Organizational choices for international cooperation: East-West European cooperation on regional environmental problems

Science.gov (United States)

Connolly, Barbara Mary

This dissertation applies theoretical insights from transaction cost economics to explain and predict the organizational form of cooperative agreements between Eastern and Western Europe in areas of regional environmental and political concern. It examines five contracting problems related to nuclear power safety and acid rain, and describes the history of international negotiations to manage these problems. It argues that the level of interdependence in a given issue area, or costly effects experienced in one state due to activities and decisions of other states, along with the level of transactional vulnerability, or sunk costs invested in support of a particular contractual relationship among these states, are key determinants of the governance structures states choose to facilitate cooperation in that issue area. Empirically, the dissertation traces the evolution of three sets of institutional arrangements related to nuclear safety: governance for western nuclear safety assistance to Eastern Europe, negotiations of a global convention on safety standards for nuclear power plants, and contracts among utilities and multilateral banks to build new nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe. Next it studies European acid rain, chronicling the history of international acid rain controls within the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and the European Union, and finally examining institutional arrangements for burden-sharing to promote European bargains on emissions reduction, including bilateral aid transfers and proposals for multilateral burden sharing. Political actors have a wide range of choice among institutional arrangements to facilitate international cooperation, from simple market-type exchanges, to arbitration-type regimes that provide information and enhance reputation effects, to self-enforcing agreements such as issue-linkage, to supranational governance. The governance structures states devise to manage their cooperative

Nash Bargaining Game-Theoretic Framework for Power Control in Distributed Multiple-Radar Architecture Underlying Wireless Communication System

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Chenguang Shi

2018-04-01

Full Text Available This paper presents a novel Nash bargaining solution (NBS-based cooperative game-theoretic framework for power control in a distributed multiple-radar architecture underlying a wireless communication system. Our primary objective is to minimize the total power consumption of the distributed multiple-radar system (DMRS with the protection of wireless communication user’s transmission, while guaranteeing each radar’s target detection requirement. A unified cooperative game-theoretic framework is proposed for the optimization problem, where interference power constraints (IPCs are imposed to protect the communication user’s transmission, and a minimum signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR requirement is employed to provide reliable target detection for each radar. The existence, uniqueness and fairness of the NBS to this cooperative game are proven. An iterative Nash bargaining power control algorithm with low computational complexity and fast convergence is developed and is shown to converge to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium for the cooperative game model. Numerical simulations and analyses are further presented to highlight the advantages and testify to the efficiency of our proposed cooperative game algorithm. It is demonstrated that the distributed algorithm is effective for power control and could protect the communication system with limited implementation overhead.

Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria

OpenAIRE

Giuseppe De Marco; Jacqueline Morgan

2009-01-01

Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the rel- ative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We pr...

Bargaining with Optimism

OpenAIRE

Yildiz, Muhamet

2011-01-01

Excessive optimism is a prominent explanation for bargaining delays. Recent results demonstrate that optimism plays a subtle role in bargaining, and its careful analysis may shed valuable insights into negotiation behavior. This article reviews some of these results, focusing on the following findings. First, when there is a nearby deadline, optimistic players delay the agreement to the last period before the deadline, replicating a broad empirical regularity known as the deadline effect. Sec...

Bargaining over Tax Information Exchange

OpenAIRE

May Elsayyad

2012-01-01

This paper empirically studies recent treaty signings between tax havens and OECD countries as the outcome of a bargaining process over treaty form. Havens can decide not to sign an agreement, to sign a tax information exchange agreement or to sign a double taxation convention. We use a highly stylized bargaining model to develop testable hypotheses with regards to the type of agreement signed. We show that the main determinants of treaty signing are a haven's bargaining power and good govern...

Constructive Conflict in Academic Bargaining.

Science.gov (United States)

Birnbaum, Robert

1980-01-01

Collective bargaining is seen as a process of shared authority used in some institutions to manage conflict. Some ways in which parties to bargaining can significantly alter their relationships to promote constructive and creative outcomes of conflict are suggested. (MLW)

Are Women Asking for Low Wages? Gender Differences in Wage Bargaining Strategies and Ensuing Bargaining Success

OpenAIRE

Säve-Söderbergh, Jenny

2007-01-01

Men and women’s labor market outcomes differ along pay, promotion and competitiveness. This paper contributes by uncovering results in a related unexplored field using unique data on individual wage bargaining. We find striking gender differences. Women, like men, also bargain, but they submit lower wage bids and are offered lower wages than men. The adjusted gender wage gap is lower with postedwage jobs than with individual bargaining, although less is ascribable to the term associated with ...

Quality and Pricing Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ji-cai Li

2018-01-01

Full Text Available Product quality and pricing, as the important competitive tools, play a key role in attracting consumers. In a supply chain, the decisions on product quality and pricing are usually interlinked and would influence the cooperation relation between the members, especially when they are fairness-concerned and have different bargaining power. However, linking the quality and pricing decisions to the decision-makers’ behavioral factors such as fairness concern draws a little attention in the literature of supply chain management. This paper incorporates the members’ fairness preference and bargaining power into the product quality and pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain, where the supplier offers core components with a certain quality level to the downstream manufacturer, who subsequently sells the final products in the end market. Both the supplier and the manufacturer are assumed to be fairness-concerned by adopting Nash bargaining solutions as their fairness reference points. We use game-theoretic models to analyze the equilibrium product quality and pricing strategies under the setting of integrated and decentralized supply chain, respectively. Detailed comparisons and sensitivity analysis are further conducted to examine the impacts of members’ strengths of fairness concern, bargaining power, and decision structure on their equilibrium product quality and pricing strategies and corresponding payoffs.

Third party bargaining and contract terms: a link over time?

Science.gov (United States)

Brooks, John M; Doucette, William R; Sorofman, Bernard A

2002-01-01

To evaluate whether prior pharmacy bargaining process strategies and pharmacy dependence on third parties affect the bargaining power of pharmacies in price negotiations with third parties. One-time survey. Random sample of 900 independent and small chain pharmacies in nine states: Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Two hundred sixteen of the returned surveys contained sufficient responses for this analysis. Survey data on pharmacy bargaining power and prior pharmacy bargaining strategies, pharmacy dependence, and market characteristics were analyzed using multiple regression in a previously developed and modified provider/third party bargaining model. Pharmacy bargaining power. Pharmacy bargaining power varied across our sample. Pharmacy bargaining power was positively related to whether a pharmacy previously bargained with the third parties, negatively related to prior requests for contract changes, and negatively related to the pharmacy's dependence on third parties in total. Pharmacy bargaining power is related to the bargaining strategies employed by pharmacies during the previous year and the dependence of pharmacies on third party payers in total. With the prevalence of "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts from third parties, prior pharmacy bargaining behavior may affect the initial terms of the contracts that pharmacies are offered.

CO2 capture and storage: Another Faustian Bargain?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Spreng, Daniel; Marland, Gregg; Weinberg, Alvin M.

2007-01-01

A quarter-century ago, one of us termed the use of nuclear energy a Faustian Bargain. In this paper, we discuss what a Faustian Bargain means, how the expression has been used in characterizing other technologies, and in what measure CO 2 capture and storage is a Faustian Bargain. If we are about to enter into another Faustian Bargain, we should understand the contract

On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games

Science.gov (United States)

2018-01-01

Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium. In a recent paper, we proposed an alternative model, termed ‘economic harmony’ in which we modified the individual's utility by defining it as a function of the ratio between the actual and aspired pay-offs. We also abandoned the notion of equilibrium, in favour of a new notion of ‘harmony’, defined as the intersection of strategies, at which all players are equally satisfied. We showed that the proposed model yields excellent predictions of offers in the ultimatum game, and requests in the sequential common pool resource dilemma game. Strikingly, the predicted demand in the ultimatum game is equal to the famous Golden Ratio (approx. 0.62 of the entire pie). The same prediction was recently derived independently by Schuster (Schuster 2017. Sci. Rep. 7, 5642). In this paper, we extend the solution to bargaining games with alternating offers. We show that the derived solution predicts the opening demands reported in several experiments, on games with equal and unequal discount factors and game horizons. Our solution also predicts several unexplained findings, including the puzzling ‘disadvantageous counter-offers’, and the insensitivity of opening demands to variations in the players' discount factors, and game horizon. Strikingly, we find that the predicted opening demand in the alternating offers game is also equal to the Golden Ratio. PMID:29515877

On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games.

Science.gov (United States)

Suleiman, Ramzi

2018-02-01

Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium. In a recent paper, we proposed an alternative model, termed 'economic harmony' in which we modified the individual's utility by defining it as a function of the ratio between the actual and aspired pay-offs. We also abandoned the notion of equilibrium, in favour of a new notion of 'harmony', defined as the intersection of strategies, at which all players are equally satisfied. We showed that the proposed model yields excellent predictions of offers in the ultimatum game, and requests in the sequential common pool resource dilemma game. Strikingly, the predicted demand in the ultimatum game is equal to the famous Golden Ratio (approx. 0.62 of the entire pie). The same prediction was recently derived independently by Schuster (Schuster 2017. Sci. Rep. 7 , 5642). In this paper, we extend the solution to bargaining games with alternating offers. We show that the derived solution predicts the opening demands reported in several experiments, on games with equal and unequal discount factors and game horizons. Our solution also predicts several unexplained findings, including the puzzling 'disadvantageous counter-offers', and the insensitivity of opening demands to variations in the players' discount factors, and game horizon. Strikingly, we find that the predicted opening demand in the alternating offers game is also equal to the Golden Ratio.

Partisan optimism and political bargaining

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Jensen, Thomas; Madum, Andreas

2017-01-01

to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do...

Moral sentiments and cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hooge, de I.E.; Zeelenberg, M.; Breugelmans, S.M.

2007-01-01

For centuries economists and psychologists (Frank, 1988; Ketelaar, 2004; Smith, 1759) have argued that moral emotions motivate cooperation. Ketelaar and Au (2003) recently found first evidence that guilt increases cooperation for proselfs in social bargaining games. We investigated whether this

Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Dahl, Christian Møller; le Maire, Christian Daniel; Munch, Jakob R.

2013-01-01

This article studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm level influences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use detailed panel data covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides variation in the individual worker......'s wage-setting system that facilitates identification of the effects of decentralization. We find a wage premium associated with firm-level bargaining relative to sector-level bargaining and that the return to skills is higher under the more decentralized wage-setting systems. Using quantile regression......, we also find that wages are more dispersed under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems....

Danes - The keen bargain hunters

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Jensen, Birger Boutrup

2008-01-01

New research proves that Danes are keen bargain hunters, and that they do specific price checks before selecting a product.......New research proves that Danes are keen bargain hunters, and that they do specific price checks before selecting a product....

A Bad Bargain: How Teacher Collective Bargaining Affects Students' Employment and Earnings Later in Life

Science.gov (United States)

Lovenheim, Michael F.; Willén, Alexander

2016-01-01

Today, more than 60 percent of teachers in the United States work under a union contract. The rights of teachers to unionize and bargain together have expanded dramatically since the late 1950s, when states began passing "duty-to-bargain" (DTB) laws that required school districts to negotiate with teachers unions in good faith. Recently,…

Hospital-insurer bargaining: an empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing.

Science.gov (United States)

Brooks, J M; Dor, A; Wong, H S

1997-08-01

Employers' increased sensitivity to health care costs has forced insurers to seek ways to lower costs through effective bargaining with providers. What factors determine the prices negotiated between hospitals and insurers? The hospital-insurer interaction is captured in the context of a bargaining model, in which the gains from bargaining are explicitly defined. Appendectomy was chosen because it is a well-defined procedure with little clinical variation. Our results show that certain hospital institutional arrangements (e.g. hospital affiliations), HMO penetration, and greater hospital concentration improve hospitals' bargaining position. Furthermore, hospitals' bargaining effectiveness has diminished over time and varies across states.

Secret deals & bargained justice : lifting the veil of secrecy surrounding plea bargaining in Victoria

OpenAIRE

Flynn, Asher Leigh Gevaux

2017-01-01

This thesis examines Victoria’s plea bargaining process and argues that significant benefits would flow from formalisation, in the form of statutory recognition and control. Drawing upon the responses of 42 participants obtained from 57 semi-structured interviews, and the observations of 51 participants, it identifies and analyses the justifications driving the formalisation of Victoria’s plea bargaining process, and discusses the practical and policy implications of formalisat...

Adherence to Cooperative Principles among Agricultural ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

User

Data on group characteristics, level of awareness, adherence and ... enhance small scale farmers' access to credit, Oruonye and Musa (2012) ... According to FAO (2012) cooperatives play important roles in overcoming barriers ... collective bargaining power in input and output markets; and ..... Members' dishonest attitude.

Breakthrough bargaining.

Science.gov (United States)

Kolb, D M; Williams, J

2001-02-01

Unspoken, subtle parts of a bargaining process--also known as the shadow negotiation--can set the tone for a successful negotiation. Deborah Kolb and Judith Williams, whose book The Shadow Negotiation was the starting point for this article, say there are three strategies businesspeople can use to guide these hidden interactions. Power moves are used when two negotiating parties hold unequal power--for instance, subordinates and bosses; new and existing employees; and people of different races, ages, or genders. These strategies, such as casting the status quo in an unfavorable light, can help parties realize that they must negotiate: they will be better off if they do and worse off if they don't. Process moves affect how negotiation issues are received by both sides in the process, even though they do not address substantive issues. Working outside of the actual bargaining process, one party can suggest ideas or marshal support that can shape the agenda and influence how others view the negotiation. Appreciative moves alter the tone or atmosphere so that a more collaborative exchange is possible. They shift the dynamics of the shadow negotiation away from the adversarial--helping parties to save face--and thus build trust and encourage dialogue. These strategic moves don't guarantee that all bargainers will walk away winners, but they help to get stalled negotiations moving--out of the dark of unspoken power plays and into the light of true dialogue.

Bargaining in Mergers and Termination Fees

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Weitzel, U.; Rosenkranz, S.

We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain termination fees for, both, the target and the acquirer, subject to parties’ bargaining power and outside options. In equilibrium, termination fees are offered by firms with outside options in exchange for a greater share of merger synergies.

Faculty Power: Collective Bargaining on Campus.

Science.gov (United States)

Tice, Terrence N., Ed.; Holmes, Grace W., Ed.

This document, an outgrowth of the national conference of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education held in 1971, sets forth the views of lawyers and educators concerning the legal, economic, and institutional implications of faculty collective bargaining. Part I, principles and practices of collective bargaining, discusses legal principles of…

36 CFR 254.10 - Bargaining; arbitration.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Bargaining; arbitration. 254.10 Section 254.10 Parks, Forests, and Public Property FOREST SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE... determine values. Bargaining or any other process must be based on an objective analysis of the valuation in...

Bilateral Bargaining

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Brendstrup, Bjarne; Kuhn, Johan Moritz; Paarsch, Harry J.

2008-01-01

We employ a simple two-person bargaining model to interpret wage data-demands(offers) by workers (firms) and acceptances by firms (workers). Under two polarextremebargaining solutions, we develop a strategy to recover estimates of themarginal-productivity and the opportunity-cost distributions. W...

Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Hongmei Guo

2018-01-01

Full Text Available A supply chain contract is established using a dynamic, Nash bargaining game which determines the optimal bargaining power allocation for the manufacturer, retailer, and society in an environment affected by moral hazard and irreversible investment. The results found that the manufacturer’s choice was to hold all bargaining power; however, due to the remaining information problem, the retailer still had a profit; in contrast, the retailer was only willing to give up bargaining power if the manufacturer’s profit was reserved. The optimal bargaining power allocation was found to be strongly related to the ability to convert and monitor technology, with the bargaining power gradually shifting to the manufacturer as the technology improved. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results.

Instability and Change in Collective Bargaining

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Brandl, Bernd; Ibsen, Christian Lyhne

2017-01-01

Previous studies on collective bargaining structures and macroeconomic performance have largely ignored the role of stable and instable institutional structures and the effects of institutional change itself. In this article we posit that institutional stability of collective bargaining is of maj...... following the change. This effect also holds for changes in both decentralization and centralization of institutions....

Essays on Intra-Household Bargaining Power of Women in India

OpenAIRE

Dasgupta, Poulomi

2016-01-01

This thesis investigates the factors that affect women's bargaining power within the household, in India. The first chapter introduces the literature on household bargaining mostly by describing how household outcomes like children's health indicators and expenditure pattern change with increase in resources under women's control. The second chapter describes the conceptual framework for intra-household bargaining. It discusses the two broad topics – household bargaining models and gendered i...

The role of mediation institutions in Sweden and Denmark after centralized bargaining

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Ibsen, Christian Lyhne

2016-01-01

not explain the internal stability of bargaining coordination once established. This analysis stresses the role of mediation institutions of both countries for solving collective action problems in pattern bargaining by pegging other settlements to the manufacturing labour cost norm. Mediation capabilities......This article compares coordinated collective bargaining in Sweden and Denmark after centralized bargaining. Existing theories — power resource and cross-class alliance theory — seem capable of explaining the transition from centralized bargaining to pattern bargaining system. However, they do...

29 CFR 1620.23 - Collective bargaining agreements not a defense.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... Section 1620.23 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION THE EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.23 Collective bargaining agreements not a defense. The establishment by collective bargaining or inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement of unequal rates of pay does not...

Cooperative membership and farmers’ choice of marketing channels – Evidence from apple farmers in Shaanxi and Shandong Provinces, China

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hao, Jinghui; Bijman, Jos; Gardebroek, Cornelis; Heerink, Nico; Heijman, Wim; Huo, Xuexi

2018-01-01

Cooperatives are established to improve farmers' production conditions, to increase their bargaining power and to enable them to benefit from modern value chains. In China, farmers are members of a cooperative for multiple reasons. Little is known on whether and how cooperative membership affects

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining.

Science.gov (United States)

LeVeck, Brad L; Hughes, D Alex; Fowler, James H; Hafner-Burton, Emilie; Victor, David G

2014-12-30

One of the best-known and most replicated laboratory results in behavioral economics is that bargainers frequently reject low offers, even when it harms their material self-interest. This finding could have important implications for international negotiations on many problems facing humanity today, because models of international bargaining assume exactly the opposite: that policy makers are rational and self-interested. However, it is unknown whether elites who engage in diplomatic bargaining will similarly reject low offers because past research has been based almost exclusively on convenience samples of undergraduates, members of the general public, or small-scale societies rather than highly experienced elites who design and bargain over policy. Using a unique sample of 102 policy and business elites who have an average of 21 y of practical experience conducting international diplomacy or policy strategy, we show that, compared with undergraduates and the general public, elites are actually more likely to reject low offers when playing a standard "ultimatum game" that assesses how players bargain over a fixed resource. Elites with more experience tend to make even higher demands, suggesting that this tendency only increases as policy makers advance to leadership positions. This result contradicts assumptions of rational self-interested behavior that are standard in models of international bargaining, and it suggests that the adoption of global agreements on international trade, climate change, and other important problems will not depend solely on the interests of individual countries, but also on whether these accords are seen as equitable to all member states.

Progressive Taxation, Wage Bargaining, and Endogenous Working Time

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kreiner, Claus Thustrup

This paper analyses the impact of tax reforms that decrease income tax progression in an equilibrium search model with wage bargaining and endogenous individual working time. The working time is either bargained together with the hourly wage (case 1) or determined solely by workers after bargaining...... over the wage (case 2). In both cases reducing tax progression increases working time of employed and, more interestingly, increases unambiguously wages and unemployment. Wages and unemployment rise more and working time and production less in case 1 compared to case 2; probably making case 2 countries...... best suited for such tax reforms...

Bargaining in Mergers: The Role of Outside Options and Termination Provisions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Rosenkranz, S.; Weitzel, U.

2005-01-01

We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain the existence and net effect of target as well as bidder termination fees, subject to bargaining power and outside options. In equilibrium, net termination fees (target minus acquirer fees) are offered by firms with a superior bargaining

Workers' Well-Being and Productivity: The Role of Bargaining.

Science.gov (United States)

Mayer, Jean

1983-01-01

Bargaining that makes available facilities for satisfaction of workers' basic needs can contribute to increased productivity, which in turn enhances competitiveness. Such bargaining can be an effective means of extending and reinforcing national economic planning. (SK)

Rethinking Plea Bargaining Policy: The Case of Ethiopia

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Alemu Meheretu Negash

2017-12-30

Dec 30, 2017 ... Plea bargaining · Ethiopian Criminal Justice Policy · Trial · Policy justifications of plea bargaining ... For the discussion of this from the Ethiopian context, .... decisions meant to guard defendant's rights, and the absence of guilty plea .... massive case backlogs.36 In theory, this has far-reaching implications in.

Bargaining for Competitiveness: Law, Research and Case Studies.

Science.gov (United States)

Block, Richard N., Ed.

This book is an analysis of the relationship among collective bargaining (CB), firm competitiveness, and employment protection/creation in the United States (U.S.). Comparisons are also made between the U.S. situation and that in Europe. "Collective Bargaining in Context" (Richard N. Block, Peter Berg) places the US system of industrial…

The Transatlantic Bargain

Science.gov (United States)

2012-01-01

Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama, New York, The Continuum International Publish- ing Group Inc ., 2010. 44 the late 1940s were striving for or... Nike -Hercules surface-to-air missiles. 51 is most vividly remembered for its campaign to move NATO away from what Washington perceived at the time to

Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries-super-1

OpenAIRE

Cheryl Doss

2013-01-01

Many key development outcomes depend on women s ability to negotiate favorable intrahousehold allocations of resources. Yet it has been difficult to clearly identify which policies can increase women's bargaining power and result in better outcomes. This paper reviews both the analytical frameworks and the empirical evidence on the importance of women's bargaining power. It argues that there is sufficient evidence from rigorous studies to conclude that women's bargaining power does affect out...

Intrahousehold bargaining and resource allocation in developing countries

OpenAIRE

Doss, Cheryl

2013-01-01

Many key development outcomes depend on women's ability to negotiate favorable intrahousehold allocations of resources. Yet it has been difficult to clearly identify which policies can increase women's bargaining power and result in better outcomes. This paper reviews both the analytical frameworks and the empirical evidence on the importance of women's bargaining power. It argues that the...

The Effect of Welfare Reform on Women's Marital Bargaining Power

OpenAIRE

Bird, Mia

2011-01-01

Marital bargaining models predict changes in the policy environment that affect the relative well-being of husbands and wives in divorce will indirectly affect the distribution of power within marriage. This study estimates the effect of 1996 welfare reform policies on the marital bargaining power of women with young children. Although the distribution of marital power cannot be directly observed, I utilize Consumer Expenditure data to infer shifts in bargaining power from changes in family d...

Unequal Bargaining? Australia's Aviation Trade Relations with the United States

Science.gov (United States)

Solomon, Russell

2001-01-01

International aviation trade bargaining is distinguished by its use of a formal process of bilateral bargaining based on the reciprocal exchange of rights by states. Australia-United States aviation trade relations are currently without rancour, but this has not always been the case and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their formal bilateral aviation negotiations were a forum for a bitter conflict between two competing international aviation policies. In seeking to explain the bilateral aviation outcomes between Australia and the United States and how Australia has sought to improve upon these, analytical frameworks derived from international political economy were considered, along with the bilateral bargaining process itself. The paper adopts a modified neorealist model and concludes that to understand how Australia has sought to improve upon these aviation outcomes, neorealist assumptions that relative power capabilities determine outcomes must be qualified by reference to the formal bilateral bargaining process. In particular, Australia's use of this process and its application of certain bargaining tactics within that process remain critical to understanding bilateral outcomes.

A NOTE ON FRANCHISING AND WAGE BARGAINING

OpenAIRE

Thomas Grandner

2004-01-01

A franchise contract relocates distributable rent between franchisor and franchisee. With decentralized wage bargaining this modifies the position of the union in wage bargaining. If the rent is relocated to the franchisor completely, then even a strong union is not able to raise the wage above reservation level in the franchisee's firm. If franchisor and franchisee negotiate on rent division, there is an incentive to increase franchise fee with the consequence that franchisee's wage is pushe...

Collective bargaining: An analysis of hurdles and applicability in the public sector

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Daniel Chigudu

2015-04-01

Full Text Available This article discusses the arguments against adopting collective bargaining in the public sector and its benefits. Collective bargaining in the public sector is viewed primarily as undermining democratic governance in one way and paradoxically it is seen as an essential part of democratic governance. In the former view, collective bargaining in the public sector is seen as an interference with administrative law for personal benefit to the detriment of the taxpayer. Proponents of this view argue that unionising public sector employees encourages disloyalty to the government at the expense of public welfare. In the later view, public sector collective bargaining is viewed as a fundamental human right in a pluralistic society. Advocates of this view posit that, public sector unions provide a collective voice that stimulates improvement of government services as well as sound administration of law. They also argue that, public sector collective bargaining represents public policy interests and serves as a watchdog to government’s monopoly power in employment matters. Public sector unions raise employee salaries and perks to levels higher than they would have been in the absence of collective bargaining. These two opposite views are subjected to a critical analysis in this paper, with empirical evidence for both the benefits of public sector collective bargaining and arguments against public sector unions. The article found that public sector collective bargaining depends on the socio-economic background of states although international laws favour public sector unionism.

Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Stefan Kohler

2012-09-01

Full Text Available Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement occurs even if all experimentally controlled information is common knowledge. This paper rationalizes both regularities coherently by modeling heterogeneous social preferences, either self-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and signaling.

Online Cooperative Promotion and Cost Sharing Policy under Supply Chain Competition

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Erjiang E

2016-01-01

Full Text Available This paper studies online cooperative promotion and cost sharing decisions in competing supply chains. We consider a model of one B2C e-commerce platform and two supply chains each consisting of a supplier and an online retailer. The problem is studied using a multistage game. Firstly, the e-commerce platform carries out the cooperative promotion and sets the magnitude of markdown (the value of e-coupon. Secondly, each retailer and his supplier determine the fraction of promotional cost sharing when they have different bargaining power. Lastly, the retailers decide whether to participate in the cooperative promotion campaign. We show that the retailers are likely to participate in the promotion if consumers become more price-sensitive. However, it does not imply that the retailers can benefit from the price promotion; the promotion decision game resembles the classical prisoner’s dilemma game. The retailers and suppliers can benefit from the cooperative promotion by designing an appropriate cost sharing contract. For a supply chain, the bargaining power between supplier and retailer, consumer price sensitivity, and competition intensity affect the fraction of the promotional cost sharing. We also find that equilibrium value of e-coupon set by the e-commerce platform is not optimal for all the parties.

Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining.

Science.gov (United States)

Boles; Croson; Murnighan

2000-11-01

This paper investigates the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. Anonymous dyads exchanged messages and offers in a series of four ultimatum bargaining games that had prospects for relatively large monetary outcomes. Variations in each party's knowledge of the other's resources and alternatives created opportunities for deception. Revelation of prior unknowns exposed deceptions and created opportunities for retribution in subsequent interactions. Results showed that although proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, proposers told more outright lies. Both were more deceptive when their private information was never revealed, and proposers were most deceptive when their potential profits were largest. Revelation of proposers' lies had little effect on their subsequent behavior even though responders rejected their offers more than similar offers from truthful proposers or proposers whose prior deceit was never revealed. The discussion and conclusions address the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated bargaining interactions. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.

Bargaining babblers: vocal negotiation of cooperative behaviour in a social bird

Science.gov (United States)

Bell, M. B. V.; Radford, A. N.; Smith, R. A.; Thompson, A. M.; Ridley, A. R.

2010-01-01

Wherever individuals perform cooperative behaviours, each should be selected to adjust their own current contributions in relation to the likely future contributions of their collaborators. Here, we use the sentinel system of pied babblers (Turdoides bicolor) to show that individuals anticipate contributions by group mates, adjusting their own contribution in response to information about internal state broadcast by others. Specifically, we show that (i) short-term changes in state influence contributions to a cooperative behaviour, (ii) individuals communicate short-term changes in state, and (iii) individuals use information about the state of group mates to adjust their own investment in sentinel behaviour. Our results demonstrate that individual decisions about contributions to a cooperative effort can be influenced by information about the likely future contribution of others. We suggest that similar pre-emptive adjustments based on information obtained from collaborators will be a common feature of cooperative behaviour, and may play an important role in the development of complex communication in social species. PMID:20519221

Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Dahl, Christian M.; Le Maire, Christian Daniel; Munch, Jakob Roland

in the individual worker's wage-setting system that facilitates identification of the effects of decentralization. Consistent with predictions we find that wages are more dispersed under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems. However, the differences across wage-setting systems......This paper studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm level influences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use a detailed panel data set covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides exogenous variation...

Plea bargaining and the religious cum socio-cultural concept of ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Plea bargaining and the religious cum socio-cultural concept of Yoruba ọmọlúàbí in the Nigerian political landscape. ... Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies ... It therefore, attempts to define what is meant by plea bargaining, introduction as to its ...

Developing a stochastic conflict resolution model for urban runoff quality management: Application of info-gap and bargaining theories

Science.gov (United States)

Ghodsi, Seyed Hamed; Kerachian, Reza; Estalaki, Siamak Malakpour; Nikoo, Mohammad Reza; Zahmatkesh, Zahra

2016-02-01

In this paper, two deterministic and stochastic multilateral, multi-issue, non-cooperative bargaining methodologies are proposed for urban runoff quality management. In the proposed methodologies, a calibrated Storm Water Management Model (SWMM) is used to simulate stormwater runoff quantity and quality for different urban stormwater runoff management scenarios, which have been defined considering several Low Impact Development (LID) techniques. In the deterministic methodology, the best management scenario, representing location and area of LID controls, is identified using the bargaining model. In the stochastic methodology, uncertainties of some key parameters of SWMM are analyzed using the info-gap theory. For each water quality management scenario, robustness and opportuneness criteria are determined based on utility functions of different stakeholders. Then, to find the best solution, the bargaining model is performed considering a combination of robustness and opportuneness criteria for each scenario based on utility function of each stakeholder. The results of applying the proposed methodology in the Velenjak urban watershed located in the northeastern part of Tehran, the capital city of Iran, illustrate its practical utility for conflict resolution in urban water quantity and quality management. It is shown that the solution obtained using the deterministic model cannot outperform the result of the stochastic model considering the robustness and opportuneness criteria. Therefore, it can be concluded that the stochastic model, which incorporates the main uncertainties, could provide more reliable results.

Power allocation for target detection in radar networks based on low probability of intercept: A cooperative game theoretical strategy

Science.gov (United States)

Shi, Chenguang; Salous, Sana; Wang, Fei; Zhou, Jianjiang

2017-08-01

Distributed radar network systems have been shown to have many unique features. Due to their advantage of signal and spatial diversities, radar networks are attractive for target detection. In practice, the netted radars in radar networks are supposed to maximize their transmit power to achieve better detection performance, which may be in contradiction with low probability of intercept (LPI). Therefore, this paper investigates the problem of adaptive power allocation for radar networks in a cooperative game-theoretic framework such that the LPI performance can be improved. Taking into consideration both the transmit power constraints and the minimum signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) requirement of each radar, a cooperative Nash bargaining power allocation game based on LPI is formulated, whose objective is to minimize the total transmit power by optimizing the power allocation in radar networks. First, a novel SINR-based network utility function is defined and utilized as a metric to evaluate power allocation. Then, with the well-designed network utility function, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash bargaining solution are proved analytically. Finally, an iterative Nash bargaining algorithm is developed that converges quickly to a Pareto optimal equilibrium for the cooperative game. Numerical simulations and theoretic analysis are provided to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

Trade reforms, mark-ups and bargaining power of workers: the case ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Ethiopian Journal of Economics ... workers between 1996 and 2007, a model of mark-up with labor bargaining power was estimated using random effects and LDPDM. ... Keywords: Trade reform, mark-up, bargaining power, rent, trade unions ...

Coevolution of Artificial Agents Using Evolutionary Computation in Bargaining Game

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sangwook Lee

2015-01-01

Full Text Available Analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issue in the field of game theory. This paper investigates the interaction and coevolutionary process among heterogeneous artificial agents using evolutionary computation (EC in the bargaining game. In particular, the game performance with regard to payoff through the interaction and coevolution of agents is studied. We present three kinds of EC based agents (EC-agent participating in the bargaining game: genetic algorithm (GA, particle swarm optimization (PSO, and differential evolution (DE. The agents’ performance with regard to changing condition is compared. From the simulation results it is found that the PSO-agent is superior to the other agents.

Collective Bargaining on Employment Security: The Influence of the Legal Framework

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Zekic, Nuna; Muffels, R.J.A.

2016-01-01

Employers’ organisations and trade unions (also called the social partners) are given a central role to play in the specification of employment security into concrete regulations through collective bargaining. The question is how employment security can be implemented through collective bargaining.

Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty

OpenAIRE

Peter Cramton

1984-01-01

The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others' preferences. This paper explores, within the context of an infinite-horizon bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty, how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible. Since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable, they must communicate some of their p...

Disentangling Bargaining Power from Individual and Household Level to Institutions: Evidence on Women’s Position in Ethiopia

NARCIS (Netherlands)

I.P. van Staveren (Irene); R. Mabsout (Ramzi)

2010-01-01

textabstractSUMMARY Women's bargaining power is generally analyzed only with individual level and household level variables. We add a third level, namely institutional bargaining power. We define this as bargaining power which one party freely derives from unequal social norms. In the bargaining

Disentangling Bargaining Power from Individual and Household Level to Institutions: Evidence on Women’s Position in Ethiopia

OpenAIRE

Staveren, Irene; Mabsout, Ramzi

2010-01-01

textabstractSUMMARY Women's bargaining power is generally analyzed only with individual level and household level variables. We add a third level, namely institutional bargaining power. We define this as bargaining power which one party freely derives from unequal social norms. In the bargaining literature there is a common paradoxical finding, namely that more access to and control over individual resources sometimes decreases rather than increases women‟s bargaining outcomes. With household...

Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Driesen, B.W.I.; Lombardi, M.; Peters, H.J.M.

2015-01-01

We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse

Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Tranæs, Torben; Hendon, Ebbe

1991-01-01

A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with...... with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium...

Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hendon, Ebbe; Tranæs, Torben

1991-01-01

A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with...... with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium....

The Doha Talks and the Bargaining Surplus in Agriculture

OpenAIRE

Furtan, William Hartley; Guzel, A.; Karantininis, Kostas

2007-01-01

The Doha Round has been slow to achieve a reduction in the level of agricultural protection. This remains the case notwithstanding the substantial economic benefits that would arise from a more liberal agricultural trading regime. We provide one explanation for this slowness using a simple bargaining model. We demonstrate that the bargaining countries received a substantial fiscal gain from reducing government expenditures in the run-up to the Uruguay Round. This fiscal pressure was sufficien...

Center-Periphery Bargaining in the Age of Democracy

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Siroky, David; Mueller, Sean; Hechter, Michael Norman

2016-01-01

This paper introduces the key concepts used in this special issue – center, periphery, and vertical bargaining – and inquires why some national groups within democratic states demand outright independence, while others mobilize for regional autonomy and still others settle for even less. It then ......This paper introduces the key concepts used in this special issue – center, periphery, and vertical bargaining – and inquires why some national groups within democratic states demand outright independence, while others mobilize for regional autonomy and still others settle for even less...

Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining

Science.gov (United States)

Butler, Christopher K.

2007-01-01

Despite many applications of prospect theory's concepts to explain political and strategic phenomena, formal analyses of strategic problems using prospect theory are rare. Using Fearon's model of bargaining, Tversky and Kahneman's value function, and an existing probability weighting function, I construct a model that demonstrates the differences…

Organizational Climate, Conflict, and Collective Bargaining.

Science.gov (United States)

Kowalski, Theodore J.

1982-01-01

A discussion focuses on the emergence of collective bargaining in the public sector, the prevalence of bureaucratic climates in school districts, and the realization that conflict is a variable dependent on organizational climate and structure. (FG)

48 CFR 22.1405 - Collective bargaining agreements.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... SOCIOECONOMIC PROGRAMS APPLICATION OF LABOR LAWS TO GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS Employment of Workers with..., Affirmative Action for Workers with Disabilities, may necessitate a revision of a collective bargaining...

Productivity Bargaining--Pattern for the Future?

Science.gov (United States)

Smith, Ralph R.

1977-01-01

How to measure productivity increases in service occupations is a problem that still awaits a solution. Efforts being made in the federal sector to gauge productivity growth are discussed, along with implications in private-sector bargaining. (Editor/LBH)

Unwritten rules: virtual bargaining underpins social interaction, culture, and society.

Science.gov (United States)

Misyak, Jennifer B; Melkonyan, Tigran; Zeitoun, Hossam; Chater, Nick

2014-10-01

Many social interactions require humans to coordinate their behavior across a range of scales. However, aspects of intentional coordination remain puzzling from within several approaches in cognitive science. Sketching a new perspective, we propose that the complex behavioral patterns - or 'unwritten rules' - governing such coordination emerge from an ongoing process of 'virtual bargaining'. Social participants behave on the basis of what they would agree to do if they were explicitly to bargain, provided the agreement that would arise from such discussion is commonly known. Although intuitively simple, this interpretation has implications for understanding a broad spectrum of social, economic, and cultural phenomena (including joint action, team reasoning, communication, and language) that, we argue, depend fundamentally on the virtual bargains themselves. Copyright © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

Towards Automated Bargaining in Electronic Markets: A Partially Two-Sided Competition Model

Science.gov (United States)

Gatti, Nicola; Lazaric, Alessandro; Restelli, Marcello

This paper focuses on the prominent issue of automating bargaining agents within electronic markets. Models of bargaining in literature deal with settings wherein there are only two agents and no model satisfactorily captures settings in which there is competition among buyers, being they more than one, and analogously among sellers. In this paper, we extend the principal bargaining protocol, i.e. the alternating-offers protocol, to capture bargaining in markets. The model we propose is such that, in presence of a unique buyer and a unique seller, agents' equilibrium strategies are those in the original protocol. Moreover, we game theoretically study the considered game providing the following results: in presence of one-sided competition (more buyers and one seller or vice versa) we provide agents' equilibrium strategies for all the values of the parameters, in presence of two-sided competition (more buyers and more sellers) we provide an algorithm that produce agents' equilibrium strategies for a large set of the parameters and we experimentally evaluate its effectiveness.

Automated Bilateral Negotiation and Bargaining Impasse

Science.gov (United States)

Lopes, Fernando; Novais, A. Q.; Coelho, Helder

The design and implementation of autonomous negotiating agents involve the consideration of insights from multiple relevant research areas to integrate different perspectives on negotiation. As a starting point for an interdisciplinary research effort, this paper employs game-theoretic techniques to define equilibrium strategies for the bargaining game of alternating offers and formalizes a set of negotiation strategies studied in the social sciences. This paper also shifts the emphasis to negotiations that are "difficult" to resolve and can hit an impasse. Specifically, it analyses a situation where two agents bargain over the division of the surplus of several distinct issues to demonstrate how a procedure to avoid impasses can be utilized in a specific negotiation setting. The procedure is based on the addition of new issues to the agenda during the course of negotiation and the exploration of the differences in the valuation of these issues to capitalize on Pareto optimal agreements.

Metastrategies in large-scale bargaining settings

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hennes, D.; Jong, S. de; Tuyls, K.; Gal, Y.

2015-01-01

This article presents novel methods for representing and analyzing a special class of multiagent bargaining settings that feature multiple players, large action spaces, and a relationship among players' goals, tasks, and resources. We show how to reduce these interactions to a set of bilateral

Proliferation Persuasion. Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Volpe, Tristan A. [George Washington Univ., Washington, DC (United States)

2015-08-31

Why do states wait for prolonged periods of time with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Only a handful of countries have ever acquired the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Yet the enduring trend over the last five decades is for these states to delay or forgo exercising the nuclear weapons option provided by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. I show that states pause at this threshold stage because they use nuclear technology to bargain for concessions from both allies and adversaries. But when does nuclear latency offer bargaining benefits? My central argument is that challengers must surmount a dilemma to make coercive diplomacy work: the more they threaten to proliferate, the harder it becomes to reassure others that compliance will be rewarded with nuclear restraint. I identify a range of mechanisms able to solve this credibility problem, from arms control over breakout capacity to third party mediation and confidence building measures. Since each step towards the bomb raises the costs of implementing these policies, a state hits a sweet spot when it first acquires enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR) technology. Subsequent increases in proliferation capability generate diminishing returns at the bargaining table for two reasons: the state must go to greater lengths to make a credible nonproliferation promise, and nuclear programs exhibit considerable path dependency as they mature over time. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about power in world politics, less nuclear latency thereby yields more coercive threat advantages. I marshal new primary source evidence from archives and interviews to identify episodes in the historical record when states made clear decisions to use ENR technology as a bargaining chip, and employ this theory of proliferation persuasion to explain how Japan, North Korea, and Iran succeeded and failed to barter concessions from the

Behavioral aspects of bargaining and pricing

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kroger, S.

2003-01-01

Some remarkable results of the studies in this thesis are that individual behavior seems to be rather well described by theories taking the (im)patience of agents into account. Fairness considerations are found to play an important role not only in bargaining situations but also in competitive

Delegated bargaining and competition

OpenAIRE

Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Roth, Stefan

2004-01-01

In this paper, we analyze a two-producers two-agent model in which producers delegate sales and price negotiations to exclusive, separate, and independent agents. Producers first choose a pricing arrangement (two-part tariff versus linear tariff) and then set wholesale prices (and fixed fees)to their agents. Given this, agents announce prices to consumers as a basis for negotiations. Finally, consumers make their buying decision and bargain about the actually paid price once they arrive at an...

