be used to screen for albuminuria in cases of prediabetes and diabetes. PMID:27834062

  9. Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

    1983-01-01

    Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

  10. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  11. ASEA-ATOM's URANUS system for production control, economic control and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattson, J.C.

    1983-01-01

    ASEA-ATOM needs a system for production and economic control because: (1) the uranium is the valuable property of the customer; (2) short delivery times are a prime means of competition; (3) the manufacture of fuel necessitates frequent enrichment changes and much enrichment blending; (4) minimizing uranium stock reduces interest costs. A system which meets the above needs will with minor modifications meet safeguard requirements. URANUS is an integrated man/computer system with manual input and automatic data treatment and reporting of information. The man/computer interface is monitored by the automatic checking for plausibility of all input. An item is a quantity of material which is treated as a unit in production. Each item receives a unique identification number which may be used only once. If the qualitative properties of an item are changed a new item number is issued. Items are reported on forms and fed into URANUS by authorized personnel using personal passwords or are directly reported by terminal from certain operations. Pertinent information is entered for each project. The URANUS computer system consists of terminal activated on-line and batch modules which are briefly described. Output is information for planning, economic control and safeguards. Safeguards information consists of the following. For flow and blending control: delivery information; change of nominal enrichment; enrichment blending; internal transactions that change an enrichment/origin account; material status report (MSR); item inventory per MBA; general ledger. For physical inventory: material balance report (MBR); book item inventory per MBA; physical item inventory per MBA; uranium balance per origin and enrichment

  12. Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

    2015-01-01

    Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

  13. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1987-01-01

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

  14. Current technical issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.

    1977-01-01

    Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

  15. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  16. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  17. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

  18. Unfolding study of a trimeric membrane protein AcrB.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ye, Cui; Wang, Zhaoshuai; Lu, Wei; Wei, Yinan

    2014-07-01

    The folding of a multi-domain trimeric α-helical membrane protein, Escherichia coli inner membrane protein AcrB, was investigated. AcrB contains both a transmembrane domain and a large periplasmic domain. Protein unfolding in sodium dodecyl sulfate (SDS) and urea was monitored using the intrinsic fluorescence and circular dichroism spectroscopy. The SDS denaturation curve displayed a sigmoidal profile, which could be fitted with a two-state unfolding model. To investigate the unfolding of separate domains, a triple mutant was created, in which all three Trp residues in the transmembrane domain were replaced with Phe. The SDS unfolding profile of the mutant was comparable to that of the wild type AcrB, suggesting that the observed signal change was largely originated from the unfolding of the soluble domain. Strengthening of trimer association through the introduction of an inter-subunit disulfide bond had little effect on the unfolding profile, suggesting that trimer dissociation was not the rate-limiting step in unfolding monitored by fluorescence emission. Under our experimental condition, AcrB unfolding was not reversible. Furthermore, we experimented with the refolding of a monomeric mutant, AcrBΔloop , from the SDS unfolded state. The CD spectrum of the refolded AcrBΔloop superimposed well onto the spectra of the original folded protein, while the fluorescence spectrum was not fully recovered. In summary, our results suggested that the unfolding of the trimeric AcrB started with a local structural rearrangement. While the refolding of secondary structure in individual monomers could be achieved, the re-association of the trimer might be the limiting factor to obtain folded wild-type AcrB. © 2014 The Protein Society.

  19. Safeguards systems parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

    1979-01-01

    In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

  20. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  1. Safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, H. S.

    2010-01-01

    Although the safeguards system of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) seems similar to that of Light Water Reactor (LWR), it was raised safeguards challenges of SFR that resulted from the visual opacity of liquid sodium, chemical reactivity of sodium and other characteristics of fast reactor. As it is the basic concept stage of the safeguards of SFR in Korea, this study tried to analyze the latest similar study of safeguards issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) at Joyo and Monju in Japan. For this reason, this study is to introduce some potential safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor. With this analysis, future study could be to address the safeguards challenges of SFR in Korea

  2. Brownfields/IGD: EF_ACRES

    Data.gov (United States)

    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency — EF_ACRES is a subset of facilities from FRS_INTEREST and FRS_FACILITY_SITE which are updated on a monthly basis as part of the Locational Reference Tables (LRT)...

  3. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobey, William

    2008-01-01

    NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

  4. Characterization and enzymatic properties of protein kinase ACR4 from Arabidopsis thaliana.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhao, Yu; Liu, Xuehe; Xu, Ziyan; Yang, Hui; Li, Jixi

    2017-07-22

    Serine/threonine-protein kinase-like protein ARABIDOPSIS CRINKLY4 (ACR4), a transmembrane protein of Arabidopsis thaliana, plays important roles in cell division and differentiation. Although accumulating studies shed light on the function of ACR4, the structure and catalytic mechanism of ACR4 remain to be elucidated. Here, we report the purification and enzymatic properties of the intracellular kinase domain (residues 464-799) of ACR4 (ACR4 IKD ). Through Ni-affinity chromatography and gel filter chromatography methods, we successfully obtain high-purity ACR4 IKD protein from Escherichia coli. Dynamic light scattering and gel-filtration methods reveal that ACR4 IKD distributes with high homogeneity and exists as a monomer in solution. In addition, the ACR4 IKD protein has typical kinase activity with myelin basic protein (MBP) as the substrate. Our study may lay the foundation for structure determination of ACR4 IKD and further functional research, for example, screening significant substrates of ACR4 in Arabidopsis thaliana. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  5. Safeguards can not operate alone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

    2013-01-01

    There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  6. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  7. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  8. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  9. The Prevalence of acrA and acrB Genes Among Multiple-Drug Resistant Uropathogenic Escherichia coli Isolated From Patients With UTI in Milad Hospital, Tehran

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Maleki

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available Background Urinary tract infection (UTI is one of the most common infectious diseases and nosocomial infections worldwide, and uropathogenic Escherichia coli is the primary cause of UTI. Due to increased antibiotic resistance and the emergence of multidrug resistant (MDR UPEC clones, the treatment of UTI is difficult. The occurrence of MDR in E. coli has been attributed to the AcrAB-TolC complex of efflux pumps. Objectives The aim of this study was to complete a frequency evaluation of acrA and acrB genes among UPEC MDR strains isolated from patients with UTI who were admitted to Milad hospital in Tehran. Methods For 123 UPEC strains that were isolated and diagnosed from the urine samples of patients using biochemical tests, antibiotic susceptibility was carried out using the disc diffusion method according to CLSI guidelines. Isolates that were resistant to at least one antimicrobial agent in three or more of the categories were considered to be MDR. The presence and frequency of acrA and acrB genes was determined using PCR. Results The rates of antibiotic resistance to ampicillin, cefalotin, tetracycline, cefazolin, ceftriaxone, ceftizoxime, ceftazidime, ciprofloxacin, and cotrimoxazole were 82.9%, 78.1%, 61.1%, 49.5%, 38.2%, 30.2%, 26.1%, 42.2%, and 60.1%, respectively. The isolates were most sensitive to nitrofurantoin (95.9%, gentamicin (77.2%, and amikacin (71.5%. A total of 78% of the isolates were MDR. The frequency of the acrA gene was 82.90%, the acrB gene was 95.90% and acrA + acrB was 95.90%. There was no significant difference between acrA and acrB frequency relating to bacterial antibiotic resistance. Conclusions Our results showed that ways to control the treatment of UTI for the prevention of MDR occurrence should be sought. For a better study of efflux pumps, a comprehensive and detailed study regarding the presence of efflux pumps gees is required.

  10. Automatic coding method of the ACR Code

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Kwi Ae; Ihm, Jong Sool; Ahn, Woo Hyun; Baik, Seung Kook; Choi, Han Yong; Kim, Bong Gi

    1993-01-01

    The authors developed a computer program for automatic coding of ACR(American College of Radiology) code. The automatic coding of the ACR code is essential for computerization of the data in the department of radiology. This program was written in foxbase language and has been used for automatic coding of diagnosis in the Department of Radiology, Wallace Memorial Baptist since May 1992. The ACR dictionary files consisted of 11 files, one for the organ code and the others for the pathology code. The organ code was obtained by typing organ name or code number itself among the upper and lower level codes of the selected one that were simultaneous displayed on the screen. According to the first number of the selected organ code, the corresponding pathology code file was chosen automatically. By the similar fashion of organ code selection, the proper pathologic dode was obtained. An example of obtained ACR code is '131.3661'. This procedure was reproducible regardless of the number of fields of data. Because this program was written in 'User's Defined Function' from, decoding of the stored ACR code was achieved by this same program and incorporation of this program into program in to another data processing was possible. This program had merits of simple operation, accurate and detail coding, and easy adjustment for another program. Therefore, this program can be used for automation of routine work in the department of radiology

  11. Safeguardability assessment on pilot-scale advanced spent fuel conditioning facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Pickett, S.E.; Miller, M.C.; Ko, W.I.; Kim, H.D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: In South Korea, approximately 6,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactor operation has been accumulated with the expectation of more than 30,000 metric tons, three times the present storage capacity, by the end of 2040. To resolve these challenges in spent fuel management, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a dry reprocessing technology called Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP). This is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent fuel into a metallic form, and the electrolytic reduction (ER) technology developed recently is known as a more efficient concept for spent fuel conditioning. The goal of the ACP study is to recover more than 99% of the actinide elements into a metallic form with minimizing the volume and heat load of spent fuel. The significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected to lighten the burden of final disposal in terms of disposal size, safety, and economics. In the framework of R and D collaboration for the ACP safeguards, a joint study on the safeguardability of the ACP technology has been performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and KAERI. The purpose of this study is to address the safeguardability of the ACP technology, through analysis of material flow and development of a proper safeguards system that meet IAEA's comprehensive safeguards objective. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot-scale ACP facility were analyzed, and subsequently the relevant material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) were designed for material accounting. The uncertainties in material accounting were also estimated with international target values, and design requirements for the material accounting systems were derived

  12. IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, Nikolai

    2001-01-01

    IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

  13. Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

  14. Comparing new diagnostic criteria of 2010 ACR/EULAR with 1987 ACR criteria in rheumatoid arthritis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Fatemeh Shirani

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Background: Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA is a chronic inflammatory disease presenting with inflammation, tenderness and destruction of the synovial joints, resulting in severe disability and early death due to complication of disease. Previous diagnostic criteria are not useful for identifying patients who need early treatment. Thus, new diagnostic criteria for faster diagnosis of disease are introduced in 2010. The aim of this study was to compared 1987 ACR (American College of Rheumatology criteria and 2010 ACR/EULAR (European League Against Rheumatism classification criteria for diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis. Methods: In this Cohort prospective study, patients with early arthritis were evaluated   according to the old and new diagnostic criteria and followed-up every two monthly for one year (2012-2013 in Hazrat-e Rasool University Hospital, Tehran. Inclusion criteria of this study were age more than 18 year and indefinite diagnosis of arthritis. For all of patients physical examination by expert rheumatologist was done and lab data include erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR, C-reactive protein (CRP, anti-cyclic citrullinated peptide (Anti-CCP and rheumatoid factor was requested. The sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative predictive values were then determined for each diagnostic criteria. Results: In this study 104 patients including 28 males (26.9% and 76 females (73.1% with the mean age of 44.2±13.7 years were included. At the end of one year follow-up, 82 were diagnosed to have RA while other 22 patients were not categorized as RA. Sensitivity for ESR, CRP, Anti-CCP and rheumatoid factor in 2010 ACR/EULAR criteria was 52%, 19%, 48%, 28% and specificity for them was 45%, 71%, 27%, 79% respectively. Number of small and large joint arthritis were more in patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA rather than other arthritis (P=0.0001. Sensitivity and specificity for small joints involvement was 87% and 54% and for large joints

  15. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip Casey; Hockert, John; Morgan, James

    2010-01-01

    Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC and A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many - owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: (1) In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. (2) Life-cycle cost

  16. Implementing The Safeguards-By-Design Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J. Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D.; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC and A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  17. Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varjoranta, Tero

    2016-01-01

    IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

  18. IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

  19. 75 FR 49513 - Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians 228.04-Acre Fee-to-Trust...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-08-13

    ... construct a casino, hotel, parking areas and other facilities. The proposed project is located partially... square-foot hotel and a 30,000 square- foot event/conference center on the 228.04-acre site. The gaming... restaurant, bar, and coffee bar), meeting space, guest support services, offices, and security area. The five...

