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Sample records for accountability nuclear materials

  1. Nuclear material accounting handbook

    The handbook documents existing best practices and methods used to account for nuclear material and to prepare the required nuclear material accounting reports for submission to the IAEA. It provides a description of the processes and steps necessary for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of nuclear material accounting and control at the material balance area, facility and State levels, and defines the relevant terms. This handbook serves the needs of State personnel at various levels, including State authorities, facility operators and participants in training programmes. It can assist in developing and maintaining accounting systems which will support a State's ability to account for its nuclear material such that the IAEA can verify State declarations, and at the same time support the State's ability to ensure its nuclear security. In addition, the handbook is useful for IAEA staff, who is closely involved with nuclear material accounting. The handbook includes the steps and procedures a State needs to set up and maintain to provide assurance that it can account for its nuclear material and submit the prescribed nuclear material accounting reports defined in Section 1 and described in Sections 3 and 4 in terms of the relevant agreement(s), thereby enabling the IAEA to discharge its verification function as defined in Section 1 and described in Sections 3 and 4. The contents of the handbook are based on the model safeguards agreement and, where applicable, there will also be reference to the model additional protocol. As a State using The handbook consists of five sections. In Section 1, definitions or descriptions of terms used are provided in relation to where the IAEA applies safeguards or, for that matter, accounting for and control of nuclear material in a State. The IAEA's approach in applying safeguards in a State is also defined and briefly described, with special emphasis on verification. In Section 2, the obligations of the State

  2. Safeguards and nuclear material accounting

    The safeguards activities performed under INFCIRC/153 type of agreements are often characterized as traditional safeguards. This approach contains three elements: nuclear material accountancy; containment and surveillance measures; and on-site inspections. The nuclear material accountancy establishes the quantity of nuclear material present and changes in that over a period of time. Containment and surveillance measures take advantage of physical boundaries like walls, containers, cameras and seals to restrict, control or monitor the movement of or access to nuclear material. On-site inspection verifies the credibility of the first two verification elements. When we consider accounting of nuclear material we must have in our mind a Material Balance Area (MBA) separated by a physical boundary. There should be a close accounting period and also a nuclear material to account for. If there is some beginning inventory (BPI) in the MBA, it might receipt some material say R from other source. Then after processing some end product say S has been transferred to other MBA. During the process some part of the material can not be used further so it has to be discarded after measurement. Let it be MD. At the end of period some part of the material is still left over in the MBA, call it EPI. Since the nuclear materials are of high monitory and strategic value. The objective of their accounting and control is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities - to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and to deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection

  3. 4. Accounting of nuclear materials

    The questions are discussed of international policy significance of nuclear materials control and the ensuing position of IAEA. Attention is primarily paid to the Non-proliferation Treaty and to the international safeguards system based on agreements of safeguards among the individual countries and IAEA. In compliance with these agreements, around 600 nuclear installations are currently under control of IAEA. In the CSSR, a state system of nuclear materials record and management was established which fully meets the IAEA requirements while observing the internal regulations of the CSSR. CSKAE (Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission) was entrusted with the control of the state system and thus with the performance of state surveillance over the nuclear materials record and management. IAEA has been carrying out inspections of nuclear materials at Czechoslovak work places since 1972. No anomalies have been detected which would indicate possible misuse of nuclear materials. (Z.M.)

  4. Automated accounting systems for nuclear materials

    History of the development of nuclear materials accounting systems in USA and their purposes are considered. Many present accounting systems are based on mainframe computers with multiple terminal access. Problems of future improvement accounting systems are discussed

  5. Concepts of IAEA nuclear materials accounting

    The paper describes nuclear material accounting from the standpoint of IAEA Safeguards and how this accounting is applied by the Agency. The basic concepts of nuclear material accounting are defined and the way these apply to States with INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements is presented. (author)

  6. Modernizing computerized nuclear material accounting systems

    DOE Orders and draft orders for nuclear material control and accountability address a complete material control and accountability (MC and A) program for all DOE contractors processing, using, or storing nuclear materials. A critical element of an MC and A program is the accounting system used to track and record all inventories of nuclear material and movements of materials in those inventories. Most DOE facilities use computerized accounting systems to facilitate the task of accounting for all their inventory of nuclear materials. Many facilities still use a mixture of a manual paper system with a computerized system. Also, facilities may use multiple systems to support information needed for MC and A. For real-time accounting it is desirable to implement a single integrated data base management system for a variety of users. In addition to accountability needs, waste management, material management, and production operations must be supported. Information in these systems can also support criticality safety and other safety issues. Modern networked microcomputers provide extensive processing and reporting capabilities that single mainframe computer systems struggle with. This paper describes an approach being developed at Los Alamos to address these problems

  7. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  8. Accountancy, control and protection of nuclear material

    Clear distribution of responsibilities between the Agency, the States and the operators is fundamental. The Agency has the responsibility to establish and administer safeguards and to assist Member States, upon their request, to develop the means to solve problems arising from the use of atomic energy, one of them being the control of nuclear material. States have the responsibility, in respect to nuclear activities carried out within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere, to define appropriate measures to control nuclear material, to set up an organizational structure to enable the implementation of the measures and to control compliance with the law. This means that States establish systems for ensuring accountancy and control and physical protection of nuclear material. The paper gives an indication of the advice the Agency may give to States, which may request it, in setting up their systems of accountancy and control and physical protection of nuclear material. It also gives some ideas on the co-ordination of the States' systems, the relationship between the States and the Agency in the accountancy and control of nuclear material and the role of the Agency in the physical protection of nuclear material. The present irreplaceable role of the State as a regulatory power is stressed. (author)

  9. Measurement control program for nuclear material accounting

    A measurement control program for nuclear material accounting monitors and controls the quality of the measurments of special nuclear material that are involved in material balances. The quality is monitored by collecting data from which the current precision and accuracy of measurements can be evaluated. The quality is controlled by evaluations, reviews, and other administrative measures for control of selection or design of facilities, equipment and measurement methods and the training and qualification of personnel who perform SNM measurements. This report describes the most important elements of a program by which management can monitor and control measurement quality

  10. Bar code usage in nuclear materials accountability

    The age old method of physically taking an inventory of materials by listing each item's identification number has lived beyond its usefulness. In this age of computerization, which offers the local grocery store a quick, sure, and easy means to inventory, it is time for nuclear materials facilities to automate accountability activities. The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant began investigating the use of automated data collection devices in 1979. At that time, bar code and optical-character-recognition (OCR) systems were reviewed with the purpose of directly entering data into DYMCAS (Dynamic Special Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability System). Both of these systems appeared applicable; however, other automated devices already employed for production control made implementing the bar code and OCR seem improbable. However, the DYMCAS was placed on line for nuclear material accountability, a decision was made to consider the bar code for physical inventory listings. For the past several months a development program has been underway to use a bar code device to collect and input data to the DYMCAS on the uranium recovery operations. Programs have been completed and tested, and are being employed to ensure that data will be compatible and useful. Bar code implementation and expansion of its use for all nuclear material inventory activity in Y-12 is presented

  11. The changing role of nuclear materials accounting

    Nuclear materials accounting and accounting systems at what have been DOE Production sites are evolving into management decision support tools. As the sites are moving into the mode of making decisions on how to disposition complex and varied nuclear material holdings, the need for complete and many times different information has never been greater. The artificial boundaries that have historically been established between what belongs in the classic material control and accountability (MC and A) records versus what goes into the financial, radiological control, waste, or decommissioning and decontamination records are being challenged. In addition, the tools historically used to put material into different categories such as scrap codes, composition codes, etc. have been found to be inadequate for the information needs of today. In order to be cost effective and even, more importantly to effectively manage -our inventories, the new information systems the authors design have to have the flexibility to serve many needs. In addition, those tasked with the responsibility of managing the inventories must also expand beyond the same artificial boundaries. This paper addresses some of the things occurring at the Savannah River Site to support the changing role of nuclear materials accounting

  12. Nuclear material accounting software for Ukraine

    Among the needs identified during initial surveys of nuclear facilities in Ukraine was improved accounting software for reporting material inventories to the regulatory body. AIMAS (Automated Inventory/Material Accounting System) is a PC-based application written in Microsoft Access that was jointly designed by an US/Ukraine development team. The design is highly flexible and configurable, and supports a wide range of computing infrastructure needs and facility requirements including situations where networks are not available or reliable. AIMAS has both English and Russian-language options for displays and reports, and it operates under Windows 3.1, 95, or NT 4.0trademark. AIMAS functions include basic physical inventory tracking, transaction histories, reporting, and system administration functions (system configuration, security, data backup and recovery). Security measures include multilevel password access control, all transactions logged with the user identification, and system administration control. Interfaces to external modules provide nuclear fuel burn-up adjustment and barcode scanning capabilities for physical inventory taking. AIMAS has been installed at Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research (KINR), South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (SUNPP), Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT), Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry (SINEI), and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety/Nuclear Regulatory Administration (MEPNS/NRA). Facility specialists are being trained to use the application to track material movement and report to the national regulatory authority

  13. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

  14. Bar code usage in nuclear materials accountability

    The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant began investigating the use of automated data collection devices in 1979. At this time, bar code and optical-character-recognition (OCR) systems were reviewed with the purpose of directly entering data into DYMCAS (Dynamic Special Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability System). Both of these systems appeared applicable, however, other automated devices already employed for production control made implementing the bar code and OCR seem improbable. However, the DYMCAS was placed on line for nuclear material accountability, a decision was made to consider the bar code for physical inventory listings. For the past several months a development program has been underway to use a bar code device to collect and input data to the DYMCAS on the uranium recovery operations. Programs have been completed and tested, and are being employed to ensure that data will be compatible and useful. Bar code implementation and expansion of its use for all nuclear material inventory activity in Y-12 is presented

  15. Bar code application to nuclear material accountancy

    For the purpose of efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards inspection, operators ought to prepare the information which is related to the strata for flow verification in a timely manner, such as physical inventory listing and summary of the fuel bundles. Today the use of bar code technique in tracing of products related data or counting number of items has been more and more applied to many facets of industry. From these points of view, the Japan Nuclear Fuel Company (NF) has been developing JNF Total Bar Code System. Now JNF has established an on-line input system of the fuel bundle accountability data by use of the bar code system to quickly prepare the information necessary for the inspection. As the first step, JNF implemented this bar code system at the flow verification to prepare physical inventory summary and location map of the fuel bundles in the storage. This paper reports that as a result of this, NF confirmed that this bar code system made it possible to input easily and quickly nuclear material accountancy information, and therefore this system is utilized as an effective and efficient measure of timely preparation for the inspection

  16. 10 CFR 74.51 - Nuclear material control and accounting for strategic special nuclear material.

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for strategic special nuclear material. 74.51 Section 74.51 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Formula Quantities of Strategic Special...

  17. The French national system for centralized accounting of nuclear materials

    The French national system for centralized accounting of nuclear materials located on French soil is described. Texts of accountancy regulations and operator's obligations, which determine the technical conditions for nuclear material management are presented. The NUclear Material Operation Declaration Form used for declaring changes in inventory is considered. The hardware configuration of the automated accounting system for nuclear materials consists of multiprocessor mini-computer, SUN computers, a SYBASE relational database manager and optical fiber network

  18. Nuclear material accounting: The next generation

    The Westinghouse Hanford company (Westinghouse Hanford) and the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) have undertaken a joint effort to develop a new generation material accounting system. The system will incorporate the latest advances in microcomputer hardware, software, and network technology. This system, the Local Area Network Material Accounting System (LANMAS), offers greater performance and functionality at a reduced overall cost. It also offers the possibility of establishing a standard among DOE and NRC facilities for material accounting. This report provides a discussion of this system

  19. Nuclear materials accounting, helping the facility operator

    A modern materials control and accounting (MCandA) system can provide major benefits to production personnel. It can enhance understanding of process systems performance, localize and reconcile material losses, and identify instruments that are out-of-calibration or malfunctioning. Examples of the above MCandA system application are given. The authors show how Operations personnel can use an MCandA system to their advantage rather than letting the MCandA systems take advantage of them

  20. Accounting systems for special nuclear material control. Technical report

    Nuclear material accounting systems were examined and compared to financial double-entry accounting systems. Effective nuclear material accounting systems have been designed using the principles of double-entry financial accounting. The modified double-entry systems presently employed are acceptable if they provide adequate control over the recording and summarizing of transactions. Strong internal controls, based on principles of financial accounting, can help protect nuclear materials and produce accurate, reliable accounting data. An electronic data processing system can more accurately maintain large volumes of data and provide management with more current, reliable information

  1. Technology development for nuclear material accountability

    The objective of this study is to contribute efforts to identifying the characteristics and operation reason of known or clandestine nuclear facility. To achieve this purpose is by means of chemical analysis of various samples from process line and surrounding environment. It is possible to assume that the information of the qualitative and quantitative nuclear activities can be obtained by chemically verifying the various samples discharged from specific nuclear facility. Therefore, these techniques may be helpful to identify the presence of undecleared facilities, to detect the falsified operating data and to verify the accounting data. Am-241 dating method is available to detect the actions to conceal the diversion strategy by falsifying operation data of plutonium production facility. Low level counting systems have been used as environmental monitoring in the neighborhood of nuclear facilities, and it is important to optimize experimental conditions (to reduce system background and to improve detection efficiency) for more accurate measurement. These optimized conditions may be useful in establishing low background counting system and counting room. (Author)

  2. The users manual and concepts of nuclear materials accounting system

    This report is to describe the concepts, operation status and user's manuals of nuclear materials accounting system which was developed to not only make out, report and manage the IAEA accounting reports but also maintain the accounting information. Therefore, facility operator could effectively make use of the accounting system without a special training by using this report. 3 tabs., 15 figs., (Author) .new

  3. Fuzzy controllers in nuclear material accounting

    Fuzzy controllers are applied to predicting and modeling a time series, with particular emphasis on anomaly detection in nuclear material inventory differences. As compared to neural networks, the fuzzy controllers can operate in real time; their learning process does not require many iterations to converge. For this reason fuzzy controllers are potentially useful in time series forecasting, where the authors want to detect and identify trends in real time. They describe an object-oriented implementation of the algorithm advanced by Wang and Mendel. Numerical results are presented both for inventory data and time series corresponding to chaotic situations, such as encountered in the context of strange attractors. In the latter case, the effects of noise on the predictive power of the fuzzy controller are explored

  4. U.S. national nuclear material control and accounting system

    Issues related to nuclear material control and accounting and illegal dealing in these materials were discussed at the April 19--20, 1996 Moscow summit meeting (G7 + Russia). The declaration from this meeting reaffirmed that governments are responsible for the safety of all nuclear materials in their possession and for the effectiveness of the national control and accounting system for these materials. The Russian delegation at this meeting stated that ''the creation of a nuclear materials accounting, control, and physical protection system has become a government priority''. Therefore, in order to create a government nuclear material control and accounting system for the Russian Federation, it is critical to study the structure, operating principles, and regulations supporting the control and accounting of nuclear materials in the national systems of nuclear powers. In particular, Russian specialists have a definite interest in learning about the National Nuclear Material Control and Accounting System of the US, which has been operating successfully as an automated system since 1968

  5. U.S. national nuclear material control and accounting system

    Taylor, S; Terentiev, V G

    1998-12-01

    Issues related to nuclear material control and accounting and illegal dealing in these materials were discussed at the April 19--20, 1996 Moscow summit meeting (G7 + Russia). The declaration from this meeting reaffirmed that governments are responsible for the safety of all nuclear materials in their possession and for the effectiveness of the national control and accounting system for these materials. The Russian delegation at this meeting stated that ''the creation of a nuclear materials accounting, control, and physical protection system has become a government priority''. Therefore, in order to create a government nuclear material control and accounting system for the Russian Federation, it is critical to study the structure, operating principles, and regulations supporting the control and accounting of nuclear materials in the national systems of nuclear powers. In particular, Russian specialists have a definite interest in learning about the National Nuclear Material Control and Accounting System of the US, which has been operating successfully as an automated system since 1968.

  6. Development of Nuclear Material Accounting and Safeguards Technology

    This project is aimed at the development of nuclear material accounting and safeguards technology. Nuclear material accountancy technology for an each unit process and nuclear characteristic analysis technology to demonstrate the safeguards technology for a pyroprocessing facility have been developed during the first phase of the project. A study for analyzing the safeguardability of pyroprocessing facility and preliminary evaluation has also been carried out. The safeguards technology system for electro-reduction process has been established to develop the unit process nuclear material accountancy technology through nuclear material accounting in ACPF and performance test of surveillance equipment using spent fuels and neutron source. Nuclear material accountancy measure for electro-refining process where various kinds of nuclear materials are generated compared to electro-reduction process has been constructed, and its performance test has been conducted as well. A Gamma/neutron integrated system has been developed as a nuclear characteristic analysis technology for pyroprocess nuclear material, the possibility of Pu and U measurement has been analyzed using FRAM, and fundamental experiment has been performed to examine whether LIBS technology is applicable to nuclear material accountancy of pyroprocess. A preliminary concept design of safeguards system for pyroprocessing facility and basic design of computer code for analyzing the safeguardability have been carried out to perform the safeguardability analysis and preliminary evaluation for pyroprocessing facility, and a study for analyzing the safeguardability of KAPF which has scale of 100 MT-HM/year has been conducted in collaboration with LANL. Also, an IAEA Member State Support Program for establishing safeguards approach technology for pyroprocessing facility ('Support for Development for a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant') has been conducting in cooperation with KINAC. It is expected that

  7. Technology development for nuclear material accountability

    Hong, Jong Sook; Lee, Byung Doo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Lee, Yong Duk; Choi, Hyung Nae; Nah, Won Woo; Park, Hoh Joon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1994-12-01

    Computer code simulation was carried out for Pu contents estimation from the spent fuel discharged from research reactor for the purpose of the effective and efficient support of independent verification of nuclear activity in that reactor. MCNP code was used to find the characteristics of spontaneous fission neutrons and of neutrons produced by (a, n) reaction, and to get the detection probability of neutrons emitted from the spent fuels at the surrounding detectors as a function of energy. 13 figs, 9 tabs, 3 refs. (Author).

  8. 10 CFR 74.31 - Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of low strategic significance.

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of low strategic significance. 74.31 Section 74.31 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Special Nuclear Material of...

  9. Technology development for nuclear material accountability

    A positive on-site verification technique of spent PWR fuel rods in pool and material balance evaluation in bulk material handling facility were developed in support of facility operation and IAEA verification activity. The measured signal from each individual rod in assembly was noticeable different from empty hole and general BKG and also the target rod was not interfered by the surrounding rods in activity counting. Base on this fact it was possible to distinguish the dummy fuel rod from real rod from real one. As a result this technique may be used by IAEA for the on-site routine inspection. A system for facility MUF evaluation was established for the apply it the bulk material handling facility, the evaluated results of MUF occured in CFFF showed that the efficiency of fabrication process and the international confidence level for MUF are considered to have brought forth a positive conclusion. The uncertainty of measurement system in CFFF fell within IAEA's recomended values. But the measurement error limits of DIQ presented to IAEA of CFFF were lower than actual error limits, so that measurement error limits of DIQ might be updated. (Author)

  10. Software for MUF evaluating in item nuclear material accounting

    Nuclear material accounting is a key measure for nuclear safeguard. Software for MUF evaluation in item nuclear material accounting was worked out in this paper. It is composed of several models, including input model, data processing model, data inquiring model, data print model, system setting model etc. It could be used to check the variance of the measurement and estimate the confidence interval according to the MUF value. To insure security of the data multi-user management function was applied in the software. (authors)

  11. The development of nuclear material accountability system - software user's manual

    We have developed the near-real time nuclear material accountability system, named by DMAS, for DUPIC Test Facility in the basis of the survey of DUPIC process and activities for the accountability of the system, and the review of the rules and regulations related to the nuclear material accounting. Our system adopts the structure and technologies used in COREMAS which was developed by LANL. This technical report illustrates the system structure and program usage as a user manual for DMAS. (author). 56 tabs., 1 fig

  12. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control

  13. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  14. Nuclear Material Accountancy Assessment Technical Measures in Nuclear Centrifuge Enrichment Facility

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear material accountancy assessment is the main technical measures for nuclear materials regulatory. It is an important basis to detect theft, loss and the illegal diversion of nuclear material. In order to implement the control of nuclear materials for nuclear facilities,

  15. Modelling adversary actions against a nuclear material accounting system

    Lim, J.J.; Huebel, J.G.

