WorldWideScience

Sample records for additional protocol ratification

  1. Communication dated 19 January 2009 received from the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Agency regarding ratification by the United States of the Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement with the Agency

    The Agency has received a communication dated 19 January 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Agency regarding ratification by the United States of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America. As requested therein, the communication is herewith circulated for information

  2. Law project adopted by the Senate and authorizing the ratification of the additional protocol to the agreement between France, the European atomic energy community and the international atomic energy agency relative to the application of warranties in France

    This project of law concerns an additional protocol to the agreement of warranties signed on September 22, 1998 between France, the European atomic energy community and the IAEA. This agreement concerns the declaration of all information relative to the R and D activities linked with the fuel cycle and involving the cooperation with a foreign country non endowed with nuclear weapons. These information include the trade and processing of nuclear and non-nuclear materials and equipments devoted to nuclear reactors (pressure vessels, fuel loading/unloading systems, control rods, force and zirconium tubes, primary coolant pumps, deuterium and heavy water, nuclear-grade graphite), to fuel reprocessing plants, to isotope separation plants (gaseous diffusion, laser enrichment, plasma separation, electromagnetic enrichment), to heavy water and deuterium production plants, and to uranium conversion plants. (J.S.)

  3. Climate change ratification of the Kyoto Protocol : clearing the air on the debate

    The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change would commit Canada to limit emissions of greenhouse gases to 6 per cent below 1990 levels by 2008-2012. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce has outlined the following 3 key prerequisites that the federal government should and will have in place before any decision on ratification is made: (1) a detailed plan for achieving the Kyoto reductions, (2) a detailed analysis of environmental and economic impacts associated with Kyoto implementation, and (3) consultations with all stakeholder and the Canadian public once the plan has been released. Currently, Canadian businesses are taking voluntary actions to reduce industrial sector emissions through programs such as the Canadian Industry Program for Energy Conservation. Between 1990 and 1999, industrial sector emissions fell by 6 per cent. However, it was emphasized that despite these efforts, the gap between Canada's Kyoto target and its current greenhouse gas emissions continues to grow because of population and economic growth and rising exports. At the current rate of growth, it is estimated that meeting the Kyoto target could cost the economy up to $30 billion in 2010. The paper also discusses the implementation of key flexibility mechanisms such as carbon sinks, Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism and credits for export of cleaner energy to the United States, a non-Kyoto country. It is argued that ratification of Kyoto could hurt investments and impact jobs in Canada by making Canadian industries uncompetitive relative to their American counterparts. It is emphasized that full participation by the Canadian public is required in adapting to major lifestyle changes to reduce the use of fossil fuels and other sources of greenhouse gases. In conclusion, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce does not believe that the Kyoto Protocol is the most effective and efficient way of moving forward on the climate change issue and recommends that the federal government develop a made

  4. Model Additional Protocol

    Since the end of the cold war a series of events has changed the circumstances and requirements of the safeguards system. The discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq, the continuing difficulty in verifying the initial report of Democratic People's Republic of Korea upon entry into force of their safeguards agreement, and the decision of the South African Government to give up its nuclear weapons program and join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have all played a role in an ambitious effort by IAEA Member States and the Secretariat to strengthen the safeguards system. A major milestone in this effort was reached in May 1997 when the IAEA Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements. The Model Additional Protocol was negotiated over a period of less than a year by an open-ended committee of the Board involving some 70 Member States and two regional inspectorates. The IAEA is now in the process of negotiating additional protocols, State by State, and implementing them. These additional protocols will provide the IAEA with rights of access to information about all activities related to the use of nuclear material in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and greatly expanded physical access for IAEA inspectors to confirm or verify this information. In conjunction with this, the IAEA is working on the integration of these measures with those provided for in comprehensive safeguards agreements, with a view to maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency, within available resources, the implementation of safeguards. Details concerning the Model Additional Protocol are given. (author)

  5. Joint protocol relating to the application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. Status list as of 12 September 2000. Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

    The document presents the status of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention as of 12 September 2000. The Joint Protocol entered into force on 27 April 1992

  6. Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol: a citizen's guide to the Canadian climate change policy process

    Canada is faced with the important decision of whether it should ratify the Kyoto Protocol. A reference for stakeholders and non-expert interested parties, this document is a guide into the Canadian Climate Change Policy Process. An understanding of climate science is required for climate policy, as is a knowledge of policy options available to overcome the challenges posed by climate change. The situation is further complicated by international and federal-provincial negotiations over the measures that should be implemented, if any. Climate policy affects all aspects of our lives, especially how we produce and use energy. An overview of climate science is provided in the first section, and the relationship between climate and rising temperatures due to greenhouse gas emissions is established. The sources of greenhouse gases in Canada are identified, with a closer look at the current trends. The Kyoto Protocol, if ratified, calls for Canada to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases to six per cent below 1990 levels. It is noted that to date, Canada's emissions have risen 19.7 per cent above 1990 levels. The process underlying the international negotiations associated with the Kyoto Protocol, and especially Canada's role in it, are discussed. Flexibility mechanisms are strongly supported by Canada, such as credits for sinks, international carbon trading and credits for Clean Energy Exports. By approving such measures, the integrity of the Protocol would be considerably weakened. The domestic policy-making environment is examined, presenting key federal, provincial business and environmental players. In addition, the policy process in Canada is described, as well as the decisions made up to September 2002. Bibliographic and contact information is added in the last section of the document. 89 refs., 7 tabs., 7 figs

  7. Bill project authorizing the ratification of the amendment to the Kyoto protocol of the 11 December 1997 - Nr 1880

    This bill project first recalls the context of adoption of the amendment (objectives of the Kyoto protocol for the limitation of greenhouse gas emissions, adoption of the amendment in Durban to extend these commitments over a new eight-year long period). It indicates and describes the scope of the amendment according to its two articles and in relationship with the Kyoto protocol. The text of the amendment is provided, and then the text of the French bill project authorizing its ratification. This bill project also recalls the context, indicates the objectives of the amendment, discusses the estimated consequences (notably constraints) of its implementation in terms of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and, more generally, in the struggle against climate change. These consequences are economic and financial, environmental, legal (and in relationship with the existing legal framework) and administrative. The history of the negotiation process is briefly recalled. It is noticed that five countries have already ratified the amendment at the time of publication of this bill project. Some remarks are made regarding the application of the amendment to the French overseas territories

  8. Decree No. 33/77 of 11 March approving ratification of the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, signed in Paris on 29 July 1960 and amended by the Additional Protocol, signed in Paris on 29 January 1964

    This Decree, promulgated on 21 February 1977, approves ratification of the Paris Convention and reproduces the full text of the Convention in French, followed by its translation into Portuguese. The Paris Convention provides an exceptional nuclear liability system and its scope is limited to risks of an exceptional character for which common law rules and practice are not suitable. Under the Convention, liability is absolute, channelled onto the nuclear operator and limited in amount. (NEA)

  9. Report realized on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Commission, of Defense and Armed Forces on the law project allowing the additional protocol ratification to the agreement between France, European Community of the atomic energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the guaranties application in France

    In a first part the author presents the International Atomic Energy Agency and its missions in the nuclear non proliferation policy especially in the agreements with the states of the TNP (Treaty of Nuclear non Proliferation). the today position of France is then analyzed towards the IAEA and the novations added by the additional protocol. (A.L.B.)

  10. Additional protocol experience in Romania

    Full text: National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN) is the national regulatory body with regulation, authorization and control responsibilities. CNCAN has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied, in accordance with the terms of the safeguards agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. CNCAN has built a strong primary and secondary legislation in order to have a strong legal framework to fulfill the NPT, Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol requirements. In respect of the non-proliferation issues CNCAN has as a major goal to strengthen the effectiveness and to improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. Also closer co-operation between the IAEA and CNCAN as coordinator of the national system of accounting for and control of nuclear material has been developed by organizing international and national seminars on the implementation of safeguards and the additional protocol. After the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, CNCAN prepared appropriate declarations and answers to the relevant IAEA questions in order to obtain a drawn conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and nuclear activities within Romania territory. The IAEA evaluated in Romania not only the results of its nuclear material related activities under the Safeguards Agreement but also the results of its broader, more qualitative, evaluation and verification activities under the Additional Protocol. CNCAN assured that the IAEA inspectors have complementary access according to the Additional Protocol as requested in accordance with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol and cooperated in resolving in a timely manner, any questions or

  11. Bill authorizing the ratification of the protocol amending the Protocol on transitional provisions annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community

    After an indication of the European Parliament composition, this text describes the transitional provisions adopted as the Lisbon Treaty did not come into effect before the European elections held in June 2009. The document also provides the protocol text signed by the Members States and which amended the protocol on transitional provisions annexed to the Treaty on the European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. The last part of the document discusses the administrative and legal consequences of this protocol. It also recalls the history of the negotiations and indicates the present status of signatures and ratifications

  12. Workshop to promote the ratification of the protocol on heavy metals across the entire UN ECE region

    NONE

    2009-12-15

    Within the workshop of the German Federal Environment Agency (Dessau-Rosslau, Federal Republic of Germany) at 14th to 16th May, 2008 in Yerevan (Armenia), the following lectures were held: (1) The convention and its protocols - framework and requirements (Tea Aulavuo); (2) Development of the heavy metals protocol up to now (D. Jost); (3) Experiences in transposing the obligations of the HM protocol into national law (Ivan Angelov); (4) Evaluation of concentrations of air pollutants and depositions of HM over the EECCA region (Ilia Ilyin); (5) The effectiveness of the HM protocol - emission reductions and costs (TNO-study) (M. van het Bolscher); (6) Technologies and techniques and their emission reduction potential and costs (Andre Peeters Weem); (7) Synergies of reduction of HM and particulate matter (Katja Kraus); (8) Critical loads / critical levels and effects of HM - integrated assessment (Jean-Paul Hettelingh); (9) Additional technical measures / options and their reduction potential (M. van het Bolscher); (10) Overview of the situation in the EECCA region - evaluation of a questionnaire of the Secretariat of the LRTAP Convention and ideas on revising the protocol and its annexes (Johan Sliggers); (11) Future aims of the TF (Katja Kraus).

  13. Protocol for ADDITION-PRO

    Johansen, Nanna Borup; Hansen, Anne-Louise Smidt; Jensen, Troels M;

    2012-01-01

    disease and microvascular diabetic complications. We also require a better understanding of the mechanisms that underlie and drive early changes in cardiometabolic physiology. The ADDITION-PRO study was designed to address these issues among individuals at different levels of diabetes risk recruited from...... Danish primary care. METHODS/DESIGN: ADDITION-PRO is a population-based, longitudinal cohort study of individuals at high risk for diabetes. 16,136 eligible individuals were identified at high risk following participation in a stepwise screening programme in Danish general practice between 2001 and 2006...... assessment included detailed measurement of anthropometry, body composition, biochemistry, physical activity and cardiovascular risk factors including aortic stiffness and central blood pressure. All ADDITION-PRO participants are being followed for incident cardiovascular disease and death. DISCUSSION: The...

  14. Implementation of the Additional Protocol in Japan

    The Additional Protocol between Japan and the IAEA entered into force in December 1999. To come into force a series of implementation trials of Additional Protocol was carried out at two Japanese representative nuclear research centers, i.e. Tokai Research Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Oarai Engineering Center of Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC). These trials were proposed by Japan and were conducted in cooperation with the IAEA Secretariat. In addition, Japan amended 'the Law for the Regulation of Reactors etc.', to collect adequate information to submit to the IAEA, to arrange the surrounding for the complementary access, etc. In addition, Japan Submitted the Initial Declaration of the Additional Protocol within 180 days of the entry into force of the Protocol, in the middle of June, 2000

  15. Kyoto's enemy : the american oil industry's influence in the signing and non-ratification of the Kyoto protocol

    2006-01-01

    Executive Summary This study is an empirical and theoretical analysis of the influence obtained by the American oil industry in the United States decision to first sign and then not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The purpose of the study is to explore and measure the influence the industry managed to obtain and then compare the period before the signing to the period between the signing and the decision to not ratify Kyoto. By employing theoretical framework, the empirical data collected wi...

  16. The challenges of additional protocol implementation

    Full text: The IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements, INFCIRC/540, (referred to as the Additional Protocol) in May 1997. The Additional Protocol provides for new mechanisms that include expanded information on State's nuclear activities to be declared to the IAEA and increased physical access to locations for IAEA inspectors. The objective is to provide the basis for gaining assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State. Although the Agency conducted field trials of various aspects of implementation of the Additional Protocol, the first actual implementation experience began with the entry into force of Australia's additional protocol in December of 1997. As of late August 2001,21 states have entered into force an additional protocol and another 35 states have signed the additional protocol but not yet entered the agreement into force. Because implementation of the Additional Protocol requires new activities to be carried out by the IAEA, new procedures, guidelines and training have been developed to support these activities. As more experience is gained these documents are being refined and additional ones developed to meet unforeseen needs. In addition, evaluation and follow-up of the expanded information and the results of increased access has required the Safeguards Department to expand and adapt its procedures and mode of operation. The challenge has been in establishing sufficient measures and the necessary infrastructure for consistent application of the additional protocol in such a way that they can be adapted as needed based on Agency experience. Initial development focused on the logistical aspects of implementing these new activities. These activities include the processing, handling and review of additional protocol declarations; planning, conducting and reporting on complementary access activities; and follow-up activities arising from information review or

  17. Bill authorizing the ratification of the protocol amending the Protocol on transitional provisions annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community; Projet de loi autorisant la ratification du protocole modifiant le protocole sur les dispositions transitoires annexe au traite sur l'Union europeenne, au traite sur le fonctionnement de l'Union europeenne et au traite instituant la Communaute europeenne de l'energie atomique

    NONE

    2010-07-01

    After an indication of the European Parliament composition, this text describes the transitional provisions adopted as the Lisbon Treaty did not come into effect before the European elections held in June 2009. The document also provides the protocol text signed by the Members States and which amended the protocol on transitional provisions annexed to the Treaty on the European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. The last part of the document discusses the administrative and legal consequences of this protocol. It also recalls the history of the negotiations and indicates the present status of signatures and ratifications

  18. Report realized on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Commission, of Defense and Armed Forces on the law project allowing the additional protocol ratification to the agreement between France, European Community of the atomic energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the guaranties application in France; Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires etrangeres, de la defense et des forces armees sur le projet de loi autorisant la ratification du protocole additionnel a l'accord entre la France, la Communaute europeenne de l'energie atomique et l'Agence internationale de l'energie atomique relatif a l'application de garanties en France

    NONE

    2002-07-01

    In a first part the author presents the International Atomic Energy Agency and its missions in the nuclear non proliferation policy especially in the agreements with the states of the TNP (Treaty of Nuclear non Proliferation). the today position of France is then analyzed towards the IAEA and the novations added by the additional protocol. (A.L.B.)