  20. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  1. Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1975-01-01

    Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

  2. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

    1991-05-01

    The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

  3. Lessons learned in testing of Safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, Susan; Farnitano, Michael; Carelli, Joseph

    2001-01-01

    Full text: During the 1990s, the IAEA Department of Safeguards began a transition from analog to digital equipment. This included surveillance equipment, seals, NDA measurement systems, and other instruments. The transition to digital equipment was intended to facilitate compatibility between and integration of instruments, remote communication of data, improved data storage, and modernization. Many of the instruments are designed to operate on battery power during loss of facility power, and therefore, are designed to consume minimal power. In 2000, the IAEA experienced a number of failures in digital image surveillance (DIS) equipment. A study of the performance data revealed that the failures occurred in 'high risk' environments where the systems were exposed to neutrons. As a supporter of IAEA equipment development and implementation, the U.S. Support Program worked with the IAEA, the equipment designer, and the equipment manufacturer in special meetings on DIS to determine the cause of the failures. It was as a result of these meetings that single event upset (SEU) was determined to be the root cause of the failures. The meeting participants also identified a list of actions to improve the reliability of DIS systems. As a result of the DIS meetings and the identified actions, the U.S. Support Program approved a request from the IAEA and established Task E.125, 'Remote Monitoring and Unattended Digital Surveillance Systems.' This task is an umbrella task intended to provide a mechanism for response to IAEA needs related to improving the reliability of unattended, remote monitoring and DIS equipment. Subtasks approved under this task include: E.125.1, 'SDIS Software Consolidation and DCM-14 Audit' - This subtask involves the consolidation of a number of individual upgrades to the SDIS and review of the DCM-14 software. As the sponsor of the design of the DCM-14 by Dr. Neumann, the German Support Program is also a participant in this subtask; E.125.2, 'DIS

  4. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard; Philip C. Durst

    2012-05-01

    This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility. The need for this guidance is becoming increasingly urgent as more and more nuclear power plants move their spent fuel from resident spent fuel ponds to independent spent fuel storage installations. The safeguards requirements and best practices described herein are also relevant to the design and construction of regional independent spent fuel storage installations that nuclear power plant operators are starting to consider in the absence of a national long-term geological spent fuel repository. The following document has been prepared in support of two of the three foundational pillars for implementing Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). These are: i) defining the relevant safeguards requirements, and ii) defining the best practices for meeting the requirements. This document was prepared with the design of the latest independent dry spent fuel storage installations in mind and was prepared specifically as an aid for designers of commercial nuclear facilities to help them understand the relevant international requirements that follow from a country’s safeguards agreement with

  5. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  6. Women's Leadership in the ACR, 2001-2015.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patel, Amy K; Fielding, Julia; Macura, Katarzyna J; Applegate, Kimberly E; Zackula, Rosalee; Arleo, Elizabeth Kagan

    2017-06-01

    To assess the trends of women in voluntary leadership roles in the ACR from 2001 to 2015. Retrospective leadership records from 2001 to 2015 were collected from the ACR Membership Database based on member demographics, gender, and participation in leadership roles at the national and state level. Data were sorted by gender and year to assess the proportion of women in each leadership position relative to total member/representation counts. Overall, there were increasing numbers of women represented in ACR leadership. From 2001 to 2015, there were increasing rates of women achieving fellowship in the College (7%-11%), now at parity with male member rates. Representation by women has risen from 7% to 21% for state chapter presidents and from 14% to 18% for state councilors. Comparing rolling 5-year averages from 2001-2005 and 2011-2015 showed statistically significant increases (P leadership roles. Women members of the council steering committee rose from 13% in 2001 to 19% in 2015, peaking at 24% in 2014. The Board of Chancellors (BOC) showed the largest increase in women, from 9% to 33%, with a peak at 37% in 2014. However, no BOC chairs were women, one council speaker was a woman, two women were ACR presidents, and two women were vice presidents. Women's participation in ACR leadership has increased significantly at the state level and in fellowship recognition. Although there are increasing numbers of women on the BOC, top positions remain male-dominated at the national level. Published by Elsevier Inc.

  7. Report to the Director General on the twenty third series of SAGSI meetings, 11-15 May 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-08-01

    This report (on the twenty third series of meetings of SAGSI - Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation) deals with the following items (of the agenda): Discussion on measurement uncertainties; Issues relating to safeguarding OLR facilities; Consideration of 90(a) and 90(b) statements (by the IAEA to Member States on the results of inspections); Considerations of the long-term criteria; The agenda for the next SAGSI meeting. The following annexes are included: SAGSI Response to DDG(SG) Question Regarding the Role of C/S; SAGSI Advice on Safeguarding On-load Refuelled Power Reactors; Draft: 90(b) Statement. 2 tabs

  8. ACR: Licensing and design readiness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alizadeh, A.

    2009-01-01

    Full text The Canadian nuclear technology has a long history dating back to the 1940s. In this regard, Canada is in a unique situation, shared only by a very few countries, where original nuclear power technology has been invented and further developed. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), then called AECB, was established in 1946. CNSC focuses on nuclear security, nuclear safety, establishing health and safety regulations, and has also played an instrumental role in the formation of the IAEA. CNSC has provided assistance to the establishment of regulatory authorities in AECL's client countries such as Korea, Argentina, China and Romania. AECL has developed the Gen III+ ACR 1000 as evolutionary advancement of the current CANDU 6 reactor. ACR-1000 has evolved from AECL's in depth experience with CANDU systems, components, and materials, as well as the feedback received from owners and operators of CANDU plants. The ACR-1000 design retains the proven strengths and features of CANDU reactors, while incorporating innovations and state-of-the-art technology. It also features major improvements in economics, inherent safety characteristics, and performance. ACR-1000 has completed its Basic Engineering, has advanced in the licensing process in Canada, and is ready for deployment in Canadian and world markets. EC6 is an evolution of CANDU 6 and is a Gen III natural uranium fuelled reactor. Its medium size and potential for fuel localization and advanced fuel cycles is an optimal strategic solution in many markets.AECL's reactor products are shown to be compliant with a variety of licensing and regulatory requirements. These include the new CNSC DRD-337, IAEA NS-R1, and EUR. This allows the countries interested in CANDU reactor products to be confident of its licensing in their own regulatory regimes.

  9. Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

    1980-01-01

    The scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues: (1) global safeguards effectiveness or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on the first issue, while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed towards the second. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example. 4 refs

  10. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

    2010-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

  11. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  12. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

  13. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  14. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

  15. Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

    2001-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

  16. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF 6 feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load

  17. Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

  18. Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ade lndra B; Kasturi; Tatang Eryadi

    2004-01-01

    Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

  19. Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1976-01-01

    With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

  20. A view to the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsuboi, Hiroshi

    2000-01-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

  1. Challenges for development and provision of metrological quality control tools in nuclear safeguards, nuclear forensics and nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aregbe, Y.; Richter, S.; Jakopic, R.; Bauwens, J.; Truyens, J.; Sturm, M.; Bujak, R.; Eykens, R.; Kehoe, F.; Kuehn, H.; Hennessy, C.

    2013-01-01

    Joint advancements in quality control tools and measurement sciences of international reference and safeguards laboratories include: -) successful integration of the Modified Total Evaporation technique (MTE) as a new tool for routine thermal ionization mass spectrometry in nuclear safeguards and security, -) research and feasibility studies for the development of new materials standard, particularly for nuclear forensics (Certified Reference Materials - CRMs for age-dating), -) quality control tools to support the additional protocol and nuclear security (particle CRMs, NUSIMEP (inter-laboratory comparisons for U particle analysis), and -) scientific/technical advice, training and knowledge transfer. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and the CETAMA Commission from the French Commission of Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies (CEA/CETAMA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Meetings are the platforms to exchange views on the needs and challenges for new Quality Control tools for nuclear safeguards and security. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  2. Nuclear safeguards considerations for pebble bed reactors (PBRs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moses, David L.

    2012-01-01

    Recent reports by the Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for low enriched uranium (LEU)-fueled pebble bed reactors (PBRs) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in “used fuel.” These reports fail to account for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “provisional” guidelines for termination of safeguards on “measured discards.” The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel is not sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of the uranium minor isotopes 232 U and 236 U in the used fuel at the target burnup of ∼90 Gigawatt-days per metric ton (GWD/MT) exceed standard specification limits for reprocessed uranium and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the 236 U content to fall within specification. Hence, the PBR used fuel is less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBR specific activity of a reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A 2 values for effective dose limits if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light-water-reactor used fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product (technetium, 99 Tc) and plutonium contamination. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant consideration is that reprocessing technologies for

  3. Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, D.A.

    1986-10-01

    Safeguarding our country's nuclear materials against theft or diversion is extremely important due to their significantly strategic value. In addition, nuclear materials also have an extremely high monetary value. The term ''safeguards'' is defined as an integrated system of physical protection, accountability, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession and use of special nuclear materials. An aggressive Safeguards program, therefore, employs both good security measures and a strong material control and accountability system. For effective internal control of nuclear materials, having people qualified in the many aspects of safeguards and accountability is essential. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), this goal is accomplished through a Laboratory-wide Safeguards Awareness Program. All PNL staff members receive a level of Safeguards training appropriate to their particular function within the Laboratory. This paper presents an overview of the unique training opportunities this topic provides and how the training goals are accomplished through the various training courses given to the staff members

  4. Constructability - from Qinshan to the ACR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elgohary, M.; Fairclough, N.; Ricciuti, R.

    2003-01-01

    AECL has recognised the importance of Constructability for many years and is applying its principals to CANDU projects with increasing success. Constructability is defined as the consideration of construction knowledge and experience during all phases of a project, and recognizes that maximum benefit can be achieved during the concept phases of a project. The CANDU 6 Nuclear Power Plant has been constructed eleven times in the last 25 years, however, the last two units being completed on the Qinshan project in China have employed some very innovative construction methods that have not been used on the previous units. In order to make nuclear power generation more competitive, shorter construction schedules and reduced project costs and risks are essential objectives. The application of constructability principles is a major contributor to achieving these objectives. The success of Qinshan has increased the confidence in the new construction methods which are being implemented on the ACR (Advanced CANDU Reactor) successfully. An ACR construction strategy that utilizes advanced construction techniques has been developed by AECL. The strategy includes paralleling of activities by using extensive modularization and the vertical installation of equipment and modules into the reactor building, using a VHL (Very Heavy Lift) crane. This strategy allows short schedules to be met with a minimum risk to the project. This paper describes the latest construction methods used successfully on the Qinshan CANDU 6 project and looks at the extensive implementation of similar methods for ACR. It is concluded, based on the Qinshan success, that the ACR construction schedule is readily achievable. (author)

  5. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  6. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  7. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-01-01

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  8. IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-10-01

    Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

  9. The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, P.

    1999-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  10. Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gyane, E.

    2010-01-01

    Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

  11. International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.

    1995-01-01

    The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies

  12. Expression of the AcrAB Components of the AcrAB-TolC Multidrug Efflux Pump of Yersinia enterocolitica Is Subject to Dual Regulation by OmpR.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Adrianna Raczkowska

    Full Text Available OmpR is a transcriptional regulator implicated in the control of various cellular processes and functions in Enterobacteriaceae. This study was undertaken to identify genes comprising the OmpR regulon in the human gastrointestinal pathogen Yersinia enterocolitica. Derivatives of an ompR-negative strain with random transposon insertions creating transcriptional fusions with the reporter gene lacZ were isolated. These were supplied with the wild-type ompR allele in trans and then screened for OmpR-dependent changes in β-galactosidase activity. Using this strategy, five insertions in genes/operons positively regulated by OmpR and two insertions in genes negatively regulated by this protein were identified. Genetic analysis of one of these fusion strains revealed that the gene acrR, encoding transcriptional repressor AcrR is negatively regulated by OmpR. Differential analysis of membrane proteins by SDS-PAGE followed by mass spectrometry identified the protein AcrB, a component of the AcrAB-TolC multidrug efflux pump, as being positively regulated by OmpR. Analysis of the activity of the acrR and acrAB promoters using gfp fusions confirmed their OmpR-dependent repression and activation, respectively. The identification of putative OmpR-binding sites and electrophoretic mobility shift assays confirmed that this regulator binds specifically to both promoter regions with different affinity. Examination of the activity of the acrR and acrAB promoters after the exposure of cells to different chemicals showed that bile salts can act as an OmpR-independent inducer. Taken together, our findings suggest that OmpR positively controls the expression of the AcrAB-TolC efflux pump involved in the adaptive response of Y. enterocolitica O:9 to different chemical stressors, thus conferring an advantage in particular ecological niches.

  13. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes

  14. Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

    1999-01-01

    A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

  15. The international safeguards profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

  16. Combined SAFE/SNAP approach to safeguards evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Chapman, L.D.; Grant, F.H.; Polito, J.

    1980-01-01

    Generally, the scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues, (1) global safeguards effectiveness, or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on (1) while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed at (2). SAFE addresses (1) in that it considers the entire facility, i.e., the composite system of hardware and human components, in one global analysis. SNAP addresses (2) by providing a safeguards modeling symbology sufficiently flexible to represent quite complex scenarios from the standpoint of hardware interfaces while also accounting for a rich variety of human decision making. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example

  17. State-wide performance criteria for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Budlong-Sylvester, K.W.; Pilat, Joseph F.; Stanbro, W.D.