    1979-04-01

    A typical nuclear material accounting system employing double-entry bookkeeping is described. A logic diagram is used to model the interactions of the accounting system and the adversary when he attempts to thwart it. Boolean equations are derived from the logic diagram; solution of these equations yields the accounts and records through which the adversary may disguise a SSNM theft and the collusion requirements needed to accomplish this feat. Some technical highlights of the logic diagram are also discussed.

  16. Modelling adversary actions against a nuclear material accounting system

    A typical nuclear material accounting system employing double-entry bookkeeping is described. A logic diagram is used to model the interactions of the accounting system and the adversary when he attempts to thwart it. Boolean equations are derived from the logic diagram; solution of these equations yields the accounts and records through which the adversary may disguise a SSNM theft and the collusion requirements needed to accomplish this feat. Some technical highlights of the logic diagram are also discussed

  17. 10 CFR 74.41 - Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of moderate strategic...

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. 74.41 Section 74.41 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Special Nuclear...

  18. An accountancy system for nuclear materials control in research centres

    The Nuclear Accountancy and Control System (NACS) was developed at KFA Juelich in accordance with the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The main features are (1) recording of nuclear material in inventory items. These are combined to form batches wherever suitable; (2) extrapolation of accounting data as a replacement for detailed measurement of inventory items data. Recording and control of nuclear material are carried out on two levels with access to a common data bank. The lower level deals with nuclear materials handling plus internal management while on the upper level there is a central control point which is responsible for nuclear safeguarding within the entire research centre. By keeping the organizational and technical infrastructure it was possible to develop a system which is both economical and operator-oriented. In this system the emphasis of nuclear safeguarding is placed on the acquisition of the nuclear material inventory. As much consideration has been given to the interests of the various operational levels and organizational units as to internal and national regulations. Since it is part of the safeguarding and control system, access to the NACS must be restricted to a limited number of users only. Furthermore, it must include facilities for manual control in the form of records. Authorization for access must correspond with the various tasks of different user groups. All necessary data are acquired decentrally in the organizational units and entered via a terminal. It is available to the user groups on both levels through a central data bank. To meet all requirements, the NACS has been designed as an integrated, computer-assisted information system for the automated processing of extensive and multi-level nuclear materials data. As part of the preventive measures entailed with nuclear safeguarding, the accountancy system enables the operator of a nuclear plant to furnish proof of non-diversion of nuclear material. (author)

  19. Development of a comprehensive nuclear materials accountancy system at JAEA

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is submitting various types of accounting reports of international controlled materials to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) based on domestic laws and regulations. JAEA developed a comprehensive Nuclear Material Accountancy System to achieve uniform management of the data of each facility by using a company-wide database. Personal computers in each facility are connected throughout the company using an in-house network to create the comprehensive Nuclear Material Accountancy System. This System uses personal computers to facilitate timely communication and for easy maintenance and operation. Efficient data processing and quality control functions for accountancy reporting are also realized by this System. In addition, the System has the ability to extract and summarize data about Plutonium Management in the company for public announcement. This report introduces and describes the details and functions of this System. (author)

  20. Implementation of national system of nuclear material accounting and safeguards

    This paper describes the implementation of a national system of accounting and safeguards of nuclear material in egypt. A plan of the implementation was designed in three stages. The first stage covers the existing nuclear activities in the country which are actually in operation. The second and third stages were designed to cover the mid-term and long term prospects of the nuclear development in the country. The paper also describes the methodology, procedures and formats which have to be used for the implementation. This is harmony with nuclear safeguards and verification procedures of the international Atomic Energy Agency.5 fig

  1. Development and operation of nuclear material accounting system of JAERI

    For the nuclear material accounting system, the mainframe computer had been used in Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI). For the purpose of more flexible use and easy operation, the PC base accounting system has been developed since 1999, and operation started from October, 2002. This system consists of the server with the database software and the client PC with original application software. The functions of this system are the input and edit of data, the creation of inspection correspondence data, and creation of a report to the states. Furthermore, it is also possible to create the Web application which used accounting data on a user level by using the programming language. Now, this system is being specialized in JAERI, but it is during a plan to develop as a system which can be also used at other institutions and organization. In the paper, the outline and operating situation of the nuclear material accounting system of JAERI are presented. (author)

  2. Application of game theory to nuclear material accounting. Final report

    An approach based upon the theory of games is presented that determines an optimal alarm threshold for detecting unauthorized or deliberate diversion of nuclear material based upon material accounting data. A mathematical model is developed, solved, and applied to a generic nuclear facility. By considering a malevolent diverter as a basic ingredient of the analysis this approach offers advantages over conventional statistical hypothesis testing. The results show that periodic inventories and appropriate interpretation of MUF can provide a high assurance for indicating diversion in a nuclear material safeguards situation. The optimal policy is to select the alarm threshold by a mixed strategy rather than a pre-set single fixed value. Procedures for doing this are presented in the report. With this approach, MUF data by itself may be more useful in indicating possible unauthorized diversion of special nuclear material

  3. Verification of nuclear material accounts as a management function

    UKAEA management has established a technically based Nuclear Materials Accounting Control Team (NMACT) whose responsibilities include verification of nuclear material holdings, independently of local management, at the six Authority establishments. This paper reviews the principles on which this technical verification work is based and discusses, where appropriate, the relevance to and differences from Safeguards' inspections. Preliminary results are presented on both record audit and physical verification activities at a fissile material store, a plutonium laboratory, a prototype power reactor, an experimental fuels laboratory, and a fuel fabrication plant. (author)

  4. Variance and covariance calculations for nuclear materials accounting using 'MAVARIC'

    Determination of the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system to the loss of special nuclear material (SNM) requires (1) obtaining a relation for the variance of the materials balance by propagation of the instrument errors for the measured quantities that appear in the materials balance equation and (2) substituting measured values and their error standard deviations into this relation and calculating the variance of the materials balance. MAVARIC (Materials Accounting VARIance Calculations) is a custom spreadsheet, designed using the second release of Lotus 1-2-3, that significantly reduces the effort required to make the necessary variance (and covariance) calculations needed to determine the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system. Predefined macros within the spreadsheet allow the user to carry out long, tedious procedures with only a few keystrokes. MAVARIC requires that the user enter the following data into one of four data tables, depending on the type of the term in the materials balance equation; the SNM concentration, the bulk mass (or solution volume), the measurement error standard deviations, and the number of measurements made during an accounting period. The user can also specify if there are correlations between transfer terms. Based on these data entries, MAVARIC can calculate the variance of the materials balance and the square root of this variance, from which the detection sensitivity of the accounting system can be determined

  5. Variance and covariance calculations for nuclear materials accounting using ''MAVARIC''

    Determination of the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system to the loss of special nuclear material (SNM) requires (1) obtaining a relation for the variance of the materials balance by propagation of the instrument errors for the measured quantities that appear in the materials balance equation and (2) substituting measured values and their error standard deviations into this relation and calculating the variance of the materials balance. MAVARIC (Materials Accounting VARIance Calculations) is a custom spreadsheet, designed using the second release of Lotus 1-2-3, that significantly reduces the effort required to make the necessary variance (and covariance) calculations needed to determine the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system. Predefined macros within the spreadsheet allow the user to carry out long, tedious procedures with only a few keystrokes. MAVARIC requires that the user enter the following data into one of four data tables, depending on the type of the term in the materials balance equation; the SNM concentration, the bulk mass (or solution volume), the measurement error standard deviations, and the number of measurements made during an accounting period. The user can also specify if there are correlations between transfer terms. Based on these data entries, MAVARIC can calculate the variance of the materials balance and the square root of this variance, from which the detection sensitivity of the accounting system can be determined

  6. Variance and covariance calculations for nuclear materials accounting using ''PROFF''

    To determine the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system to the loss of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) requires (1) obtaining a relation for the variance of the materials balance by propagation of the instrument errors for those measured quantities that appear in the materials balance equation and (2) substituting measured values and their error standard deviations into this relation and calculating the variance of the materials balance. The authors have developed an interactive, menu-driven computer program, called PROFF (for PROcessing and Fuel Facilities), that considerably reduces the effort required to make the variance and covariance calculations needed to determine the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system. PROFF is discussed in this paper

  7. Variance and covariance calculations for nuclear materials accounting using ''PROFF''

    To determine the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system to the loss of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) requires: (1) obtaining a relation for the variance of the materials balance by propagation of the instrument errors for those measured quantities that appear in the materials balance equation and (2) substituting measured values and their error standard deviations into this relation and calculating the variance of the materials balance. We have developed an interactive, menu-driven computer program, called PROFF (for PROcessing and Fuel Facilities), that considerably reduces the effort required to make the variance and covariance calculations needed to determine the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system. PROFF asks questions of the user to establish the form of each term in the materials balance equation, possible correlations between them, and whether the measured quantities are characterized by an additive or multiplicative error model. Then for each term of the materials balance equation, it presents the user with a menu that is to be completed with values of the SNM concentration, mass (or volume), measurement error standard deviations, and the number of measurements made during the accounting period. On completion of all the data menus, PROFF presents the variance of the materials balance and the square root of this variance, so that the sensitivity of the accounting system can be determined. PROFF is programmed in TURBO-PASCAL for micro-computers using MS-DOS 2.1 (IBM and compatibles)

  8. Nuclear Material Control and Accountability System Effectiveness Tool (MSET)

    A nuclear material control and accountability (MC and A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) has been developed in the United States for use in evaluating material protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A) systems in nuclear facilities. The project was commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation. MSET was developed by personnel with experience spanning more than six decades in both the U.S. and international nuclear programs and with experience in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in the nuclear power industry. MSET offers significant potential benefits for improving nuclear safeguards and security in any nation with a nuclear program. MSET provides a design basis for developing an MC and A system at a nuclear facility that functions to protect against insider theft or diversion of nuclear materials. MSET analyzes the system and identifies several risk importance factors that show where sustainability is essential for optimal performance and where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. MSET contains five major components: (1) A functional model that shows how to design, build, implement, and operate a robust nuclear MC and A system (2) A fault tree of the operating MC and A system that adapts PRA methodology to analyze system effectiveness and give a relative risk of failure assessment of the system (3) A questionnaire used to document the facility's current MPC and A system (provides data to evaluate the quality of the system and the level of performance of each basic task performed throughout the material balance area (MBA)) (4) A formal process of applying expert judgment to convert the facility questionnaire data into numeric values representing the performance level of each basic event for use in the fault tree risk assessment calculations (5) PRA software that performs the fault tree risk assessment calculations and produces risk importance

  9. Towards a new system of accounting of nuclear material

    The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) of Argentina has, among other functions, to ensure the fulfilment of national nuclear regulatory standards and all international safeguards commitments assumed by Argentina, particularly those related to the accounting and control of nuclear materials. To fulfil this responsibility, national inspections and audits of the operator's accounting and measurement systems are carried out, generating a great deal of data to be processed and evaluated. To manage this information in an efficient way, the RNA has implemented a control system composed by three database: SCMN, SIS and SOP, which interact amongst them. The objectives and functions of this integrated system and the achieved results to date are described in the present paper. (author)

  10. Nuclear materials control and accountability criteria for upgrades measures

    As a result of major political and societal changes in the past several years, methods of nuclear material control may no longer be as effective as in the past in Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltic States (BS). The objective of the Department of Energy (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC and A) is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by collaborating with Russia, NIS, and BS governments to promote western-style MPC and A. This cooperation will improve the MPC and A on all weapons useable nuclear materials and will establish a sustainable infrastructure to provide future support and maintenance for these technology-based improvements. Nuclear materials of proliferation concern include materials of the types and quantities that can be most easily and directly used in a nuclear weapon. Sabotage of nuclear material is an event of great concern and potentially disastrous consequences to both the US and the host country. However, sabotage is currently beyond the scope of program direction and cannot be used to justify US-funded MPC and A upgrades. Judicious MPC and A upgrades designed to protect against insider and outsider theft scenarios would also provide addition, although not comprehensive, protection against saboteurs. This paper provides some suggestions to establish consistency in prioritizing system-enhancement efforts at nuclear material facilities. The suggestions in this paper are consistent with DOE policy and directions and should be used as a supplement to any policy directives issued by NN-40, DOE Russia/NIS Task Force

  11. Nuclear materials control and accountability internal audit program

    This paper reports that the Department of Energy Order (DOE) 5633.3, Control and Accountability for Nuclear Materials, includes several requirements for development and implementation of an internal audit program. Martin Marietta Energy System, Inc., manages five sites in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio for the DOE Field Office, Oak Ridge and has a Central Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability (NMC and A) Manager with matrixed responsibility for the NMC and A program at the five sites. The Energy Systems Central NMC and A Manager has developed an NMC and A Internal Audit Handbook which defines the functional responsibilities, performance criteria, and reporting and documentation requirements for the Energy Systems NMC and A Internal Audit Program. The initial work to develop and implement these standards was tested at the K-25 Site when the site hired an internal auditor to meet the DOE requirements for an NMC and A Internal Audit program

  12. Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material

    The implementation of safeguards agreements has always involved governmental organizations to a greater or lesser extent, according to the practices of the State concerned. When the Safeguards Committee 1970 defined the structure and content of agreements required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particular attention was paid to the contacts between States and the Agency during the implementation of such agreements. The basic idea was that in each State a national organization would, as far as possible, lay the foundations for international safeguards. Accordingly, NPT safeguards agreements contain the obligation of the State to establish and maintain a 'State's system of accountancy for and control of nuclear material'. The Agency document describing the structure and content of NPT safeguards agreements, INFCIRC/153, also known as the 'Blue Book', lays down the basic requirements for a State's system of accounting for and control of nuclear material - SSAC for short. The same document stipulates that the Agency in its safeguards work should take due account of the technical effectiveness of the SSAC. In practice, the effectiveness of SSACs may differ widely. To take due account of their effectiveness, the Agency has to analyse them, note the elements included in them and the requirements they meet, and consider the particular situations they are designed to cope with

  13. Methods of Verification, Accountability and Control of Special Nuclear Material

    Stewart, J.E.

    1999-05-03

    This session demonstrates nondestructive assay (NDA) measurement, surveillance and analysis technology required to protect, control and account (MPC and A) for special nuclear materials (SNM) in sealed containers. These measurements, observations and analyses comprise state-of-the art, strengthened, SNM safeguards systems. Staff member specialists, actively involved in research, development, training and implementation worldwide, will present six NDA verification systems and two software tools for integration and analysis of facility MPC and A data.

  14. The application of statistical techniques to nuclear materials accountancy

    Over the past decade much theoretical research has been carried out on the development of statistical methods for nuclear materials accountancy. In practice plant operation may differ substantially from the idealized models often cited. This paper demonstrates the importance of taking account of plant operation in applying the statistical techniques, to improve the accuracy of the estimates and the knowledge of the errors. The benefits are quantified either by theoretical calculation or by simulation. Two different aspects are considered; firstly, the use of redundant measurements to reduce the error on the estimate of the mass of heavy metal in an accountancy tank is investigated. Secondly, a means of improving the knowledge of the 'Material Unaccounted For' (the difference between the inventory calculated from input/output data, and the measured inventory), using information about the plant measurement system, is developed and compared with existing general techniques. (author)

  15. Recent activities of the nuclear materials accounting sub-committee of nuclear fuel fabricators

    The nuclear materials accounting sub-committee of the Japanese Commercial nuclear fuel fabricators has been active in tackling common issues associated with the nuclear materials accounting and safeguards matters. In addition to internal consultations among the fabricators there have been numerous meetings and information exchanges with relevant organizations relevant to the nuclear materials accounting and safeguards for promoting common interest that is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the nuclear materials control related activities. Whereas the fabricators are engaged in fierce battle each other to survive in the increasingly competitive nuclear fuel market, they are committed to mutually educate, endeavor and co-operate with the common cause of national and international authorities to improve the quality of the accounting and safeguards of the nuclear materials. This paper summarizes up-to-date status of the issues on the agenda of the committee such as Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI). (author)

  16. Nuclear material accountancy and control system in Brazil

    Full text: The Safeguards and Physical Protection Coordination (COSAP) integrates the structure of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) that is a governmental entity in Brazil. COSAP itself is responsible for the control of nuclear materials, the physical protection of facilities handling nuclear or radioactive materials and the control of the illicit traffic of nuclear and radioactive materials. Besides this control of the nuclear material implemented by the state safeguards system, all the nuclear material after the starting point of application of safeguards is subject to a regional safeguards system (implemented by ABACC - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) and an international safeguards system (implemented by IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency). Under this scope, COSAP has to maintain the inventory knowledge of nuclear material of all nuclear facilities in the country updated, and to report inventory changes to ABACC and IAEA based on data collected from the operators of the facilities. Nowadays, this data collection is made by means of collections of MS-Excel spreadsheets for support documents, general ledgers and inventory lists which is not the best situation. The accounting reports are then prepared and submitted by encrypted e-mail to ABACC and IAEA. COSAP has recently been involved in upgrading the Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control System of Brazil. Such upgrading is based on an entirely new software system (E-GAMMA) that is being developed right now in Brazil by CNEN staff. This software will be a Web system installed in a dedicated server under a secure environment maintained at CNEN headquarters, and each facility or institution will be provided with the necessary hardware and software to access the system (Digital Clients Certificates, Smart Cards, VPN, computers, etc). Users will access the system with strong passwords with creation rules and expiration dates controlled by the

  17. Survey procedure: Control and accountability of nuclear materials

    Van Ness, H.

    1987-02-01

    This procedure outlines the method by which the Department of Energy (DOE) San Francisco Operations Office (SAN) will plan and execute periodic field surveys of the Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) program and practices at designated contractors' facilities. The surveys will be conducted in accordance with DOE Order 5630.7, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials Surveys (7/8/81) to ascertain compliance with applicable DOE Orders and SAN Management Directives in the 5630 series, as well as the adequacy of the contractor's program and procedures. Surveys will be conducted by the Safeguards and Security Division of DOE-SAN. The survey team will review and evaluate the adequacy of the contractor's procedures and practices for nuclear material control and accounting by means of physical inventory, internal control, measurement and statistics, material control indicators, records and reports, and personnel training. The survey will include an audit of records and reports, observation of inventory procedures, an independent test of the inventory and a review and evaluation of the inventory differences, accidental losses, and normal operational losses as applicable to the facility to be surveyed.