  19. The challenges of additional protocol implementation

    The IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements, INFCIRC/540, (referred to as the Additional Protocol) in May 1997. The Additional Protocol provides for new mechanisms that include expanded information on State's nuclear activities to be declared to the IAEA and increased physical access to locations for IAEA inspectors. Given the expanded capability under the additional protocol for the Agency to draw conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, Safeguards Department staff have had to broaden their outlook with respect to all safeguards activities being conducted. Beyond verification of nuclear material, inspectors are being called upon to conduct a wider range of activities, with more emphasis on observation of indicators of a State's nuclear-related activities and consideration of the consistency of the other information with a State's declarations. This includes consideration of how the evaluation of all information available to the Agency affects the planning and prioritizing of future safeguards activities, for example in resolving questions or inconsistencies in the declared information or selecting locations for conducting complementary access. The implementation of strengthened safeguards and the additional protocol has led to a need to institutionally change the roles of many staff members in the various Safeguards Divisions and increase the interaction between the Divisions to most effectively draw State-level conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This paper focuses on the significant changes in the roles of safeguards inspectors, in particular facility officers and country officers, in the implementation of strengthened safeguards. It outlines the nature of the changes, and some of the challenges being faced in order to adapt to these roles, including changes in the nature of interaction between the Operations and Support Divisions

  20. Intelligence and treaty ratification

    This paper starts with some comments about where the author thinks the intelligence community fits in the process and then plays this back through the INF negotiations and ratifications as the author saw them unfold. As a general rule in ratification, the first thing to remember is that you are not dealing with an objective process. That the president can sign the treaty and send it to the Senate means that he and others in the executive branch have already accepted that the treaty is a good thing. And they are not bringing it to the Senate saying maybe it is or it is not. They are there to sell the treaty to the Senate, especially to those who may be skeptical, but whose votes will make the difference between a simple majority and the two-thirds you need to get the treaty back to the White House for ratification

  1. Recommendations for Enhancing Implementation of Additional Protocol Declarations

    Japan signed the Additional Protocol (hereafter, AP) in December 1998. The domestic law and regulation had been revised to implement the initial and annual declarations for the Agency and the Additional Protocol came into force in December 1999. Since initial declaration in 2000, Japan has submitted the annual declaration in every May. Until 2010, Japan has made 10 annual declarations. This paper gives recommendations to enhance implementation of Additional Protocol declarations based on 10-year experience in Japan and addresses the following: Current status of additional protocol declaration in Japan; Outline of processing method; AP Information Management System; Recommendations for improving quality of declaration. Preparation of additional protocol declaration in NMCC has been conducted in the course of contract with Japan Safeguards Office (hereafter, JSGO) for safeguards information treatment. (author)

  2. IAEA to implement Safeguards Additional Protocols in the EU

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed the entry into force today of the Additional Protocols for 15 States of the European Union - France, the United Kingdom and the 13 non-nuclear weapon States of the EU - and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The Protocols, which provide the Agency with better tools to verify compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments, entered into force when the European Commission informed the Agency that EURATOM's own requirements for entry into force had been met. The 15 States had provided similar notifications over the past years since signing the Protocols in 1998. The simultaneous entry into force of Additional Protocols for the 15 EU States is 'a very positive development and a milestone in our efforts to strengthen the verification regime', said Dr. ElBaradei. 'In my view, the Additional Protocol should become the standard for verification under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).' He added that the Agency had been preparing for the entry into force of the EU protocols and was confident that, in co-operation with the 15 States and EURATOM, it would be able to ensure effective and efficient implementation in the EU States. The Model Additional Protocol was developed following the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme to ensure that the IAEA is given the information and access it needs for timely discovery of any similar activities in States that have pledged not to use nuclear material and activities for weapons purposes. In the past year, Additional Protocols entered into force for 22 countries, and the Agency will now implement Additional Protocols in 58 States, which includes the 15 EU States. The 10 countries joining the EU on 1 May 2004 - seven of which already have brought into force Additional Protocols to their respective safeguards agreements - are expected to gradually accede to the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol covering

  3. Towards wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system: Additional protocols and small quantities protocols

    During the past few years, the IAEA Secretariat has been implementing a Plan of Action to encourage and facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Such outreach activities by the IAEA and its Member States have contributed to the IAEA's effectiveness and efficiency objectives through a rapidly increasing number of States with additional protocols. Since 2001, the number of States with additional protocols in force has more than tripled from 24 to 78, while 110 States have signed additional protocols. Of particular importance for the strengthening of safeguards, more than 80% of all States with safeguards significant nuclear activities have concluded additional protocols. Following the IAEA Board of Governors' decisions in 2005 regarding small quantities protocols (SQPs), the Secretariat's outreach activities have also promoted the acceptance of the new standardized SQP text, which allows for initial reports, early information about new facilities and IAEA inspections, while making SQPs unavailable for States with planned or existing nuclear facilities. Since the Board took its decisions, nine States have accepted the modified SQP text and the IAEA has written to all relevant States proposing to modify the existing SQPs. For States that have not yet decided to conclude an additional protocol, the Secretariat has found that this is generally because of policy reasons or administrative hurdles or because of legal or technical obstacles. Specifically, a number of States need to put in place an effective national system for accounting and control of nuclear material and activities. Many States have taken action to strengthen such controls in order to be able to report under their safeguards agreements and additional protocols. This is a positive development from the point of view of strengthened safeguards, and also strengthens the authorities' hand in preventing and detecting attempts at illicit trafficking. Accordingly, the IAEA has

  4. Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty

    Ioana PATRAN

    2008-01-01

    Every country in the EU must ratify according to its own legislation The Lisbon Treaty for it to come into force and for the next elections for the European Parliament to be held according to these new settlements. In the way that the ratification process is presented in this moment, it seems that only in the summer of 2008 the situation will start to clarify and we will know if the Treaty will have a different path from The Constitutional Treaty, becoming just a beautiful memory of the EU re...

  5. 76 FR 24854 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Additional Protocol Report Forms

    2011-05-03

    ...-related items and materials; and research and development. The Protocol also expands IAEA access to... Bureau of Industry and Security Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Additional Protocol.... Abstract The Additional Protocol requires the United States to submit declaration forms to...

  6. The Role of Additional Pulses in Electropermeabilization Protocols

    Suárez, Cecilia; Soba, Alejandro; Maglietti, Felipe; Olaiz, Nahuel; Marshall, Guillermo

    2014-01-01

    Electropermeabilization (EP) based protocols such as those applied in medicine, food processing or environmental management, are well established and widely used. The applied voltage, as well as tissue electric conductivity, are of utmost importance for assessing final electropermeabilized area and thus EP effectiveness. Experimental results from literature report that, under certain EP protocols, consecutive pulses increase tissue electric conductivity and even the permeabilization amount. Here we introduce a theoretical model that takes into account this effect in the application of an EP-based protocol, and its validation with experimental measurements. The theoretical model describes the electric field distribution by a nonlinear Laplace equation with a variable conductivity coefficient depending on the electric field, the temperature and the quantity of pulses, and the Penne's Bioheat equation for temperature variations. In the experiments, a vegetable tissue model (potato slice) is used for measuring electric currents and tissue electropermeabilized area in different EP protocols. Experimental measurements show that, during sequential pulses and keeping constant the applied voltage, the electric current density and the blackened (electropermeabilized) area increase. This behavior can only be attributed to a rise in the electric conductivity due to a higher number of pulses. Accordingly, we present a theoretical modeling of an EP protocol that predicts correctly the increment in the electric current density observed experimentally during the addition of pulses. The model also demonstrates that the electric current increase is due to a rise in the electric conductivity, in turn induced by temperature and pulse number, with no significant changes in the electric field distribution. The EP model introduced, based on a novel formulation of the electric conductivity, leads to a more realistic description of the EP phenomenon, hopefully providing more accurate

  7. International Workshops to Foster Implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol

    A countrys adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agencys (IAEA) Additional Protocol is an important statement to the world of that countrys commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Without the Additional Protocol (AP) it is possible, as demonstrated in Iraq, for a country party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to clandestinely work toward nuclear weapons and be undetected by the IAEA. This is because classical safeguards under the NPT are directed at diversion of nuclear material from declared activities. But a country may instead build undeclared activities to produce weapons-grade nuclear material. The AP is directed at detecting those undeclared activities. As of May 2003, 73 countries had signed the AP, but only 35 have entered into force. To further adherence to the AP, the IAEA has held regional, high-level seminars in Japan, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Peru, Romania, and Malaysia to explain AP provisions. To supplement these policy-level seminars, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has undertaken to develop a set of modules of technical competencies required to implement the AP. The intent is to work closely with the IAEA by providing these technical competencies to countries as well as to complement the IAEAs regional seminars and other outreach efforts. This paper briefly describes the technical competency modules.

  8. Implementation of INFCIRC/193 and its additional protocol in the Slovak Republic

    requirements resulting from the Protocol. To enable the ratification of the Protocol Additional, first of all it was necessary to amend the Atomic Law and associated regulations. On 21 June 2004 the president of the Slovak Republic has signed the letter of accession of Slovakia to the safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol. On 1 December 2005 this agreement entered into force. During the period between 1 May 2004 and 1 December 2005 the Slovak Republic had to report both to the IAEA (according INFCIRC/173) and to the European Commission (according to the Euratom Treaty and Regulation No. 302/2005). Starting from 1 December 2005 the UJD has begun with the implementation of INFCIRC/193 and its Protocol Additional. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material, equipment and technologies is being used. The government of the Slovak Republic like many other governments uses for this purpose licensing system. Basic principles for control of export/import of selected goods were defined in the Act No. 26/2002. The act clearly describes requirement of exporters/importers and also responsibility and powers of the regulator which is the Ministry of Economy of SR issuing license. In like manner as for safeguards, after accession to the EU, Regulation 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology entered into force. The role of the UJD in the export/import control system is anchored in the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. The act gives the UJD power to issue permission for export/import of nuclear material, nuclear-related or dual-use material, equipment and technologies a list of which is included in Regulation 1334/2000. In issuing the permission the UJD strictly follows recommendations and requirements of the Regulation 1334/2000 and NSG guidelines published in the IAEA INFCIRC/254 and guidelines of the

  9. The Status of Implementation on Additional Protocol at KAERI

    Under the Additional Protocol, a State is required to provide the IAEA with further information on nuclear related activities, all buildings on a site, etc. through an expanded declaration and further access rights at a nuclear site and any location included in the expanded declaration. This paper describes the implementation status on the expanded declaration and the complementary access at KAERI under the AP. This paper reviewed the implementation status of the AP at KAERI, and there are some practical issues to prepare the expanded declarations as mentioned above. From the view point of the effective and efficient processing of the expanded declaration, it will be necessary to discuss the criterion for the definition of the nuclear fuel cycle-related R and D to be declared under the AP with IAEA

  10. New START: The Contentious Road to Ratification

    Elizabeth Zolotukhina

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available Senate ratification of the New START treaty re-established effective bilateral inspection and monitoring of American and Russian nuclear holdings and has the potential to further enhance U.S.-Russian cooperation on key issues, including containing the Iranian nuclear program, and further reductions in the two countries' arsenals. Although the accord was widely heralded as a foreign policy success of the Obama administration, the contentious Senate ratification may impede future progress on arms control.

  11. Commercial satellite data as support to the additional protocol declarations

    Full text: Objectives - The overall objective of the project is to show how commercial satellite data can be used for safeguard purposes both at SKI and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore this project will support IAEA in its process to develop methods to make the best use of provided information such as digitised maps and satellite images. Finally it will give IAEA a case study of the usefulness of satellite data for change detection purposes. Background - The protocol calls among others for an extended/complete declaration of all nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities as well as sites where nuclear material is or was customarily used. The declaration shall include descriptions of all buildings at the sites as well as maps. In parallel to the development of the additional protocol IAEA has started to use a variety of measures/techniques both to verify that declarations are complete and correct but also to be able to come to the conclusion that a state has no undeclared nuclear material or undeclared nuclear activities. One such technique is the use of commercial satellite data. The IAEA is now in the process of evaluating the usefulness and effectiveness of such data for safeguard purposes. In order to come to a decision on how to use satellite data IAEA is highly dependant on support from member states which can provide results from case studies etc. Analysis - This project shall provide SKI with digitised maps and commercial satellite data by the means of GIS to verify the descriptions provided by two of the nuclear operators. Furthermore those digital data can be included in the declaration given to IAEA. The overall aim is to enhance the quality of the Swedish declaration including support to IAEA to develop methods to use commercial satellite data. Results - The paper will present experiences and mapping results made during the work. (author)

  12. Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

    For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  13. Recommended Protocol for Round Robin Studies in Additive Manufacturing

    Moylan, Shawn; Brown, Christopher U.; Slotwinski, John

    2016-01-01

    One way to improve confidence and encourage proliferation of additive manufacturing (AM) technologies and parts is by generating more high quality data describing the performance of AM processes and parts. Many in the AM community see round robin studies as a way to generate large data sets while distributing the cost among the participants, thereby reducing the cost to individual users. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has conducted and participated in several of these AM round robin studies. While the results of these studies are interesting and informative, many of the lessons learned in conducting these studies concern the logistics and methods of the study and unique issues presented by AM. Existing standards for conducting interlaboratory studies of measurement methods, along with NIST’s experience, form the basis for recommended protocols for conducting AM round robin studies. The role of round robin studies in AM qualification, some of the limitations of round robin studies, and the potential benefit of less formal collaborative experiments where multiple factors, AM machine being only one, are varied simultaneously are also discussed. PMID:27274602

  14. The Role of Additional Pulses in Electropermeabilization Protocols

    Suárez, Cecilia; Soba, Alejandro; Maglietti, Felipe; Olaiz, Nahuel; Marshall, Guillermo

    2014-01-01

    Electropermeabilization (EP) based protocols such as those applied in medicine, food processing or environmental management, are well established and widely used. The applied voltage, as well as tissue electric conductivity, are of utmost importance for assessing final electropermeabilized area and thus EP effectiveness. Experimental results from literature report that, under certain EP protocols, consecutive pulses increase tissue electric conductivity and even the permeabilization amount. H...

  15. Green certificates - additional instruments at Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms

    The paper presents four mechanisms, designed to realize certain objectives - to stimulate the use of electricity produced from renewable energy sources and to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The operation mode of these mechanisms is analyzed and their common characteristics are determined, as well as the possibility to interact each other. The systems analysed are Tradable Green Certificates and Flexible Mechanisms of Kyoto Protocol. The Green Certificates System is explained more thoroughly because the Romanian Government chose them to promote electricity from renewable energy sources on the internal electricity market. The main characteristic of these systems, which combine elements of centralization with the use of market mechanisms are outlined

  16. THE LISBON TREATY: A SINUOUS RATIFICATION

    Adrian-Gabriel Corpădean

    2011-01-01

    This article deals with the intricate ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, while focusing on the thorny issues of Euroscepticism and democratic deficit within the European Union in the current institutional context. The study is based on a wide research endeavour, whose purpose has been to encompass multiple points of view on the future of the European Union, seen from the perspective of the Treaty of Lisbon and its reception in all member states. These viewpoints include the ones found...

  17. THE LISBON TREATY: A SINUOUS RATIFICATION

    Adrian-Gabriel Corpădean

    2011-03-01

    Full Text Available This article deals with the intricate ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, while focusing on the thorny issues of Euroscepticism and democratic deficit within the European Union in the current institutional context. The study is based on a wide research endeavour, whose purpose has been to encompass multiple points of view on the future of the European Union, seen from the perspective of the Treaty of Lisbon and its reception in all member states. These viewpoints include the ones found in the speciality literature, as well as in the press that published representative articles during the debates on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Useful attempts are made in order to classify the member states of the EU according to various relevant criteria in their attitude germane to the ratification of the Treaty, so as to outline new waves of Euroscepticism, opt-outs and criticism. Apart from an institutional and a legal perspective, this study presents a large number of political, national and even cultural aspects encountered in attitudes and courses of action pertaining to the future of European Construction, seen through the eyes of the reform process carried out by the latest EU major legal document.