    2001-01-01

    Traditionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has relied upon prescriptive criteria to guide safeguards implementation. The prospect of replacing prescriptive safeguards criteria with more flexible performance criteria would constitute a structural change in safeguards and raises several important questions. Performance criteria imply that while safeguards goals will be fixed, the means of attaining those goals will not be explicitly prescribed. What would the performance objectives be under such a system? How would they be formulated? How would performance be linked to higher level safeguards objectives? How would safeguards performance be measured State-wide? The implementation of safeguards under performance criteria would also signal a dramatic change in the manner the Agency does business. A higher degree of flexibility could, in principle, produce greater effectiveness and efficiency, but would come with a need for increased Agency responsibility in practice. To the extent that reliance on prescriptive criteria decreases, the burden of justifying actions and ensuring their transparency will rise. Would there need to be limits to safeguards implementation? What would be the basis for setting such limits? This paper addresses these and other issues and questions relating to both the formulation and the implementation of performance-based criteria.

  18. Structural and functional aspects of the multidrug efflux pump AcrB.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Eicher, Thomas; Brandstätter, Lorenz; Pos, Klaas M

    2009-08-01

    The tripartite efflux system AcrA/AcrB/TolC is the main pump in Escherichia coli for the efflux of multiple antibiotics, dyes, bile salts and detergents. The inner membrane component AcrB is central to substrate recognition and energy transduction and acts as a proton/drug antiporter. Recent structural studies show that homotrimeric AcrB can adopt different monomer conformations representing consecutive states in an allosteric functional rotation transport cycle. The conformational changes create an alternate access drug transport tunnel including a hydrophobic substrate binding pocket in one of the cycle intermediates.

  19. The IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

    1976-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

  20. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  1. Safeguards and security aspects of a potential Canadian used-fuel disposal facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.M.; Wuschke, D.; Baumgartner, P.

    1994-09-01

    Large quantities of highly radioactive used fuel have been produced by Canadian nuclear generating stations. Conceptual design and development is under way to assess a means of disposing of this used fuel within a vault located 500 to 1000 m deep in plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield. In parallel with this work, the safeguards and physical security measures that will be required for this used fuel during transportation, packaging, and containment in a disposal vault are being studied in Canada, in several other countries that have similar requirements and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Canadian commitments and regulations applicable to used-fuel transportation and disposal are described. The experience gained from applying safeguards and physical security measures at similar facilities is considered together with the availability of equipment that might be used in applying these measures. Possible safeguards and physical security measures are outlined and considered. These measures are based on the conceptual design studies for a reference Used-Fuel Disposal Centre and associated transportation systems undertaken by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. These studies show that effective and practical safeguards, which meet present IAEA objectives, can be applied to the used fuel in transportation and at a disposal facility. They also show that physical security measures can be employed that have a high probability of preventing theft or sabotage. 27 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs., glossary, 2 appendices

  2. Safeguards and security aspects of a potential Canadian used-fuel disposal facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, R M; Wuschke, D; Baumgartner, P

    1994-09-01

    Large quantities of highly radioactive used fuel have been produced by Canadian nuclear generating stations. Conceptual design and development is under way to assess a means of disposing of this used fuel within a vault located 500 to 1000 m deep in plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield. In parallel with this work, the safeguards and physical security measures that will be required for this used fuel during transportation, packaging, and containment in a disposal vault are being studied in Canada, in several other countries that have similar requirements and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Canadian commitments and regulations applicable to used-fuel transportation and disposal are described. The experience gained from applying safeguards and physical security measures at similar facilities is considered together with the availability of equipment that might be used in applying these measures. Possible safeguards and physical security measures are outlined and considered. These measures are based on the conceptual design studies for a reference Used-Fuel Disposal Centre and associated transportation systems undertaken by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. These studies show that effective and practical safeguards, which meet present IAEA objectives, can be applied to the used fuel in transportation and at a disposal facility. They also show that physical security measures can be employed that have a high probability of preventing theft or sabotage. 27 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs., glossary, 2 appendices.

  3. Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

    2010-01-01

    IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

  4. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-01-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future

  5. IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.

    1988-01-01

    The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

  6. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Hebditch, David; Morgan, Jim; Meppen, Bruce; DeMuth, Scott; Ehinger, Michael; Hockert, John

    2008-01-01

    The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing 'nuclear security' risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as 'the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,' with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: (sm b ullet) Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, (sm b ullet) Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, (sm b ullet) Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of 'nuclear security' considerations as 'full and equal' partners in the design process, (sm b ullet) Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and (sm b ullet) Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic

  7. Pickering safeguards: a preliminary analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todd, J.L.; Hodgkinson, J.G.

    1977-05-01

    A summary is presented of thoughts relative to a systems approach for implementing international safeguards. Included is a preliminary analysis of the Pickering Generating Station followed by a suggested safeguards system for the facility

  8. MRI quality assurance using the ACR phantom in a multi-unit imaging center

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ihalainen, Toni M.; Kuusela, Linda J.; Savolainen, Sauli E.; Loennroth, Nadja T.; Peltonen, Juha I.; Uusi-Simola, Jouni K.; Timonen, Marjut H.; Sipilae, Outi E.

    2011-01-01

    Background. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) instrumentation is vulnerable to technical and image quality problems, and quality assurance is essential. In the studied regional imaging center the long-term quality assurance has been based on MagNET phantom measurements. American College of Radiology (ACR) has an accreditation program including a standardized image quality measurement protocol and phantom. The ACR protocol includes recommended acceptance criteria for clinical sequences and thus provides possibility to assess the clinical relevance of quality assurance. The purpose of this study was to test the ACR MRI phantom in quality assurance of a multi-unit imaging center. Material and methods. The imaging center operates 11 MRI systems of three major manufacturers with field strengths of 3.0 T, 1.5 T and 1.0 T. Images of the ACR phantom were acquired using a head coil following the ACR scanning instructions. Both ACR T1- and T2-weighted sequences as well as T1- and T2-weighted brain sequences in clinical use at each site were acquired. Measurements were performed twice. The images were analyzed and the results were compared with the ACR acceptance levels. Results. The acquisition procedure with the ACR phantom was faster than with the MagNET phantoms. On the first and second measurement rounds 91% and 73% of the systems passed the ACR test. Measured slice thickness accuracies were not within the acceptance limits in site T2 sequences. Differences in the high contrast spatial resolution between the ACR and the site sequences were observed. In 3.0 T systems the image intensity uniformity was slightly lower than the ACR acceptance limit. Conclusion. The ACR method was feasible in quality assurance of a multi-unit imaging center and the ACR protocol could replace the MagNET phantom tests. An automatic analysis of the images will further improve cost-effectiveness and objectiveness of the ACR protocol

  9. Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henriques, Sasha

    2011-01-01

    The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

  10. Safeguarding arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flanagan, S.J.

    1988-01-01

    This essay reviews the evolution of various safeguards concepts associated with U.S. Soviet arms control negotiations over the past twenty-five years. It explore in some detail the origins, nature, and effectiveness of the safeguards packages associated with six agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the SALT I Interim Agreement (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) and the SALT II Treaty (1979). Finally, the implications of this historical record for developing future nuclear and conventional arms control accords and for shoring up existing pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, are assessed with a view towards practicable prescriptions for Western policymakers. The treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) incorporates several verification safeguards, and it is very likely that analogous measures would be attached to any accord constraining conventional forces in Europe

  11. Safeguards Export-Import Training: Adapting to Changes in the Department of Safeguards Over 6 Years of Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; ); Crete, J.-M.; Schot, P.-M.; Hushbeck, E.C.; Heine, P.

    2015-01-01

    Safeguards relevant information encompasses information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfiling its obligations under relevant safeguards agreement(s). It includes information relating to nuclear or nuclear related trade like international transfers of nuclear material, or export (or import upon request by the Agency) of specified equipment described in annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. It may also include information provided by States on a voluntary basis. In 2005, the General Conference (see GC(49)/RES/13) encouraged the provision of information on procurement enquiries, export denials and other nuclear related information. Objectively and independently assessing this information and combining it with other Safeguards data and knowledge requires relevant expertise and well defined processes. Since 2008, the bi-annual Export-Import (EXIM) Training Workshop, jointly run by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the U.S. Department of Energy, enables SG staff to develop competencies required for collecting, processing and drawing objective conclusions in this area. Over the years, more than 150 SG staff have been exposed to technical information on relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, trade data from different origins, analytical processes, and exercises to use this knowledge in realistic safeguards work scenarios. The EXIM training has also been an opportunity to develop analytical best practices and explore how this analytical work finds it place in the verification process. The paper describes the background and purpose of the EXIM training, how it helps Safeguards to independently collect and analyze relevant trade information to fulfil its obligations. It also touches on the lessons learned from six years of training experience, observing how the Department of Safeguards develops and implements structured processes to collect, process and evaluate safeguards relevant trade information, in order to establish findings and draw

  12. Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

    2011-09-01

    During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

  13. Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP): overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D; Engi, D.

    1979-08-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems provide physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The outputs provided by the SNAP simulation program supplements the safeguards analyst's evaluative capabilities and supports the evaluation of existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  14. Licensing the ACR-700 in the USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Langman, V.; Ion, R.; Reid, C.; Snell, V.

    2003-01-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), via its 100% owned US subsidiary AECL Technologies Inc., is performing a pre-application review of the Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR) with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). Completion of this pre-application review by mid-2004, is in support of an application to the USNRC for Standard Design Certification that is targeted for the fall of 2004. The intent of the pre-application review is to deal up-front with potential issues associated with the CANDU reactor genealogy of the ACR that are different from the Light Water Reactor (LWR) and Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) regulatory framework in the USA. The focus of the paper will be to describe the pre-application review process currently underway with the NRC staff. In the context of the pre-application review this paper will provide an overview of the licensing approach being used to introduce the ACR-700 to the USA. (author)

  15. Licensing the ACR-700 in the USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Langman, V.; Ion, R. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Mississauga, Ontario (Canada); Reid, C. [Bechtel Power Corporation, San Fransisco, California (United States); Snell, V. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Mississauga, Ontario (Canada)

    2003-07-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), via its 100% owned US subsidiary AECL Technologies Inc., is performing a pre-application review of the Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR) with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). Completion of this pre-application review by mid-2004, is in support of an application to the USNRC for Standard Design Certification that is targeted for the fall of 2004. The intent of the pre-application review is to deal up-front with potential issues associated with the CANDU reactor genealogy of the ACR that are different from the Light Water Reactor (LWR) and Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) regulatory framework in the USA. The focus of the paper will be to describe the pre-application review process currently underway with the NRC staff. In the context of the pre-application review this paper will provide an overview of the licensing approach being used to introduce the ACR-700 to the USA. (author)

  16. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  17. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  18. 37. annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1996-01-01

    The following subjects were covered in this meeting: waste management; nuclear materials management -- safety and health; international safeguards; measurement control and statistics for nuclear materials management; material control and accountability; packaging and transportation; nonproliferation and arms control; and physical protection. Separate papers were prepared for 74 items of this meeting

  19. NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kyd, D.R.

    1993-10-01

    Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

  20. IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

  1. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

  2. Improving the Transparency of IAEA Safeguards Reporting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toomey, Christopher; Hayman, Aaron M.; Wyse, Evan T.; Odlaug, Christopher S.

    2011-01-01

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data.

  3. Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hayes, Timothy [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Carlsbad Operations Group (United States); Nelson, Roger [Department Of Energy, Carlsbad Operations Office (United States)

    2012-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an

  4. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  5. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, J. S.; Kim, B. K.; Kwack, E. H.

    1996-12-01

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  6. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials Refs, figs, tabs

  7. Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX). An experience in international co-operation on safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, G.; Koizumi, T.; Higuchi, K.

    1983-01-01

    TASTEX stands for Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise, and was the joint programme of Japan, the United States of America, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency for developing, testing and evaluating advanced safeguards technology to be used in reprocessing facilities. The TASTEX programme, which started early in 1978 and successfully ended in May 1981, consisted of thirteen safeguards-technology-related tasks, from Task A to M. They were classified into four groups from the viewpoints of their usefulness and effectiveness: (1) Tasks technically feasible for international safeguards application in the near future: Tasks E, G, H and part of Task A (underwater CCTV and monitoring cameras); (2) Tasks which can be used in the future if research and development are continued: Tasks F, I, J, C and the other part of Task A (exclusive of the themes shown in (1)); (3) Tasks which may be used in future at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility if research and development are continued: Tasks K and L; and (4) Tasks which are difficult to be used at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility: Tasks B, D and M. The tasks classified under Group (1) are being developed further as part of the JASPAS (Japan Support Programme for Agency's Safeguards) project. (author)

  8. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2000-01-01

    SCK-CEN's department of Safeguards and Physics Measurements provides a wide variety of internal and external services including dosimetry, calibration, instrumentation, whole body counting, safeguards and non-destructive analysis. Main developments in these areas in 1999 are described

  9. MO-AB-207-00: ACR Update in MR, CT, Nuclear Medicine, and Mammography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program

  10. MO-AB-207-00: ACR Update in MR, CT, Nuclear Medicine, and Mammography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2015-06-15

    A goal of an imaging accreditation program is to ensure adequate image quality, verify appropriate staff qualifications, and to assure patient and personnel safety. Currently, more than 35,000 facilities in 10 modalities have been accredited by the American College of Radiology (ACR), making the ACR program one of the most prolific accreditation options in the U.S. In addition, ACR is one of the accepted accreditations required by some state laws, CMS/MIPPA insurance and others. Familiarity with the ACR accreditation process is therefore essential to clinical diagnostic medical physicists. Maintaining sufficient knowledge of the ACR program must include keeping up-to-date as the various modality requirements are refined to better serve the goals of the program and to accommodate newer technologies and practices. This session consists of presentations from authorities in four ACR accreditation modality programs, including magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, nuclear medicine, and mammography. Each speaker will discuss the general components of the modality program and address any recent changes to the requirements. Learning Objectives: To understand the requirements of the ACR MR Accreditation program. The discussion will include accreditation of whole-body general purpose magnets, dedicated extremity systems well as breast MRI accreditation. Anticipated updates to the ACR MRI Quality Control Manual will also be reviewed. To understand the requirements of the ACR CT accreditation program, including updates to the QC manual as well as updates through the FAQ process. To understand the requirements of the ACR nuclear medicine accreditation program, and the role of the physicist in annual equipment surveys and the set up and supervision of the routine QC program. To understand the current ACR MAP Accreditation requirement and present the concepts and structure of the forthcoming ACR Digital Mammography QC Manual and Program.