  18. Survey procedure: Control and accountability of nuclear materials

    This procedure outlines the method by which the Department of Energy (DOE) San Francisco Operations Office (SAN) will plan and execute periodic field surveys of the Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) program and practices at designated contractors' facilities. The surveys will be conducted in accordance with DOE Order 5630.7, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials Surveys (7/8/81) to ascertain compliance with applicable DOE Orders and SAN Management Directives in the 5630 series, as well as the adequacy of the contractor's program and procedures. Surveys will be conducted by the Safeguards and Security Division of DOE-SAN. The survey team will review and evaluate the adequacy of the contractor's procedures and practices for nuclear material control and accounting by means of physical inventory, internal control, measurement and statistics, material control indicators, records and reports, and personnel training. The survey will include an audit of records and reports, observation of inventory procedures, an independent test of the inventory and a review and evaluation of the inventory differences, accidental losses, and normal operational losses as applicable to the facility to be surveyed

  19. Security features of a nuclear material accounting system

    The Los Alamos Nuclear Material Accounting and Safeguards System (MASS) is a near-real-time accountability system for bulk materials, discrete items, and materials undergoing dynamic processing. MASS has evolved from a 80-column, card-based process control system to a very sophisticated computer system. Recently, the computer hardware was upgraded to a modern transaction oriented central computer system designed to accommodate extensive growth in the foreseeable future. The security of the MASS computer system is provided through various access controls. There are two kinds of access controls to be addressed. They are physical access control to the hardware which make up the system and access control to the software. There are many features which provide a measure of security to the hardware that are discussed. Access to the software is controlled by a security password. Access to various transaction activities in the system is controlled through the level of MASS under privilege. Details of MASS user privilege are discussed

  20. Nuclear material safeguards surveillance and accountancy by isotope correlation techniques

    The purpose of this study is to investigate the applicability of isotope correlation techniques (ICT) to the Light Water Reactor (LWR) and the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) fuel cycles for nuclear material accountancy and safeguards surveillance. The isotopic measurement of the inventory input to the reprocessing phase of the fuel cycle is the primary direct determination that an anomaly may exist in the fuel management of nuclear material. The nuclear materials accountancy gap which exists between the fabrication plant output and the input to the reprocessing plant can be minimized by using ICT at the dissolver stage of the reprocessing plant. The ICT allows a level of verification of the fabricator's fuel content specifications, the irradiation history, the fuel and blanket assemblies management and scheduling within the reactor, and the subsequent spent fuel assembly flows to the reprocessing plant. The investigation indicates that there exist relationships between isotopic concentration which have predictable, functional behavior over a range of burnup. Several cross-correlations serve to establish the initial core assembly-averaged composition. The selection of the more effective functionals will depend not only on the level of reliability of ICT for verification, but also on the capability, accuracy and difficulty of developing measurement methods. The propagation of measurement errors on the correlation functions and respective sensitivities to isotopic compositional changes have been examined and found to be consistent with current measurement methods

  1. Some technical aspects of the nuclear material accounting and control at nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    The possibilities of nuclear material accounting and control are discussed at nuclear facilities of fuel cycle (WWER-type reactor, fuel fabrication plant, reprocessing plant and uranium enrichment facility) and zero energy fast reactor facility. It is shown that for nuclear material control the main method is the accounting with the application isotopic correlations at the reprocessing plant and enrichment facility. Possibilities and limitations of the application of destructive and non-destructive methods are discussed for nuclear material determinations at fuel facilities and their role in the accounting and safeguards systems as well as possibilities of the application of neutron method at a zero energy fast reactor facility

  2. Statistical analysis and Kalman filtering applied to nuclear materials accountancy

    Much theoretical research has been carried out on the development of statistical methods for nuclear material accountancy. In practice, physical, financial and time constraints mean that the techniques must be adapted to give an optimal performance in plant conditions. This thesis aims to bridge the gap between theory and practice, to show the benefits to be gained from a knowledge of the facility operation. Four different aspects are considered; firstly, the use of redundant measurements to reduce the error on the estimate of the mass of heavy metal in an 'accountancy tank' is investigated. Secondly, an analysis of the calibration data for the same tank is presented, establishing bounds for the error and suggesting a means of reducing them. Thirdly, a plant-specific method of producing an optimal statistic from the input, output and inventory data, to help decide between 'material loss' and 'no loss' hypotheses, is developed and compared with existing general techniques. Finally, an application of the Kalman Filter to materials accountancy is developed, to demonstrate the advantages of state-estimation techniques. The results of the analyses and comparisons illustrate the importance of taking into account a complete and accurate knowledge of the plant operation, measurement system, and calibration methods, to derive meaningful results from statistical tests on materials accountancy data, and to give a better understanding of critical random and systematic error sources. The analyses were carried out on the head-end of the Fast Reactor Reprocessing Plant, where fuel from the prototype fast reactor is cut up and dissolved. However, the techniques described are general in their application. (author)

  3. Technology development for nuclear material measurement and accountability

    Hong, Jong Sook; Lee, Byung Doo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Lee, Yong Duk; Choi, Hyung Nae; Nah, Won Woo; Park, Hoh Joon; Lee, Yung Kil [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1994-12-01

    The measurement techniques for Pu samples and spent fuel assembly were developed in support of the implementation of national inspection responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act promulgated in 1994 and a computer program was also developed to assess the total nuclear material balance by facility declared records. The results of plutonium isotopic determination by gamma-ray spectrometry with high resolution germanium detector with peak analysis codes (FRAM and MGA codes) were approached to within 1% {approx} 2% of error from chemical analysis values by mass spectrometry. A gamma-ray measurement system for underwater spent nuclear fuels was developed and tested successfully. The falsification of facility and state records can be traced with the help of the developed computer code against declared reports submitted by the concerned state. This activity eventually resulted in finding the discrepancy of accountability records. 18 figs, 20 tabs, 27 refs. (Author).

  4. Use of Imaging for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability

    The recent addition of imaging to the Nuclear Materials and Identification System (NMIS) using a small portable DT neutron generator with an embedded alpha detector to time and directionally tag neutrons from the DT reaction is discussed. The generator weighs ∼35 lbs including power supplies (5 x 107 n/sec) and operates on 50 watts power. Thus, the source can be easily moved to a variety of locations within an operational facility with minimum impact on operations or can be used at a fixed location for example to monitor receipts. Imaging NMIS (INMIS) not only characterizes the detailed shape of a containerized object by transmission tomography but determines the presence of fissile material by measuring the emitted radiation from induced fission. Previous work has shown that this type of imaging has a variety of applications other than nuclear material control and accountability (NMC and A). These include nonproliferation applications such as verification of configuration of nuclear weapons/components shipped or received, warhead authentication behind an information barrier, and traceability of weapons components both fissile and non fissile in dismantlement and counter terrorism. This paper concentrates on the use for NMC and A. Some of the NMC and A applications discussed are: verifying inventory and receipts, making more accurate holdup measurements especially where thicknesses of materials affect gamma ray spectrometry , determining the shape of unknown configurations of fissile materials where the material type may be known but not the form, determining the oxidation of fissile metal in storage cans, fingerprinting the content of storage containers going into a storage facility, and determining unknown configurations for criticality safety.

  5. Upgrading nuclear material protection, control and accounting in Russia

    In this paper we review the Cooperative US-Russia Program of Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A), whose goal is to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation by strengthening systems of MPC and A; thereby the Program enhances US national security. Based on this goal, the technical objective is to enhance, through US technical cooperation, the effectiveness of MPC and A systems at Russian sites with weapons-usable nuclear material, i.e. plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The Program exists because the extensive social, political and economic changes in Russia arising from the dissolution of the Soviet Union have increased the risk that these materials would be subject to theft or other misuse, with potentially grave consequences. On the US side, the MPC and A Program is administered by the US Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration through the DOE national laboratories and other contractors. On the Russian side, the Program is administered by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) through its nuclear sites, by the regulatory agency Gosatomnadzor, and by nuclear sites not under Minatom. To carry out the Program objective, the DOE national laboratories consummate contracts with the Russian sites to implement agreed MPC and A upgrades. Deciding on what upgrades to perform depends on a cooperative analysis of site characteristics, materials, and vulnerabilities by joint US and Russian teams. Once the upgrades are agreed, the DOE laboratories supply technical and financial support and equipment to the Russian sites. The staff of the Russian sites do the work, and the US team members monitor the work through some combination - according to contract - of direct observation and reports, photographs and videotape supplied by the staff of the Russian sites. MPC and A task areas include: information in this review covers a selection of topical areas, with a focus on implementation of the upgrades at the

  6. 78 FR 38739 - Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants

    2013-06-27

    ... Information DG-5028, was published in the Federal Register on May 14, 2012 (77 FR 28407), for a 60-day public... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY:...

  7. 77 FR 28407 - Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants

    2012-05-14

    ... January 1998 (63 FR 2426; January 15, 1998), because the underlying basis standard, ANSI N15.8-1974... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY:...

  8. Statistical methods in nuclear material accountancy: Past, present and future

    The analysis of nuclear material inventory data is motivated by the desire to detect any loss or diversion of nuclear material, insofar as such detection may be feasible by statistical analysis of repeated inventory and throughput measurements. The early regulations, which laid down the specifications for the analysis of inventory data, were framed without acknowledging the essentially sequential nature of the data. It is the broad aim of this paper to discuss the historical nature of statistical analysis of inventory data including an evaluation of why statistical methods should be required at all. If it is accepted that statistical techniques are required, then two main areas require extensive discussion. First, it is important to assess the extent to which stated safeguards aims can be met in practice. Second, there is a vital need for reassessment of the statistical techniques which have been proposed for use in nuclear material accountancy. Part of this reassessment must involve a reconciliation of the apparent differences in philosophy shown by statisticians; but, in addition, the techniques themselves need comparative study to see to what extent they are capable of meeting realistic safeguards aims. This paper contains a brief review of techniques with an attempt to compare and contrast the approaches. It will be suggested that much current research is following closely similar lines, and that national and international bodies should encourage collaborative research and practical in-plant implementations. The techniques proposed require credibility and power; but at this point in time statisticians require credibility and a greater level of unanimity in their approach. A way ahead is proposed based on a clear specification of realistic safeguards aims, and a development of a unified statistical approach with encouragement for the performance of joint research. (author)

  9. Upgrading nuclear material protection, control and accounting in Russia

    Full text: I. Program goal and organization - In this paper we review the Cooperative US-Russia Program of Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A), whose goal is to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation by strengthening systems of MPC and A; thereby the Program enhances US national security. Based on this goal, the technical objective is to enhance, through US technical cooperation, the effectiveness of MPC and A systems at Russian sites with weapons-usable nuclear material, i.e. plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The Program exists because the extensive social, political and economic changes in Russia arising from the dissolution of the Soviet Union have increased the risk that these materials would be subject to theft or other misuse, with potentially grave consequences. On the US side, the MPC and A Program is administered by the US Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration through the DOE national laboratories and other contractors. On the Russian side, the Program is administered by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) through its nuclear sites, by the regulatory agency Gosatomnadzor, and by nuclear sites not under Minatom. To carry out the Program objective, the DOE national laboratories consummate contracts with the Russian sites to implement agreed MPC and A upgrades. Deciding on what upgrades to perform depends on a cooperative analysis of site characteristics, materials, and vulnerabilities by joint US and Russian teams. Once the upgrades are agreed, the DOE laboratories supply technical and financial support and equipment to the Russian sites. The staff of the Russian sites do the work, and the US team members monitor the work through some combination - according to contract - of direct observation and reports, photographs and videotape supplied by the staff of the Russian sites. II. MPC and A task areas - Information in this review covers a selection of topical areas, with a

  10. ABACC's nuclear accounting area

    The functions and activities of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) accounting area is outlined together with a detailed description of the nuclear accounting system used by the bilateral organization

  11. Prescriptive concepts for advanced nuclear materials control and accountability systems

    Networking- and distributed-processing hardware and software have the potential of greatly enhancing nuclear materials control and accountability (MC and A) systems, from both safeguards and process operations perspectives, while allowing timely integrated safeguards activities and enhanced computer security at reasonable cost. A hierarchical distributed system is proposed consisting of groups of terminal and instruments in plant production and support areas connected to microprocessors that are connected to either larger microprocessors or minicomputers. These micros and/or minis are connected to a main machine, which might be either a mainframe or a super minicomputer. Data acquisition, preliminary input data validation, and transaction processing occur at the lowest level. Transaction buffering, resource sharing, and selected data processing occur at the intermediate level. The host computer maintains overall control of the data base and provides routine safeguards and security reporting and special safeguards analyses. The research described outlines the distribution of MC and A system requirements in the hierarchical system and distributed processing applied to MC and A. Implications of integrated safeguards and computer security concepts for the distributed system design are discussed. 10 refs., 4 figs

  12. Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities. Implementing Guide

    Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) works in a complementary fashion with the international safeguards programme and physical protection systems to help prevent, deter or detect the unauthorized acquisition and use of nuclear materials. These three methodologies are employed by Member States to defend against external threats, internal threats and both state actors and non-state actors. This publication offers guidance for implementing NMAC measures for nuclear security at the nuclear facility level. It focuses on measures to mitigate the risk posed by insider threats and describes elements of a programme that can be implemented at a nuclear facility in coordination with the physical protection system for the purpose of deterring and detecting unauthorized removal of nuclear material

  13. Safeguarding nuclear materials in the former Soviet Republics through computerized materials protection, control and accountability

    The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation is a problem of global concern. International efforts at nonproliferation focus on preventing acquisition of weapons-grade nuclear materials by unauthorized states, organizations, or individuals. Nonproliferation can best be accomplished through international cooperation in the application of advanced science and technology to the management and control of nuclear materials. Computerized systems for nuclear material protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A) are a vital component of integrated nuclear safeguards programs. This paper describes the progress of scientists in the United States and former Soviet Republics in creating customized, computerized MPC and A systems. The authors discuss implementation of the Core Material Accountability System (CoreMAS), which was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory by the US Department of Energy and incorporates, in condensed and integrated form, the most valuable experience gained by US nuclear enterprises in accounting for and controlling nuclear materials. The CoreMAS approach and corresponding software package have been made available to sites internationally. CoreMAS provides methods to evaluate their existing systems and to examine advantages and disadvantages of customizing CoreMAS or improving their own existing systems. The sites can also address crucial issues of software assurance, data security, and system performance; compare operational experiences at sites with functioning computerized systems; and reasonably evaluate future efforts. The goal of the CoreMAS project is to introduce facilities at sites all over the world to modern international MPC and A practices and to help them implement effective, modern, computerized MPC and A systems to account for their nuclear materials, and thus reduce the likelihood of theft or diversion. Sites are assisted with MPC and A concepts and the implementation of an effective computerized MPC and A system

  14. Some basic criteria for using of accountancy common system and nuclear material control

    Some basic criteria used by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, using in the Accountancy and Control Common System of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) are presented and the control elements are described. The SCCC is a safeguard system used for all nuclear materials present in all nuclear activities executed by Brazil and Argentina. (C.G.C.). 4 refs, 1 tab

  15. Nuclear material control and accounting by process simulation with smalltalk

    Smalltalk, an object oriented computer language, enables programmers to build data structures and code which explicitly reflect the structure and working of a facility in an easily understood fashion. This paper discusses demonstration material control and accounting system that has been written in Smalltalk for the IBM PC-XT computer using the methods environment from Digitalk, Inc. The system is designed to track uranium through a processing facility. The objects are generic and not specific to any facility, objects like vault positions or tanks are created from classes of objects called uranium accounts. Uranium account objects are connected by a list of transfer rules which should reflect the operation of the facility. If operations or equipment are changed, only those rules or objects which simulate the affected components must be changed. By the nature of Smalltalk code, other objects will not be affected by these changes

  16. Analysis of difficulties accounting and evaluating nuclear material of PWR fuel plant

    Background: Nuclear materials accountancy must be developed for nuclear facilities, which is required by regulatory in China. Currently, there are some unresolved problems for nuclear materials accountancy of bulk nuclear facilities. Purpose: The retention values and measurement errors are analyzed in nuclear materials accountancy of Power Water Reactor (PWR) fuel plant to meet the regulatory requirements. Methods: On the basis of nuclear material accounting and evaluation data of PWR fuel plant, a deep analysis research including ratio among random error variance, long-term systematic error variance, short-term systematic error variance and total error involving Material Unaccounted For (MUF) evaluation is developed by the retention value measure in equipment and pipeline. Results: In the equipment pipeline, the holdup estimation error and its total proportion are not more than 5% and 1.5%, respectively. And the holdup estimation can be regraded as a constant in the PWR nuclear material accountancy. Random error variance, long-term systematic error variance, short-term systematic error variance of overall measurement, and analytical and sampling methods are also obtained. A valuable reference is provided for nuclear material accountancy. Conclusion: In nuclear material accountancy, the retention value can be considered as a constant. The long-term systematic error is a main factor in all errors, especially in overall measurement error and sampling error: The long-term systematic errors of overall measurement and sampling are considered important in the PWR nuclear material accountancy. The proposals and measures are applied to the nuclear materials accountancy of PWR fuel plant, and the capacity of nuclear materials accountancy is improved. (authors)

  17. The nuclear materials control and accountability internal audit program at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant

    The internal audit program of the Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (NMCandA) Department at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, through inventory-verification audits, inventory-observation audits, procedures audits, and records audits, evaluates the adequacy of material accounting and control systems and procedures throughout the Plant; appraises and verifies the accuracy and reliability of accountability records and reports; assures the consistent application of generally accepted accounting principles in accounting for nuclear materials; and assures compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) and NMCandA procedures and requirements. The internal audit program has significantly strengthened the control and accountability of nuclear materials through improving the system of internal control over nuclear materials, increasing the awareness of materials control and accountability concerns within the Plant's material balance areas (MBAs), strengthening the existence of audit trails within the overall accounting system for nuclear materials, improving the accuracy and timeliness of data submitted to the nuclear materials accountability system, auditing the NMCandA accounting system to ensure its accuracy and reliability, and ensuring that all components of that system (general ledgers, subsidiary ledgers, inventory listings, etc.) are in agreement among themselves

  18. An integrated approach to process information, nuclear materials control and accounting in BNFL's Thorp facility

    The paper describes the integrated computer control system on British Nuclear Fuels' new Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant at Sellafield. It explains the hierarchical structure and the role of the major components. The paper provides an outline description of the conventional Nuclear Materials Control and Accountancy and the on-line Near Real Time Materials Accountancy Systems

  19. The Status of Development on a Web-Based Nuclear Material Accounting System at KAERI

    Lee, Byungdoo; Kim, Inchul; Lee, Seungho; Kim, Hyunjo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    The Integrated Safeguards (IS) has been applied to 10 nuclear facilities and 1 location outside facility (LOF) at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since July 2008. One of the major changes in the implementation of safeguards under the IS is to apply the concept of a Random Interim Inspection (RII) instead of an interim inspection. The RII plan is notified within a few hours under the IS. It is thus difficult for facility operators to prepare the inspection documents within a short time if they do not periodically manage and process the nuclear material accounting data at each facility. To resolve these issues, KAERI developed a Web-based accounting system with the function of a near real-time accounting (NRTA) system to effectively and efficiently manage the nuclear material accounting data produced at the nuclear facilities and cope with a short notice inspection under the IS, called KASIS (KAeri Safeguards Information treatment System). The facility operators must input the accounting data on the inventory changes, which are the transfers of nuclear materials among the nuclear facilities and the chemical/physical composition changes, into the KASIS. KAERI also established an RFID system for controlling and managing the transfer of nuclear material and/or radioactive materials between the nuclear facilities for the purpose of nuclear safety management, and developed the nuclear material accounting system with the functions of inventory management of nuclear material at the facility level.