  18. Report made on the behalf of the Foreign Affairs Commission on the bill project nr 2932 authorizing the ratification of the protocol modifying the protocol on transitory dispositions attached to the Treaty on the European Union, to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community

    This report first describes and comments the consequences of the Lisbon Treaty in terms of composition for the European Parliament, and more particularly the debate about the design of an efficient and representative parliament, the election mode and the seat distribution. Then, it describes how the modification protocol has been elaborated, its content (general architecture, eighteen additional seats for twelve member States and their election modalities), and its implementation (agenda and method)

  19. State system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials and Protocol Additional in the Slovak Republic

    proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear materials accountancy and control with special reference to material balance areas and key measurement points, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking. This document is prepared by the IAEA using the Design Information Questionnaire supplied by the facility operator. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic uses computerised system for SSAC - Code ZARUKY 3.00. This code should be able to communicate with the database of operators, which are allowed to handle nuclear material and it should reflect all limitations specified in theirs permissions. It is created on a system with fully satisfactory safety, strictly defined confidentiality and in a system, which allows the access of several users in parallel. As a new component of the code the system for reporting in accordance with the requirements of the Additional Protocol will be incorporated. Starting after political changes in the Central Europe in the beginning of nineties the Slovak Republic is facing a new type of crime illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. Direct economical losses in this case are not comparable with the impact on proliferation and radiation safety risk. The government of the Slovak Republic is aware of the situation and has prepared some measures, which may help us to cope with this problem. These measures were mostly concentrated on detection on the state border as well as inside the state. However, the most important is a state system of measures how to prevent removal of material into illegal use. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. However, The Protocol cannot be ratified, as the laws now in effect in the Slovak Republic do not make it possible to meet all requirements resulting from the Protocol. To enable the ratification of the Protocol Additional, first of all it is necessary to amend the Atomic Law and associated regulations

  20. A Relation between the Protocol Partition Number and the Quasi-Additive Bound

    Kamiyama, Naoyuki

    2010-01-01

    In this note, we show that the linear programming for computing the quasi-additive bound of the formula size of a Boolean function presented by Ueno [MFCS'10] is equivalent to the dual problem of the linear programming relaxation of an integer programming for computing the protocol partition number. Together with the result of Ueno [MFCS'10], our results imply that there exists no gap between our integer programming for computing the protocol partition number and its linear programming relaxa...

  1. Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the European Union - prospect and impact

    Most of the fifteen current Member States of the EU have signed and ratified the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193. The Additional Protocol will enter into force when all 15 Member States have completed their internal legal requirements for its implementation and when the European Commission notifies the IAEA that the legal instruments to bring the AP into force are in place. This is expected to be during 2003. Euratom's role in the implementation of the Additional Protocol by the IAEA will be limited to facilitating the provision of information and services required. Euratom will not perform an evaluation of the Additional Protocol measures, nor will it draw safeguards conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The future enlargement of the EU in 2004 brings with it 10 countries already under Agency Safeguards, some with the Additional Protocol in force and others well on the road to Integrated Safeguards. All of these factors will have an impact, not only within the IAEA and Euratom themselves, but, importantly, on the relationship and cooperation between both organizations

  2. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  3. Declarations pursuant to the Articles 2 and 3 of the Model Additional Protocol

    Articles 2 and 3 of the Model Additional Protocol specify the content and the time limits of the information to be provided by the States into the framework of the Safeguard Agreements. To standardize the presentation of this information the IAEA has prepared guidelines for the preparation of the documents. A detailed explanation of the guidelines is given in the paper

  4. 15 CFR 781.2 - Purposes of the Additional Protocol and APR.

    2010-01-01

    ... Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL.../Infcircs/index.html), except that it excludes IAEA access to activities with direct national security... about aspects of the U.S. civil nuclear fuel cycle, including: Mining and concentration of nuclear...

  5. CLASS ACTION AGAINST THE NON-IMMEDIACY OF RATIFICATION OF THE 1990 MIGRANT WORKERS CONVENTION

    Wisnu Aryo Dewanto

    2014-01-01

    Ratification of treaties in Indonesia can be regarded as mere political acts, as ratification itself  does not yet rule for its enforcement in Indonesia’s jurisdiction. As stipulated in Article 11 of the 1945Indonesian Constitution, these ratifications are still subject to consent from the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) as they are the appointed institution in Indonesia with treaty-making powers. The act of ratification by the Indonesian Government is regarded as a ratification onl...

  6. Iran to sign additional protocol and suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing

    Full text: Iran's representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Ali Akbar Salehi, today delivered a letter to IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei conveying his Government's acceptance of the Additional Protocol. Mr. Salehi also informed the Director General that Iran had decided, as of today, to suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in Iran - specifically, to suspend all activities on the site of Natanz, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes and not to import enrichment-related items. 'This is a welcome and positive development,' IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said. The IAEA intends to verify, in the context of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, the implementation by Iran of these decisions. At its meeting on 12 September, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran to sign, ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol promptly and unconditionally, and as a confidence building measure to act henceforth in accordance with the Additional Protocol. The Board also called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, pending provision by the Director General of the assurances required by Member States and pending satisfactory application of the provisions of the Additional Protocol. Also today, Mr. ElBaradei has released his report to IAEA Member States on the 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran' for consideration at the 20 November Board of Governors' meeting. Unless the IAEA Board decides otherwise, the document's circulation is restricted and it cannot be released to the press. (IAEA)

  7. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  8. Latest approaches of Kyoto protocol

    Recently EURELECTRIC welcome the proposal of new EC Directive concerning the inclusion in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) of credits from the project mechanisms - Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The proposed Directive is an amendment to the EU Emissions Trading Directive adopted in June 2003. EURELECTRIC calls for unlimited use of credits in ETS. The draft Directive provides for the application of these mechanisms to begin as of 2008, on condition that the Kyoto Protocol does actually enter into force, an event which is still dependent on Russia's ratification. Such ratification has been subject to contradictory statements from the Russian Government, and the question of whether their signature to the Protocol is forthcoming is still fraught with uncertainty. Although it is not anticipated that significant quantities of JI or CDM certified credits will be available in the period 2005-2007, those that do become available would provide some additional liquidity in the emissions trading market. There is a direct relation between the coming ETS and electricity pricing: environmental policy is the driver, based on the need to switch to a low-carbon future and manage the necessary investments in a rational manner - and emissions trading is the best solution available. Romania has good opportunities to be involved in the greenhouse gases market, both in ETS and JI mechanisms. Some JI projects between Romanian and The Netherlands are already done or underway. (author)

  9. Approach to integrate current safeguards measures with Additional Protocol requirements at national level

    Peru approved the Additional Protocol and then new obligations have to be fulfilled. Until now classic safeguards has been applied to two Material Balance Zones and reports are being periodically sent to IAEA as established in the subsidiary arrangements and the records of nuclear materials are kept in the State System for Control and Accountability. The new commitments were analyzed to determine the magnitude of needed efforts. The recommended guidelines to submit information under the new protocol was also reviewed. Co-ordinations were made with Customs organization and with Ministry of Industry to obtain information about the material and equipment specified in the annexes of Protocol. It is expected that implementation of the new measures and activities will increase the volume of records and the reports to IAEA. However, some of these efforts may be saved if adjustments are made in future subsidiary arrangements. (author)

  10. Law project (no. 1329) adopted by the Senate and authorizing the ratification of the agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of nuclear weapons prohibition in South America and the Caribbeans area (two protocols together)

    The French Senate adopted on January 6, 2004 the project of law which authorizes the ratification of the agreement between France, the European atomic energy community and the IAEA about the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons in South America and in the Caribbean area signed in Vienna (Austria) on March 21, 2000. The text of this treaty is attached to this law. (J.S.)

  11. U.S. Additional Protocol Outreach Program-Tabletop Exercises to Implement the AP

    The Office of International Regimes and Agreement (NA-243) is the lead office in the Department of Energy (DOE) to assist DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sites in the preparation of providing declarations on relevant civilian, nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is in accordance to the implementation of the ''Protocol Additional to the AGreement between the United STates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Applications of Safeguards in the United States. In preparation for entry-into-force, NA-243 conducted two tabletop exercises under the Additional Protocol Outreach Program. The first one, held in May 2004 at Los Alamos National Laboratory, focused on the factors important to protect national security assets and intellectual property. The other, held in August 2004 at the Idaho National Laboratory explored the level of detail or granularity for reporting declarable activities. Both tabletops invited participants from the national laboratories and DOE/NNSA organizations. Discussions were based around the process to identify potential declarable activities relating to the nuclear fuel cycle-related R and D projects from the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative program. The two tabletop exercises provided recommendations and conclusions that would be helpful to other DOE/NNSA locations for preparing for and reporting relevant and concise information to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol. This paper provides details on the events, discussions, observations, and lessons learned from both the LANL and INL tabletop exercises.

  12. Site Definition in the Additional Protocol how to Focus on The Real Issues

    Nuclear sites represent a key element in the Additional Protocol. In order to ensure that a state does not use collocated declared activities and buildings to cover up clandestine activities, the state is requested to give information about every building on the site and the IAEA is given far reaching access rights to all places on these sites. This seemed to be a logical approach that would not lead to many implementation difficulties. The reality however showed to be slightly different. The definition of the site under the Article 2a(iii) declaration turned out to be one of the most important practical issues when preparing for the implementation of the Additional Protocol. Straightforward for standard facilities, it needs careful consideration for sites of a research centres or nuclear institutes in the middle of a university campus. The site has to be carefully defined as it has a direct influence on the amount of information to be provided to the IAEA, the Agency's rights for Complementary Access, and the building owner obligations to grant this access in often a very short notice. Sites should be large enough to meet the objectives of the Additional Protocol. On the other hand there is no reason that buildings that do not contribute to the nuclear mission of the site should be part of it. The site boundaries should, therefore, be set in such way that no unnecessary burden is put on building operators that have no functional relationship with nearby nuclear activities

  13. Additional factors for the estimation of mean glandular breast dose using the UK mammography dosimetry protocol

    The UK and European protocols for mammographic dosimetry use conversion factors that relate incident air kerma to the mean glandular dose (MGD) within the breast. The conversion factors currently used were obtained by computer simulation of a model breast with a composition of 50% adipose and 50% glandular tissues by weight (50% glandularity). Relative conversion factors have been calculated which allow the extension of the protocols to breasts of varying glandularity and for a wider range of mammographic x-ray spectra. The data have also been extended to breasts of a compressed thickness of 11 cm. To facilitate the calculation of MGD in patient surveys, typical breast glandularities are tabulated for women in the age ranges 40-49 and 50-64 years, and for breasts in the thickness range 2-11 cm. In addition, tables of equivalent thickness of polymethyl methacrylate have been provided to allow the simulation for dosimetric purposes of typical breasts of various thicknesses. (author)

  14. Approach to integrate current safeguards measures with additional protocol requirements at national level

    Peru adhered to the Additional Protocol in March 2000 which was also approved by the Congress in May 2001. After approval by law the obligations derived from this Additional Protocol will be in force after 180 days. After the signing of the Protocol an approach was designed to help better fulfill these requirements in an integrated way with the previous measures. As first stage, a review of the current state of safeguards was undertaken. Under the current agreement (an INFCIRC/153 type agreement) the reporting is less complicated and inexpensive to be carried out because these reports include only the declared nuclear material and the features of declared facilities where the nuclear material is used. No other related facility or material or activity needs to be declared. In Peru there are only two MBAs where low enriched uranium (LEU) is used and the record system includes general ledgers, inventory records and operational books. The results of national inspections and copies of reports and communications sent to the IAEA are also kept in this system. Under the agreement and subsidiary arrangements material balance reports (MBR), physical inventory listings (PIL) and inventory change reports (ICR) are prepared and submitted to the IAEA at scheduled periods. The MBR and PIL reports are sent after yearly regular inspections carried out by the IAEA. The ICR is sent just every time when an import or export of nuclear material is made. The time devoted to carry out all of these activities is not so extensive for both the State System for Accountability and Control (SSAC) and the users because of the limited nuclear activities in the country. Because of the characteristics and limited quantities of nuclear material the efforts for inspection and reporting activities are few. Another subject under review was the procedure for controlling the imports of nuclear material. Under the current agreement this subject was not a problem, as all of the radioactive and nuclear

  15. 25 CFR 81.7 - Adoption, ratification, or revocation by majority vote.

    2010-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Adoption, ratification, or revocation by majority vote... TRIBAL REORGANIZATION UNDER A FEDERAL STATUTE § 81.7 Adoption, ratification, or revocation by majority... those actually voting are in favor of adoption, ratification, or revocation. The total vote...

  16. 48 CFR 2901.602-3 - Ratification of unauthorized commitments.

    2010-10-01

    ... Director, Division of Acquisition Management Services, for submission to the Procurement Review Board... unauthorized commitments. 2901.602-3 Section 2901.602-3 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF... Authority, and Responsibilities 2901.602-3 Ratification of unauthorized commitments. (a) If the HCA...

  17. Report made on the behalf of the Foreign Affairs Commission on the bill project nr 2932 authorizing the ratification of the protocol modifying the protocol on transitory dispositions attached to the Treaty on the European Union, to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community; Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Etrangeres sur le Projet de Loi n. 2932, autorisant la ratification du protocole modifiant le protocole sur les dispositions transitoires annexe au traite sur l'Union europeenne, au traite sur le fonctionnement de l'Union europeenne et au traite instituant la Communaute europeenne de l'energie atomique

    NONE

    2011-07-01

    This report first describes and comments the consequences of the Lisbon Treaty in terms of composition for the European Parliament, and more particularly the debate about the design of an efficient and representative parliament, the election mode and the seat distribution. Then, it describes how the modification protocol has been elaborated, its content (general architecture, eighteen additional seats for twelve member States and their election modalities), and its implementation (agenda and method)

  18. A geo-portal for data management and integration in the context of the additional protocol

    Since the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, nuclear safeguards is faced with an abundance of information from different sources which require effective tools for the collection, storage, analysis and retrieval of data. Over the last years, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) has developed a number of tools supporting the preparation, management and verification of AP declarations, which were demonstrating the usefulness of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) for this purpose. Following these experiences, DG-TREN has asked the JRC to develop a Geo-Portal integrating the diverse databases at DG-TREN and providing a single point of access to all safeguards-relevant information. Based on the same platform, NUMAS was developed with the objective of integrating information from various sources in view making available information on Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The article describes the objectives and the features of both systems. (author)

  19. A geo-portal for data management and integration in the context of the additional protocol

    The Directorate General for Energy and Transport of the European Commission (DG-TREN) is responsible for the implementation of the EURATOM Safeguards system and the Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols under the Non Proliferation Treaty. In particular since the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, DG-TREN is faced with an abundance of information from different sources which require effective tools for the collection, storage, analysis and retrieval of data. Over the last years, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) developed a number of tools supporting the preparation, management and verification of AP declarations showing the usefulness of (Geographic Information System (GIS) for this purpose. Following these experiences, DG-TREN asked the JRC to develop a Geo-Portal integrating the diverse databases at DG-TREN and providing a single point of access to all relevant information. The proposed system is sketched and has the following features: - It is a multi-tier system (database, application server, client application) which is compatible with the existing IT architecture at DG-TREN. Particular attention is paid on respecting the strict security requirements associated with the information. - It implements a geo-database containing all locations and geographic features of interest (sites, buildings, mines, R and D activities, etc). Every geographic feature has a link to each existing item of information that is associated with this feature, e.g. a site contains links to all relevant AP declarations, inspector reports, supporting documentation, etc) - An application server transfers the data to the client application using standard web protocols thus providing maximum flexibility for possible extensions and also facilitating deployment and maintenance. The system will be installed within the secure DG-TREN network which protects the information from unauthorised external access. - The GIS client application provides a single point of access to all data