WOMEN'S BARGAINING POWER IN HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC DECISIONS: EVIDENCE FROM GHANA

OpenAIRE

Doss, Cheryl R.

1996-01-01

In this paper, the percentage of assets held by women within the household is used as a measure of women's bargaining power. The assets used in this paper include land, savings, and business assets. Using detailed household survey data from Ghana, I demonstrate that the share of assets owned by women has a significant impact on household expenditure decisions. This provides additional support for the notion that women's bargaining power can be measured, at least in some dimensions, and that w...

Resources on Academic Bargaining and Governance.

Science.gov (United States)

Tice, Terrence N.

In recent years several bibliographies have been compiled on the subject of collective bargaining in higher education. This publication is an attempt to provide laymen with an up-to-date and comprehensive bibliography. Citations are presented in three categories: (1) agencies, bibliographies, periodicals, and other basic resources; (2) public…

Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tertrais, B

2005-07-01

In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tertrais, B.

2005-01-01

In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

Cooperative Fuzzy Games Approach to Setting Target Levels of ECs in Quality Function Deployment

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Zhihui Yang

2014-01-01

Full Text Available Quality function deployment (QFD can provide a means of translating customer requirements (CRs into engineering characteristics (ECs for each stage of product development and production. The main objective of QFD-based product planning is to determine the target levels of ECs for a new product or service. QFD is a breakthrough tool which can effectively reduce the gap between CRs and a new product/service. Even though there are conflicts among some ECs, the objective of developing new product is to maximize the overall customer satisfaction. Therefore, there may be room for cooperation among ECs. A cooperative game framework combined with fuzzy set theory is developed to determine the target levels of the ECs in QFD. The key to develop the model is the formulation of the bargaining function. In the proposed methodology, the players are viewed as the membership functions of ECs to formulate the bargaining function. The solution for the proposed model is Pareto-optimal. An illustrated example is cited to demonstrate the application and performance of the proposed approach.

Cooperative fuzzy games approach to setting target levels of ECs in quality function deployment.

Science.gov (United States)

Yang, Zhihui; Chen, Yizeng; Yin, Yunqiang

2014-01-01

Quality function deployment (QFD) can provide a means of translating customer requirements (CRs) into engineering characteristics (ECs) for each stage of product development and production. The main objective of QFD-based product planning is to determine the target levels of ECs for a new product or service. QFD is a breakthrough tool which can effectively reduce the gap between CRs and a new product/service. Even though there are conflicts among some ECs, the objective of developing new product is to maximize the overall customer satisfaction. Therefore, there may be room for cooperation among ECs. A cooperative game framework combined with fuzzy set theory is developed to determine the target levels of the ECs in QFD. The key to develop the model is the formulation of the bargaining function. In the proposed methodology, the players are viewed as the membership functions of ECs to formulate the bargaining function. The solution for the proposed model is Pareto-optimal. An illustrated example is cited to demonstrate the application and performance of the proposed approach.

China's Crisis Bargaining in the South China Sea Dispute (2010-2013)

OpenAIRE

Ramadhani, Eryan

2014-01-01

As one of China’s most intricate territorial dispute, the South China Sea dispute has sufficiently consumed significant amount of Chinese leaders’ attention in Beijing. This paper reveals that China exerts signaling strategy in its crisis bargaining over the South China Sea dispute. This strategy contains reassurance as positive signal through offering negotiation and appearing self-restraint and of negative signal by means of escalatory acts and verbal threats. China’s crisis bargaining in t...

Negotiated Procurements: Squandering the Benefit of the Bargain

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Whiteford, David

2002-01-01

.... In particular, the thesis will discuss how the Rewrite and other reforms created a regulatory framework much more conducive to bargaining but still overly amenable in allowing the Government to avoid...

Enterprise Bargaining and the Gender Earnings Gap.

Science.gov (United States)

Wooden, Mark

1997-01-01

Examination of the widening gender earnings gap in Australia indicates that women's wages continue to lag behind those of men. The main factor appears to be women's concentration in part-time work in enterprises where bargaining is less likely to occur. (JOW)

How to Handle Impasses in Bargaining.

Science.gov (United States)

Durrant, Robert E.

Guidelines in an outline format are presented to school board members and administrators on how to handle impasses in bargaining. The following two rules are given: there sometimes may be strikes, but there always will be settlements; and on the way to settlements, there always will be impasses. Suggestions for handling impasses are listed under…

Collective bargaining in a time of crisis: developments in the private sector in Europe

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Glassner, V.; Keune, M.; Marginson, P.

2011-01-01

This article discusses crisis-related developments in collective bargaining in the private sector across the EU since the onset of the crisis during 2008. It analyses developments in the incidence, procedures and content of collective bargaining during the crisis and is cross-nationally and

Intergenerational bargaining in the EU: comparative report

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Tros, F.; Keune, M.

2015-01-01

We conclude that there are three advantages in promoting the ‘intergenerational’ dimension in social dialogue and collective bargaining: o It strengthens awareness of the specific labour market positions and needs of both younger and older workers. o It supports social partners’ role in unifying

Breaking and entering’ of contracts as a matter of bargaining power and exclusivity clauses

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Rosenkranz, S.|info:eu-repo/dai/nl/157222241; Weitzel, G.U.|info:eu-repo/dai/nl/276323394

2011-01-01

We analyze the effect of liquidated damage rules in exclusive contracts that are negotiated in a sequential bargaining process between one seller and two buyers with endogenous outside options. We show that assumptions on the distribution of bargaining power influence the size of the payment of

Legislative Bargaining and Incremental Budgeting

OpenAIRE

Dhammika Dharmapala

2002-01-01

The notion of 'incrementalism', formulated by Aaron Wildavsky in the 1960's, has been extremely influential in the public budgeting literature. In essence, it entails the claim that legislators engaged in budgetary policymaking accept past allocations, and decide only on the allocation of increments to revenue. Wildavsky explained incrementalism with reference to the cognitive limitations of lawmakers and their desire to reduce conflict. This paper uses a legislative bargaining framework to u...

Bargaining for bribes under uncertainty

OpenAIRE

Danila Serra

2008-01-01

A corrupt transaction is often the result of bargaining between the parties involved. This paper models bribery as a double auction where a private citizen and a public official strategically interact as the potential buyer and the potential seller of a corrupt service. Individuals differ in the internalized moral cost generated by corruption, and may have only imperfect information on others' moral cost, i.e. their "corruptibility". This paper investigates the role that imperfect information...

Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Tranæs, Torben; Sloth, Birgitte; Hendon, Ebbe

1994-01-01

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) study a market with one seller, two buyers, and voluntary matching. Both the competitive outcomepc and the bilateral bargaining outcomepb are possible in subgame perfect equilibrium. We consider two variations. First, if there is a cost larger thanpc−pc to the seller...

On the Evolutionary Stability of Bargaining Inefficiency

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Poulsen, Anders

This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game tough behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus may be wasted. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary select...

Leadership, Pay, and Promotion as Predictors of Choice of Bargaining Unit in a University.

Science.gov (United States)

Kelley, Lane

1979-01-01

Examines the choice of bargaining unit and its relationship to style of and satisfaction with departmental leadership and to fairness of and satisfaction with pay and the promotion system. Collective bargaining choices were actual organizations campaigning to be the faculty's representatives in the University of Hawaii system. (Author/IRT)

Cooperative Emissions Trading Game: International Permit Market Dominated by Buyers.

Science.gov (United States)

Honjo, Keita

2015-01-01

Rapid reduction of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is required to mitigate disastrous impacts of climate change. The Kyoto Protocol introduced international emissions trading (IET) to accelerate the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The IET controls CO2 emissions through the allocation of marketable emission permits to sovereign countries. The costs for acquiring additional permits provide buyers with an incentive to reduce their CO2 emissions. However, permit price has declined to a low level during the first commitment period (CP1). The downward trend in permit price is attributed to deficiencies of the Kyoto Protocol: weak compliance enforcement, the generous allocation of permits to transition economies (hot air), and the withdrawal of the US. These deficiencies created a buyer's market dominated by price-making buyers. In this paper, I develop a coalitional game of the IET, and demonstrate that permit buyers have dominant bargaining power. In my model, called cooperative emissions trading (CET) game, a buyer purchases permits from sellers only if the buyer forms a coalition with the sellers. Permit price is determined by bargaining among the coalition members. I evaluated the demand-side and supply-side bargaining power (DBP and SBP) using Shapley value, and obtained the following results: (1) Permit price is given by the product of the buyer's willingness-to-pay and the SBP (= 1 - DBP). (2) The DBP is greater than or equal to the SBP. These results indicate that buyers can suppress permit price to low levels through bargaining. The deficiencies of the Kyoto Protocol enhance the DBP, and contribute to the demand-side dominance in the international permit market.

The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Teacher Transfer Rates in Urban High-Poverty Schools

Science.gov (United States)

Nelson, F. Howard

2006-01-01

Data in this report reveals that collectively bargaining agreements are not the source of the teacher quality problem in urban school districts. The data shows that collective bargaining agreements are associated with reduced teacher transfer activity, especially in high-poverty schools, and less reliance on first-year teachers to staff…

31 PLEA BARGAINING AND THE RELIGIOUS CUM SOCIO ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

HP

2016-07-09

Jul 9, 2016 ... eradicating corruption in the country will not be a mere political ... have plea bargaining systems, albeit in different stages of development. .... dying as a result of socio-cultural disintegration being witnessed as a bye product.

Bargaining for Equality. A Guide to Legal and Collective Bargaining Solutions for Workplace Problems that Particularly Affect Women.

Science.gov (United States)

Popkin, Mary; Ross, Diane

This is a guide to legal and collective bargaining solutions for workplace problems that particularly affect women. The first section of the guide presents a survey of legal remedies for discrimination including information on: (1) Title VII; (2) Equal Pay Act; (3) Executive Order 11246; (4) Age Discrimination in Employment Act; and (5) State Fair…

Collective bargaining on wages in Denmark

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Andersen, Søren Kaj; Navrbjerg, Steen Erik

2008-01-01

17 kapitler kommer på forskellig vis rundt om disse hovedstrømninger, men indeholder naturligvis også mange andre informationer om lønfastsættelse på det europæiske arbejdsmarked. Bogen kan købes hos ETUI i Bruxelles bl.a. via deres hjemmeside: http://www.etui-rehs.org/research/activities/Workers-representation/Books/Wages-and-wage-bargaining-in-Europe...

Toronto Civic Workers Bargaining Without a Base: The Significance of 2012

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Carlo Fanelli

2014-05-01

Full Text Available This article explores how the politics and economics of austerity has influenced collective bargaining between the CUPE Locals 79/416 and the city of Toronto. I explore the relationship between neoliberalism and workplace precarity, drawing attention to the importance of the municipal public sector to trade unionism and the political potential of urbanized Left-labour radicalism. Following this, I provide an overview of the repeated attempts by City Council to extract concessions from unionized workers with a focus on the concession-filled 2012 round of bargaining and its relationship to earlier rounds. In what follows I discuss the implications of austerity bargaining for Locals 79 and 416 members, drawing attention to the repercussions this may have for other public sector workers. To conclude, I propose an alternative political strategy for municipal public sector unions, stressing the importance of a radicalized labour approach. It is my contention that this requires the development of both alternative policies and an alternative politics rooted in demands for workplace democracy and social justice.

Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Celik, Levent; Karabay, B.; McLaren, J.

2013-01-01

Roč. 91, č. 2 (2013), s. 179-190 ISSN 0022-1996 Institutional support: RVO:67985998 Keywords : trade policy * multilateral legislative bargaining * political economy Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 2.443, year: 2013

Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Becher, Michael; Christiansen, Flemming Juul

2015-01-01

Chief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well-developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policymaking....... To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength, as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election...

29 CFR 541.4 - Other laws and collective bargaining agreements.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... REGULATIONS DEFINING AND DELIMITING THE EXEMPTIONS FOR EXECUTIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, PROFESSIONAL, COMPUTER AND OUTSIDE SALES EMPLOYEES General Regulations § 541.4 Other laws and collective bargaining agreements. The...

On the Evolutionary Stability of 'Tough' Bargaining Behavior

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Poulsen, Anders

2003-01-01

This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game such behavior survives. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary selection wipes out all tough behavior, as long as th...

[Guidelines to productivity bargaining in the health care industry].

Science.gov (United States)

Fottler, M D; Maloney, W F

1979-01-01

A potential conflict exists between the recent growth of unionization in the health care industry and management efforts to increase productivity. One method of managing this conflict is to link employee rewards to employee productivity through productivity bargaining.

Gambler’s fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Nunnari, S.; Zápal, Jan

2016-01-01

Roč. 99, September (2016), s. 275-294 ISSN 0899-8256 Institutional support: RVO:67985998 Keywords : legislative bargaining * experiments * quantal response Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.904, year: 2016

Rising wage inequality, the decline of collective bargaining, and the gender wage gap

OpenAIRE

Antonczyk, Dirk; Fitzenberger, Bernd; Sommerfeld, Katrin

2010-01-01

This paper investigates the increase in wage inequality, the decline in collective bargaining, and the development of the gender wage gap in West Germany between 2001 and 2006. Based on detailed linked employer-employee data, we show that wage inequality is rising strongly – driven not only by real wage increases at the top of the wage distribution, but also by real wage losses below the median. Coverage by collective wage bargaining plummets by 16.5 (19.1) percentage points for male (female)...

Antagonistic and Bargaining Games in Optimal Marketing Decisions

Science.gov (United States)

Lipovetsky, S.

2007-01-01

Game theory approaches to find optimal marketing decisions are considered. Antagonistic games with and without complete information, and non-antagonistic games techniques are applied to paired comparison, ranking, or rating data for a firm and its competitors in the market. Mix strategy, equilibrium in bi-matrix games, bargaining models with…

Bargaining for Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: A Game ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Bargaining for Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. ... Using game-theoreticanalysis, the authors model the truth-amnesty game and predict the optimal commission strategy. ... AJOL African Journals Online.

Bargaining for Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: A Game ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Bargaining for Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. ... Using game-theoretic analysis, the authors model the truth-amnesty game and predict the optimal commission strategy. ... AJOL African Journals Online.

Teacher Bargaining Structures. A Brief to the Ministry of Education from the British Columbia Teachers' Federation

Science.gov (United States)

British Columbia Teachers' Federation, 2012

2012-01-01

Collective bargaining has evolved as a recognized way of creating a system of fairness and equity in the workplace. Full free collective bargaining is the fruition of the evolution of labour management relations. It is the mechanism that balances the power of the employer and prevents injustice and exploitation. The Supreme Court of Canada has…

Endogenous Learning and Consensual Understanding in Multilateral Negotiations: Arguing and Bargaining in the WTO

OpenAIRE

Wolfe, Robert

2010-01-01

People at home and trade negotiators in Geneva cannot bargain what they do not understand, and what they bargain must be based on consensual understanding among the relevant actors, whether or not they agree on what to do about it. Consensual understanding is endogenous, arising in an argumentative process of learning structured by constitutive principles of a regime. In a departure from both rationalist and constructivist approaches to negotiation analysis in political science, my goal in th...

The role of information and aspiration in bargaining behaviour ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

The study examines how information and aspiration level affect bargaining behavior. Eighty (80) students of the staff Development Centre, Bureau of Establishment and Training, Osogbo, Osun State, served as participants for the study. They were assigned to treatments conditions, in a 2 x 2 factorial design experiment.

Selected Collective Bargaining Agreements of Michigan Two-Year Colleges.

Science.gov (United States)

National Education Association, Washington, DC.

Collective bargaining agreements of 19 selected Michigan two-year colleges are presented, representing contracts in effect in 1987. Contracts for the following colleges are included: Alpena Community College, Bay de Noc Community College, Gogebic Community College, Grand Rapids Junior College, Kalamazoo Valley Community College, Kellogg Community…

On the Sensitivity Matrix of the Nash Bargaining Solution

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Engwerda, J.C.

2006-01-01

In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity.While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson [15], this

Bargaining for Social Rights (BARSORI) project: Country report on Spain

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Ramos Martin, N.E.

2012-01-01

The Barsori project studied social partners' initiatives contributing to the reduction of precarious employment through collective bargaining and social dialogue. The project compared experiences in seven EU countries: Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain and the UK. Trade

Experimental Evidence on Bargaining Power Within Couples

OpenAIRE

Beblo, Miriam; Beninger, Denis

2014-01-01

We conducted an experiment on the nature of income sharing within 95 established couples in Germany. In a first step, the partners revealed their individual preferences by making consumption choices independently. In a second step, decisions were taken jointly over five different rounds with varying resource allocations between the partners. From this design we are able to derive a female bargaining power index without structural restrictions, reflecting the sharing rule within the couple. We...

29 CFR 4.1b - Payment of minimum compensation based on collectively bargained wage rates and fringe benefits...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... bargained wage rates and fringe benefits applicable to employment under predecessor contract. 4.1b Section 4... collectively bargained wage rates and fringe benefits applicable to employment under predecessor contract. (a) Section 4(c) of the Service Contract Act of 1965 as amended provides special minimum wage and fringe...

Caspian games: A dynamic bargaining game

Science.gov (United States)

Michaud, Dennis Wright

This Dissertation was written under the direction of Professor P.Terrence Hopmann. In this work, the author seeks to identify the independent variables affecting the outcome of three key decisions required of the international consortiums constructing Caspian oil export pipelines. The first of involves whether or not the enterprises developing the pipelines to export Kazakh oil, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium ("CPC"), and Azeri oil, the Azerbaijan International Operating Consortium ("CPC"), cooperate by utilizing the same route or utilize separate energy export corridors. Second, I analyzed how the actual Main Export Pipeline route ("MEP") for Azeri oil was selected by the AIOC. Finally, I tried to understand the factors driving the residual equity positions in each consortium. I was particularly interested in the equity position of Russian state and commercial interests in each consortium. I approached the puzzle as a multilevel bargaining problem. Hence, the preferences of each relevant actor (state and corporate levels) were assessed. The covering theory utilized was rational choice. An application of game theoretic modeling, particularly Bayesian analysis (used as a metaphor), accounted for the learning process resulting from the strategic interaction between actors. I sought to understand greater the refinement of each actor's perception of counterpart preferences. Additionally, the Gordon Constant Growth Model ("CGM") and the Sharp's Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") were utilized to relate multinational actors preferences, achieving a cost of capital based hurdle rate, to political risk. My end findings demonstrate this interrelationship and provide a clear argument for great power states to persuade newly developing Caspian states to adopt a more transparent, and credible approach to corporate governance. This revised state strategy will reduce multinationals' perception of political risk, lower firms' cost of capital (hurdle rate), and increase the

The Strategies of Tofu and Fermented Soybean Cake Cooperation in Facing China-Asean Free Trade

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Rusdarti Rusdarti

2015-12-01

Full Text Available This research was aimed to identify the internal and external factor for encountering free trade China-Asean and to find some strategic model alternative that can be applied by Primkopti Semarang to develop their business. The analysis methods used were descriptive analysis method and SWOT analysis. The result of this research showed that internal factors for cooperation’s strength for encountering free trade including soybean distributor in form of cooperation in Semarang and experienced manager to carry out the business. The weakness one was the research and development of cooperation hasn’t been optimal and the management of information system hasn’t worked well. External factors for opportunity one including the soybean buyer or main customer was cooperation members having dual identity, as for the threat including no resistance for new competitor, increasing soybean import, soybean importer has strong bargain position. Compatible strategy for cooperation implementation in encountering free trade China-Asean was market penetration strategy and product development.

Gambler’s fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Nunnari, S.; Zápal, Jan

2016-01-01

Roč. 99, September (2016), s. 275-294 ISSN 0899-8256 R&D Projects: GA ČR(CZ) GP14-27902P Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23 Keywords : legislative bargaining * experiments * quantal response Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.904, year: 2016

Multi-attribute bilateral bargaining in a one-to-many setting

NARCIS (Netherlands)

E.H. Gerding (Enrico); D.J.A. Somefun (Koye); J.A. La Poutré (Han)

2005-01-01

htmlabstractNegotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes

Modest Labor-Management Bargains Continue in 1984 Despite the Recovery.

Science.gov (United States)

Ruben, George

1985-01-01

Major collective bargaining agreements in 1984 resulted in modest settlements, due to concern about foreign competition, domestic deregulation, and inflation. Agreements occurred in the following industries: auto, soft coal, airlines, aircraft and aerospace, construction, petroleum refining, longshore industry, railroads, trucking, steel, West…

Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Zápal, Jan

2016-01-01

Roč. 98, July (2016), s. 235-242 ISSN 0899-8256 Institutional support: RVO:67985998 Keywords : dynamic decision-making * endogenous status-quo * spatial bargaining Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.904, year: 2016

Collective bargaining under the new Labour Relations Act: The ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

2 PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW ACT. The 1956 Act was premised on a "pluralist" perspective) of the relation- ... However, in view of the Act's ostensible abstentionist approach, interven- tion by the courts in the bargaining ... trade union members but who are, in terms of a collective agreement, nevertheless represented by the ...

Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Celik, Levent; Karabay, Bilgehan; McLaren, J.

2013-01-01

Roč. 91, č. 2 (2013), s. 179-190 ISSN 0022-1996 R&D Projects: GA ČR(CZ) GAP402/12/0666 Grant - others:UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012 Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23 Keywords : trade policy * multilateral legislative bargaining * political economy Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 2.443, year: 2013

Conflict or cooperation over global warming policy? An analysis based on the interaction of countries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ihara, D.M.

1991-01-01

Response to climatic change due to global warming, rather than being the common response of humankind to a common problem, may well be the product of decisions made by countries with diverse and possibly divergent interests. This study analyzes the interactions of countries with diverse interests. The analysis begins with a one period, two-country case with a single fossil fuel and without binding agreements, without side payments between countries, and without prior history of fossil fuel use. The cases implied by relaxing restrictions are then analyzed. The study shows explicitly how countries' global warming policy decisions could define a prisoners dilemma game. It characterizes cooperative outcomes such as the Nash bargaining solution and Coasean bargaining. It compares non-side-payment outcomes with the side-payment outcomes implied by tradeable carbon-emission quotas. The small estimated elasticities suggest that economic growth may not be greatly reduced by restricting fossil fuel use and that economic growth may depend primarily on non-fossil fuel factors

Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Zápal, Jan

2016-01-01

Roč. 98, July (2016), s. 235-242 ISSN 0899-8256 Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23 Keywords : dynamic decision-making * endogenous status-quo * spatial bargaining Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.904, year: 2016

Competitive consensus: bargaining on employment and competitiveness in the Netherlands

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Huiskamp, M.J.; Huiskamp, Rien; van Riemsdijk, Maarten

2001-01-01

This article shows how bargaining on the conflicting issues of fighting unemployment and increasing competitiveness has evolved. It offers an empirical insight into the degree to which the national framework agreements that form part of the now famous Dutch polder model are implemented. At the

Social activity’s in four Savings and Credit Cooperatives from Pichincha, Ecuador

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

María Andreina García Tenorio

2017-07-01

Full Text Available The social cooperative management is articulated to the social groups linked to the cooperatives by the intention of looking for a collective benefit. The social management finds immersed in the social cooperative responsibility is practised across all the acts that a cooperative company realizes orientated to the well-being of his partners and hard-working. It has to see with the voluntary integration on the part of the companies of the social and environmental worries in the relations with each of his groups of interest; from the employees, as fundamental assets of the organization; up to the clients, suppliers, public power, and the company in his set. For it the aim of the investigation was evaluated the performance of the Social Management of four cooperatives of saving and credit of the province Bargain, Ecuador. The investigation is of type descriptive-correlacional and the used methods are theoretical and empirical. His analysis I throw as results and / or conclusions that the cooperatives possess a budget for the social management, but, the participation of the partners in the process of definition and approval of the above mentioned budget is not definite well, in addition on having checked the activities that realize the cooperatives as part of the social management, one determined that these do not satisfy the needs of the social groups.

Provision for Community College Faculty Development in Collective Bargaining Agreements

Science.gov (United States)

Wallace, Terry H. Smith

1976-01-01

Trends of collective negotiations were examined as they affect inservice education, through an examination of collective bargaining agreements. Conclusion: the trend is presently one of negotiation of provisions in a piecemeal fashion rather than one with the goal of establishing comprehensive professional improvement programs. (Editor/JT)

The Proposed Plea Bargaining in Ethiopia: How it Fares with ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

The FDRE Criminal Justice Policy embodies multiple reforms that are meant to address the various problems in the Ethiopian criminal justice system. The reforms include the introduction of plea bargaining which represents an unprecedented and ambitious development in the realm of the criminal justice system in Ethiopia.

Essays in competition with product differentiation and bargaining in markets

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Bouckaert, J.M.C.

1996-01-01

The fourth essay uses bargaining theory and compares the outcome of a negotiation in two differently organized markets. In the first market, sellers simultaneously offer their good or service for sale. In the second market, sellers queue and offer their good or service sequentially for sale.

Two-Person Bargaining Under Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of New Mechanisms

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Parco, James

2002-01-01

.... It is now generally accepted that a theory of bargaining behavior for individuals who typically do not meet the stringent assumptions about common knowledge of rationality cannot be complete without...

Implications of Nash Bargaining for Horizontal Industry Integration

OpenAIRE

Richard E. Just; Siddhartha Mitra; Sinaia Netanyahu

2005-01-01

This article shows how horizontal industry integration can arise from transferable asymmetry of technologies and endowments. The Nash bargaining solution suggests that greater technological diversity among coordinating parties yields greater gains from horizontal integration. The framework fits the case where a firm with a superior technology franchises the technology by horizontal integration. The results appear to fit hog production where integration has been primarily horizontal and, in pa...

China’s Bargaining Strategies after the Cold War

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

He, Kai; Feng, Huiyun

2014-01-01

Applying bargaining theory of international conflicts, we examine the successes and challenges of China’s strategic choices in its ascent after the Cold War. We suggest that China needs to alleviate information and commitment problems in order to rise peacefully. Since 2008, China’s “peaceful rise...... disputes. China should engage in rule-based, institution building, such as a security community between China and ASEAN, to reinforce its peaceful rise commitments....

A theory of ethnic diversity and income distribution: a legislative bargaining approach

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Tsuchimoto Menkyna, Fusako

2014-01-01

Roč. 34, June (2014), s. 52-67 ISSN 0176-2680 Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23 Keywords : political economy * diversity * legislative bargaining Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 1.468, year: 2014

Risk Sensitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Continuity of Bargaining Solutions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

M.B.M. de Koster (René); H.J.M. Peters (Hans); S.H. Tijs; P.P. Wakker (Peter)

1983-01-01

textabstractBargaining solutions are considered which have the following four properties: individual rationality, Pareto optimality, independence of equivalent utility representations, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. A main result of this paper is a simple proof of the fact that all

Two Impossibility Results on the Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining

OpenAIRE

Youngsub Chun

1999-01-01

We present two impossibility results on the converse consistency principle in the context of bargaining. First, we show that there is no solution satis-fying Pareto optimality, contraction independence, and converse consistency. Next, we show that there is no solution satisfying Pareto optimality, strong individual rationality, individual monotonicity, and converse consistency.

Policy Brief: Bargaining for social rights of precarious workers in Spain

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Ramos Martin, N.E.

2012-01-01

The main focus of the Barsori project was the contribution that social partners make to the reduction of precarious employment through collective bargaining and social dialogue. The project studied experiences in seven EU countries: Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain and the

The Influence of Performance on Bargaining and Distribution of Rewards.

Science.gov (United States)

Landau, Samuel B.

Performance variables were manipulated to elicit differential outcomes of success and failure for dyad members in an attempt to investigate resultant bargaining and distribution of rewards. Seventy, 10-12-year old children (36 female, 34 males) were placed into dyads controlling for age, sex, I.Q., and friendship choices. Self-allocations were…

Power Dependence in Individual Bargaining: The Expected Utility of Influence.

Science.gov (United States)

Lawler, Edward J.; Bacharach, Samuel B.

1979-01-01

This study uses power-dependence theory as a framework for examining whether and how parties use information on each other's dependence to estimate the utility of an influence attempt. The effect of dependence in expected utilities is investigated (by role playing) in bargaining between employer and employee for a pay raise. (MF)

The effects of hospitals' governance on optimal contracts: bargaining vs. contracting.

Science.gov (United States)

Galizzi, Matteo M; Miraldo, Marisa

2011-03-01

We propose a two-stage model to study the impact of different hospitals' governance frameworks on the optimal contracts designed by third-party payers when patients' disease severity is the private information of the hospital. In the second stage, doctors and managers interact within either a bargaining or a contracting scenario. In the contracting scenario, managers offer a contract that determines the payment to doctors, and doctors decide how many patients to treat. In the bargaining scenario, doctors and managers strategically negotiate on both the payment to doctors and the number of patients to treat. We derive the equilibrium doctors' payments and number of treated patients under both scenarios. We then derive the optimal contract offered by the government to the hospital in the first stage. Results show that when the cost of capital is sufficiently low, the informational rent is lower, and the social welfare is higher, in the contracting scenario. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Tackling the Crisis through Concession Bargaining: Five Company Cases from Germany

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Zagelmeyer, S.J.

2013-01-01

Purpose – This paper aims to present an analysis of the nature and drivers of company‐level concession bargaining during the financial crisis 2008‐10 in Germany. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on five company case studies. Data collection methods include document analysis and

Collective Bargaining in Higher Education Systems: A Study of Four States.

Science.gov (United States)

Lienemann, William H.; Bullis, Bruce

Systemwide bargaining in higher education in four states (Florida, Minnesota, New York, Illinois) was studied to determine whether institutions were affected in the manner predicted by previous literature, whether the amounts of influence, or power, of various institutional decision-makers were affected, and whether the viewpoints of respondents…

Intertemporal Bargaining in Addiction

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

George eAinslie

2013-08-01

Full Text Available The debate between disease models of addiction and moral or voluntarist models has been endless, and often echoes the equally endless debate between determinism and free will. I suggest here that part of the problem comes from how we picture the function of motivation in self-control. Quantitative experiments in both humans and nonhumans have shown that delayed reward loses its effectiveness in proportion to its delay. The resulting instability of preference is best controlled by a recursive self-prediction process, intertemporal bargaining, which is the likely mechanism of both the strength and the experienced freedom of will. In this model determinism is consistent with more elements of free will than compatibilist philosophers have heretofore proposed, and personal responsibility is an inseparable, functional component of will. Judgments of social responsibility can be described as projections of personal responsibility, but normative responsibility in addiction is elusive. The cited publications that are under the author’s control can be downloaded from www.picoeconomics.org.

The Structure of Enterprise Law: Interrelationships among contracts, markets, and laws in the bargaining structure of the firm

OpenAIRE

SHISHIDO Zenichi

2010-01-01

The firm is an ongoing joint project requiring both financial and human capital. Like other joint projects, the firm cannot maximize added value without achieving an efficient incentive bargain among the indispensable capital providers, i.e., shareholders and creditors as the monetary capital providers, and management and employees as the human capital providers. To stimulate efficient incentive bargaining at the firm level and, consequently, to enhance the efficiency of the whole economy, I ...

Illustrated Examples of the Effects of Risk Preferences and Expectations on Bargaining Outcomes.

Science.gov (United States)

Dickinson, David L.

2003-01-01

Describes bargaining examples that use expected utility theory. Provides example results that are intuitive, shown graphically and algebraically, and offer upper-level student samples that illustrate the usefulness of the expected utility theory. (JEH)

Coal dust darkens the bargaining table

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Raskin, A.H.

1978-04-24

Reverberations from the lengthy winter 1978 coal strike are sure to have effects on other unions--teamsters, postal workers, trainmen, steel workers--the author says. This debacle in the coal fields obliges Americans to recognize that, bad as union dictatorship undoubtedly is, union anarchy is potentially more destructive. Miners showed that anarchy pays; they demonstrated that the rank-and-file with control over a vital source can get a better deal by spurning the settlements made by their elected leaders and defying court back-to-work orders. President Carter's encouragement of defiance is discussed. The U.M.W. precedent may encourage all rebel groups in unions to demand a seat at the bargaining table. (MCW)

Two-stage bargaining with coverage extension in a dual labour market

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Roberts, Mark A.; Stæhr, Karsten; Tranæs, Torben

2000-01-01

This paper studies coverage extension in a simple general equilibrium model with a dual labour market. The union sector is characterized by two-stage bargaining whereas the firms set wages in the non-union sector. In this model firms and unions of the union sector have a commonality of interest...

Does Collective Bargaining Influence the Pay Satisfaction of Elementary School Teachers?

Science.gov (United States)

Buckman, David G.; Tran, Henry; Young, I. Phillip

2016-01-01

The purpose of this study is to determine the impact of collective bargaining on teacher pay satisfaction and offer knowledge of the factors contributing to the pay satisfaction of public elementary school teachers. The study focuses on how human capital, occupational characteristics, and job related characteristics impact the pay satisfaction of…

Bonds or Bargains: Relationship Paradigms and Their Significance for Marital Therapy.

Science.gov (United States)

Johnson, Sue

1986-01-01

Discusses contrasting conceptual paradigms describing the nature of intimate relationships. Relationships may be viewed in terms of a rational bargain or as an emotional bond. The implications of each paradigm for the process of marital therapy and the role of bonding and attachment in adult intimacy are prescribed. Implications for marital…

Bargaining power and revenue distribution in the Costa Rican mango supply chain

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Zúñiga-Arias, G.; Meijer, S.A.; Ruben, R.; Hofstede, G.J.

2007-01-01

By the time a European consumer eats a Costa Rican mango, the product has been traded in several transactions between producers, traders, retailers and consumers. This paper investigates the position of Costa Rican smallholders in the mango supply chain in terms of bargaining power and revenue

Conservation when landowners have bargaining power

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Lennox, Gareth D.; Gaston, Kevin J.; Acs, Szvetlana

2013-01-01

agreement. Implicitly assumed in such studies is therefore that those who ``produce'' biodiversity (landowners) receive none of the surplus available from trade. Instead, landowners could use their bargaining power to gain profits from conservation investments. We employ game theory to determine the surplus...... landowners could obtain in negotiations over conservation agreements, and the consequent effects on conservation outcomes, when enrolment decisions are governed by continuous variables (e.g. the proportion of a property to enrol). In addition, we consider how landowner uncertainty regarding the opportunity...... costs of other landowners affects these outcomes. Landowners' ability to gain surplus is highly variable and reflects variation in the substitutability of different properties for achieving a specified conservation objective. The ability of landowners to obtain profits from conservation agreements...

Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions. Bibliography No. 22.

Science.gov (United States)

Lowe, Ida B., Ed.; Johnson, Beth Hillman, Ed.

This bibliography of 886 citations is an annual accounting of the literature on collective bargaining in higher education and the professions for 1993. The research design and methodology used in the preparation of this volume relied on computer searches of various data bases, as well as manual retrieval of citations not available on data bases.…

Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions. Bibliography No. 21.

Science.gov (United States)

Lowe, Ida B., Ed.; Johnson, Beth Hillman, Ed.

This bibliography of 885 citations is an annual accounting of the literature on collective bargaining in higher education and the professions for 1992. The research design and methodology used in the preparation of this volume relied on computer searches of various data bases, as well as manual retrieval of citations not available on data bases.…

The transit oil and gas pipeline and the role of bargaining: A non-technical discussion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Omonbude, Ekpen J.

2007-01-01

Transit oil and gas pipelines are growing in relevance, and face a number of topical problems. One of such issues is the problem of potential disruption from a number of sources, notably post-construction behaviour of the transit country. Present and future pipelines face the risk of continuous conflict over legal, economic and political issues. Once the pipeline is built and in operation, the threat of disruption of the pipeline by the transit country over disputed transit terms exists. This is due to two key problems: first, a shift in bargaining powers to the transit country upon construction and operation of the pipeline and, second, changes in the value of the throughput imply price changes that can affect the behaviour of the transit country. This paper discusses the role of basic bargaining principles in cross-border oil and gas pipelines involving transit through one or more countries. It finds that the motive behind the pipeline plays a key role in the prevention of potential disruptions to the pipeline due to rent squeezing. Also, although the potential of such disruptions does exist, there are a number of factors that could serve to mute the consequences of shifts in bargaining power to the transit countries

Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers' Bargaining.

Science.gov (United States)

Zhu, Xiaodong; Wang, Jing; Tang, Juan

2017-12-15

Environmentally friendly handling and efficient recycling of waste electrical on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) have grown to be a global social problem. As holders of WEEE, consumers have a significant effect on the recycling process. A consideration of and attention to the influence of consumer behavior in the recycling process can help achieve more effective recycling of WEEE. In this paper, we built a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model composed of manufacturers, retailers, and network recycling platforms. Based on the influence of customer bargaining behavior, we studied several different scenarios of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and contract coordination, using the Stackelberg game theory. The results show that retailers and network recycling platforms will reduce the direct recovery prices to maintain their own profit when considering the impact of consumer bargaining behavior, while remanufacturers will improve the transfer payment price for surrendering part of the profit under revenue and the expense sharing contract. Using this contract, we can achieve supply chain coordination and eliminate the effect of consumer bargaining behavior on supply chain performance. It can be viewed from the parameter sensitivity analysis that when we select the appropriate sharing coefficient, the closed-loop supply chain can achieve the same system performance under a centralized decision.

Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Xiaodong Zhu

2017-12-01

Full Text Available Environmentally friendly handling and efficient recycling of waste electrical on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE have grown to be a global social problem. As holders of WEEE, consumers have a significant effect on the recycling process. A consideration of and attention to the influence of consumer behavior in the recycling process can help achieve more effective recycling of WEEE. In this paper, we built a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model composed of manufacturers, retailers, and network recycling platforms. Based on the influence of customer bargaining behavior, we studied several different scenarios of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and contract coordination, using the Stackelberg game theory. The results show that retailers and network recycling platforms will reduce the direct recovery prices to maintain their own profit when considering the impact of consumer bargaining behavior, while remanufacturers will improve the transfer payment price for surrendering part of the profit under revenue and the expense sharing contract. Using this contract, we can achieve supply chain coordination and eliminate the effect of consumer bargaining behavior on supply chain performance. It can be viewed from the parameter sensitivity analysis that when we select the appropriate sharing coefficient, the closed-loop supply chain can achieve the same system performance under a centralized decision.

Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining

Science.gov (United States)

Zhu, Xiaodong; Wang, Jing; Tang, Juan

2017-01-01

Environmentally friendly handling and efficient recycling of waste electrical on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) have grown to be a global social problem. As holders of WEEE, consumers have a significant effect on the recycling process. A consideration of and attention to the influence of consumer behavior in the recycling process can help achieve more effective recycling of WEEE. In this paper, we built a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model composed of manufacturers, retailers, and network recycling platforms. Based on the influence of customer bargaining behavior, we studied several different scenarios of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and contract coordination, using the Stackelberg game theory. The results show that retailers and network recycling platforms will reduce the direct recovery prices to maintain their own profit when considering the impact of consumer bargaining behavior, while remanufacturers will improve the transfer payment price for surrendering part of the profit under revenue and the expense sharing contract. Using this contract, we can achieve supply chain coordination and eliminate the effect of consumer bargaining behavior on supply chain performance. It can be viewed from the parameter sensitivity analysis that when we select the appropriate sharing coefficient, the closed-loop supply chain can achieve the same system performance under a centralized decision. PMID:29244778

Union Bargaining in an Oligopoly Market with Cournot-Bertrand Competition: Welfare and Policy Implications

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Elizabeth Schroeder

2014-03-01

Full Text Available We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand. The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this model, with the competitive advantage going to the Cournot-type competitor. A comparison of the results from the Cournot-Bertrand model with those found in the traditional Cournot and Bertrand models reveals that firms and the union have a different preference ordering over labor market bargaining. These differences help explain why the empirical evidence does not support any one model of union bargaining. We also examine the welfare and policy implications of union activity in a Cournot-Bertrand setting.

Improving the explanatory power of bargaining models - New evidence from European Union studies

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Selck, TJ

Focusing on recent studies of European Union legislative decision-making, this research note evaluates the current literature that attempts to improve the explanatory power of bargaining models by integrating game-theoretic spatial models with micro-level data gained from expert interviews or from

Managing Organizational Conflict: When to Use Collaboration, Bargaining and Power Approaches. Working Paper.

Science.gov (United States)

Derr, C. Brooklyn

A contingency theory for managing conflicts in organizational settings is proposed. Collaboration, bargaining, and power approaches to conflict management are all appropriate, given certain situations. The situations and the costs and benefits of using a given strategy under varying conditions are discussed. (Author)

Essays on Women’s Bargaining Power and Intra-household Resource in Rural Ethiopia

NARCIS (Netherlands)

B.B. Dito

2011-01-01

textabstractxv Abstract This thesis investigates the effect of a woman’s bargaining power on her welfare and that of her children in rural Ethiopia. The issue is of particular concern because, as empirical evidence shows, intra-household inequalities in welfare are frequently the direct

Unwritten rules: virtual bargaining underpins social interaction, culture, and society

OpenAIRE

Misyak, Jennifer B.; Melkonyan, Tigran; Zeitoun, Hossam; Chater, Nick

2014-01-01

Many social interactions require humans to coordinate their behavior across a range of scales. However, aspects of intentional coordination remain puzzling from within several approaches in cognitive science. Sketching a new perspective, we propose that the complex behavioral patterns – or 'unwritten rules' – governing such coordination emerge from an ongoing process of 'virtual bargaining'. Social participants behave on the basis of what they would agree to do if they were explicitly to barg...

1994/1995 collective bargaining in the Ruhr coal industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heidelbach, G.; Herting, W.