  20. The Status of Development on a Web-Based Nuclear Material Accounting System at KAERI

    The Integrated Safeguards (IS) has been applied to 10 nuclear facilities and 1 location outside facility (LOF) at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since July 2008. One of the major changes in the implementation of safeguards under the IS is to apply the concept of a Random Interim Inspection (RII) instead of an interim inspection. The RII plan is notified within a few hours under the IS. It is thus difficult for facility operators to prepare the inspection documents within a short time if they do not periodically manage and process the nuclear material accounting data at each facility. To resolve these issues, KAERI developed a Web-based accounting system with the function of a near real-time accounting (NRTA) system to effectively and efficiently manage the nuclear material accounting data produced at the nuclear facilities and cope with a short notice inspection under the IS, called KASIS (KAeri Safeguards Information treatment System). The facility operators must input the accounting data on the inventory changes, which are the transfers of nuclear materials among the nuclear facilities and the chemical/physical composition changes, into the KASIS. KAERI also established an RFID system for controlling and managing the transfer of nuclear material and/or radioactive materials between the nuclear facilities for the purpose of nuclear safety management, and developed the nuclear material accounting system with the functions of inventory management of nuclear material at the facility level

  1. Accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear material at the Chernobyl Shelter

    The existing assessments of nuclear material amounts present within the post-accident Chernobyl unit 4 are provided. The system for accounting for and control of Shelter nuclear material is considered. The common nature of the tasks for nuclear material accounting, control and physical protection is demonstrated. The configuration and characteristics of the Shelter physical protection system are described and factors that may adversely affect its effectiveness are identified

  2. The system of accounting and control of nuclear materials in Belarus

    The creation and development trends of the state system of accounting and control of nuclear materials (SSAC) in the Republic of Belarus are described. The existing system of nuclear material accountancy and control is briefly outlined as well as its components: legal basis, requirements for departmental systems of accounting and control, running of inspections, preparation and submission of accounting documents, and criteria for nuclear material accountancy. Further development lines of the SSAC are considered: refinement of information processing procedures and reduction of information submission time, intensification of international co-operation, improvement of measuring systems, strengthening of the legal and normative base. Systems of accounting and control have been created in Belarus in parallel with the establishing of the state supervision of safety in uses of nuclear energy. In accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, all nuclear materials under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Belarus have been placed under the IAEA safeguards. (author)

  3. Role of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control System for Ensuring Nuclear Security

    The problem of nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) already arose at the initial stage of industrial production and utilization of nuclear materials (NM) whose cost is very high and which are potentially dangerous for human health and life. The unified methodological approach at the international level to creation of NM accounting and control systems was developed in the IAEA late in seventies of the last century during design and implementation of the IAEA safeguards system, required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This approach was fixed, first of all, in the model agreement for application of safeguards in accordance with NPT (INFCIRC/153 corrected), and in the “Guidelines for States’ Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material”. In these documents, requirements were established for NMAC structure, including requirements for organization of material balance areas (MBAs) and for the system of records and reports. At that time in the IAEA, quantity (NM significant quantities) and timeliness (time of detecting NM diversion) criteria of achieving the IAEA inspections goals in IAEA safeguards application were accepted. In some sense these criteria were target parameters for effective functioning of NMAC system. Created in many IAEA member states for safeguards purposes, systems of accounting and control of NM solve successfully problems not only in the safeguards area, but also in other areas where information about NM quantity, quality and location is required. Recent IAEA recommendations concerning NMAC systems are presented in the guidebook “Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook” stated from the viewpoint of IAEA safeguards application

  4. Some ideas for next-generation controlled nuclear materials accountability techniques

    Current DOE regulations for Controlled Nuclear Materials (CNM) management have particular accounting problems that have become more evident as computer systems have been designed and programmed to automate the materials accounting functions. Some valuable detailed accounting information is lost with current accounting procedures and some aspects of the procedures are more complicated than need be. In February, 1988, the authors first recommended that the basic concepts of CNM accountability be reviewed, with particular emphasis on developing an Isotopic accountability system as opposed to the present Material-type accountability system. A parallel effort to review the materials measurement program would also be desirable

  5. Nuclear material control and accounting at the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Academy Sciences of Uzbekistan

    Full text: The account and the control of fissionable nuclear materials provide the reliable and timely information about quantity and distribution of nuclear materials, timely detection of the losses, non-authorized use or theft of fissionable nuclear materials. The account and the control of nuclear materials at the reactor WWR-SM INP AS RU is conducted constantly from the moment of the first reception of nuclear fuel. The quarterly account and the control of nuclear materials till 1991 were spent by a technique of the Ministry of atomic engineering and the industry of the USSR. Since 1994 all documents containing the information under the account of nuclear materials, are passed in Agency 'ASIM' of Republic of Uzbekistan, further on official channels in IAEA. For optimization of the account and the control of nuclear materials in October, 2003 the Los Alamos National laboratory has given to INP AS RU system AIMAS (the Automated System of the Account and Formation of Reports on Inventory Quantity of the Material), developed by Argonne National laboratory under the order of Department of Energy of USA with a view of improvement of the account and the control of nuclear materials (actual quantity of a cash material, fixation of chronology of transfer of a material, preparation of reports, protection of the information and system administrative functions). The system has the evident interface and is simple in operation for the user - expert in the field of the account of nuclear materials. This system accustoms responsible persons under the account and the control of nuclear materials on the reactor of WWR-SM at INP AS RU and since 2005 all documents containing the information under the account of nuclear materials and passed in Agency 'ASIM' and IAEA will be made out on system AIMAS

  6. Topical understandings of nuclear material measurement · accountancy and quality assurance

    Nuclear material measurement is an important measure to determine the amount of nuclear material of each stage such as receipt, shipment, inventory and hold-up. The material accountancy based on the material balance among the measurements is a measure to control of nuclear material. The material accountancy, from the technical aspect, can be used as promising measures for purposes from operator's level to state's level such as the nuclear safety, property control and environmental preservation other than safeguards measures only to conclude no diversion of nuclear material. This paper discusses various purposes of nuclear material measurements and clarifies the certain function such as quality assurance to be expected at each purpose. Based on the discussion, critical points for the quality assurance of each stage are studied. (author)

  7. Annual Report ABACC 2003 - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

    This Report describes the actions of the Brazil-Argentine of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), during the year of 2003. The developed work allowed to concluded that there is no event indicating that any nuclear material non-accounted for were deviated for non permitted activities by the Agreement for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy between Argentine and Brazil and by the Four Parties Agreement among these countries, the ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

  8. Some technical aspects of accounting for and control of nuclear material at nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the USSR

    The possibilities are discussed of accounting for and control of nuclear material for the WWER-type reactor at nuclear fuel cycle facilities: nuclear power plant, fuel fabrication plant, fuel reprocessing plant, and uranium enrichment plant. It is shown that, for control of nuclear material, accounting is the principal method. The possibilities and limitations of destructive and non-destructive methods for nuclear material determination at these facilities and at fast reactor facilities, as well as their role in the accounting and safeguards systems, are discussed. (author)

  9. Resolution 62/96 Regulation for the accounting and control of the nuclear materials

    The present Regulation is a complementary disposition of the ordinance number 208 of May 24 National System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and it has as objective to establish the relative norms to this System. As for the responsibilities it establish that the National Center of Nuclear Security (CNSN) it is the responsible for the execution from the relative tasks to the National System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. It establishes the regulations for the following aspects: licenses and authorizations for the transportation of the nuclear material and important components, Of the ceasing of the Accounting and Control, Of the Accounting and Control of the Nuclear Materials, Control of the Important Components, The Inspections, International Organism of the Atomic Energy Safeguards

  10. German Democratic Republic State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material

    The system of accountancy for and control of nuclear material in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) with its legal bases and components is embedded in the overall State system of protection in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As the competent State authority, the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Board of the GDR is also responsible for meeting the GDR's national and international tasks in the control of nuclear material. At enterprise level, the observance of all safety regulations for nuclear material, including the regulations for the control, is within the responsibility of managers of establishments, which are in any way concerned with the handling of nuclear material. To support managers and to function as internal control authorities, nuclear material officers have been appointed in these establishments. Design information, operating data, physical inventory of nuclear material and the respective enterprise records and reports are subject to State control by the Nuclear Material Inspectorate of the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Board. This Inspectorate keeps the central records on nuclear material, forwards reports and information to, and maintains the necessary contacts with, the IAEA. For the nuclear material in the GDR four material balance areas have been established for control purposes. To rationalize central recording and reporting, electronic data processing is increasingly made use of. In a year-long national and international control of nuclear material, the State control system has stood the test and successfully co-operates with the IAEA. (author)

  11. State system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Poland

    The paper presents the operation of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC NM) in Poland. The structure of the system, legislation, inspection activities, data maintenance and computerized system of data processing and reporting to IAEA are presented in the paper. The nuclear materials control in the field by the NDA methods performed by state inspectors is also described

  12. Manual of use and accounting of radioactive material and procedures of radiological protection for nuclear medicine

    This manual of use and accounting of material radioactive and procedures of radiological safety tries to facilitate workings of protection of material radioactive in services of medicine nuclear, during diagnosis (examinations with x-rays, or those that are made in nuclear medicine), or during the processing of diseases, mainly of the carcinomas (x-ray)

  13. Guide to realise accounting reports. Accounting nuclear materials in compliance with the EURATOM 302/2005 regulation

    In order to help nuclear operators in the implementation of the EURATOM 302/2005 application rule, the European Commission has developed the ENMAS Light software to perform an accounting of nuclear materials. This guide aims at training operators in using this software, and at guiding them when performing and exploiting their international accounting reports. After a presentation of the principles adopted by EURATOM for the accounting of nuclear materials, this document presents and describes the software user interface, how the software is installed, how to read a stock variation report (RVS), how to create and build up a physical stock situation (ESP), and how to create and perform a material assessment report (RBM)

  14. Experience in nuclear materials accountancy, including the use of computers, in the UKAEA

    The UKAEA have operated systems of nuclear materials accountancy in research and development establishments handling large quantities of material for over 20 years. In the course of that time changing requirements for nuclear materials control and increasing quantities of materials have required that accountancy systems be modified and altered to improve either the fundamental system or manpower utilization. The same accountancy principles are applied throughout the Authority but procedures at the different establishments vary according to the nature of their specific requirements; there is much in the cumulative experience of the UKAEA which could prove of value to other organizations concerned with nuclear materials accountancy or safeguards. This paper reviews the present accountancy system in the UKAEA and summarizes its advantages. Details are given of specific experience and solutions which have been found to overcome difficulties or to strengthen previous weak points. Areas discussed include the use of measurements, the establishment of measurement points (which is relevant to the designation of MBAs), the importance of regular physical stock-taking, and the benefits stemming from the existence of a separate accountancy section independent of operational management at large establishments. Some experience of a dual system of accountancy and criticality control is reported, and the present status of computerization of nuclear material accounts is summarized. Important aspects of the relationship between management systems of accountancy and safeguards' requirements are discussed briefly. (author)

  15. Test and evaluation of computerized nuclear material accounting methods. Final report

    In accordance with the definition of a Material Balance Area (MBA) as a well-defined geographical area involving an Integral operation, the building housing the BFS-1 and BFS-1 critical facilities is considered to consist of one MBA. The BFS materials are in the form of small disks clad in stainless steel and each disk with nuclear material has its own serial number. Fissile material disks in the BFS MBA can be located at three key monitoring points: BFS-1 facility, BFS-2 facility and main storage of BFS fissile materials (storage 1). When used in the BFS-1 or BFS-2 critical facilities, the fissile material disks are loaded in tubes (fuel rods) forming critical assembly cores. The following specific features of the BFS MBA should be taken into account for the purpose of computerized accounting of nuclear material: (1) very large number of nuclear material items (about 70,000 fissile material items); and (2) periodically very intensive shuffling of nuclear material items. Requirements for the computerized system are determined by basic objectives of nuclear material accounting: (1) providing accurate information on the identity and location of all items in the BFS material balance area; (2) providing accurate information on location and identity of tamper-indicating devices; (3) tracking nuclear material inventories; (4) issuing periodic reports; (5) assisting with the detection of material gains or losses; (6) providing a history of nuclear material transactions; (7) preventing unauthorized access to the system and data falsification. In August 1995, the prototype computerized accounting system was installed on the BFS facility for trial operation. Information on two nuclear material types was entered into the data base: weapon-grade plutonium metal and 36% enriched uranium dioxide. The total number of the weapon-grade plutonium disks is 12,690 and the total number of the uranium dioxide disks is 1,700

  16. Systematic Approach to Training and Professional Development Specialists of Physical Protection, Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in Ukraine

    Conclusion: 1. Ukraine has created the State system for professional training, retraining and professional development of specialists in physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials. 2. Ukraine has founded profession physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials

  17. State system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials and Additional Protocol in the Slovak Republic

    Nuclear materials under jurisdiction of the Slovak Republic are located in five nuclear facilities and in location outside facilities (LOFs) - nuclear materials for non-nuclear purposes. Nuclear Regulatory authority has been authorised to account for and control of nuclear materials. These activities are performed in accordance with legal regulations and international commitments of the Slovak Republic. (author)

  18. Decree 2805 by means of which the National Accounting and Control of Basic Nuclear Materials and Special Fusionable Materials System, is established

    This Decree has for object to establish a National Accounting and Control of Basic Nuclear Materials and Special Fusionable Materials System, under the supervision of the National Council for the Nuclear Industry Development. Its aims are to account nuclear materials, to control nuclear activities, to preserve and control nuclear information, to keep technical relationship with specialized organizations, and to garant nuclear safeguards

  19. Annual Report 2007 - ABACC - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

    This document reports activities during the year 2007 related to: technical activities as application of safeguards; management of the Quadripartite Agreement and the SCCC - Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; training; technical cooperation; outlook for 2008 and; institutional, administrative and financial activities; technical glossary; list of brazilian facilities; list of argentine facilities and a list of institution of nuclear area

  20. Annual report - ABACC (accounting and nuclear materials control Brazil-Argentina agency) - 1998

    The annual activities report of 1998 of accounting and nuclear materials control Brazil-Argentina agency introduces the next main topics: institutional activities - safeguards agreements implementation and administration; technical activities - planning and evaluation, operation, technical support, information accounting and treatment, technical cooperation, technical capacity invigoration; administrative and financial activities

  1. Proceedings of the Tripartite Seminar on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at Radiochemical Plants

    The problems of creation and operation of nuclear materials (NM) control and accounting systems and their components at radiochemical plants were discussed in seminar during November 2-6 of 1998. There were 63 Russian and 25 foreign participants in seminar. The seminar programme includes following sessions and articles: the aspects of State NM control and accountancy; NM control and accounting in radiochemical plants and at separate stages of reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and irradiated fuel elements of commercial reactors; NM control and accountancy in storage facilities of radiochemical plants; NM control and accounting computerization, material balance assessment, preparation of reports; qualitative and quantitative measurements in NM control and accounting at radiochemical plants destructive analysis techniques

  2. The first stage of BFS integrated system for nuclear materials control and accounting. Final report

    The BFS computerized accounting system is a network-based one. It runs in a client/server mode. The equipment used in the system includes a computer network consisting of: One server computer system, including peripheral hardware and three client computer systems. The server is located near the control room of the BFS-2 facility outside of the 'stone sack' to ensure access during operation of the critical assemblies. Two of the client computer systems are located near the assembly tables of the BFS-1 and BFS-2 facilities while the third one being the Fissile Material Storage. This final report details the following topics: Computerized nuclear material accounting methods; The portal monitoring system; Test and evaluation of item control technology; Test and evaluation of radiation based nuclear material measurement equipment; and The integrated demonstration of nuclear material control and accounting methods

  3. The first stage of BFS integrated system for nuclear materials control and accounting. Final report

    NONE

    1996-09-01

    The BFS computerized accounting system is a network-based one. It runs in a client/server mode. The equipment used in the system includes a computer network consisting of: One server computer system, including peripheral hardware and three client computer systems. The server is located near the control room of the BFS-2 facility outside of the `stone sack` to ensure access during operation of the critical assemblies. Two of the client computer systems are located near the assembly tables of the BFS-1 and BFS-2 facilities while the third one being the Fissile Material Storage. This final report details the following topics: Computerized nuclear material accounting methods; The portal monitoring system; Test and evaluation of item control technology; Test and evaluation of radiation based nuclear material measurement equipment; and The integrated demonstration of nuclear material control and accounting methods.

  4. U.S. N.R.C. special safeguards study on nuclear material control and accounting

    In Feb. 1975, NRC directed that an effort be made to determine a safeguards program for Pu recycle. This paper summarizes results of individual contractor evaluations of upgrading material control and accounting concepts as applied to strategically important special nuclear material and describes staff interpretations of these results as applied to future high-throughput fuel-cycle facilities. Real-time material control, design for physical inventory, Pu isotopics control and calorimetry, and material control and accounting for highly enriched uranium fuel materials were the concepts studied. 1 table, 15 references

  5. Development of a computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system for a fuel reprocessing plant

    A computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system (CNMCAS) for a fuel reprocessing plant is being developed by Allied-General Nuclear Services at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant. Development work includes on-line demonstration of near real-time measurement, measurement control, accounting, and processing monitoring/process surveillance activities during test process runs using natural uranium. A technique for estimating in-process inventory is also being developed. This paper describes development work performed and planned, plus significant design features required to integrate CNMCAS into an advanced safeguards system

  6. 10 CFR 74.33 - Nuclear material control and accounting for uranium enrichment facilities authorized to produce...

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for uranium enrichment facilities authorized to produce special nuclear material of low strategic significance. 74.33 Section 74.33 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF...

  7. Decree No. 208 On National Accounting and Control System of the Nuclear Materials

    The present Decree establishes the arrangements to formalize the National Accounting and Control System of the Nuclear Materials, the which one has the objectives of contributing to an efficient and economic management of the nuclear materials in the national territory; to establish the arrangements directed to detect any employment, lost or unauthorized movement of the nuclear material; and to establish the measures of necessary control to give fulfillment to the international commitments assumed by the Cuban State in relationship to the nuclear materials, important components, or both. It also establishes the following responsibilities: The Ministry of Science Technology and Environment is the Organism of the Central Administration of the State responsible for the supervision and control of the dispositions and it delegates in the National Center of Nuclear Security the execution of the functions assigned to this Ministry

  8. Time-series-analysis techniques applied to nuclear-material accounting

    This document is designed to introduce the reader to the applications of Time Series Analysis techniques to Nuclear Material Accountability data. Time series analysis techniques are designed to extract information from a collection of random variables ordered by time by seeking to identify any trends, patterns, or other structure in the series. Since nuclear material accountability data is a time series, one can extract more information using time series analysis techniques than by using other statistical techniques. Specifically, the objective of this document is to examine the applicability of time series analysis techniques to enhance loss detection of special nuclear materials. An introductory section examines the current industry approach which utilizes inventory differences. The error structure of inventory differences is presented. Time series analysis techniques discussed include the Shewhart Control Chart, the Cumulative Summation of Inventory Differences Statistics (CUSUM) and the Kalman Filter and Linear Smoother

  9. Use of process monitoring data for enhancement of nuclear material control and accounting

    A study was performed for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to determine whether existing process monitoring data recorded by licensees can be used in conjunction with present material accounting systems to increase the effectiveness of safeguarding special nuclear materials. Two licensed fuel fabrication facilities were examined. The results show that significant improvements are obtainable in timeliness of loss detection, mass sensitivity for loss detection, and localization of detected loss to specific materials by the utilization of process monitoring data. The cost for implementation to obtain these improvements is nominal because the measurements already exist. 2 refs

  10. Regional training course on state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material

    The publication is an outline of the subjects that are included in a regional training course organized in Buenos Aires (Argentina) by the IAEA with the cooperation of the Argentine Government and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) from September 24 to October 5, 2001

  11. A pilot workshop of nuclear material accounting and control of facilities

    With collaboration among the US Department of Energy, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), we have developed a Pilot Workshop of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at Facilities and offered on May 19-June 1, 2004 in Beijing, China. The purpose of the workshop is to provide instruction in facility-level safeguards and security to participants from China and other invited countries a variation on the traditional State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) by focusing on the nuclear material control and accounting (MC and A) measures as applied at the facility level. Moreover, the shift in emphasis from the state system of accounting and control to the facility level offers an opportunity to address insider and terrorist threats. In this manner, the traditional SSAC course would be merged with issues more closely associated with nuclear security and terrorism prevention. All instruction and practical exercises were in English with sequential interpretation into Chinese. The workshop materials were in both English and Chinese. In addition to course lectures and invited guest lectures, all participants visited to a nuclear fuel fabrication plant used as a model for an exercise in designing the safeguards system for a bulk facility. This paper reports the result and experience of the workshop and discusses the course evaluation from participants.