  20. Extraction and Analysis of Information Related to Research & Development Declared Under an Additional Protocol

    The additional protocol (AP) provides important tools to strengthen and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. Safeguards are designed to verify that States comply with their international commitments not to use nuclear material or to engage in nuclear-related activities for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Under an AP based on INFCIRC/540, a State must provide to the IAEA additional information about, and inspector access to, all parts of its nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, the State has to supply information about its nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development (R&D) activities. The majority of States declare their R&D activities under the AP Articles 2.a.(i), 2.a.(x), and 2.b.(i) as part of initial declarations and their annual updates under the AP. In order to verify consistency and completeness of information provided under the AP by States, the Agency has started to analyze declared R&D information by identifying interrelationships between States in different R&D areas relevant to safeguards. The paper outlines the quality of R&D information provided by States to the Agency, describes how the extraction and analysis of relevant declarations are currently carried out at the Agency and specifies what kinds of difficulties arise during evaluation in respect to cross-linking international projects and finding gaps in reporting. In addition, the paper tries to elaborate how the reporting quality of AP information with reference to R&D activities and the assessment process of R&D information could be improved. (author)

  1. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

  2. Experience of implementing the additional protocol in the EU - The first years

    Full text: The Additional Protocol (AP) is in force in all 25 Member States of the European Union (EU). The three APs related to the Safeguards Agreements INFCIRC/193, INFCIRC/263 and INFCIRC/290 entered into force on 30 April 2004 covering the fifteen states members of the EU at that time. These APs are all trilateral agreements between the IAEA, the Member States and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), reflecting the role of Euratom has as regional safeguards authority for accountancy and control (RSAC) in the European Union. They are also the only trilateral APs currently in force in the world. At the time of the EU enlargement in 2004 the AP was in force in seven of the ten new Member States. These States have been reporting to the IAEA on the basis of their bilateral APs for several years. In the remaining three new Member States the AP was brought into force after their accession to the EU. These states are now preparing their initial declarations. The European Commission is a supra-national body, which in addition to its role as a RSAC, is also a nuclear operator and an important component of Europe's nuclear research capacity. It therefore declares its own activities relevant to the AP as a separate entity and party to the AP. Thanks to its role as a focal point in implementing the AP in the European Union, the Commission has accumulated an ample experience in reporting, following up and in matters relating to Complementary Access. The paper reviews this experience and presents an outlook of the future challenges of the AP implementation in the EU. (author)

  3. Vienna convention on civil liability for nuclear damage and optional protocol concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Status lists as of 12 September 2000. Signature, ratification, accession, or succession. Declarations/reservations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto. Declarations/reservations made upon signature

    The document provides the status list to the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and optional protocol concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes as of 12 September 2000

  4. Kyoto protocol cooperation: does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying?.

    Fredriksson, Per G.; Neumayer, Eric; Ujhelyi, Gergely

    2007-01-01

    Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying? In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. We find that increased environmental lobby group ac...

  5. Kyoto Protocol one step closer

    Showstack, Randy

    The European Union (EU) could soon decide to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, following a 4 March meeting of the European Commissions environment council to approve the treaty.European Commission President Romani Prodi said the council's move enables the 15 EU member states to take the steps toward simultaneous ratification together with the commission before 1 June."I urge our partners both in the developed and in the developing countries to also ratify the Kyoto Protocol soon," he said.

  6. Implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol in the Philippines: USDOE/PNRI Cooperation

    The Philippines entered into force the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (AP) in February 2010. The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) is the government agency responsible for implementing the AP. In June 2010 the IAEA invited the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to help conduct a joint national training seminar on the AP. DOE presented to PNRI its AP international technical assistance program, administered by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), which helps partner countries implement the AP. In coordination with the IAEA, DOE established this program in 2008 to complement IAEA AP seminars with long-term country-specific cooperation from the perspective of a Member State. The US version of the AP is the same version as that of non-nuclear weapon states except for the addition of a national security exclusion. Due to this, DOE cooperation with other countries enables the sharing of valuable lessons learned in implementing the AP. DOE/INSEP described to PNRI the various areas of cooperation it offers to interested countries, whether they are preparing for entry into force or already implementing the AP. Even countries that have entered the AP into force are sometimes not fully prepared to implement it well, and welcome cooperation to improve their implementation process. PNRI and DOE/INSEP subsequently agreed to cooperate in several areas to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Philippines AP implementation. These areas include providing working-level training to PNRI staff and preparing an information document that details that training for future reference, assisting with the development of an outreach program and procedures for AP reporting and complementary access, and identifying Annex II equipment and non-nuclear materials whose export must be reported under the AP. DOE laboratory representatives, funded by INSEP, met again with PNRI in February 2011 to provide training for PNRI AP

  7. Law project (no. 1329) adopted by the Senate and authorizing the ratification of the agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of nuclear weapons prohibition in South America and the Caribbeans area (two protocols together); Projet de loi (no. 1329) adopte par le Senat autorisant la ratification de l'accord entre la Republique francaise, la Communaute europeenne de l'energie atomique et l'Agence internationale de l'energie atomique relatif a l'application de garanties dans le cadre du traite visant l'interdiction des armes nucleraires en Amerique latine et dans les Caraibes (ensemble deux protocoles)

    NONE

    2004-01-01

    The French Senate adopted on January 6, 2004 the project of law which authorizes the ratification of the agreement between France, the European atomic energy community and the IAEA about the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons in South America and in the Caribbean area signed in Vienna (Austria) on March 21, 2000. The text of this treaty is attached to this law. (J.S.)

  8. 75 FR 4323 - Additional Quantitative Fit-testing Protocols for the Respiratory Protection Standard

    2010-01-27

    ... article published in a peer-reviewed industrial-hygiene journal describing the protocol and explaining how..., and from 500 to 1000 for full facepieces. Peer-reviewed industrial-hygiene journal article. The peer... the studies described in the peer-reviewed journal article well controlled, and conducted......

  9. The Effects of AFGP Addition and Removing Protocol of CPA on Vitrification Cryopreservation of Osteoblasts

    2005-01-01

    1 Introduction Vitrification is an effective method for cryopreservation of cells~([1, 2]). However, cells are usually damaged due to the osmotic injury caused by the higher concentrations of cryoprotective agents (CPA) during CPA removing. The ice recrystallization in thawing solution can also hurt cells seriously. Antifreeze glycoprotein (AFGPs) is extremely efficient at inhibiting ice recrystallization~([3]).The effects of Removing protocols and AFGP on cell viability were investigated. 2 Materials and M...

  10. Does ratification of human-rights treaties have effects on population health?

    Palmer, Alexis; Tomkinson, Jocelyn; Phung, Charlene; Ford, Nathan; Joffres, Michel; Fernandes, Kimberly A; Zeng, Leilei; Lima, Viviane; Montaner, Julio S G; Guyatt, Gordon H; Mills, Edward J

    2009-06-01

    Human-rights treaties indicate a country's commitment to human rights. Here, we assess whether ratification of human-rights treaties is associated with improved health and social indicators. Data for health (including HIV prevalence, and maternal, infant, and child [corruption index), gathered from 170 countries, showed no consistent associations between ratification of human-rights treaties and health or social outcomes. Established market economy states had consistently improved health compared with less wealthy settings, but this was not associated with treaty ratification. The status of treaty ratification alone is not a good indicator of the realisation of the right to health. We suggest the need for stringent requirements for ratification of treaties, improved accountability mechanisms to monitor compliance of states with treaty obligations, and financial assistance to support the realisation of the right to health. PMID:19501746

  11. Implementation of the Additional Protocol: Verification activities at uranium mines and mills

    Full text: The mining and milling of uranium is the first in a long chain of processes required to produce nuclear materials in a form suitable for use in nuclear weapons. Misuse of a declared uranium mining/milling facility, in the form of understatement of production, would be hard to detect with the same high level of confidence as afforded by classical safeguards on other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. For these reasons, it would not be cost-effective to apply verification techniques based on classical safeguards concepts to a mining/milling facility in order to derive assurance of the absence of misuse. Indeed, these observations have been recognised in the Model Protocol (INFCIRC/540): 'the Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify' information provided to it by States (Article 4.a.). Nevertheless, complementary access to uranium mining/milling sites 'on a selective basis in order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities' (Article 4.a.(i)) is provided for. On this basis, therefore, this paper will focus predominantly on options other than site access, which are available to the Agency for deriving assurance that declared mining/milling operations are not misused. Such options entail the interpretation and analysis of information provided to the Agency including, for example, from declarations, monitoring import/export data, open source reports, commercial satellite imagery, aerial photographs, and information provided by Member States. Uranium mining techniques are diverse, and the inventories, flows and uranium assays which arise at various points in the process will vary considerably between mines, and over the operating cycle of an individual mine. Thus it is essentially impossible to infer any information, which can be used precisely to confirm, or otherwise, declared production by measuring or estimating any of those parameters at points within the mining/milling process. The task of attempting to

  12. The entry into force of the Additional Protocol in the European Union: The new dimension of safeguards in Europe

    Recio, M. [Deputy Direction General for Nuclear Energy, Direction General for Energy Policy and Mines Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, Paseo de la Castellana, 160 Madrid 28046 (Spain)]. E-mail: MRecio@mityc.es; Prieto, N. [Asesoria Juridica, Direccion de Division Administracion, Enresa, c/Emilio Vargas, 7, Madrid 28043 (Spain)]. E-mail: nprs@enresa.es

    2006-07-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has entered into force on 30 April 2004. This completes the implementation in the EU of what undoubtedly represents the most ambitious project undertaken by the IAEA, designed to reinforce its current safeguards system, a project that the international community considers to be a key component strengthening the fight against one of the most serious threats for world security: nuclear proliferation. (author)

  13. Report made on behalf of the commission of foreign affairs about the law project, adopted by the Senate, authorizing the ratification of the agreement between the French Republic, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency relative to the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of nuclear weapons prohibition in South America and the Caribbeans area (two protocols together); Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires etrangeres sur le projet de loi, adopte par le senat, autorisant la ratification de l'accord entre la Republique francaise, la Communaute europeenne de l'energie atomique et l'Agence internationale de l'energie atomique relatif a l'application de garanties dans le cadre du traite visant l'interdiction des armes nucleaires en Amerique latine et dans les Caraibes (ensemble deux protocoles)

    NONE

    2004-07-01

    This report comments the reasons of the signature of the agreement between France, EURATOM and the IAEA for the reinforcement of IAEA's non-proliferation controls in the South America and Caribbean areas (law project no. 1329). The ratification of this agreement will have only few concrete consequences but will contribute to the promotion of non-proliferation and to the enforcement of warranties in the framework of the treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons in South America and in the Caribbean area (signed in Vienna, Austria, on March 21, 2000). The commission of foreign affairs adopted this law project on March 3, 2004. (J.S.)

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in China is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 31 December 1998. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from China written notification that China's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 28 March 2002

  15. Protocol Additional to the agreement between France, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in France

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between France, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in France is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 16 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, the date on which the Agency received written notification that the European Atomic Energy Community and France had met their respective internal requirements for entry into force

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  17. Hierarchical Management to be Implemented on Ratification Risk of Certification Institution

    2007-01-01

    @@ Recently, the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment (CNAS) has promulgated Measures for Hierarchical Management of Ratification Risk of Certification Institution (hereinafter referred to as Measures), which was put into execution.

  18. Does ratification of human-rights treaties have effects on population health?

    Palmer, Alexis; Tomkinson, Jocelyn; Phung, Charlene; Ford, Nathan; Joffres, Michel; Fernandes, Kimberly A; Zeng, Leilei; Lima, Viviane; Montaner, Julio S.G.; Guyatt, Gordon H; Mills, Edward J.

    2009-01-01

    Human-rights treaties indicate a country's commitment to human rights. Here, we assess whether ratification of human-rights treaties is associated with improved health and social indicators. Data for health (including HIV prevalence, and maternal, infant, and child [

  19. The Kyoto Protocol: Can We Meet?

    Boromisa, Ana-Maria; Tišma, Sanja

    2008-01-01

    Integration into the EU is one of strategic foreign policy goals of Croatia. Before accession, Croatia has to align with the EU policies and legislation. The European Commission in its Croatia 2007 Progress report identified ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as progress regarding environmental chapter of accession negotiations. By ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in May 2007 Croatia pledged to reduce greenhouse gases by 5% in the first commitment period, 2008-2012, from the amount released into ...

  20. Improving a mother to child HIV transmission programme through health system redesign: quality improvement, protocol adjustment and resource addition.

    Michele S Youngleson

    Full Text Available BACKGROUND: Health systems that deliver prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT services in low and middle income countries continue to underperform, resulting in thousands of unnecessary HIV infections of newborns each year. We used a combination of approaches to health systems strengthening to reduce transmission of HIV from mother to infant in a multi-facility public health system in South Africa. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: All primary care sites and specialized birthing centers in a resource constrained sub-district of Cape Metro District, South Africa, were enrolled in a quality improvement (QI programme. All pregnant women receiving antenatal, intrapartum and postnatal infant care in the sub-district between January 2006 and March 2009 were included in the intervention that had a prototype-innovation phase and a rapid spread phase. System changes were introduced to help frontline healthcare workers to identify and improve performance gaps at each step of the PMTCT pathway. Improvement was facilitated and spread through the use of a Breakthrough Series Collaborative that accelerated learning and the spread of successful changes. Protocol changes and additional resources were introduced by provincial and municipal government. The proportion of HIV-exposed infants testing positive declined from 7.6% to 5%. Key intermediate PMTCT processes improved (antenatal AZT increased from 74% to 86%, PMTCT clients on HAART at the time of labour increased from 10% to 25%, intrapartum AZT increased from 43% to 84%, and postnatal HIV testing from 79% to 95% compared to baseline. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: System improvement methods, protocol changes and addition/reallocation of resources contributed to improved PMTCT processes and outcomes in a resource constrained setting. The intervention requires a clear design, leadership buy-in, building local capacity to use systems improvement methods, and a reliable data system. A systems improvement

  1. Will markets direct investments under the Kyoto Protocol ?

    Larson, Donald F.; Breustedt, Gunnar

    2007-01-01

    Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries can meet treaty obligations by investing in projects that reduce or sequester greenhouse gases elsewhere. Prior to ratification, treaty participants agreed to launch country-based pilot projects, referred to collectively as Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ), to test novel aspects of the project-related provisions. Relying on a 10-year history of proje...