1994-01-01

The Ruhr coal industry will reduce its production capacity beyond the initial target due to the unexpected dramatic decline in coking coal sales. In a move of joint social responsibility the collective bargaining parties therefore entered their negotiations prematurily, in December 1993, in order to agree on additional - temporary - free shifts subject to salary deduction, in an attempt to master the added burden of adaptation and avoid dismissals. On December 20, 1993, then was concluded a collective agreement which takes due account of that target. (orig.)

Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care

OpenAIRE

Barros, Pedro Pita

2005-01-01

A feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the co−existence of a públic and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private providers while holding idle capacity. This is often seen as inefficiency from the management of public facilities. We present here a different rationale for the existence of such idle capacity: the public sector may opt to have idle capacity as a way to gain bargaining power vis−à−vis the private provider, under the assumption of a...

Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care

OpenAIRE

Xavier Martinez-Giralt; Barros Pedro Pita

2005-01-01

A feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the co-existence of a public and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private providers while holding idle capacity. This is often seen as inefficiency from the management of public facilities. We present here a different rationale for the existence of such idle capacity: the public sector may opt to have idle capacity as a way to gain bargaining power vis-Ã -vis the private provider, under the assumption of ...

How do health insurer market concentration and bargaining power with hospitals affect health insurance premiums?

Science.gov (United States)

Trish, Erin E; Herring, Bradley J

2015-07-01

The US health insurance industry is highly concentrated, and health insurance premiums are high and rising rapidly. Policymakers have focused on the possible link between the two, leading to ACA provisions to increase insurer competition. However, while market power may enable insurers to include higher profit margins in their premiums, it may also result in stronger bargaining leverage with hospitals to negotiate lower payment rates to partially offset these higher premiums. We empirically examine the relationship between employer-sponsored fully-insured health insurance premiums and the level of concentration in local insurer and hospital markets using the nationally-representative 2006-2011 KFF/HRET Employer Health Benefits Survey. We exploit a unique feature of employer-sponsored insurance, in which self-insured employers purchase only administrative services from managed care organizations, to disentangle these different effects on insurer concentration by constructing one concentration measure representing fully-insured plans' transactions with employers and the other concentration measure representing insurers' bargaining with hospitals. As expected, we find that premiums are indeed higher for plans sold in markets with higher levels of concentration relevant to insurer transactions with employers, lower for plans in markets with higher levels of insurer concentration relevant to insurer bargaining with hospitals, and higher for plans in markets with higher levels of hospital market concentration. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Monetary policy and wage bargaining in the EMU: restrictive ECB policies, high unemployment, nominal wage restraint and inflation above the target

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Eckhard Hein

2002-09-01

Full Text Available Assessing the effects of monetary policy and wage bargaining on employment andinflation in the European Monetary Union (EMU, the first step sees development of a Post-Keynesian competitive claims model of inflation with endogenous money. In this model the NAIRU is considered to be a short-run limit to employment enforced by independent and conservative central banks. In the long run, however, the NAIRU will follow actual unemployment and is therefore also dependent on the forces determining aggregate demand, including monetary policies. But the NAIRU may also be reduced through effectively co-ordinated wage bargaining, as has been shown by institutional political economists. Applying these considerations to the economic performance of the EMU, different scenarios determined by wage bargainingcoordination and the European Central Bank's (ECB monetary policies are developed. It is shown that the first phase of the EMU was dominated by uncoordinated wage bargaining across the EMU and an "anti-growth-bias" of theECB. Thus the euro area was plagued with nominal wage restraint, highunemployment and inflation above the ECB target. Economic performance will improve if the ECB abandons its asymmetric monetary strategy. This may be facilitated by a higher degree of effective wage bargaining co-ordination across the EMU.

Fear and guilt in proposers : Using emotions to explain offers in ultimatum bargaining

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Nelissen, R.M.A.; Leliveld, M.C.; van Dijk, E; Zeelenberg, M.

We argue that offers in bargaining are guided by the emotions that proposers anticipate when contemplating their offers. In particular, we reason that positive offers may be driven by fear and guilt, where fear is more related to the perceived consequences of having one's offer rejected, and guilt

Are litigation and collective bargaining complements or substitutes for achieving gender equality? A study of the British Equal Pay Act

OpenAIRE

Simon Deakin; Sarah Fraser Butlin; Colm McLaughlin; Aleksandra Polanska

2015-01-01

We present a socio-legal case study of the recent equal pay litigation wave in Britain, which saw an unprecedented increase in the number of claims, triggered in part by the entry of no-win, no-fee law firms into this part of the legal services market. Although the rise in litigation led to greater adversarialism in pay bargaining, litigation and collective bargaining mostly operated as complementary mechanisms in advancing an equality agenda. Litigation may be a more potent agent for socia...

Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Cukierman, A.; Lippi, F.

1998-01-01

This paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate the effects of central bank independence, of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and of the interaction between those institutional variables, on real wages, unemployment and inflation, in a framework in which unions are averse to

Sabbatical, Personal, Maternity, and Sick Leave Policies. Collective Bargaining Perspectives, Volume 2, Number 10.

Science.gov (United States)

Goeres, Ernest R.

While hiring and advancement considerations are of paramount importance to the faculty member as well as to the institution where collective bargaining agreements are negotiated each year, other employment conditions are accorded almost as much consideration. Allowances for leave follow closely on the heels of placement and promotion conditions in…

Policy Poison or Promise: Exploring the Dual Nature of California School District Collective Bargaining Agreements

Science.gov (United States)

Strunk, Katharine O.

2012-01-01

Purpose: This study examines policies set in the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) negotiated between teachers' unions and school boards and explores what kinds of districts have contract provisions that restrict district administrators, enhance administrative flexibility, and/or improve teachers' professional work lives and that have…

Prosecution's Power, Procedural Rights, and Pleading Guilty: The Problem of Coercion in Plea Bargaining Drug Cases.

Science.gov (United States)

Cloyd, Jerald W.

1979-01-01

The forms of psychological pressure placed on the defendant's pleading in drug cases are examined, with emphasis on the interplay between rational and emotional aspects of such situations. Three stages in plea bargaining negotiations are outlined. (Author/MC)

Uncertainty of food contamination origin and liability rules: Implications for bargaining power

OpenAIRE

Boutouis, M. Z.; Benhassine, W.; Perito, Maria Angela

2018-01-01

We propose an industrial organization model to analyze the role of bargaining power and liability rules in creating incentives for downstream and upstream supply chain operators to invest in good practices. We investigate the case in which either upstream production practices or downstream distribution may cause product contamination resulting in noncompliance with the authorized thresholds of residues (maximum residue limit [MRL]). We provide a comparative analysis of the retailers' liabilit...

NASH BARGAINING BASED BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION IN COGNITIVE RADIO FOR DELAY CRITICAL APPLICATIONS

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Kalyani Kulkarni

2015-11-01

Full Text Available In order to effectively regulate the existing resources, dynamic spectrum access in cognitive radio needs to adopt the effective resource allocation strategies. Multimedia applications require large bandwidth and have to meet the delay constraints while maintaining the data quality. Game theory is emerging as an effective analytical tool for the analysis of available resources and its allocation. This paper addresses resource allocation schemes employing bargaining game model for Multi-carrier CDMA based Cognitive Radio. Resource allocation scheme is designed for transmission of video over cognitive radio networks and aim to perform bandwidth allocation for different cognitive users. Utility function based on bargaining model is proposed. Primary user utility function includes the pricing factor and an upbeat factor that can be adjusted by observing the delay constraints of the video. Allocated bandwidth to the secondary user can be adjusted by changing the upbeat factor. Throughput in the proposed scheme is increased by 2% as compared to other reported pricing based resource allocation schemes. The edge PSNR of reconstructed video obtained as 32.6dB resulting to optimum decoding of the video at the receiver. The study also shows upbeat factor can be used to enhanced capacity of the network.

Interactions of Bargaining Power and Introduction of Online Channel in Two Competing Supply Chains

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Jie Wei

2018-01-01

Full Text Available This paper studies the effect of dual-channel format on supply chain’s competition ability and the effect of different bargaining powers on the competition between two supply chains and the optimal pricing decisions of all supply chain members when one supply chain introduces an online retailing channel. We develop four game models and obtain the optimal pricing decisions in closed form of these models and give some sensitivity analysis through numerical approach. Some new managerial insights are obtained as follows: Regardless of the two supply chain members’ bargaining forms, the optimal price, the maximal demand, and the maximal profit decrease as the self-price sensitivity decreases. The industry holds advantage in getting higher profit when the supply chain without online retailing channel is led by the retailer. In addition, we find that a manufacturer as a leader of its supply chain can get more profit when the competing supply chain’s leader is the manufacturer than when the competing supply chain’s leader is the retailer.

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

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Meina Hua

2017-10-01

Full Text Available Improper disposal of household unwanted medications (UMs is an emergency problem around the world that adversely affects the sustainability of the environment and human’s health. However, the current disposal practices, mainly based on advertising and collecting status, are unsatisfactory in most countries and regions. Thus, some scholars proposed an alternative disposal practice that is to provide incentives to customers. This study aims to compare a Single Model (advertising only with a Joint Model (advertising with take-back pricing in a two-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC that is composed of one disposer and one collector. In each model, four games (non-cooperative, collector as the Stackelberg leader, disposer as the Stackelberg leader, and cooperative were established in order to identify the optimal pricing and advertising strategies for both members. The results of the study indicate that there is a Pareto dominant range for Joint Model compared to Single Model, whereas Single Model has no Pareto improvement in any games. Furthermore, in non-cooperative games of Joint Model, it is better to implement the leader-follower structure rather than simultaneous movement structure. Additionally, it is verified that the cooperative game is feasible, which leads to the cooperation between the disposer and the collector, and the extra profit from the cooperation can be shared based on the Nash bargaining game. However, in Single Model, it is better for the disposer to act as a channel leader and the collector figures the follower.

Going beyond the surface: gendered intra-household bargaining as a social determinant of child health and nutrition in low and middle income countries.

Science.gov (United States)

Richards, Esther; Theobald, Sally; George, Asha; Kim, Julia C; Rudert, Christiane; Jehan, Kate; Tolhurst, Rachel

2013-10-01

A growing body of research highlights the importance of gendered social determinants of child health, such as maternal education and women's status, for mediating child survival. This narrative review of evidence from diverse low and middle-income contexts (covering the period 1970-May 2012) examines the significance of intra-household bargaining power and process as gendered dimensions of child health and nutrition. The findings focus on two main elements of bargaining: the role of women's decision-making power and access to and control over resources; and the importance of household headship, structure and composition. The paper discusses the implications of these findings in the light of lifecycle and intersectional approaches to gender and health. The relative lack of published intervention studies that explicitly consider gendered intra-household bargaining is highlighted. Given the complex mechanisms through which intra-household bargaining shapes child health and nutrition it is critical that efforts to address gender in health and nutrition programming are thoroughly documented and widely shared to promote further learning and action. There is scope to develop links between gender equity initiatives in areas of adult and adolescent health, and child health and nutrition programming. Child health and nutrition interventions will be more effective, equitable and sustainable if they are designed based on gender-sensitive information and continually evaluated from a gender perspective. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The plea bargain as a criminal policy instrument: the tension about the fundamental guarantees of the defendant

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Murilo Thomas Aires

2017-03-01

Full Text Available The present research intends to analyze the plea bargaining based on its political-criminal foundation, in order to achieve the tension it maintains in relation to certain fundamental guarantees of the defendant, especially the one who signs the agreement. On this occasion, there will be substantially a contraposition between the legal procedure of collaboration and the principles of the adversary, ample defense, presumption of innocence, and non-self-incrimination. The application of the plea bargain proves extremely controversial not only in the common sense, often conveyed by the media, but mainly in the technical perspective, especially in relation to the scientific debate, which reflects the complexity of the proposed theme. For an effective approach to the theme, the work uses the deductive, historical-evolutionary and dialectical methods, being the bibliographical research the technique fundamentally used.

The Bargaining Table and Beyond: How the AFT Came to Support Labor-Management Collaboration

Science.gov (United States)

Kugler, Phil

2014-01-01

When he first came to the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) in 1973, reports Phil Kugler, there was no such thing as labor-management collaboration. It was a term he had never heard of, and no one used it. Back then, the focus was on supporting local unions in their struggles to win collective bargaining rights. At the time, teachers were…

Desire to bargain and negotiation success: Lessons about the need to negotiate from six hydropower disputes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burkardt, N.; Lamb, B.L.; Taylor, J.G.

1998-01-01

The authors investigated the notion that successful licensing negotiations require that all parties to the dispute must have a desire to bargain. This desire is most likely to be present when the dispute exhibits ripeness and each party believes a bargained solution is the most cost-effective way to resolve differences. Structured interviews of participants in six Federal Energy Regulatory Commission hydropower licensing consultations were conducted to determine the level of need to negotiate for each party. The findings indicate that a need to negotiate is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for success. Several factors were associated with a need to negotiate: a weak BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement); a salient issue; participants' sense of efficacy; a sense of inevitability; professional roles encouraging negotiation; and disputes about facts as opposed to disputes about values. Participants' need to negotiate fluctuated throughout the process and intensified when questions were ripe: i.e., critical issues were debated or the regulatory process required action

PROFESSIONAL NEGOTIATION IN EDUCATION--A BARGAINING GAME WITH SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS. INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL. FIRST REVISED EDITION.

Science.gov (United States)

HORVAT, JOHN J.

IN AN APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY TO PREPARE PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL FOR EFFECTIVE PROFESSIONAL NEGOTIATION IN EDUCATION, THREE FORMS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ARE SIMULATED--ONE FOR A FOUR- TO EIGHT-HOUR TIME PERIOD, A SECOND FOR A TWO- TO FOUR-DAY TIME PERIOD, AND A THIRD FOR A ONE- TO THREE-WEEK WORKSHOP OR SEMINAR. LONGER FORMS PRESENT MORE…

A game theory approach for competition and cooperation among project’s subcontractors with interaction activities

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Ashkan Hafezalkotob

2017-04-01

Full Text Available Some projects are often performed by many subcontractors that cooperate with each other and some of them are conducted by outsourcing them to several firms; so subcontractors carry out activities in competition. Appropriate trade-off between time and cost and achieving more benefit and cost saving are objectives of both models. In this paper, it is investigated that how different subcontractors of a project can cooperate to achieve more advantages if possible and how sub-contractors can compete to make the results better and find the optimum cost to minimize the time for each of them. The competition here does not mean eliminating a competitor, but the aim is to challenge the contractors in order to choose the best decision. The purpose of this study is to address the challenges in time and cost management and to find more profit allocation among subcontractors and fair competition for fair allocation as well. A model based on cooperative game theory in time/cost trade-off problem of projects is suggested and then a competition model among subcontractors based on non-cooperative game theory is proposed. A case study is rep-resented to comprehensively illustrate the problem, the cooperative techniques of cooperative game theory, and the payoff matrix of non-cooperative model among subcontractors. Results of the proposed model reveal that subcontractors can obtain higher profit from cooperation if pos-sible. When they outsource the project and compete with each other, they must consider the in-teraction activities and choose the best strategies for cost saving and gain more reward from the client. Moreover, it is found that some techniques such as Shapley value, Core, Max-Min Core, or Equal Profit Method (EPM are able to fairly assign extra profit of cooperation, and using the payoff matrix, Nash equilibrium, and Nash bargaining helps to find the optimum point to mini-mize time and cost for interaction activities state.

Legal distinction between employee and independent contractor as applied to collective bargaining activities in timber harvesting

Science.gov (United States)

James E. Granskog; William C. Siegal

1977-01-01

Collective bargaining attempts by timber harvesting labor groups is often complicated by lack of a clear legal distinction between "employees" and "independent contractors." the primary criterion to make the distinction - the "right-to-control" test of common law - has now been amplified by a number of secondary tests, including: 1) the...

A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Joint Subcarrier and Power Allocation Problem in Multi-Service SCFDMA Networks

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E. E. Tsiropoulou

2016-06-01

Full Text Available In this paper a joint resource allocation problem is studied in a multi-service Single Carrier FDMA (SC-FDMA wireless network. Mobile users request various services with different Quality of Service (QoS characteristics and they determine in a distributed and non-cooperative manner a joint subcarrier and power allocation towards fulfilling their QoS prerequisites. Initially, a well-designed utility function is formulated to appropriately represent users’ diverse QoS prerequisites with respect to their requested service. The subcarriers allocation problem is solved based on a multilateral bargaining model, where users are able to select different discount factors to enter the bargaining game, thus better expressing their different needs in system resources with respect to their requested service. The subcarriers mapping is realized based either on the localized SC-FDMA method where the subcarriers are sequentially allocated to the users or the distributed SC-FDMA via considering the maximum channel gain policy, where each subcarrier is allocated to the user with the maximum channel gain. Given the subcarriers assignment, an optimization problem with respect to users’ uplink transmission power is formulated and solved, in order to determine the optimal power allocation per subcarrier assigned to each user. Finally, the performance of the proposed framework is evaluated via modeling and simulation and extensive numerical results are presented.

Convergent and divergent country trends in coordinated wage-setting and collective bargaining in the public hospitals sector

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Grimshaw, D.; Jaehrling, K.; van der Meer, M.; Méhaut, P.; Shimron, N.

2007-01-01

Drawing on the findings of research in the public hospitals sector in five European countries1—France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK—this article assesses the character of change in wage setting and collective bargaining. It demonstrates the diversity of national arrangements by

Considering the impact of the 'Right to Bargain' Legislation in Ireland: A Review

OpenAIRE

Cullinane, Niall; Dobbins, Anthony

2014-01-01

Ireland is rare among advanced economies in not having statutory trade union recognition legislation for collective bargaining purposes. The matter has been a source of policy contention over the years with attempts to resolve it encapsulated in the so-called ‘Right to Bargain’ legislation, introduced in 2001. This legislation has sought to circumvent statutory recognition in Ireland by putting in place an alternative mechanism for unions to represent members in non-union firms where collecti...

Behavioural consequences of regret and disappointment in social bargaining games.

Science.gov (United States)

Martinez, Luis M F; Zeelenberg, Marcel; Rijsman, John B

2011-02-01

Previous research on the role of negative emotions in social bargaining games has focused primarily on social emotions such as anger and guilt. In this article, we provide a test for behavioural differences between two prototypical decision-related negative emotions-regret and disappointment-in one-shot social dilemma games. Three experiments with two different emotion-induction procedures (autobiographical recall and imagined scenarios) and two different games (the ultimatum game and the 10-coin give-some game) revealed that regret increased prosocial behaviour, whereas disappointment decreased prosocial behaviour. These results extend previous findings concerning differences between regret and disappointment to interdependent (social) situations. © 2010 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

Transforming gender relations through the market: Smallholder milk market participation and women's intra-household bargaining power in Ethiopia

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Lenjiso, B.M.; Ruben, R.; Smits, J.P.J.M.

2016-01-01

We study the relationship between smallholder milk market participation and women's intra-household bargaining position in Ethiopia, using a quasi-experiment and propensity score matching. In market participant households, milk income is higher and its control has shifted from women to men. Our data

Bargaining power and revenue distribution in the Costa Rican mango chain: a gaming simulation approach with local producers

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Zuniga Arias, G.E.; Meijer, S.; Ruben, R.; Hofstede, G.J.

2007-01-01

By the time a European consumer eats a Costa Rican mango, the product has been traded in several transactions between producers, traders, retailers and consumers. This paper investigates the position of Costa Rican smallholders in the mango supply chain in terms of bargaining power and revenue

Balancing work and family in the low-wage service sector: the role of legislated and collectively-bargained norms in Quebec.

Science.gov (United States)

Bernstein, Stéphanie

2011-01-01

This paper looks at the role of legislated norms of general application in shaping "family-friendly" workplaces and their interaction with collectively-bargained standards in the retail service sector and more specifically, in a single unionized retail sector in Quebec, Canada. The methodology used is traditional legal research methodology: analysis of laws, collective agreements and case law. The principal norms examined concern parental and family leave, working time and disparities between different employment statuses. A series of legislative provisions have been adopted in Quebec over the last 30 years whose objectives are the improvement of family-related leave and the reduction of working time. Unions have also negotiated provisions in collective agreements with these same goals. In the low-wage retail sector studied, the working time standards negotiated between the unions and the employers reflect the characteristics of the sector, most notably extended opening hours, seven days a week. Predictability of hours also varies according to employment status. Such issues as family-unfriendly working time arrangements (last-minute scheduling, asocial hours, etc.) and the need for flexibility in family-related leave are insufficiently taken into account by the legislated and bargained provisions. A fine analysis and comprehension of existing formal regulation, be it legislated or collectively-bargained, is required to fully understand workers' experiences with work-family balance and to identify the gaps between formal norms and the needs expressed by workers with respect to work-family balance.

Transforming Gender Relations through the Market: Smallholder Milk Market Participation and Women`s Intra-household Bargaining Power in Ethiopia

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Lenjiso, B.M.; Smits, J.P.J.M.; Ruben, R.

2016-01-01

We study the relationship between smallholder milk market participation and women's intra-household bargaining position in Ethiopia, using a quasi-experiment and propensity score matching. In market participant households, milk income is higher and its control has shifted from women to men. Our data

Potentiality of the existence of plea bargaining in the criminal process of Lithuania

OpenAIRE

Janušaitytė, Gintarė

2016-01-01

Kontinentinės teisės tradicijos valstybėse pradėtas taikyti bendrosios teisės sistemos valstybėms būdingas derybų dėl kaltės (angl. plea bargaining) institutas sudarė prielaidas diskusijoms apie naujos baudžiamosios procesinės formos taikymo galimybes Lietuvos Respublikos baudžiamajame procese. Atsižvelgiant į siekį tobulinti baudžiamojo proceso optimizavimo galimybes, yra tikslinga svarstyti derybų dėl kaltės instituto egzistavimo prielaidas Lietuvos Respublikos baudžiamajame procese. Straip...

Teacher Satisfaction and Turnover in Charter Schools: Examining the Variations and Possibilities for Collective Bargaining in State Laws

Science.gov (United States)

Torres, A. Chris; Oluwole, Joseph

2015-01-01

Charter schools see as many as one in four teachers leave annually, and recent evidence attributes much of this turnover to provisions affected by collective bargaining processes and state laws such as salary, benefits, job security, and working hours. There have been many recent efforts to improve teacher voice in charter schools (Kahlenberg…

The Role of "Islamic feminism" in Somali Immigrant Women's Intra-and Extra-Household Bargaining Power and in Mitigating the Negative Effects of the Image Problem in their Integration in Norway

OpenAIRE

Ngunjiri, Anne Wangui

2013-01-01

This research explores the aspirations and life experiences of Somali immigrant women in Bergen as they embark on gender-tuned interpretation of the Quran as a source of bargaining power within the household and in the wider Norwegian immigration context. By bargaining power I mean an individual's interests or preferences and the ability to act on those interests or preferences. I show that, faced by constraints such as restrictive structures within the Norwegian immigration context and pa...

Plea bargaining as a third route of criminal law in the fight against organized administrative corruption

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Marcelo Rodrigues da Silva

2017-03-01

Full Text Available The purpose of this article is to examine whether the plea bargaining in the context of “Lava Jato” Operation is adopting a third route of criminal law against administrative corruption, in which reparation of damages is established as one of the primary objectives of criminal prosecution, in substitution or mitigation of the restrictive sentence of the collaborating defendants. Subsequent to this analysis, it is intended to reflect if the adoption of a third route of criminal law by means of these negotiating instruments could imply in the utilitarian mercantilization of the criminal process prejudicial to the principle of criminal legality, proportionality and isonomy in the application of the punishment. This is a necessary and pertinent analysis due to the protagonism that the plea-bargaining have been assuming in the discovery of great corruption schemes in Brazil and the recovery of assets. The procedural methodology is the bibliographic and the method of approach is the hypothetico-deductive one, besides the case study involving “Lava Jato” operation. The hypothesis worked out is that the award-winning collaboration agreements have externalized a third-way criminal law and that there is a viability of violations of isonomy and criminal legality in fight against administrative corruption.

Collective Bargaining Agreement 1985-1987 between Regis College and the Regis College Chapter of the American Association of University Professors.

Science.gov (United States)

Regis Coll., Denver, CO.

The collective bargaining agreement between Regis College and the Regis College Chapter (50 members) of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) covering the period August 1985-August 1987 is presented. Items covered in the agreement include: definitions and AAUP recognition; faculty-administration relationships; stipends for…

Collective Bargaining and District Costs for Teacher Health Insurance: An Examination of the Data from the BLS and Wisconsin

Science.gov (United States)

Costrell, Robert M.

2015-01-01

District costs for teachers' health insurance are, on average, higher then employer costs for private-sector professionals. How much of this is attributable to collective bargaining? This article examines the question using data from the National Compensation Survey (NCS) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the state of Wisconsin. In…

Strategic reasoning and bargaining in catastrophic climate change games

Science.gov (United States)

Verendel, Vilhelm; Johansson, Daniel J. A.; Lindgren, Kristian

2016-03-01

Two decades of international negotiations show that agreeing on emission levels for climate change mitigation is a hard challenge. However, if early warning signals were to show an upcoming tipping point with catastrophic damage, theory and experiments suggest this could simplify collective action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. At the actual threshold, no country would have a free-ride incentive to increase emissions over the tipping point, but it remains for countries to negotiate their emission levels to reach these agreements. We model agents bargaining for emission levels using strategic reasoning to predict emission bids by others and ask how this affects the possibility of reaching agreements that avoid catastrophic damage. It is known that policy elites often use a higher degree of strategic reasoning, and in our model this increases the risk for climate catastrophe. Moreover, some forms of higher strategic reasoning make agreements to reduce greenhouse gases unstable. We use empirically informed levels of strategic reasoning when simulating the model.

The austerity bargain and the social self: conceptual clarity surrounding health cutbacks.

Science.gov (United States)

Buchanan, David A

2013-01-01

As necessary austerity measures make major inroads into western health services, this paper investigates the philology of austerity and finds that there are two subtly similar yet importantly different derivations from the Latin and the Greek. The Latin austerus is an abstract term meaning dry, harsh, sour; whereas the Greek austeros has a more embodied and literal meaning of making the tongue dry. What seems an initially subtle difference between the metaphorical and the metonymic plays out as involving seriously different outcomes between harsh economic measures and the literal effects on the people suffering under measures that actually make the tongue dry. The paper argues that between the trope and the literal that which Wittgenstein described as 'a language game' ensues wherein the metaphorical through a sleight of grammar is passed off as being real while, the literal effects on real people is downplayed as metaphorical 'collateral damage'. The paper further argues that within this grammar that forces itself upon us, the game of capital is played out through what the author terms an austerity bargain that is levelled by the financial elites: healthy capitalism equals a healthy society. The paper then examines the six elements of the social determinants of health and what actually contributes to a healthy society. Rather than being under an individual threat of exclusion from what Marx termed a superabundance, the paper considers the irreducible differences between the game of capital's individualism, and, the social determinants of health's social inclusion, legitimization and that which Habermas termed public authentication. The paper concludes that not only do necessary austerity measures need to be critiqued but that they radically undermine what determines a healthy society. It follows also that the social determinants of health, radically undermine the bargain inherent for the privileged few within the game of capital. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Two Monthly Continuous Dynamic Model Based on Nash Bargaining Theory for Conflict Resolution in Reservoir System.

Science.gov (United States)

Homayounfar, Mehran; Zomorodian, Mehdi; Martinez, Christopher J; Lai, Sai Hin

2015-01-01

So far many optimization models based on Nash Bargaining Theory associated with reservoir operation have been developed. Most of them have aimed to provide practical and efficient solutions for water allocation in order to alleviate conflicts among water users. These models can be discussed from two viewpoints: (i) having a discrete nature; and (ii) working on an annual basis. Although discrete dynamic game models provide appropriate reservoir operator policies, their discretization of variables increases the run time and causes dimensionality problems. In this study, two monthly based non-discrete optimization models based on the Nash Bargaining Solution are developed for a reservoir system. In the first model, based on constrained state formulation, the first and second moments (mean and variance) of the state variable (water level in the reservoir) is calculated. Using moment equations as the constraint, the long-term utility of the reservoir manager and water users are optimized. The second model is a dynamic approach structured based on continuous state Markov decision models. The corresponding solution based on the collocation method is structured for a reservoir system. In this model, the reward function is defined based on the Nash Bargaining Solution. Indeed, it is used to yield equilibrium in every proper sub-game, thereby satisfying the Markov perfect equilibrium. Both approaches are applicable for water allocation in arid and semi-arid regions. A case study was carried out at the Zayandeh-Rud river basin located in central Iran to identify the effectiveness of the presented methods. The results are compared with the results of an annual form of dynamic game, a classical stochastic dynamic programming model (e.g. Bayesian Stochastic Dynamic Programming model, BSDP), and a discrete stochastic dynamic game model (PSDNG). By comparing the results of alternative methods, it is shown that both models are capable of tackling conflict issues in water allocation

Two Monthly Continuous Dynamic Model Based on Nash Bargaining Theory for Conflict Resolution in Reservoir System.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mehran Homayounfar

Full Text Available So far many optimization models based on Nash Bargaining Theory associated with reservoir operation have been developed. Most of them have aimed to provide practical and efficient solutions for water allocation in order to alleviate conflicts among water users. These models can be discussed from two viewpoints: (i having a discrete nature; and (ii working on an annual basis. Although discrete dynamic game models provide appropriate reservoir operator policies, their discretization of variables increases the run time and causes dimensionality problems. In this study, two monthly based non-discrete optimization models based on the Nash Bargaining Solution are developed for a reservoir system. In the first model, based on constrained state formulation, the first and second moments (mean and variance of the state variable (water level in the reservoir is calculated. Using moment equations as the constraint, the long-term utility of the reservoir manager and water users are optimized. The second model is a dynamic approach structured based on continuous state Markov decision models. The corresponding solution based on the collocation method is structured for a reservoir system. In this model, the reward function is defined based on the Nash Bargaining Solution. Indeed, it is used to yield equilibrium in every proper sub-game, thereby satisfying the Markov perfect equilibrium. Both approaches are applicable for water allocation in arid and semi-arid regions. A case study was carried out at the Zayandeh-Rud river basin located in central Iran to identify the effectiveness of the presented methods. The results are compared with the results of an annual form of dynamic game, a classical stochastic dynamic programming model (e.g. Bayesian Stochastic Dynamic Programming model, BSDP, and a discrete stochastic dynamic game model (PSDNG. By comparing the results of alternative methods, it is shown that both models are capable of tackling conflict issues in

Designing Leadership models in a Three Level Unlimited Supply Chain: Non-Cooperative Game Theory Approach

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Ahmad Jaafarnehad

2015-09-01

Full Text Available The role and importance of supply chain management, has faced with many challenges and problems. Although a comprehensive model of supply chain issues, has not been explained, we have to indicate that issues such as reviewing the theoretical foundations of information systems, marketing, financial management, logistical and organizational relations have been considered by many researchers. The objective of supply chain management is to improve various activities and components to increase overall supply chain system benefits. In order to achieve the overall objectives, many contradictions may occur between the components and different levels of supply chain and the contradictions that these disorders over time, result in decreased strength and competitiveness of the supply chain. Such conflicts, like marketing costs (advertising, pricing and inventory can occur during the supply chain life cycle. A Game Theory approach with respect to property is the appropriate tool for collaboration in the supply chain. This tool is used for collaborative making in any kind of supply chain such as cooperative supply chain and non-cooperative supply chain. In the present study and assuming a lack of cooperation between different levels of a supply chain, a dynamic game with complete information has been generated. In addition identifying appropriate leaders of various levels of the supply chain is considered. Non-Cooperative dynamic game mode (Stackelberg Game, for each of the three levels of supply chain including retailers, suppliers and manufacturers are modeled. Depending on the bargaining power and its position in the market, any level of supply chain can make a leader of the following rule. In the present study, the equilibrium model to play Stackelberg game may be led by a leader or leading players and ultimately identifying and modeling the appropriate unlimited three level supply chain are determined.

A bargaining game analysis of international climate negotiations

Science.gov (United States)

Smead, Rory; Sandler, Ronald L.; Forber, Patrick; Basl, John

2014-06-01

Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to possible positive outcomes--that is, agreements with the requisite emissions reduction commitments. Other work on large-scale social dilemmas suggests that it should be possible to resolve the climate problem. It therefore seems that equilibrium selection may be a barrier to successful negotiations. Here we use an N-player bargaining game in an agent-based model with learning dynamics to examine the past failures of and future prospects for a robust international climate agreement. The model suggests reasons why the desirable solutions identified in previous game-theoretic models have not yet been accomplished in practice and what mechanisms might be used to achieve these solutions.

New Public Management, Public Service Bargains and the challenges of interdepartmental coordination: a comparative analysis of top civil servants in state administration

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hansen, Morten Balle; Steen, Trui; de Jong, Marsha

2013-01-01

In this article we are interested in how the coordinating role of top civil servants is related to the argument that country-level differences in the adoption of New Public Management significantly alter the Public Service Bargains of top civil servants and consequently their capacity to accompli...

Support for Farmers' Cooperatives : case study report structure and strategy of wine cooperatives: comparing Veneto, Italy, to Castilla-La Mancha, Spain

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Bijman, J.; Gijselinckx, C.; Poppe, K.J.

2012-01-01

The imbalances in bargaining power between the contracting parties in the food supply chain have drawn much attention, also from policy makers. The European Commission is committed to facilitate the restructuring of the sector by encouraging the creation of voluntary agricultural producer

A multi-stakeholder framework for urban runoff quality management: Application of social choice and bargaining techniques.

Science.gov (United States)

Ghodsi, Seyed Hamed; Kerachian, Reza; Zahmatkesh, Zahra

2016-04-15

In this paper, an integrated framework is proposed for urban runoff management. To control and improve runoff quality and quantity, Low Impact Development (LID) practices are utilized. In order to determine the LIDs' areas and locations, the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II), which considers three objective functions of minimizing runoff volume, runoff pollution and implementation cost of LIDs, is utilized. In this framework, the Storm Water Management Model (SWMM) is used for stream flow simulation. The non-dominated solutions provided by the NSGA-II are considered as management scenarios. To select the most preferred scenario, interactions among the main stakeholders in the study area with conflicting utilities are incorporated by utilizing bargaining models including a non-cooperative game, Nash model and social choice procedures of Borda count and approval voting. Moreover, a new social choice procedure, named pairwise voting method, is proposed and applied. Based on each conflict resolution approach, a scenario is identified as the ideal solution providing the LIDs' areas, locations and implementation cost. The proposed framework is applied for urban water quality and quantity management in the northern part of Tehran metropolitan city, Iran. Results show that the proposed pairwise voting method tends to select a scenario with a higher percentage of reduction in TSS (Total Suspended Solid) load and runoff volume, in comparison with the Borda count and approval voting methods. Besides, the Nash method presents a management scenario with the highest cost for LIDs' implementation and the maximum values for percentage of runoff volume reduction and TSS removal. The results also signify that selection of an appropriate management scenario by stakeholders in the study area depends on the available financial resources and the relative importance of runoff quality improvement in comparison with reducing the runoff volume. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier

Abordajes sobre la negociación colectiva durante la convertibilidad: Aportes para interrogar al presente Approaches concerning collective bargaining on convertibility: Contributions to ask at the present time

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Cecilia Anigstein

2011-12-01

Full Text Available En la actualidad, ¿se ha reestablecido la "pauta tradicional" de negociación colectiva luego de un paréntesis demarcado por el régimen de convertibilidad? ¿O mantiene vigencia la pauta de negociación instaurada con la flexibilización laboral?. Estos interrogantes reclaman una revisión de las argumentaciones que se articularon en torno a los cambios en los patrones de la negociación colectiva durante la década de los noventa y de sus premisas conceptuales. El propósito es construir un punto de partida conceptual que nos habilite un abordaje del presente, sino exento, al menos advertido de algunas perspectivas normativas.At present, the guideline was re-established the " traditional guideline " of collective bargaining after a parenthesis limited by the regime of convertibility? Or, does it follow in force the guideline of collective bargaining installed in the decade of the nineties?. These questions claim a review of the argumentations that were articulated concerning the changes in the bosses of the collective bargaining during the decade of the nineties and of his conceptual premises. The intention is to construct a point of conceptual item that a boarding of the present enables us, but exempt, at least warned of some normative perspectives.

Daddy Months

OpenAIRE

Volker Meier; Helmut Rainer

2014-01-01

We consider a bargaining model in which husband and wife decide on the allocation of time and disposable income. Since her bargaining power would go down otherwise more strongly, the wife agrees to having a child only if the husband also leaves the labor market for a while. The daddy months subsidy enables the couple to overcome a hold-up problem and thereby improves efficiency. However, the same ruling harms cooperative couples and may also reduce welfare in an endogenous taxation framework.

"He will ask why the child gets sick so often": the gendered dynamics of intra-household bargaining over healthcare for children with fever in the Volta Region of Ghana.

Science.gov (United States)

Tolhurst, Rachel; Amekudzi, Yaa Peprah; Nyonator, Frank K; Bertel Squire, S; Theobald, Sally

2008-03-01

This paper explores the gendered dynamics of intra-household bargaining around treatment seeking for children with fever revealed through two qualitative research studies in the Volta Region of Ghana, and discusses the influence of different gender and health discourses on the likely policy implications drawn from such findings. Methods used included focus group discussions, in-depth and critical incidence interviews, and Participatory Learning and Action methods. We found that treatment seeking behaviour for children was influenced by norms of decision-making power and 'ownership' of children, access to and control over resources to pay for treatment, norms of responsibility for payment, marital status, household living arrangements, and the quality of relationships between mothers, fathers and elders. However, the implications of these findings may be interpreted from different perspectives. Most studies that have considered gender in relation to malaria have done so within a narrow biomedical approach to health that focuses only on the outcomes of gender relations in terms of the (non-)utilisation of allopathic healthcare. However, we argue that a 'gender transformatory' approach, which aims to promote women's empowerment, needs to include but go beyond this model, to consider broader potential outcomes of intra-household bargaining for women's and men's interests, including their livelihoods and 'bargaining positions'.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Paper Tiger or Regional Powerhouse

Science.gov (United States)

2005-09-01

themselves in a better situation to bargain state- to-state, even if at a disadvantage in traditional power categories. The 2004 SCO heads of state...interest: he needs the West for Russia to succeed in a globalising [sic] world.136 Other analysts continue to maintain that the foreign policy of the

Bargaining, Sorting, and the Gender Wage Gap: Quantifying the Impact of Firms on the Relative Pay of Women

OpenAIRE

David Card; Ana Rute Cardoso; Patrick Kline

2015-01-01

There is growing evidence that firm-specific pay premiums are an important source of wage inequality. These premiums will contribute to the gender wage gap if women are less likely to work at high-paying firms or if women negotiate (or are offered) worse wage bargains with their employers than men. Using longitudinal data on the hourly wages of Portuguese workers matched with income statement information for firms, we show that the wages of both men and women contain firm-specific premiums th...

Pricing policies for a two-part exhaustible resource cartel: the case of OPEC (world oil project). Working paper

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hnyilicza, E.; Pindyck, R.S.

1976-04-01

This paper examines pricing policies for OPEC under the assumption that the cartel is composed of a block of spender countries with large cash needs and a block of saver countries with little immediate need for cash and a lower rate of discount. The decision problem for the two-part cartel is embodied in a game-theoretic framework and the optimal bargaining solution is computed using results from the theory of cooperative games developed by Nash. The set of feasible bargaining points--and the corresponding Nash solution--is computed under two assumptions on the behavior of output shares: that they are subject to choice and that they are fixed at historical values. The results suggest that for fixed output shares, there is little room for bargaining and the price path approximates the optimal monopoly price path. If the shares are subject to control, optimal paths depend significantly on the relative bargaining power of each block.

Social penalty promotes cooperation in a cooperative society.

Science.gov (United States)

Ito, Hiromu; Yoshimura, Jin

2015-08-04

Why cooperation is well developed in human society is an unsolved question in biological and human sciences. Vast studies in game theory have revealed that in non-cooperative games selfish behavior generally dominates over cooperation and cooperation can be evolved only under very limited conditions. These studies ask the origin of cooperation; whether cooperation can evolve in a group of selfish individuals. In this paper, instead of asking the origin of cooperation, we consider the enhancement of cooperation in a small already cooperative society. We ask whether cooperative behavior is further promoted in a small cooperative society in which social penalty is devised. We analyze hawk-dove game and prisoner's dilemma introducing social penalty. We then expand it for non-cooperative games in general. The results indicate that cooperation is universally favored if penalty is further imposed. We discuss the current result in terms of the moral, laws, rules and regulations in a society, e.g., criminology and traffic violation.

Teacher-Board Relations in Connecticut: A Summary of the Law Regarding Scope of Negotiations, Good Faith Bargaining, and Unfair Labor Practices. Preliminary Draft.

Science.gov (United States)

Zirkel, Perry A.

This document is a discussion draft intended to lead to the formulation of a set of guidelines by the state board of education concerning three areas of teacher negotiations: scope, good faith bargaining, and prohibited practices. It has been prepared in the form of an organized data base that focuses on summarizing the present state of the law…

The Impact of a Collegiate Course in Bargaining and Negotiation on Students' Perceptions of Their Own and Others' Attitudes and Behaviors: An Exploratory Study

Science.gov (United States)

Schafer, Stuart E.; Ammeter, Anthony P.; Hawley, Delvin D.; Garner, Bart L.