  12. Status of national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Turkey

    Regulating the nuclear activities in Turkey is at the responsibility of Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEA). Under the TAEA Act, the Authority is responsible for national security and protection of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. After signing the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT, a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) has been established. This paper covers national safeguards activities and implementation of SSAC and activities for upgrading of national system. These activities are the part of the IAEA programme on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and on combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources. (author)

  13. Nuclear material control and accounting system evaluation in uranium conversion operations

    The Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems in uranium conversion operations are described. The conversion plant, uses ammonium diuranate (ADU), as starting material for the production of uranium hexafluoride. A combination of accountability and verification measurement is used to verify physical inventory quantities. Two types of inspection are used to minimize the measurements uncertainty of the Material Unaccounted For (MUF) : Attribute inspection and Variation inspection. The mass balance equation is the base of an evaluation of a Material Balance Area (MBA). Statistical inference is employed to facilitate rapid inventory taking and enhance material control of Safeguards. The calculation of one sampling plan for a MBA and the methodology of inspection evaluation are also described. We have two kinds of errors : no detection and false delation. (author)

  14. A real-time system of accounting and control of nuclear materials and radioactive sources

    The present study describes a real-time system of accounting and control of nuclear materials [NMs] and radioactive source [RSs] in a nuclear facility operating as a research and development [R and D] laboratory. The system's approach is based on the recording, accounting and verification of every item containing such materials during any process, or that moves in/or/out the facility at specific key measurement points [KMP]. The system is designed to operate in coordination with the physical protection system [PPS] of the facility in order to allow cross-checking of the inventory changes of NMs and RSs, hence; enhancing the control and PP of Materials and the facility itself. The basic verification measure in this study is the Real-time Accountancy of NMs and RSs. This implies the application of real-time accounting of materials and performing -in the same time- measurements to verify qualitatively or quantitatively the amounts of such materials. The employed measuring system for the verification of NMs and RSs is a classical γ-ray spectrometer. Its basic components are; NaI (Tl) Scintillation Detector and associated electronics and; a suitable computer (PC - Pentium III, or compatible). A computer program is developed for constructing the real-time accounting and control system that can deal with information concerning NMs and RSs as well. This is done by means of a suitable software technique (Oracle). The program uses a Database Management System [DBMS] that enables it to store, retrieve or modify data in the DB as required by the operator. The DB is created for chronological recording; and retrieving of all transactions involving the material inventory, movements and inventory changes at any time. The program allows to access data from the DB concerning the total inventory of materials in the facility or any specified material at any specified time or period of time. The system is capable of controlling the inventory and the flow of materials in the facility

  15. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is an on-line accountability system used by Rocky Flats Plant to provide accountability control of its nuclear material inventory. The system is also used to monitor and evaluate the use of the nuclear material inventory against programmatic objectives for materials management. The SAN system utilizes two Harris 800 Computers as central processing units. Enhancement plans are currently being formulated to provide automated data collection from process operations on the shop floor and from non-destructive analysis safeguards instrumentation. SAN, discussed in this paper, is an excellent system for basic accountability control of nuclear materials inventories and is a quite useful tool in evaluating the efficient use of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant

  16. The Lithuanian state system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials

    In March of 1990 Lithuania declared its independence. However, Ignalina nuclear power plant with two operating units, among the most powerful ones in the world, remained factually in the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union. In August 1991 after the formal collapse of the Soviet Union the Ignalina NPP located in the north east corner of Lithuania finally came under the authority of the Republic of Lithuania. The same year, 1991, on the 18th of October the Government of the Republic of Lithuania made a resolution to establish the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) from the 1st of November. The regulatory safety control of the Ignalina NPP was assigned to it. This year it will be the 10th anniversary of VATESI. Lithuania became a party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the 23rd of September 1991. One year later, on the 15th of October 1992, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed. Establishment of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) was entrusted to VATESI. It was designated a Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) Authority. The full competence of VATESI is set in the Law on Nuclear Energy. Further, Government's resolution on the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials has obliged VATESI to represent the Republic of Lithuania and co-operate with the IAEA and other states' respective institutions in the nuclear material accounting and control area. In collaboration between the IAEA and VATESI Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement have been documented. The General Part entered into force on the 8th of December 1997. A separate Attachment for the Ignalina NPP entered into force on the 8th of July 1999.The above mentioned international and national legal documents set the legal

  17. Los Alamos MAWST software layered on Westinghouse Savannah River Company's nuclear materials accountability system

    The Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group's Materials Accounting With Sequential Testing (MAWST) computer program was developed to fulfill DOE Order 5633.3B requiring that inventory-difference control limits be based on variance propagation or any other statistically valid technique. Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) developed a generic computerized accountability system, NucMAS, to satisfy accounting and reporting requirements for material balance areas. NucMAS maintains the calculation methods and the measurement information required to compute nuclear material transactions in elemental and isotopic masses by material type code. The Safeguards Systems Group designed and implemented to WSRC's specifications a software interface application, called NucMASloe. It is a layered product for NucMAS that automatically formats a NucMAS data set to a format compatible with MAWST and runs MAWST. This paper traces the development of NucMASloe from the Software Requirements through the testing and demonstration stages. The general design constraints are described as well as the difficulties encountered on interfacing an external software product (MAWST) with an existing classical accounting structure (NucMAS). The lessons learned from this effort, the design, and some of the software are directly applicable to the Local Area Network Material Accountability System (LANMAS) being sponsored by DOE

  18. Production of an English/Russian glossary of terminology for nuclear materials control and accounting

    The program plans for Former Soviet Union National Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting (MC and A) Systems Enhancements call for the development of an English/Russian Glossary of MC and A terminology. This glossary was envisioned as an outgrowth of the many interactions, training sessions, and other talking and writing exercises that would transpire in the course of carrying out these programs. This report summarizes the status of the production of this glossary, the most recent copy of which is attached to this report. The glossary contains over 950 terms and acronyms associated with nuclear material control and accounting for safeguards and nonproliferation. This document is organized as follows: English/Russian glossary of terms and acronyms; Russian/English glossary of terms and acronyms; English/Russian glossary of acronyms; and Russian/English glossary of acronyms

  19. Application of near real time accountancy to nuclear material balance data

    The application of near real time accountancy to nuclear material balance data can be performed effectively only with the help of computerised nuclear material accounting and information systems. Two computer programmes are introduced: DIDI, a programme for computing the MUF series and the measurement model of a reprocessing plant which is assumed to be a one-block model from data resulting from the routine operation of the facility, and PROSA, a programme for statistical analysis of NRTA data, which evaluates the MUF series on the basis of the measurement model. After the presentation of the two computer programmes two examples with realistic balance data will demonstrate the application of NRTA measures. Furthermore, some new remarks on the precision of Monte-Carlo simulations are mentioned which provide a substantial better estimation. (orig.)

  20. Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards: The past, the present, the future

    Markin, J.T.; Augustson, R.H.; Eccleston, G.W.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear materials accountancy was introduced as a primary safeguards measure in international safeguards from the inception of the EURATOM safeguards directorate in 1959 and IAEA safeguards in 1961 with the issuance of INFCIRC 26. As measurement technology evolved and safeguarded facilities increased in both number and size, measurement methodology requirements increased as reflected in INFCIRC 66 (Rev 2.) in 1968 and later in INFCIRC 153 in 1972. Early measurements relied heavily on chemical analysis, but in the 1960s it evolved more and more toward nondestructive assay. Future nuclear materials accountancy systems will increase in complexity, driven by larger and more complex facilities; more stringent health, safety, and environmental considerations; and unattended automation in facility operations. 15 refs.

  1. Production of an English/Russian glossary of terminology for nuclear materials control and accounting

    Schachowskoj, S.; Smith, H.A. Jr.

    1995-05-01

    The program plans for Former Soviet Union National Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting (MC and A) Systems Enhancements call for the development of an English/Russian Glossary of MC and A terminology. This glossary was envisioned as an outgrowth of the many interactions, training sessions, and other talking and writing exercises that would transpire in the course of carrying out these programs. This report summarizes the status of the production of this glossary, the most recent copy of which is attached to this report. The glossary contains over 950 terms and acronyms associated with nuclear material control and accounting for safeguards and nonproliferation. This document is organized as follows: English/Russian glossary of terms and acronyms; Russian/English glossary of terms and acronyms; English/Russian glossary of acronyms; and Russian/English glossary of acronyms.

  2. Development of an integrated system for nuclear material accountancy and control at JAERI

    This paper describes the design concept and the current status of an integrated system for nuclear material accountancy and control, which is under development at JAERI. We, at JAERI, have decided to update the current system for material accountancy and control and to develop the integrated new system with a consolidated data base in order to augment transparency, credibility and promptness of the system, to materialize a prudent control of obligations required by bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, and to give information for the physical protection, safely handling, property control and cost-effective use of nuclear material and for public relations. The system is composed of two work-stations operated by UNIX, one for implementation and the other for development, and many terminals located at the headquarters, administrative offices, and research facilities and laboratories. It is connected with a mainframe computer. There are many files on the data base to record inventory changes, book and physical inventories, and statistics on material balances. These files are controlled by a commercial data base management system which enables us to make access to data on the files with a simple query language, spread sheet type software or an application program. (author)

  3. A role for distributed processing in advanced nuclear materials control and accountability systems

    Networking and distributed processing hardware and software have the potential of greatly enhancing nuclear materials control and account-ability (MCandA) systems, both from safeguards and process operations perspectives while allowing timely integrated safeguards activities and enhanced computer security at reasonable cost. A hierarchical distributed system is proposed consisting of groups of terminals and instruments in plant production and support areas connected to microprocessors that are connected to either larger microprocessors or minicomputers. The structuring and development of a limited distributed MCandA prototype system, including human engineering concepts, are described. Implications of integrated safeguards and computer security concepts to the distributed system design are discussed

  4. Advanced international training course on state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the Advanced International Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material held April 27 through May 12, 1981 at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards. Major emphasis for the 1981 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at both the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, Richland, Washington

  5. Advanced international training course on state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials

    1981-10-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the Advanced International Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material held April 27 through May 12, 1981 at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards. Major emphasis for the 1981 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at both the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, Richland, Washington.

  6. Potentiality of an accounting system for nuclear materials in the PNC plutonium fuel facilities

    The accounting system based on data filing and inquiry processing by the use of an optical mark reader (OMR) has been developed and operated satisfactorily for criticality control and accountancy of nuclear materials in the plutonium facilities of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC). The OMR system has merits, especially compared with an old chit and punch-card system, such as low cost, abundance of the data included on a single sheet, universality of use for all kinds of material transfers, ease of data correction, and a large capacity. The OMR system is applied to the material transfer and also for physical inventory taking. This system, together with the use of an accurate automatic balance equipped at each glove box, which is generally designated as an accounting unit for the criticality control, generated a MUF of 0.43% for a fuel fabrication campaign of 119 assemblies for a fast reactor, which can be decreased further. In relation to the recent safeguarding situation and also to fitting in with an automatic fuel fabrication process, however, a further development of the present system will be necessary in the near future. This future system is discussed with reference to criticism of the current accountancy system by Rosenbaum and others, and its possible framework with the emphasis on the weighing and reading of numbered items is suggested. (author)

  7. Development of an integrated system for nuclear material accountancy and control at JAERI

    The paper describes the design concept and the current status of an integrated system for nuclear material accountancy and control which is under development at Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI). JAERI has decided to update the current system for material accountancy and control and to develop the integrated new system with a consolidated database in order to augment transparency, credibility, promptness and flexibility of the system in accordance with the strengthening and streamlining of IAEA safeguards, to realize prudent control of obligations required by bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements, and to provide information on the physical protection, safe handling, property control and cost effective use of nuclear material, also for public relations. The system is composed of two workstations using the UNIX operating system - one for implementation and the other for development purposes - and many terminals, located at the headquarters, administrative offices, and research facilities and laboratories. The system is also connected with a mainframe computer. There are many files on the database to record inventory changes, book and physical inventories, and statistics on material balances. These files are controlled by a commercially available database management system which permits access to data on the files with a simple query language, spread sheet type software or application programs. (author). 1 fig

  8. The Lithuanian state system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials

    In March of 1990 Lithuania declared its independence and in 1991 Ignalina nuclear power plant with two operating units, among the most powerful ones in the world, finally came under the authority of the Republic of Lithuania. The same year, 1991, on the 23rd of September, Lithuania signed the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. One week later, on the 1st of November, the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) was established. The regulatory control of Ignalina NPP was assigned to it. This year it will be the 10th anniversary of VATESI. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement, Nuclear energy law and Government's resolution on the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials set the legal basis for the Lithuanian SSAC. VATESI has been designated a nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) Authority. Within VATESI Nuclear Materials Control Department is responsible for the SSAC. The need for the computer based Information System was obvious from the first steps of the introduction of the SSAC in Lithuania. This, one of the functional elements of the SSAC, was developed with the help of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). In the beginning almost all nuclear material subject to safeguards was located in Ignalina NPP. Swedish company AMC Konsult AB developed and provided the software for the recording and processing of information on nuclear material, provided by the facility operator, and also for preparing of reports to the IAEA. The same company took care of the accounting and reporting software for the spent nuclear fuel dry storage at the facility level and at the same time updated the state program. Reports are produced in the labelled format and every month sent to Vienna in the form of floppy

  9. Using the general principles of quality assessment of the facilities while examining the nuclear materials accounting and control system at enterprises

    The issue of control and regulation in the field of adequate accounting and control of nuclear material is discussed. Ways of improving the nuclear materials accounting and control system at nuclear facilities in the Russian Federation are presented

  10. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is a computerized on-line accountability system for the safeguards accountability control of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant. SAN is a dedicated accountability system utilizing source documents filled out on the shop floor as its base. The system incorporates double entry accounting and is developed around the Material Balance Area (MBA) concept. MBA custodians enter transaction information from source documents prepared by personnel in the process areas directly into the SAN system. This provides a somewhat near-real time perpetual inventory system which has limited interaction with MBA custodians. MBA custodians are permitted to inquire into the system and status items on inventory. They are also responsible for the accuracy of the accountability information used as input to the system for their MBA. Monthly audits by the Nuclear Materials Control group assure the timeliness and accuracy of SAN accountability information

  11. Current status of the system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in the Philippines

    as environmental sampling to our isotope laboratories. Technical assistance in the establishment of computerized system of nuclear materials accounting and control was solicited from the IAEA in 1985. The computer utilized the VAX11/750. At present, the data were in text file, which we hope to send by electronic mail. (author)

  12. Efforts in strengthening accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Russia

    Full text: Recent state orders, directives, regulations are reviewed as well as practical results of the state system for nuclear material accountancy and control (NMAC) development in the Russian Federation are addressed. Based on the Federal Laws and regulations responsibilities of different agencies related to the NMAC are discussed in view of transforming the existing nuclear material accountancy and control systems to a new system at the federal level. Governmental Orders of 10 July 1998 No.746 and of 15 December 2000 No. 962 assigned Minatom of Russia as the agency in charge of establishing and operating the NMAC at the federal level while Gosatomnadzor of Russia as the agency responsible for the enforcement of the MC and A regulation and for the NMAC oversight functions. Provisions of major regulatory documents that have been or are currently being developed defining requirements, procedures, conditions and agencies' responsibilities in the area of NM control and accounting are addressed. Trends in development of the domestic safeguards system are reported in light of strengthening regulation, inspection infrastructure and licensing of NM use. Incorporation of GAN and the agencies in charge of managing nuclear installations is discussed. Foreign support to the NMAC development in Russia is also reviewed. (author)

  13. Groundwater and vadose Zone Integration Project Nuclear Material Mass Flow and Accountability on the Hanford Site

    The purpose of this report is to provide a discussion of the accountable inventory of Hanford Site nuclear material (NM) over the operating period. This report does not provide judgments on impacts to the Hanford Site environs by the reported waste streams or inventory. The focus of this report is on the processes, facilities, and process streams that constituted the flow primarily of plutonium and uranium through the Hanford Site. The material balance reports (MBRS) are the basis of the NM accountable inventory maintained by each of the various contractors used by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors to operate the Hanford Site. The inventory was tracked in terms of a starting inventory, receipts, transfers, and ending inventory. The various components of the inventory are discussed as well as the uncertainty in the measurement values used to establish plant inventory and material transfers. The accountable NM inventory does not report all the NM on the Hanford Site and this difference is discussed relative to some representative nuclides. The composition and location of the current accountable inventory are provided, as well as the latest approved set (2000) of flow diagrams of the proposed disposition of the excess accountable NM inventory listed on the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) web page

  14. Case study on nuclear material accounting and control violations and regulatory response. Annex III

    In June 2000, during records reconciliation and verification of the spent fuel pool inventory, the licensee for a nuclear power plant identified that two full-length irradiated fuel rods, which had been separated from their parent assemblies and placed in a container for individual rods in the spent fuel pool, were not in the location specified in the nuclear material accounting records. The licensee conducted an extensive investigation, which concluded that the missing fuel rods had very likely been transported to a licensed low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. The State’s SRA conducted an inspection that reviewed the results of the licensee’s investigation and concurred with the licensee’s conclusions regarding the location of the two rods. The licensee was cited for failure to control and account for the two rod segments, and was issued a Severity Level II violation with a monetary penalty

  15. Regional training course on state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    The 1986 Regional SSAC Course was designed to assist IAEA Member States from the Far East, South East Asia and the Pacific Region which have a small but developing nuclear program to organize their national systems of nuclear material accounting and control along sound lines and to make them adaptable and responsive to future developments. The course emphasized the application of State Systems of Accounting and Control to research reactors and related facilities, with the HIFAR Materials Testing Reactor and related facilities forming the basis for the model reference facilities used. The lectures covered international safeguards and the role of SSAC; the setting up of a SSAC with emphasis on the facility level; the organization of the State System in Australia; physical protection; measurement of nuclear material; the interaction of the IAEA and the SSAC; the establishment of a national system; and the experiences of various national authorities. Each session is preceded by an overview and an outline of its objectives and some sessions include exercises. The course was intended to be the most elementary of all the SSAC courses offered to date

  16. Specialists training on nuclear materials control, accounting and physical protection in the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute

    Educational program to train specialists on non-proliferation problems and nuclear materials control, accounting and physical protection systems (NMCA and PP) at the Science Master's level was developed and is being realized in Moscow Sate Institute of Engineering and Physics at the support of the USA Ministry of Energy. The program is intended to train students who already got the Bachelor's degree on physical and technical subjects. The United methodological base of the program comprises lecture courses, practice in laboratories and computer programs. The educational program contains the following parts for training the students. 1) Deep scientific and technical knowledge. 2) System approach to designing and analysis of the NMCA and PP systems. 3) Knowledge of scientific and technical principles, means, devices and procedures used in the NMCA and PP systems. 4) Judicial, international and economical aspects of nuclear materials management. 5) Application of computer and information technologies for nuclear materials control and accounting. 6) Extensive practice in laboratories, using the most up-to-date equipment and devices used in the worldwide practice of NM control

  17. Design and Implementation of a Computerized Integrated Nuclear Material Accounting System for Egypt

    As a vital requirement and to facilitate secure information and data handling, a computerized Integrated nuclear material Accounting System on the State level (IASS) is designed and implemented. The main objective of the system is to maintain, retrieve and provide complete information for the Nuclear Material (NM) data under control in Egypt in an accurate and efficient way. The data include NM weights, inventory, inventory changes, locations, and material description and all relevant operating and accounting records and reports. Accounting records and reports are generated by the system with the advantages of time-effort-saving, human error avoidance, NM balance matching among different facilities and Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) and operator data evaluation. The integration of multi-origin information is very important in the sense that it verifies data matching and allows automatic reconciliation. The system is controlled by a main computer (server) with multi-terminals. A system security is achieved allowing authorized access not only to the system, but to specific data as well. The whole network is fully monitored by an interrogated surveillance system. Ongoing work is also considered and being implemented to improve system security through data encryption. (author)