  2. Lessons Learned at the Idaho National Laboratory for the Entry into Force of the U.S. Additional Protocol

    For a number of years, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been preparing for the entry into force of the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP). These preparations included attending training, participating in tabletop exercises, preparing draft declarations, developing INL-specific guidance documents, preparing for and hosting a mock complementary access visit, and preparing declarations for official submittal. All of these activities, the training materials, and software developed by other U.S. DOE national laboratories (PNNL, ORNL, LANL, and BNL) were very helpful in preparing for the entry into force of the AP. As with any endeavor of this size and complexity, however, there are always instances where even the best preparations and advanced planning do not anticipate every challenge. As the DOE's lead nuclear energy research and development facility, the INL faced many unique challenges. The majority of research conducted at the INL is nuclear fuel cycle related, most of which is not protected by the National Security Exclusion. This paper describes the lessons learned from the INL's experience of preparing for the entry into force of the AP, specifically how translating and implementing general principles into actual activities proved to be one of many challenges, and provides general suggestions on how to respond effectively and efficiently to routine annual data calls and other AP requests

  3. 87. Austrian ratification of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

    This is the notification of the Austrian ratification of the Convention, resulting in the entry into force of the Convention for Austria on 22 December 1989. The ratification included a declaration concerning Article 10 paragraph 5(b). The text of the Convention is reproduced in English, French and German. (NEA)

  4. Impératifs et limites de la croissance

    Rolf Steppacher

    2006-07-01

    Full Text Available La théorie de la croissance domine l’actualité. Pourtant, il devient chaque jour plus évident que la poursuite de ce programme mondial n’est pas indéfiniment réalisable, compte tenu des limites imposées par les écosystèmes. Plus surprenant encore, l’impératif de croissance est parvenu à se dissimuler sous le masque de la durabilité. Devenu « durable » ou « soutenable », le développement s’accommode plutôt bien du capitalisme, sans questionner pour autant le cœur du paradoxe contemporain : comment parler de durabilité sans remettre en cause en même temps le système économique ? Comment maintenir une croissance illimitée – elle-même alimentée par une industrie publicitaire créatrice de désirs illimités – sans remettre parallèlement en question l’utilisation que nous faisons des ressources non renouvelables ? Plus que jamais et à l’heure où le développement durable s’impose comme le nouveau messianisme technologique, il devient vital de s’interroger sur le fonctionnement nécessairement problématique des économies modernes et de leurs choix énergétiques. Aller au-delà du consensus politique actuel fondé sur la tyrannie de la croissance, ne pas succomber à l’incantation technocratique, penser l’action, l’innovation et les transformations économiques génératrices du bien-être, concevoir que toute société porte en elle un projet qui ne se réduit pas à une capacité gestionnaire, rechercher les sources de la richesse et les raisons de sa fin possible. Voilà quelques-unes des ambitions de Rolf Steppacher, économiste à l’institut universitaire d’études du développement (IUED à Genève et observateur critique de l’évolution du développement durable et de son pendant, la décroissance. Il nous livre ici quelques clés d’interprétation. Entretien réalisé par Olivier Walther.

  5. The Kyoto protocol : Russian opportunities: OIES paper: RIIA Briefing Note

    Müller, Benito

    2004-01-01

    Much, possibly too much, of the most recent debate on Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has centred around the issue whether the Kyoto emission limit would hinder Russian economic growth, particularly in the context of the ambitious decadal Russian growth targets. The aim of this paper is to return the focus of the debate to the opportunities which the Kyoto Protocol could afford the Russian economy and which would be lost if Russia fails to grasp them by bringing the ...

  6. Carrying out"Administrative Ratification Law"%行政许可法:推进产业发展的法制化

    夏竞辉

    2004-01-01

    It is said that "Administrative Ratification Law" is put into practice from 1st July this year. Then the State Council and MII both issue related schemes in order to promote the implementation of "Administration Ratification Law". The enforcement of the "Administrative Ratification Law" will have a great and deep influence on the transfer of the governmental functions, reform of administrative methods and advancement of legal administration. The comparative centralization of administrative ratification right and the unified handling of administrative ratification reflected in the law can be said a summary and extension of the latest years, successful experience and is also a legal confirmation of this kind of practice.

  7. Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

    This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

  8. Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

    This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

  9. A field exercise course to train IAEA Safeguards inspectors in implementing the additional protocol and performing complementary access activities

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards has the task of implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) in the Member States that have signed agreements bringing that treaty into force. The IAEA inspector under the traditional INFCIRC/153 safeguards has been an accountant focused on the declared nuclear material stores of a Member State. The INFCIRC/540 Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS) provides the Agency and its inspectors with the right to investigate a Member State's nuclear programme to see if all declared activities are in order and no undeclared activities exist. This broadening of the scope of the inspector's responsibilities has changed the training of the inspectors to orient them to being an investigator compared to an accountant. The Safeguards training department has created a curriculum of courses that provides the background to train the inspectorate into this new inspection regime. The United States Support Program (USSP) has contributed to this curriculum by putting together a course at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) in Additional Protocol Complementary Access (APCA) to give the IAEA the opportunity to provide inspectors a necessary field exercise in a realistic environment at a research site. Brookhaven National Laboratory contains three shutdown nuclear research reactors, operating particle accelerators, hot cells, radioactive waste storage, laser laboratories, and magnet production facilities on a large site very similar to numerous research facilities around the world situated in non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). The USSP Team created an Article 2 declaration containing annotated maps of the site, descriptions of the buildings on site, satellite and aerial photographs of the area, and a declaration of research activities on the site. The declaration is as realistic to actual BNL research except that proprietary and security concerns of the BNL site have been taken into account. The USSP Team felt the best

  10. Guidelines and format for preparation and submission of declarations pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements

    The information to be provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as 'the Agency') by States under an additional protocol (INFCIRC/540) is identified in Article 2. The timing with which the information is to be provided is specified in Article 3. It was widely recognized during the negotiation of the additional protocol that States and the Agency would need explanation and guidance, regarding the information to be declared, beyond that possible to incorporate in the language of the protocol itself. The Board of Governors, meeting in special session on 15 May 1997 to approve the additional protocol, was assured that such guidance would be quickly available to States. The initial Additional Protocol Reporting Guidelines, drawing from Programme 93+2 documentation and the negotiating record of Committee 24, were published in August 1997. A simplified set of Guidelines was subsequently produced for States whose safeguards agreement includes a small quantities protocol. The Guidelines serve two purposes. First, they provide specificity as to what information is required and at what level of detail. Second, the Guidelines provide a consistent reporting format. The Guidelines have been supplemented with Agency developed software, the PROTOCOL REPORTER, which simplifies the process through which States can prepare and submit their declarations electronically. There is no legal requirement that States follow the Guidelines in preparing and submitting their Article 2 declarations. However, if States submit declarations prepared according to these Guidelines, it will reduce greatly the Agency's workload in processing, reviewing and storing the information provided. With minor exceptions, all States that have submitted declarations prior to 2004 have followed the Guidelines. The process of improving the Guidelines, based on the cumulative experience of States and the Agency, began in mid-2002. The process involved the development of a detailed

  11. The Geneva Protocol of 1925

    This paper reports that when President Gerald Ford signed the instruments of ratification for the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on January 22, 1975, a tortured, half-century-long chapter in U.S. arms control policy was brought to a close. Fifty years earlier, at the Geneva Conference for the Control of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War, the United States had played a key role in drafting and reaching agreement on the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The protocol, signed by thirty nations, including the United States, on June 17, 1925, prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices as well as the use of bacteriological methods of warfare

  12. Remote Sensing and the Kyoto Protocol: A Workshop Summary

    Rosenqvist, Ake; Imhoff, Marc; Milne, Anthony; Dobson, Craig

    2000-01-01

    The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change contains quantified, legally binding commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels and allows carbon emissions to be balanced by carbon sinks represented by vegetation. The issue of using vegetation cover as an emission offset raises a debate about the adequacy of current remote sensing systems and data archives to both assess carbon stocks/sinks at 1990 levels, and monitor the current and future global status of those stocks. These concerns and the potential ratification of the Protocol among participating countries is stimulating policy debates and underscoring a need for the exchange of information between the international legal community and the remote sensing community. On October 20-22 1999, two working groups of the International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ISPRS) joined with the University of Michigan (Michigan, USA) to convene discussions on how remote sensing technology could contribute to the information requirements raised by implementation of, and compliance with, the Kyoto Protocol. The meeting originated as a joint effort between the Global Monitoring Working Group and the Radar Applications Working Group in Commission VII of the ISPRS, co-sponsored by the University of Michigan. Tile meeting was attended by representatives from national government agencies and international organizations and academic institutions. Some of the key themes addressed were: (1) legal aspects of transnational remote sensing in the context of the Kyoto Protocol; (2) a review of the current and future and remote sensing technologies that could be applied to the Kyoto Protocol; (3) identification of areas where additional research is needed in order to advance and align remote sensing technology with the requirements and expectations of the Protocol; and 94) the bureaucratic and research management approaches needed to align the remote sensing

  13. What the Kyoto Protocol means for Russians

    The only impediment to the Kyoto protocol entering into force now is the Russians. The only global agreement to save climate, which has been ratified by 110 countries, is still in limbo. This article presents an up-to-the-minute analysis of the reasons. The history of progress up to and back from ratification is summarised, including the latest facts from early June 2003. The views of all relevant ministries, business, Parliament and the general public are briefly presented, as are the intentions and/or plans. It is clear that there is progress toward ratification, but serious opposition still exists. The selfish interests of agencies, clumsy bureaucracy and misunderstandings should and can be overcome

  14. Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

  15. Vicissitudes of Nagoya Protocol in Colombia

    The fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources is not only one of the central objectives of the Nagoya Protocol, but also a challenge for communities of scientists, researchers, and indigenous ancestral generally for the educational community. It is therefore essential to know what the real and material implications for the population, the ratification of the Nagoya Protocol, which despite having sufficient justification and argued, highlights the need to develop legal tools, economic, technological and education for proper and fair implementation.

  16. The Fiscal Pact and the Problem of its Ratification - Selected Aspects

    Andrzej Borodo

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available The treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union dated 2 March 2012 (called the fiscal act is the law rela-ting to the economic and budgetary matters of the Member States of the European Union, mainly to the deficit and public debt. The treaty in focus encroaches on the budgetary powers of the Parliament and the government. On February 2012, the Parliament passed the act of law entitling the President of the Republic of Poland to ratify the treaty. The procedure for the ratification of the treaty appears to be questionable. A question arises whether the content of the treaty justifies the adoption of the law authorizing the ratification by ordinary or qualified majority (in accordance with Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, or paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 90 of the Constitution.

  17. Brazil and the strengthening of safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency: from the four-part agreement to the additional protocol

    The main objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution of IAEA verification system, that constitutes one of the main fundaments of the Non-proliferation nuclear weapons regimen, and to point out elements that contribute to inform the Brazilian position related to the Model Protocol additional to agreements for safeguard application: instrument that comprehend the most recent multilateral efforts of the nuclear verification

  18. Convention on nuclear safety. Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Status as of 17 March 1997

    The document presents the status as of 17 March 1997 of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by Member States of the Convention on Nuclear Safety adopted on 17 June 1994 by the Diplomatic Conference convened by the IAEA at its Headquarters between 14-17 June 1994. The Convention entered into force on 24 October 1996. There are 65 signatories and 35 parties. Reservations/declarations deposited upon signature are also included

  19. L’impératif en français parlé

    Nguyen Minh Chinh

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Dans la grammaire française, l’impératif est considéré comme le moyen typique pour exprimer l’injonction. Il peut être utilisé pour tout but injonctif, du plus léger (prière, sollicitation au plus péremptoire (ordre, commandement. Cependant, l’impératif n’exprime pas toujours la valeur injonctive proprement dite, les locuteurs peuvent l’utiliser pour d’autres buts tels que l’expression de la condition ou de l’interrogation, etc. Partant de l’idée qu’à l’oral chaque genre a son vocabulaire de construction, ses formes d’organisation, ses contenus attendus, ses modes productifs, la caractérisation des genres est un préalable à la constitution de corpus utilisables pour des tâches de l’étude. Je présenterai dans cet article l’analyse des caractéristiques pragmatiques des énoncés impératifs et de leur répartition en m’appuyant sur l’analyse des occurrences retirées de 5 situations différentes.

  20. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 13 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of South Africa and the Agency, i.e. on 13 September 2002

  1. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  3. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 22 March 2013, upon signature by the representatives of the Denmark and the Agency.

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 16 April 2014 in Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and on 19 May 2014 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 May 2014, upon signature by the representatives of Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Agency

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 25 November 2004. It was signed in Vienna on 11 May 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 5 March 2009, the date on which the Agency received from Colombia written notification that Colombia's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  9. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

  12. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Mali and the Agency, i.e. on 12 September 2002

  16. The Kyoto Protocol: one more stage in the climate change negotiations

    This article notices on the internal difficulties that will be generated around the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in developed countries as United States, Canada and Japan, given the position of industries like the vehicles and the energetic, that try to dilate the commitments assumed in December of 1997. It is emphasized in the North American case, taking into account their contribution in the global greenhouse gases emissions and the importance of their participation in an international agreement on the topic of the climate change, assuming a critical position about the Senate's decision of conditioning the agreement's ratification to the assumption of commitments of developing countries

  17. Study to the effectiveness of the UNECE Persistent Organic Pollutants (POP). Protocol and cost of additional measures. Phase II: Estimated emission reduction and cost of options for a possible revision of the POP Protocol

    Denier van der Gon, H.A.C.; Visschedijk, A.J.H.; Bolscher, M. van het

    2006-01-01

    The rationale is that during the review of the POP Protocol there will be a need for an assessment of the potential for further emission reduction and costs of a possible revision of the Protocol. The sources of POPs listed in the Protocol that are to be addressed revision of the POP Protocol have b

  18. Will The Kyoto Protocol Affect Growth in Russia?

    Lecocq, Franck; Shalizi, Zmarak

    2004-01-01

    In light of the recent argument that rapid economic growth in Russia over the next decade, might result in emissions higher than the Kyoto target, thereby putting much-needed growth at risk, the authors revisit the discussion on the costs and benefits of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia. They conclude that even under a very high economic growth assumption, and even under very c...

  19. Addition of novobiocin in pre-enrichment step can improve Salmonella culture protocol of modified semisolid Rappaport-Vassiliadis

    Jensen, Annette Nygaard; Sørensen, Gitte; Baggesen, Dorte Lau; Bødker, Rene; Hoorfar, Jeffrey

    2003-01-01

    , 90 samples opposed to 50 yielded a strong positive reading (+++) when Novobiocin was applied. Growth was on average 0.3 scores higher when pre-enriched with Novobiocin. The difference in growth score medians of the two methods was highly significant (Sign test; p <0.001). Despite the increased...... sensitivity, 13 culture-positive samples were missed when using the Novobiocin-containing BPW. In conclusion, a simple addition of Novobiocin in the BPW pre-enrichment step of fecal samples may facilitate reading and thereby detection of Salmonella on MSRV. The increase of Salmonella in the semi-quantitative......The aim was to investigate the effect of addition of Novobiocin to the non-selective buffered peptone water (BPW) for pre-enrichment of Salmonella in connection with plating on modified semisolid Rappaport-Vassiliadis (MSRV). In a semi-quantitative study, the level of Salmonella following pre...

  20. Bill project authorizing the ratification of the statutes of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)

    After a presentation text describing the content of each of the 20 articles of the statutes of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), this document contains the full text of these statutes. A third text is the bill project authorizing the ratification of these statutes, and described the economic, financial, social, environmental, administrative or juridical consequences of the implementation of the agreement or convention associated with the creation of the agency. The text also recalls the negotiation process, and indicates the place given to the French language

  1. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME II/III IAEA COMMITTEE 24, Major Issues Underlying the Model Additional Protocol (1996-1997).

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.

    2010-01-01

    Volume I of this Review traces the origins of the Model Additional Protocol. It covers the period from 1991, when events in Iraq triggered an intensive review of the safeguards system, until 1996, when the IAEA Board of Governors established Committee 24 to negotiate a new protocol to safeguards agreement. The period from 1991-1996 set the stage for this negotiation and shaped its outcome in important ways. During this 5-year period, many proposals for strengthening safeguards were suggested and reviewed. Some proposals were dropped, for example, the suggestion by the IAEA Secretariat to verify certain imports, and others were refined. A rough consensus was established about the directions in which the international community wanted to go, and this was reflected in the draft of an additional protocol that was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on May 6, 1996 in document GOV/2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System - Proposals For Implementation Under Complementary Legal Authority, A Report by the Director General. This document ended with a recommendation that, 'the Board, through an appropriate mechanism, finalize the required legal instrument taking as a basis the draft protocol proposed by the Secretariat and the explanation of the measures contained in this document.'