  11. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

  12. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun

    2015-01-01

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice

  13. A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chatelus, Renaud [Consultant, Export Control and IAEA Safeguards Specialist, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))

    2012-06-15

    The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the 'trigger list', as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

  14. A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, Renaud; )

    2012-01-01

    The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the “trigger list”, as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

  15. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, also included are events reported involving byproduct material which is exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  16. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fadden, M.; Yardumian, J.

    1993-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

  17. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE's Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL

  18. Some basic concepts of fast breeder reactor safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tkharev, E.; Walford, F.J.

    1987-04-01

    The range of discussion topics of this report is restricted to a few key areas of safeguards importance at Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) only. The differences between thermal and fast reactors that may have safeguards significance in the case of FBRs are listed. The FBR principles of design are mentioned. The relevant safeguards objectives and criteria are given. The fundamental issues for safeguarding FBR are treated. An outline safeguards approach is presented. Model inspection activities are mentioned. 4 figs

  19. Advisory group meeting on safeguards related to final disposal of nuclear material in waste and spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-07-01

    This paper is primarily concerned with Section 11 of INFCIRC/153 which provides for the possible termination of safeguards based on a determination that the nuclear material in question has been consumed, has been diluted, or has become practicably irrecoverable. Two distinctly different categories of nuclear material have been suggested for possible termination of safeguards based on a determination that the nuclear material has become practicably irrecoverable: One relates to a variety of low concentration waste materials, meaning thereby materials which the State or plant operator considers to be of questionable economic recoverability and the other relates to the spent fuel placed in facilities described as ''permanent repositories'' which are at least claimed to represent ''final disposal'' facilities and are candidates for a possible determination of practicably irrecoverable. 26 refs, tabs

  20. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, James W.

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  1. IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Practices Guides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mathews, C.; Sahar, S.; Cisar, V.

    2015-01-01

    Implementation of IAEA safeguards benefits greatly from effective cooperation among the IAEA, State or regional authorities (SRAs), and operators of facilities and other locations. To improve such cooperation, the IAEA has produced numerous safeguards guidance documents in its Services Series publications. The IAEA also provides assistance, training and advisory services that are based on the published guidance. The foundation of the IAEA's safeguards guidance is the Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (IAEA Services Series 21) published in March of 2012. The large majority of States have concluded CSAs and therefore will benefit from this guidance. Many States with CSAs also have concluded small quantities protocols (SQPs) to their CSAs. In April of 2013, the IAEA published the Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with SQPs (IAEA Services Series 22). Other guidance focuses on specific topics such as preparing additional protocol declarations and nuclear material accounting. This paper will describe a recent effort to produce a ''Safeguards Implementation Practices'' (SIP) series of guides that will provide additional explanatory information about safeguards implementation, and share the practical experiences and lessons learned of States and the IAEA over the many decades of implementing safeguards. The topics to be addressed in four SIP guides include: 1) Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities; 2) Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure; 3) Provision of Information to the IAEA; and 4) Collaborative Approaches to Safeguards Implementation. The SIP Guides build upon the content of IAEA Services Series 21. Because the SIP Guides are intended to share implementation practices and lessons learned of States, a number of experienced State experts have participated in the development of the documents, through a joint Member State Support Programme task

  2. SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kempf, C.R.

    1994-01-01

    A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report

  3. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henzlova, Daniela; Kouzes, R.; McElroy, R.; Peerani, P.; Baird, K.; Bakel, A.; Borella, M.; Bourne, M.; Bourva, L.; Cave, F.; Chandra, R.; Chernikova, D.; Croft, S.; Dermody, G.; Dougan, A.; Ely, J.; Fanchini, E.; Finocchiaro, P.; Gavron, Victor; Kureta, M.; Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov; Ishiyama, K.; Lee, T.; Martin, Ch.; McKinny, K.; Menlove, Howard Olsen; Orton, Ch.; Pappalardo, A.; Pedersen, B.; Plenteda, R.; Pozzi, S.; Schear, M.; Seya, M.; Siciliano, E.; Stave, S.; Sun, L.; Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Tagziria, H.; Takamine, J.; Weber, A.-L.; Yamaguchi, T.; Zhu, H.

    2015-01-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3 He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3 He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3 He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3 He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3 He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3 He-alternative technologies.

  4. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henzlova, Daniela [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kouzes, R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); McElroy, R. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Peerani, P. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Aspinall, M. [Hybrid Instruments Ltd., Birmingham (United Kingdom); Baird, K. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Bakel, A. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Borella, M. [SCK.CEN, Mol (Belgium); Bourne, M. [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Bourva, L. [Canberra Ltd., Oxford (United Kingdom); Cave, F. [Hybrid Instruments Ltd., Birmingham (United Kingdom); Chandra, R. [Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd., Zurich (Sweden); Chernikova, D. [Chalmers Univ. of Technology (Sweden); Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Dermody, G. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); Dougan, A. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Ely, J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Fanchini, E. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Finocchiaro, P. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Gavron, Victor [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kureta, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Ishiyama, K. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Lee, T. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Martin, Ch. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); McKinny, K. [GE Reuter-Stokes, Twinsburg, OH (United States); Menlove, Howard Olsen [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Orton, Ch. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Pappalardo, A. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Pedersen, B. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Peranteau, D. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Plenteda, R. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Pozzi, S. [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Schear, M. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); Seya, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Siciliano, E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Stave, S. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sun, L. [Proportional Technologies Inc., Houston, TX (United States); Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Tagziria, H. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Vaccaro, S. [DG Energy (Luxembourg); Takamine, J. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Weber, A. -L. [Inst. for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), Fontenay-aux-Roses (France); Yamaguchi, T. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Zhu, H. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States)

    2015-12-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3

  5. Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

    1995-01-01

    The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards

  6. Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.; Grady, L.M.; Bennett, H.A.; Sasser, D.W.; Engi, D.

    1978-08-01

    An automated approach to facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation has been developed. This automated process, called Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE), consists of a collection of a continuous stream of operational modules for facility characterization, the selection of critical paths, and the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness along these paths. The technique has been implemented on an interactive computer time-sharing system and makes use of computer graphics for the processing and presentation of information. Using this technique, a comprehensive evaluation of a safeguards system can be provided by systematically varying the parameters that characterize the physical protection components of a facility to reflect the perceived adversary attributes and strategy, environmental conditions, and site operational conditions. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

  7. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H D; Ko, W I; Song, D Y [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  8. A Legal Analysis of Safeguard Measures in the European Community

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Guang Ma

    2006-12-01

    Full Text Available In 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the “Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China” and the “Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures." In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in thIn 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the "Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China" and the "Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures." In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in the European Community comply with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. In conclusion, based on the analysis of safeguard measures in the European Community's legal system and their practice in actual cases, it apparent that the European Community is making a serious effort to comply with the standards of the WTO Safeguards Agreement. In certain respects, the European Community has a comparatively higher level of standards than the WTO. Nevertheless, there continue to be challenges to WTO

  9. Swift conclusion of Safeguards Agreements with Atomic Energy Agency urged on all signatories to Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document contains statements made by the representatives of the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, New Zealand, Uruguay, Australia, Armenia, Belarus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Japan at the 47th Meeting in connection with the annual report of the IAEA, especially related to the implementation of strengthened safeguards

  10. Guarantying and testing the nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turcu, Ilie

    2002-01-01

    Apparently, the nuclear power will ensure an important share of the world energy demand at least for the next decades because there is no viable alternative in the fan of energy sources neither one complying with the environment preservation requirements. The nuclear energy future depends not only on technical and economical aspects but also on preventing any danger of nuclear safeguards nature. The main international legal instrument which provides concrete commitments for nations in this field is the Nuclear Safeguard Convention. It provides guarantees and testings of the nuclear safeguards over the entire service life of the nuclear power plants. In the two general conferences (of 1999 and 2002) the status and measures adopted in the field of nuclear safeguards by the states adhering to the convention were discussed and reviewed, as well as the issues of financial resources, licensing and the adequate measures in emergency cases. The nuclear safeguards is a major issue among the criteria of integration in UE. Essential for maintaining and endorsing the provisions of nuclear safeguards in Romania are specific research and development activities aiming at integrating the equipment and structures, solving the operation problems of nuclear facilities, studying the behavior of installations in transient regimes, investigating the reliability and probabilistic assessing of nuclear safeguards, examining the phenomenology and simulating severe accidents or human factor behavior. Of major importance appears to be the international cooperation aiming that a permanent exchange of information and experience, dissemination of the best results, solutions and practices. The paper presents the status and trends at the world level, as well as in Romania, underlining the main issues of the strategy in this field and stressing the financial and human resources implied the implementing the nuclear safeguards provisions

  11. Safeguards and physics measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2002-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'

  12. Australian nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerin, J.C.

    1988-01-01

    The Australian Government considers that allegations made by the West German magazine - Der Spiegel in its January and February 1988 editions, flow from a lack of understanding of the complexities of international trade in nuclear materials, confusion between internal and international flag swaps and failure to comprehend the equivalence principle used in nuclear materials accounting. The Ministerial statement briefly outlines these issues and concludes that there is no evidence that any material subject to Australia's bilateral safeguards agreement has been diverted from peaceful uses or that Australia's safeguard requirements have been breached

  13. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-01-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

  14. Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rames, J.

    1999-01-01

    This presentation discusses the legal framework of IAEA Safeguards which consists of a number of elements, including agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings, basic safeguards documents (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, INFCIRC/153 (Corr..), INFCIRC/540 (Corr.), INFCIRC/9/Rev.2, GC(V)/INF/39), the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements, and finally the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Boards of Governors. Major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguard agreements are described

  15. Timely integration of safeguards and security with projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Price, R.; Blount, P.M.; Garcia, S.W.; Gonzales, R.L.; Salazar, J.B.; Campbell, C.H.

    2004-01-01

    established institutional performance standards and criteria, then implemented requirements and guidance for meeting the expectations. This paved the way for making a business case and developing a process for systematically integrating safeguards and security planning into all LANL construction, facility modifications or upgrades, mission changes, and operational projects. The Safeguards and Security Requirements Integration Team (S and S RIT) serves as the pathway to project engagement and S and S integration.

  16. International safeguards for fast critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gunderson, D.O.; Todd, J.L.

    1978-12-01

    It was concluded that practical routine inventory verification techniques can be effective in detecting protracted diversion but will not meet the seven-day timeliness criteria either for protracted or large one-time diversions. An effective international safeguards system requires a method of continuously monitoring facility activities either with instrumentation, inspectors, or a combination thereof. It was also concluded that a resident inspector is required at this type of facility because of the many nonroutine operations. However, a single inspector cannot adequately monitor all activities to assure that no diversion is taking place. The use of existing structural features and unattended monitoring at portals as well as surveillance by a resident inspector can provide an effective detection capability. A rapid special inventory verification is required following detection to verify any suspected diversion

  17. Fuel cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-07-01

    In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

  18. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards contingency plan. 72.184 Section 72.184 Energy... Protection § 72.184 Safeguards contingency plan. (a) The requirements of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats and radiological sabotage must be as defined in appendix C to part...

  19. Safeguards planning in a plant design process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinrich, L.A.

    1977-01-01

    The safeguards efforts for the partitioning fuel cycle are considered. Included in the discussion are the organization of the safeguards study, the development of safeguards criteria, the expression of these criteria as requirements for facility design, and some preliminary details of the implementation of these requirements in facility and process layout

  20. Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dugan, V.L.; Chapman, L.D.

    1977-01-01

    A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

  1. Structure for the decomposition of safeguards responsibilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dugan, V.L.; Chapman, L.D.