  18. Nuclear safeguards and security: Analytical evaluation of material control and accountability systems

    Full text: A nuclear Material Control and Accountability System Effectiveness Tool (MSET) has been developed in the United States for use in evaluating Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) systems in nuclear facilities. The project was commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation to potentially evaluate MC and A in Russian facilities. MSET was developed by U.S. personnel with experience spanning more than six decades in both the U.S. and international nuclear programs and with experience in probabilistic risk assessment in the nuclear power industry. MSET contains five major components: 1. A functional model that shows how to design, build, implement, and operate a robust nuclear material control and accountability system. The model defines 151 fundamental elements that are needed for a comprehensive MC and A system. An extensive description, along with performance metrics and standards, was developed for each fundamental element. 2. A fault tree of the operating MC and A system that adapts probabilistic risk assessment methodology to analyze system effectiveness and give a relative risk of failure assessment of the system. 3. A questionnaire that is used to develop documentation on the facility's current MC and A system. It provides data to rate the quality of the system and the level of performance of each basic MC and A task that is performed throughout the material balance area. 4. A formal process of applying expert judgement to convert the facility MC and A data into numeric values representing the performance level of each basic event for use in the fault tree risk assessment calculations. 5. A software system that performs the fault tree risk assessment calculations and produces risk importance factor reports on the facility's MC and A system. The software is widely used in the aerospace, chemical, and nuclear power industries. MSET was peer reviewed in 2007 and

  19. Integrated material accountancy system

    In this paper we present the system that we are actually using for Nuclear Material Accounting and Manufacturing Management in our UO2 Fuel Fabrication Plant located at Juzbado, Salamanca, Spain. The system is based mainly on a real time data base which gather data for all the operations performed in our factory from UO2 powder reception to fuel assemblies shipment to the customers. The accountancy is just an important part of the whole integrated system covering all the aspects related to manufacturing: planning, traceability, Q.C. analysis, production control and accounting data

  20. Computerization of nuclear material accounting and control at storage facilities of RT-1 plant, PA Mayak

    Computerized system for nuclear material (NM) accounting and control at RT-1 plant is being created on the basis of advanced engineering and programming tools, which give a possibility to ensure prompt access to the information required, to unify the accounting and report documentation, make statistical processing of the data, and trace the NM transfers in the chain of its storage at facilities of RT-1 plant. Currently, the accounting is performed in parallel, both by the old methods and with computerized system. The following functions are performed by the system at the current stage: input of data on the end product's (plutonium dioxide) quantitative and qualitative composition; data input on the localization of containers with finished products at storage facilities of the plant and the product's temporary characteristics; selective verification of the data on containers and batches, according to the criteria prespecified by the user; data protection against unauthorized access; data archiving; report documents formation and providing

  1. Basic concepts of materials accounting

    The importance of accounting for nuclear materials to the efficient, safe, and economical operation of nuclear facilities is introduced, and the following topics are covered: material balance equation; item control areas; material balance uncertainty; decision procedures for materials accounting; conventional and near-real-time accounting; regulatory requirements of the US Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and a summary related to the development of a materials accounting system to implement the basic concepts described. The summary includes a section on each of the following: problem definition, system objectives, and system design

  2. Training and Professional Development of Specialists in Nuclear Materials Physical Protection, Accounting and Control in Ukraine

    In the core of the national policy of Ukraine governing physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive wastes and other sources of ionizing radiation lie the recognition that activity carried out by individuals in area of regulation and implementation of physical protection measures is a profession in the domain of nuclear energy use and radiation safety, as well as the need to create a state system for professional training, retraining and skill improvement of physical protection personnel.1. The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry as a central executive authority responsible for physical protection of nuclear installations, nuclear material, radioactive wastes and other sources of ionizing radiation at facilities in the Ministry’s jurisdiction sees professional training and development of physical protection specialists as a key factor in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Based on the understanding that a specialist is an individual having a specialty, highly qualified, profoundly knowledgeable in a certain scientific or technical discipline, and demonstrating skill in both the basics and in-depth aspects of their profession, the Ministry listed goals and responsibilities of specialists and requirements to their knowledge, skill, and professional experience in 2008. Also in 2009, jointly with the concerned authorities the Ministry developed requirements to the physical protection department and personnel. Accordingly, the main task is to provide the fuel and energy sector of Ukraine with experts and high-level professionals, those who are experts in their field, are highly qualified and profoundly knowledgeable in the field of physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials

  3. Practical experience with nuclear material control and accountancy in a large reprocessing plant

    This paper describes the system implemented in UP3 and provides the results of the 9-year operation experience. It will be insisted on the necessity to perform measurements as accurately as possible in order to have an effective system. The Nuclear Material Control and Accountancy implemented at La Hague has proven to be an effective and efficient tool for the management of the facility. In particular it has been shown the necessity to determine as accurately as possible every transfer of nuclear material (NM) out or into the facility of area of the facility, whatever is considered, in order to establish the best possible balance of NM. A computerized system permits accurate and timely data collection, following up of throughputs and inventories, establishment of reports and records requested by national and international authorities

  4. Efforts in strengthening accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Russia

    Recent state orders, directives, regulations are reviewed as well as practical results of the state system for nuclear material accountancy and control (NMAC) development in the Russian Federation are addressed. Based on the Federal Laws and regulations responsibilities of different agencies related to the NMAC are discussed in view of transforming the existing nuclear material accountancy and control systems to a new system at the federal level. Governmental Orders of 10 July 1998 No.746 and of 15 December 2000 No. 962 assigned Minatom of Russia as the agency in charge of establishing and operating the NMAC at the federal level while Gosatomnadzor of Russia as the agency responsible for the enforcement of the MC and A regulation and for the NMAC oversight functions. Provisions of major regulatory documents that have been or are currently being developed defining requirements, procedures, conditions and agencies' responsibilities in the area of NM control and accounting are addressed. Trends in development of the domestic safeguards system are reported in light of strengthening regulation, inspection infrastructure and licensing of NM use. (author)

  5. International State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material training cources

    The problem of assisting IAEA member-states in the development of national state systems of accountancy and control of nuclear material (SSAC) is discussed. Training cources for SSAC personnel were organized under IAEA. The first training course took place in Vienna in November, 1976. Presently the cources are attended by 318 specialists from 53 member-states. This fact proves the existence of a broad and active interest to the problems pertaining to SSAC and is a foundation for the planning of future courses in this field

  6. The Russian Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program: Analysis and prospect

    This paper summarizes an analysis of the US-Russian Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) Program, developed on the basis of extensive discussions with US laboratory participants as well as personal experience. Results of the discussions have been organized into three main areas: Technical/MPC and A Progress; Programmatic and Administrative Issues; and Professional Aspects. Implications for MPC and A effectiveness, for MPC and A sustainability, and for future relations and collaboration are derived. Suggested next steps are given

  7. Transparency, openness and cooperation with the State System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

    During its meeting in November 1993, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) concentrated on the re-examination of safeguards implementation. This re-examination took note of both the discussion at the June 1993 Board of Governors meeting on SAGSI's April 1993 Report to the Director General and the resolution at the General Conference requesting the director general to continue and intensify his efforts to achieve a more effective and cost-efficient safeguards system. This paper focuses on relevant aspects of transparency in relation to the State System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) and to Operators. Some views expressed by SAGSI are included

  8. Computer-based accountability system (Phase I) for special nuclear materials at Argonne-West

    An automated accountability system for special nuclear materials (SNM) is under development at Argonne National Laboratory-West. Phase I of the development effort has established the following basic features of the system: a unique file organization allows rapid updating or retrieval of the status of various SNM, based on batch numbers, storage location, serial number, or other attributes. Access to the program is controlled by an interactive user interface that can be easily understood by operators who have had no prior background in electronic data processing. Extensive use of structured programming techniques make the software package easy to understand and to modify for specific applications. All routines are written in FORTRAN

  9. Detecting anomalous nuclear materials accounting transactions: Applying machine learning to plutonium processing facilities

    Nuclear materials accountancy is the only safeguards measure that provides direct evidence of the status of nuclear materials. Of the six categories that gives rise to inventory differences, the technical capability is now in place to implement the technical innovations necessary to reduce the human error categories. There are really three main approaches to detecting anomalies in materials control and accountability (MC ampersand A) data: (1) Statistical: numeric methods such as the Page's Test, CUSUM, CUMUF, SITMUF, etc., can detect anomalies in metric (numeric) data. (2) Expert systems: Human expert's rules can be encoded into software systems such as ART, KEE, or Prolog. (3) Machine learning: Training data, such as historical MC ampersand A records, can be fed to a classifier program or neutral net or other machine learning algorithm. The Wisdom ampersand Sense (W ampersand S) software is a combination of approaches 2 and 3. The W ampersand S program includes full features for adding administrative rules and expert judgment rules to the rule base. if desired, the software can enforce consistency among all rules in the rule base

  10. Game theory and decision support system for use in security reviews of nuclear material tracking and accountancy systems

    Tracking and accountancy arrangements help guarantee the security of nuclear materials. Verifications consisting of comparisons between physical identifications or measurements on one hand and material accountancy on the other hand are carried out, in order to detect any unexpected absence of nuclear material. This paper studies two different aspects of the problem of the efficiency of these verifications. First, a decision support system for use in security reviews of nuclear material accountancy systems is presented. Its purpose is firstly to represent a facility and the associated verifications, tracking and accountancy operations and secondly, to calculate the detection delay in the case of an absence of nuclear material. Next, in order to minimize the detection delay for a limited, fixed number of physical identifications, a two-person, zero-sum game with incomplete information is described. The first results obtained from this analysis indicate shorter detection times than those given by games with complete information

  11. Evolution of US-Russian cooperation in nuclear material protection, control, and accounting

    In a historic turn of events, the early 1990's marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. In 1991, the Soviet Threat Reduction Act was passed by the US Congress. This legislative measure gave birth to discussions between the two nuclear powers on the safe, secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation issues. Cooperation in nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) between the US and Russia was a small part of this original effort. Also, due to the enormous changes in Russian society, the protection systems which had been historically utilized at Russian facilities no longer addressed the threat to those locations. Recognizing that the Russian government has ultimate responsibility for nuclear materials in their country, the US made a commitment to support the improvement of these systems through technical assistance, funding, technology transfer, and experience sharing. At this time, the US and Russia are at an important juncture in their cooperation in MPC and A. Currently, there is the need for this work, the political will to make progress, and funding to make it happen

  12. U.S. government-to-government cooperation on nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is cooperating with Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltics to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the improvement of national systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A). US cooperation with Russia is carried out under the DOE MPC and A Program and the Nunn-Lugar funded Cooperative Threat Reduction program for Russia. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-41 designated DOE as the government agency with primary responsibility for MPC and A efforts in Russia, the NIS, and Baltics. Cooperation is conducted in coordination with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the development of a strong, independent national regulatory agency in Russia. DOE also coordinates these efforts with the European Community and other countries. DOE''s cooperation under the MPC and A program with Russia includes aggressive near-term activities to better secure nuclear materials through MPC and A system upgrades at facilities. Simultaneously, DOE is supporting Russia in its long-term goal of implementing upgraded MPC and A systems that can be maintained and supported from indigenous resources. Projects include the development of national regulations and laws, training of trainers, the development of a computerized federal information system, and other related tasks. NRC''s role in these efforts includes regulatory development activities, such as licensing and inspection program development, and related training. This paper provides an overview of the activities undertaken through DOE-Russian cooperation on MPC and A and how they complement each other

  13. Assistance to newly independent states in establishing state systems of accounting and control of nuclear material

    Nuclear trade and co-operation among States are essential dependent upon effective and credible safeguards. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union has resulted, inter alia, in the emergence of a number of newly independent States (NIS). With one exception, all the NIS have declared their intention either to become or to remain non-nuclear-weapon States, but many of them have nuclear programmes. However, the nuclear infrastructure on which those programmes once rested is no longer in place and needs to be reconstructed. The paper outlines work under way among the IAEA, its Member States and the NIS relating to the establishment and development in the NIS of State Systems of Accounting and Control (SSAC) of nuclear material. The paper describes IAEA activities in the NIS, including fact-finding missions and technical visits, the successful attempts to find donor States providing voluntary funding and expertise, and the co-ordination of technical support between the IAEA and the donor States. (author). 3 tabs

  14. Nuclear material control and accountancy in a spent fuel storage ponds

    The spent fuel storage ponds of a large reprocessing plant La Hague in France are under safeguards by means of a wide range of techniques currently used. These techniques include the nuclear material accountancy an containment/surveillance (C/S). Nondestructive assay, design information verification, and authentication of equipment provided by the operator are also implemented. Specific C/S equipment including video surveillance and unattended radiation monitoring have been developed and implemented in a spent fuel pond of La Hague. These C/S systems named EMOSS and CONSULHA with high degree of reliability and conclusiveness provide the opportunity to improve the efficiency of safeguards, particularly as related to spent fuel storage areas where the accountancy is verified by item counting

  15. Establishing and Advancing Electronic Nuclear Material Accounting Capabilities: A Canadian Perspective

    Under safeguards agreements that the Government of Canada has with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and nuclear cooperation agreements with other states, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is required to track the inventory and movement of all safeguarded material. As safeguards programmes evolve, including the implementation of Integrated Safeguards, the scope of the reporting requirements for facilities within Canada has also increased. At the same time, ensuring the secure transmission of the associated data continues to be an overarching factor. The changes that are occurring in the nuclear material accounting (NMA) landscape have necessitated a modernization of Canada's accounting and reporting system, with the objective of creating a more effective and efficient system, while at the same time maintaining the security of prescribed information. After a review of the environment, the CNSC embarked on a project that would encourage facilities to transition away from traditional modes of NMA reporting and adopt an electronic approach. This paper will discuss how the changes to Canada's NMA infrastructure were identified and implemented internally to allow for optimized electronic reporting. Improvements included the development of the regulatory and guidance documents, the overhaul of the reporting forms, the upgrade of the CNSC's NMA database, and the development of an electronic reporting platform that leveraged existing technologies. The paper will also discuss the logistics of engaging stakeholders throughout the process, launching the system and soliciting feedback for future system improvements. Special consideration will be given to the benefits realized by both the CNSC and facilities who have voluntarily embraced electronic reporting. The final objective of this paper will be to identify the challenges that were faced by the CNSC and the nuclear industry as the system changes were implemented and to highlight how

  16. A vulnerability assessment process and enhancements in nuclear material protection control and accountability programs

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories have conducted Vulnerability Analysis (VA) workshops at several Russian nuclear institutes over the past year and a half. These workshops present quantitative probabilistic risk analysis techniques used by the US Department of Energy (US DOE) to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the protection systems for category 1 and 2 and Special Nuclear Material (SNM) facilities in the US. The VA workshops focus on utilizing the computer-based analysis tool, Analytical System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS), to quantify the detection, delay and neutralization probabilities for the protection systems. The workshops provide instruction to Russian organizations responsible for nuclear Material Protection Control and Accountability (MPC and A) in an effort to communicate how DOE assesses the status of protection systems, and how to use the assessments to evaluate and prioritize potential MPC and A enhancements. The VA methodology introduced in the workshops is now being used to provide an initial quantification of risk at each institute where the workshop is conducted. Further, MPC and A enhancements and upgrades, identified by the class participants during the workshop or as a follow-on activity, have been or will be implemented at several nuclear facilities within Russian. This paper will discuss the vulnerability assessment and computer modeling techniques presented at the Russian nuclear facilities by the US DOE National Laboratories, review the issues associated with adopting a US evaluation methodology in Russia, and explain how the application of this methodology could lead to more cost effective MPC and A program enhancements throughout Russia

  17. Nuclear fuel lease accounting

    The subject of nuclear fuel lease accounting is a controversial one that has received much attention over the years. This has occurred during a period when increasing numbers of utilities, seeking alternatives to traditional financing methods, have turned to leasing their nuclear fuel inventories. The purpose of this paper is to examine the current accounting treatment of nuclear fuel leases as prescribed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) Uniform System of Accounts. Cost accounting for leased nuclear fuel during the fuel cycle is also discussed

  18. Where do the Nuclear Materials Management functions fit in the Materials Control and Accountability (MC and A) plan?

    Safeguards had its beginning in the early 1940s and has continued to grow through the stormy years in dealing with nuclear materials. MC and A Plans have been developed for each facility which includes requirements for containment, surveillance, internal controls, measurements, statistics, records and report systems, and inventory certification of its nuclear materials, in the context of how precisely the inventory is known at stated risk or confidence levels. The I and E Regulations, the newest document affecting the control system, are used for testing the current MC and A plan in place at each facility. Nuclear Materials Management activities also have reporting requirements that include: (1) Annual Forecast, (2) Materials Management Plan, (3) Quarterly Status Report, (4) Assessment Report, and (5) Scrap and Excess Material Management. Data used to generate reports for both functions come from the same data base and source documents at most facilities. The separation of sponsoring groups at the DOE for NM Accountability and NM Management can and does pose problems for contractors. In this paper, we will try to separate and identify these overlaps at the Facility and DOE level

  19. Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

    Humberto Garcia; Wen-Chiao Lin; Reed Carlson

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

  20. International target values 2010 for achievable measurement uncertainties in nuclear material accountancy

    Dias, Fabio C., E-mail: fabio@ird.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Almeida, Silvio G. de; Renha Junior, Geraldo, E-mail: silvio@abacc.org.b, E-mail: grenha@abacc.org.b [Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares (ABACC), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2011-07-01

    The International Target Values (ITVs) are reasonable uncertainty estimates that can be used in judging the reliability of measurement techniques applied to industrial nuclear and fissile materials subject to accountancy and/or safeguards verification. In the absence of relevant experimental estimates, ITVs can also be used to select measurement techniques and calculate sample population during the planning phase of verification activities. It is important to note that ITVs represent estimates of the 'state-of-the-practice', which should be achievable under routine measurement conditions affecting both facility operators and safeguards inspectors, not only in the field, but also in laboratory. Tabulated values cover measurement methods used for the determination of volume or mass of the nuclear material, for its elemental and isotopic assays, and for its sampling. The 2010 edition represents the sixth revision of the International Target Values (ITVs), issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a Safeguards Technical Report (STR-368). The first version was released as 'Target Values' in 1979 by the Working Group on Techniques and Standards for Destructive Analysis (WGDA) of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and focused on destructive analytical methods. In the latest 2010 revision, international standards in estimating and expressing uncertainties have been considered while maintaining a format that allows comparison with the previous editions of the ITVs. Those standards have been usually applied in QC/QA programmes, as well as qualification of methods, techniques and instruments. Representatives of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) participated in previous Consultants Group Meetings since the one convened to establish the first list of ITVs released in 1993 and in subsequent revisions

  1. The Russian Federal Information System for Nuclear Material Control and Accounting: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

    Most enterprises in the Russian Federation are not prepared to report to the Russian Federal Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Information System (FIS) by the full function reporting method. The full function reporting method requires reporting inventory listings on a schedule based on nuclear material category, submission of individual inventory change reports, and reconciliation and closeout at the end of each reporting period. Most Russian enterprises do not have automated systems and do not have the resources to develop and implement such systems. Over the last two years, MinAtom put the regulations and national level nuclear material control and accounting (MC and A) software in place to require all enterprises in the Russian Federation to report summarized inventory listings to the FIS in January 2002. Enterprises do not need automated systems to comply with summarized reporting requirements. Along with the approximately 25% of the total Category 1 Material Balance Areas (MBAs) using full function reporting, the addition of this complete summarized inventory makes the FIS a more valuable tool for MinAtom management. The FIS is now poised to complete the work by improving the integrity and reliability of the data through increasing the number of enterprises and MBAs using full function reporting. There are obstacles and issues that must be dealt with along the way to achieving the final goal of every MBA sending inventory and inventory change reports using the full function reporting method. Summarized reporting is a major step toward this final goal. Currently all MBAs using full function reporting are doing so under a U.S. contract. FIS management recognized full function reporting could not be implemented in the near-term and prepared a plan with immediate, intermediate, and long-term FIS tasks. To address the major obstacles and optimize implementation, two paths need to be followed in parallel: developing the regulatory basis and overcoming

  2. Decree of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission No. 28/1977 on the accountancy and inspection of nuclear materials

    The Decree specifies regulatory requirements placed on the accountancy and inspection of nuclear materials and commitments following from the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. The responsibilities of state surveillance inspectors are laid down, as are the obligations of organizations to keep records and take stock of nuclear materials and to report on this to the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Agency. The responsibilities associated with nuclear materials exports and imports are also specified. The Decree entered into force on 1 June 1977. (J.B.)