  2. Law project for the application of additional protocol to the agreement between France and the atomic energy european community and the international atomic energy agency relative to the application of guaranties in France, signed at Vienna the 22 september 1998

    This law project aims to allow the application of the additional protocol. This protocol plans the transmission, by France, to IAEA of defined information. These information concern materials and nuclear activities non declared by States not owning the nuclear weapon. (A.L.B.)

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into force

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Additional Protocol entered into force on 28 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Armenia written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  13. Protocol between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)1 is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 9 April 2003

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 2005

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2010. It was signed on 7 October 2011 in Banjul, The Gambia, and on 18 October 2011 in Vienna, Austria

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (TLATELOLCO) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 29 November 2001. It was signed in the City of Panama on 11 December 2001

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2001. It was signed in Vienna on 5 December 2001

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 14 September 2004. It was signed on 9 December 2004 in Vienna

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  2. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  4. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

  5. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  9. Making a Historical Survey of a State's Nuclear Ambitions. Impact of Historical Developments of a State's National Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy on Additional Protocol Implementation

    In 1998, SKI initiated a project to conduct a historical survey of the Swedish nuclear weapons research for the period 1945-1972. IAEA became interested and accepted it in 2000 as a support program task to increase transparency and to support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. The main purpose of the Additional Protocol is to make the IAEA control system more efficient with regard to nuclear material, facilities and research. Other countries have now shown interest to follow the Swedish example and to make their own reviews of their past nuclear energy and nuclear weapons research. The most important aim is to produce basic information for IAEA on the nuclear activities of the past and to refine and strengthen the instruments of the Safeguard System within the Additional Protocol. The first objective of this report is to present a short summary of the Swedish historical survey, as well as similar projects in other countries dealing with nuclear-related and nuclear weapons research reviews. These tasks are dealt with in chapter 2. Secondly, the objective is to present a general model of how a national base survey can be designed. The model is based on the Swedish experiences and it has been designed to also serve as a guideline for other countries to strengthen their safeguards systems within the framework of the Additional Protocol. Since other States declared that they would make similar historical surveys, the SKI decided to work out a model that could be used by other countries intending to conduct such studies. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are participating in a co-operation project to carry out such nationally base surveys under the auspices of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. Finland is also conducting such a survey, but it is done independently, albeit in close exchange of views between SKI and its Finnish counterpart, STUK. This is described in chapter 3. The third objective is to develop a pedagogic methodology for teaching

  10. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

  11. Implications of international protocols on energy markets

    Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol will have significant medium and long term implications for the economies of Annex B and non-Annex B countries. It is shown that the adoption of a system of internationally tradable emission quotas would result in three 'dividends' compared with an outcome where Article 17 trading - relating to emissions trading - is prohibited. First, trading would improve the environmental effectiveness of the protocol because the extent of carbon dioxide equivalent leakage would be reduced. Second, the overall cost of meeting the agreed Annex B targets would be reduced thus leading to greater certainty that the protocol will be implemented in full. Third, a disparity in the differential impacts of Annex B abatement policies on different developing countries would be reduced under emissions trading, leading to a more equitable outcome for these countries

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 29 July 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2003, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Cyprus written notification that Cyprus' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 28 September 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from the Czech Republic written notification that the Czech Republic's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 1 July 2002

  14. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Spanish Edition)

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Canada written notification that Canada's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 8 September 2000

  20. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 5 July 2000. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Azerbaijan written notification that Azerbaijan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 29 November 2000

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 21 April 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Kingdom of Morocco written notification that Morocco's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  2. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 13 December 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Union of the Comoros written notification that Comoros' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 November 2003, the date on which the Agency received from Chile written notification that Chile's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional, the Protocol entered into force on 13 October 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Seychelles written notification that the Republic of Seychelles's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  7. Protocol between the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

    The text of the Protocol between the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol on 21 March 2000. It was signed on 22 March 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 16 October 2007, the date on which the Agency received from the Russian Federation written notification that the procedures of the Russian Federation required for entry into force had been met

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998

  13. 3 July 1985: Convention signed in Brussels on 31 January 1963, supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and Act approving the Protocols to amend the Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention

    This Act refers to the Brussels Supplementary Convention approved by Belgium in 1966 and ratified on 20 August 1985 and approves ratification of the Protocols of 16 November 1982 to amend the Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention respectively. The Protocols are reproduced in French, Dutch and German. (NEA)

  14. Vienna convention on civil liability for nuclear damage. Signatures, ratifications, accessions and successions and text of reservations/declarations. Status as of 31 December 1996

    The document refers to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (IAEA-INFCIRC-500), giving the status of signatures, ratifications, accessions and successions, and the texts of reservations/declarations as of 31 December 1996

  15. Statement by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the twentieth anniversary of Iraq's ratification of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT)

    The document reproduces the full text of the statement made by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the twentieth anniversary of Iraq's ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  16. Explaining Political Party Performance in European Communication: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Party Political Cueing in domestic EU Treaty Ratification.

    Packham, Kathrin

    2009-01-01

    Political parties messages or cues constitute important factors shaping public attitudes not only on domestic matters but also on issues of European integration and constitutionalisation. The question explored in the book is, how national political parties communication matters for European integration. The study aims at providing explanations for the politicisation of European contentious politics here EU treaty ratification by analysing patterns of variation in political parties public comm...

  17. Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol – Just Symbolic Policy!

    Böhringer, Christoph; Vogt, Carsten

    2002-01-01

    We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward under political economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the concretion of the Protocol prior to its likely ratification at the end of 2002. Remaining non-EU Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power and, thus, were successful in asserting far reaching concessions from t...

  18. Locoregionally Advanced Head and Neck Cancer Treated With Primary Radiotherapy: A Comparison of the Addition of Cetuximab or Chemotherapy and the Impact of Protocol Treatment

    Purpose: The addition of platinum-based chemotherapy (ChRT) or cetuximab (ExRT) to concurrent radiotherapy (RT) has resulted in improved survival in Phase III studies for locoregionally advanced head and neck cancer (LAHNC). However the optimal treatment regimen has not been defined. A retrospective study was performed to compare outcomes in patients who were treated definitively with ExRT or ChRT. Methods: Cetuximab with concurrent RT was used to treat 29 patients with LAHNC, all of whom had tumors of the oral cavity, oropharynx, or larynx. All patients were T2 to T4 and overall American Joint Committee on Cancer Stage III to IVB, with a Karnofsky Performance Status (KPS) score of 60 or greater. ChRT was used to treat 103 patients with similar characteristics. Patients were evaluated for locoregional control (LRC), distant metastasis-free survival (DMFS), disease-specific survival (DSS), and overall survival (OS). Median follow-up for patients alive at last contact was 83 months for those treated with ExRT and 53 months for those treated with ChRT. Cox proportional hazard models were used to assess independent prognostic factors. Results: The LRC, DMFS, and DSS were not significantly different, with 3-year rates of 70.7%, 92.4%, and 78.6% for ExRT and 74.7%, 86.6%, and 76.5% for ChRT, respectively. The OS was significantly different between the two groups (p = 0.02), with 3-year rates of 75.9% for ExRT and 61.3% for ChRT. OS was not significant when patients who were on protocol treatments of ExRT or ChRT were compared. Also, OS was not significant when multivariate analysis was used to control for potential confounding factors. Conclusion: In our single-institution retrospective review of patients treated with ExRT or ChRT, no significant differences were found in LRC, DMFS, DSS, or OS

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

  20. A field exercise course to train IAEA safeguards inspectors in implementing the additional protocol and performing complementary access activities (LA-UR-06-5798)

    Full text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards has the task of implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) in the Member States that have signed agreements bringing that treaty into force. The IAEA inspector under the traditional INFCIRC/153 safeguards has been an accountant focused on the declared nuclear material stores of a Member State. The INFCIRC/540 Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS) provides the Agency and its inspectors with the right to investigate a Member State's nuclear programme to see if all declared activities are in order and no undeclared activities exist. This broadening of the scope of the inspector's responsibilities has changed the training of the inspectors to orient them to being an investigator compared to an accountant. The Safeguards training department has created a curriculum of courses that provides the background to train the inspectorate into this new inspection regime. The United States Support Program (USSP) has contributed to this curriculum by putting together a course at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) in Additional Protocol Complementary Access (APCA) to give the IAEA the opportunity to provide inspectors a necessary field exercise in a realistic environment at a research site. Brookhaven National Laboratory contains three shutdown nuclear research reactors, operating particle accelerators, hot cells, radioactive waste storage, laser laboratories, and magnet production facilities on a large site very similar to numerous research facilities around the world situated in non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). The BNL team created an Article 2 declaration containing annotated maps of the site, descriptions of the buildings on site, satellite and aerial photographs of the area, and a declaration of research activities on the site. The declaration is as realistic to actual BNL research except that proprietary and security concerns of the BNL site have been taken into account. The BNL team felt the best training vehicle provides a

  1. Claims to success: advocacy for the protocol on the rights of women in Africa – solidarity for African women’s rights and the use of information and communication technologies

    K. Kemp (Karoline)

    2010-01-01

    textabstractThe goal of this particular research has been to examine the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in policy advocacy as applied by civil society. Taking the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights coalition and their work towards the ratification of the Protocol on Wom

  2. Carbon emissions: the economic benefits of the Kyoto Protocol

    The third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto set the target of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions by an average of 5.3 per cent with respect to 1990 values by 2008 - 2012. One of the main objections to the protocol's ratification is that compliance would pose an unbearable economic burden on the countries involved. But we show here that this is not the case if costs apart from the direct costs of energy production are also considered. Costs are also incurred in rectifying damage to human health, material goods, agriculture and the environment related to greenhouse-gas emissions. (author)

  3. Bill project authorizing the ratification of the statutes of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA); Projet de Loi autorisant la ratification des statuts de l'Agence internationale pour les energies renouvelables (IRENA)

    NONE

    2011-07-01

    After a presentation text describing the content of each of the 20 articles of the statutes of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), this document contains the full text of these statutes. A third text is the bill project authorizing the ratification of these statutes, and described the economic, financial, social, environmental, administrative or juridical consequences of the implementation of the agreement or convention associated with the creation of the agency. The text also recalls the negotiation process, and indicates the place given to the French language

  4. U.S. ratification of the CRC and reducing child poverty: can we get there from here?

    Aber, J Lawrence; Hammond, Andrew S; Thompson, Scott M

    2010-01-01

    If the United States finally ratifies the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), will it improve the country's to effectively combat child poverty and thereby improve child well-being? This article addresses this and related questions in two ways. First, the authors examine how ratification of the CRC has influenced the efforts of other wealthy Anglophone countries to reduce child poverty. Second, they draw on lessons learned from these other countries' efforts to generate predictions about America's postratification future. The authors conclude that, while the CRC is a compelling, practical tool, a communications strategy and business plan are necessary complements to achieve desired results. PMID:21361163

  5. Clean energy exports and the Kyoto Protocol

    This paper discussed Canada's attempt in international negotiations to gain credits for energy exports that may result in greenhouse gas emission reductions in the United States. It examined how well founded this position is from an environmental perspective and in terms of international equity and political reality. The author emphasized that the clean energy export issue does not provide a legitimate reason to delay Canada's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and cautioned that further renegotiation of Kyoto targets for the first commitment period would not be practical and would jeopardize Canada's international standing. The author did note, however, that for the second commitment period, this issue could be reintroduced. Although the problem can potentially be resolved by granting credits to producers and exempting emissions, it was suggested that the most effective approach would be for countries to factor energy export considerations into their negotiating positions

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  7. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Amendment of Article 17

    The document reproduces the amendment to the Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The amendment was approved by the Board of Governors in June 1999, and entered into force on 10 September 1999

  10. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  11. Bilateral sweat tests with two different methods as a part of cystic fibrosis newborn screening (CF NBS protocol and additional quality control.

    Anna Nowakowska

    2010-11-01

    Full Text Available Infants with positive CF newborn screening (NBS results are called to a CF Centre for verification. Those, in whom the sweat test is elevated, undergo further medical procedures. The aim of our study was to evaluate the applicability of Nanoduct - a new system measuring sweat conductivity and giving immediate results in a CF NBS protocol. Measurements with Nanoduct were compared with the classic pilocarpine method. During 3 years 487 infants from CF NBS had both sweat tests performed on the same day, at the same CF centre. CF infants had a mean conductivity of 99.8 Âą 1 8.8 mmol/L and a mean chloride concentration of 74.0 Âą 18.4 mmol/L. Non-CF infants values were 29.8 Âą 7.7 mmol/L and 19.2 Âą 6.6 mmol/L respectively. A good correlation between both tests was found (95% confidence level (CI; r=0.87. The optimal cut off, based on follow up experience of screened children, for conductivity tests was 50 mmol/L and for chloride concentration was 34 mmol/L (no lost CF, 11 false positive with 100% sensitivity and 97.5 % specificity. In conclusion Nanoduct is a very useful and reliable tool in CF NBS protocol, allowing more time efficient organization of the diagnostic and training procedures. Simultaneous bilateral sweat testing with two different methods (concentration and conductivity provides an extra quality control system.

  12. A simple protocol for the michael addition of indoles with electron deficient olefins catalysed by TBAHS in aqueous media and their broad spectrum antibacterial activity

    M Damodiran; R Senthil Kumar; P M Sivakumar; Mukesh Doble; Paramasivan T Perumal

    2009-01-01

    Tetrabutylammonium hydrogen sulfate catalysed addition of indoles to electron deficient olefins in water generated the corresponding Michael adducts in good to excellent yield. The Michael addition of indole occurred regioselectively at position 3 and the -alkylated products have not been observed. The synthesized compounds were tested for their antibacterial activity against four microorganisms namely, E. coli NCIM 2931, S. aureus NCIM 5021, P. vulgaris NCIM 2813, P. aeruginosa NCIM 5029 by micro dilution method. These compounds showed MIC (Minimum Inhibitory Concentration) values in the range of 0.16-2.67 M.

  13. Nouvelle méthode d'évaluation des cycles régénératifs

    Duparquet, Alain

    2013-01-01

    Les turbines à vapeur basés sur les cycles de Rankine et de Hirn comportant des soutirages régénératifs sont utilisés dans l'industrie depuis le début du 20 ème sciècle. C'est partucilièrement le cas dans les installations de production d'électricité.Tout le monde connaît la célèbre relation de Carnot qui dit que le meilleur rendement théorique d'un cycle obéit à l'hypothèse des compressions et détentes isentropiques.Cet article étudie une machine à vapeur comportant des soutirages régénérati...

  14. The ADDITION-Cambridge trial protocol: a cluster – randomised controlled trial of screening for type 2 diabetes and intensive treatment for screen-detected patients

    Kinmonth Ann; Prevost A Toby; Barling Roslyn S; Williams Kate M; Simmons Rebecca K; Echouffo-Tcheugui Justin B; Wareham Nicholas J; Griffin Simon J

    2009-01-01

    Abstract Background The increasing prevalence of type 2 diabetes poses a major public health challenge. Population-based screening and early treatment for type 2 diabetes could reduce this growing burden. However, the benefits of such a strategy remain uncertain. Methods and design The ADDITION-Cambridge study aims to evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of (i) a stepwise screening strategy for type 2 diabetes; and (ii) intensive multifactorial treatment for people with screen-de...