    1977-08-01

    A major mission of safeguards is to protect against the use of nuclear materials by adversaries to harm society. A hierarchical structure of safeguards responsibilities and activities to assist in this mission is defined. The structure begins with the definition of international or multi-national safeguards and continues through domestic, regional, and facility safeguards. The facility safeguards is decomposed into physical protection and material control responsibilities. In addition, in-transit safeguards systems are considered. An approach to the definition of performance measures for a set of Generic Adversary Action Sequence Segments (GAASS) is illustrated. These GAASS's begin outside facility boundaries and terminate at some adversary objective which could lead to eventual safeguards risks and societal harm. Societal harm is primarily the result of an adversary who is successful in the theft of special nuclear material or in the sabotage of vital systems which results in the release of material in situ. With the facility safeguards system, GAASS's are defined in terms of authorized and unauthorized adversary access to materials and components, acquisition of material, unauthorized removal of material, and the compromise of vital components. Each GAASS defines a set of ''paths'' (ordered set of physical protection components) and each component provides one or more physical protection ''functions'' (detection, assessment, communication, delay, neutralization). Functional performance is then developed based upon component design features, the environmental factors, and the adversary attributes. An example of this decomposition is presented

  2. Security Management and Safeguards Office

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bewley, Nathaniel M.

    2004-01-01

    The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are

  3. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 947.54 from entering channels of trade and other outlets for...

  4. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  5. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron

    2008-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant's large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis

  6. Leveraging physical protection technology for international safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glidewell, Don

    2001-01-01

    Full text: In an effort to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability of equipment used for International Safeguards, the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) Reflection Group requested the ESARDA Containment and Surveillance Working Group to investigate the feasibility of employing physical protection technologies for international safeguards applications. The physical protection market has traditionally been much greater than the international safeguards market. Consequently, physical protection technology has been subjected to greater testing and evaluation, and has enjoyed much greater real world experience. The larger market yields economies of scale, and the greater testing and experience should arguably result in improved reliability. This paper will compare requirements for physical protection versus international safeguards equipment, and identify types of physical protection equipment, which have potential for safeguards applications. It will evaluate both Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) and non-COTS equipment. Finally, for selected physical protection equipment, the paper will evaluate the degree of modification that would be needed to make it acceptable for safeguards applications. (author)

  7. Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Garcia, Humberto; Desmond, William; Demuth, Scott

    2010-01-01

    International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

  8. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petit, A.

    1991-01-01

    The IAEA has now 200 Inspectors or so, and Euratom a similar number. People in Vienna are talking about increases of this staff, in the range of a possible doubling in the five years to come, although even an immediate restart of the expansion of nuclear industry, would not materialize significantly within this period. This means that keeping the same safeguarding approach would probably lead to another doubling of such staff in the ten following years, which is completely unrealistic. Such a staff is our of proportion with those of national inspectorates in other fields. The paper analyzes the basic irrealistic dogma which have hindered the progress of international safeguards, and recall the suggestions made since ten years to improve them

  9. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  10. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  11. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  12. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  13. The voluntary safeguards offer of the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Houck, F.S.

    1985-01-01

    During negotiations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concerns were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States that their acceptance of Agency safeguards would put them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the nuclear-weapon States. To allay these concerns, the United States and the United Kingdom in December 1967 made voluntary offers to accept Agency safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. Subsequently, France made a voluntary offer, the safeguards agreement for which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in February 1978, with a view to encouraging acceptance of Agency safeguards by additional States. More recently, in February 1985 the Board approved the safeguards agreement for the voluntary offer of the USSR, made inter alia to encourage further acceptance of Agency safeguards. These safeguards agreements with nuclear-weapon-States have two important features in common: Namely, they result from voluntary offers to accept safeguards rather than from multilateral or bilateral undertakings, and they give the Agency the right but generally not an obligation to apply its safeguards. The agreements differ in certain respects, the most noteworthy of which is the scope of the nuclear activities covered by each offer. The agreements of the United States and United Kingdom are the broadest, covering all peaceful nuclear activities in each country. The safeguards agreement for the US voluntary offer has been in force since December 1980. Now is an appropriate time to review the experience with the agreement's implementation during its first four years, as well as its history and salient features

  14. Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

    2015-01-01

    Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

  15. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems

  16. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems.

  17. Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rockwood, Laura

    2001-01-01

    The legal framework of IAEA safeguards consists of a number of elements, not at all of which are documents. These elements include the Statute of the IAEA; treaties and supply agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings; the basic safeguards documents, the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements; and finally, the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Board of Governors. After a discussion of these elements the major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Finally the procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguards agreements are described. (author)

  18. Safeguards Culture: Analogies from Safety Culture and Security Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naito, K.

    2013-01-01

    The terminology of 'safeguards culture' has been used loosely by safeguards experts as an essential element for establishing an organizational environment of stakeholders for the effective and efficient implementation of international safeguards. However, unlike the other two triplet brothers/ sisters of 3S's (Safety, Security, Safeguards), there is no formally established definition of safeguards culture. In the case of safety culture, INSAG (the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group) has extensively dealt with its concept, elaborating its definition and key characteristics, and published its report, INSAG-4, as the IAEA Safety Series 75. On the other hand, security culture has also been defined by AdSec (the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security). In this paper, a provisional definition of safeguards culture is made on the analogies of safety culture and security culture, and an effort is made to describe essential elements of safeguards culture. It is proposed for SAGSI (the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation) to formally consider the definition of safeguards culture and its characteristics. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  19. Framework for Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards in the Design and Operation of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Darby, John L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Horak, Karl Emanuel [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); LaChance, Jeffrey L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Tolk, Keith Michael [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whitehead, Donnie Wayne [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2007-10-01

    The US is currently on the brink of a nuclear renaissance that will result in near-term construction of new nuclear power plants. In addition, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) ambitious new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program includes facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and reactors for transmuting safeguards material. The use of nuclear power and material has inherent safety, security, and safeguards (SSS) concerns that can impact the operation of the facilities. Recent concern over terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation led to an increased emphasis on security and safeguard issues as well as the more traditional safety emphasis. To meet both domestic and international requirements, nuclear facilities include specific SSS measures that are identified and evaluated through the use of detailed analysis techniques. In the past, these individual assessments have not been integrated, which led to inefficient and costly design and operational requirements. This report provides a framework for a new paradigm where safety, operations, security, and safeguards (SOSS) are integrated into the design and operation of a new facility to decrease cost and increase effectiveness. Although the focus of this framework is on new nuclear facilities, most of the concepts could be applied to any new, high-risk facility.

  20. The Systematic Approach to Training: Analysis and Evaluation in the Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ticevic, S.; Weichselbraun, A.; Pickett, S.; Crete, J.-M.

    2015-01-01

    In applying a systematic approach to training (SAT), identifying the learning needs is the first step - a learning needs analysis allows the organization to identify the competencies required to perform a particular job. A systematic approach can provide a clear structure for training and education programme development as well as the necessary evaluation and feedback so that the organization can adjust the development accordingly and deliver the optimal learning experience. In this presentation we will describes two key elements of a SAT used in the Safeguards Training Section in the Department of Safeguards: Analysis and Evaluation. Analysis is the first part of a SAT needed to define competencies for Safeguards staff in order to improve training development within the Department. We describe the training needs analysis used to capture and articulate the various competencies required for safeguards implementation based upon an analysis of tasks and activities carried out by staff members in the Department. Firstly, we highlight the different qualitative methods used to gather information from staff and the process of evaluating and organizing this information into a structured framework. Secondly, we describe how this framework provides the necessary reference to specify learning objectives, evaluate training effectiveness, review and revise training offerings, and select appropriate training paths based on identified needs. In addition, as part of the SAT, evaluation is performed to identify the usefulness of course outcomes and improvements for future offerings based on lessons learned, to ensure that appropriate knowledge and skills are being taught and to demonstrate the value of training by meeting the organization's needs. We present how the Kirkpatrick four-level evaluation model has been implemented by Safeguards Training Section in order to evaluate course effectiveness after the training has been completed, and discuss how the current evaluation

  1. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, pre-1990 alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  2. Some reflections on nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, Ross.

    1981-01-01

    The author doubts whether, in view of the 1976 policy of requiring adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent IAEA safeguards, Canada still needs the 1974 policy of bilateral safeguards on technology as well as material. The opinion is expressed that bilateral safeguards create difficulties for the IAEA, and are resented by some potential customers. Much better, if it were achievable, would be a code agreed by a convention of vendors and customers alike, to include sanctions against transgressors. The author expresses confidence in the IAEA, but perceives a need for more men and money. Also needed are better instruments to account for materials

  3. International safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.; Curtis, H.B.

    1977-01-01

    To recognize the limitations of safeguards as a barrier to nuclear proliferation is not to deny their essential role in the effort to contain that problem. Without a safeguards system, international nuclear commerce and development would not, indeed could not, be what they are today. The problems evoked in the discussion of the spread of sensitive nuclear technology underscore the importance of ensuring that activities do not outpace our ability to control them. To sustain a global nuclear economy requires a readiness to live within the constraints that such an economy requires. Enhanced safeguards and strengthened national commitments to facilitate their application are key elements of those constraints. So also may be a prepardness by many nations to forego explicitly national control over all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle while still sharing fully and equally in the benefits of the peaceful atom. The challenge of the coming years will be to craft mechanisms and institutions enabling the continued growth of peaceful nuclear activity without further impairing international security. The constraints that such an outcome entails are not limited to nations lacking sophisticated nuclear technology; they apply to the most advanced nuclear nations as well--partly through adherence to the safeguards system that these countries call upon others to adopt, and partly through greater willingness to entertain solutions that may involve greater international involvement in, and control over, their own peaceful nuclear productive activities. With time, the relative incompatibility of nuclear energy with full national sovereignty, and the far-sighted wisdom of the Baruch Plan, are becoming increasingly clear. 1 table, 10 references

  4. 77 FR 38033 - WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-26

    ... DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Foreign Agricultural Service WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels... and trigger levels for safeguard measures provided for in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement... measures under the safeguard provisions of the WTO [[Page 38034

  5. The Department of Safeguards Quality Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konecni, S.

    2015-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards quality management system (QMS) provides the framework for all activities that support the Agency's commitment to providing soundly-based safeguards conclusions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material. The focus of the QMS is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through defined, documented processes, routine oversight and continual improvement initiatives. In accordance with QMS principles, the high-level business processes representing the Department's activities are defined in procedures, guidelines and policies that are maintained in the Safeguards Document Manager. These processes form the basis for Department operations for drawing safeguards conclusions regarding State's compliance with their safeguards obligations. Oversight is provided through internal quality audits. These audits are targeted at processes selected by Senior Management with a focus on procedure compliance as well as customer expectations. Best practices and areas for improvement are assessed through continual improvement. Noncompliance and conditions that are adverse to quality are identified and analyzed in the Condition Report System. Root cause analysis and the implementation actions to eliminate the cause reduce the chance of condition recurrence. Through continual process improvement, processes are measured and analyzed to reduce process and administration waste. The improved processes improve efficiency while providing the desired results. Within the scope of the QMS, these tools support the performance of Departmental processes so that Safeguards products achieve the intended purpose. This paper describes how the various elements of the Department's QMS support safeguards implementation. (author)

  6. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Franklin, M.; Dondi, M.G.

    1981-01-01

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  7. Safeguards for the atom

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-10-15

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  8. Safeguards for the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1959-01-01

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  9. Computer-based safeguards information and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Acquiring, processing and analysing information about inventories and flow of nuclear materials are essential parts of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards information originates from several sources. The information to be provided is specified in the various safeguards agreements between the States and the IAEA, including both NPT agreements and safeguards trilateral agreements. Most of the safeguards information currently received by the IAEA is contained in accounting reports from the States party to the NPT. Within the frame of the material balance concept of NPT, three types of reports are provided to the IAEA by the States: Physical Inventory Listings (PIL); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports (MBR). In addition, facility design information is reported when NPT safeguards are applied and whenever there is a change in the facility or its operation. Based on this data, an accounting system is used to make available such information as the book inventories of nuclear material as a function of time, material balance evaluations, and analysis of shipments versus receipts of nuclear material. A second source of NPT safeguards information is the inspection activities carried out in the field as a necessary counterpart for verification of the data presented by the States in their accounting reports. The processing of inspection reports and other inspection data is carried out by the present system in a provisional manner until a new system, which is under development is available. The major effort currently is directed not to computer processing but toward developing and applying uniform inspection procedures and information requirements. A third source of NPT safeguards information is advanced notifications and notifications of transfer of source materials before the starting point of safeguards. Since, however, the States are not completely aware of the need and requirement to provide these data, this is a point to be emphasized in future workshops and

  10. Work Group 1: Future Directions for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Casterton, J.; Meylemans, P.

    2013-01-01

    The State-Level Concept (SLC) is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States with safeguards agreements. It is based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a State level approach for each State, including a specific combination of safeguards measures. It is executed through an annual implementation plan. The SLC has the value of considering the State as a whole. It provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into account through all stages of safeguards implementation. The implementation of the SLC permits the IAEA to be responsive to all kinds of changes arising from continuous analysis. As a result the safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date. The SLC is implemented by the IAEA as a continuous process involving three major components: establishing knowledge about the State and drawing conclusions, determining the specific State level approach, and planning and implementing safeguards activities. The major products that emerge from this process are the State level approach, the annual implementation plan that is the basis for implementing safeguards activities in a State on an annual basis, and the safeguards conclusions, which are set out in the Safeguards Implementation Report on an annual basis. A better cooperation between IAEA and SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material), RSAC (Regional State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material is important for developing and implementing SLC. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  11. Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program

  12. Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.; Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.