  3. The concept of an integrated quality record nuclear material accountancy system

    RBU had already started in 1976 with the computerisation of its nuclear material accountancy system. It used the hardware and the software which were at hand at that time. The development of the software needed about 3 years, and so, the system, was fully introduced in 1979 and has been used since then with only minor changes. But with the time, the overwhelming progress in computer and software technology has overcome the existing system. Upgrading the old system would need a lot of effort, so RBU decided to modernize its system fundamentally. In the time between RBU has developed a quality record and documentation system for the purposes of quality assurance and quality control. This system shall be enlarged, so that it can overtake the tasks of NMA, too. The quality record system contains already nearly 80 % of all NMA-relevant data. The presented paper will describe the main changes between the present and the future system

  4. A Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) for accountability monitoring of stored nuclear materials

    Nearly all facilities that store hazardous (radioactive or non-radioactive) materials must comply with prevailing federal, state, and local laws. These laws usually have components that require periodic physical inspections to insure that all materials remain safely and securely stored. The inspections are generally labor intensive, slow, put personnel at risk, and only find anomalies after they have occurred. The system described in this paper was developed for monitoring stored nuclear materials resulting from weapons dismantlement, but its applications extend to any storage facility that meets the above criteria. The traditional special nuclear material (SNM) accountability programs, that are currently used within most of the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, require the physical entry of highly trained personnel into SNM storage vaults. This imposes the need for additional security measures, which typically mandate that extra security personnel be present while SNM inventories are performed. These requirements increase labor costs and put additional personnel at risk to radiation exposure. In some cases, individuals have received radiation exposure equivalent to the annual maximum during just one inventory verification. With increasing overhead costs, the current system is rapidly becoming too expensive to operate, the need for an automated method of inventory verification is evident. The Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) described in this paper was designed and prototyped as a low cost, highly reliable, and user friendly system that is capable of providing, real-time weight, gamma. and neutron energy confirmation from each item stored in a SNM vault. This paper describes the sensor technologies, the CAVIS prototype system (built at Y- 12 for highly enriched uranium storage), the technical requirements that must be achieved to assure successful implementation, and descriptions of sensor technologies needed for a plutonium facility

  5. Review of methodological analysis for the nuclear material accounting and control in the advanced spent fuel management process

    Nuclear materials accounting and verification in radiochemical processing facilities is essential, because it is the first possible time in the nuclear fuel cycle that plutonium can be measured. In these facilities, effective nuclear materials accounting systems and international safeguards inspections rely heavily upon nondestructive assay measurements. Therefore, it is important to know whether the radiation-based nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Advanced Spent Fuel Management Process are applicable or not. As a result of reviewing the existing NDA techniques for nuclear material accounting, it was revealed that γ-ray spectrometry, x-ray fluorescence/ densitometry and calorimetry techniques are not applicable to the advanced spent fuel management process because of the size of the measuring devices installed in a hot cell and the samples including some fission products. Therefore, the neutron technique is only applicable to this processing facility. The results reviewed in this study can be used to design a hot cell for the advanced spent fuel management process

  6. Nuclear material control and accounting and physical protection cooperation with the former Soviet Union

    The end of the Cold War precipitated an unprecedented, fast-paced effort by the United States and states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) to dismantle nuclear weapons. At the same time, instability in the FSU as nuclear stockpiles are drawn down has given rise to a proliferation threat potentially more serious than any nuclear crisis faced by the superpowers during their 40-yr standoff. With the FSU more susceptible than ever to proliferation and terrorist threats, it is probable that countries that intend to develop nuclear weapons will attempt or may already have attempted to obtain nuclear material not only from dismantled weapons but from civilian nuclear programs as well. Numerous reports have emerged in the international media during the past year alone on FSU nuclear material being lost, stolen, or recovered following theft attempts. Under the US initiative for nuclear weapons safety, security and dismantlement (SSD), and the President's Nonproliferation Initiative, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are engaged in establishing bilateral technical assistance programs with FSU states in nuclear material safeguards. The overarching objective of US assistance is to help the FSU states improve their capabilities to effectively safeguard and protect nuclear material. The assistance will be carried out under bilateral agreements for cooperation and supported by funds authorized by Congress in the Soviet Nuclear Reduction Act of 1991 and successor legislation, such as the Freedom Support Act (1992)

  7. Material accountancy measurement techniques in dry-powdered processing of nuclear spent fuels

    The paper addresses the development of inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICPMS), thermal ionization-mass spectrometry (TIMS), alpha-spectrometry, and gamma spectrometry techniques for in-line analysis of highly irradiated (18 to 64 GWD/T) PWR spent fuels in a dry-powdered processing cycle. The dry-powdered technique for direct elemental and isotopic accountancy assay measurements was implemented without the need for separation of the plutonium, uranium and fission product elements in the bulk powdered process. The analyses allow the determination of fuel burn-up based on the isotopic composition of neodymium and/or cesium. An objective of the program is to develop the ICPMS method for direct fissile nuclear materials accountancy in the dry-powdered processing of spent fuel. The ICPMS measurement system may be applied to the KAERI DUPIC (direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors) experiment, and in a near-real-time mode for international safeguards verification and non-proliferation policy concerns

  8. Nuclear materials control and accountability (NMC and A) auditors in the 90's

    The increase in emphasis on the adequacy of the NMC and A internal control systems requires that management define what type of training and experience is needed by NMC and A Internal Audit Program. At Martin Marietta Energy Systems, inc. (the prime contractor for the Department of Energy at Oak Ridge, Tenn.), the Central NMC and A Manager has developed a comprehensive set of NMC and A Internal Audit policies that defines performance standards, methods of conducting audits, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate independence for NMC and A auditors, structure for standardized audit reports and working papers, and a section that addresses the development of training plans for individual NMC and A auditors. The training requirements reflect the unique combination of skills necessary to be an effective NMC and A Internal Auditor- a combination of the operational auditing skills of a Certified Internal Auditor, the accounting auditing capabilities of a Certified Public Accountant, and the specific technical knowledge base associated with nuclear materials. This paper presents a mechanism for identifying an individual training program for NMC and A auditors that considers the above requirements and the individual's long-range career goals

  9. Procedures and practices in nuclear material accounting and reporting in the GDR

    The typical features of the GDR's nuclear material safeguards system are pointed out by analysing the nuclear material data reporting to the IAEA since 1972. Extent and consequences of the application of modern electronic data registration and processing methods at State and MBA levels are considered and an outlook is given for planned developments and extensions of the data processing system with a view to making the data exchange between the main users of nuclear material and the State control authority more effective and the work of the State control authority itself more efficient

  10. Development of an automated system of nuclear materials accounting for nuclear power stations with water-cooled, water-moderated reactors

    The results of work carried out under IAEA Contract No. 2336/RB are described (subject: an automated system of nuclear materials accounting for nuclear power stations with water-cooled, water-moderated (VVER) reactors). The basic principles of an accounting system for this type of nuclear power plant are outlined. The general structure and individual units of the information computer program used to achieve automated accounting are described and instructions are given on the use of the program. A detailed example of its application (on a simulated nuclear power plant) is examined

  11. Application of game theory to nuclear material accounting. Final report, 1 April 1977-3 January 1978

    An approach based upon the theory of games is presented that determines an optimal alarm threshold for detecting unauthorized or deliberate diversion of nuclear material based upon material accounting data. A mathematical model is developed, solved, and applied to a generic nuclear facility. By considering a malevolent diverter as a basic ingredient of the analysis, this approach offers advantages over conventional statistical hypothesis testing. The results show that periodic inventories and appropriate interpretation of MUF (Material Unaccounted For) can provide a high assurance for indicating diversion in a nuclear material safeguards situation. The optimal policy is to select the alarm threshold by a mixed strategy rather than a pre-set single fixed value. Procedures for doing this are presented in the report. With this approach, MUF data by itself may be more useful in indicating possible unauthorized diversion of special nuclear material

  12. The state system of accounting and control of nuclear material in Argentina and the Y2K issue

    The nuclear regulatory activities in Argentina are carried out by the 'Nuclear Regulatory Authority' (ARN). To fulfil its responsibilities, the ARN has established and enforced a regulatory framework for all nuclear activities concerning nuclear safety and radiological protection, physical protection and the guarantees of non-proliferation. Concerning the guarantees of non-proliferation, the SSAC includes an independent verification system based on national safeguards inspections, evaluations and a centralised accounting database of all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities performed in Argentina. The ARN has implemented two computerised databases to improve its SSAC. One is the 'Safeguards Inspections System' (SIS) developed to optimise the programming of the national inspections and their evaluation. The other is the 'Nuclear Material Control System' (SCMN) designed to improve the issuing and submission of accounting and operating reports. To improve further the SSAC, the ARN has requested software that should be in use at each nuclear installation in the near future. This computerised accounting database (SOP) would increase the quality of the operator's accounting and control system. About the change of the millennium, it is important to bear in mind that it may have an impact not only in the dates of the safeguards reports, but also in some data generated by software or equipment at nuclear installations used as the basis for safeguards records. For example, computerised programs for fuel element management at the Nuclear Power Stations or certain software and hardware in use at bulk installations would require a comprehensive review to assure that the change of the year 2000 will not cause any problem. Besides, some of the data generated by computerised systems at the level of installations are inputs for the three integrated databases SCMN, SIS and SOP. This paper describes the objectives and functions of these integrated systems and some main aspects

  13. Current status of the system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in the Philippines

    Prior to the construction of nuclear power plant in 1976, the only safeguarded nuclear materials in the Philippines were the nuclear fuels of the research reactor (PRR-1). The arrival of the nuclear fuels of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in 1984 increased the number of safeguarded nuclear materials. Further, the upgrading of the present MTR reactor to a TRIGA type in 1987 necessitated the acquisition of additional nuclear fuels. With the decision of the Philippine Government to mothball the BNPP in 1986, the operator, the National Power Corporation, made arrangements to sell the nuclear fuel assemblies. In December 1997 Siemens Power Corporation bought the fresh fuel assemblies. On the other hand, the spent fuel assemblies of mixed enrichment from PRR-1 were shipped to the United States on 14 March 1999. This shipment was in line with the U.S. initiative to implement its Record of Decision to accept and manage all foreign research reactors uranium fuels of U.S. origin. The only safeguarded materials left are the TRIGA fuels and the complete reactor assembly of BNPP. (author)

  14. Protection, control, accounting and disposition of nuclear-explosive materials: Recent developments in the United States and Russia

    In the frame of recent development in the USA and Russia concerning protection, control, accounting and disposition of nuclear-explosive materials, the paper presents in detail the status of US-Russian agreement on fissile materials, namely deactivation and dismantling; transparency; removal of material from possibility of military use; safe and secure storage; production cut-off. Findings of the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) Panel on reactor related options for disposition of excess weapon plutonium are included

  15. Use of process monitoring data for the enhancement of nuclear material control and accounting

    Two licensed fuel fabrication facilities, one processing low-enriched and the other high-enriched uranium, were examined in this study. Safeguards effectiveness of the current material accounting system at each licensee was quantitatively assessed using an evaluation methodology. Two generations of alternate material control systems using portions of the facilities' process monitoring data were developed and similarly evaluated for each facility

  16. ABACC - Brazil-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, a model of integration and transparence

    Argentina and Brazil began its activities in the nuclear area about the same time, in the 50 century past. The existence of an international nuclear nonproliferation treaty-TNP-seen by Brazil and Argentina as discriminatory and prejudicial to the interests of the countries without nuclear weapons, led to the need for a common system of control of nuclear material between the two countries to somehow provide assurances to the international community of the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programs. The creation of a common system, assured the establishment of uniform procedures to implement safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, so the same requirements and safeguards procedures took effect in both countries, and the operators of nuclear facilities began to follow the same rules of control of nuclear materials and subjected to the same type of verification and control. On July 18, 1991, the Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy created a binational body, the Argentina-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials-ABACC-to implement the so-called Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear materials - SCCC. The deal provided, permanently, a clear commitment to use exclusively for peaceful purposes all material and nuclear facilities under the jurisdiction or control of the two countries. The Quadripartite Agreement, signed in December of that year, between the two countries, ABACC and IAEA completed the legal framework for the implementation of comprehensive safeguards system. The 'model ABACC' now represents a paradigmatic framework in the long process of economic, political, technological and cultural integration of the two countries. Argentina and Brazil were able to establish a guarantee system that is unique in the world today and that consolidated and matured over more than twenty years, has earned the respect of the international community

  17. Experience gained with nuclear material accounting and control in storage facility for plutonium dioxide of SChK radiochemical plant

    The task for the computerized accounting of containers at the storage with barcoding equipment for inventory taking has been performed at achieve the pre-commissioning phase. This gave the following upgrade: decrease of the time spent by the personnel in storage compartments with plutonium dioxide during inventory taking, this diminishing the dose for personnel; changeover from traditional record book to computerized accounting of nuclear materials at the storage, which will make it possible to include the local workstation of the storage into computer network for nuclear material (NM) accounting at the Radiochemical plant; test and improve technique for the use of barcoding equipment for further introduction at plants and storage facilities of the SChK. Works are underway for further improvement of the NM accounting at the storage for plutonium dioxide

  18. Development of technologies for national control of and accountancy for nuclear materials

    The aim of this project is to establish a rigid foundation of national safeguards and to develop the new technologies for the nuclear control. This project is composed of four different technologies; 1. Monitoring technology for nuclear materials, 2. Detection technology for a single particle, 3. Safeguards information management technology, 4. Physical protection technology. Various studies such as a remote verification system for CANDU spent fuel in dry storage canister, a spent fuel verification system using an optical fiber scintillator, and development of softwares for safeguards and physical protection were performed in the frist phase('99-'01). As a result of this research, it has been identified that the developed technologies could be a crucial means of the control for the nuclear material and facilities related. We are planing to accomplish a steady national safeguard system in the second phase('02-'06). This research will help to elevate the transparency and credibility in national nuclear activities by improving the relative technologies

  19. State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in the Republic of Uzbekistan

    After the breakup of the USSR the Republic of Uzbekistan has been working in the following areas, attaching primary importance to producing a legislative the structure for the safe use of nuclear energy: legal framework for nuclear and radiation safety; licensing and control of nuclear facilities and radiation sources; regulations for the safe transport of nuclear and radioactive materials; emergency preparedness. Presentation includes description of principal elements and the function of the SSAC; nuclear activities in Uzbekistan (Atomic inspection safeguarded at the beginning of 2001, 9 installations, 2 Research Reactors, 2 Uranium mine and reprocessing plants, 5 Storage installations). The current Uzbekistan's SSAC has been developed and fully satisfies both the IAEA safeguards requirements. The Republic of Uzbekistan supports the introduction of the 'integrated safeguards'. There is need to further strengthen the relationship between the Uzbekistan's SSAC and the IAEA under an integrated safeguards regime to provide more effective and efficient safeguards application

  20. Materials accounting at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    This presentation gives an overview of the accounting system used at the Los Alamos National Laboratory by the Los Alamos Nuclear Material Accounting and Safeguards System (MASS). This system processes accounting data in real time for bulk materials, discrete items, and materials undergoing dynamic processing. The following topics are covered in this chapter: definitions; nuclear material storage; nuclear material storage; computer system; measurement control program; inventory differences; and current programs and future plans

  1. Nuclear material accounting reports to the IAEA: (code 10 of Subsidiary Arrangements)

    The INFCIRC/153-type safeguard agreements provide the basis to inform the IAEA on the nuclear materials in the Member States. Reports to be provided to the the Agency consist of three types: Inventory Change Report (ICR), Physical Inventory Listing (PIL) and Material Balance Report (MBR). Concise notes may be provided for any of these reports. An explanation for the use of the report forms is given

  2. Nuclear fuels accounting interface: River Bend experience

    Barry, J.E.

    1986-01-01

    This presentation describes nuclear fuel accounting activities from the perspective of nuclear fuels management and its interfaces. Generally, Nuclear Fuels-River Bend Nuclear Group (RBNG) is involved on a day-by-day basis with nuclear fuel materials accounting in carrying out is procurement, contract administration, processing, and inventory management duties, including those associated with its special nuclear materials (SNM)-isotopics accountability oversight responsibilities as the Central Accountability Office for the River Bend Station. As much as possible, these duties are carried out in an integrated, interdependent manner. From these primary functions devolve Nuclear Fuels interfacing activities with fuel cost and tax accounting. Noting that nuclear fuel tax accounting support is of both an esoteric and intermittent nature, Nuclear Fuels-RBNG support of developments and applications associated with nuclear fuel cost accounting is stressed in this presentation.

  3. Nuclear fuels accounting interface: River Bend experience

    This presentation describes nuclear fuel accounting activities from the perspective of nuclear fuels management and its interfaces. Generally, Nuclear Fuels-River Bend Nuclear Group (RBNG) is involved on a day-by-day basis with nuclear fuel materials accounting in carrying out is procurement, contract administration, processing, and inventory management duties, including those associated with its special nuclear materials (SNM)-isotopics accountability oversight responsibilities as the Central Accountability Office for the River Bend Station. As much as possible, these duties are carried out in an integrated, interdependent manner. From these primary functions devolve Nuclear Fuels interfacing activities with fuel cost and tax accounting. Noting that nuclear fuel tax accounting support is of both an esoteric and intermittent nature, Nuclear Fuels-RBNG support of developments and applications associated with nuclear fuel cost accounting is stressed in this presentation

  4. Achievements, current status and prospects for Russian-American cooperation in nuclear material physical protection, control and accounting - 1998

    The process of upgrading the material physical protection, control and accounting systems is an ongoing and long-term process that consists of modernization measuring equipment and methodologies, improving, data exchange and processing technologies, and improving administrative procedures. The positive results that was already achieved form a foundation upon which this collaboration may extend into other new and important areas, such as - the second and third lines of defence, which are directed toward countering illegal trafficking not only in nuclear materials, but in other hazardous substances that constitute a threat to the nuclear sites and national security of the countries

  5. Minatom of Russia Situation and Crisis Center and the Automated Federal Information System for Nuclear Material Control and Accounting

    Under the Situation and Crisis Center (SCC) management, the Information Analytical Center (IAC) of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) of Russia was created to oversee the operation of the Federal Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Information System (FIS). During 2000, the FIS achieved an important milestone in its development: the basic functions of the information system were implemented. This includes placing into operation the collecting and processing of nuclear material control and accounting (MC and A) information from the enterprises reporting to the FIS. The FIS began working with 14 Russian enterprises to develop and implement full-function reporting (i.e., reporting inventory and inventory changes including closeout and reconciliation between the FIS and enterprises). In 2001, the system will expand to include enterprise-level inventory information for all enterprises using nuclear materials in Russia. For this reason, at the end of 2000 through the beginning of 2001, five separate training sessions were held for over 100 enterprise personnel responsible for preparation and transfer of the reports to the FIS. Through the assistance of the Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) program, information systems for the accounting of nuclear materials are being installed at Russia enterprises. In creating the program for modernization of the Russian Federation State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) of nuclear material, the SCC conducted a survey of the enterprises to determine the readiness of their internal MC and A systems for reporting to the FIS. Based on the information from the survey and the results of the projects on creation of local information systems at Russian enterprises, the analysis of information and the technical aspects of MC and A systems identified deficiencies that were analyzed and recommendations for eliminating these deficiencies were proposed. The concentration of analytical and administrative

  6. Status report on US-Russian laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation in nuclear materials protection, control and accounting

    In April 1994, a new program of cooperation on nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) was initiated between (1) the US Department of Energy and its laboratories and (2) nuclear institutes and enterprises of the Russian Federation. The program is called the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (Lab-to-Lab MPC and A Program); it is one of several, complementary US-Russian MPC and A programs. The purpose of the Lab-to-Lab MPC and A Program is to accelerate progress toward a goal that is vital to the national security interests of both countries: reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation by strengthening MPC and A systems. In its first two years, the program has made significant progress and has expanded to include many additional Russian participants. It has also fostered a spirit of mutual understanding, partnership, and respect between US and Russian nuclear specialists, which has paved the way for advances in other MPC and A and nuclear security cooperative efforts. This paper reviews the current status of the program. In addition to summarizing the background and objectives of the program, the paper describes highlights of recent work and outlines future directions for Lab-to-Lab MPC and A cooperation

  7. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held October 17 through November 4, 1983, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a State system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1983 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Westinghouse Fast Flux Test Facility Visitor Center, and Washington Public Power System nuclear reactor facilities in Richland, Washington. Individual presentations were indexed for inclusion in the Energy Data Base

  8. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    1984-06-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held October 17 through November 4, 1983, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a State system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1983 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Westinghouse Fast Flux Test Facility Visitor Center, and Washington Public Power System nuclear reactor facilities in Richland, Washington. Individual presentations were indexed for inclusion in the Energy Data Base.