2011-01-01

This article presents a discussion of the importance of a course in bargaining and negotiation to university-level students in an accredited business school environment. In addition to discussing recommended content, pedagogy, and assessment methods, the results of a study that examines the impact of the course on students' perceptions of skills,…

A User Cooperation Stimulating Strategy Based on Cooperative Game Theory in Cooperative Relay Networks

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Ping Zhang

2009-01-01

Full Text Available This paper proposes a user cooperation stimulating strategy among rational users. The strategy is based on cooperative game theory and enacted in the context of cooperative relay networks. Using the pricing-based mechanism, the system is modeled initially with two nodes and a Base Station (BS. Within this framework, each node is treated as a rational decision maker. To this end, each node can decide whether to cooperate and how to cooperate. Cooperative game theory assists in providing an optimal system utility and provides fairness among users. Under different cooperative forwarding modes, certain questions are carefully investigated, including “what is each node's best reaction to maximize its utility?” and “what is the optimal reimbursement to encourage cooperation?” Simulation results show that the nodes benefit from the proposed cooperation stimulating strategy in terms of utility and thus justify the fairness between each user.

A User Cooperation Stimulating Strategy Based on Cooperative Game Theory in Cooperative Relay Networks

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Jiang Fan

2009-01-01

Full Text Available This paper proposes a user cooperation stimulating strategy among rational users. The strategy is based on cooperative game theory and enacted in the context of cooperative relay networks. Using the pricing-based mechanism, the system is modeled initially with two nodes and a Base Station (BS. Within this framework, each node is treated as a rational decision maker. To this end, each node can decide whether to cooperate and how to cooperate. Cooperative game theory assists in providing an optimal system utility and provides fairness among users. Under different cooperative forwarding modes, certain questions are carefully investigated, including "what is each node's best reaction to maximize its utility?" and "what is the optimal reimbursement to encourage cooperation?" Simulation results show that the nodes benefit from the proposed cooperation stimulating strategy in terms of utility and thus justify the fairness between each user.

Amblyopia

Science.gov (United States)

... the amblyopic eye. On the other hand, the child may be more cooperative or more open to bargaining if patching is performed during certain, favorite activities (such as watching a preferred television program or video). Some eye doctors believe that ...

Interethnic Interaction, Strategic Bargaining Power, and the Dynamics of Cultural Norms : A Field Study in an Amazonian Population.

Science.gov (United States)

Bunce, John Andrew; McElreath, Richard

2017-12-01

Ethnic groups are universal and unique to human societies. Such groups sometimes have norms of behavior that are adaptively linked to their social and ecological circumstances, and ethnic boundaries may function to protect that variation from erosion by interethnic interaction. However, such interaction is often frequent and voluntary, suggesting that individuals may be able to strategically reduce its costs, allowing adaptive cultural variation to persist in spite of interaction with out-groups with different norms. We examine five mechanisms influencing the dynamics of ethnically distinct cultural norms, each focused on strategic individual-level choices in interethnic interaction: bargaining, interaction-frequency-biased norm adoption, assortment on norms, success-biased interethnic social learning, and childhood socialization. We use Bayesian item response models to analyze patterns of norm variation and interethnic interaction in an ethnically structured Amazonian population. We show that, among indigenous Matsigenka, interethnic education with colonial Mestizos is more strongly associated with Mestizo-typical norms than even extensive interethnic experience in commerce and wage labor is. Using ethnographic observations, we show that all five of the proposed mechanisms of norm adoption may contribute to this effect. However, of these mechanisms, we argue that changes in relative bargaining power are particularly important for ethnic minorities wishing to preserve distinctive norms while engaging in interethnic interaction in domains such as education. If this mechanism proves applicable in a range of other ethnographic contexts, it would constitute one cogent explanation for when and why ethnically structured cultural variation can either persist or erode given frequent, and often mutually beneficial, interethnic interaction.

To cooperate or not to cooperate

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Wessels, Josepha Ivanka

To Cooperate or not to Cooperate...? discusses results of a research project to study the rehabilitation of 1500-year old water tunnels, so called "qanats", in Syria. Communities all over the world are using traditional technologies to extract drinkingwater, irrigate their lands and feed...... their livestock. But these often sustainable and ancient ways to make use of groundwater are in rapid decline worldwide. A research project started in 1999 to study the rehabilitation of 1500-year old water tunnels called "qanats"in Syria. To Cooperate or not to Cooperate...? discusses results and outcomes...

75 FR 10319 - Cooper Tools-Sumter, Cooper Tools Divisions, a Subsidiary of Cooper Industries, Inc., Including...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-03-05

... DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Employment and Training Administration [TA-W-71,602] Cooper Tools--Sumter, Cooper Tools Divisions, a Subsidiary of Cooper Industries, Inc., Including On-Site Leased Workers From... January 26, 2010, applicable to workers of Cooper Tools--Sumter, Cooper Tools Division, a subsidiary of...

Non-unions force wage cut-backs in pipeline industry

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bain, D

1984-03-01

Faced with another year of high unemployment and shrinking markets, Western Canada's unionized pipeline construction trades have taken a step toward stabilizing the industry. The unions have struck a bargain to combat an increasing number of non-union open shops. Management and labor cooperated to insure that the unions regain their share of the pipeline construction market. The pipeline construction boom has ended, with an overcapacity, a downturn in sales, and few major projects on the drawing boards. The bargains included wage reductions of 30%, daily living allowance reductions of nearly 50%, the elimination of double time, and the use of composite crews.

Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangements

Science.gov (United States)

1992-01-01

Sponsors in the Private Nonfarm Sector in the United States, 1978-79," Volume IV, Description and Analysis of Plans and Plan Sponsors, NTIS # PB81-180366...Labor finds to be collectively bargained plans, and those organized by rural electrical cooperatives and rural telephone cooperatives. Thus, except for...their existence and generally higher cost than uninsured plans no doubt contributed to the development of other types of multiple employer

Vertical Integration or Disintegration? A Bargaining Model of the Maquiladora's Case

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Ikuho Kochi

2012-01-01

Full Text Available In this paper we present an analytical framework to study the demands of foreign and domestic factors of production of the maquiladora industry. We derive the net profitability of demanding high in72 9 Vol. 21 ¿ número 41 ¿ 2012 stead of low quality inputs. We argue that differences in the quality of inputs between foreign and domestic factors can explain the low vertical integration of the maquiladora with the Mexican industry. We show that if the difference in quality and its positive effect in marginal production compensates the difference in prices, then the maquiladora can be induced to integrate vertically with foreign suppliers of inputs, even if the unitary cost to demand foreign inputs is strictly higher than that of domestic inputs. We also show that a depreciation of the Mexican exchange rate does not necessarily increase the maquiladora's demand of Mexican inputs. This explains recent empirical evidence showing this phenomenon. Conversely, a depreciation of the exchange rate might increase the maquiladora's demand of imported inputs if foreign and domestic factors are complementary. The above holds even if the domestic supplier participates in a bargaining game offering an efficient contract.

Using game theory for perceptual tuned rate control algorithm in video coding

Science.gov (United States)

Luo, Jiancong; Ahmad, Ishfaq

2005-03-01

This paper proposes a game theoretical rate control technique for video compression. Using a cooperative gaming approach, which has been utilized in several branches of natural and social sciences because of its enormous potential for solving constrained optimization problems, we propose a dual-level scheme to optimize the perceptual quality while guaranteeing "fairness" in bit allocation among macroblocks. At the frame level, the algorithm allocates target bits to frames based on their coding complexity. At the macroblock level, the algorithm distributes bits to macroblocks by defining a bargaining game. Macroblocks play cooperatively to compete for shares of resources (bits) to optimize their quantization scales while considering the Human Visual System"s perceptual property. Since the whole frame is an entity perceived by viewers, macroblocks compete cooperatively under a global objective of achieving the best quality with the given bit constraint. The major advantage of the proposed approach is that the cooperative game leads to an optimal and fair bit allocation strategy based on the Nash Bargaining Solution. Another advantage is that it allows multi-objective optimization with multiple decision makers (macroblocks). The simulation results testify the algorithm"s ability to achieve accurate bit rate with good perceptual quality, and to maintain a stable buffer level.

Assessing the Impact of Wage Bargaining and Worker Preferences on the Gender Pay Gap in Ireland Using the National Employment Survey 2003

OpenAIRE

McGuinness, Seamus; Kelly, Elish; O'Connell, Philip J.; Callan, Tim

2009-01-01

This paper assesses the magnitude and nature of the gender pay gap in Ireland using the National Employment Survey 2003, an employeremployee matched dataset. The results suggest that while a wage bargaining system centred around social partnership was of benefit to females irrespective of their employment status, the minimum wage mechanism appears to improve the relative position of part-time females only. Trade union membership was associated with a widening gender pay gap in the full-time l...

A qualitative study of participants' views on re-consent in a longitudinal biobank.

Science.gov (United States)

Dixon-Woods, Mary; Kocman, David; Brewster, Liz; Willars, Janet; Laurie, Graeme; Tarrant, Carolyn

2017-03-23

Biomedical research increasingly relies on long-term studies involving use and re-use of biological samples and data stored in large repositories or "biobanks" over lengthy periods, often raising questions about whether and when a re-consenting process should be activated. We sought to investigate the views on re-consent of participants in a longitudinal biobank. We conducted a qualitative study involving interviews with 24 people who were participating in a longitudinal biobank. Their views were elicited using a semi-structured interview schedule and scenarios based on a hypothetical biobank. Data analysis was based on the constant comparative method. What participants identified as requiring new consent was not a straightforward matter predictable by algorithms about the scope of the consent, but instead was contingent. They assessed whether proposed new research implied a fundamental alteration in the underlying character of the biobank and whether specific projects were within the scope of the original consent. What mattered most to them was that the cooperative bargain into which they had entered was maintained in good faith. They saw re-consent as one important safeguard in this bargain. In determining what required re-consent, they deployed two logics. First, they used a logic of boundaries, where they sought to detect any possible rupture with their existing framework of cooperation. Second, they used a logic of risk, where they assessed proposed research for any potential threats for them personally or the research endeavour. When they judged that a need for re-consent had been activated, participants saw the process as way of re-actualising and renewing the cooperative bargain. Participants' perceptions of research as a process of mutual co-operation between volunteer and researcher were fundamental to their views on consent. Consenting arrangements for biobanks should respect the cooperative values that are important to participants, recognise the two

International cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

In this chapter international cooperation of the Division for Radiation Safety, NPP Decommissioning and Radwaste Management of the VUJE, a. s. is presented. Very important is cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This cooperation has various forms - national and regional projects of technical cooperation, coordinated research activities, participation of our experts in preparation of the IAEA documentation etc.

Mind the First Step: The Intrapersonal Effects of Affect on the Decision to Initiate Negotiations under Bargaining Power Asymmetry

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ilias Kapoutsis

2017-08-01

Full Text Available We undertook two vignette studies to examine the role of affect (trait and state and bargaining power on initiating negotiations, an often overlooked stage of the negotiation process. Using a job negotiation opportunity, we examine three distinct phases of the initiation process—engaging a counterpart, making a request, and optimizing a request. Study 1 examines the effects of two affect dispositions (happiness and sadness, under power asymmetry (low vs. high bargaining power, on the three initiation behaviors. We found that power is pivotal to the decision to engage, request, and optimize. Also, sadness reduces the likelihood of initiation when power is high but is immaterial when power is low. In contrast, individuals who tend to be happy can reverse the adverse effect of powerlessness on requesting, but not on engaging and optimizing. However, happiness does not carry over a positive effect on negotiation initiation, over and above that of power. Study 2 investigated the role of trait affect when individuals are in power asymmetry and when they are induced with sadness or happiness. We found that those with a happy disposition initiate more (engage, request, and optimize when power is high and experience incidental sadness. Overall, these findings qualify previous research on negotiation initiation and highlight the importance of trait affect and its interaction with state affect as additional driving forces and of power as a boundary condition.“for the error occurs at the beginning, and the beginning as the proverb says is half of the whole, so that even a small mistake at the beginning stands in the same ratio to mistakes at the other stages.”(trans.Aristotle, 1944, 1303b

Non-cooperative game theory in biology and cooperative reasoning in humans.

Science.gov (United States)

Kabalak, Alihan; Smirnova, Elena; Jost, Jürgen

2015-06-01

The readiness for spontaneous cooperation together with the assumptions that others share this cooperativity has been identified as a fundamental feature that distinguishes humans from other animals, including the great apes. At the same time, cooperativity presents an evolutionary puzzle because non-cooperators do better in a group of cooperators. We develop here an analysis of the process leading to cooperation in terms of rationality concepts, game theory and epistemic logic. We are, however, not attempting to reconstruct the actual evolutionary process. We rather want to provide the logical structure underlying cooperation in order to understand why cooperation is possible and what kind of reasoning and beliefs would lead to cooperative decision-making. Game theory depends on an underlying common belief in non-cooperative rationality of the players, and cooperativity similarly can utilize a common belief in cooperative rationality as its basis. We suggest a weaker concept of rational decision-making in games that encompasses both types of decision-making. We build this up in stages, starting from simple optimization, then using anticipation of the reaction of others, to finally arrive at reflexive and cooperative reasoning. While each stage is more difficult than the preceding, importantly, we also identify a reduction of complexity achieved by the consistent application of higher stage reasoning.

Designing for cooperation - cooperating in design

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kyng, Morten

1991-01-01

This article will discuss how to design computer applications that enhance the quality of work and products, and will relate the discussion to current themes in the field of Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW). Cooperation is a key element of computer use and work practice, yet here...... a specific "CSCW approach is not taken." Instead the focus is cooperation as an important aspect of work that should be integrated into most computer support efforts in order to develop successful computer support, however, other aspects such as power, conflict and control must also be considered....

System dynamics applied to closed loop supply chains of desktops and laptops in Brazil: A perspective for social inclusion of waste pickers.

Science.gov (United States)

Ghisolfi, Verônica; Diniz Chaves, Gisele de Lorena; Ribeiro Siman, Renato; Xavier, Lúcia Helena

2017-02-01

The structure of reverse logistics for waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is essential to minimize the impacts of their improper disposal. In this context, the Brazilian Solid Waste Policy (BSWP) was a regulatory milestone in Brazil, submitting WEEE to the mandatory implementation of reverse logistics systems, involving the integration of waste pickers on the shared responsibility for the life cycle of products. This article aims to measure the impact of such legal incentives and the bargaining power obtained by the volume of collected waste on the effective formalization of waste pickers. The proposed model evaluates the sustainability of supply chains in terms of the use of raw materials due to disposal fees, collection, recycling and return of some materials from desktops and laptops using system dynamics methodology. The results show that even in the absence of bargaining power, the formalization of waste pickers occurs due to legal incentives. It is important to ensure the waste pickers cooperatives access to a minimum amount, which requires a level of protection against unfair competition with companies. Regarding the optimal level of environmental policies, even though the formalization time is long, it is still not enough to guarantee the formalization of waste picker cooperatives, which is dependent on their bargaining power. Steel is the material with the largest decrease in acquisition rate of raw material. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Mesoscopic effects in an agent-based bargaining model in regular lattices.

Science.gov (United States)

Poza, David J; Santos, José I; Galán, José M; López-Paredes, Adolfo

2011-03-09

The effect of spatial structure has been proved very relevant in repeated games. In this work we propose an agent based model where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. The model extends the multiagent bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young modifying the assumption of global interaction. Each agent is endowed with a memory and plays the best reply against the opponent's most frequent demand. We focus our analysis on the transient dynamics of the system, studying by computer simulation the set of states in which the system spends a considerable fraction of the time. The results show that all the possible persistent regimes in the global interaction model can also be observed in this spatial version. We also find that the mesoscopic properties of the interaction networks that the spatial distribution induces in the model have a significant impact on the diffusion of strategies, and can lead to new persistent regimes different from those found in previous research. In particular, community structure in the intratype interaction networks may cause that communities reach different persistent regimes as a consequence of the hindering diffusion effect of fluctuating agents at their borders.

Mesoscopic effects in an agent-based bargaining model in regular lattices.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

David J Poza

Full Text Available The effect of spatial structure has been proved very relevant in repeated games. In this work we propose an agent based model where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. The model extends the multiagent bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young modifying the assumption of global interaction. Each agent is endowed with a memory and plays the best reply against the opponent's most frequent demand. We focus our analysis on the transient dynamics of the system, studying by computer simulation the set of states in which the system spends a considerable fraction of the time. The results show that all the possible persistent regimes in the global interaction model can also be observed in this spatial version. We also find that the mesoscopic properties of the interaction networks that the spatial distribution induces in the model have a significant impact on the diffusion of strategies, and can lead to new persistent regimes different from those found in previous research. In particular, community structure in the intratype interaction networks may cause that communities reach different persistent regimes as a consequence of the hindering diffusion effect of fluctuating agents at their borders.

Governance Mechanism for Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Wei Yu

2013-01-01

Full Text Available Today developed and developing countries have to admit the fact that global warming is affecting the earth, but the fundamental problem of how to divide up necessary greenhouse gas reductions between developed and developing countries remains. In this paper, we propose cooperative and noncooperative stochastic differential game models to describe greenhouse gas emissions decision makings of developed and developing countries, calculate their feedback Nash equilibrium and the Pareto optimal solution, characterize parameter spaces that developed and developing countries can cooperate, design cooperative conditions under which participants buy the cooperative payoff, and distribute the cooperative payoff with Nash bargaining solution. Lastly, numerical simulations are employed to illustrate the above results.

A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Driessen, Theo; Hou, D.

For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within the core are

Pricing of Vehicle-to-Grid Services in a Microgrid by Nash Bargaining Theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mohammad Hossein Sarparandeh

2017-01-01

Full Text Available Owners of electric vehicles (EVs can offer the storage capacity of their batteries to the operator of a microgrid as a service called vehicle-to-grid (V2G to hold the balance between supply and demand of electricity, particularly when the microgrid has intermittent renewable energy sources. Literature review implies that V2G has economic benefits for both microgrid operator and EV owners, but it is unclear how these benefits are divided between them. The challenge grows when the policy makers rely on the V2G revenue as an incentive for expanding the penetration of EVs in the automotive market. This paper models the interaction between microgrid operator and EV owners as a bargaining game to determine how the benefits of V2G should be divided. The method has been implemented on a hybrid power system with high wind penetration in addition to diesel generators in Manjil, Iran. The results indicate that, in addition to V2G benefits, government subsidies are necessary to promote the use of EVs.

Policy guidelines for collective bargaining and family planning.

Science.gov (United States)

Finnigan, O D; Parulan, D

1973-01-01

The benfits of establishing family planning through collective bargaining to both labor and management are discussed. Until workers can be convinced that their children will receive health care, education and employment, and that they will be economically secure in old age, it is difficult to convince them of the many benefits of child spacing and small family size. In 1953, it was calculated by management in a Japanese steel factory that about 70% of all acidents could be attributable to difficulties in the private lives of employees. In order to ease problems in the home, collective agreements were initiated by management in the Nippon Express Company to provide family planning services. Labor agreed as long as the workers were to share in the economic awards which came from participation. Costs of implementing the family planning programs were fully offset by the decrease in expenditure on family allowances, confinement, nursing, and so on. In India some ten estates began a program in which a certain amount of money is paid into an account for every month that a woman does not become pregnant. If the woman becomes pregnant, she forfeits a substantial amount of the fund. This money comes directly from the funds which would normally have to be set aside to provide for maternity and child support programs. Certain guidelines are presented in the paper to outline the areas of responsibility of labor and management in the provision of family planning services. Among the many possibilities mentioned is the idea that both labor and management could look into the conceivability of plowing back a portion of whatever savings are accrued by management into a pension scheme to compensate workers for the loss of labor caused by having fewer children than were previously anticipated.

Decision support models for solid waste management: Review and game-theoretic approaches

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Karmperis, Athanasios C.; Aravossis, Konstantinos; Tatsiopoulos, Ilias P.; Sotirchos, Anastasios

2013-01-01

Highlights: ► The mainly used decision support frameworks for solid waste management are reviewed. ► The LCA, CBA and MCDM models are presented and their strengths, weaknesses, similarities and possible combinations are analyzed. ► The game-theoretic approach in a solid waste management context is presented. ► The waste management bargaining game is introduced as a specific decision support framework. ► Cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic approaches to decision support for solid waste management are discussed. - Abstract: This paper surveys decision support models that are commonly used in the solid waste management area. Most models are mainly developed within three decision support frameworks, which are the life-cycle assessment, the cost–benefit analysis and the multi-criteria decision-making. These frameworks are reviewed and their strengths and weaknesses as well as their critical issues are analyzed, while their possible combinations and extensions are also discussed. Furthermore, the paper presents how cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic approaches can be used for the purpose of modeling and analyzing decision-making in situations with multiple stakeholders. Specifically, since a waste management model is sustainable when considering not only environmental and economic but also social aspects, the waste management bargaining game is introduced as a specific decision support framework in which future models can be developed

Decision support models for solid waste management: Review and game-theoretic approaches

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Karmperis, Athanasios C., E-mail: athkarmp@mail.ntua.gr [Sector of Industrial Management and Operational Research, School of Mechanical Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, Iroon Polytechniou 9, 15780 Athens (Greece); Army Corps of Engineers, Hellenic Army General Staff, Ministry of Defence (Greece); Aravossis, Konstantinos; Tatsiopoulos, Ilias P.; Sotirchos, Anastasios [Sector of Industrial Management and Operational Research, School of Mechanical Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, Iroon Polytechniou 9, 15780 Athens (Greece)

2013-05-15

Highlights: ► The mainly used decision support frameworks for solid waste management are reviewed. ► The LCA, CBA and MCDM models are presented and their strengths, weaknesses, similarities and possible combinations are analyzed. ► The game-theoretic approach in a solid waste management context is presented. ► The waste management bargaining game is introduced as a specific decision support framework. ► Cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic approaches to decision support for solid waste management are discussed. - Abstract: This paper surveys decision support models that are commonly used in the solid waste management area. Most models are mainly developed within three decision support frameworks, which are the life-cycle assessment, the cost–benefit analysis and the multi-criteria decision-making. These frameworks are reviewed and their strengths and weaknesses as well as their critical issues are analyzed, while their possible combinations and extensions are also discussed. Furthermore, the paper presents how cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic approaches can be used for the purpose of modeling and analyzing decision-making in situations with multiple stakeholders. Specifically, since a waste management model is sustainable when considering not only environmental and economic but also social aspects, the waste management bargaining game is introduced as a specific decision support framework in which future models can be developed.

International cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

In 1995, Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (NRA SR) ensured foreign cooperation particularly in the frame of the Slovak Republic is membership in the IAEA, as well as cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD NEA), cooperation with European Union in the frame of PHARE programmes, and intergovernmental cooperation and cooperation among nuclear regulatory authorities. With respect to an international importance, prestige and a wide-scope possibilities of a technical assistance , either a direct one (expert assessments, technology supplies, work placement, scientific trips, training courses) or indirect one (participation at various conferences, seminars, technical committees, etc), the most important cooperation with the IAEA in Vienna. In 1994, the Slovak Republic, was elected to the Board Governors, the represent the group of Eastern European countries. The Slovak Government entrusted the NRA SR's Chairman with representing the Slovak Republic in the Board of Governors. Owing to a good name of Slovakia was elected to the one of two Vice-Chairmen of the Board of Governors at the 882-nd session on the Board. IAEA approved and developed 8 national projects for Slovakia in 1995. Generally, IAEA is contracting scientific contracts with research institutes, nuclear power plants and other organizations. Slovak organizations used these contracts as complementary funding of their tasks. In 1995, there were 12 scientific contracts in progress, or approved respectively. Other international activities of the NRA SR, international co-operations as well as foreign affairs are reported

International cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prieto, F.E.

1984-01-01

It looks doubtless that the need for an international cooperation to solve the worldwide energy problems is already a concern of individuals, institutions, and governments. This is an improvement. But there is something lacking. The author refers to the Atoms for Peace speech, the origin of the IAEA and of the subsequent spreading of the nuclear option. He also refers back to the call made by the Mexican government for a worldwide energy cooperation. He stresses the need for governments to cooperate, so that this international cooperation on energy can be put into operation for the benefit of mankind

Cooperation for a competitive position: The impact of hospital cooperation behavior on organizational performance.

Science.gov (United States)

Büchner, Vera Antonia; Hinz, Vera; Schreyögg, Jonas

2015-01-01

Several public policy initiatives, particularly those involving managed care, aim to enhance cooperation between partners in the health care sector because it is expected that such cooperation will reduce costs and generate additional revenue. However, empirical evidence regarding the effects of cooperation on hospital performance is scarce, particularly with respect to creating a comprehensive measure of cooperation behavior. The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of hospital cooperation behavior on organizational performance. We differentiate between horizontal and vertical cooperation using two alternative measures-cooperation depth and cooperation breadth-and include the interaction effects between both cooperation directions. Data are derived from a survey of German hospitals and combined with objective performance information from annual financial statements. Generalized linear regression models are used. The study findings provide insight into the nature of hospitals' cooperation behavior. In particular, we show that there are negative synergies between horizontal administrative cooperation behavior and vertical cooperation behavior. Whereas the depth and breadth of horizontal administrative cooperation positively affect financial performance (when there is no vertical cooperation), vertical cooperation positively affects financial performance (when there is no horizontal administrative cooperation) only when cooperation is broad (rather than deep). Horizontal cooperation is generally more effective than vertical cooperation at improving financial performance. Hospital managers should consider the negative interaction effect when making decisions about whether to recommend a cooperative relationship in a horizontal or vertical direction. In addition, managers should be aware of the limited financial benefit of cooperation behavior.

Choosing the cooperative option

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

English, G. (National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (United States))

1999-06-01

Cooperatives do not ask to be exempted from the law. They do ask that laws and regulations be designed to allow them to meet the needs of their consumer-owners in accordance with cooperative principles, at a time that the marginal consumers being abandoned by for-profit utilities may be ready to gravitate toward cooperatives. The cooperative principles are worth reviewing because they explain the focus on the consumer and the cooperative concept of service: cooperatives are voluntary organizations, open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership; cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting policies and making decisions, the elected representatives are accountable to the membership; members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their cooperative; cooperatives are autonomous, self-help organizations controlled by their members, if they enter into agreements with other organizations, including governments, they do so on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their cooperative autonomy; cooperatives provide education and training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the development of their cooperatives, they inform the general public, particularly young people and opinion leaders, about the nature and benefits of cooperation; cooperatives serve their members most effectively and strength the cooperative movement by working together through local, national, regional, and international structures; and while focusing on member needs, cooperatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through policies accepted by their members.

International co-operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

In this part the are reviewed: Co-operation with IAEA; Participation of the Slovakia on the 41 st session of the General Conference; The comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; Co-operation with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; co-operation with the European Commission; Fulfillment of obligations resulting from the international contracting documents

Third-party punishment increases cooperation in children through (misaligned) expectations and conditional cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Lergetporer, Philipp; Angerer, Silvia; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Sutter, Matthias

2014-05-13

The human ability to establish cooperation, even in large groups of genetically unrelated strangers, depends upon the enforcement of cooperation norms. Third-party punishment is one important factor to explain high levels of cooperation among humans, although it is still somewhat disputed whether other animal species also use this mechanism for promoting cooperation. We study the effectiveness of third-party punishment to increase children's cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game. Based on an experiment with 1,120 children, aged 7 to 11 y, we find that the threat of third-party punishment more than doubles cooperation rates, despite the fact that children are rarely willing to execute costly punishment. We can show that the higher cooperation levels with third-party punishment are driven by two components. First, cooperation is a rational (expected payoff-maximizing) response to incorrect beliefs about the punishment behavior of third parties. Second, cooperation is a conditionally cooperative reaction to correct beliefs that third party punishment will increase a partner's level of cooperation.

Author: L Hawthorne

African Journals Online (AJOL)

10332324

cooperation with" / "plus". It is submitted that according to Brand J inequality of bargaining power is not sufficient on its own to sustain a finding that a particular term of a contract is contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable. Consequently, to define "public policy" another element is required to supplement the inequality ...

77 FR 4366 - North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Notice of Determination Regarding Review of...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-01-27

... GOM's subsequent actions or lack thereof denied these workers their rights under Mexican law related to freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the... de Electricistas (SME), a Mexican union, filed the submission with OTLA on November 14, 2011. The SME...

77 FR 40911 - Solicitation for a Cooperative Agreement-Technical Assistance Site Management in NIC's Evidence...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-07-11

... bail and pretrial release conditions, pretrial diversion, charging and plea bargaining, sentencing of... Opportunity Number'' and Title in this announcement. The package must include: A cover letter that identifies... letter, where indicated on Standard Form 424, and outside of the envelope in which the application is...

The impact of bank's franchise on loan price: With an estimation about bargaining power of China's commercial bank%银行特许权对贷款价格的影响研究:兼论我国商业银行的议价能力

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

魏琪; 曾胜

2017-01-01

With the deepening of the banking liberalization and market-oriented reform of interest rate controls,it would be an inevitable trend for banks and enterprises to determine the loan price by negotiation,so the role of the bargaining power in the loan pricing process will become more prominent.However,the existing literature mostly discussed the issue of loan pricing by focus on the product attribute of loan and the financial intermediary attribute of banks which ignored the properties of general merchandise of loans,so we barely knew the loan pricing mechanism form the perspective of market player's bargaining power,especially the bargaining power which came from bank's franchise and its impacts on loan price.This is neither conducive for us to understand the process of capital pricing correctly,nor comprehensive understanding the role of bank's franchise in loan pricing.This paper established a bargaining game model to analyze the formation mechanism of loan pricing with the market trend,and influences of bank's franchise on the loan prices negotiation.Based on this,this paper did an empirical study on the determinants of loan pricing by using two-tier stochastic frontier model and the data of 104 China's commercial bank from 2005 to 2013,measured commercial bank's bargaining power and its impact degree on loan prices.The study found:Firstly,franchise brought banks monopoly and operational superiority,which made banks have lower negotiation cost and stronger bargaining power,so as to get a strong position in the loan price negotiation to make the negotiation reach a higher transaction price;Secondly,beside the benchmark interest rate,loan cost,credit risk,the market structure of banking and the level of inflation were the major factors to determine the price of the loan.And the barging between the lender and borrower could lead to loan price fluctuation.Thirdly,although interest rate control limited the bargaining space of loan price,with monopoly power and

Sorting and sustaining cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Vikander, Nick

2013-01-01

This paper looks at cooperation in teams where some people are selfish and others are conditional cooperators, and where lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date. I show that the best way to sustain cooperation prior to the lay-offs is often in a sorting equilibrium, where conditional cooperators...... can identify and then work with one another. Changes to parameters that would seem to make cooperation more attractive, such as an increase in the discount factor or the fraction of conditional cooperators, can reduce equilibrium cooperation if they decrease a selfish player's incentive to sort....

Cooperatives as Entrants

OpenAIRE

Richard J. Sexton; Terri A. Sexton

1987-01-01

A potential shortcoming of game-theoretic models in industrial organization is their failure to consider consumers as players. We introduce a customer coalition --- a cooperative -- as a potential entrant and compare the cooperative entry threat with that posed by the usual for-profit entrant. We identify four fundamental distinctions between cooperative and for-profit entrants and demonstrate that the strategic interplay between a cooperative and an incumbent firm may differ markedly from th...

Alternative vision or utopian fantasy? Cooperation, empowerment and women's cooperative development in India.

Science.gov (United States)

Mayoux, L

1995-01-01

The discussion addresses the costs and benefits of working in cooperatives in India, imposed participation, methods for increasing incomes, preconceived models, the importance of meeting the actual needs of women, and participatory options. This author evaluated 10 producer cooperatives in West Bengal, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu during 1984-92. It is argued that more discussion is needed on how ideals of cooperation and empowerment of women can occur simultaneous with the context in which cooperatives must operate. The ten study cooperatives were all officially registered cooperatives. Cooperatives varied in size, organizational structure, and forms of support. Four were determined to be successful in economic and participatory terms. Three were successful because of the efforts of the women themselves. All three cases were based on earning goals that were higher than the women could have achieved on their own. Six failed in terms of participatory decision making and cooperative operations. Lack of sufficient support and/or excessive bureaucratic red tape were involved in the six failures, but to varying degrees. Type of support and means of implementation were important in the six failures. All women used cooperatives as a means of increasing income. Participation rules were imposed by outside agencies. Women were given "cooperative" training. Disputes occurred because women selected to power positions were powerful leaders outside the cooperative. Consensus was difficult to reach. There were conflicts of interest between different departments. Quality control was made difficult by women's inability to provide discipline. Personal conflicts from outside were carried on within the cooperative. Incomes could be improved by training women in local marketing and networking, insuring adequate resources and capital, and providing savings schemes. Gender inequalities were a key factor limiting income for women, but cooperatives did not address this issue. Gains for women

MODAL SOSIAL DAN PRAKTIK GOTONG ROYONG PARA PENGRAJIN GULA KELAPA DI DESA KETANDA KABUPATEN BANYUMAS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Dodi Faedlulloh

2017-10-01

Full Text Available Palm sugar is an important commodity for Indonesia. In Banyumas regency, it plays an essential role too. Unfortunately, the palm sugar makers remain far from prosperity. There is an imbalanced social relation, the palms sugar makers are always in subordinate position towards middleman and big corporations above them. Given this condition, some palm sugar maker decided to organize themselves to have some cooperations in improving their quality of economc life. It also helps them to strengthen their bargaining position by establishing an organization called Argo MulyoJati. With its available social capital, certain value is being institutionalized in Katanda village, called GotongRoyong (mutual cooperation. Actually, It has existed inherently in the lifes of Indonesian people. Despite being a newly-born organization Argo MulyoJati is able to prove that collective work could enhance their bargaining position among the stakeholders in Katanda village. It is achieved with high level of social trust that has been growing as their social capital. This study explains how the role of social capital and the practice of mutual cooperation are conducted by members of Argo Mulyo Jati. The discussion is limited on the reformation of social capital as a power owned by palm maker, their aspect of trust as a part of social capital which supports the development of Argo MulyoJati Co-operative, and how is the institutionalization process of GotongRoyong value in the organization activities.

Negotiation and Optimality in an Economic Model of Global Climate Change

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gottinger, H.

2000-03-01

The paper addresses the problem of governmental intervention in a multi-country regime of controlling global climate change. Using a simplified case of a two-country, two-sector general equilibrium model the paper shows that the global optimal time path of economic outputs and temperature will converge to a unique steady state provided that consumers care enough about the future. To answer a set of questions relating to 'what will happen if governments decide to correct the problem of global warming?' we study the equilibrium outcome in a bargaining game where two countries negotiate an agreement on future consumption and production plans for the purpose of correcting the problem of climate change. It is shown that the agreement arising from such a negotiation process achieves the best outcome and that it can be implemented in decentralised economies by a system of taxes, subsidies and transfers. By employing the recent advances in non-cooperative bargaining theory, the agreement between two countries is derived endogenously through a well-specified bargaining procedure

Negotiation and Optimality in an Economic Model of Global Climate Change

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gottinger, H. [International Institute for Environmental Economics and Management IIEEM, University of Maastricht, Maastricht (Netherlands)

2000-03-01

The paper addresses the problem of governmental intervention in a multi-country regime of controlling global climate change. Using a simplified case of a two-country, two-sector general equilibrium model the paper shows that the global optimal time path of economic outputs and temperature will converge to a unique steady state provided that consumers care enough about the future. To answer a set of questions relating to 'what will happen if governments decide to correct the problem of global warming?' we study the equilibrium outcome in a bargaining game where two countries negotiate an agreement on future consumption and production plans for the purpose of correcting the problem of climate change. It is shown that the agreement arising from such a negotiation process achieves the best outcome and that it can be implemented in decentralised economies by a system of taxes, subsidies and transfers. By employing the recent advances in non-cooperative bargaining theory, the agreement between two countries is derived endogenously through a well-specified bargaining procedure.

Effect of initial fraction of cooperators on cooperative behavior in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Keizo Shigaki

Full Text Available We investigate the influence of initial fraction of cooperators on the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games. Compared with the results of heterogeneous networks, we find that there is a relatively low initial fraction of cooperators to guarantee higher equilibrium cooperative level. While this interesting phenomenon is contrary to the commonly shared knowledge that higher initial fraction of cooperators can provide better environment for the evolution of cooperation. To support our outcome, we explore the time courses of cooperation and find that the whole course can be divided into two sequent stages: enduring (END and expanding (EXP periods. At the end of END period, thought there is a limited number of cooperator clusters left for the case of low initial setup, these clusters can smoothly expand to hold the whole system in the EXP period. However, for high initial fraction of cooperators, superfluous cooperator clusters hinder their effective expansion, which induces many remaining defectors surrounding the cooperator clusters. Moreover, through intensive analysis, we also demonstrate that when the tendency of three cooperation cluster characteristics (cluster size, cluster number and cluster shape are consistent within END and EXP periods, the state that maximizes cooperation can be favored.

International co-operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Klinda, J.; Lieskovska, Z.

1998-01-01

Within the Union Nations (UN) framework, the Slovak Republic participated in following activities on environment protection co-operation: UN European Economic Commission, UN Industrial Development Organization, UN Development Programme, UN Human Habitat Organization, UN Environment Programme, and UN Commission on Sustainable Development. Relevant activities of the Slovak Republic in these co-operations as well as in European Union and OECD activities are reviewed. International conventions and other forms of multilateral co-operation, bilateral co-operation, and international programmes and projects in which the Slovak Republic took participate are presented

Cooperatives between truth and validity

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Guilherme Krueger

2014-12-01

Full Text Available The current declaration of the International Cooperative Alliance on cooperative identity since its 1995 Centennial Conference (which was held in Manchester makes no distinction between cooperation and cooperative. The lack of distinction between cooperation and cooperative has caused the Decennial Cooperative Action Plan to define cooperatives as a form, while their materiality is regarded as managerial: a business (activity under a cooperative form. An identity that is close to us cannot be reduced to form, without this being a problem. Therefore, the value underlying this identity —cooperation— must have a substantial basis, even if it is idealised, if it is to affect us.Received: 27.03.2014Accepted: 12.05.2014

Conflictual cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Axel, Erik

2011-01-01

, cooperation appeared as the continuous reworking of contradictions in the local arrangement of societal con- ditions. Subjects were distributed and distributed themselves according to social privileges, resources, and dilemmas in cooperation. Here, the subjects’ activities and understandings took form from...

When cooperation begets cooperation: the role of key individuals in galvanizing support.

Science.gov (United States)

McAuliffe, Katherine; Wrangham, Richard; Glowacki, Luke; Russell, Andrew F

2015-12-05

Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors (key individuals) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in--and provide testable hypotheses of--two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuals vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation? © 2015 The Author(s).

Effect of playing violent video games cooperatively or competitively on subsequent cooperative behavior.

Science.gov (United States)

Ewoldsen, David R; Eno, Cassie A; Okdie, Bradley M; Velez, John A; Guadagno, Rosanna E; DeCoster, Jamie

2012-05-01

Research on video games has yielded consistent findings that violent video games increase aggression and decrease prosocial behavior. However, these studies typically examined single-player games. Of interest is the effect of cooperative play in a violent video game on subsequent cooperative or competitive behavior. Participants played Halo II (a first-person shooter game) cooperatively or competitively and then completed a modified prisoner's dilemma task to assess competitive and cooperative behavior. Compared with the competitive play conditions, players in the cooperative condition engaged in more tit-for-tat behaviors-a pattern of behavior that typically precedes cooperative behavior. The social context of game play influenced subsequent behavior more than the content of the game that was played.

Proto-cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Herbert-Read, James E; Romanczuk, Pawel; Krause, Stefan

2016-01-01

beneficial if the cost of attacking is high, and only then when waiting times are short. Our findings provide evidence that cooperative benefits can be realized through the facilitative effects of individuals' hunting actions without spatial coordination of attacks. Such 'proto-cooperation' may be the pre...

Cooperating to learn teaching to cooperate: adviser processes for program implement CA/AC

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

José Ramón LAGO

2011-11-01

Full Text Available The aim of this paper is present some results of advise strategy to introduce cooperative learning from the «Cooperating to Learn/ Learning to Cooperate» CL/LC Programme. The first part situates the research project and the research objective focused on how introduction of CL/LC program through a process of advice facilitates permanent improvements to the inclusion of students. In the second we analyzed the phases and tasks of an adviser process for the introduction of cooperative learning and three stages to build on cooperative learning in school: the introduction, generalization and consolidation. The third part is the central part. We describe five process of adviser to implement cooperative learning which we can observe different degrees and modalities of collaboration between teachers and counselors and between teachers. Is possible the first step of a network centers to work cooperatively.

Cooperative Trust Games

Science.gov (United States)

2013-01-01

the more widely recognized competitive (non-cooperative) game theory. Cooperative game theory focuses on what groups of self-interested agents can...provides immediate justification for using non-cooperative game theory as the basis for modeling the purely competitive agents. 2.4. Superadditive...the competitive and altruistic contributions of the subset team. Definition: Given a payoff function ( ) in a subset team game , the total marginal

A Global Governance Shift in Development : A study on how transnational corporation´s CSR initiative can address Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining and how that can facilitate development

OpenAIRE

Runesson, Sophie

2016-01-01

Through globalization non-state actors including transnational corporations (TNC), have taken on a more important global governance role from the nation state, where they through their CSR initiatives, impact social issues surrounding development. There are however conflicting views whether CSR could contribute to development in the society. TNCs CSR engagement mainly concerns social issues at the workplace such as complying with labour rights. But workers right to organize and bargain collec...

Cooperative strategies European perspectives

CERN Document Server

Killing, J Peter

1997-01-01

Cooperative Strategies: European Perspectives is one of three geographically targeted volumes in which the contributors present the most current research on topics such as advances in theories of cooperative strategies, the formation of cooperative alliances, the dynamics of partner relationships, and the role of information and knowledge in cooperative alliances. Blending conceptual insights with empirical analyses, the contributors highlight commonalities and differences across national, cultural, and trade zones. The chapters in this volume are anchored in a wide set of theoretical approaches, conceptual frameworks, and models, illustrating how rich the area of cooperative strategies is for scholarly inquiry.