    1975-06-01

    There has been much discussion and public debate concerning the effectiveness of the national system of safeguards against malevolent acts involving nuclear materials. Useful dialogue on this subject has been hampered by the lack of well-defined objectives, system parameters and boundary conditions as a framework for communication. This study provides such a framework. Expressing the safeguards objective in terms of societal risk represents a change in focus, rather than intent, from the earlier view of safeguards as a system for protecting nuclear material against theft or diversion. The study defines both the safeguards problem and the safeguards system in terms that can be related to the general safeguards objective. It is axiomatic that the first step to an effective solution is a careful definition of the problem. The significant and immediate value of this study lies in the rigorous definition and systematic organization of recognized elements into a coherent and comprehensive pattern. Although the title specifically addresses design and evaluation, the framework provided by the study will be a useful management tool for safeguards implementation and administration as well. (U.S.)

  13. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  14. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  15. Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

  16. Prospects for regional safeguards systems - State-level Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peixoto, O.J.M.

    2013-01-01

    The increased co-operation with Regional Safeguard's System (RSAC) is a relevant tool for strengthening effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the international safeguard. The new safeguards system that emerges from the application of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) and the full use of State-level Concept is a challenge and an opportunity for effectively incorporate RSAC into the international safeguards scheme. The challenge is to determine how the co-operation and coordination will be implemented on this new safeguards scheme. This paper presents some discussions and prospects on the issues to be faced by RSAC and IAEA during the implementation of State-level Approach (SLA) using all information available. It is also discussed how different levels of co-operation could be achieved when SLA is applied by IAEA safeguards. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  17. The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wagner, W.

    2000-01-01

    A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

  18. Drug transport mechanism of the AcrB efflux pump.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pos, Klaas M

    2009-05-01

    In Gram-negative bacteria such as Escherichia coli and Pseudomonas aeruginosa, tripartite multidrug efflux systems extrude cytotoxic substances from the cell directly into the medium bypassing periplasm and the outer membrane. In E. coli, the tripartite efflux system AcrA/AcrB/TolC is the pump that extrudes multiple antibiotics, dyes, bile salts and detergents. The inner membrane component AcrB, a member of the Resistance Nodulation cell Division (RND) family, is the major site for substrate recognition and energy transduction of the entire tripartite system. The drug/proton antiport processes in this secondary transporter are suggested to be spatially separated, a feature frequently observed for primary transporters like membrane-bound ATPases. The recently elucidated asymmetric structure of the AcrB trimer reveals three different monomer conformations proposed to represent consecutive states in a directional transport cycle. Each monomer shows a distinct tunnel system with entrances located at the boundary of the outer leaflet of the inner membrane and the periplasm through the periplasmic porter (pore) domain towards the funnel of the trimer and TolC. In one monomer a hydrophobic pocket is present which has been shown to bind the AcrB substrates minocyclin and doxorubicin. The energy conversion from the proton motive force into drug efflux includes proton binding in (and release from) the transmembrane part. The conformational changes observed within a triad of essential, titratable residues (D407/D408/K940) residing in the hydrophobic transmembrane domain appear to be transduced by transmembrane helix 8 and associated with the conformational changes seen in the periplasmic domain. From the asymmetric structure a possible peristaltic pump transport mechanism based on a functional rotation of the AcrB trimer has been postulated. The novel drug transport model combines the alternate access pump mechanism with the rotating site catalysis of F(1)F(o) ATPase as

  19. Improvement of Safeguards Practices in Armenia Through Implementation of Advanced Software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Melkumyan, A.; Amirjanyan, A.

    2015-01-01

    The Agreement between the Republic Armenia (RA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in connection with Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed on 23.09.1993 and the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement was ratified on 28.06.2004. In 2007 the RA invited the IAEA ISSAS mission that made recommendations the majority of which have been implemented. The Law of the RA on Safe Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes establishes the provisions related to the safeguards implementation on state and facility levels, as well as provisions related to preparation and conduct of SG inspections at nuclear facilities and LOFs, preparation and submission of accounting reports and other. The Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority is responsible for the safeguards implementation on the state level. The ANRA also maintains the general ledger for LOFs, prepares the accounting reports and submits them to the IAEA. To improve the SG practices and provide with the efficient and continuous control over the nuclear materials, the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center (ANRA’s TSO) developed an electronic database NUCMAT to maintain an accurate inventory, record all changes and provide recoverable history of all activities related to the nuclear materials present in the RA. The NUCMAT provides with automated access to the information on NM and is aimed to assist in efficient implementation of accounting and control of NM, storing data, generating the accounting reports in the format that meets the IAEA requirements, as well tables and maps and quick access to the data. At present the NUCMAT is in trial use by the ANRA specifically in relation to implementation of the accounting and control of nuclear materials in the LOFs. (author)

  20. Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezniczek, A.

    2013-01-01

    Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  1. IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelly, P.

    1986-01-01

    The author gives a personal view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is described (including containment, surveillance and inspection), and the limitations and strengths of the system are examined. (U.K.)

  2. Nuclear non-proliferation states urged to conclude Safeguards Agreement with International Atomic Energy Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document contains a brief presentation of the annual report of the IAEA, the statement of the Director General of the IAEA at the General Assembly Plenary with emphasis on Agency's actions to strengthen safeguards, and statements made by the representatives of Brazil, Finland, Mexico, United States, Lithuania, Cuba, Czech Republic, Japan, Egypt, Ukraine, South Africa, India, Myanmar, and the Russian Federation at the 46th Meeting, on 4 November 1999

  3. The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

  4. The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

  5. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  6. Middle term prospects for Japan's safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogawa, T.

    2001-01-01

    Japan has responded to IAEA requirements on reinforced safeguard regulations. The IAEA additional protocol entered in force in Japan on December 1999. Japan submitted a preliminary information report to IAEA on June 2000 after joint works with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) of Japan. The first annual report was submitted to IAEA on May 2001. Another activity for the additional protocol is complementary accesses. The total 36 accesses to facilities have been done from November 2000 to September 2001. Procedures of access to managements are under discussion. MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has been constructing the Rokkasho Safeguards On-Site Laboratory from 1997, and the Rokkasho Safeguards Center from 2000. The Design Information Verification (DIV) is now ongoing. Much more personal resources will be needed for future inspections. Therefore, the budget for safeguards is increasing in contrast to the flat base budget for the total atomic energy. As for future activity, a MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuels) fuel processing plant is one of the issues for discussion. The construction of the MOX processing plant is supposed to begin on around 2004. The conclusion of additional protocol will be given by IAEA until end of 2002. Shift to integrated safeguards are under discussions by MEXT, NMCC and utilities of Japan parallel with IAEA. Key issues of discussion are cost saving for safeguards, development of personal resources for inspectors and the role of NMCC. (Y. Tanaka)

  7. IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

  8. Developing a simulation for border safeguarding

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Van Rooyen, S

    2011-09-01

    Full Text Available Border safeguarding is the defence of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and this is a joint responsibility of the military and the police. Military doctrine for conventional warfare is not sufficient for Border Safeguarding operations due...

  9. Concept for fuel-cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    deMontmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-01-01

    Although the guidelines for NPT safeguards specify that the State's fuel cycle and degree of international independence are to be taken into account, the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle, and the findings are reported in those terms. A concept whereby safeguards might more effectively and efficiently accomplish the purposes of NPT safeguards is explored. The principal features are: (1) division of the fuel cycle into three zones, each containing material having a different degree of significance for safeguards; (2) closing a verified material balance around each zone, supplementing the present MBA balances for more sensitive facilities and replacing them for others; (3) maintenance by the IAEA of a current book inventory for each facility by means of immediate, abbreviated reporting of interfacility transfers; (4) near real-time analysis of material flow patterns through the fuel cycle; and (5) a periodic statement of the findings for the entire State that takes the form that there is assurance that all nuclear materials under safeguards are accounted for to some stated degree of uncertainty

  10. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  11. Points for Improvement in Mexican Legislation on Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maciel Sánchez, S.; Carreño Padilla, A. L.

    2015-01-01

    The main goal of this paper is to underline the specific points needed still to be improved on safeguards in the Mexican legal framework. The problem: Mexico proposed the Tlatelolco Treaty which was before the TNP. So the Mexican legislation on safeguards should to be one of the best around the world, but there are still points to be improved, such as a specific regulation on the topic. Justification: Remembering that the exact sciences need of the law in order to be applied in a desirable way. I mean, the safeguards could be well conceived and well worked from the physics and mathematics point of view, but in order to be followed in any country, it is necessary the right legal framework. Hypothesis: What has Mexico now in its legislation on safeguards and what remains to be done (what is pending in the Mexican legal scope of the safeguards)? Objectives: – To propose legal solutions to correct the weakness of the Mexican legal framework on Safeguards; taking into account my own experience drafting the Mexican regulation on safeguards from 2008 for the Mexican Government in my nuclear law firm “Martínez and Maciel”. – To propose a legal framework on safeguards for Mexico as it is understood by the IAEA. – To update the legal frame work on safeguards in Mexico linking it to the Back end of the spent fuel. (Considering that sooner or later the Mexican Government will have to define its politic on this topic). (author)

  12. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  13. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wigeland, R.; Bjornard, T.; Castle, B.

    2009-01-01

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization's purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations' approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  14. IAEA safeguards for the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Close, D.A.

    1995-06-01

    This document is an overview of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the basic requirements or elements of an IAEA safeguards regime. The primary objective of IAEA safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of material and the timely detection of undeclared activities. The two important components of IAEA safeguards to accomplish their primary objective are nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance. This overview provides guidance to the Fissile Materials Disposition Project for IAEA inspection requirements. IAEA requirements, DOE Orders, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations will be used as the basis for designing a safeguards and security system for the facilities recommended by the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

  15. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santi, Peter A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hypes, Philip A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  16. Evaluation of safeguards procedures: a summary of a methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salisbury, J.D.; Savage, J.W.

    1979-01-01

    A methodology for the evaluation of safeguards procedures is described. As presently conceptualized, the methodology will consist of the following steps: (1) expansion of the general protection requirements that are contained in the NRC regulations into more detailed but still generic requirements for use at the working level; (2) development of techniques and formats for using the working-level requirements in an evaluation; (3) development of a technique for converting specific facility protection procedures into a format that will allow comparison with the working-level requirements; (4) development of an evaluation technique for comparing the facility protection procedures to determine if they meet the protection requirements

  17. Safeguards at NRC licensed facilities: Are we doing enough

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asselstine, J.K.

    1986-01-01

    Safeguards at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) facilities are discussed in this paper. The NRC is pursuing a number of initiatives in the safeguards area. The Commission is conducting a reassessment of its safeguards design basis threat statements to consider the possible implications of an explosive-laden vehicle for U.S. nuclear safeguards and to examine the comparability of safeguards features at NRC-licensed and DOE facilities. The Commission is also completing action on measures to protect against the sabotage threat from an insider at NRC-licensed facilities, and is examining the potential safety implications of safeguards measures. Finally, the NRC has developed measures to reduce the theft potential for high-enriched uranium

  18. IAEA safeguards technical manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-03-01

    Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

  19. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included

  20. From safeguards to treaty verification and the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, J.

    1997-01-01

    Changes in safeguards techniques and changes in the context in which it has to be applied have led to a continuous evolution of safeguards. Nuclear material accountancy and its verification is still the basis of safeguards. But also other, less technical, tools are developed for the future. Will safeguards not become an idle story but continue to lay effectively and efficiently a concrete foundation for international trust and peace, there is a need for more investment in new methods and techniques to allow safeguards to keep pace with the developments, both politically and technically. Safeguards serves the international community by enhancing the mutual trust that leads to national security. That also enabled the rapid growth of international co-operation on the applications of nuclear energy. But international security is based on confidence. It is not a priori the technique that creates that sphere of confidence, the human and political interactions are at least equally important. In different cultures there are marked differences in behaviour and such differences can be easily misinterpreted. Therefore also the new safeguards has to be equally objectively established and critically executed under the close attention of all parties concerned

  1. Inspection methods for safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minichino, C.; Richard, E.W.

    1981-01-01

    A project team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been developing inspection procedures and training materials for the NRC inspectors of safeguards systems at licensed nuclear facilities. This paper describes (1) procedures developed for inspecting for compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, (2) training materials for safeguards inspectors on technical topics related to safeguards systems, such as computer surety, alarm systems, sampling techniques, and power supplies, and (3) an inspector-oriented methodology for evaluating the overall effectiveness of safeguards systems