  15. Protocol for ADDITION-PRO: a longitudinal cohort study of the cardiovascular experience of individuals at high risk for diabetes recruited from Danish primary care

    Johansen Nanna B

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Screening programmes for type 2 diabetes inevitably find more individuals at high risk for diabetes than people with undiagnosed prevalent disease. While well established guidelines for the treatment of diabetes exist, less is known about treatment or prevention strategies for individuals found at high risk following screening. In order to make better use of the opportunities for primary prevention of diabetes and its complications among this high risk group, it is important to quantify diabetes progression rates and to examine the development of early markers of cardiovascular disease and microvascular diabetic complications. We also require a better understanding of the mechanisms that underlie and drive early changes in cardiometabolic physiology. The ADDITION-PRO study was designed to address these issues among individuals at different levels of diabetes risk recruited from Danish primary care. Methods/Design ADDITION-PRO is a population-based, longitudinal cohort study of individuals at high risk for diabetes. 16,136 eligible individuals were identified at high risk following participation in a stepwise screening programme in Danish general practice between 2001 and 2006. All individuals with impaired glucose regulation at screening, those who developed diabetes following screening, and a random sub-sample of those at lower levels of diabetes risk were invited to attend a follow-up health assessment in 2009–2011 (n = 4,188, of whom 2,082 (50% attended. The health assessment included detailed measurement of anthropometry, body composition, biochemistry, physical activity and cardiovascular risk factors including aortic stiffness and central blood pressure. All ADDITION-PRO participants are being followed for incident cardiovascular disease and death. Discussion The ADDITION-PRO study is designed to increase understanding of cardiovascular risk and its underlying mechanisms among individuals at high risk of diabetes

  16. The ADDITION-Cambridge trial protocol: a cluster – randomised controlled trial of screening for type 2 diabetes and intensive treatment for screen-detected patients

    Kinmonth Ann

    2009-05-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background The increasing prevalence of type 2 diabetes poses a major public health challenge. Population-based screening and early treatment for type 2 diabetes could reduce this growing burden. However, the benefits of such a strategy remain uncertain. Methods and design The ADDITION-Cambridge study aims to evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of (i a stepwise screening strategy for type 2 diabetes; and (ii intensive multifactorial treatment for people with screen-detected diabetes in primary care. 63 practices in the East Anglia region participated. Three undertook the pilot study, 33 were allocated to three groups: no screening (control, screening followed by intensive treatment (IT and screening plus routine care (RC in an unbalanced (1:3:3 randomisation. The remaining 27 practices were randomly allocated to IT and RC. A risk score incorporating routine practice data was used to identify people aged 40–69 years at high-risk of undiagnosed diabetes. In the screening practices, high-risk individuals were invited to take part in a stepwise screening programme. In the IT group, diabetes treatment is optimised through guidelines, target-led multifactorial treatment, audit, feedback, and academic detailing for practice teams, alongside provision of educational materials for newly diagnosed participants. Primary endpoints are modelled cardiovascular risk at one year, and cardiovascular mortality and morbidity at five years after diagnosis of diabetes. Secondary endpoints include all-cause mortality, development of renal and visual impairment, peripheral neuropathy, health service costs, self-reported quality of life, functional status and health utility. Impact of the screening programme at the population level is also assessed through measures of mortality, cardiovascular morbidity, health status and health service use among high-risk individuals. Discussion ADDITION-Cambridge is conducted in a defined high-risk group

  17. The Text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between The Netherlands and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Respect to The Netherlands Antilles in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Additional Protocol 1 to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    The text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973, and of the two Protocols thereto, between The Netherlands and the Agency for the application of safeguards with respect to The Netherlands Antilles in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and with Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement and the two Protocols thereto entered into force on 5 June 1975, pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement and to Article II of each of the Protocols.

  18. The Text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between The Netherlands and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards with respect to Surinam in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

    The text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973, and of the two Protocols thereto, between The Netherlands and the Agency for the application of safeguards with respect to Surinam in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and with Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.The Agreement and the two Protocols thereto entered into force on 5 June 1975, pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement and to Article II of each of the Protocols.

  19. The Kyoto Protocol : Canada's risky rush to judgement

    This paper outlined the 4 proposed policy options to implement the Kyoto Protocol in Canada and presented reasons why the Canadian timetable to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is an unrealistic and unsound policy. The Canadian Prime Minister will ask Parliament to ratify the agreement before the end of 2002 but the authors claim that before any decision regarding ratification is made, the government should cost out all relevant options, under all reasonable contingencies. For policy purposes, this paper focuses on reductions of carbon dioxide. Canada's obligation is to reduce them 6 per cent below 1990 levels by 2010, but because of economic growth, emissions among participating countries may be 30 per cent above their aggregate target. In addition, the withdrawal of the United States means that about two-thirds of the world's emissions are not covered by Kyoto. The first policy option involves the selling of emission permits covering about 80 per cent of domestic emitters. It results in 16 MT of domestic emissions reductions being accomplished and 128 MT of foreign permits being purchased. This first option is considered to be the least costly of the four. The second option relies on command-and-control measures in which 104 MT worth of new targeted measures are forced through. Although the government has not provided cost estimates for option 2, it is likely to be much more costly than option 1. The third option slightly adjusts the mix of permits trading and command-and-control measures, and distributes the permits freely instead of selling them. Only the large emitters are involved in the trading system, covering 40 per cent of domestic emission sources. The cost of emissions reductions would be lower than under option 1. The fourth and final option combines tradable permits systems in which only large emitters are involved, but where permits are distributed according to sectoral emission reduction costs, expected future emission growth rates as well as economic

  20. Addition of telephone coaching to a physiotherapist-delivered physical activity program in people with knee osteoarthritis: A randomised controlled trial protocol

    Bennell Kim L

    2012-12-01

    data. Follow-up assessments will also occur at 12 and 18 months. Discussion The findings will help determine whether the addition of telephone coaching sessions can improve sustainability of outcomes from a physiotherapist-delivered physical activity intervention in people with knee OA. Trial Registration Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry reference: ACTRN12612000308897

  1. Optimising corticosteroid injection for lateral epicondylalgia with the addition of physiotherapy: A protocol for a randomised control trial with placebo comparison

    Brooks Peter

    2009-06-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Corticosteroid injection and physiotherapy are two commonly prescribed interventions for management of lateral epicondylalgia. Corticosteroid injections are the most clinically efficacious in the short term but are associated with high recurrence rates and delayed recovery, while physiotherapy is similar to injections at 6 weeks but with significantly lower recurrence rates. Whilst practitioners frequently recommend combining physiotherapy and injection to overcome harmful effects and improve outcomes, study of the benefits of this combination of treatments is lacking. Clinicians are also faced with the paradox that the powerful anti-inflammatory corticosteroid injections work well, albeit in the short term, for a non-inflammatory condition like lateral epicondylalgia. Surprisingly, these injections have not been rigorously tested against placebo injections. This study primarily addresses both of these issues. Methods A randomised placebo-controlled clinical trial with a 2 × 2 factorial design will evaluate the clinical efficacy, cost-effectiveness and recurrence rates of adding physiotherapy to an injection. In addition, the clinical efficacy and adverse effects of corticosteroid injection beyond that of a placebo saline injection will be studied. 132 participants with a diagnosis of lateral epicondylalgia will be randomly assigned by concealed allocation to one of four treatment groups – corticosteroid injection, saline injection, corticosteroid injection with physiotherapy or saline injection with physiotherapy. Physiotherapy will comprise 8 sessions of elbow manipulation and exercise over an 8 week period. Blinded follow-up assessments will be conducted at baseline, 4, 8, 12, 26 and 52 weeks after randomisation. The primary outcome will be a participant rating of global improvement, from which measures of success and recurrence will be derived. Analyses will be conducted on an intention-to-treat basis using linear

  2. After Indonesia’s Ratification: The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and Its Effectiveness As a Regional Environmental Governance Tool

    Daniel Heilmann

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available On 20 January 2015 Indonesia deposited its instrument of ratification for the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution with the ASEAN Secretariat, becoming the last ASEAN member state to join the treaty. Haze pollution poses a serious health threat to the people of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, and for decades haze pollution has been a highly contentious issue among ASEAN member states. This article argues that Indonesia’s ratification will not be an immediate game changer. The mechanisms of the agreement are too weak to contribute much to a reduction of haze pollution in the region. The agreement is designed according to the ASEAN way: a non-binding approach that is based on the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. This makes it unlikely that the agreement itself will bring about change, even now that all ASEAN member states have ratified it.

  3. Baudrit Alain. L’apprentissage coopératif : origines et évolutions d’une méthode pédagogique

    Develay, Michel

    2010-01-01

    Le vocable « l’apprentissage coopératif » est spontanément relié en France à des auteurs comme Célestin Freinet ou à des mouvements pédagogiques comme l’Office central de la coopération à l’école (OCCE). Le mérite de l’ouvrage d’Alain Baudrit est de nous ouvrir à des travaux de recherche étrangers à propos de ce qu’il considère comme une méthode pédagogique. L’auteur consacre le premier chapitre de son ouvrage à « des entrées multiples » à propos de l’apprentissage coopératif. Il est question...

  4. Report on the behalf of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Commission on: the bill project (accelerated procedure) authorizing the ratification of the joint procurement agreement for a designation by auction of common bid platforms, and the bill project (accelerated procedure) authorizing the ratification of the joint procurement agreement for a designation by auction of an auction monitor. Nr 171

    This document first presents the currently operating greenhouse gas emission quota trading scheme and its evolution according to which quotas will be put up for auction. Then, it more precisely describes different aspects of this arrangement: general economy of the auction system, common auction platforms, auction monitor, and market procedures. Consequences on the French law are presented. The ratification procedure is discussed

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in Guatemala City on 14 December 2001

  8. A secure additive protocol for card players

    Cordon-Franco, Andres; Fernandez-Duque, David; Joosten, Joost J; Soler-Toscano, Fernando

    2011-01-01

    Consider three players Alice, Bob and Cath who hold a, b and c cards, respectively, from a deck of d=a+b+c cards. The cards are all different and players only know their own cards. Suppose Alice and Bob wish to communicate their cards to each other without Cath learning whether Alice or Bob holds a specific card. Considering the cards as consecutive natural numbers 0,1,..., we investigate general conditions for when Alice or Bob can safely announce the sum of the cards they hold modulo an appropriately chosen integer. We demonstrate that this holds whenever a,b>2 and c=1. Because Cath holds a single card, this also implies that Alice and Bob will learn the card deal from the other player's announcement.

  9. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, the date on which the Agency received written notification that the European Atomic Energy Community and the United Kingdom had met their respective internal requirements for entry into force

  10. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 July 2006, upon signature by the representatives of the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the Agency

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 2002. It was signed on 5 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 May 2004, the date on which Agency received from El Salvador written notification that El Salvador's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 15 September 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Paraguay written notification that Paraguay's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the United Mexican States written notification that Mexico's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 March 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Jamaica and the Agency, i.e. on 19 March 2003

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999 and signed in Vienna on 21 June 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Korea written notification that the Republic of Korea's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  18. The roles of parties with different commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and implications for NAFTA

    A government perspective on climate change negotiations was presented with particular reference to Canada's cleaner energy exports, the Kyoto mechanism and the second commitment period. The author emphasized the importance of cleaner energy exports for Canada, although progress is likely to be slow in this area because of the opposition among other Parties. Whatever approach the United States takes to trading, it must be compatible with the Kyoto Protocol. Eligibility for trading in North America was discussed with reference to what effect Canada's ratification of the Protocol would have on energy exports. It was noted that if Canada ratifies, it could be both a buyer and a seller, whereas the United States could only buy and Mexico could only sell. The author also suggested that developing countries or major emitters should take on commitments in order to provide greater compatibility in the North American context, especially if the United States rejoined the Kyoto Protocol

  19. Cryptographic Protocols:

    Geisler, Martin Joakim Bittel

    in Chapter 2. Comparisons play a key role in many systems such as online auctions and benchmarks — it is not unreasonable to say that when parties come together for a multiparty computation, it is because they want to make decisions that depend on private information. Decisions depend on comparisons....... We have implemented the comparison protocol in Java and benchmarks show that is it highly competitive and practical. The biggest contribution of this dissertation is a general framework for secure multiparty computation. Instead of making new ad hoc implementations for each protocol, we want a single......; benchmarks show that the approach is practical....

  20. Report on the behalf of the Commission for Foreign Affairs on the bill project adopted by the Senate, bearing application of the additional protocol to the agreement between France, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the International Atomic Energy Agency related to the application of guarantees in France, signed in Vienna on the 22 September 1998. Nr 3428

    This report first discusses an international context which requires a strengthened regime of nuclear non proliferation. It outlines that the struggle against nuclear proliferation is more than ever a matter of concern (a severe threat for peace, security and stability, a contrasted situation with noticeable advances in some countries and regions on the one hand, and severe proliferation crisis on the other hand). It analyses the contribution of the additional protocol to the strengthening of the non proliferation regime: a necessary strengthening of the IAEA guarantee system, the NPT as a keystone of the non proliferation regime, and a perfectible regime on other issues. The second part outlines that the bill project consolidates the French participation to the IAEA guarantee system. The Commission works are then reported, notably the detailed examination of the different bill project articles which deal with declaration obligations, international verification, penal arrangements, and arrangements related to overseas territories and other arrangements. Appendices propose an impact study, a comparative table between the text transmitted by the Senate and the provisions of the additional protocol, a comparison between the French additional protocol and the model adopter in 1997, a comparative table of additional protocols adopted by other countries, and a list of additional protocols

  1. A study protocol of a randomised controlled trial incorporating a health economic analysis to investigate if additional allied health services for rehabilitation reduce length of stay without compromising patient outcomes

    Peiris Casey

    2010-11-01

    alongside the randomised controlled trial. Discussion This paper outlines the study protocol for the first fully powered randomised controlled trial incorporating a health economic analysis to establish if additional Saturday allied health services for rehabilitation inpatients reduces length of stay without compromising discharge outcomes. If successful, this trial will have substantial health benefits for the patients and for organizations delivering rehabilitation services. Clinical trial registration number Australian and New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12609000973213

  2. Submission to the British Columbia government on the Kyoto Protocol

    The Business Council provided its comments concerning the Kyoto Protocol and climate change to the government of British Columbia, recommending that a clear position be established quickly on the matter. The adopted position should also be disseminated broadly to allow stake holders sufficient time to prepare for the upcoming meetings of the Joint Ministers and First Ministers. The federal government has announced that the decision on whether to ratify the Kyoto Protocol will be made before the end of 2002, and this decision will have numerous effects on the people of British Columbia, businesses, workers, and consumers alike. The Business Council of British Columbia believes that the unique interests of the province can best be protected by a proactive approach. Actions plans are being prepared by several of the other provinces and territories, who have already stated their position concerning the Kyoto Protocol. The long-term risks of climate change for British Columbia have not been determined nor have the elements of a provincial approach. The following elements should be included in British Columbia's position on the Kyoto Protocol, according to the Business Council of British Columbia: (1) a credible and cost-effective implementation plan that does not unduly burden the province and other jurisdictions must be developed before Canada decides to ratify the Protocol. British Columbia should go on the record stating it does not support the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in its present form. (2) the province should advocate for a national approach to climate change that can be achieved within a reasonable time frame, reflects the long-term nature of the problem, and is in agreement with the economic development objectives of British Columbia, (3) a plan detailing how the province intends to deal with the growth of greenhouse gas emissions should supplement and support the position of the province on the Kyoto Protocol. Consumers and business should be engaged

  3. Rational Protocols

    Cachin, Christian

    Security research continues to provide a plethora of new protocols and mechanisms; these solutions patch either existing vulnerabilities found in practical systems or solve hypothetical security problems in the sense that the problem is often conceived at the same time when the first solution is proposed. Yet only a very small fraction of this research is relevant to ordinary users in the sense that they are willing to actually deploy the technology.