Cooperatives management evaluation of four Savings and Credit Cooperatives of Quito, Ecuador

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Richard Joel Alba Caluguillin

2017-07-01

Full Text Available The administrative management in cooperative enterprises develops in each of the stages of the administrative process of the traditional companies, which are planning, organization, direction and control, with the only difference that the savings and credit cooperatives comply with cooperative principles and values such as mutual aid, social responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. The objective of this research was to evaluate the process of administrative management in four selected savings and credit cooperatives from Quito city, Ecuador, were applied theoretical and empirical methods of research. From the empirical point of view, a survey was applied getting results from this process. In general, in the cooperatives evaluated, it was recognized the importance of comprehensive management, strategic planning, motivation as a key element for good job performance, the effectiveness of formal communication channels and other aspects inherent in administrative management, although there are certain deficiencies that limit the results of the cooperative activity.

Inertia in Cooperative Remodeling

OpenAIRE

Nilsson, Jerker

1997-01-01

Which organization model is appropriate for a cooperative enterprise depends on the prerequisites in its business environment. When conditions are changing, the firm must adapt itself. The entry of Sweden, Finland, and Austria into the European Union led to radical changes for agricultural cooperation, especially for Swedish cooperatives since agricultural policy was not allowed a transitional period. After two years, Swedish cooperatives have still not adapted their organization model despit...

Cooperation and cheating in microbes

Science.gov (United States)

Gore, Jeff

2011-03-01

Understanding the cooperative and competitive dynamics within and between species is a central challenge in evolutionary biology. Microbial model systems represent a unique opportunity to experimentally test fundamental theories regarding the evolution of cooperative behaviors. In this talk I will describe our experiments probing cooperation in microbes. In particular, I will compare the cooperative growth of yeast in sucrose and the cooperative inactivation of antibiotics by bacteria. In both cases we find that cheater strains---which don't contribute to the public welfare---are able to take advantage of the cooperator strains. However, this ability of cheaters to out-compete cooperators occurs only when cheaters are present at low frequency, thus leading to steady-state coexistence. These microbial experiments provide fresh insight into the evolutionary origin of cooperation.

Cooperating for assisting intelligently operators

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brezillon, P.; Cases, E.; CEA Centre d'Etudes de la Vallee du Rhone, 30 - Marcoule

1995-01-01

We are in the process of an intelligent cooperative system in a nuclear plant application. The system must cooperate with an operator who accomplishes a task of supervision of a real-world process. We point out in the paper that a cooperation between a cooperative system and an operator has two modes: a waking state and a participating state. During the waking state, the system observes the operator's behavior and the consequences on the process. During the participation state, the cooperative system builds jointly with the user a solution to the problem. In our approach, the cooperation depends on the system capabilities to explain, to incrementally acquire knowledge and to make explicit the context of the cooperation. We develop these ideas in the framework of the design of the cooperative system in the nuclear plant. (authors). 22 refs., 1 fig

Cooperation in wireless networks principles and applications : real egoistic behavior is to cooperate!

CERN Document Server

Fitzek, Frank HP

2006-01-01

Covers the underlying principles of cooperative techniques as well as several applications demonstrating the use of such techniques in practical systems. This book also summarizes the strength of cooperation for wireless communication systems, motivating the use of cooperative techniques.

Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Rand, David G; Peysakhovich, Alexander; Kraft-Todd, Gordon T; Newman, George E; Wurzbacher, Owen; Nowak, Martin A; Greene, Joshua D

2014-04-22

Cooperation is central to human societies. Yet relatively little is known about the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative decision making. Does cooperation require deliberate self-restraint? Or is spontaneous prosociality reined in by calculating self-interest? Here we present a theory of why (and for whom) intuition favors cooperation: cooperation is typically advantageous in everyday life, leading to the formation of generalized cooperative intuitions. Deliberation, by contrast, adjusts behaviour towards the optimum for a given situation. Thus, in one-shot anonymous interactions where selfishness is optimal, intuitive responses tend to be more cooperative than deliberative responses. We test this 'social heuristics hypothesis' by aggregating across every cooperation experiment using time pressure that we conducted over a 2-year period (15 studies and 6,910 decisions), as well as performing a novel time pressure experiment. Doing so demonstrates a positive average effect of time pressure on cooperation. We also find substantial variation in this effect, and show that this variation is partly explained by previous experience with one-shot lab experiments.

Cooperative games and network structures

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Musegaas, Marieke

2017-01-01

This thesis covers various research topics involving cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool to analyze the cooperative behavior within a group of players. The focus is mainly on interrelations between operations research and cooperative game theory by analyzing specific types of cooperative

Rejection in Bargaining Situations: An Event-Related Potential Study in Adolescents and Adults.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Kiki Zanolie

Full Text Available The neural correlates of rejection in bargaining situations when proposing a fair or unfair offer are not yet well understood. We measured neural responses to rejection and acceptance of monetary offers with event-related potentials (ERPs in mid-adolescents (14-17 years and early adults (19-24 years. Participants played multiple rounds of the Ultimatum Game as proposers, dividing coins between themselves and a second player (responder by making a choice between an unfair distribution (7 coins for proposer and 3 for responder; 7/3 and one of two alternatives: a fair distribution (5/5 or a hyperfair distribution (3/7. Participants mostly made fair offers (5/5 when the alternative was unfair (7/3, but made mostly unfair offers (7/3 when the alternative was hyperfair (3/7. When participants' fair offers (5/5; alternative was 7/3 were rejected this was associated with a larger Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN compared to acceptance of fair offers and rejection of unfair offers (7/3; alternative was 3/7. Also, the MFN was smaller after acceptance of unfair offers (7/3 compared to rejection. These neural responses did not differ between adults and mid-adolescents, suggesting that the MFN reacts as a neural alarm system to social prediction errors which is already prevalent during adolescence.

Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution for optimal resource allocation over wireless DS-CDMA visual sensor networks

Science.gov (United States)

Pandremmenou, Katerina; Kondi, Lisimachos P.; Parsopoulos, Konstantinos E.

2012-01-01

Surveillance applications usually require high levels of video quality, resulting in high power consumption. The existence of a well-behaved scheme to balance video quality and power consumption is crucial for the system's performance. In the present work, we adopt the game-theoretic approach of Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (KSBS) to deal with the problem of optimal resource allocation in a multi-node wireless visual sensor network (VSN). In our setting, the Direct Sequence Code Division Multiple Access (DS-CDMA) method is used for channel access, while a cross-layer optimization design, which employs a central processing server, accounts for the overall system efficacy through all network layers. The task assigned to the central server is the communication with the nodes and the joint determination of their transmission parameters. The KSBS is applied to non-convex utility spaces, efficiently distributing the source coding rate, channel coding rate and transmission powers among the nodes. In the underlying model, the transmission powers assume continuous values, whereas the source and channel coding rates can take only discrete values. Experimental results are reported and discussed to demonstrate the merits of KSBS over competing policies.

What drives cooperative breeding?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Walter D Koenig

2017-06-01

Full Text Available Cooperative breeding, in which more than a pair of conspecifics cooperate to raise young at a single nest or brood, is widespread among vertebrates but highly variable in its geographic distribution. Particularly vexing has been identifying the ecological correlates of this phenomenon, which has been suggested to be favored in populations inhabiting both relatively stable, productive environments and in populations living under highly variable and unpredictable conditions. Griesser et al. provide a novel approach to this problem, performing a phylogenetic analysis indicating that family living is an intermediate step between nonsocial and cooperative breeding birds. They then examine the ecological and climatic conditions associated with these different social systems, concluding that cooperative breeding emerges when family living is favored in highly productive environments, followed secondarily by selection for cooperative breeding when environmental conditions deteriorate and within-year variability increases. Combined with recent work addressing the fitness consequences of cooperative breeding, Griesser et al.'s contribution stands to move the field forward by demonstrating that the evolution of complex adaptations such as cooperative breeding may only be understood when each of the steps leading to it are identified and carefully integrated.

Cooperation in Construction:

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Vogelius, Peter; Storgaard, Kresten

2016-01-01

The study presents a building project executed by a major Danish construction company, where cooperation and its staging were essential for achieving high productivity and competitiveness. The form of this cooperation is the main theme for the article. The contractor actively changed the communic......The study presents a building project executed by a major Danish construction company, where cooperation and its staging were essential for achieving high productivity and competitiveness. The form of this cooperation is the main theme for the article. The contractor actively changed...... the companies in the case can be understood as possessing a social capital which is enforced and united by initiatives of the main contractor. The social capital was built up and maintained through the actual constitution of cooperation already in the initial phase of bidding before the building process....... The management logic of the main contractor is interpreted as based on a sociology-inspired understanding focusing on norms and social values rather than on contractual (law) and functional (engineering) logic, which had hitherto been prevalent in Danish construction management....

The sound of cooperation: Musical influences on cooperative behavior.

Science.gov (United States)

Kniffin, Kevin M; Yan, Jubo; Wansink, Brian; Schulze, William D

2017-03-01

Music as an environmental aspect of professional workplaces has been closely studied with respect to consumer behavior while sparse attention has been given to its relevance for employee behavior. In this article, we focus on the influence of music upon cooperative behavior within decision-making groups. Based on results from two extended 20-round public goods experiments, we find that happy music significantly and positively influences cooperative behavior. We also find a significant positive association between mood and cooperative behavior. Consequently, while our studies provide partial support for the relevance of affect in relation to cooperation within groups, we also show an independently important function of happy music that fits with a theory of synchronous and rhythmic activity as a social lubricant. More generally, our findings indicate that music and perhaps other atmospheric variables that are designed to prime consumer behavior might have comparably important effects for employees and consequently warrant closer investigation. Copyright © 2016 The Authors Journal of Organizational Behavior Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Transnational Research Co-operation: Opportunities and Challenges for transnational research co-operation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

of the NGOs have a lot of international experience (mainly in Denmark and Germany) as partners in different co-operation projects. Almost all the NGOs have recognized the important role of the scientific information in their activity. NGOs also feel the need for an easy access to required information...... for transnational co-operation like: an investigation/project concerning the driving forces behind urban development,or a co-operation in the field of wastewater reuse and minimization of wastewater loads and discharge, or a service page (internet) to search for potential partners. The governmental institutions...... in order to improve transnational cooperation are identified to be: • Search for national/international project partners • Access to existent co-operation projects or networks • Develop in common project proposals on themes requested by community groups • Exchange information/good operational practices...

An Offer You Cannot Refuse: Obtaining Efficiency and Fairness in Preplay Negotiation Games with Conditional Offers

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Goranko, Valentin; Turrini, Paolo

2013-01-01

. Such offers transform the payoff matrix of the original game and allow for some degree of cooperation between rational players while preserving the non-cooperative nature of the game. We focus on 2-player negotiations games arising in the preplay phase when offers for payments are made conditional...... on a suggested matching offer of the same kind being made in return by the receiver. We study and analyze such bargaining games, obtain results describing their possible solutions and discuss the degrees of efficiency and fairness that can be achieved in such negotiation process depending on whether time...

The donor-receptor relation in international cooperation management in Medellín Relaciones donante -receptor en la gestión de la cooperación internacional en Medellín

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sergio Castrillón Orrego

2011-12-01

Full Text Available Foreign Aid plays an increasingly important role in the political and economic dynamics of Latin America. This article analyses the findings regarding the relationships between donors and partners in the management of international cooperation in the city of Medellin, for the period comprehended between 2003 and 2008. The detailed content analysis of the interviews conducted with a representative sample of key players of international cooperation in the city, has enabled us to identify the key moments that characterize and dynamize those relationships as. basically we found that successful management of Foreign Aid must consider the following key moments: identification of partners and sources of international cooperation; building trust and credibility; forming partnerships; developing plans and bargaining and finally relationships with partners and community.La Cooperación Internacional juega un papel cada vez más importante en las dinámicaspolíticas y económicas de América Latina. El presente artículo muestra los hallazgossobre las relaciones donante-receptor, en la gestión de la cooperación internacional enla ciudad de Medellín, respecto al periodo comprendido entre los años 2003 y 2008.A partir de un estudio minucioso de los contenidos de las entrevistas realizadas a losactores significativos de la cooperación internacional en la ciudad, se identifican losprincipales momentos que caracterizan y dinamizan dichas relaciones. Fundamentalmenteencontramos que una buena gestión de la cooperación internacional debe considerarlos siguientes momentos: la identificación de los socios y de las fuentes de cooperacióninternacional; la generación de confianza y credibilidad; la conformación de alianzas; laelaboración de planes y negociación y, finalmente, la relación ejecutor comunidad.

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/8: Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Qojas, M.

1999-03-01

This document is an analysis of options for unilateral and cooperative action to improve the security of Jordan's borders. Sections describe the current political, economic, and social interactions along Jordan's borders. Next, the document discusses border security strategy for cooperation among neighboring countries and the adoption of confidence-building measures. A practical cooperative monitoring system would consist of hardware for early warning, command and control, communications, and transportation. Technical solutions can expand opportunities for the detection and identification of intruders. Sensors (such as seismic, break-wire, pressure-sensing, etc.) can warn border security forces of intrusion and contribute to the identification of the intrusion and help formulate the response. This document describes conceptual options for cooperation, offering three scenarios that relate to three hypothetical levels (low, medium, and high) of cooperation. Potential cooperative efforts under a low cooperation scenario could include information exchanges on military equipment and schedules to prevent misunderstandings and the establishment of protocols for handling emergency situations or unusual circumstances. Measures under a medium cooperation scenario could include establishing joint monitoring groups for better communications, with hot lines and scheduled meetings. The high cooperation scenario describes coordinated responses, joint border patrols, and sharing border intrusion information. Finally, the document lists recommendations for organizational, technical, and operational initiatives that could be applicable to the current situation.

Inter-jurisdictional cooperation on pharmaceutical product listing agreements: views from Canadian provinces

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Morgan Steven G

2013-01-01

Full Text Available Abstract Background Confidential product listing agreements (PLAs negotiated between pharmaceutical manufacturers and individual health care payers may contribute to unwanted price disparities, high administrative costs, and unequal bargaining power within and across jurisdictions. In the context of Canada’s decentralized health system, we aimed to document provincial policy makers’ perceptions about collaborative PLA negotiations. Methods We conducted semi-structured telephone interviews with a senior policy maker from nine of the ten Canadian provinces. We conducted a thematic analysis of interview transcripts to identify benefits, drawbacks, and barriers to routine collaboration on PLA negotiations. Results Canadian policy makers expressed support for joint negotiations of PLAs in principle, citing benefits of increased bargaining power and reduced inter-jurisdictional inequities in drug prices and formulary listings. However, established policy institutions and the politics of individual jurisdictional authority are formidable barriers to routine PLA collaboration. Achieving commitment to a joint process may be difficult to sustain among heterogeneous and autonomous partners. Conclusions Though collaboration on PLA negotiation is an extension of collaboration on health technology assessment, it is a very significant next step that requires harmonization of the outcomes of decision-making processes. Views of policy makers in Canada suggest that sustaining routine collaborations on PLA negotiations may be difficult unless participating jurisdictions have similar policy institutions, capacities to implement coverage decisions, and local political priorities.

The story of technical cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Yang Taek

1989-09-01

This book gives descriptions of technical cooperation, which is about why does technology transfer?, process of technology transfer with model, decisive cause and cooperation of technology transfer, cost and effect of technology transfer, historical experience of technology transfer, cases of technology transfer by field such as rubber tire, medicine and computer industry and automobile industry, technology transfer process and present condition of technical cooperation, and strategy for rising of technical cooperation : selection of technology for object of cooperation and development of human resources.

More equal than others: Equity norms as an integration of cognitive heuristics and contextual cues in bargaining games.

Science.gov (United States)

Civai, Claudia; Rumiati, Raffaella Ida; Rustichini, Aldo

2013-09-01

Behavior in one-shot bargaining games, like the Ultimatum Game (UG), has been interpreted as an expression of social preferences, such as inequity aversion and negative reciprocity; however, the traditional UG design limits the range of possible psychological interpretation of the results. Here, we employed three different designs for ultimatum games, finding support for a more comprehensive theory: behavior is driven by cognitive factors implementing rules such as equal splitting, speaking up for the idea that equity works as a cognitive heuristic, applicable when the environment provides no reason to behave otherwise. Instead subjects deviate from this rule when environment changes, as, for instance, when personal interest is at stake. Results show that behavior varies systematically with contextual cues, balancing the self-interest with the automatic application of the equity heuristic. Thus, the context suggests the rule to be applied in a specific situation. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

What is a cooperative?

Science.gov (United States)

Kimberly Zeuli

2006-01-01

Groups of individuals throughout time have worked together in pursuit of common goals. The earliest forms of hunting and agriculture required a great deal of cooperation among humans. Although the word "cooperative" can be applied to many different types of group activities, in this publication it refers to a formal business model. Cooperative businesses are...

Common mycorrhizal networks and their effect on the bargaining power of the fungal partner in the arbuscular mycorrhizal symbiosis.

Science.gov (United States)

Bücking, Heike; Mensah, Jerry A; Fellbaum, Carl R

2016-01-01

Arbuscular mycorrhizal (AM) fungi form mutualistic interactions with the majority of land plants, including some of the most important crop species. The fungus takes up nutrients from the soil, and transfers these nutrients to the mycorrhizal interface in the root, where these nutrients are exchanged against carbon from the host. AM fungi form extensive hyphal networks in the soil and connect with their network multiple host plants. These common mycorrhizal networks (CMNs) play a critical role in the long-distance transport of nutrients through soil ecosystems and allow the exchange of signals between the interconnected plants. CMNs affect the survival, fitness, and competitiveness of the fungal and plant species that interact via these networks, but how the resource transport within these CMNs is controlled is largely unknown. We discuss the significance of CMNs for plant communities and for the bargaining power of the fungal partner in the AM symbiosis.

Scandinavian Cooperative Advantage

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Strand, Robert; Freeman, R. Edward

2015-01-01

. We conclude by endorsing the expression “Scandinavian cooperative advantage” in an effort to draw attention to the Scandinavian context and encourage the field of strategic management to shift its focus from achieving a competitive advantage toward achieving a cooperative advantage....

Milk marketing under cooperative and non-cooperative marketing channels: Evidence from west Bengal

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sarker Debnarayan

2010-01-01

Full Text Available The present study is an attempt to empirically investigate the price spread, marketing costs, marketing margins, marketing efficiency, and profit efficiency among market middlemen under cooperative and non-cooperative marketing channels in the domestic trade market of liquid milk in West Bengal. One of the important findings of this study is that, although the inter-market (and intramarket price variation for liquid milk under the cooperative marketing agency in not far from uniformity, and all marketing agencies under cooperative channels receive much lower abnormal profit per unit of milk as compared with non-cooperative channels, the former fails to provide much economic benefit, either to the producer or to the consumer, because of the burden of much higher fixed cost per unit of liquid milk.

Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Krasnow, Max M; Delton, Andrew W; Cosmides, Leda; Tooby, John

2015-01-01

Humans everywhere cooperate in groups to achieve benefits not attainable by individuals. Individual effort is often not automatically tied to a proportionate share of group benefits. This decoupling allows for free-riding, a strategy that (absent countermeasures) outcompetes cooperation. Empirically and formally, punishment potentially solves the evolutionary puzzle of group cooperation. Nevertheless, standard analyses appear to show that punishment alone is insufficient, because second-order free riders (those who cooperate but do not punish) can be shown to outcompete punishers. Consequently, many have concluded that other processes, such as cultural or genetic group selection, are required. Here, we present a series of agent-based simulations that show that group cooperation sustained by punishment easily evolves by individual selection when you introduce into standard models more biologically plausible assumptions about the social ecology and psychology of ancestral humans. We relax three unrealistic assumptions of past models. First, past models assume all punishers must punish every act of free riding in their group. We instead allow punishment to be probabilistic, meaning punishers can evolve to only punish some free riders some of the time. This drastically lowers the cost of punishment as group size increases. Second, most models unrealistically do not allow punishment to recruit labor; punishment merely reduces the punished agent's fitness. We instead realistically allow punished free riders to cooperate in the future to avoid punishment. Third, past models usually restrict agents to interact in a single group their entire lives. We instead introduce realistic social ecologies in which agents participate in multiple, partially overlapping groups. Because of this, punitive tendencies are more expressed and therefore more exposed to natural selection. These three moves toward greater model realism reveal that punishment and cooperation easily evolve by

Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Max M Krasnow

Full Text Available Humans everywhere cooperate in groups to achieve benefits not attainable by individuals. Individual effort is often not automatically tied to a proportionate share of group benefits. This decoupling allows for free-riding, a strategy that (absent countermeasures outcompetes cooperation. Empirically and formally, punishment potentially solves the evolutionary puzzle of group cooperation. Nevertheless, standard analyses appear to show that punishment alone is insufficient, because second-order free riders (those who cooperate but do not punish can be shown to outcompete punishers. Consequently, many have concluded that other processes, such as cultural or genetic group selection, are required. Here, we present a series of agent-based simulations that show that group cooperation sustained by punishment easily evolves by individual selection when you introduce into standard models more biologically plausible assumptions about the social ecology and psychology of ancestral humans. We relax three unrealistic assumptions of past models. First, past models assume all punishers must punish every act of free riding in their group. We instead allow punishment to be probabilistic, meaning punishers can evolve to only punish some free riders some of the time. This drastically lowers the cost of punishment as group size increases. Second, most models unrealistically do not allow punishment to recruit labor; punishment merely reduces the punished agent's fitness. We instead realistically allow punished free riders to cooperate in the future to avoid punishment. Third, past models usually restrict agents to interact in a single group their entire lives. We instead introduce realistic social ecologies in which agents participate in multiple, partially overlapping groups. Because of this, punitive tendencies are more expressed and therefore more exposed to natural selection. These three moves toward greater model realism reveal that punishment and cooperation

Spontaneous cooperation for prosocials, but not for proselfs: Social value orientation moderates spontaneous cooperation behavior

Science.gov (United States)

Mischkowski, Dorothee; Glöckner, Andreas

2016-01-01

Cooperation is essential for the success of societies and there is an ongoing debate whether individuals have therefore developed a general spontaneous tendency to cooperate or not. Findings that cooperative behavior is related to shorter decision times provide support for the spontaneous cooperation effect, although contrary results have also been reported. We show that cooperative behavior is better described as person × situation interaction, in that there is a spontaneous cooperation effect for prosocial but not for proself persons. In three studies, one involving population representative samples from the US and Germany, we found that cooperation in a public good game is dependent on an interaction between individuals’ social value orientation and decision time. Increasing deliberation about the dilemma situation does not affect persons that are selfish to begin with, but it is related to decreasing cooperation for prosocial persons that gain positive utility from outcomes of others and score high on the related general personality trait honesty/humility. Our results demonstrate that the spontaneous cooperation hypothesis has to be qualified in that it is limited to persons with a specific personality and social values. Furthermore, they allow reconciling conflicting previous findings by identifying an important moderator for the effect. PMID:26876773

Extending the Cooperative Phenotype: Assessing the Stability of Cooperation across Countries.

Science.gov (United States)

Reigstad, Amanda G; Strømland, Eirik A; Tinghög, Gustav

2017-01-01

This paper studies whether individual cooperation is stable across settings and over time. Involving more than 7,000 subjects on two different continents, this study documents positive correlation in cooperative behavior across economic games in Norway, Sweden, Austria, and the United States. The game measures also correlate with a tendency to make deontological judgments in moral dilemmas, and display of general trust toward strangers. Using time-variation in the data, we test whether temporal stability of behavior is similar in the United States and Norway, and find similar stability estimates for both the American and Norwegian samples. The findings here provide further evidence of the existence of a stable behavioral inclination toward prosociality - a "cooperative phenotype," as it has recently been termed. Also in line with previous research, we find that punishment and cooperation seem to be uncorrelated.

Excited cooper pairs

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lopez-Arrietea, M. G.; Solis, M. A.; De Llano, M. [Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico, D.F (Mexico)

2001-02-01

Excited cooper pairs formed in a many-fermion system are those with nonzero total center-of mass momentum (CMM). They are normally neglected in the standard Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer (BCS) theory of superconductivity for being too few compared with zero CMM pairs. However, a Bose-Einstein condensation picture requires both zero and nonzero CMM pairs. Assuming a BCS model interaction between fermions we determine the populations for all CMM values of Cooper pairs by actually calculating the number of nonzero-CMM pairs relative to that of zero-CMM ones in both 2D and 3D. Although this ratio decreases rapidly with CMM, the number of Cooper pairs for any specific CMM less than the maximum (or breakup of the pair) momentum turns out to be typically larger than about 95% of those with zero-CMM at zero temperature T. Even at T {approx}100 K this fraction en 2D is still as large as about 70% for typical quasi-2D cuprate superconductor parameters. [Spanish] Los pares de cooper excitados formados en un sistema de muchos electrones, son aquellos con momentos de centro de masa (CMM) diferente de cero. Normalmente estos no son tomados en cuenta en la teoria estandar de la superconductividad de Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer (BCS) al suponer que su numero es muy pequeno comparados con los pares de centro de masa igual a cero. Sin embargo, un esquema de condensacion Bose-Einstein requiere de ambos pares, con CMM cero y diferente de cero. Asumiendo una interaccion modelo BCS entre los fermiones, determinamos la poblacion de pares cooper con cada uno de todos los posibles valores del CMM calculando el numero de pares con momentos de centro de masa diferente de cero relativo a los pares de CMM igual a cero, en 2D y 3D. Aunque esta razon decrece rapidamente con el CMM, el numero de pares de cooper para cualquier CMM especifico menor que el momento maximo (o rompimiento de par) es tipicamente mas grande que el 95% de aquellos con CMM cero. Aun a T {approx}100 K esta fraccion en 2D es

International co-operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

In 1996, Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (NRA SR) ensured the Slovak Republic (SR) obligations with relation to the international agreements and with the SR membership in the IAEA.International co-operation has been ensured on the basis of the bilateral international agreements. With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-operation, the SR fulfilled its financial obligations to this organization in due time and in the full scope. Representing Central and Eastern Europe interest in the Board of Governors, the SR participation in the highest executive in the highest executive authority was finished in 1996.The Board of Governors Vice-chairman position was executed by NRA SR Chairman. 5 national and 6 regional technical co-operation and assistance projects were realized in 1996. 12 organizations participated in these projects and accordingly 104 experts took part in training programmes, scientific visits or as the mission members abroad. Besides, Slovak experts participated at work of technical advisory and consultation groups with the significant assistance. In the framework of IAEA co-operation, the SR was visited by 11 expert missions formed by 28 experts from 19 countries including IAEA. Slovak organizations, namely institutes of the Academy of Sciences, Slovak research centres and universities participated in IAEA scientific and research activities through NRA SR. 15 scientific contracts in total were approved and realized and these contracts are utilized as supplementary financing of the own scientific and research projects. Other international co-operation and regional co-operation activities of the NRA SR in 1996 are reviewed

European Union gas market liberalization: a windfall effect for Russia?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Riviere, Nicolas

2013-01-01

Natural gas has a growing importance in the European Union energy. However, because of the lack of resources in its territory, the EU is highly dependent on imports to meet its gas needs. In parallel, since 1998 the EU seeks the creation of a single and liberalized natural gas market. The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the gas market liberalization can create a risk for importers' bargaining power and more widely to the gas security of supply of the EU. The first chapter provides an overview of the European gas market. It deals with the implementation of the process of gas market liberalization, the external dependency of the EU and the weakness of gas supply diversity. Using findings from the previous chapter, the second one proposes a model from the cooperative game theory to analyze the effects of the EU natural gas market liberalization on importers' bargaining power. It shows that the liberalization weakens importers' bargaining power vis-a-vis external suppliers, where Russia is the leader. It also shows that the implementation of a European gas purchasing agency offers a counter-power to the EU that balances bargaining power. The third chapter focuses on the development of LNG in the world and more specifically in the EU market. The development of LNG in Europe allows the entry of new operators on the upstream and, thus, increases competition among the EU's suppliers for the benefit of importers' bargaining power. The last chapter analyzes the impact of US shale gas development on the EU gas market. Thus, it shows that development is accompanied by an uncertainty about the future gas demand in the EU and by a reconsideration of the EU's long-term contracts. (author)

Strategies of EU agro-food cooperatives to confront globalization: The case of wine cooperatives

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Juan Sebastián Castillo Valero

2013-06-01

Full Text Available Due to globalization and market integration, the agro-food cooperative sector needs to be more competitive. This generates new challenges for cooperative enterprises in the agro-food sector. In this article the analysis of the wine producing sector is undertaken in the area of greatest world-wide wine production and commercialization, Castilla-La Mancha. EU wineries and cooperatives should propose strategic lines within an economy marked by a globalization process in world markets. The paradigmatic case is analyzed in this paper of the comparison of strategies followed by cooperatives confronting capitalist winery enterprises. Therefore, the degree of suitability is aimed to be elucidated and the success of the foundations of international commercial strategies that cooperative enterprises of the sector have followed, depending on their characteristics. Moreover, an exhaustive diagnosis is offered of the current strategic situation of cooperatives and their probability of gaining access to and/or growing in the international market. The parameters that have resulted significant are used as conclusions and recommendations so that cooperatives will reformulate their strategies and the organizations linked to the agro-food sector will know what factors to foment and support in their internationalization and global competitive positioning.

Regional cooperation in nuclear energy development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chung, K.; Muntzing, L.M.

1987-01-01

In November 1985, PBNCC (the Pacific Basin Nuclear Cooperation Committee) was formally established. Currently six Pacific Basin members have been participating in PBNCC: Canada, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan of Chian, and the United States of America. The People's Republic of China has sent observes to the PBNCC meetings. The technical contents of PBWCC working groups are as follows: 1. Regional cooperative for pooled spare parts of nuclear power plants and inventory management; 2. Regional cooperation in nuclear training; 3. Regional cooperation on nuclear safety; 4. Regional cooperation in Codes and Standards; 5. Regional Cooperation in public acceptance; 6. Regional cooperation on radwaste management. (Liu)

International cooperation workshop. Regional workshop for CTBTO international cooperation: Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-08-01

Pursuant to the 1999 programme of work, and following the International Cooperation Workshop held in Vienna, Austria, in 1998, the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO (Prep Com) held a regional Workshop for CTBTO International Cooperation in Cairo. The purpose of the workshop was to identify how and by what means the Africa region can promote international cooperation in CTBT verification related technologies, and how the region can benefit from and contribute to Prep Com activity. PTS staff briefed the 40 participants from 22 African States who attended the Workshop on general aspects, including costs, of the establishment and operation of the CTBT verification system, including its four monitoring technologies. Participants were informed on opportunities for local institutions in the establishment of monitoring stations and on possible support for national and regional data centres. National experts presented their research and development activities and reviewed existing experiences on bi/multi-lateral cooperation. The main points of the discussion focused on the need to engage governments to advance signature/ratification, and further training opportunities for African states

How threats influence the evolutionary resolution of within-group conflict.

Science.gov (United States)

Cant, Michael A; Johnstone, Rufus A

2009-06-01

Most examples of cooperation in nature share a common feature: individuals can interact to produce a productivity benefit or fitness surplus, but there is conflict over how these gains are shared. A central question is how threats to exercise outside options influence the resolution of conflict within such cooperative associations. Here we show how a simple principle from economic bargaining theory, the outside option principle, can help to solve this problem in biological systems. According to this principle, outside options will affect the resolution of conflict only when the payoff of taking up these options exceeds the payoffs individuals can obtain from bargaining or negotiating within the group; otherwise, threats to exercise outside options are not credible and are therefore irrelevant. We show that previous attempts to incorporate outside options in synthetic models of reproductive conflict fail to distinguish between credible and incredible threats, and then we use the outside option principle to develop credible synthetic models in two contexts: reproductive skew and biparental care. A striking prediction of our analysis is that outside options are least relevant to the resolution of conflict in cooperative groups of kin and are most relevant in transient associations or interactions among nonrelatives. Our analysis shows a way to link the resolution of within-group conflict to the environmental setting in which it occurs, and it illuminates the role of threats in the evolution of social behavior.

Extending the Cooperative Phenotype: Assessing the Stability of Cooperation across Countries

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Amanda G. Reigstad

2017-11-01

Full Text Available This paper studies whether individual cooperation is stable across settings and over time. Involving more than 7,000 subjects on two different continents, this study documents positive correlation in cooperative behavior across economic games in Norway, Sweden, Austria, and the United States. The game measures also correlate with a tendency to make deontological judgments in moral dilemmas, and display of general trust toward strangers. Using time-variation in the data, we test whether temporal stability of behavior is similar in the United States and Norway, and find similar stability estimates for both the American and Norwegian samples. The findings here provide further evidence of the existence of a stable behavioral inclination toward prosociality – a “cooperative phenotype,” as it has recently been termed. Also in line with previous research, we find that punishment and cooperation seem to be uncorrelated.

The significance of the interconnection of second-level cooperatives and their peer-associated cooperatives for productivity growth

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martínez-Victoria, M.; Maté-Sánchez-Val, M.L.; Arcas-Lario, N.

2017-01-01

Cooperatives are especially important in current agri-food markets. These companies have responded to the current demand requirements with greater market orientation strategies to attract and satisfy customers. To do so, cooperatives have adopted different collaboration alternatives. In Spain, the most common alliance between cooperatives is materialised in second-level cooperatives, which are cooperatives integrated by at least two first-level cooperatives. The aim of this study was to analyse the interaction effects between first- and second level agri-food cooperatives on their productive growth and its components. To get this purpose, a Cobb-Douglas specification with spatial econometrics techniques was applied to evaluate this relationship. We included a spatial connectivity matrix to establish the interconnection among cooperatives of first- and second-level. Our results show a positive interaction effect highlighting the importance of these alliances on the productivity growth in the agri-food sector. The scarce amount of empirical papers explaining how second-level cooperatives influence the performance of first-level cooperatives shows the relevance of our study.

The significance of the interconnection of second-level cooperatives and their peer-associated cooperatives for productivity growth

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Martínez-Victoria, M.; Maté-Sánchez-Val, M.L.; Arcas-Lario, N.

2017-09-01

Cooperatives are especially important in current agri-food markets. These companies have responded to the current demand requirements with greater market orientation strategies to attract and satisfy customers. To do so, cooperatives have adopted different collaboration alternatives. In Spain, the most common alliance between cooperatives is materialised in second-level cooperatives, which are cooperatives integrated by at least two first-level cooperatives. The aim of this study was to analyse the interaction effects between first- and second level agri-food cooperatives on their productive growth and its components. To get this purpose, a Cobb-Douglas specification with spatial econometrics techniques was applied to evaluate this relationship. We included a spatial connectivity matrix to establish the interconnection among cooperatives of first- and second-level. Our results show a positive interaction effect highlighting the importance of these alliances on the productivity growth in the agri-food sector. The scarce amount of empirical papers explaining how second-level cooperatives influence the performance of first-level cooperatives shows the relevance of our study.

Non-egalitarian allocations among preschool peers in a face-to-face bargaining task.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alicia P Melis

Full Text Available In face-to-face bargaining tasks human adults almost always agree on an equal split of resources. This is due to mutually recognized fairness and equality norms. Early developmental studies on sharing and equality norms found that egalitarian allocations of resources are not common before children are 5 or 6 years old. However, recent studies have shown that in some face-to face collaborative situations, or when recipients express their desires, children at much younger ages choose equal allocations. We investigated the ability of 3.5 and 5-year-olds to negotiate face-to-face, whether to collaborate to obtain an equal or an unequal distribution of rewards. We hypothesized that the face-to-face interaction and interdependency between partners would facilitate egalitarian outcomes at both ages. In the first experiment we found that 5-year-olds were more egalitarian than 3.5-year-olds, but neither of the age classes shared equally. In the second experiment, in which we increased the magnitude of the inequality, we found that children at both ages mostly agreed on the unequal distribution. These results show that communication and face-to-face interactions are not sufficient to guarantee equal allocations at 3-5 years of age. These results add to previous findings suggesting that in the context of non-collaboratively produced resources it is only after 5 years of age that children use equality norms to allocate resources.

The hard problem of cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Kimmo Eriksson

Full Text Available Based on individual variation in cooperative inclinations, we define the "hard problem of cooperation" as that of achieving high levels of cooperation in a group of non-cooperative types. Can the hard problem be solved by institutions with monitoring and sanctions? In a laboratory experiment we find that the answer is affirmative if the institution is imposed on the group but negative if development of the institution is left to the group to vote on. In the experiment, participants were divided into groups of either cooperative types or non-cooperative types depending on their behavior in a public goods game. In these homogeneous groups they repeatedly played a public goods game regulated by an institution that incorporated several of the key properties identified by Ostrom: operational rules, monitoring, rewards, punishments, and (in one condition change of rules. When change of rules was not possible and punishments were set to be high, groups of both types generally abided by operational rules demanding high contributions to the common good, and thereby achieved high levels of payoffs. Under less severe rules, both types of groups did worse but non-cooperative types did worst. Thus, non-cooperative groups profited the most from being governed by an institution demanding high contributions and employing high punishments. Nevertheless, in a condition where change of rules through voting was made possible, development of the institution in this direction was more often voted down in groups of non-cooperative types. We discuss the relevance of the hard problem and fit our results into a bigger picture of institutional and individual determinants of cooperative behavior.

The hard problem of cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Eriksson, Kimmo; Strimling, Pontus

2012-01-01

Based on individual variation in cooperative inclinations, we define the "hard problem of cooperation" as that of achieving high levels of cooperation in a group of non-cooperative types. Can the hard problem be solved by institutions with monitoring and sanctions? In a laboratory experiment we find that the answer is affirmative if the institution is imposed on the group but negative if development of the institution is left to the group to vote on. In the experiment, participants were divided into groups of either cooperative types or non-cooperative types depending on their behavior in a public goods game. In these homogeneous groups they repeatedly played a public goods game regulated by an institution that incorporated several of the key properties identified by Ostrom: operational rules, monitoring, rewards, punishments, and (in one condition) change of rules. When change of rules was not possible and punishments were set to be high, groups of both types generally abided by operational rules demanding high contributions to the common good, and thereby achieved high levels of payoffs. Under less severe rules, both types of groups did worse but non-cooperative types did worst. Thus, non-cooperative groups profited the most from being governed by an institution demanding high contributions and employing high punishments. Nevertheless, in a condition where change of rules through voting was made possible, development of the institution in this direction was more often voted down in groups of non-cooperative types. We discuss the relevance of the hard problem and fit our results into a bigger picture of institutional and individual determinants of cooperative behavior.

Efficiency in Microfinance Cooperatives

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

HARTARSKA, Valentina

2012-12-01

Full Text Available In recognition of cooperatives’ contribution to the socio-economic well-being of their participants, the United Nations has declared 2012 as the International Year of Cooperatives. Microfinance cooperatives make a large part of the microfinance industry. We study efficiency of microfinance cooperatives and provide estimates of the optimal size of such organizations. We employ the classical efficiency analysis consisting of estimating a system of equations and identify the optimal size of microfinance cooperatives in terms of their number of clients (outreach efficiency, as well as dollar value of lending and deposits (sustainability. We find that microfinance cooperatives have increasing returns to scale which means that the vast majority can lower cost if they become larger. We calculate that the optimal size is around $100 million in lending and half of that in deposits. We find less robust estimates in terms of reaching many clients with a range from 40,000 to 180,000 borrowers.

Non-cooperative game theory

CERN Document Server

Fujiwara-Greve, Takako

2015-01-01

This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) probl...

Cooperative Communications for Wireless Information Assurance: Secure Cooperative Communications and Testbed Development

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Li, Xiaohua

2007-01-01

..., and have invented a new cooperative OFDM transmission scheme to combat transmission asynchronism. They are helpful to the development of future physical-layer wireless information assurance techniques as well as the cooperative communication techniques...

Conditional cooperation on three continents

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kocher, M.G.; Cherry, T.; Kroll, S.; Netzer, R.; Sutter, M.

2007-01-01

We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional cooperation are much higher in the U.S.A. than anywhere else.

Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation

OpenAIRE

Cronin, Katherine A.; Acheson, Daniel J.; Hernández, Penélope; Sánchez, Angel

2016-01-01

Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, yet the effect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants competed to earn hierarchy positions and then could cooperate with another individual in the hierarchy by investing in a common effort. Cooperation was ac...

Agricultural Co-Operatives in Ethiopia

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Tefera, Delelegne A.; Bijman, Jos; Slingerland, Maja A.

2017-01-01

To what extent can co-operatives strengthen rural development in sub-Saharan Africa? This paper explores the development of agricultural co-operatives in Ethiopia, particularly the changes in economic functions. Co-operative development in Ethiopia has been strongly influenced by various political

International cooperation for operating safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dupuis, M.C.

1989-03-01

The international-cooperation organization in nuclear safety domain is discussed. The nuclear energy Direction Committee is helped by the Security Committee for Nuclear Power Plants in the cooperation between security organizations of member countries and in the safety and nuclear activity regulations. The importance of the cooperation between experts in human being and engine problems is underlined. The applied methods, exchange activities and activity analysis, and the cooperation of the Nuclear Energy Agency and international organizations is analysed [fr

Cooperation in regional nuclear training

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newstead, C.M.; Lee, D.S.; Spitalnik, J.