  2. Enhanced AFCI Sampling, Analysis, and Safeguards Technology Review

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    John Svoboda

    2009-09-01

    The focus of this study includes the investigation of sampling technologies used in industry and their potential application to nuclear fuel processing. The goal is to identify innovative sampling methods using state of the art techniques that could evolve into the next generation sampling and analysis system for metallic elements. Sampling and analysis of nuclear fuel recycling plant processes is required both to monitor the operations and ensure Safeguards and Security goals are met. In addition, environmental regulations lead to additional samples and analysis to meet licensing requirements. The volume of samples taken by conventional means, can restrain productivity while results samples are analyzed, require process holding tanks that are sized to meet analytical issues rather than process issues (and that create a larger facility footprint), or, in some cases, simply overwhelm analytical laboratory capabilities. These issues only grow when process flowsheets propose new separations systems and new byproduct material for transmutation purposes. Novel means of streamlining both sampling and analysis are being evaluated to increase the efficiency while meeting all requirements for information. This report addresses just a part of the effort to develop and study novel methods by focusing on the sampling and analysis of aqueous samples for metallic elements. It presents an overview of the sampling requirements, including frequency, sensitivity, accuracy, and programmatic drivers, to demonstrate the magnitude of the task. The sampling and analysis system needed for metallic element measurements is then discussed, and novel options being applied to other industrial analytical needs are presented. Inductively coupled mass spectrometry instruments are the most versatile for metallic element analyses and are thus chosen as the focus for the study. Candidate novel means of process sampling, as well as modifications that are necessary to couple such instruments to

  3. Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities. Review and analysis of the status of safeguards technology for uranium enrichment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-09-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine critically the diversion potential at uranium enrichment facilities and to outline a basic safeguards strategy which counters all identified hazards as completely as possible yet with a minimum of non-essential redundancy. Where existing technology does not appear to be adequate for effective safeguards, the limitations are examined, and suggestions for further R and D effort are made. Parts of this report are generally applicable to all currently known enrichment processes, while other parts are specifically directed toward facilities based on the gas centrifuge process. It is hoped that additional sections discussing a safeguards strategy for gas diffusion facilities can be added later. It should be emphasized that this is a technical report, and does not reflect any legal positions. The safeguards strategy and subsequent inspection procedures are intended as guidelines, not as negotiating positions

  4. DCS emulator development for the ACR-1000 simulator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakashima, Y.; Trueman, R.; Ishii, K.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) simulators are the main means for operator training and as such are a crucial part of the NPP operation life-cycle. Hitachi, Ltd., Information and Control Systems Company (henceforth 'Hitachi') is the preferred DCS and DCS emulator developer and supplier for the ACR-1000 NPP control system. Hitachi's concept for the DCS (distributed control system) portion of the ACR-1000 simulator is 'total emulation of the DCS' by software. This paper will review the current status of the technical development and the major project milestones. (author)

  5. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

  6. Psychology of nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

    1978-08-17

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

  7. IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nardi, J.

    1984-01-01

    The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

  8. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The present IAEA approach to safeguarding various types of nuclear facilities is examined. The IAEA safeguards objectives, criteria and specific techniques are addressed, with reference e.g. to concepts like timely detection, quantities of safeguards significance, and conversion times. Material accountancy and containment and surveillance as basic features of IAEA safeguards verification are discussed. Safeguards measures for specific facility types are considered and corresponding levels of IAEA safeguards experience are assessed. Outlines of expected IAEA safeguard approaches to large bulk handling facilities are discussed. The evolutionary nature of safeguards based on experience and research and development is mentioned

  9. Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Augustson, R.H.; Eccleston, G.W.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that nuclear materials accountancy was introduced as a primary safeguards measure in international safeguards at the inception of the EURATOM safeguards directorate in 1959 and in IAEA safeguards in 1961 with the issuance of INFCIRC 26. As measurement technology evolved and safeguarded facilities increased in both number and size, measurement methodology requirements increased as reflected in INFCIRC 66 (Rev 2.) in 1968 and later in INFCIRC 153 in 1972. Early measurements relied heavily on chemical analysis, but in the 1960s the measurements evolved more and more toward nondestructive assay. Future nuclear materials accountancy systems will increase in complexity, driven by larger and more complex facilities; more stringent health, safety, and environmental considerations; and unattended automation in facility operations

  10. Training to raise staff awareness about safeguarding children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fleming, Jane

    2015-04-01

    To improve outcomes for children and young people health organisations are required to train all staff in children's safeguarding. This creates difficulties for large complex organisations where most staff provide services to the adult population. Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust is a large acute and community trust that had difficulties in engaging staff in children's safeguarding training. Compliance rates for clinical staff who were trained in children's safeguarding were low and needed to be addressed. This article sets out why safeguarding training is important for all staff and how the trust achieved staff engagement and improved compliance rates. To evaluate, maintain and develop safeguarding knowledge, understanding, skills, attitude and behaviour further resources are planned to allow access to learning resources in a variety of formats.

  11. Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant by IAEA Member State Support Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, H. S.; Kim, H. D.; Song, D. Y.; Eom, S. H.; Lee, T. H.; Ahn, S. K.; Park, S. H.; Han, B. Y.; Choi, Y.

    2012-01-01

    . However, in this report the Reference Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) is proposed to develop a safeguards approach for the integrated pyroprocessing facility. The REPF has identical processes with ESPF model but has been primarily designed for the purpose of safeguards approach development. The main subject in this report is to develop a nuclear material accounting system that includes an analysis of possible Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Points (KMP), the identification of possible operator measurement systems at KMP, and a simulation of processing operation. Based on those information, Material Unaccounted For (MUF) for the REPF were estimated. Most of contents in this report has been discussed and revised by IAEA and KAERI in the MSSP working group meeting. The assessment of the safeguard ability of the reference pyroprocessing facility concept was studied preliminarily. Pyroprocess technology is focused on securing the sustain ability of nuclear energy by improving proliferation resistance, economic efficiency, environmental friendliness, and resource utilization of back end nuclear fuel cycle. The international community's confidence should be secured for the realization of pyroprocess technology. Also, a study to demonstrate the safeguard ability for pyroprocess facility is needed through analyzing and evaluating nuclear material flow, accountancy of pyroprocess, and the measurement uncertainties of accounting equipment

  12. Financial costs of meeting global biodiversity conservation targets

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    McCarthy, Donal P.; Donald, Paul F.; Scharlemann, Jörn P.W.

    2012-01-01

    World governments have committed to halting human-induced extinctions and safeguarding important sites for biodiversity by 2020, but the financial costs of meeting these targets are largely unknown. We estimate the cost of reducing the extinction risk of all globally threatened bird species (by ≥1...

  13. Safeguards at Kozloduy NPP - Experience and expectations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elenkov, Todor

    2001-01-01

    Bulgaria is a party of Non Proliferation Treaty since 5 September 1969. The agreement between IAEA and Bulgaria - INFCIRC 178 - has been in force since 29 February 1972. At that time Bulgaria had one research reactor IRT-2000 in Sofia and two power reactors of WWER-440 type under construction. Now at Kozloduy NPP site there are 4 facilities, which consist of 4 WWER-440 and 2 WWER-1000 type power reactors, producing almost 50% of the electricity in Bulgaria and 1 wet away from reactor spent fuel storage. In 1991 under the green movements and social pressure, the research reactor in Sofia was closed and the construction of the second NPP in Belene with 2 WWER-1000 type reactors was halted. After the transfer in 1994 of the fresh fuel from the research reactor to Kozloduy due to security reasons practically NPP Kozloduy remains the only significant (from safeguards point of view) nuclear site in Bulgaria. In 1972 a 'Nuclear Fuel' group was formed at the Physicists Department in NPP Kozloduy with responsibilities to carry out for safeguards records and reports, fresh and spent fuel transport and control. In 1990 this group was transferred to the Safety Section and since 1992 it exists as 'Control and Accounting for of the Nuclear Materials' - a section in the Safety Department. Currently the section serves all four facilities in NPP Kozloduy and has four people: section head, chief inspector and two inspectors. The main activities of the section include: a) Control of the nuclear fuel location as well as meeting the storage and transport conditions regulations; b) Control of the conditions for normal operations of the installed IAEA surveillance systems; c) Preparation of documents for licensing of fresh and spent nuclear fuel transport; d) Preparation of the official information on nuclear materials location and quantity; e) Preparation of accounting records and the reports for IAEA (ICR, PIL, MBR); f) Co-ordination of the IAEA safeguards inspection activities at NPP

  14. Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, Nicholas [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Poe, Sarah [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-10-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

  15. Handbook of nuclear data for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lammer, M.; Schwerer, O.

    1991-06-01

    This handbook contains nuclear data needed by safeguards users for their work. It was initiated by an IAEA working group, and the contents were defined by the relies to a questionnaire sent to safeguards specialists. This is a preliminary edition of the handbook for distribution to safeguards and nuclear data experts for review. The present edition of the handbook contains the following basic nuclear data: actinides: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron cross sections and resonance integrals, prompt neutron data, delayed neutron data; fission products: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron capture cross sections and resonance integrals; fission product yields. Also included are appendices that summarize the data requested by safeguards users, and that present a number of questions to them and to data experts on the data contained in this preliminary issue and about additional data for possible inclusion in future editions and updates of the handbook

  16. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included Refs, figs, 1 tab

  17. Burnup dependence of coolant void reactivity for ACR-1000 cell

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Tellier, R.; Marleau, G.; Hebert, A.; Roubstov, D.; Altiparmakov, D.; Irish, D.

    2008-01-01

    The Advanced Candu Reactor (ACR-1000) is light water cooled, fueled with enriched uranium and has a smaller lattice pitch than the Candu-6. As a result, the neutronic behavior of the ACR-1000 cell is expected to be somewhat different from that of the Candu-6 leading to a negative coolant void reactivity (CVR). Here we evaluate the CVR for the ACR-1000 cell using the lattice code DRAGON and compare our results with those obtained using the code WIMS-AECL. The differences observed between these two codes for the burnup dependence of the CVR is mainly explained in terms of the specific cell leakage model used by both codes. (authors)

  18. Integrating virtual reality applications in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barletta, Michael; Crete, Jean-Maurice; Pickett, Susan

    2011-01-01

    Virtual reality (VR) tools have already been developed and deployed in the nuclear industry, including in nuclear power plant construction, project management, equipment and system design, and training. Recognized as powerful tools for, inter alia, integration of data, simulation of activities, design of facilities, validation of concepts and mission planning, their application in nuclear safeguards is still very limited. However, VR tools may eventually offer transformative potential for evolving the future safeguards system to be more fully information-driven. The paper focuses especially on applications in the area of training that have been underway in the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also outlines future applications envisioned for safeguards information and knowledge management, and information-analytic collaboration. The paper identifies some technical and programmatic pre-requisites for realizing the integrative potential of VR technologies. If developed with an orientation to integrating applications through compatible platforms, software, and models, virtual reality tools offer the long-term potential of becoming a real 'game changer,' enabling a qualitative leap in the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA invites Member States, industry, and academia to make proposals as to how such integrating potential in the use of virtual reality technology for nuclear safeguards could be realized. (author)

  19. Patient phenotypes in fibromyalgia comorbid with systemic sclerosis or rheumatoid arthritis: influence of diagnostic and screening tests. Screening with the FiRST questionnaire, diagnosis with the ACR 1990 and revised ACR 2010 criteria.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perrot, Serge; Peixoto, Mariana; Dieudé, Philippe; Hachulla, Eric; Avouac, Jerome; Ottaviani, Sebastien; Allanore, Yannick

    2017-01-01

    Fibromyalgia (FM) may occur with rheumatoid arthritis (RA) and systemic sclerosis (SSc), and debate remains about its diagnosis. We aimed to use three FM tools (a screening tool (FiRST), diagnostic criteria (ACR 1990 and revised 2010), to compare FM prevalence between RA and SSc patients, to describe the phenotypes of patients with comorbid FM, and to analyze links between FM and secondary Sjögren's syndrome (SS). Consecutive adult patients with confirmed RA or SSc from four university hospitals were tested with the three FM tools. FiRST detected FM in 22.6% of the 172 RA patients, with confirmation in 22.1% (ACR1990) and 19.1% (ACR2010). ACR1990FM+ RA patients had more diffuse pain, whereas ACR2010FM+ RA patients had higher BMI and pain intensity, more diffuse pain, active disease, disability, and associated SS. FiRST detected FM in 27.8% of the 122 SSc patients, with confirmation in 30.3% (ACR1990) and 23.7% (ACR2010). ACR1990FM+ SSc patients had greater disability and pain intensity, and more diffuse pain, whereas ACR2010FM+ SSc patients had higher BMI, pain intensity, more disability and diffuse pain, and associated SS. Correlations between FM diagnostic and screening tool results were modest in both conditions. Secondary SS was associated with comorbid FM. The prevalence of FM is high in SSc and RA, whatever the FM diagnostic tool used. Secondary SS is associated with FM in both RA and SSc. The revised ACR 2010 FM criteria and FiRST screening tool reveal specific phenotypes potentially useful for improving disease management.