  4. Arguments en faveur de l'Administration électronique : Extraits du rapport de l'OCDE L'Administration électronique : un impératif

    OECD

    2003-01-01

    Le Projet d’administration électronique de l’OCDE se fonde sur l’hypothèse que l’administration électronique peut permettre de réformer le mode de fonctionnement des administrations publiques et de mettre en place une administration plus coopérative et davantage axée sur le client. Pour cela, il convient de surmonter des enjeux importants. Un prochain rapport de l’OCDE, « L’administration électronique : un impératif », s’intéresse aux possibilités et aux incidences de l’administration électro...

  5. GENERIC VERIFICATION PROTOCOL FOR DETERMINATION OF EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS OBTAINED BY USE OF ALTERNATIVE OR REFORMULATED LIQUID FUELS, FUEL ADDITIVES, FUEL EMULSIONS AND LUBRICANTS FOR HIGHWAY AND NONROAD USE DISEL ENGINES AND LIGHT DUTY GASOLINE ENGINES AND VEHICLES

    This report sets standards by which the emissions reduction provided by fuel and lubricant technologies can be tested and be tested in a comparable way. It is a generic protocol under the Environmental Technology Verification program.

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  8. Bill authorizing the approval of the additional protocol to the construction agreement between the French government and the International organization of fusion energy for the joint implementation of the ITER project, and relative to the role of the labour inspection on the ITER international organization site and dealing with occupational health and safety

    The aim of the additional protocol to the construction agreement between the French Government and the ITER Organization is to allow the French labour inspection services to control the good respect of the French occupational health and safety regulation at the project site (Cadarache, Bouches du Rhone) and to play its role of adviser to the persons responsible for the organization. This bill gives permission to the approval of this additional protocol. It allows the labour inspectors to do their job on the ITER site. (J.S.)

  9. Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 1 October 1999

  11. Histology protocols

    CarloAlberto Redi

    2010-06-01

    Full Text Available Tim D. Hewitson & Ian A. Darby (Eds Humana press, Totowa, New Jersey (USA Series: Springer Protocols Methods in Molecular Biology, Volume 611, 2010 Pages: 230; € 83.15 ISBN: 978-1-60327-344-2 Impressive as it can sounds in the era that Biology see a clear dominance of reductionism with the idea that complexity can be disentagled more and more thanks to the use of molecular tools, the reader will remain fascinated by this slim and agile volume devoted to bring together what apparently are two separeted words: molecular biology and histology. Simply remembering to the youngest scientists.....

  12. Testing for identification of locking, maintenance and ratification of large expansion joints; Teste para identificacao de travamento, manutencao e aceitacao de junta de expansao de grande porte

    Veiga, Jordana Luiza Barbosa da Costa; Lemos, Ricardo Jose Fernandes; Medeiros, Jorivaldo [Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (PETROBRAS), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2012-07-01

    Piping systems connected to large machines must have high reliability. In particular systems that have traditionally turbo expander large diameter and operate at high temperatures (up to 760 deg C) and low pressure (less than 4 kgf/cm2). This paper focuses on verification, maintenance and ratification of the correct functioning of expansion joints ('JE') of a piping system (72 inches external diameter), connected to a turbo expander system. After verification of 'JE's' locking, it was necessary to intervene in the system to restore the correct operation, for reasons of delivery, only maintenance was carried out in the expansion joints connected to this system. These expansion joints were tested before and after the maintenance to ensure proper operation after installation and verify that the locking system had its origin in 'JE'. This paper presents the degradation observed in JE, maintenance performed and the results of the tests. (author)

  13. Report on the behalf of the Foreign Affairs Commission on the bill project n 3080 authorizing the ratification of the statutes of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)

    This document first recalls that the creation of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) is due to a German initiative. It recalls the rather quick negotiations (2007-2009) which led to the creation of the Agency, outlines that its statutes were inspired by those of other organizations coming under the United Nations. It comments the content of the article which defines the agency's missions. Then it discusses some questions which have been shelved: the absence of China and Russia, the risk of non ratification by the United States, the language issue. In a second part, the document reports the discussions during the bill examination by the Commission. An appendix indicates the countries which have signed or ratified the IRENA statutes

  14. Nr 621 - Report on the behalf of the Commission of foreign affairs, defence and armed forces on the bill project on the application of the additional protocol to the agreement between France, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the International Atomic Energy Agency related to the application of guarantees in France, signed in Vienna on the 22 September 1998

    This report concerns an additional protocol which aims at reinforcing the efficiency of the international guarantee system. This system is part of an international approach for the struggle against nuclear weapon proliferation. The authors outline the necessary evolution of law to deal with the risk of development of clandestine military nuclear programs. They present the role of the IAEA, its organisation, its financing, and outline its reinforced role within the frame of the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) and of generalised guarantee agreements (a typology of these agreements is given). They also outline the limits of this guarantee system, and the necessity of its adaptation through an additional protocol. They discuss the difficulty of an international application (notably in the cases of Iran and North Korea). The articles are then discussed. They deal with definitions, declaration obligations, international verification, penal arrangements, arrangements related to overseas territories and other arrangements. The commission discussion is reported, and tables give comparisons between agreements

  15. Brazil and the strengthening of safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency: from the four-part agreement to the additional protocol; O Brasil e o fortalecimento do sistema de salvaguardas da Agencia Internacional de Energia Atomica: do acordo quadripartite ao protocolo adicional

    Moura, Carmen Lidia Richter Ribeiro

    2001-07-01

    The main objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution of IAEA verification system, that constitutes one of the main fundaments of the Non-proliferation nuclear weapons regimen, and to point out elements that contribute to inform the Brazilian position related to the Model Protocol additional to agreements for safeguard application: instrument that comprehend the most recent multilateral efforts of the nuclear verification

  16. Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000

  17. Effective Protocols for Mobile Communications and Networking

    Espinoza, J.; Sholander, P.; Van Leeuwen, B,

    1998-12-01

    This report examines methods of mobile communications with an emphasis on mobile computing and wireless communications. Many of the advances in communications involve the use of Internet Protocol (IP), Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), and ad hoc network protocols. However, many of the advances in these protocols have been focused on wired communications. Recently much focus has been directed at advancing communication technology in the area of mobile wireless networks. This report discusses various protocols used in mobile communications and proposes a number of extensions to existing protocols. A detailed discussion is also included on desirable protocol characteristics and evaluation criteria. In addition, the report includes a discussion on several network simulation tools that maybe used to evaluate network protocols.

  18. A review of the Protocol Reporter v.2.0

    The Agreement between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Safeguards Agreement) entered into force on November 14th, 1975. The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement (the Additional Protocol) was signed on June 21st, 1999 and entered into force on February 19th, 2004. ROK has been submitting annual updated reports of initial declaration on every May 15th since August 2004. Additional protocol reports have been submitted through Protocol Reporter provided by IAEA. Protocol Reporter is a computer system that facilitates preparation of reports by Member States of Declarations pursuant to Article 2 and 3 of the Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements (Additional Protocol). Protocol Reporter version 1.0 was developed by the IAEA in 1999 to help Member States structure electronic data storage and reporting formats in a way which is compatible with the guidelines on the Additional Protocol and its data handling system. However, Protocol Reporter version 1.0 had several limitations in data management and Member states requested upgraded software. In order to meet the demand, IAEA developed and released Protocol Reporter version 2.0 in 2008. Member states, consequently, should declare and submit the additional reports through the new version of the protocol reporter. This paper aimed to provide a brief overview of Protocol Reporter v.2.0 and highlight the improvements over the previous version

  19. Mobile internet protocol analysis

    Brachfeld, Lawrence J.

    1999-01-01

    Mobile Internet Protocol (IP) is a proposed standard that builds on the current Internet Protocol by making the fact that a user is mobile transparent to applications and higher level protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). Mobile IP allows mobile computers to send and receive packets addressed with their home network IP address, regardless of the IP address of their current point of attachment on the Internet while maintaining any current conne...

  20. Coded Splitting Tree Protocols

    Sørensen, Jesper Hemming; Stefanovic, Cedomir; Popovski, Petar

    2013-01-01

    This paper presents a novel approach to multiple access control called coded splitting tree protocol. The approach builds on the known tree splitting protocols, code structure and successive interference cancellation (SIC). Several instances of the tree splitting protocol are initiated, each...... as possible. Evaluations show that the proposed protocol provides considerable gains over the standard tree splitting protocol applying SIC. The improvement comes at the expense of an increased feedback and receiver complexity....

  1. Report made on behalf of the Commission of foreign affairs about the bill, adopted by the Senate, authorizing the approval of the additional protocol to the construction agreement between the French government and the International organization of fusion energy for the joint implementation of the ITER project, and relative to the role of the labour inspection on the ITER international organization site and dealing with occupational health and safety

    The aim of the additional protocol to the construction agreement between the French Government and the ITER Organization is to allow the French labour inspection services to control the good respect of the French occupational health and safety regulation at the project site (Cadarache, Bouches du Rhone) and to play its role of adviser to the persons responsible for the organization. A bill authorizing the approval of this additional protocol was adopted by the French Senate. This report is the examination by the Commission of foreign affairs of this bill. It presents, first the ITER project, its opportunities for Europe and France, and its juridical framework which favours transparency. Then it introduces the additional protocol as an additional element of transparency and as an exception to the traditional rules of the international right as well. Finally, the authorization of this approval by the Commission of foreign affairs is presented in the form of a single article. (J.S.)

  2. Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

    Blanchet, Bruno

    2012-01-01

    Security protocol verification has been a very active research area since the 1990s. This paper surveys various approaches in this area, considering the verification in the symbolic model, as well as the more recent approaches that rely on the computational model or that verify protocol implementations rather than specifications. Additionally, we briefly describe our symbolic security protocol verifier ProVerif and situate it among these approaches.

  3. Failure of Kak quantum key distribution protocol

    Ching-Nung Yang; Su-Hsuan Chu; Bing-Ling Lu

    2005-01-01

    Kak's quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol provides not only the distribution but also the integrity of secret key simultaneously in quantum channel. Consequently the additional exchange of information, used to check whether an eavesdropper exists, is unnecessary. In this comment, we will point out the failure of Kak's protocol and show that Kak's protocol does not have the joint distribution and integration that the author declares in [1].

  4. Reading the Kyoto Protocol. Ethical aspects of the convention on climate change

    The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by urging the international community to take measures preventing 'dangerous man-made interference with the climate system'. Since its publication in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol has triggered heated debates among scientists and politicians. According to a number of critics, the questions as to whether global warming is caused by human intervention, and whether taking appropriate measures could reduce the trend, has not yet been conclusively answered. In a limited number of countries, this situation has led to a delay in the ratification process. Only when these disputes were settled in February 2005 the Kyoto Protocol became legally binding on all the signatories. If predictions are accurate, measures have to be taken to prevent a global catastrophe. This leads to another, much overlooked, but no less important question, namely how mankind can be motivated to accept the burden attached to the measures proposed by the Kyoto Protocol; in other words, how do we find and formulate an ethical basis for measures forcing us to sacrifice some of our wealth and riches, for a cleaner, more sustainable world?

  5. Methow and Columbia Rivers studies: summary of data collection, comparison of database structure and habitat protocols, and impact of additional PIT tag interrogation systems to survival estimates, 2008-2012

    Martens, Kyle D.; Tibbits, Wesley T.; Watson, Grace A.; Newsom, Michael A.; Connolly, Patrick J.

    2014-01-01

    designed to show some initial analysis and to disseminate summary information that could potentially be used in ongoing modeling efforts by USGS, Reclamation, and University of Idaho. The second chapter documents the database of fish and habitat data collected by USGS from 2004 through 2012 and compares USGS habitat protocols to the Columbia Habitat Monitoring Program (CHaMP) protocol. The third chapter is a survival analysis of fish moving through Passive Integrated Transponder (PIT) tag interrogation systems in the Methow and Columbia Rivers. It examines the effects of adding PIT tags and/or PIT tag interrogation systems on survival estimates of juvenile steelhead and Chinook salmon.

  6. MTP: An atomic multicast transport protocol

    Freier, Alan O.; Marzullo, Keith

    1990-01-01

    Multicast transport protocol (MTP); a reliable transport protocol that utilizes the multicast strategy of applicable lower layer network architectures is described. In addition to transporting data reliably and efficiently, MTP provides the client synchronization necessary for agreement on the receipt of data and the joining of the group of communicants.

  7. Efficient secure two-party protocols

    Hazay, Carmit

    2010-01-01

    The authors present a comprehensive study of efficient protocols and techniques for secure two-party computation -- both general constructions that can be used to securely compute any functionality, and protocols for specific problems of interest. The book focuses on techniques for constructing efficient protocols and proving them secure. In addition, the authors study different definitional paradigms and compare the efficiency of protocols achieved under these different definitions.The book opens with a general introduction to secure computation and then presents definitions of security for a

  8. Mac protocols for cyber-physical systems

    Xia, Feng

    2015-01-01

    This book provides a literature review of various wireless MAC protocols and techniques for achieving real-time and reliable communications in the context of cyber-physical systems (CPS). The evaluation analysis of IEEE 802.15.4 for CPS therein will give insights into configuration and optimization of critical design parameters of MAC protocols. In addition, this book also presents the design and evaluation of an adaptive MAC protocol for medical CPS, which exemplifies how to facilitate real-time and reliable communications in CPS by exploiting IEEE 802.15.4 based MAC protocols. This book wil

  9. A New Watermarking Protocol against Conspiracy

    ZHANG Jun; KOU Weidong; FAN Kai; CAO Xuefei

    2006-01-01

    A trusted third party introduced in watermarking protocols would decrease the security and affect the implementation of the protocols. In this paper, a new watermarking protocol with an un-trusted third party (UTTP) was proposed. Based on the idea of all-or-nothing disclosure of secret (ANDOS), all of the buyer, the seller and the third party didn't know the exact watermark, which was embedded in a digital content for tracing piracy. The proposed protocol provided mechanisms to trace piracy and protect customer's right. In addition, the problem that a seller colluded with UTTP to frame the buyer, namely, the conspiracy problem, could be avoided.

  10. Economic analysis of a phase III clinical trial evaluating the addition of total androgen suppression to radiation versus radiation alone for locally advanced prostate cancer (Radiation Therapy Oncology Group protocol 86-10)

    Purpose: To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of adding hormone therapy to radiation for patients with locally advanced prostate cancer, using a Monte Carlo simulation of a Markov Model. Methods and Materials: Radiation Therapy Oncology Group (RTOG) protocol 86-10 randomized patients to receive radiation therapy (RT) alone or RT plus total androgen suppression (RTHormones) 2 months before and during RT for the treatment of locally advanced prostate cancer. A Markov model was designed with Data Pro (TreeAge Software, Williamstown, MA). The analysis took a payer's perspective. Transition probabilities from one state of health (i.e., with no disease progression or with hormone-responsive metastatic disease) to another were calculated from published rates pertaining to RTOG 86-10. Patients remained in one state of health for 1 year. Utility values for each health state and treatment were obtained from the literature. Distributions were sampled at random from the treatment utilities according to a second-order Monte Carlo simulation technique. Results: The mean expected cost for the RT-only treatments was $29,240 (range, $29,138-$29,403). The mean effectiveness for the RT-only treatment was 5.48 quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) (range, 5.47-5.50). The mean expected cost for RTHormones was $31,286 (range, $31,058-$31,555). The mean effectiveness was 6.43 QALYs (range, 6.42-6.44). Incremental cost-effectiveness analysis showed RTHormones to be within the range of cost-effectiveness at $2,153/QALY. Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve analysis resulted in a >80% probability that RTHormones is cost-effective. Conclusions: Our analysis shows that adding hormonal treatment to RT improves health outcomes at a cost that is within the acceptable cost-effectiveness range