1985-01-01

This paper presents an overview of the nuclear training currently being undertaken in the countries of the co-authors, and considers the degree to which training problems are amenable to common solutions such as cooperative regional training programs. Different types of cooperation are discussed including the development of regional and international training centers, cooperative bilateral and multilateral training, and the proposed US International Nuclear Safety Training Academy. The paper provides suggestions of ways for enhancing regional cooperation

Models in cooperative game theory

CERN Document Server

Branzei, Rodica; Tijs, Stef

2008-01-01

This book investigates models in cooperative game theory in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game players are allowed to cooperate with infinite many different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation. A multi-choice game describes the intermediate case in which each player may have a fixed number of activity levels. Different set and one-point solution concepts for these games are presented. The properties of these solution concepts and their interrelations on several classes of crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games are studied. Applications of the investigated models to many economic situations are indicated as well. The second edition is highly enlarged and contains new results and additional sections in the different chapters as well as one new chapter.

[Child protection--cooperation and conflict management].

Science.gov (United States)

Averbeck, Birgit; Hermans, Björn Enno

2010-01-01

When people have to deal with conflicts or opposing views they often refer to the term cooperation. But after lengthy discussions the question may be raised if it is more useful not to cooperate. The authors of this article analyse why cooperation is often called for but frequently fails. In this article key prerequisites for successful cooperation are described before the authors present their practical method of 'sYpport'. 'SYpport' mostly refers to trans-institutional cooperation and focuses on the required attitude of those involved. The authors' simple but crucial conclusion is that cooperation requires faith in others.

Subgame consistent cooperation a comprehensive treatise

CERN Document Server

Yeung, David W K

2016-01-01

Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution tec...

Evidence for strategic cooperation in humans.

Science.gov (United States)

Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; El Mouden, Claire; West, Stuart A

2017-06-14

Humans may cooperate strategically, cooperating at higher levels than expected from their short-term interests, to try and stimulate others to cooperate. To test this hypothesis, we experimentally manipulated the extent an individual's behaviour is known to others, and hence whether or not strategic cooperation is possible. In contrast with many previous studies, we avoided confounding factors by preventing individuals from learning during the game about either pay-offs or about how other individuals behave. We found clear evidence for strategic cooperators-just telling some individuals that their groupmates would be informed about their behaviour led to them tripling their initial level of cooperation, from 17 to 50%. We also found that many individuals play as if they do not understand the game, and their presence obscures the detection of strategic cooperation. Identifying such players allowed us to detect and study strategic motives for cooperation in novel, more powerful, ways. © 2017 The Author(s).

Neural correlates of social cooperation and non-cooperation as a function of psychopathy.

Science.gov (United States)

Rilling, James K; Glenn, Andrea L; Jairam, Meeta R; Pagnoni, Giuseppe; Goldsmith, David R; Elfenbein, Hanie A; Lilienfeld, Scott O

2007-06-01

Psychopathy is a disorder involving a failure to experience many emotions that are necessary for appropriate social behavior. In this study, we probed the behavioral, emotional, and neural correlates of psychopathic traits within the context of a dyadic social interaction. Thirty subjects were imaged with functional magnetic resonance imaging while playing an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with human confederates who were outside the scanner. Subjects also completed two self-report psychopathy questionnaires. Subjects scoring higher on psychopathy, particularly males, defected more often and were less likely to continue cooperating after establishing mutual cooperation with a partner. Further, they experienced more outcomes in which their cooperation was not reciprocated (cooperate-defect outcome). After such outcomes, subjects scoring high in psychopathy showed less amygdala activation, suggesting weaker aversive conditioning to those outcomes. Compared with low-psychopathy subjects, subjects higher in psychopathy also showed weaker activation within orbitofrontal cortex when choosing to cooperate and showed weaker activation within dorsolateral prefrontal and rostral anterior cingulate cortex when choosing to defect. These findings suggest that whereas subjects scoring low on psychopathy have emotional biases toward cooperation that can only be overcome with effortful cognitive control, subjects scoring high on psychopathy have an opposing bias toward defection that likewise can only be overcome with cognitive effort.

'Shared-rhythm cooperation' in cooperative team meetings in acute psychiatric inpatient care.

Science.gov (United States)

Vuokila-Oikkonen, P; Janhonen, S; Vaisanen, L

2004-04-01

The cooperative team meeting is one of the most important interventions in psychiatric care. The purpose of this study was to describe the participation of patients and significant others in cooperative team meetings in terms of unspoken stories. The narrative approach focused on storytelling. The data consisted of videotaped cooperative team meetings (n = 11) in two acute closed psychiatric wards. The QRS NVivo computer program and the Holistic Content Reading method were used. During the process of analysis, the spoken and unspoken stories were analysed at the same time. According to the results, while there was some evident shared-rhythm cooperation (the topics of discussion were shared and the participants had eye contact), there were many instances where the interaction was controlled and defined by health care professionals. This lack of shared rhythm in cooperation, as defined in terms of storytelling, was manifested as monologue and the following practices: the health care professionals controlled the storytelling by sticking to their opinions, by giving the floor or by pointing with a finger and visually scanning the participants, by interrupting the speaker or by allowing the other experts to sit passively. Implications for mental health nursing practice are discussed.

From cooperation to globalization

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gabriela UNGUREANU

2010-09-01

Full Text Available Globalization is seen as a consequence of cross-border business. This complex and irreversible process can be seen as an extension of capitalist relations of production or increased interdependence in the economic system. Globalization has given rise to more and more fields of activity worldwide. To meet the challenges of business globalization, many companies form strategic alliances, cooperate or merge with other companies. Cooperation is seen by many companies as an alternative path to success. In recent years joint international associations, licensing, co-production agreements, joint research programs, exploration of consortia and other cooperative relationships between two or more corporations with potential have increased. We notice a cooperation tendency among small-sized companies, especially among those from the developing countries.

Formation, “Gold Rule” for the cooperative development

OpenAIRE

Alcides López Labrada

2013-01-01

Before the arising of the cooperative movement in the world, cooperation already existed. So, it is logical to affirm that there can be cooperation without cooperative movement. But there cannot be cooperative movement without cooperation, because cooperation is an indispensable premise for the existence of cooperative movement. Both the precursors of the cooperative movement and the classics of Marxism agreed on the necessity of cooperative formation. Lenin called socialism “the regime o...

Cooperative Learning: Developments in Research

Science.gov (United States)

Gillies, Robyn M.

2014-01-01

Cooperative learning is widely recognized as a pedagogical practice that promotes socialization and learning among students from kindergarten through to college level and across different subject areas. Cooperative learning involves students working together to achieve common goals or complete group tasks. Interest in cooperative learning has…

Reciprocity Outperforms Conformity to Promote Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Romano, Angelo; Balliet, Daniel

2017-10-01

Evolutionary psychologists have proposed two processes that could give rise to the pervasiveness of human cooperation observed among individuals who are not genetically related: reciprocity and conformity. We tested whether reciprocity outperformed conformity in promoting cooperation, especially when these psychological processes would promote a different cooperative or noncooperative response. To do so, across three studies, we observed participants' cooperation with a partner after learning (a) that their partner had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials and (b) that their group members had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials with that same partner. Although we found that people both reciprocate and conform, reciprocity has a stronger influence on cooperation. Moreover, we found that conformity can be partly explained by a concern about one's reputation-a finding that supports a reciprocity framework.

7 CFR 1425.19 - Member cooperatives.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Member cooperatives. 1425.19 Section 1425.19... OF AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS § 1425.19 Member cooperatives. A CMA may obtain loans or LDP's on behalf of a member cooperative when the member...

Predisposed to cooperate

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Cathryn Costello

2013-09-01

Full Text Available Recent research in Toronto and Geneva indicates that asylum seekers and refugees are predisposed to be cooperative with the refugee status determination system and other immigration procedures, and that the design of alternatives to detention can create, foster and support this cooperative predisposition – or can undermine or even demolish it.

Helping Children Cooperate

Science.gov (United States)

Pica, Rae

2011-01-01

There are occasions in life when the competitive process is appropriate. But when people consider the relationships in their lives--with friends, family members, coworkers, and the larger community--they realize the value of cooperation. When adults give children the chance to cooperate, to work together toward a solution or a common goal like…

Soft cooperation systems and games

Science.gov (United States)

Fernández, J. R.; Gallego, I.; Jiménez-Losada, A.; Ordóñez, M.

2018-04-01

A cooperative game for a set of agents establishes a fair allocation of the profit obtained for their cooperation. In order to obtain this allocation, a characteristic function is known. It establishes the profit of each coalition of agents if this coalition decides to act alone. Originally players are considered symmetric and then the allocation only depends on the characteristic function; this paper is about cooperative games with an asymmetric set of agents. We introduced cooperative games with a soft set of agents which explains those parameters determining the asymmetry among them in the cooperation. Now the characteristic function is defined not over the coalitions but over the soft coalitions, namely the profit depends not only on the formed coalition but also on the attributes considered for the players in the coalition. The best known of the allocation rules for cooperative games is the Shapley value. We propose a Shapley kind solution for soft games.

Political Ideology, Trust, and Cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Balliet, Daniel; Tybur, Joshua M.; Wu, Junhui; Antonellis, Christian; Van Lange, Paul A. M.

2016-01-01

Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before (n = 362) and after (n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners’ outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis (r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups. PMID:29593363

Formation, “Gold Rule” for the cooperative development

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alcides López Labrada

2013-06-01

Full Text Available Before the arising of the cooperative movement in the world, cooperation already existed. So, it is logical to affirm that there can be cooperation without cooperative movement. But there cannot be cooperative movement without cooperation, because cooperation is an indispensable premise for the existence of cooperative movement. Both the precursors of the cooperative movement and the classics of Marxism agreed on the necessity of cooperative formation. Lenin called socialism “the regime of cultured cooperators” and the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA contemplated the following, among the seven universal principles of the cooperative movement: education, formation and training of cooperative members, as one of the most important and strategic principles. They have been recognized as the golden rule of the cooperative movement. The changes occurred in Cuba (the existence and evolution of different types of cooperatives, the updating of the economic model, the dynamics of the agrarian sector and the opening of the cooperative movement towards other sectors of the National Economy fully justify the achievement of a cooperative culture, not only of cooperative members but also the actors that perform around cooperatives, the decision- makers and all society. Among the most significant proposals for the achievement of a cooperative culture in Cuba the following can be found: to integrate the different actors that participate in the cooperative formation by means of a national network for cooperative formation by identifying the training demand and training the people that should really implement the change, while building capacities of all the individuals involved in the cooperative movement in a direct or indirect way.

Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Cronin, Katherine A; Acheson, Daniel J; Hernández, Penélope; Sánchez, Angel

2015-12-22

Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, yet the effect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants competed to earn hierarchy positions and then could cooperate with another individual in the hierarchy by investing in a common effort. Cooperation was achieved if the combined investments exceeded a threshold, and the higher ranked individual distributed the spoils unless control was contested by the partner. Compared to a condition lacking hierarchy, cooperation declined in the presence of a hierarchy due to a decrease in investment by lower ranked individuals. Furthermore, hierarchy was detrimental to cooperation regardless of whether it was earned or arbitrary. These findings mirror results from nonhuman primates and demonstrate that hierarchies are detrimental to cooperation. However, these results deviate from nonhuman primate findings by demonstrating that human behavior is responsive to changing hierarchical structures and suggests partnership dynamics that may improve cooperation. This work introduces a controlled way to investigate the social influences on human behavior, and demonstrates the evolutionary continuity of human behavior with other primate species.

Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Amandine Ghintran

2010-09-01

Full Text Available We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

Cooperative Learning in Elementary Schools

Science.gov (United States)

Slavin, Robert E.

2015-01-01

Cooperative learning refers to instructional methods in which students work in small groups to help each other learn. Although cooperative learning methods are used for different age groups, they are particularly popular in elementary (primary) schools. This article discusses methods and theoretical perspectives on cooperative learning for the…

Nuclear energy and international cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oshima, Keiichi

1981-01-01

There is no need to emphasize that nuclear energy cannot be developed without international cooperation at either the industrial or the academic level. In the meanwhile, there have been some marked political, economic and social changes in recent years which are posing constraints to the international cooperation in nuclear energy. The problems and constraints impeding nuclear power programs cannot be overcome by only one nation; international cooperation with common efforts to solve the problems is essential. Nuclear energy is different from fossil energy resources in that it is highly technology-intensive while others are resource-intensive. International cooperation in technology has an entirely different importance in the field of nuclear energy. Educational institutions will play a role in a new era of the international cooperation. (Mori, K.)

Transparency in Cooperative Online Education

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Dalsgaard, Christian; Paulsen, Morten Flate

2009-01-01

The purpose of this article is to discuss the following question: What is the potential of social networking within cooperative online education? Social networking does not necessarily involve communication, dialogue, or collaboration. Instead, the authors argue that transparency is a unique...... feature of social networking services. Transparency gives students insight into each other’s actions. Cooperative learning seeks to develop virtual learning environments that allow students to have optimal individual freedom within online learning communities. This article demonstrates how cooperative...... learning can be supported by transparency. To illustrate this with current examples, the article presents NKI Distance Education’s surveys and experiences with cooperative learning. The article discusses by which means social networking and transparency may be utilized within cooperative online education...

Cooperation: the foundation of improvement.

Science.gov (United States)

Clemmer, T P; Spuhler, V J; Berwick, D M; Nolan, T W

1998-06-15

Cooperation--working together to produce mutual benefit or attain a common purpose--is almost inseparable from the quest for improvement. Although the case for cooperation can be made on ethical grounds, neither the motivation for nor the effects of cooperation need to be interpreted solely in terms of altruism. Cooperation can be a shrewd and pragmatic strategy for accomplishing personal goals in an interdependent system. Earlier papers in this series have explored the conceptual roots of modern approaches to improvement, which lie in systems theory. To improve systems, we must usually attend first and foremost to interactions. Among humans, "better interaction" is almost synonymous with "better cooperation." Physicians have ample opportunities and, indeed, an obligation to cooperate with other physicians in the same or different specialties, with nurses and other clinical workers, with administrators, and with patients and families. Many intellectual disciplines have made cooperation an object of study. These include anthropology; social psychology; genetics; biology; mathematics; game theory; linguistics; operations research; economics; and, of course, moral and rational philosophy. Scientifically grounded methods to enhance cooperation include developing a shared purpose; creating an open, safe environment; including all who share a common purpose and encouraging diverse viewpoints; negotiating agreement; and insisting on fairness and equity in the application of rules. These methods apply at the organizational level and at the level of the individual physician. This paper describes the application of these methods at the organizational level and focuses on one especially successful example of system-level cooperation in a care delivery site where interactions matter a great deal: the modern intensive care unit.

Groundwater Management at Varamin Plain: The Consideration of Stochastic and Environmental Effects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Najafi Alamdarlo, H.; Ahmadian, M.; Khalilian, S.

2016-01-01

Groundwater is one of the common resources in Varamin Plain, but due to over extraction it has been exposed to ruin. This phenomenon will lead to economic and environmental problems. On the other hand, the world is expected to face with more stochastic events of water supply. Furthermore, incorporating stochastic consideration of water supply becomes more acute in designing water facilities. Therefore, the strategies should be applied to improve managing resources and increase the efficiency of irrigation system. Hence, in this study the effect of efficiency improvement of irrigation system on the exploitation of groundwater and cropping pattern is examined in deterministic and stochastic condition using Nash bargaining theory. The results showed that farmers in B scenario are more willing to cooperate and as a result of their cooperation, they lose only 3 percentages of their present value of the objective function. Therefore, the efficiency improvement of irrigation system can result in improving the cooperation between farmers and increasing the amount of reserves.Groundwater is one of the common resources in Varamin Plain, but due to over extraction it has been exposed to ruin. This phenomenon will lead to economic and environmental problems. On the other hand, the world is expected to face with more stochastic events of water supply. Furthermore, incorporating stochastic consideration of water supply becomes more acute in designing water facilities. Therefore, the strategies should be applied to improve managing resources and increase the efficiency of irrigation system. Hence, in this study the effect of efficiency improvement of irrigation system on the exploitation of groundwater and cropping pattern is examined in deterministic and stochastic condition using Nash bargaining theory. The results showed that farmers in B scenario are more willing to cooperate and as a result of their cooperation, they lose only 3 percentages of their present value of the

Does intuition cause cooperation?

Science.gov (United States)

Verkoeijen, Peter P J L; Bouwmeester, Samantha

2014-01-01

Recently, researchers claimed that people are intuitively inclined to cooperate with reflection causing them to behave selfishly. Empirical support for this claim came from experiments using a 4-player public goods game with a marginal return of 0.5 showing that people contributed more money to a common project when they had to decide quickly (i.e., a decision based on intuition) than when they were instructed to reflect and decide slowly. This intuitive-cooperation effect is of high scientific and practical importance because it argues against a central assumption of traditional economic and evolutionary models. The first experiment of present study was set up to examine the generality of the intuitive-cooperation effect and to further validate the experimental task producing the effect. In Experiment 1, we investigated Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers' contributions to a 4-player public goods game with a marginal return of 0.5 while we manipulated the knowledge about the other players' contribution to the public goods game (contribution known vs. contribution unknown), the identity of the other players (humans vs. computers randomly generating contributions) and the time constraint (time pressure/intuition vs. forced delay/reflection). However, the results of Experiment 1 failed to reveal an intuitive-cooperation effect. Furthermore, four subsequent direct replications attempts with AMT workers (Experiments 2a, 2b, 2c and Experiment 3, which was conducted with naïve/inexperienced participants) also failed to demonstrate intuitive-cooperation effects. Taken together, the results of the present study could not corroborate the idea that people are intuitively cooperative, hence suggesting that the theoretical relationship between intuition and cooperation should be further scrutinized.

Does intuition cause cooperation?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Peter P J L Verkoeijen

Full Text Available Recently, researchers claimed that people are intuitively inclined to cooperate with reflection causing them to behave selfishly. Empirical support for this claim came from experiments using a 4-player public goods game with a marginal return of 0.5 showing that people contributed more money to a common project when they had to decide quickly (i.e., a decision based on intuition than when they were instructed to reflect and decide slowly. This intuitive-cooperation effect is of high scientific and practical importance because it argues against a central assumption of traditional economic and evolutionary models. The first experiment of present study was set up to examine the generality of the intuitive-cooperation effect and to further validate the experimental task producing the effect. In Experiment 1, we investigated Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT workers' contributions to a 4-player public goods game with a marginal return of 0.5 while we manipulated the knowledge about the other players' contribution to the public goods game (contribution known vs. contribution unknown, the identity of the other players (humans vs. computers randomly generating contributions and the time constraint (time pressure/intuition vs. forced delay/reflection. However, the results of Experiment 1 failed to reveal an intuitive-cooperation effect. Furthermore, four subsequent direct replications attempts with AMT workers (Experiments 2a, 2b, 2c and Experiment 3, which was conducted with naïve/inexperienced participants also failed to demonstrate intuitive-cooperation effects. Taken together, the results of the present study could not corroborate the idea that people are intuitively cooperative, hence suggesting that the theoretical relationship between intuition and cooperation should be further scrutinized.

Chromodynamics of cooperation in finite populations.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Arne Traulsen

2007-03-01

Full Text Available The basic idea of tag-based models for cooperation is that individuals recognize each other via arbitrary signals, so-called tags. If there are tags of different colors, then cooperators can always establish new signals of recognition. The resulting "chromodynamics" is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Cooperators use a secret tag until they are discovered by defectors who then destroy cooperation based on this tag. Subsequently, a fraction of the population manages to establish cooperation based on a new tag.We derive a mathematical description of stochastic evolutionary dynamics of tag-based cooperation in populations of finite size. Benefit and cost of cooperation are given by b and c. We find that cooperators are more abundant than defectors if b/c > 1+2u/v, where u is the mutation rate changing only the strategy and v is the mutation rate changing strategy and tag. We study specific assumptions for u and v in two genetic models and one cultural model.In a genetic model, tag-based cooperation only evolves if a gene encodes both strategy and tag. In a cultural model with equal mutation rates between all possible phenotypes (tags and behaviors, the crucial condition is b/c > (K+1/(K-1, where K is the number of tags. A larger number of tags requires a smaller benefit-to-cost ratio. In the limit of many different tags, the condition for cooperators to have a higher average abundance than defectors becomes b > c.

The governance of cooperative societies

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yaiza Juanes Sobradillo

2005-12-01

Full Text Available The present work aims to expose the appropriate legislation for cooperative societies to which Article 129 of the Spanish Constitution refers, deepen the analysis of the organs of management and control based on the Spanish and Basque Laws on Cooperatives and the Statute for the European Cooperative Societies.

Does facial resemblance enhance cooperation?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Trang Giang

Full Text Available Facial self-resemblance has been proposed to serve as a kinship cue that facilitates cooperation between kin. In the present study, facial resemblance was manipulated by morphing stimulus faces with the participants' own faces or control faces (resulting in self-resemblant or other-resemblant composite faces. A norming study showed that the perceived degree of kinship was higher for the participants and the self-resemblant composite faces than for actual first-degree relatives. Effects of facial self-resemblance on trust and cooperation were tested in a paradigm that has proven to be sensitive to facial trustworthiness, facial likability, and facial expression. First, participants played a cooperation game in which the composite faces were shown. Then, likability ratings were assessed. In a source memory test, participants were required to identify old and new faces, and were asked to remember whether the faces belonged to cooperators or cheaters in the cooperation game. Old-new recognition was enhanced for self-resemblant faces in comparison to other-resemblant faces. However, facial self-resemblance had no effects on the degree of cooperation in the cooperation game, on the emotional evaluation of the faces as reflected in the likability judgments, and on the expectation that a face belonged to a cooperator rather than to a cheater. Therefore, the present results are clearly inconsistent with the assumption of an evolved kin recognition module built into the human face recognition system.

Cooperative Tagging Center (CTC)

Data.gov (United States)

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce — The Cooperative Tagging Center (CTC) began as the Cooperative Game Fish Tagging Program (GTP) at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute (WHOI) in 1954. The GTP was...

Astronaut Gordon Cooper during flight tests

Science.gov (United States)

1963-01-01

Astronaut L. Gordon Cooper, prime pilot for the Mercury-Atlas 9 mission, relaxes while waiting for weight and balance tests to begin (03974); Cooper prior to entering the Mercury Spacecraft for a series of simulated flight tests. During these tests NASA doctors, engineers and technicians monitor Cooper's performance (03975); Cooper undergoing suit pressurization tests (03976).

26 CFR 1.1382-3 - Taxable income of cooperatives; special deductions for exempt farmers' cooperatives.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... deductions for exempt farmers' cooperatives. 1.1382-3 Section 1.1382-3 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE... Patrons § 1.1382-3 Taxable income of cooperatives; special deductions for exempt farmers' cooperatives. (a) In general. (1) Section 1382(c) provides that in determining the taxable income of a farmers', fruit...

The Cooperative Education as central axis for the integral Formation in the cooperative sector

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Iriadna Marín de León

2013-06-01

Full Text Available The cooperative constitutes one of the most important sectors in the economy in any economic formation - social, its fundamental cell is the man's integral development who should be capable for, from a reflexive and creative position, to assume the challenges that it implies an efficient and effective administration in function of the cooperative company. It is the educational dimension in cooperative values the key for the future, conceived in a systematic way and assuming an appropriate methodological conception. In this perspective, leaving of the theoretical foundation of the administration of the human resources in general, he intends to be carried out an integral analysis of the formation processes and education for the cooperative with the purpose of valuing the central aspects of this thematic one, leaving of the fact that the education constitutes the medullary element that leads to a true cooperative formation.

China-Africa: New Directions of Cooperation

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L V Ponomarenko

2015-12-01

Full Text Available This article analyzes the policy of fifth generation of Chinese leadership with regard to African states. The article deals with the concept of “Chinese Dream”, which was first declared in Africa, an innovative model of international cooperation in the framework of the formation of “economic zone of the Silk Road”. The authors reveal three basic directions of cooperation - political, economic and humanitarian cooperation. Political cooperation is characterized by the activation of mutual visits at the highest level, the interaction in the framework of the UN General Assembly, participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Economic cooperation is characterized by the activation of bilateral trade, the transition to a “modernized version of” investment cooperation, implementation of the strategy of “going abroad” of Chinese products, imports of natural resources from Africa, creating jobs for the local population, financing of infrastructure projects, the transfer of labor-intensive industries in Africa. Humanitarian cooperation includes training program for Africa, the implementation of the Sino-African programs, technology partnerships, research and exchange, and the China-Africa Forum “Think Tank”. Cooperation in health care also plays an important role. The authors note that the new Chinese leadership declares transition to an upgraded version of the Sino-African cooperation.

Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Cronin, Katherine A.; Acheson, Daniel J.; Hernández, Penélope; Sánchez, Angel

2015-01-01

Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, yet the effect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants competed to earn hierarchy positions and then could cooperate with another individual in the hierarchy by investing in a common effort. Cooperation was achieved if the combined investments exceeded a threshold, and the higher ranked individual distributed the spoils unless control was contested by the partner. Compared to a condition lacking hierarchy, cooperation declined in the presence of a hierarchy due to a decrease in investment by lower ranked individuals. Furthermore, hierarchy was detrimental to cooperation regardless of whether it was earned or arbitrary. These findings mirror results from nonhuman primates and demonstrate that hierarchies are detrimental to cooperation. However, these results deviate from nonhuman primate findings by demonstrating that human behavior is responsive to changing hierarchical structures and suggests partnership dynamics that may improve cooperation. This work introduces a controlled way to investigate the social influences on human behavior, and demonstrates the evolutionary continuity of human behavior with other primate species. PMID:26692287

Role reversal and problem solving in international negotiations: the Partial Nuclear Test Ban case

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

King, T.D.

1978-01-01

To facilitate finding bargaining space and to reinforce cooperative potential, a number of analysts have promoted the use of role reversal and problem solving. Role reversal involves restating the positions of one's adversary to demonstrate understanding and to develop empathy, while problem solving involves searching for alternatives that promote joint interests. The case of the negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference from 1962--1963 leading to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty provided the context for examining bargaining relationships involving role reversal and problem solving. Interactions among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, as recorded in transcripts of 112 sessions, were coded using Bargaining Process Analysis II, a content analysis instrument used to classify negotiation behaviors. Role reversal was measured by the frequency of paraphrases of the adversary's positions. Problem solving was measured by the frequency of themes promoting the exploration of alternatives and the search for mutually beneficial outcomes. The findings on the use of paraphrasing suggest that it can be used to restrict exploration as well as to promote it. The exploratory focus of problem solving was somewhat limited by its use in association with demands, suggesting that problem solving was interpreted as a sign of weakness

Exploring Hope, Self-Efficacy, Procrastination, and Study Skills between Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Education Students

Science.gov (United States)

Drysdale, Maureen T. B.; McBeath, Margaret

2014-01-01

The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between participation in cooperative education, and several psychological constructs believed to be related to success in both academic and professional settings. Participants, undergraduate cooperative (n = 1224) and non-cooperative education (n = 746) students in all years of study and from…

Nordic Energy Policy Cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Jørgensen, Birte Holst

2016-01-01

Brundtland Commission Report, and climate change became a common concern. Energy technology cooperation was an integral part of Nordic energy policy cooperation from the very beginning. The Nordic Energy Research Programme was established with funding from each of the Nordic countries, and was earmarked...... by a committee of senior officials and a secretariat. This was characterised by an incremental development of the cooperation based on consensus, mutual understanding and trust facilitated through exchange of experiences, work groups, seminars, educational activities and mobility schemes for energy policy...

Hormonal mechanisms of cooperative behaviour

Science.gov (United States)

Soares, Marta C.; Bshary, Redouan; Fusani, Leonida; Goymann, Wolfgang; Hau, Michaela; Hirschenhauser, Katharina; Oliveira, Rui F.

2010-01-01

Research on the diversity, evolution and stability of cooperative behaviour has generated a considerable body of work. As concepts simplify the real world, theoretical solutions are typically also simple. Real behaviour, in contrast, is often much more diverse. Such diversity, which is increasingly acknowledged to help in stabilizing cooperative outcomes, warrants detailed research about the proximate mechanisms underlying decision-making. Our aim here is to focus on the potential role of neuroendocrine mechanisms on the regulation of the expression of cooperative behaviour in vertebrates. We first provide a brief introduction into the neuroendocrine basis of social behaviour. We then evaluate how hormones may influence known cognitive modules that are involved in decision-making processes that may lead to cooperative behaviour. Based on this evaluation, we will discuss specific examples of how hormones may contribute to the variability of cooperative behaviour at three different levels: (i) within an individual; (ii) between individuals and (iii) between species. We hope that these ideas spur increased research on the behavioural endocrinology of cooperation. PMID:20679116

Household Income Composition and Household Goods

OpenAIRE

Voynov, Ivan

2005-01-01

The paper focuses on the change in household income composition and the factors that determine it. The results bring additional knowledge about household poverty dynamics. Based on the collective approach to the family and the cooperative game theory it is constructed theoretical model of household income composition change. The change in income composition is a result from bargaining between household members in attempt to defend the most suitable for them income source. Decisive influence i...

Forestry cooperatives: past and present

Science.gov (United States)

Mark G. Rickenbach

2006-01-01

Forest landowner cooperatives are not a new phenomenon, but past efforts to create and sustain these businesses have been largely unsuccessful in the U.S. Before and just after World War II saw significant investment in cooperative development that failed to create durable business. The purpose of this chapter is to briefly describe the history of forestry cooperatives...

Cooperative Bacterial Foraging Optimization

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Hanning Chen

2009-01-01

Full Text Available Bacterial Foraging Optimization (BFO is a novel optimization algorithm based on the social foraging behavior of E. coli bacteria. This paper presents a variation on the original BFO algorithm, namely, the Cooperative Bacterial Foraging Optimization (CBFO, which significantly improve the original BFO in solving complex optimization problems. This significant improvement is achieved by applying two cooperative approaches to the original BFO, namely, the serial heterogeneous cooperation on the implicit space decomposition level and the serial heterogeneous cooperation on the hybrid space decomposition level. The experiments compare the performance of two CBFO variants with the original BFO, the standard PSO and a real-coded GA on four widely used benchmark functions. The new method shows a marked improvement in performance over the original BFO and appears to be comparable with the PSO and GA.

Signaling emotion and reason in cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Levine, Emma E; Barasch, Alixandra; Rand, David; Berman, Jonathan Z; Small, Deborah A

2018-05-01

We explore the signal value of emotion and reason in human cooperation. Across four experiments utilizing dyadic prisoner dilemma games, we establish three central results. First, individuals infer prosocial feelings and motivations from signals of emotion. As a result, individuals believe that a reliance on emotion signals that one will cooperate more so than a reliance on reason. Second, these beliefs are generally accurate-those who act based on emotion are more likely to cooperate than those who act based on reason. Third, individuals' behavioral responses towards signals of emotion and reason depend on their own decision mode: those who rely on emotion tend to conditionally cooperate (that is, cooperate only when they believe that their partner has cooperated), whereas those who rely on reason tend to defect regardless of their partner's signal. These findings shed light on how different decision processes, and lay theories about decision processes, facilitate and impede cooperation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

¿EXISTE UNA CULTURA COOPERATIVA ORGANIZACIONAL EN TRABAJADORES COOPERATIVISTAS Y NO COOPERATIVISTAS?/IS THERE A CULTURE IN ORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATIVE WORKERS COOPERATIVES AND NO COOPERATIVES?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Francisco DIAZ BRETONES

2009-01-01

Full Text Available En este trabajo se explora si el tipo de cultura cooperativa influye en la estructura de valores personales. Asumiendo que los valores son elementos cambiantes, hipotetizamos que aquellas personas que trabajan en cooperativas desarrollarán perfiles de valores más colectivistas que otros trabajadores de empresas no cooperativas, de manera que la cooperativa tendría una función formativa y de conformación en el desarrollo de valores más colectivistas hacia todos sus integrantes, frete a otro tipo de empresas. Para estudiar este problema de investigación, llevamos a cabo una investigación en dos empresas cooperativas y otras dos no cooperativas. En total se recogieron 148 cuestionarios (74 de trabajadores de cooperativas y 74 de no cooperativas. Los resultados muestran como ambos grupos poseen diferencias significativas aunque no el sentido esperado. /In this work it is explored if the type of cooperative culture influences the structure of personal values. Assuming that the values are changeable elements, suppose that those persons who are employed at cooperatives will develop profiles of more collectivist values than other workpeople of not cooperative companies, so that the cooperative would have a formative function in the development of the most collectivist values towards all his members, opposite to another type of companies. To study this investigation problem, we carry out an investigation in two cooperative companies and other two not co-operatives. In whole there were gathered 148 questionnaires (74 of workpeople of cooperatives and 74 of not cooperatives.The results show both groups possess significant differences although not the awaited ones.

Cooperative Mobile Web Browsing

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Perrucci, GP; Fitzek, FHP; Zhang, Qi

2009-01-01

This paper advocates a novel approach for mobile web browsing based on cooperation among wireless devices within close proximity operating in a cellular environment. In the actual state of the art, mobile phones can access the web using different cellular technologies. However, the supported data......-range links can then be used for cooperative mobile web browsing. By implementing the cooperative web browsing on commercial mobile phones, it will be shown that better performance is achieved in terms of increased data rate and therefore reduced access times, resulting in a significantly enhanced web...

Cooperation, trust and confidence

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Korver, T.; Oeij, P.R.A.; Urze, P.C.G.D.

2007-01-01

Environmental complexity may strain cooperative relationships, both within and beyond organizations, for two reasons. First, when complexity implies uncertainty the predictability of change disappears. Secondly, change may and often will entail different estimates of the cooperating partners on the

Tax cooperation among member states of European Union and Directive on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Josimovski Aleksandar G.

2013-01-01

Full Text Available Countries have possibility to choose between several alternatives for cooperation in international tax matters at global level. They can decide not to cooperate or provide some form of tax cooperation. Because of harmful tax competition among countries and efforts of international organizations, all countries in the world are oblidged to comply with one of multiple alternatives for tax cooperation. Situation in European Union (hereinafter EU is specific. EU is not country or classic international organization. By the reason of its successful functioning, EU has need for tax cooperation. EU has attempted to harmonise tax policies of member states, but member states did not approve that. Only indirect taxes are harmonized on EU level, direct taxes are harmonized only to the point necessarily for functioning of single market. That is why tax cooperation instruments are so important. Object of this paper are procedures and measures, stipulated by the most important instrument in the field of tax cooperation enacted by institutions of EU, its development and status in international tax law. Regulatives and directives in field of tax cooperation in the EU are 'pioneers' in tax matters. EU instruments provide standards which are subsequently accepted by several international organizations - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD and United Nations (UN. Our purpose is to present positive and negative aspects of tax cooperation in the EU. In time of crisis efficient tax cooperation provides higher revenues for the member states, on the other hand, taxpayers and tax administrations have increased expenses as result of tax cooperation which are not fairly distributed.

Cooperative Experimental System Development - cooperative techniques beyound initial design and analysis

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Grønbæk, Kaj; Kyng, Morten; Mogensen, Preben Holst

1995-01-01

This chapter represents a step towards the establishment of a new system development approach, called Cooperative Experimental System Development (CESD). CESD seeks to overcome a number of limitations in existing approaches: specification oriented methods usually assume that system design can....../design activities of development projects. In contrast, the CESD approach is characterized by its focus on: active user involvement throughout the entire development process; prototyping experiments closely coupled to work-situations and use-scenarios; transforming results from early cooperative analysis...... be based solely on observation and detached reflection; prototyping methods often have a narrow focus on the technical construction of various kinds of prototypes; Participatory Design techniques—including the Scandinavian Cooperative Design (CD) approaches—seldom go beyond the early analysis...

Social learning in cooperative dilemmas.

Science.gov (United States)

Lamba, Shakti

2014-07-22

Helping is a cornerstone of social organization and commonplace in human societies. A major challenge for the evolutionary sciences is to explain how cooperation is maintained in large populations with high levels of migration, conditions under which cooperators can be exploited by selfish individuals. Cultural group selection models posit that such large-scale cooperation evolves via selection acting on populations among which behavioural variation is maintained by the cultural transmission of cooperative norms. These models assume that individuals acquire cooperative strategies via social learning. This assumption remains empirically untested. Here, I test this by investigating whether individuals employ conformist or payoff-biased learning in public goods games conducted in 14 villages of a forager-horticulturist society, the Pahari Korwa of India. Individuals did not show a clear tendency to conform or to be payoff-biased and are highly variable in their use of social learning. This variation is partly explained by both individual and village characteristics. The tendency to conform decreases and to be payoff-biased increases as the value of the modal contribution increases. These findings suggest that the use of social learning in cooperative dilemmas is contingent on individuals' circumstances and environments, and question the existence of stably transmitted cultural norms of cooperation. © 2014 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.

Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Nowak, Martin A.

2006-12-01

Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.

ITDB Cooperation With International Organizations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

IAEA illicit trafficking database cooperates with many international organizations. Among these organizations are Interpol, Universal Postal Union,and World Customs Organization. Other organizations are Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, UN Economic Commission for Europe, UN-Department of Disarmament Affairs and UN office for Drug and Crime. The cooperation with Interpol involves consultations on issues of training and technical assistance and other matters of common interest.

Cooperation, compensation and transition

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Ju, Y.

2004-01-01

Cooperation and compensation are two important and well-linked issues in economics. The central question in cooperation is how to share the joint gains among participating players. Compensation is a specific aspect of surplus sharing problems providing incentives for agents to sacrifice their own

Industrial Buyer-Supplier Cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Olsen, Rasmus Friis

The dissertation considers industrial buyer-supplier cooperation from a systems and management perspective. The purpose is to discuss and elaborate on the buying company’s choice of cooperation strategy (governance mechanism). It is stated that no single governance mechanism will be the best in all...

The cooperation between family and school in cooperative education of children and youth in the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

ELŻBIETA MAGIERA

2017-10-01

Full Text Available Pedagogical journalism and literature of the interwar period emphasised importance of the cooperation between family and school with respect to cooperative education of school-age children and youth. Cooperative education started usually in family through the formation of reason, will and emotions. Family home constituted a basic level of education and could repeatedly stimulate cooperative interests. Common work of the family at family farm or in craft or cottage industry business became the first school of cooperation and joint-action on which cooperative activity was based. Family home played a supporting part in the development of student cooperative. The acceptance of parents and their recognition, and sometimes their involvement in the work of student cooperation, were a form of encouragement for students and teachers for further activity of the cooperative. At the same time, student cooperative – in particular in rural areas – was a medium stimulating the parents of these students and the environment to cooperatistic actions. The social life of school was guided by the principle of convergence, i.e. its interpenetration and complementation by the family home and environment life. The idea of cooperation in the interwar educational system being accomplished in practice by means of student cooperatives had the possibilities of playing a very big part. This was determined by its broad application in educational activity of the Polish school as well as its understanding and acceptance by the family and environment. Important part was played by the tutor of student cooperative. His / her duty was to tighten the cooperation between student cooperative and family home which, on the one hand, ensured the understanding of teacher's actions and, on the other hand, provided material and moral assistance for the cooperative. At the same time, teacher – through student cooperative – could influence socially and educationally the family and

Cognitive Load and Cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Døssing, Felix Sebastian; Piovesan, Marco; Wengström, Erik Roland

2017-01-01

We study the effect of intuitive and reflective processes on cooperation using cognitive load. Compared with time constraint, which has been used in the previous literature, cognitive load is a more direct way to block reflective processes, and thus a more suitable way to study the link between...... intuition and cooperation. Using a repeated public goods game, we study the effect of different levels of cognitive load on contributions. We show that a higher cognitive load increases the initial level of cooperation. In particular, subjects are significantly less likely to fully free ride under high...... cognitive load....

Prospects for regional cooperation. Regional cooperation in remote monitoring for nuclear nonproliferation and transparency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olsen, John

2006-01-01

The JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have cooperated for a decade in development and testing of remote monitoring technologies in support of international safeguards. With this technology approaching maturity, the JAEA/SNL partnership now envisions regional cooperation to use these technologies to advance nuclear transparency and strengthen nonproliferation, as well. This presentation summarizes the technical evolution and notes the opportunity for regional cooperation to include institutions in the ROK, as well as Japan and the US. (author)

Territorial Cooperation With Non-Eu Regions

OpenAIRE

Rodriguez-Cohard, Juan Carlos; Alfonso, Javier; Vázquez-Barquero, Antonio

2012-01-01

TERRITORIAL COOPERATION WITH NON-EU REGIONS Territorial Cooperation (TC) has been possible because there is a trajectory of many years of work invested by the local actors, participants who have become the architects of TC through the city or region involved. Transcontinental cooperation as studied by the European Union TERCO project is providing important lessons for understanding TC. The purpose of the presentation is to analyze the Andalusian-North of Morocco territorial cooperation during...

Theoretical and methodological bases of the cooperation and the cooperative

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Claudio Alberto Rivera Rodríguez

2013-12-01

Full Text Available The present work has the purpose to approach the theoretical and methodological foundations of the rise of the cooperatives. In this article are studied the logical antecedents of the cooperativism, the premises  establish by  the Industrial Revolution for the emergence of the first modern cooperative “The Pioneers of Rochdale”  that  is  the inflection point of  cooperativism, until analyzing the contributions of the whole thinking  of the time that maintain this process.

Advisory and autonomous cooperative driving systems

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Broek, T.H.A. van den; Ploeg, J.; Netten, B.D.

2011-01-01

In this paper, the traffic efficiency of an advisory cooperative driving system, Advisory Acceleration Control is examined and compared to the efficiency of an autonomous cooperative driving system, Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control. The algorithms and implementation thereof are explained. The

Cooperation induces other cooperation: Fruiting bodies promote the evolution of macrocysts in Dictyostelium discoideum.