  20. Transit Matching for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

    2015-01-01

    In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

  1. Integrated safeguards: Australian views and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.; Bragin, V.; Leslie, R.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Australia has had a pioneering role in assisting the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods for strengthened safeguards, both before and after the conclusion of Australia's additional protocol. Australia played a key role in the negotiation of the model additional protocol, and made ratification a high priority in order to encourage early ratification by other States. Australia was the first State to ratify an additional protocol, on 10 December 1997, and was the first State in which the IAEA exercised complementary access and managed access under an additional protocol. Australia has undergone three full cycles of evaluation under strengthened safeguards measures, enabling the Agency to conclude it was appropriate to commence implementation of integrated safeguards. In January 2001 Australia became the first State in which integrated safeguards are being applied. As such, Australia's experience will be of interest to other States as they consult with the IAEA on the modalities for the introduction of integrated safeguards in their jurisdictions. The purpose of the paper is to outline Australia's experience with strengthened safeguards and Australia's views on the implementation of integrated safeguards. Australia has five Material Balance Areas (MBAs), the principal one covering the 10 MWt research reactor at Lucas Heights and the associated inventory of fresh and irradiated HEU fuel. Under classical safeguards, generally Australia was subject to annual Physical Inventory Verifications (PIVs) for the four MBAs at Lucas Heights, plus quarterly interim inspections, making a total of four inspections a year (PIVs for the different MBAs were conducted concurrently with each other or with interim inspections in other MBAs), although there was a period when the fresh fuel inventory exceeded one SQ, requiring monthly inspections. Under strengthened safeguards, this pattern of four inspections a year was maintained, with the addition of complementary

  2. Societal risk approach to safeguards design and evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphey, W.M.; Sherr, T.S.; Bennett, C.A.

    1975-01-01

    A comprehensive rationale for safeguards design and evaluation, and a framework for continuing systematic assessment of the system's effectiveness and efficient allocation of available safeguards resources for balanced protection, were developed. The societal risk approach employed considers the likelihood of successful destructive acts involving nuclear materials or facilities and the magnitude of the effects on society. The safeguards problem is described in terms of events affecting societal risk and adversary actions. Structure of the safeguards system and the evaluation of its adequacy are discussed. Adversary characteristics are also discussed

  3. Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richardson, J.M.

    1982-03-01

    Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures

  4. Some problems relating to application of safeguards in the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tolchenkov, D.L.

    1983-01-01

    By the end of this century there will have been a considerable increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA will therefore be faced with problems due to the increased volume of safeguards activity, the application of safeguards to new types of facility and to large facilities, the optimization of the existing IAEA safeguards system and so on. The authors analyse the potential growth in the IAEA's safeguards activities up to the year 2000 and consider how to optimize methods for the application of safeguards, taking into account a number of factors relating to a State's nuclear activity, the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards etc. On the basis of a hypothetical model of the nuclear fuel cycle that allows for the factors considered as part of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the authors assess the possible risk of diversion as a function of a full-scope safeguards effort. They also examine possible conceptual approaches to safeguarding large-scale facilities such as fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants. (author)

  5. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 36. annual meeting: Proceedings. Volume 24

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1995-01-01

    The sessions at this meeting covered the following topics: international safeguards; physical protection; material control and accountability (MC and A) training; waste overview; nonproliferation and arms control -- US/former Soviet Union; MC and A/physical protection -- SNM storage; spent fuel storage; physical protection -- intrusion sensors and access delay; MC and A -- gamma ray and holdup measurements; MC and A -- neutron based measurements; MC and A/nonproliferation and arms control -- fissile materials disposition; low level waste; packaging and transportation; international safeguards and nonproliferation and arms control -- IAEA verification in the US; international safeguards and physical protection -- video systems; poster and demonstrations; international safeguards and physical protection -- T.I.D.'s, tags and seals; high level wastes and mixed waste; MC and A -- bulk measurements; MC and A and physical protection -- policy; nonproliferation and arms control -- detection and monitoring techniques; nonproliferation and arms control -- US-Russian lab-to-lab safeguards cooperation; MC and A -- information systems; physical protection and MC and A -- vulnerability assessments; waste management -- measurement; international safeguards -- integrated and remote monitoring systems; MC and A -- material control and accountability and indicators; nonproliferation and arms control -- treaties and analysis; nonproliferation and arms control -- plutonium/HEU nonproliferation; MC and A -- measurement control and verification; and international safeguards and nonproliferation and arms control -- environmental monitoring and export control. Separate abstracts were prepared for some of the papers in this volume

  6. Assessment, Cleanup and Redevelopment Exchange System (ACRES)

    Data.gov (United States)

    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency — The Assessment, Cleanup and Redevelopment Exchange System (ACRES) is an online database for Brownfields Grantees to electronically submit data directly to EPA.

  7. Safeguards at NRC licensed facilities: Are we doing enough

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asselstine, J.K.

    1986-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is pursuing a number of initiatives in the safeguards area. The Commission is conducting a reassessment of its safeguards design basis threat statements to consider the possible implications of an explosive-laden vehicle for U.S. nuclear safeguards and to examine the comparability of safeguards features at NRC-licensed and DOE facilities. The Commission is also completing action on measures to protect against the sabotage threat from an insider at NRC-licensed facilities, and is examining the potential safety implications of safeguards measures. Finally, the NRC has developed measures to reduce the theft potential for high-enriched uranium

  8. International safeguards for critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ney, J.F.; Todd, J.L.

    1979-01-01

    A study was undertaken to investigate various approaches to provide international safeguards for critical facilities and to select an optimized system. Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. The goal of the study was to detect and confirm the protracted or abrupt diversion of 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately a week of the diversion. The general safeguards alternatives considered were (1) continuous inspections by resident inspectors, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, (2) periodic inspections by regional inspectors at varying time intervals, (3) unattended containment/surveillance measures, and (4) various combinations of the above. It was concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system can be achieved by employing a method of continuously monitoring facility activities which could lead to diversion. This is in addition to the routine inspections typical of current international safeguards. Monitoring detects inventory discrepancies and violations of agreed-upon procedural restrictions, as well as unauthorized removal of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). A special inventory is used following detection to confirm any suspected diversion. Comparison of 28 safeguards options led to the selection of a system for further development which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident IAEA personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and routine inventory sampling. A development programme is described which is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of several containment and surveillance measures proposed in the study. Included are a personnel portal and an instrument/material pass-through as well as associated recording and tamper-protection features. (author)

  9. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-02-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  10. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  11. International safeguards: experience and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.; Menlove, H.O.

    1982-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have been applied to over 95% of the nuclear material and facilities outside of the nuclear weapon states. The present system of nonproliferation agreements implemented by IAEA safeguards likely will not be changed in the foreseeable future. Instruments used for nondestructive analysis are described: portable multichannel analyzer, high-level neutron coincidence counter, active well coincidence counter, and neutron coincidence collar. 7 figs

  12. Organizational Culture, 3S, and Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-01-31

    While Safety and Security Culture are well socialized among nuclear facility designers, the concept of safeguards culture is less well defined. One area where safeguards culture may play a helpful role is in the area of Safeguards by Design. This paper will include a theoretical discussion of organizational culture, leading with safety culture and security culture that are well known, and positing that there may be room to think about safeguards culture along with the others. It will also examine the utility of the 3S concept and how this concept has been used in training for newcomer states. These will lead into a discussion of how the addition of safeguards to the mix of safety by design and security by design can be valuable, particularly as it is socialized to newcomer states.

  13. EULAR definition of erosive disease in light of the 2010 ACR/EULAR rheumatoid arthritis classification criteria.

    Science.gov (United States)

    van der Heijde, Désirée; van der Helm-van Mil, Annette H M; Aletaha, Daniel; Bingham, Clifton O; Burmester, Gerd R; Dougados, Maxime; Emery, Paul; Felson, David; Knevel, Rachel; Kvien, Tore K; Landewé, Robert B M; Lukas, Cédric; McInnes, Iain; Silman, Alan J; Smolen, Josef S; Stanislawska-Biernat, Ewa; Zink, Angela; Combe, Bernard

    2013-04-01

    The aim of this report was to propose a definition for erosive disease in the context of inflammatory arthritis in light of the 2010 American College of Rheumatology (ACR)/European League Against Rheumatism (EULAR) rheumatoid arthritis (RA) criteria for use in clinical practice and studies. A EULAR task force was formed including 16 rheumatologists and one rheumatology fellow. The process was both evidence based and consensus based, and included, between March 2010 and April 2012, analyses of data from two cohorts, two face-to-face meetings, one online voting and one teleconference. The Leiden Early Arthritis Cohort and the French ESPOIR cohort were used for the evidence-based part. The outcome measures, which were initiation of methotrexate therapy, or any disease-modifying antirheumatic drug therapy within the first year of disease and arthritis persistency over 5 years, were studied with the aim to give the best definition of erosive disease. A decision was made to select a definition with a high specificity and focus on patients who did not otherwise fulfil the 2010 ACR/EULAR RA criteria (definition was selected: erosive disease for use in the 2010 ACR/EULAR RA classification criteria is defined when an erosion (defined as a cortical break) is seen in at least three separate joints at any of the following sites: the proximal interphalangeal, the metacarpophalangeal, the wrist (counted as one joint) and the metatarsophalangeal joints on radiographs of both hands and feet. A highly specific definition for erosive disease has thus been formulated.

  14. Light water reactor safeguards system evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.; Daniel, S.L.

    1978-01-01

    A methodology for assessing the effectiveness of safeguards systems was developed in this study and was applied to a typical light water reactor plant. The relative importance of detection systems, barriers, response forces and other safeguards system components was examined in extensive parameter variation studies. (author)

  15. 21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 5 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Safeguards for patient safety. 312.88 Section 312... Severely-debilitating Illnesses § 312.88 Safeguards for patient safety. All of the safeguards incorporated within parts 50, 56, 312, 314, and 600 of this chapter designed to ensure the safety of clinical testing...

  16. Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1999-01-01

    'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

  17. Usefulness of ACR MRI phantom for quality assurance of MRI instruments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jung Whee; Ahn, Kook Jin; Lee, Seung Koo; Na, Dong Gyu; Oh, Chang Hyun; Chang, Yong Min; Lim, Tae Hwan

    2006-01-01

    To examine whether the ACR phantom could be used in quality standards for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) instruments in Korea. We conducted the phantom test using the ACR MRI phantom in 20 MRI instruments currently used in Korea. According to ACR criteria, we acquired the phantom images which were then assessed by the following seven tests: geometric accuracy, high spatial resolution, slice thickness accuracy, slice position accuracy, image intensity uniformity, percent signal ghosting, and low contrast object detectability. The phantom images were interpreted by three experienced radiologists according to ACR criteria. Then, we examined the failure rate of each test and evaluated the inter-observer variation in the measurements and test failure. The failure rate of each test could be broken into the following components: geometric accuracy (11-21%), high contrast spatial resolution (10-15%), slice thickness accuracy(6-22%), slice position accuracy (5-17%), image intensity uniformity (6%), percent signal ghosting (16%), and low contrast object detectability (8-10%). In this series, all the failure rates were less than 30%. In addition, no inter-observer variation was seen in the measurements and test failure. ACR MRI phantom promises to be established as the standard phantom for MRI instruments in Korea because of its objectivity in assessing the phantom images

  18. The feasibility of introducing an adult safeguarding measure for inclusion in the Adult Social Care Outcomes Framework (ASCOF): findings from a pilot study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Norrie, Caroline; Manthorpe, Jill; Cartwright, Cher; Rayat, Pritpal

    2016-06-30

    There are currently no national measures in England reporting the experiences of people who have been involved with adult safeguarding services following concerns that they may be at risk of abuse or neglect. The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) aimed to develop a new adult safeguarding outcome measure (survey) for local authorities (LAs) that could be added to the Adult Social Care Outcomes Framework (ASCOF). The ASCOF is a national collection of social care outcomes performance indicators collected from the perspective of people receiving partial or total funding from a LA for care services. An outcome measure (a face-to-face interview based survey consisting of 7 questions) was piloted in 40 LAs with 382 adults at risk (or their representative) who had been the subject of a safeguarding investigation. The aim was to investigate the feasibility of the survey in three domains: i) if a statistically representative sample of adults at risk (or their family, friend, carer or advocate) could be recruited; ii) analysis of survey responses and its acceptability to participants iii) feedback from LAs about the survey's administration. Overall the survey results met statistical confidence; however the individual results for adults at risk did not, due to the high proportion of representatives who responded because adults at risk were unable. Responses to the survey were generally positive; 72 % of participants felt that the help received during the safeguarding investigation had made them or the adult at risk (if reporting as a proxy) feel 'quite a bit' or 'a lot safer'. These results are the most robust data collected in England on the perspectives of adults at risk and their representatives on safeguarding services. Participants reported they appreciated being asked for feedback. LAs suggested survey administration improvements. This survey is one way LAs can meet their new legal requirement under the Care Act 2014 to 'seek feedback' from adults at

  19. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  20. The UK safeguards R and D support program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patrick, B.H.; Andrew, G.; Tuley, J.N.

    1991-01-01

    The UK Safeguards R and D Programme in support of IAEA safeguards was formally initiated in 1981. Funding is provided by HM Government through the Department of Energy, responsibility for managing and carrying out the work being placed in the hands of the UK Atomic Energy Authority The programme covers safeguards in a variety of areas, including reprocessing and enrichment plants, nuclear materials in waste, authentication of facility computer systems, training courses for safeguards inspectors, containment and surveillance, destructive and non-destructive assay techniques and techniques for assessing diversion path analysis. In this paper an overview of the work is presented