Science.gov (United States)

Shibasaki, Shota; Shirokawa, Yuka; Shimada, Masakazu

2017-05-21

Biological studies of the evolution of cooperation are challenging because this process is vulnerable to cheating. Many mechanisms, including kin discrimination, spatial structure, or by-products of self-interested behaviors, can explain this evolution. Here we propose that the evolution of cooperation can be induced by other cooperation. To test this idea, we used a model organism Dictyostelium discoideum because it exhibits two cooperative dormant phases, the fruiting body and the macrocyst. In both phases, the same chemoattractant, cyclic AMP (cAMP), is used to collect cells. This common feature led us to hypothesize that the evolution of macrocyst formation would be induced by coexistence with fruiting bodies. Before forming a mathematical model, we confirmed that macrocysts coexisted with fruiting bodies, at least under laboratory conditions. Next, we analyzed our evolutionary game theory-based model to investigate whether coexistence with fruiting bodies would stabilize macrocyst formation. The model suggests that macrocyst formation represents an evolutionarily stable strategy and a global invader strategy under this coexistence, but is unstable if the model ignores the fruiting body formation. This result indicates that the evolution of macrocyst formation and maintenance is attributable to coexistence with fruiting bodies. Therefore, macrocyst evolution can be considered as an example of evolution of cooperation induced by other cooperation. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cooperative Prototyping Experiments

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bødker, Susanne; Grønbæk, Kaj

1989-01-01

This paper describes experiments with a design technique that we denote cooperative prototyping. The experiments consider design of a patient case record system for municipal dental clinics in which we used HyperCard, an off the shelf programming environment for the Macintosh. In the ecperiments we...... tried to achieve a fluent work-like evaluation of prototypes where users envisioned future work with a computer tool, at the same time as we made on-line modifications of prototypes in cooperation with the users when breakdown occur in their work-like evaluation. The experiments showed...... that it was possible to make a number of direct manipulation changes of prototypes in cooperation with the users, in interplay with their fluent work-like evaluation of these. However, breakdown occurred in the prototyping process when we reached the limits of the direct manipulation support for modification. From...

Cooperative decision making in a stochastic environment

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Suijs, J.P.M.

1998-01-01

Cooperative game theory is a mathematical tool to analyze situations involving several individuals who can obtain certain benefits by cooperating. The main questions this theory addresses are who will cooperate with whom and how will the corresponding benefits be divided. Most results of cooperative

Is Cooperative Memory Special? The Role of Costly Errors, Context, and Social Network Size When Remembering Cooperative Actions

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tim Winke

2017-10-01

Full Text Available Theoretical studies of cooperative behavior have focused on decision strategies, such as tit-for-tat, that depend on remembering a partner’s last choices. Yet, an empirical study by Stevens et al. (2011 demonstrated that human memory may not meet the requirements that needed to use these strategies. When asked to recall the previous behavior of simulated partners in a cooperative memory task, participants performed poorly, making errors in 10–24% of the trials. However, we do not know the extent to which this task taps specialized cognition for cooperation. It may be possible to engage participants in more cooperative, strategic thinking, which may improve memory. On the other hand, compared with other situations, a cooperative context may already engage improved memory via cheater detection mechanisms. This study investigated the specificity of memory in cooperative contexts by varying (1 the costs of errors in memory by making forgetting defection more costly and (2 whether the recall situation is framed as a cooperative or neutral context. Also, we investigated whether variation in participants’ social network size could account for individual differences observed in memory accuracy. We found that neither including differential costs for misremembering defection nor removing the cooperative context influenced memory accuracy for cooperation. Combined, these results suggest that memory accuracy is robust to differences in the cooperative context: Adding more strategic components does not help accuracy, and removing cooperative components does not hurt accuracy. Social network size, however, did correlate with memory accuracy: People with larger networks remembered the events better. These findings suggest that cooperative memory does not seem to be special compared with other forms of memory, which aligns with previous work demonstrating the domain generality of memory. However, the demands of interacting in a large social network may

Establishment of International Cooperative Network and Cooperative Research Strategy Between Korea and USA on Nuclear Thermal Hydraulics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baek, Won Pil; Song, Chul Hwa; Jeong, Jae Jun; Choi, Ki Yong; Kang, Kyoung Ho

2004-07-01

1. Scope and Objectives of the Project - Successful holding of the NURETH-10 - Analysis of the international trends in technology development and applications for nuclear thermal-hydraulics - Establishment of the international cooperative network and cooperative research strategy between Korea and USA on nuclear thermal-hydraulics 2. Research Results - Successful holding of the NURETH-10 - Analysis of the international trends in technology development and applications for nuclear thermal-hydraulics: - Establishment of international cooperative network and cooperative research strategy focused between Korea and USA on nuclear thermal-hydraulics: 3. Application Plan of the Research Results - Utilization as the basic data/information in establishing the domestic R and D directions and the international cooperative research strategy, - Application of the relevant experiences and data bases of NURETH-10 for holding future international conferences, - Promote more effective and productive research cooperation between Korea and USA

South-South Development Cooperation and Soft Power. The case of Brazil's foreign policy and technical cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bry, Sandra

's participation in development cooperation and how these international political ambitions influence the project model of its South-South Development Cooperation, called technical cooperation. This was done by investigating the manifestations of ‘soft power’ in Brazilian development cooperation activities...... of the agent's attractive actions without which a country's soft power is non-existent. Therefore this thesis maintains that soft power theory should shift its current analytical focus from the agent to the subject and enhance the analysis on the role of subject's perceptions in the creation of ‘soft...

45 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL ADMINISTRATION PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects § 46.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative... conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and...

Building up active membership in cooperatives

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Verhees, F.J.H.M.; Sergaki, P.; Dijk, van G.

2015-01-01

Abstract Active membership is crucial for agricultural cooperatives as it engenders better performance. It even is the key for cooperative competitiveness. Active membership, however, decreases in many cooperatives. Thus, it is important to know what galvanizes members to become active members. The

7 CFR 1220.107 - Cooperator organization.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperator organization. 1220.107 Section 1220.107... CONSUMER INFORMATION Soybean Promotion and Research Order Definitions § 1220.107 Cooperator organization. The term Cooperator Organization means the American Soybean Association, or any successor organization...

50 CFR 81.3 - Cooperative Agreement.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

...) FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE-WILDLIFE SPORT FISH RESTORATION PROGRAM CONSERVATION OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES OF FISH, WILDLIFE, AND PLANTS-COOPERATION WITH THE STATES § 81.3 Cooperative Agreement. Upon... Project Agreement can be approved for endangered or threatened species projects. A cooperative agreement...

A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperative Games

OpenAIRE

Suijs, J.P.M.

1996-01-01

This paper extends the definition of the nucleolus to stochastic cooperative games, that is, to cooperative games with random payoffs to the coalitions. It is shown that the nucleolus is nonempty and that it belongs to the core whenever the core is nonempty. Furthermore, it is shown for a particular class of stochastic cooperative games that the nucleolus can be determined by calculating the traditional nucleolus introduced by Schmeidler (1969) of a specific deterministic cooperative game.

On the relative advantage of cooperatives

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Albæk, Svend; Schultz, Christian

1998-01-01

We show that the fact that farmers in a cooperative individually decide how much to supply to the cooperative may serve as a commitment device for credibly (and profitably) gaining market share in competition with a profit maximizing firm......We show that the fact that farmers in a cooperative individually decide how much to supply to the cooperative may serve as a commitment device for credibly (and profitably) gaining market share in competition with a profit maximizing firm...

Regional cooperation planning. Project planning for JAEA/SNL regional cooperation on remote monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olsen, John

2006-01-01

Developing cooperation between the JAEA's NPSTC and the NNCA may take advantage of bilateral activities between those parties and SNL. The merger of JNC and JAERI has affected the schedule for JAEA/SNL cooperation. Also, the evolution of the NNCA as an independent agency has slowed the projected schedule for cooperation between the JAEA and the NNCA. A potential schedule for establishment of a quadrilateral remote monitoring system may include interim activities, securing an agreement of some type, and actual establishment of VPN links. A parallel schedule might exist for informing other regional parties and gaining their interest. (author)

Subsidizing R&D cooperatives

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hinloopen, J.

2001-01-01

A framework is developed with which the implementation of two commonly used R&D-stimulating policies can be evaluated: providing R&D subsidies and sustaining the formation of R&D cooperatives. Subsidized R&D cooperatives can also be analyzed. The analysis shows that providing R&D subsidies is more

University-Company Cooperation in a Hydroelectric Plant: Cooperation Study in Environmental Management

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Fabricio Mussi

2017-05-01

Full Text Available Hydroelectric power plants are considered strategic for the country when considering their relevance and impact on other sectors of the economy. However, the dynamics of the operation of a plant, its support structure and power generation activities can cause impacts on the environment, which must be constantly monitored in order to mitigate any environmental risks. The purpose of this study is to examine the partnership relations between a plant by menas of the creation of a department within the environmental management and universities and research institutes to identify specific partnerships in environmental management and hydroelectric plants. Six projects have been selected for analysis, four of them related to projects with universities and two related to cooperation with research institutes. The focus of the analysis was restricted to the main points observed in the management of these partnerships, which are: (a motivation for establishing partnerships, (b the composition of the estimated costs for implementing these partnerships, (c the difficulties of reconciling technical management and financial management, and (d the measurement of results and contributions from these interactions. Administrative practices of management of partnerships were also analyzed in the stages preceding cooperation for cooperation and further cooperation. Although other such studies are needed to strengthen the findings presented, one can conclude that the purposes of the establishment of cooperation in environmental management differ from those observed in other fields of knowledge such as engineering and biotechnology, for example.

Soviet/Russian-American space cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Karash, Yuri Y.

This dissertation seeks to answer two questions: (1) what are the necessary conditions for the emergence of meaningful space cooperation between Russia and the United States, and (2) might this cooperation continue developing on its own merit, contributing to the further rapprochement between the two countries, even if the conditions that originated the cooperation were to change? The study examines the entire space era up to this point, 1957 to 1997, from the first satellite launch through the joint U.S.-Russian work on the ISS project. It focuses on the analysis of three distinct periods of possible and real cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. The first possibility for a limited Soviet-American cooperation in space emerged in the late 1950s, together with the space age, and continued until the mid-1960s. The major potential joint project of this period was a human expedition to the Moon. The global competition/confrontation between the two countries prevented actual cooperation. The second period was from the late 1960s until 1985 with consideration of experimental docking missions, including the docking of a reusable U.S. shuttle to a Soviet Salyut-type station. The global U.S.-Soviet competition still continued, but the confrontation was replaced by detente for a brief period of time lasting from the end of 1960s until mid-1970s. Detente gave the first example of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space---the Apollo-Soyuz joint space flight (ASTP) which took place in 1975. However, the lack of interest of political leaderships in continuation of broad-scale cooperation between the two countries, and the end of detente, removed ASTP-like projects out of question at least until 1985. The third period started together with Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika in 1985 and continues until now. It involves almost a hundred of joint space projects both at the governmental and at the private sectors levels. The mainstream of the joint activities

Post-socialist agricultural cooperatives in Russia : A case study of top-down cooperatives in the Belgorod region

NARCIS (Netherlands)

A. Kurakin (Alexander); O. Visser (Oane)

2017-01-01

markdownabstractThrough a study of agricultural service cooperatives in Russia’s Belgorod region, this article addresses two gaps in the literature: _first_, the dearth of empirical studies on cooperatives in post-socialist Russia; _second_, the lack of attention to top-down cooperatives in

Instrumentation and controls training in TVA: a story of large numbers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Conner, D.L.

1981-01-01

The Tennessee Valley Authority currently has four nuclear units on line with seventeen units planned prior to the year 2000. Providing a permanent instrumentation and controls workforce, projected to be approximately 700 trades and labor craftsmen, is a formidable task requiring the cooperative efforts of many diverse groups: mangement and labor, engineers and craftsmen, students and instructors. In TVA, the primary source of skilled I and C craftsmen is through formal training programs conducted in cooperation with the craft bargaining unit, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. The purpose of this paper is to describe and review the progress of two of these programs: the Instrument Mechanic Training Program and the Senior Instrument Mechanic Training Program

Coordinating choice in partial cooperative equilibrium

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Mallozzi, L.; Tijs, S.H.

2009-01-01

In this paper we consider symmetric aggregative games and investigate partial cooperation between a portion of the players that sign a cooperative agreement and the rest of the players. Existence results of partial cooperative equilibria are obtained when the players who do not sign the agreement

Report: National Conference on Cooperative Education.

Science.gov (United States)

Bureau of Occupational and Adult Education (DHEW/OE), Washington, DC. Div. of Vocational and Technical Education.

The conference report on cooperative vocational education contains four main sections. The first, background papers, contains three papers: Education in a Changing Society, Carl H. Madden; A Prospectus for Cooperative Vocational Education, William F. Pierce; and Critical Issues in Cooperative Vocational Education, Robert M. Worthington. The second…

Human cooperation by lethal group competition.

Science.gov (United States)

Egas, Martijn; Kats, Ralph; van der Sar, Xander; Reuben, Ernesto; Sabelis, Maurice W

2013-01-01

Why humans are prone to cooperate puzzles biologists, psychologists and economists alike. Between-group conflict has been hypothesized to drive within-group cooperation. However, such conflicts did not have lasting effects in laboratory experiments, because they were about luxury goods, not needed for survival ("looting"). Here, we find within-group cooperation to last when between-group conflict is implemented as "all-out war" (eliminating the weakest groups). Human subjects invested in helping group members to avoid having the lowest collective pay-off, whereas they failed to cooperate in control treatments with random group elimination or with no subdivision in groups. When the game was repeated, experience was found to promote helping. Thus, not within-group interactions alone, not random group elimination, but pay-off-dependent group elimination was found to drive within-group cooperation in our experiment. We suggest that some forms of human cooperation are maintained by multi-level selection: reciprocity within groups and lethal competition among groups acting together.

The level of influence of trust, commitment, cooperation, and power in the interorganizational relationships of Brazilian credit cooperatives

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Denise Maria Martins

Full Text Available Abstract This article aims to analyze the level of influence of trust, commitment, cooperation, and power in the interrelationships of individual credit cooperatives and their central organization in Brazil. The quantitative and descriptive research was developed in unique credit unions linked to the Central Bank of Brazil and the Organization of Brazilian Cooperatives. The data were analyzed using structural equation modeling, with the estimation through partial least squares. The results obtained for the coefficients of determination (R2 of the endogenous latent variables confirmed the assumptions found in the theoretical models of Morgan and Hunt (1994 and Coote, Forrest, and Tam (2003. Statistical significance was also found in the relationships between power and trust, commitment and cooperation, trust and commitment, trust and cooperation, and power and commitment. However, in this study the relationship between power and commitment characterized the significance and was positive between the individual credit cooperatives and their central organization. This is in line with the understanding that power is the solution to resolving conflicts. The research identifies how the constructs of trust, commitment, cooperation, and power show relevance to the alignment of relations between individual credit cooperatives and their central organization.

Cooperation between territorial communities: theory and practice

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

П. М. Любченко

2015-05-01

Full Text Available Problem Setting. The paper analyzes the problems in the system of legal regulation of cooperation between communities, highlights the advantages and disadvantages of such cooperation in Ukrainian local government. Analysis of the recent researches and publications. The legal basis for cooperation in the field of local government are provisions of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, by-laws. The organizational principles of communities cooperation, principles, forms and mechanisms of such cooperation and its promotion, financing and monitoring prescribed by the Law of Ukraine «On cooperation of local communities» 17 June 2014, which provides five possible forms of cooperation. Paper main body. The first form - delegation to one party of cooperation by another parties of cooperation execution of one or few tasks with transferring of appropriate resources - one of the most difficult to implement, therefore in Ukraine it is not yet implemented. The second form – realization of joint projects, involving coordination of activities between parties of cooperation and accumulating them for a certain period resources to joint implementation of appropriate measures - one of the most common. This  form is popular because of its simplicity and versatility. Parties are determining the purpose of the project, terms and conditions of its implementation, a list of activities and conditions for their implementation, financial liabilities, other forms of local governments participation in implementation of the project and mechanism of coordination. The third and fourth forms aimed on the creation and maintenance of communal enterprises, institutions and organizations - joint infrastructure projects by parties of cooperation. This form of cooperation with the prospect of widespread use because it is aimed at ensuring effective use of resources of local communities based on common application available in one of the subjects of cooperation of municipal

Latin American cooperation on nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Faria, N.M. de; Associacao Brasileira de Direito Nuclear, Rio de Janeiro)

1984-01-01

The cooperation between Latin American countries on nuclear matters in which Brazil should play a significant role is presented. The possible areas for cooperation, particularly the nuclear law, are focused. The cooperation should be developed on bilateral or multilateral basis, by governmental and non governmental entities. (Author) [pt

Co-Operative Learning and Development Networks.

Science.gov (United States)

Hodgson, V.; McConnell, D.

1995-01-01

Discusses the theory, nature, and benefits of cooperative learning. Considers the Cooperative Learning and Development Network (CLDN) trial in the JITOL (Just in Time Open Learning) project and examines the relationship between theories about cooperative learning and the reality of a group of professionals participating in a virtual cooperative…

Autonomic computing enabled cooperative networked design

CERN Document Server

Wodczak, Michal

2014-01-01

This book introduces the concept of autonomic computing driven cooperative networked system design from an architectural perspective. As such it leverages and capitalises on the relevant advancements in both the realms of autonomic computing and networking by welding them closely together. In particular, a multi-faceted Autonomic Cooperative System Architectural Model is defined which incorporates the notion of Autonomic Cooperative Behaviour being orchestrated by the Autonomic Cooperative Networking Protocol of a cross-layer nature. The overall proposed solution not only advocates for the inc

Fostering cooperative activism through critical design

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Menendez Blanco, Maria; Bjørn, Pernille; De Angeli, Antonella

2017-01-01

Critical design is gaining momentum in interaction design, yet little CSCW research has focused on articulating the cooperative potentials of critical design artefacts. We address this gap by reflecting upon a design project aimed at overturning the prevailing narrative regarding dyslexia in Italy....... The adversarial propositions embedded in our critical design artefacts challenged the description of dyslexia as a learning disorder putting forward the view of a learning difference. These artefacts demonstrated their capacity to bridge heterogeneous social worlds (those of teachers, children, and parents......) into one cooperative entity and mobilise cooperative activism. The contribution to CSCW is two-fold. Firstly, we introduce the cooperative potentials of critical design artefacts; secondly, we propose critical design as a strategy for researchers engaging with cooperative activism....

Cooperative learning in 21st century

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

David W. Johnson

2014-10-01

Full Text Available The 21st century brings four important challenges in which cooperation plays a central role: (1 a rapidly increasing global interdependence that will result in increasing local diversity as well as more frequent and intense conflicts, (2 the increasing number of democracies throughout the world, (3 the need for creative entrepreneurs, and (4 the growing importance of interpersonal relationships that affect the development of personal identity. The tools for meeting these challenges include cooperative learning. In this article the nature of cooperative learning will be reviewed, the underlying theory of social interdependence will be discussed, and the results of the research on cooperative learning will be briefly reviewed. The way in which cooperative learning contributes to meeting the four challenges will then be discussed.

The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Svendsen, Adam David Morgan

"Providing an in-depth insight into the subject of intelligence cooperation (officially known as liason), this book explores the complexities of this process. Towards facilitating a general understanding of the professionalization of intelligence cooperation, Svendsen's analysis includes risk...... management and encourages the realisation of greater resilience. Svendsen discusses the controversial, mixed and uneven characterisations of the process of the professionalization of intelligence cooperation and argues for a degree of 'fashioning method out of mayhem' through greater operational...

Partner Choice in Raven (Corvus corax) Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Asakawa-Haas, Kenji; Schiestl, Martina; Bugnyar, Thomas; Massen, Jorg J M

2016-01-01

Although social animals frequently make decisions about when or with whom to cooperate, little is known about the underlying mechanisms of partner choice. Most previous studies compared different dyads' performances, though did not allow an actual choice among partners. We tested eleven ravens, Corvus corax, in triads, giving them first the choice to cooperate with either a highly familiar or a rather unfamiliar partner and, second, with either a friend or a non-friend using a cooperative string-pulling task. In either test, the ravens had a second choice and could cooperate with the other partner, given that this one had not pulled the string in the meantime. We show that during the experiments, these partner ravens indeed learn to wait and inhibit pulling, respectively. Moreover, the results of these two experiments show that ravens' preferences for a specific cooperation partner are not based on familiarity. In contrast, the ravens did show a preference based on relationship quality, as they did choose to cooperate significantly more with friends than with non-friends and they were also more proficient when cooperating with a friend. In order to further identify the proximate mechanism of this preference, we designed an open-choice experiment for the whole group where all birds were free to cooperate on two separate apparatuses. This set-up allowed us to distinguish between preferences for close proximity and preferences to cooperate. The results revealed that friends preferred staying close to each other, but did not necessarily cooperate with one another, suggesting that tolerance of proximity and not relationship quality as a whole may be the driving force behind partner choice in raven cooperation. Consequently, we stress the importance of experiments that allow such titrations and, suggest that these results have important implications for the interpretations of cooperation studies that did not include open partner choice.

The good governance and management  of cooperative societies under cooperative values: a didactic review

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

José Eduardo Souza de Miranda

2005-12-01

Full Text Available Regarding the administrative management of cooperative enterprises, the various cooperative laws establish the need to organize a social-democratic structure formed by all members of society.

Predicting Human Cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

John J Nay

Full Text Available The Prisoner's Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma (defection, when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner's Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner's Dilemma highlight that players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental predicament. We present the first computational model of human behavior in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual decisions. The model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game parameters and history of play. Our model is successful not merely at fitting the data, but in predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information about the game structure. We demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing how to best promote human cooperation.

Mobility, fitness collection, and the breakdown of cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Gelimson, Anatolij; Cremer, Jonas; Frey, Erwin

2013-04-01

The spatial arrangement of individuals is thought to overcome the dilemma of cooperation: When cooperators engage in clusters, they might share the benefit of cooperation while being more protected against noncooperating individuals, who benefit from cooperation but save the cost of cooperation. This is paradigmatically shown by the spatial prisoner's dilemma model. Here, we study this model in one and two spatial dimensions, but explicitly take into account that in biological setups, fitness collection and selection are separated processes occurring mostly on vastly different time scales. This separation is particularly important to understand the impact of mobility on the evolution of cooperation. We find that even small diffusive mobility strongly restricts cooperation since it enables noncooperative individuals to invade cooperative clusters. Thus, in most biological scenarios, where the mobility of competing individuals is an irrefutable fact, the spatial prisoner's dilemma alone cannot explain stable cooperation, but additional mechanisms are necessary for spatial structure to promote the evolution of cooperation. The breakdown of cooperation is analyzed in detail. We confirm the existence of a phase transition, here controlled by mobility and costs, which distinguishes between purely cooperative and noncooperative absorbing states. While in one dimension the model is in the class of the voter model, it belongs to the directed percolation universality class in two dimensions.

Forskningsoversigt - Effekterne af Cooperative Learning

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Larsen, Lea Lund

Kan Cooperative Learning - en undervisningsform hvor lærerens tid ved tavlen mindskes og hvor de lærende samarbejder om stoffet - maksimere de lærendes indlæring og medvirke til en forbedring af deres interpersonelle og kommunikative kompetencer, samt øge deres motivation for læring? Den megen...... forskning fra USA viser, at Cooperative Learning øger lærerens bevidsthed om, hvilken adfærd, han er medvirkende til at skabe blandt de lærende. Og den øger lærerens bevidsthed omkring interaktioner i klasserummet, og giver god plads og taletid til hver enkelt lærende. Set i lyset heraf kan Cooperative......, at Cooperative Learning har lige så høj grad af positiv effekt, som den viser sig at have på grundskoleområdet. Det er sigtet med denne oversigt over den empiriske forskning. Til start præsenteres Cooperative Learning som metode, dens rødder og udvikling, dernæst skitseres den omfattende forskning omkring...

International cooperation on breeder reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gray, J.E.; Kratzer, M.B.; Leslie, K.E.; Paige, H.W.; Shantzis, S.B.

1978-01-01

In March 1977, as the result of discussions which began in the fall of 1976, the Rockefeller Foundation requested International Energy Associates Limited (IEAL) to undertake a study of the role of international cooperation in the development and application of the breeder reactor. While there had been considerable international exchange in the development of breeder technology, the existence of at least seven major national breeder development programs raised a prima facie issue of the adequacy of international cooperation. The final product of the study was to be the identification of options for international cooperation which merited further consideration and which might become the subject of subsequent, more detailed analysis. During the course of the study, modifications in U.S. breeder policy led to an expansion of the analysis to embrace the pros and cons of the major breeder-related policy issues, as well as the respective views of national governments on those issues. The resulting examination of views and patterns of international collaboration emphasizes what was implicit from the outset: Options for international cooperation cannot be fashioned independently of national objectives, policies and programs. Moreover, while similarity of views can stimulate cooperation, this cannot of itself provide compelling justification for cooperative undertakings. Such undertakings are influenced by an array of other national factors, including technological development, industrial infrastructure, economic strength, existing international ties, and historic experience

How feeling betrayed affects cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Ramazi, Pouria; Hessel, Jop; Cao, Ming

2015-01-01

For a population of interacting self-interested agents, we study how the average cooperation level is affected by some individuals' feelings of being betrayed and guilt. We quantify these feelings as adjusted payoffs in asymmetric games, where for different emotions, the payoff matrix takes the structure of that of either a prisoner's dilemma or a snowdrift game. Then we analyze the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed population of agents, each of whom is associated with such a payoff matrix. At each time-step, an agent is randomly chosen from the population to update her strategy based on the myopic best-response update rule. According to the simulations, decreasing the feeling of being betrayed in a portion of agents does not necessarily increase the level of cooperation in the population. However, this resistance of the population against low-betrayal-level agents is effective only up to some extend that is explicitly determined by the payoff matrices and the number of agents associated with these matrices. Two other models are also considered where the betrayal factor of an agent fluctuates as a function of the number of cooperators and defectors that she encounters. Unstable behaviors are observed for the level of cooperation in these cases; however, we show that one can tune the parameters in the function to make the whole population become cooperative or defective.

How feeling betrayed affects cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Pouria Ramazi

Full Text Available For a population of interacting self-interested agents, we study how the average cooperation level is affected by some individuals' feelings of being betrayed and guilt. We quantify these feelings as adjusted payoffs in asymmetric games, where for different emotions, the payoff matrix takes the structure of that of either a prisoner's dilemma or a snowdrift game. Then we analyze the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed population of agents, each of whom is associated with such a payoff matrix. At each time-step, an agent is randomly chosen from the population to update her strategy based on the myopic best-response update rule. According to the simulations, decreasing the feeling of being betrayed in a portion of agents does not necessarily increase the level of cooperation in the population. However, this resistance of the population against low-betrayal-level agents is effective only up to some extend that is explicitly determined by the payoff matrices and the number of agents associated with these matrices. Two other models are also considered where the betrayal factor of an agent fluctuates as a function of the number of cooperators and defectors that she encounters. Unstable behaviors are observed for the level of cooperation in these cases; however, we show that one can tune the parameters in the function to make the whole population become cooperative or defective.

A Strategic-Equilibrium Based

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gabriel J. Turbay

2011-03-01

Full Text Available The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form, a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all players.  This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the stronger player paradox.  A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal

International nuclear cooperation in Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lim, Yong-Kyu

1987-01-01

Nuclear power project traditionally involve huge financial investment, highly sophisticated technology, and long lead time. Many countries, particularly developing ones, find it impossible to implement their nuclear power programs without technical cooperation and assistance from advanced countries. In this Asia and Pacific Region, seven countries have commercial nuclear power units in operation and/or under construction. Korea has six nuclear power units in operation, and three under construction. Active nuclear cooperation has been instrumental in implementing her abmitious nuclear power programs successfully. Nuclear cooperation is one of the widely recognized necessities, which is quite often talked about among the countries of the Asia and Pacific Region. But the differences in nuclear maturity and national interests among those in the region seem to be standing against it. Given the constraints, it is not easy to select appropriate areas for cooperation. There is no doubt, however, that they should include the nuclear policy, nuclear safety, radwaste management, radiological protection, and the management of nuclear units. In order to effectively promote nuclear cooperation in the Region, the scope of RCA activities must be expanded to include the nuclear power area. The Regional Nuclear Data Bank, the Regional Training Center and the Nuclear Emergency Response Center, for example, would be the effective tools for cooperation to meet the demands of the countries in the Region. In view of the technological gap between Japan and all others in the region, we cannot speak of a regional nuclear cooperation without heavily counting on Japan, the most advanced nuclear state in the region. For these reasons, Japan is expected to share an increasing portion of her nuclear technology with others. (author)

Need for cooperative work in education

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Rodolfo Acosta Padrón

2006-12-01

Full Text Available This paper claims for the use of cooperative work to achieve democratic, communicative and socializing learning; Furthermore, theoretical grounds for cooperative work are presented, from sociological and psychological positions about the development of cooperative work on the basis of Vigotsky, Kart Lewin and Dewey ́s works, among others.

Cooperation arrangements related to technology transfer

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eysel, G.

1986-04-01

A developing country which considers to launch a nuclear program should put as much as possible efforts to elaborate a program which suits the country's needs as well as reflects its capabilities. It deems advantageous that a developing country makes use of the experience and knowledge in the nuclear field of a partner country already in the phase when exploring the technical and commercial aspects of a nuclear power program. For the different stages of cooperation between two countries a three-level concept appears advisable for establishing the basis for individual cooperation agreement. The first level are agreements between the governments of both countries on joint scientific research projects and technical development programs covering a broad spectrum of activities not limited to the energy sector. At the second level cooperation agreements can already concentrate on the energy sector and e.g. specifically investigate the energy structure of the developing country. If this investigation results in the decision of the developing country to establish a nuclear power program the next level will cover a broad based cooperation in the nuclear field including a large number of different cooperation contracts in various fields. In this stage of bilateral cooperation the main emphasis will be put on industrial cooperation. Cooperation agreements to be concluded between respective partners of both countries may cover fields related to research and development, engineering of a nuclear power plant, manufacturing of its components, erection and installation as well as operation of the plant. The most common agreements refer to technical cooperation, which covers not only the transfer of blueprints but also training of the recipient's personnel in the partner's country and delegation of experts to the recipient's country. The most comprehensive form of cooperation is the foundation of a joint venture company where the technology partner does not only transfer his know

International relations and co-operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This bulletin contains information about activities of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD). In this leaflet the international relations and co-operation of the UJD are presented. International community is aware of the fact that nuclear energy shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and on condition of high standard of nuclear safety. Therefore, the long-term aim of UJD in the area of international relations is to maintain and develop internationally recognised system of state supervision upon the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to reach internationally accepted level of nuclear safety in the Slovak Republic. There are many important international treaties (Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Convention on Nuclear Safety, etc.) to which slovakia is a party. In order to meet the obligations of these treaties UJD has the main aim for contribute to the process of international disarmament, and to a mutually advantageous co-operation. By means of the most important international organisations (e.g. International Atomic Energy Agency) the Slovak Republic actively participates in the international co-operation. Under the leadership of UJD, Slovak institutions participate in many projects and activities which have the aim to improve the safety of nuclear international obligations. In addition, UJD actively participates in the integration process of the Slovak Republic into European and Trans-Atlantic structures. Since 1993 the co-operation with the European Commission and the Nuclear Energy Agency of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development (OECD/NEA) has been successfully implemented. Besides multilateral co-operation UJD attaches extraordinary importance to bilateral co-operation, in particular with neighbouring countries. Regular meetings of senior Slovak experts with foreign experts are organised, with the aim to exchange the newest experiences and information on peaceful use of nuclear energy. Also in

Proposals for regional cooperation in Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Diaco, T.

1999-01-01

This presentation includes proposals for regional cooperation in Africa in the field of seismic monitoring and proposes future actions for establishing this cooperation. It emphasises the benefits of regional cooperation meaning scientific benefit from an established data base, as well as benefit in the field of geology, meteorology, geophysics and in unified budgets and logistics

Culture and Cooperation during the Interwar Period

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Anişoara Popa

2015-05-01

Full Text Available Starting from the most important Publications of the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (1925-1946 we will explore the ideas concerning culture and personalities involved in the intellectual cooperation during the Interwar Period. Pointing out the role that the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation had and the Romanian contribution to this cooperation is another purpose of this article.

The Emergence of Relationship-based Cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Xu, Bo; Wang, Jianwei

2015-11-01

This paper investigates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation by coupling two simple mechanisms into the model: tie strength based investment preference and homophily assumption. We construct the model by categorizing game participants into four types: prosocialists (players who prefers to invest in their intimate friends), antisocialists (players who prefer to invest in strangers), egoists (players who never cooperate) and altruists (players who cooperate indifferently with anyone). We show that the relationship-based cooperation (prosocialists) is favored throughout the evolution if we assume players of the same type have stronger ties than different ones. Moreover, we discover that strengthening the internal bonds within the strategic clusters further promotes the competitiveness of prosocialists and therefore facilitates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation in our proposed scenarios. The robustness of the model is also tested under different strategy updating rules and network structures. The results show that this argument is robust against the variations of initial conditions and therefore can be considered as a fundamental theoretical framework to study relationship-based cooperation in reality.

Foreign cooperative technology development and transfer

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schassburger, R.J.; Robinson, R.A.

1988-01-01

It is the policy of the US Department of Energy (DOE) that, in pursuing the development of mined geologic repositories in the United States, the waste isolation program will continue to actively support international cooperation and exchange activities that are judged to be in the best interest of the program and in compliance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Sec. 223. Because there are common technical issues and because technology development often requires large expenditures of funds and dedication of significant capital resources, it is advantageous to cooperate with foreign organizations carrying out similar activities. The DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management is working on cooperative nuclear waste isolation technology development programs with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), Canada's Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited (AECL), Sweden, Switzerland, and the Federal Republic of Germany. This paper describes recent technology results that have been obtained in DOE's foreign cooperative programs. Specific technology development studies are discussed for cooperative efforts with Canada, OECD/NEA, and a natural analog project in Brazil

A Project in Support of International Nuclear Cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Myung Ro; Kim, Kyoung Pyo; Lee, Jeong Kong; Jung, Sung Hyon; Shim, Jae Sun

2009-01-01

The objective of this study is to establish the strategies of international cooperation in order to promote our nation's leading role in international community, to lay the foundation for the effective transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries, and to cope with the rapidly changing in the international nuclear communities. This study contains the work undertaken to promote multilateral cooperation within the framework of international nuclear related organizations and regional cooperative agreements and the relevant forums, to enhance bilateral cooperation with foreign nuclear related research institutes as well as to promote cooperation through the exchange of foreign scientists. As for multilateral cooperation, activities for promoting cooperation within the IAEA and regional cooperative frameworks are introduced. Regarding bilateral cooperation, activities for concluding arrangements and MOUs with foreign research institutes and for participation in joint nuclear coordinating committee meetings between Korea and other countries are presented. For promoting personnel exchanges, activities for inviting and utilizing foreign scientists and mutual discussions with foreign experts, who have visited KAERI, are also described. Continuous efforts to contributing towards the international community through utilizing Korea's experience gained in the process of technical self-reliance and development of human resources are needed. Also efforts to establish the foundation of international cooperation and to make inroad into overseas nuclear markets for export of our nuclear technologies should be made. Meanwhile in the bilateral cooperation, we need to beef up cooperation with U.S.A. and Canada through the joint committee for the joint export to third countries. It is expected that this study would be utilized as a basic material for the international cooperation of nuclear energy, especially for the KAERI's international cooperation in an effective way

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xia Chengyi; Zhang Juanjuan; Wang Jinsong; Wang Yiling

2011-01-01

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature (London) 425 (2003) 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner's payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner's payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner's payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly. (general)

The Regulatory Cooperation Forum, an Opportunity to Strengthen International Cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lachaume, J.L.; Mamoru, M.

2016-01-01

The Regulatory Cooperation Forum (RCF) is a member-driven forum of nuclear power regulators created in 2010 that promotes the sharing of regulatory knowledge and experience through international cooperation and collaboration using the IAEA Safety Standards as its basis. The RCF involves countries with advanced nuclear power programmes, countries embarking on nuclear power for the first time and countries with smaller programmes considering expansion. The primary objectives of the RCF are: • To promote collaboration and cooperation among RCF members to improve coordination of support for regulatory infrastructure development; • To contribute to achieving and sustaining a high level of nuclear safety, consistent with the IAEA Safety Standards and Guidance; • To optimize resources among RCF members and avoid unnecessary support duplication through improved coordination. Membership of the RCF is open to all Member States of the IAEA. Participants in RCF activities will normally be senior representatives from regulatory bodies in Member States and from other providers, including the IAEA, European Commission (EC) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). So far, more than 30 countries are members of the RCF. The RCF has developed Action Plans to support Jordan, Vietnam, Belarus and Poland. The IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan urges Member States to strengthen the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies as well as base the development of their nuclear infrastructures on IAEA Safety Standards. The RCF assists Member States in implementing both of these actions for embarking, existing and expanding nuclear programmes. (author)

Nanoscale molecular communication networks: a game-theoretic perspective

Science.gov (United States)

Jiang, Chunxiao; Chen, Yan; Ray Liu, K. J.

2015-12-01

Currently, communication between nanomachines is an important topic for the development of novel devices. To implement a nanocommunication system, diffusion-based molecular communication is considered as a promising bio-inspired approach. Various technical issues about molecular communications, including channel capacity, noise and interference, and modulation and coding, have been studied in the literature, while the resource allocation problem among multiple nanomachines has not been well investigated, which is a very important issue since all the nanomachines share the same propagation medium. Considering the limited computation capability of nanomachines and the expensive information exchange cost among them, in this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework for distributed resource allocation in nanoscale molecular communication systems. We first analyze the inter-symbol and inter-user interference, as well as bit error rate performance, in the molecular communication system. Based on the interference analysis, we formulate the resource allocation problem as a non-cooperative molecule emission control game, where the Nash equilibrium is found and proved to be unique. In order to improve the system efficiency while guaranteeing fairness, we further model the resource allocation problem using a cooperative game based on the Nash bargaining solution, which is proved to be proportionally fair. Simulation results show that the Nash bargaining solution can effectively ensure fairness among multiple nanomachines while achieving comparable social welfare performance with the centralized scheme.

Cooperativeness and competitiveness as two distinct constructs: validating the Cooperative and Competitive Personality Scale in a social dilemma context.

Science.gov (United States)

Lu, Su; Au, Wing-Tung; Jiang, Feng; Xie, Xiaofei; Yam, Paton

2013-01-01

The present research validated the construct and criterion validities of the Cooperative and Competitive Personality Scale (CCPS) in a social dilemma context. The results from three studies supported the notion that cooperativeness and competitiveness are two independent dimensions, challenging the traditional view that they are two ends of a single continuum. First, confirmatory factor analyses revealed that a two-factor structure fit the data significantly better than a one-factor structure. Moreover, cooperativeness and competitiveness were either not significantly correlated (Studies 1 and 3) or only moderately positively correlated (Study 2). Second, cooperativeness and competitiveness were differentially associated with Schwartz's Personal Values. These results further supported the idea that cooperativeness and competitiveness are two distinct constructs. Specifically, the individuals who were highly cooperative emphasized self-transcendent values (i.e., universalism and benevolence) more, whereas the individuals who were highly competitive emphasized self-enhancement values (i.e., power and achievement) more. Finally, the CCPS, which adheres to the trait perspective of personality, was found to be a useful supplement to more prevalent social motive measures (i.e., social value orientation) in predicting cooperative behaviors. Specifically, in Study 2, when social value orientation was controlled for, the CCPS significantly predicted cooperative behaviors in a public goods dilemma (individuals who score higher on cooperativeness scale contributed more to the public goods). In Study 3, when social value orientation was controlled for, the CCPS significantly predicted cooperative behaviors in commons dilemmas (individuals who score higher on cooperativeness scale requested fewer resources from the common resource pool). The practical implications of the CCPS in conflict resolution, as well as in recruitment and selection settings, are discussed.

Peaceful use agenda at the 2015 NPT review conference. Reaffirming grand bargain and north-south agenda

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Akiyama, Nobumasa

2016-01-01

The 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was judged as having two highlights: one was that the conflict between the United States and Middle East on the 'Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction' brought about a failure in the adoption of the final document, and the other was that the discussions over nuclear disarmament livened up in the climax of debate over the inhumanity of nuclear arms. On the other hand, among the first NPT Review Conference after the Fukushima nuclear accident, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy did not attract a great attention. However, the importance of the structure of Grand Bargain' among the three pillars of NPT such as nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy was once again recognized. In addition, it was shown that the peaceful uses in the non-power generation field is important from the viewpoint of maintaining the involvement in NPT of the countries that do not necessarily use a large-scale of nuclear energy, such as developing countries. In the future, the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will increase from the viewpoints of its relationship between the development field and the equality between the developing and developed countries. (A.O.)

Social rank and social cooperation: Impact of social comparison processes on cooperative decision-making.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Xu Gong

Full Text Available Successful navigation of our complex social world requires the capability to recognize and judge the relative status of others. Hence, social comparison processes are of great importance in our interactions, informing us of our relative standing and in turn potentially motivating our behavior. However, so far few studies have examined in detail how social comparison can influence interpersonal decision-making. One aspect of social decision-making that is of particular importance is cooperative behavior, and identifying means of maintaining and promoting cooperation in the provision of public goods is of vital interest to society. Here, we manipulated social comparison by grading performance rankings on a reaction time task, and then measured cooperative decisions via a modified Public Goods Game (PGG. Findings revealed that individuals ranked highest tended to be more cooperative as compared to those who placed in the bottom rank. Interestingly, this effect was regardless of whether the comparison group members were the subsequent players in the PGG or not, and this effect was stronger in those with higher social orientation. In summary, the present research shows how different social comparison processes (assessed via social rankings can operate in our daily interaction with others, demonstrating an important effect on cooperative behavior.

Upcrowding energy co-operatives - Evaluating the potential of crowdfunding for business model innovation of energy co-operatives.

Science.gov (United States)

Dilger, Mathias Georg; Jovanović, Tanja; Voigt, Kai-Ingo

2017-08-01

Practice and theory have proven the relevance of energy co-operatives for civic participation in the energy turnaround. However, due to a still low awareness and changing regulation, there seems an unexploited potential of utilizing the legal form 'co-operative' in this context. The aim of this study is therefore to investigate the crowdfunding implementation in the business model of energy co-operatives in order to cope with the mentioned challenges. Based on a theoretical framework, we derive a Business Model Innovation (BMI) through crowdfunding including synergies and differences. A qualitative study design, particularly a multiple-case study of energy co-operatives, was chosen to prove the BMI and to reveal barriers. The results show that although most co-operatives are not familiar with crowdfunding, there is strong potential in opening up predominantly local structures to a broader group of members. Building on this, equity-based crowdfunding is revealed to be suitable for energy co-operatives as BMI and to accompany other challenges in the same way. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

COalitions in COOperation Networks (COCOON): Social Network Analysis and Game Theory to Enhance Cooperation Networks

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Sie, Rory

2012-01-01

Sie, R. L. L. (2012). COalitions in COOperation Networks (COCOON): Social Network Analysis and Game Theory to Enhance Cooperation Networks (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). September, 28, 2012, Open Universiteit in the Netherlands (CELSTEC), Heerlen, The Netherlands.

7 CFR 4285.2 - Cooperative agreement purposes.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... agency to: (a) Conduct marketing research related to agricultural cooperatives. (b) Assist other organizations in conducting marketing research related to agricultural cooperatives. ... RURAL UTILITIES SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS Federal-State Research on...

Cooperation and deception in primates.

Science.gov (United States)

Hall, Katie; Brosnan, Sarah F

2017-08-01

Though competition and cooperation are often considered opposing forces in an arms race driving natural selection, many animals, including humans, cooperate in order to mitigate competition with others. Understanding others' psychological states, such as seeing and knowing, others' goals and intentions, and coordinating actions are all important for complex cooperation-as well as for predicting behavior in order to take advantage of others through tactical deception, a form of competition. We outline evidence of primates' understanding of how others perceive the world, and then consider how the evidence from both deception and cooperation fits this framework to give us a more complete understanding of the evolution of complex social cognition in primates. In experimental food competitions, primates flexibly manipulate group-mates' behavior to tactically deceive them. Deception can infiltrate cooperative interactions, such as when one takes an unfair share of meat after a coordinated hunt. In order to counter competition of this sort, primates maintain cooperation through partner choice, partner control, and third party punishment. Yet humans appear to stand alone in their ability to understand others' beliefs, which allows us not only to deceive others with the explicit intent to create a false belief, but it also allows us to put ourselves in others' shoes to determine when cheaters need to be punished, even if we are not directly disadvantaged by the cheater. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Gossip and ostracism promote cooperation in groups.

Science.gov (United States)

Feinberg, Matthew; Willer, Robb; Schultz, Michael

2014-03-01

The widespread existence of cooperation is difficult to explain because individuals face strong incentives to exploit the cooperative tendencies of others. In the research reported here, we examined how the spread of reputational information through gossip promotes cooperation in mixed-motive settings. Results showed that individuals readily communicated reputational information about others, and recipients used this information to selectively interact with cooperative individuals and ostracize those who had behaved selfishly, which enabled group members to contribute to the public good with reduced threat of exploitation. Additionally, ostracized individuals responded to exclusion by subsequently cooperating at levels comparable to those who were not ostracized. These results suggest that the spread of reputational information through gossip can mitigate egoistic behavior by facilitating partner selection, thereby helping to solve the problem of cooperation even in noniterated interactions.

A Project in Support of International Nuclear Cooperation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Myung Ro; Kim, Kyoung Pyo; Lee, Jeong Kong; Jung, Sung Hyon; Shim, Jae Sun

2008-12-15

The objective of this study is to establish the strategies of international cooperation in order to promote our nation's leading role in international community, to lay the foundation for the effective transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries, and to cope with the rapidly changing in the international nuclear communities. This study contains the work undertaken to promote multilateral cooperation within the framework of international nuclear related organizations and regional cooperative agreements and the relevant forums, to enhance bilateral cooperation with foreign nuclear related research institutes as well as to promote cooperation through the exchange of foreign scientists. As for multilateral cooperation, activities for promoting cooperation within the IAEA and regional cooperative frameworks are introduced. Regarding bilateral cooperation, activities for concluding arrangements and MOUs with foreign research institutes and for participation in joint nuclear coordinating committee meetings between Korea and other countries are presented. For promoting personnel exchanges, activities for inviting and utilizing foreign scientists and mutual discussions with foreign experts, who have visited KAERI, are also described. Continuous efforts to contributing towards the international community through utilizing Korea's experience gained in the process of technical self-reliance and development of human resources are needed. Also efforts to establish the foundation of international cooperation and to make inroad into overseas nuclear markets for export of our nuclear technologies should be made. Meanwhile in the bilateral cooperation, we need to beef up cooperation with U.S.A. and Canada through the joint committee for the joint export to third countries. It is expected that this study would be utilized as a basic material for the international cooperation of nuclear energy, especially for the KAERI's international cooperation in an

A Project in Support of International Nuclear Cooperation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Myung Ro; Kim, Kyoung Pyo; Lee, Jeong Kong; Jung, Sung Hyon; Shim, Jae Sun

2009-01-15

The objective of this study is to establish the strategies of international cooperation in order to promote our nation's leading role in international community, to lay the foundation for the effective transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries, and to cope with the rapidly changing in the international nuclear communities. This study contains the work undertaken to promote multilateral cooperation within the framework of international nuclear related organizations and regional cooperative agreements and the relevant forums, to enhance bilateral cooperation with foreign nuclear related research institutes as well as to promote cooperation through the exchange of foreign scientists. As for multilateral cooperation, activities for promoting cooperation within the IAEA and regional cooperative frameworks are introduced. Regarding bilateral cooperation, activities for concluding arrangements and MOUs with foreign research institutes and for participation in joint nuclear coordinating committee meetings between Korea and other countries are presented. For promoting personnel exchanges, activities for inviting and utilizing foreign scientists and mutual discussions with foreign experts, who have visited KAERI, are also described. Continuous efforts to contributing towards the international community through utilizing Korea's experience gained in the process of technical self-reliance and development of human resources are needed. Also efforts to establish the foundation of international cooperation and to make inroad into overseas nuclear markets for export of our nuclear technologies should be made. Meanwhile in the bilateral cooperation, we need to beef up cooperation with U.S.A. and Canada through the joint committee for the joint export to third countries. It is expected that this study would be utilized as a basic material for the international cooperation of nuclear energy, especially for the KAERI's international cooperation in an

Cooper Pairs in Insulators?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Valles, James

2008-01-01

Nearly 50 years elapsed between the discovery of superconductivity and the emergence of the microscopic theory describing this zero resistance state. The explanation required a novel phase of matter in which conduction electrons joined in weakly bound pairs and condensed with other pairs into a single quantum state. Surprisingly, this Cooper pair formation has also been invoked to account for recently uncovered high-resistance or insulating phases of matter. To address this possibility, we have used nanotechnology to create an insulating system that we can probe directly for Cooper pairs. I will present the evidence that Cooper pairs exist and dominate the electrical transport in these insulators and I will discuss how these findings provide new insight into superconductor to insulator quantum phase transitions.

Risk of Credit Cooperatives: An analysis based on the profile of the cooperated

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

José Roberto de Souza Francisco

2012-12-01

Full Text Available This work has as purpose to analyze among the credit operations, those that generate larger breach of contract risk for the cooperative, with base in the profile of the cooperated, and to identify which the strategies can be pointed to avoid possible flaws in the next credit analyses. The work was divided in three stages. The first stage refers to the National Financial System, with the objective of demonstrating as in him the Cooperatives of Credit are inserted. The second stage approaches the System of Cooperative Credit, it presents that form is structured and his/her hierarchical level. The third stage treats of the System of Risk of Credit, in the which the risk, administration and the models of credit evaluation will be analyzed. It was verified that the most appropriate models for analysis of the Cooperatives of Credit are Credit Scoring Models and Credit Bureau, us which, through statistical techniques as the analysis discriminante and regression logistics, the characteristics of considered credits of larger breach of contract risk were demonstrated. The analysis based on identifying the "worse customer", because this generates larger breach of contract risk and it influences in the financial administration. It was ended that the most relevant variables to identify the breach of contract risk were the rude monthly income and the value liberated in the credit concession, because the largest concentration of breach of contract risk.

States, Social Capital and Cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Anthony, Denise L.; Campbell, John L.

2011-01-01

This paper reflects on Elinor Ostrom’s classic book, Governing the Commons, and much work in sociology, political science and organization studies that has appeared since its publication. We do so in order to expand our understanding of the conditions under which cooperation occurs resulting...... in the production of collective goods. We explore two issues that were underdeveloped in her book that have subsequently received much attention. First, we discuss how states can facilitate cooperative behavior short of coercively imposing it on actors. Second, we discuss how social capital can facilitate...... or undermine cooperative behavior. In both cases we focus on the important mechanisms by which each one contributes to the development of cooperative behavior and collective goods. We conclude by extending our arguments to a brief analysis of one of the world’s newest and largest collective goods...

Cooperative strings and glassy interfaces.

Science.gov (United States)

Salez, Thomas; Salez, Justin; Dalnoki-Veress, Kari; Raphaël, Elie; Forrest, James A

2015-07-07

We introduce a minimal theory of glass formation based on the ideas of molecular crowding and resultant string-like cooperative rearrangement, and address the effects of free interfaces. In the bulk case, we obtain a scaling expression for the number of particles taking part in cooperative strings, and we recover the Adam-Gibbs description of glassy dynamics. Then, by including thermal dilatation, the Vogel-Fulcher-Tammann relation is derived. Moreover, the random and string-like characters of the cooperative rearrangement allow us to predict a temperature-dependent expression for the cooperative length ξ of bulk relaxation. Finally, we explore the influence of sample boundaries when the system size becomes comparable to ξ. The theory is in agreement with measurements of the glass-transition temperature of thin polymer films, and allows quantification of the temperature-dependent thickness hm of the interfacial mobile layer.

Study on Banana Cooperatives in Hainan Province

OpenAIRE

Huang, Huide; Zhang, Wanzhen; Liu, Enping; Zhang, Xizhu

2013-01-01

This paper gives an overview of the distribution, member scale, production and operation of banana cooperatives in Hainan Province, and points out the market risk and natural risk faced by the production of banana cooperatives in Hainan Province. In order to promote the banana cooperatives to form new agricultural management system integrating organization and intensification, this paper puts forth the production and operation recommendations, such as joint production of banana cooperatives, ...

Introduction: cooperative learning

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

José-Manuel Serrano

2014-10-01

Full Text Available The principal objective of this revision is the recognition of cooperative learning as a highly effective strategy for the accomplishment of the general goals in learning. The different investigations assessed validate the potential that a cooperative organization of the classroom could entail for academic achievement, self-esteem, interpersonal attraction or social support. The solidity of the existing research contributes to its external and internal validity and, thus, to conclude that the results are consistent and can be extrapolated to different cultures, ethnic groups or countries.

The benefit of sustainable industrial cooperation. Study on the economical and ecological benefits of industrial cooperatives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hansen, D.H.J.M.; Lavrijsen, T.; Vermeulen, W.J.V.

2005-01-01

From scientific literature and policy memoranda it appears that sustainable industrial cooperatives result into economical and ecological benefits. However, little empirical data on practical results is available. Therefore, recently, an analysis has been carried out determining the benefit of industrial cooperation. The economical and ecological offer businesses a cost-effective option to reduce the environmental burden. Still, real implementation of such cooperatives is only realized yet by forerunners in the field of environmental management [nl

Parochial trust and cooperation across 17 societies

Science.gov (United States)

Romano, Angelo; Balliet, Daniel; Liu, James H.

2017-01-01

International challenges such as climate change, poverty, and intergroup conflict require countries to cooperate to solve these complex problems. However, the political tide in many countries has shifted inward, with skepticism and reluctance to cooperate with other countries. Thus, cross-societal investigations are needed to test theory about trust and cooperation within and between groups. We conducted an experimental study in 17 countries designed to test several theories that explain why, who, and where people trust and cooperate more with ingroup members, compared with outgroup members. The experiment involved several interactions in the trust game, either as a trustor or trustee. We manipulated partner group membership in the trust game (ingroup, outgroup, or unknown) and if their reputation was at stake during the interaction. In addition to the standard finding that participants trust and cooperate more with ingroup than outgroup members, we obtained findings that reputational concerns play a decisive role for promoting trust and cooperation universally across societies. Furthermore, men discriminated more in favor of their ingroup than women. Individual differences in cooperative preferences, as measured by social value orientation, predicted cooperation with both ingroup and outgroup members. Finally, we did not find support for three theories about the cross-societal conditions that influence the degree of ingroup favoritism observed across societies (e.g., material security, religiosity, and pathogen stress). We discuss the implications for promoting cooperation within and between countries. PMID:29133403

The evolution of cooperation by the Hankshaw effect.

Science.gov (United States)

Hammarlund, Sarah P; Connelly, Brian D; Dickinson, Katherine J; Kerr, Benjamin

2016-06-01

The evolution of cooperation-costly behavior that benefits others-faces one clear obstacle. Namely, cooperators are always at a competitive disadvantage relative to defectors, individuals that reap the benefits, but evade the cost of cooperation. One solution to this problem involves genetic hitchhiking, where the allele encoding cooperation becomes linked to a beneficial mutation, allowing cooperation to rise in abundance. Here, we explore hitchhiking in the context of adaptation to a stressful environment by cooperators and defectors with spatially limited dispersal. Under such conditions, clustered cooperators reach higher local densities, thereby experiencing more mutational opportunities than defectors. Thus, the allele encoding cooperation has a greater probability of hitchhiking with alleles conferring stress adaptation. We label this probabilistic enhancement the "Hankshaw effect" after the character Sissy Hankshaw, whose anomalously large thumbs made her a singularly effective hitchhiker. Using an agent-based model, we reveal a broad set of conditions that allow the evolution of cooperation through this effect. Additionally, we show that spite, a costly behavior that harms others, can evolve by the Hankshaw effect. While in an unchanging environment these costly social behaviors have transient success, in a dynamic environment, cooperation and spite can persist indefinitely. © 2016 The Author(s). Evolution © 2016 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

A Running Start or a Clean Slate? How a History of Cooperation Affects the Ability of Cities to Cooperate on Environmental Governance

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Rui Mu

2018-06-01

Full Text Available Since 2013, the Chinese central government has pushed cooperation on environmental governance in Urban Agglomerations (UAs. In some of these UAs, cities have previously been developing environmental governance activities autonomously, in the absence of inter-city cooperation, while on others, spontaneous cooperation has previously taken place. These differences in historical context provide us with an opportunity to study, in a comparative way, how a history of cooperation influences the effectiveness of inter-city cooperation on environmental governance. Our approach to carrying out this comparison is to reconstruct the trajectories of events that describe the evolution of environmental governance in two UAs (Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and Yangtze River Delta, covering the period from the early 90s to 2016. The main findings of this study are that the trajectory of environmental governance in a historical context of prior spontaneous cooperation is more effective in achieving goal intertwinement than that in a historical context of no prior cooperation; and that informal forms of cooperation, along with decentralized coordination by local actors, are critical and more influential in bringing about more effective cooperation. On the other hand, in a historical context of no prior cooperation there is an opportunity to design a cooperative structure from scratch; in this process attention should be paid to the creation of an equal playing ground, with balanced costs and benefits for all partners. By contrast, cooperation on environmental governance in a context where there is a history of spontaneous cooperation the central government can still play a role in the further facilitation of cooperation.

Cross-border innovation cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hjaltadóttir, Rannveig Edda; Makkonen, Teemu; Sørensen, Nils Karl

2017-01-01

Finding a suitable partner is paramount for the success of innovation cooperation. Thus, this paper sets out to analyse the determinants of cross-border innovation cooperation in Denmark by focusing on partner selection. The aim of the article is to investigate determinants of partner selection...... by taking the location of the partners into account. In particular, the discussion is tied to the notion of varying knowledge bases firms utilize in their innovation creation processes. Firm level data from the 2010 Community Innovation Survey in Denmark was utilized to analyse cross-border innovation...... of innovativeness increase the likelihood of cross-border innovation cooperation. Accordingly, geographical proximity to international borders is found to have a significant, positive effect on selecting partners within the European Union. The multivariate probit model shows that the decision of choosing a domestic...

Co-operation and Self-Organization

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Christian Fuchs

2008-07-01

Full Text Available Co-operation has its specific meanings in physical (dissipative, biological (autopoietic and social (re-creative systems. On upper hierarchical systemic levels there are additional, emergent properties of co-operation, co-operation evolves dialectically. The focus of this paper is human cooperation. Social systems permanently reproduce themselves in a loop that mutually connects social structures and actors. Social structures enable and constrain actions, they are medium and outcome of social actions. This reflexive process is termed re-creation and describes the process of social selforganization. Co-operation in a very weak sense means coaction and takes place permanently in re-creative systems: two or more actors act together in a co-ordinated manner so that a new emergent property emerges. Co-action involves the formation of forces, environment and sense (dispositions, decisions, definitions. Mechanistic approaches conceive coaction in terms of rational planning, consciousness, intention, predictability, and necessity. Holistic approaches conceive coaction in terms of spontaneity, unconscious and unintended actions, non-predictability, chance. Dialectic approaches conceive co-action in terms of a unity of rational planning and spontaneous emergence, a unity of conscious and unconscious aspects and consequences, and a unity of necessity and chance. Co-operation in a strong sense that is employed in this paper means that actors work together, create a new emergent reality, have shared goals, all benefit from co-operating, can reach their goals in joint effort more quickly and more efficiently than on an individual basis, make concerted use of existing structures in order to produce new structures, learn from each other mutually, are interconnected in a social network, and are mutually dependent and responsible. There is a lack of cooperation, self-determination, inclusion and direct democracy in modern society due to its antagonistic

When Reputation Enforces Evolutionary Cooperation in Unreliable MANETs.

Science.gov (United States)

Tang, Changbing; Li, Ang; Li, Xiang

2015-10-01

In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), network functions rely on cooperation of self-interested nodes, where a challenge is to enforce their mutual cooperation. In this paper, we study cooperative packet forwarding in a one-hop unreliable channel which results from loss of packets and noisy observation of transmissions. We propose an indirect reciprocity framework based on evolutionary game theory, and enforce cooperation of packet forwarding strategies in both structured and unstructured MANETs. Furthermore, we analyze the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies and derive the threshold of benefit-to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. The numerical simulations verify that the proposed evolutionary game theoretic solution enforces cooperation when the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic exceeds the critical condition. In addition, the network throughput performance of our proposed strategy in structured MANETs is measured, which is in close agreement with that of the full cooperative strategy.

Can German wine cooperatives compete on quality?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Schamel Guenter H.

2015-01-01

Full Text Available The paper analyzes how German cooperative wineries compete with private (i.e. non-cooperative wineries regarding reputation, quality categorization and varietal selection. Among the reasons why German cooperatives lag behind in terms of reputation for quality wine are organization principles of cooperatives and the difficulty to manage growers supplying grapes of different qualities. Cooperatives turn their supply of grapes into wine often classified as quality wine without much distinction. Conversely, privately owned wineries growing their own grapes may have more control over quality along their production chain and are able to produce more distinctive wines. In turn, they gain more reputation with final consumers with respect to quality. We analyze data for private and cooperative wineries from Germany. Our objective is to identify key differences in terms of reputation for quality wine production. Specifically, we look at interaction effects based on organizational form (cooperative vs. private and the German wine quality categorization (i.e. basic quality wine vs. Kabinett, Spätlese, or Auslese as well as varietal effects. We employ a hedonic pricing model to test the hypothesis that wines produced by private producers receive a reputation premium relative to cooperatives. Moreover, we hypothesize that private wineries receive a price premium relative to coopera- tives for other than basic quality wines and distinct varieties such as Riesling and Pinot Noir. The empirical analysis confirms both hypotheses. The estimated coefficients indicate that cooperatives are unable to gain quality premium for most quality cat- egories and gain price premiums only for non-distinct varieties such as Lemberger and Dornfelder. We can argue that German cooperatives are stuck in the low quality corner of the quality and variety spectrum and are currently not able to compete with private wineries in terms of quality. This result supports the observation

Marketing Cooperatives and Financial Structure

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hendrikse, G.W.J.; Veerman, C.P.

1995-01-01

The relationship between the financial structure of marketing cooperatives and the requirement of the domination of control by the members of the cooperative is analysed with an emphasis on incomplete contracts and system complementarities. It is argued that the disappearance of shortage markets in

Making Cooperative Learning Groups Work.

Science.gov (United States)

Hawley, James; De Jong, Cherie

1995-01-01

Discusses the use of cooperative-learning groups with middle school students. Describes cooperative-learning techniques, including group roles, peer evaluation, and observation and monitoring. Considers grouping options, including group size and configuration, dyads, the think-pair-share lecture, student teams achievement divisions, jigsaw groups,…

Cooperative Change and the Myth of Rationality

OpenAIRE

Rokholt, Per Ove; Borgen, Svein Ole

2000-01-01

Much of the current research on agricultural cooperatives is biased towards weaknesses of the cooperative organization form. The literature says very little about the strengths and advantages of the cooperative form and what is necessary to develop the form's uniqueness into a sustainable competitive advantage. We argue that for cooperatives to remain viable and competitive, the advantages of the form must be clearly manifested. There is now a lack of systematic theorizing in this field. Typi...

POPULAR COOPERATIVE RECYCLING: THE CASE OF COOPERATIVE RECYCLABLE MATERIAL RIBEIRÃO PRETO

OpenAIRE

Mantovani, Daielly Melina Nassif; Leite, Maria FLavia Barbosa

2015-01-01

The social cooperatives, in view of supportive economy, are pointed as a necessity to social inclusion of many marginalized employees in the work market and society. Thisarticlepresentsthe case oftheRecycling Material Cooperativefrom Ribeirão Preto (Cooperativa dos Catadores de Material Reciclável de Ribeirão Preto). The cooperative, in partner with a non-governmental organization (Casa das Mangueiras) tries to improve the social conditions of the employees and their fair social inclusion. Th...

Co-operatives and Normative Control

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bregn, Kirsten; Jagd, Søren

1992-01-01

This paper explores the conditions for applying normative control in co-operatives. For normative control to be effective two conditions are found particularly important: Individuals must be morally involved and the organization must have a system of making it possible to link common norms...... and individual action. If these conditions are not fulfilled, as may be the case in many co-operatives, normative control cannot be expected to work. The problems of normative control in co-operatives may then not be caused by the use of normative control as such, but may instead be a problem of securing...

Do Coffee Farmers Benefit in Food Security from Participating in Coffee Cooperatives? Evidence from Southwest Ethiopia Coffee Cooperatives.

Science.gov (United States)

Shumeta, Zekarias; D'Haese, Marijke

2018-06-01

Most coffee in Ethiopia is produced by smallholder farmers who face a daily struggle to get sufficient income but also to feed their families. At the same time, many smallholder coffee producers are members of cooperatives. Yet, literature has paid little attention to the effect of cooperatives on combating food insecurity among cash crop producers including coffee farmers. The objective of the study was to investigate how coffee cooperative membership may affect food security among coffee farm households in Southwest Ethiopia. The study used cross-sectional household data on income, expenditure on food, staple food production (maize and teff), and utilization of improved inputs (fertilizer and improved seed) collected from 256 randomly selected farm households (132 cooperative members and 124 nonmembers) and applied an inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimation to assess the impact of cooperative membership on food security. The result revealed that cooperative membership has a positive and significant effect on staple food production (maize and teff) and facilitated technological transformation via increased utilization of fertilizer and improved seeds. Nonetheless, the effect on food expenditure and income could not be confirmed. Findings suggest a trade-off between coffee marketing and input supply functions of the cooperatives, impairing their true food security impact from the pooled income and production effect.

The evolution of cooperation in spatial groups

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Jianlei; Zhang Chunyan; Chu Tianguang

2011-01-01

Research highlights: → We propose a model of evolutionary games in which individuals are organized into networked groups. → We show that the social dilemma can be resolved and high cooperation levels are attained. → Larger average group size would lead to lower cooperation level but higher average payoffs. → The results show that higher expectations can bring the system with larger average payoffs. - Abstract: Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. There is evidence that individuals are often organized into groups in many social situations. Inspired by this observation, we propose a simple model of evolutionary public goods games in which individuals are organized into networked groups. Here, nodes in the network represent groups; the edges, connecting the nodes, refer to the interactions between the groups. Individuals establish public goods games with partners in the same group and migrate among neighboring groups depending on their payoffs and expectations. We show that the paradigmatic public goods social dilemma can be resolved and high cooperation levels are attained in structured groups, even in relatively harsh conditions for cooperation. Further, by means of numerical simulations and mean-field analysis, we arrive at the result: larger average group size and milder cooperation environment would lead to lower cooperation level but higher average payoffs of the entire population. Altogether, these results emphasize that our understanding of cooperation can be enhanced by investigations of how spatial groups of individuals affect the evolution dynamics, which might help in explaining the emergence and evolution of cooperation.

Comparisons of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Students: An Analysis of Student Accounting System Data. Interim Report, June, 1981.

Science.gov (United States)

Frazier, Don

The major purpose of this study was to identify unique effects of cooperative vocational education. This interim report is of results of the analyses of existing data bases. Comparisons of cooperative and non-cooperative vocational programs are made on the following variables: enrollments by age, sex and race, school status, work status,…

Enresa International Cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez Beceiro, A.

1998-01-01

The Empresa Nacional de Residuos Radiactivos, S.A. (ENRESA) was set up in 1984 with the mandate to undertake responsibility for radioactive waste management in Spain. From the very beginning, ENRESA was fully aware of the fact that international cooperation plays a very important role in the development of national programmes. Aspects such as the setting up of international databases, the development and validation of models or site characterization technique such enormous efforts and amounts of resources that they could hardly be undertaken individually. Furthermore, joint participation in research, development and demonstration projects reinforces the level of confidence, not only in the decision-making process but also in the technologies, techniques and practices used. ENRESA's participation in the international contexts is largely defined, on the one hand, by the needs arising from its technical programme, as reflected in the General Radioactive Waste Plan and in the Research and Development Plan, and on the other by the need to support spanish governmental institutions in their participation in inter-governmental institutions in their participation in inter-governmental forums. The formula for cooperation varies according to needs, this cooperation generally being accomplished by means of bilateral agreements with other institutions having similar competence or by participating in the programmes of inter-governmental organizations. In particular, ENRESA has reached cooperation agreements with most of the agencies with similar responsibilities in other countries and participates very actively in the programmes of the European Union, the Nuclear energy Agency (NEA/OECD) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (Author)

The principle of cooperation in environmental law

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rengeling, H.W.

1988-01-01

The study prepared by order of the Federal Office for Environmental Protection describes the cooperation principle in German environmental policy. It presents examples from various areas of environmental protection, i.a. the participation of third-parties in government decisions. The functions, advantages, problems and risks of cooperation are dealt with. The study focuses on the constitutional and administrative fundamentals for the evaluation of the admissibility and limits of cooperation. On the one hand, there has to be cooperation between State and Society, on the other, there is a normative separation of the two in accordance with constitutional law. The study points out scopes of action for cooperation between State and Society. (RST) [de

Selfishness and Cooperation: Challenge for Social Life

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Szocik Konrad

2017-07-01

Full Text Available Cooperation is a great challenge for natural selection. Some scholars assume that cooperation could not evolve within the framework of natural selection. It is undeniable that natural selection, at least at the individual level, favors selfishness and defectors. Nonetheless, this selfish tendency does not necessarily imply that cooperation could not evolve by means of natural selection. In this paper, we specifically acknowledge certain basic challenges for the evolution of the human ability to cooperate at the level of large groups. In this paper, we discuss topics like the human ability for “supercooperation,” the importance of repetition and reputation, and Multilevel Selection Theory as the basic mechanisms of evolution of cooperation.

Testing cooperative systems with the MARS simulator

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Netten, B.D.; Wedemeijer, H.

2010-01-01

The complexity of cooperative systems makes the use of high fidelity simulation essential in the development and testing of cooperative applications and their interactions with other cooperative systems. In SAFESPOT a simulator test bench is setup to test the safety margin applications running on

75 FR 9246 - Cooperative Share Loan Insurance

Science.gov (United States)

2010-03-01

... DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT [Docket No. FR-5376-N-14] Cooperative Share Loan... comments on the subject proposal. New guidance for cooperative housing loan insurance will be published to update existing policies, and better enable mortgagees to submit cooperative share loans for FHA...

Cooperation under indirect reciprocity and imitative trust.

Science.gov (United States)

Saavedra, Serguei; Smith, David; Reed-Tsochas, Felix

2010-10-27

Indirect reciprocity, a key concept in behavioral experiments and evolutionary game theory, provides a mechanism that allows reciprocal altruism to emerge in a population of self-regarding individuals even when repeated interactions between pairs of actors are unlikely. Recent empirical evidence show that humans typically follow complex assessment strategies involving both reciprocity and social imitation when making cooperative decisions. However, currently, we have no systematic understanding of how imitation, a mechanism that may also generate negative effects via a process of cumulative advantage, affects cooperation when repeated interactions are unlikely or information about a recipient's reputation is unavailable. Here we extend existing evolutionary models, which use an image score for reputation to track how individuals cooperate by contributing resources, by introducing a new imitative-trust score, which tracks whether actors have been the recipients of cooperation in the past. We show that imitative trust can co-exist with indirect reciprocity mechanisms up to a threshold and then cooperation reverses -revealing the elusive nature of cooperation. Moreover, we find that when information about a recipient's reputation is limited, trusting the action of third parties towards her (i.e. imitating) does favor a higher collective cooperation compared to random-trusting and share-alike mechanisms. We believe these results shed new light on the factors favoring social imitation as an adaptive mechanism in populations of cooperating social actors.

Cooperation under indirect reciprocity and imitative trust.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Serguei Saavedra

Full Text Available Indirect reciprocity, a key concept in behavioral experiments and evolutionary game theory, provides a mechanism that allows reciprocal altruism to emerge in a population of self-regarding individuals even when repeated interactions between pairs of actors are unlikely. Recent empirical evidence show that humans typically follow complex assessment strategies involving both reciprocity and social imitation when making cooperative decisions. However, currently, we have no systematic understanding of how imitation, a mechanism that may also generate negative effects via a process of cumulative advantage, affects cooperation when repeated interactions are unlikely or information about a recipient's reputation is unavailable. Here we extend existing evolutionary models, which use an image score for reputation to track how individuals cooperate by contributing resources, by introducing a new imitative-trust score, which tracks whether actors have been the recipients of cooperation in the past. We show that imitative trust can co-exist with indirect reciprocity mechanisms up to a threshold and then cooperation reverses -revealing the elusive nature of cooperation. Moreover, we find that when information about a recipient's reputation is limited, trusting the action of third parties towards her (i.e. imitating does favor a higher collective cooperation compared to random-trusting and share-alike mechanisms. We believe these results shed new light on the factors favoring social imitation as an adaptive mechanism in populations of cooperating social actors.

7 CFR 1124.11 - Cooperative reserve supply unit.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Cooperative reserve supply unit. 1124.11 Section 1124... MARKETING AREA Order Regulating Handling Definitions § 1124.11 Cooperative reserve supply unit. Cooperative reserve supply unit means any cooperative association or its agent that is a handler pursuant to § 1000.9...

Monitoring emotions and cooperative behavior

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Gorbunov, R.D.

2013-01-01

Cooperation among people in teams that are bound to perform a common goal is one of the main factors determining success of these teams. Cooperation becomes even more important for small teams performing long-term missions in isolation. Examples of such missions include missions performed on the

Cooperative newsvendor games : a review

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Montrucchio, L.; Norde, H.; Ozen, U.; Scarsini, M.; Slikker, M.; Choi, T.-M.

2012-01-01

In this survey, we review some of the main contributions to the cooperative approach of newsvendor situations. We show how newsvendor situations with several retailers can be modeled as a transferable-utility cooperative game and we concentrate on one solution concept: the core. First, we examine

Türkiye’de Kooperatiflerin Vergilendirilmesi(Taxation on Cooperatives In Turkey

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

O. Murat KOÇTÜRK

2006-01-01

Full Text Available Cooperatives are regarded as the third sector in line with the private and the public sectors in most countries. According to Turkey National Cooperatives Union’s by 2004 there are 58 414 cooperatives and 7 544 872 cooperative members both in rural and urban cooperatives in Turkey. Therefore, the cooperatives in Turkey are supported by the government with various instruments such as tax exemptions and reductions. In this paper, taxation on cooperatives and their implementation on cooperative sector were examined. Being an important instrument of social economy, cooperatives undertake significant roles in EU countries. It is thought that those exemption and redections on cooperative sector would make a considerable contribution to the Turkish cooperative movement.

Strategic interaction between government and central bank in framework of cooperative and non-cooperative games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Mahmoudinia, D.; Engwerda, Jacob; Esfahani, Rahim Dallali; Dastjerdi, R.B.; Fakhar, M.

2016-01-01

In this paper we analyzed the strategic interaction between government and central bank in Iranian economy. Using dynamic differential games and Nash equilibrium within cooperative and non-cooperative setting, we try to find the optimal values of debt, deficit and monetary base. The results of

Co-operatives as heating entrepreneurs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Honkasalo, M.

2000-01-01

The objective of heating entrepreneurship functioning in the form of a co operative is to make the use of the wood chips competitive primarily through district heating of municipal centres. When compared with the conventional heating mode the reliability of chip delivery and the remuneration paid to the co-operative for attending to the running of the heating centres are considered to be the competitive advantages. The system has proven to be a working one; one indication of this is its growing application in the country. In the spring of the year 2000 there were 26 chip-based energy co-operative active in Finland. The first time that the use of bioenergy underwent a powerful rise was in the 1970s as a consequence of the oilcrises. Subsequently the enthusiasm shown to this energy form subsided. Then in the early 1990s, biofuels once again became a subject of interest mainly due to environmental issues, the restructuring of rural areas and silvicultural reasons. With the past decades' experiences forming the basis, the development needs associated with the use of bioenergy were in fresh memory and they were addressed on a wide font. Boiler technology related to solid fuels evolved rapidly and the least successful manufacturers had been eliminated by the recession. In the case of co-operative heating entrepreneurship, the commonest form neither the district heating centre nor the system of heat-transfer pipes belong to co-operative society. The co-operative is responsible only for the delivery of the fuel and for looking after the heating plant. Remuneration is generally based on the amount of energy leaving the district heating plant. Thus the heat dissipated at the heating plant is the co-operative's problem and the heat dissipated during transfer are the energy buyer's problem. The investor in the equipments usually the local municipality or an energy utility. In some cases the co-operative owns the equipments well, in which case it is correct to speak of

Treatment of capital in Brasilian cooperative societies

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Vergílio Frederico Perius

2005-12-01

Full Text Available The early history of the cooperative system never taxed much importance to capital formation in cooperatives. The first German consumer cooperative had no equity in their accounting records. We want to analyze, even though the capital was not essential, what is its function actually.

Cooperative Dynamics in Lattice-Embedded Scale-Free Networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shang Lihui; Zhang Mingji; Yang Yanqing

2009-01-01

We investigate cooperative behaviors of lattice-embedded scale-free networking agents in the prisoner's dilemma game model by employing two initial strategy distribution mechanisms, which are specific distribution to the most connected sites (hubs) and random distribution. Our study indicates that the game dynamics crucially depends on the underlying spatial network structure with different strategy distribution mechanism. The cooperators' specific distribution contributes to an enhanced level of cooperation in the system compared with random one, and cooperation is robust to cooperators' specific distribution but fragile to defectors' specific distribution. Especially, unlike the specific case, increasing heterogeneity of network does not always favor the emergence of cooperation under random mechanism. Furthermore, we study the geographical effects and find that the graphically constrained network structure tends to improve the evolution of cooperation in random case and in specific one for a large temptation to defect.

Cooperative path planning of unmanned aerial vehicles

CERN Document Server

Tsourdos, Antonios; Shanmugavel, Madhavan

2010-01-01

An invaluable addition to the literature on UAV guidance and cooperative control, Cooperative Path Planning of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles is a dedicated, practical guide to computational path planning for UAVs. One of the key issues facing future development of UAVs is path planning: it is vital that swarm UAVs/ MAVs can cooperate together in a coordinated manner, obeying a pre-planned course but able to react to their environment by communicating and cooperating. An optimized path is necessary in order to ensure a UAV completes its mission efficiently, safely, and successfully. Focussing on the path planning of multiple UAVs for simultaneous arrival on target, Cooperative Path Planning of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles also offers coverage of path planners that are applicable to land, sea, or space-borne vehicles. Cooperative Path Planning of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles is authored by leading researchers from Cranfield University and provides an authoritative resource for researchers, academics and engineers working in...

Recent developments in cooperative control and optimization

CERN Document Server

Murphey, Robert; Pardalos, Panos

2004-01-01

Over the past several years, cooperative control and optimization has un­ questionably been established as one of the most important areas of research in the military sciences. Even so, cooperative control and optimization tran­ scends the military in its scope -having become quite relevant to a broad class of systems with many exciting, commercial, applications. One reason for all the excitement is that research has been so incredibly diverse -spanning many scientific and engineering disciplines. This latest volume in the Cooperative Systems book series clearly illustrates this trend towards diversity and creative thought. And no wonder, cooperative systems are among the hardest systems control science has endeavored to study, hence creative approaches to model­ ing, analysis, and synthesis are a must! The definition of cooperation itself is a slippery issue. As you will see in this and previous volumes, cooperation has been cast into many different roles and therefore has assumed many diverse meanings. P...

Generation Z, Meet Cooperative Learning

Science.gov (United States)

Igel, Charles; Urquhart, Vicki

2012-01-01

Today's Generation Z teens need to develop teamwork and social learning skills to be successful in the 21st century workplace. Teachers can help students develop these skills and enhance academic achievement by implementing cooperative learning strategies. Three key principles for successful cooperative learning are discussed. (Contains 1 figure.)

Evolution, epigenetics and cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Bateson, Patrick

2014-04-01

Explanations for biological evolution in terms of changes in gene frequencies refer to outcomes rather than process. Integrating epigenetic studies with older evolutionary theories has drawn attention to the ways in which evolution occurs. Adaptation at the level of the gene is givingway to adaptation at the level of the organism and higher-order assemblages of organisms. These ideas impact on the theories of how cooperation might have evolved. Two of the theories, i.e. that cooperating individuals are genetically related or that they cooperate for self-interested reasons, have been accepted for a long time. The idea that adaptation takes place at the level of groups is much more controversial. However, bringing together studies of development with those of evolution is taking away much of the heat in the debate about the evolution of group behaviour.

"A model co-operative country": Irish-Finnish co-operative contacts at the turn of the twentieth century

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hilson, Mary

2017-01-01

Agricultural co-operative societies were widely discussed across late nineteenth-century Europe as a potential solution to the problems of agricultural depression, land reform and rural poverty. In Finland, the agronomist Hannes Gebhard drew inspiration from examples across Europe in founding the...... that even before the First World War it was Finland, not Ireland, that had begun to be regarded as ‘a model co-operative country’....... between Irish and Finnish co-operators around the turn of the century, and examines the ways in which the parallels between the two countries were constructed and presented by those involved in these exchanges. I will also consider the reasons for the divergence in the development of cooperation, so...

Heuristics guide cooperative behaviors in public goods game

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Yongjie; Chen, Tong

2015-12-01

In public goods game (PGG), player's cooperative behavior is not pure economical rationality, but social preference and prosocial intuition play extremely important roles as well. Social preference and prosocial intuition can be guided by heuristics from one's neighbors in daily life. To better investigate the impacts of heuristics on the evolution of cooperation, four types of agents are introduced into our spatial PGG. Through numerical simulations, results show that the larger percentages of cooperators with independent thought, the easier emergence and maintenance of collective cooperative behaviors. Additionally, we find that differentia heuristic capability has great effect on the equilibrium of PGG. Cooperation can be obviously promoted, when heuristic capability of cooperators with independent thought is stronger than that of defectors with independent thought. Finally, we observe that cooperators with independent thought and defectors with independent thought are favorable for the formation of some high quality clusters, which can resist the invasion between each other. Our work may help us understand more clearly the mechanism of cooperation in real world.

26 CFR 301.7701-14 - Cooperative bank.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Cooperative bank. 301.7701-14 Section 301.7701... ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION Definitions § 301.7701-14 Cooperative bank. For taxable years beginning after October 16, 1962, the term “cooperative bank” means an institution without capital stock...

Internal Control Good Cooperative Governance And Performance

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Andry Arifian Rachman

2017-11-01

Full Text Available This study aims to examine the influence of internal control and good cooperative governance partially and simultaneously to the performance of cooperatives in West Java Province. The research method used in this research is descriptive and verification. The sample in this research is 22 boards as manager of cooperative in West Java Province. The data used in the research is the primary data through questionnaire collection. Validity and reliability testing is performed before hypothesis testing. This research uses multiple regression analysis technique. Based on hypothesis testing obtained 1 internal control has no significant effect on performance 2 good cooperative governance has a significant effect on performance and 3 internal control and good cooperative governance have a significant effect on performance.