  9. Collaborative Russian-US work in nuclear material protection, control and accounting at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering

    The Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) is a leading research center under the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation. IPPE encompasses many installations and many specialists who perform fundamental and applied investigations in nuclear power and technology for the national nuclear program. IPPE has a key role in the national nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC ampersand A) system both as a nuclear facility and also as a training center for MPC ampersand A. As a participant in the US-Russian Laboratory-to-Laboratory Cooperative Program in MPC ampersand A, IPPE is conducting several tasks in collaboration with US Department of Energy national laboratories. The main goal of these tasks is the rapid improvement of MPC ampersand A at one of the most sensitive operating IPPE installations, the BFS critical facility, which has large numbers of fuel items containing highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. After the completion of several test, evaluation, and demonstration tasks, it is hoped that the tested and adopted methods and procedures can be applied not only to the entire population of BFS fuel items, but also to other facilities at IPPE and other Russian nuclear institutes and operating facilities. The collaborative tasks cover seven areas: computerized nuclear material accounting, entry control and portals, item control and inventory, design evaluation and analysis, gamma and neutron assay, an integrated demonstration, and physical protection elements and test bed

  10. Department of Energy Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program at the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex, Aktau, Republic of Kazakhstan

    As part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC and A) Program, the US Department of Energy and Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex (MAEC), Aktau, Republic of Kazakstan have cooperated to enhance existing MAEC MPC and A features at the BN-350 liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor. This paper describes the methodology of the enhancement activities and provides representative examples of the MPC and A augmentation implemented at the MAEC

  11. Active Interrogation using Photofission Technique for Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability

    Yang, Haori [Oregon State Univ., Corvallis, OR (United States)

    2016-03-31

    Innovative systems with increased sensitivity and resolution are in great demand to detect diversion and to prevent misuse in support of nuclear materials management for the U.S. fuel cycle. Nuclear fission is the most important multiplicative process involved in non-destructive active interrogation. This process produces the most easily recognizable signature for nuclear materials. In addition to thermal or high-energy neutrons, high-energy gamma rays can also excite a nucleus and cause fission through a process known as photofission. Electron linear accelerators (linac) are widely used as the interrogating photon sources for inspection methods involving photofission technique. After photofission reactions, prompt signals are much stronger than the delayed signals, but it is difficult to quantify them in practical measurements. Delayed signals are easily distinguishable from the interrogating radiation. linac-based, advanced inspection techniques utilizing the delayed signals after photofission have been extensively studied for homeland security applications. Previous research also showed that a unique delayed gamma ray energy spectrum exists for each fissionable isotope.

  12. Novel Problems Associated with Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material from Decontamination and Decommissioning and in Waste

    The reduction in nuclear arms and the production facilities that supported the weapons programs have produced some unique problems for nuclear material control and accountability (MC and A). Many of these problems are not limited to the weapons complex, but have the potential to appear in many legacy facilities as they undergo dismantlement and disposal. Closing facilities find that what was previously defined as product has become a waste stream bringing regulatory, human, and technological conflict. The sometimes unique compositions of these materials produce both storage and measurement problems. The nuclear material accounting and control programs have had to become very adaptive and preemptive to ensure control and protection is maintained. This paper examines some of the challenges to Safeguards generated by deinventory, decontamination decommissioning, dismantlement, demolition, and waste site remediation from predictable sources and some from unpredictable sources. 1.0 Introduction The United States is eliminating many facilities that support the nuclear weapons program. With the changing political conditions around the world and changes in military capabilities, the decreased emphasis on nuclear weapons has eliminated the need for many of the aging facilities. Additionally, the recovery of plutonium from dismantled weapons and reuse of components has eliminated the need to produce more plutonium for the near future. Because the nuclear weapons program and commercial applications generally do not mix in the United States, the facilities in the DOE complex that no longer have a weapon mission are being deinventoried, decontaminated, decommissioned, and dismantled/demolished. The materials from these activities are then disposed of in various ways but usually in select waste burial sites. Additionally, the waste in many historical burial sites associated with the weapons complex are being recovered, repackaged if necessary, and disposed of in either

  13. NDA systems to support nuclear material control and accounting in spent fuel reprocessing plants

    Detailed descriptions of a number of instrument systems relating to accountancy and safeguarding of plutonium operations and storage on Thermal Oxide Plant (Thorp) are provided. The systems described include the Plutonium Inventory Measurement System (PIMS), used to provide Near Real Time Materials Accountancy (NRTMA) information within the Thorp plutonium finishing area; the Product Can Contents Monitor (PCCM), used to verify can weight measurements and isotopic composition and; the In-Store Plutonium Verification Monitor, used to provide in-situ measurements of plutonium in cans whilst they are in their storage channels. These nondestructive systems are necessarily combined with other physical security, surveillance and identification arrangements for the handling and storage of plutonium product cans

  14. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held June 3 through June 21, 1985, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and San Clemente, California. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1985 course was placed on safeguards methods used at item-control facilities, particularly nuclear power generating stations and test reactors. An introduction to safeguards methods used at bulk handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants, was also included. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Southern California Edison Company. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, San Clemente, California

  15. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    1986-06-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held June 3 through June 21, 1985, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and San Clemente, California. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1985 course was placed on safeguards methods used at item-control facilities, particularly nuclear power generating stations and test reactors. An introduction to safeguards methods used at bulk handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants, was also included. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Southern California Edison Company. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, San Clemente, California.

  16. Development of a personal computer-based state system of accounting for/and control of nuclear materials

    An IBM-PC and compatible based state system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials under international safeguards (state-level SSAC) is presented. The system works under DOS version 2.0 and above. It consists of a single-module Safeguards Report Editor which is a multi-function menu-driven code written in BASIC. The Editor may be run both in interactive mode and as an EXEC module. The output represents four types of material accounting reports on diskette, suitable for direct input into the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS). In the first part of the report presented, a general description of the system is given. This is complemented with a detailed User Manual where a Guide to Applications, an Operator's Guide, a Programmer's Guide and Listings are included. The system is now available. It is maintained by the Bulgarian Committee on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes

  17. The Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant Process for Managing Equipment Intended for Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting System Upgrades

    Since 1996, the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) located in the town of Novouralsk, Russia, (previously known as Sverdlovsk-44) and the United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) have been cooperating under the Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) Program. Because UEIP is involved in the processing of highly enriched uranium (HEU) into low enriched uranium (LEU), and there are highly enriched nuclear materials on its territory, the main goal of the MPC and A cooperation is to upgrade those systems that ensure secure storage, processing and transportation of nuclear materials at the plant. UEIP has completed key upgrades (equipment procurement and installation) aimed at improving MPC and A systems through significant investments made by both the U.S. DOE and UEIP. These joint cooperative efforts resulted in bringing MPC and A systems into compliance with current regulations, which led to nuclear material (NM) theft risk reduction and prevention from other unlawful actions with respect to them. Upon the U.S. MPC and A project team's suggestion, UEIP has developed an equipment inventory control process to track all the property provided through the MPC and A Program. The UEIP process and system for managing equipment provides many benefits including: greater ease and efficiency in determining the quantities, location, maintenance and repair schedule for equipment; greater assurance that MPC and A equipment is in continued satisfactory operation; and improved control in the development of a site sustainability program. While emphasizing UEIP's equipment inventory control processes, this paper will present process requirements and a methodology that may have practical and helpful applications at other sites.

  18. US/Russian cooperative efforts in nuclear material protection, control, and accounting at the Siberian Chemical Combine

    The Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) is the largest multifunction nuclear production facility in the Russian nuclear complex. Until recently, it produced and processed special nuclear material for the Russian Defense Ministry. SKhK and its US partners in the Department of Energy (DOE) US/Russian Materials Protection, Control, and Accountability (MPC and A) Program are nearing completion of the initial MPC and A upgrades at the six SKhK plant sites that were begun three years ago. Comprehensive enhancements to the physical protection and access control systems are progressing on a site-wide basis while a comprehensive MC and A system is being implemented at the Radiochemical Plant site. SKhK now produces thermal and electrical power, enriches uranium for commercial reactor fuel, reprocesses irradiated fuel, converts high-enriched uranium metal into high-enriched oxide for blending into reactor-grade, low-enriched uranium, and manufactures civilian products. The authors review the progress to date and outline plans for continuing the work in 1999

  19. Trial operation of material protection, control, and accountability systems at two active nuclear material handling sites within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)

    This paper discusses Russian Federal Nuclear Center (RFNC)-VNIIEF activities in the area of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) procedures enhancement. The goal of such activities is the development of an automated systems for MPC and A at two of the active VNIIEF research sites: a research (reactor) site and a nuclear material production facility. The activities for MPC and A system enhancement at both sites are performed in the framework of a VNIIEF-Los Alamos National Laboratory contract with participation from Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and PANTEX Plant in accordance with Russian programs supported by MinAtom. The American specialists took part in searching for possible improvement of technical solutions, ordering equipment, and delivering and testing the equipment that was provided by the Americans

  20. State system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials and Protocol Additional in the Slovak Republic

    Full text: The State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) which is established in the Slovak Republic was developed by the former Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission and after splitting of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1993 it has been fully accepted by the regulatory authority of the Slovak Republic. This system is based on requirements of the safeguards agreement between the government of the Czechoslovak Republic and the IAEA (which has been accepted by the government of the Slovak Republic), known as INFCIRC/173. The agreement is conforming to INFCIRC/153 i. e. it is reflecting requirements of the Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which was signed by the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on 01. 07. 1968 and in March 1993 was accepted by the government of the Slovak Republic. The SSAC in the Slovak Republic has national and international objectives. Organisational and functional elements of the SSAC in the Slovak Republic can be addressed in the following six major areas: a) Authority and Responsibility; b) Laws, Regulations and Other Measures; c) SSAC Information System; d) Establishment of Requirements for Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control; e) Ensuring Compliance; f) Technical Support. Legal Basis for the IAEA inspection activities is an Agreement between the government of the Slovak Republic and the IAEA (INFCIRC/173). The Agreement is supplemented by the Subsidiary Arrangement (SA), which contains in the general part the requirements on accountancy documentation, reports and inspections. The Facility Attachment is a part of SA, which contains information specific for individual MBA, mainly: a brief description of the facility, its purpose, nominal capacity, geographic location, the name and address; location and flow of nuclear materials, a description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; a description of the existing and

  1. Establishing a system of nuclear materials accountancy and control at the facility level

    This paper is the guide to a workshop designed to enable the participants to gain a better understanding of National Safeguards Systems and their functions. The workshop provides the opportunity to address the principal elements of the accounting system to be implemented at the facility level (research reactor and laboratory facilities) as a part of the national safeguards system

  2. Development of state computerised accounting system for nuclear material in the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic towards 2000

    The presentation describes the evaluation of computerised system for processing of safeguards data and reporting to the IAEA in the Slovak Republic and in the Czech Republic in accordance with their Safeguards Agreements. The attention is given to the first code for processing of accounting data, established and operated in the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez in 1980. Further it is concentrated on the code ZARUKY, developed as a tool for control of and accounting for nuclear material at the State level in 1992, created on the database system CLIPPER-5 in operational system MS-DOS and operated until now. The general intention is to show and clarify main problems connected with the year 2000 and to share this experience with other colleagues. Possible ways for solution of these problems are listed and necessary regulatory role of the SSACs is presented. Also the main requirements for new code, which should communicate with the database of operators and reflect all limitations specified in their permissions, which should be a system with fully satisfactory safety, strictly defined confidentiality and should allow the access of several users in parallel is described. As a new component of this afford the requirements for reporting in accordance with the Protocol Additional to the Safeguard Agreement is mentioned. It is presented that the code in WINDOWS operation system on a database system ORACLE accepting also new date format 'YYYYMMDD' would meet all of these requirements. (author)

  3. Development of a system for academic training of the personnel engaged in nuclear material protection, control and accounting in Russia

    The main attention in the present paper is focused on discussing the educational problems in the area of nuclear materials physical protection, control and accountability (MPC and A) in Russia. Currently, only the Master of Science Graduate Program has been completely developed for students training. This is taking place at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State University, MEPhI), where the sixth generation of Masters has graduated in May 2004. The MPC and A Engineer Degree Program, currently under development at MEPhI, is considered in the paper. This paper discusses specific features of the Engineer Degree training required by the Russian educational legislation and the Russian quality control system as applied to the training process. The paper summarises the main joint actions undertaken during the past three years by MEPhI in collaboration with the US Department of Energy and US National Laboratories for developing the MPC and A Engineer Degree Program in Russia. (author)

  4. Development of the system for academic training of personnel engaged in nuclear material protection, control and accounting in Russia

    educational problems in area of nuclear materials physical protection, control and accountability (MPC and A) in Russia. General scheme of Russian educational system is considered with main emphasis on the directions under implementation now, namely academic training system, re-training system and specialists qualification upgrade system in MPC and A area. Russian academic training system consists of the educational programs at various levels: Bachelor of Sciences, Master of Sciences, Specialist (also referred to as an Engineer Degree), and professional re-training of the personnel already working in the nuclear field. Currently, only the Master of Sciences Graduate Program is completely developed for the students training. This is taking place at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State University, MEPhI), where the fourth generation of Masters has graduated from in May 2003. The graduates are now working at nuclear-related governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, universities, and nuclear facilities. Development of the system to produce academically trained Russian MPC and A personnel is therefore well underway. MEPhI's MPC and A Engineering Degree Program which currently under development is considered in the paper. Analysis of MPC and A needs at Russian nuclear facilities has demonstrated the Engineering Degree Program is the best way to satisfy these needs and the resulting demands for MPC and A specialists at Russian nuclear enterprises. This paper discusses specific features of the Engineering Degree training required by Russian education legislation and the Russian system of quality control as applied to the training process. The paper summarizes the main joint actions undertaken during the past three years by MEPhI in collaboration with the US Department of Energy and US national laboratories to develop the MPC and A Engineering Degree Program in Russia. These actions include opening a new Engineering Degree specialty, Safeguards and Nonproliferation

  5. Development of the system for academic training of personnel engaged in nuclear material protection, control and accounting in Russia

    educational problems in area of nuclear materials physical protection, control and accountability (MPC and A) in Russia. General scheme of Russian educational system is considered with main emphasis on the directions under implementation now, namely academic training system, re-training system and specialists qualification upgrade system in MPC and A area. Russian academic training system consists of the educational programs at various levels: Bachelor of Sciences, Master of Sciences, Specialist (also referred to as an Engineer Degree), and professional re-training of the personnel already working in the nuclear field. Currently, only the Master of Sciences Graduate Program is completely developed for the students training. This is taking place at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State University, MEPhI), where the fourth generation of Masters has graduated from in May 2003. The graduates are now working at nuclear-related governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, universities, and nuclear facilities. Development of the system to produce academically trained Russian MPC and A personnel is therefore well underway. MEPhI's MPC and A Engineering Degree Program which currently under development is considered in the paper. Analysis of MPC and A needs at Russian nuclear facilities has demonstrated the Engineering Degree Program is the best way to satisfy these needs and the resulting demands for MPC and A specialists at Russian nuclear enterprises. This paper discusses specific features of the Engineering Degree training required by Russian education legislation and the Russian system of quality control as applied to the training process. The paper summarizes the main joint actions undertaken during the past three years by MEPhI in collaboration with the US Department of Energy and US national laboratories to develop the MPC and A Engineering Degree Program in Russia. These actions include opening a new Engineering Degree specialty, Safeguards and Nonproliferation

  6. The Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant Sustainability Program of Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting System Upgrades

    UEIP has been working on a comprehensive sustainability program that includes establishing a site sustainability working group, information gathering, planning, organizing, developing schedule and estimated costs, trhough joint UEIP-US DOE/NNSA National Laboratory sustainability contracts. Considerable efforts have been necessary in the sustainability planning, monitoring, and control of the scope of work using tools such as Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Project and SAP R/3. While information interchanges within the sustainability program provides adequate US assurances that US funds are well spent through its quarterly reporting methodology, proper information security and protection measures are taken throughout the process. Decommissioning of outdated equipment has also become part of determining sustainability requirements and processes. The site's sustainability program has facilitated the development of a transition plan toward eventual full Russian funding of sustaining nuclear security upgrades.

  7. Nuclear materials

    In 1996, 39 inspections of nuclear materials were performed, 22 of them performed in co-operation with IAEA inspectors. The main content of common inspections with IAEA was the inspection of both fresh and spent fuel in Bohunice NPPs and Mochovce NPPs. During 1996 there were 420 spent fuel assemblies transported from the V-1 and V-2 NPPs units to the interim spent fuel storage and 396 spent fuel assemblies were transported to the Dukovany NPP. Current state of stored spent fuel in the interim spent fuel storage is 4656 fuel assemblies, 4050 of them are Bohunice NPPs assemblies and 606 of them are fuel assemblies which belong to Dukovany NPP. There are 128 spent fuel assemblies stored in A-1 NPP, which are placed in cases of the long-term storage. Inspections of fresh fuel storage in the V-1, V-2 and Mochovce NPPs were performed, as well as spent fuel inspections in the A-1 NPP and in the interim spent fuel storage in Bohunice. From the outcomes of inspections resulted, that the limits and conditions, operating procedures and conditions of nuclear safety were not violated in any ease. There was no extraordinary event at above mentioned equipment during the 1996 and the equipment was reliably operated. NRA SR performed during 1996 eight inspections focused on safety protection of nuclear equipment and nuclear materials, and no significant deficiencies, which could resulted in extraordinary events or violation of nuclear safety were found out. Safety of transportation of fresh fuel, spent fuels, and other materials is discussed. NRA SR performed inspection focused on checking transportation readiness each transportation of the spent nuclear fuel. Serious deficiencies were not found out. Suggested system for treatment of radioactive materials caught at illegal trade is described. An attempt to export 3 radioactive sources in consignment of iron scrap to Italy came about in 1996. The NRA SR continued in co-operation with IAEA on updating IAEA database to illegal

  8. Co-operation between Ulba fuel fabrication plant, Kazakhstan and Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate to strengthen nuclear material accountancy and control at Ulba

    The first mission from SKI to Ulba fuel fabrication plant took place in 1992 about a year after the foundation of the Republic of Kazakhstan and at a time when the Kazakhstan nuclear authority was developing its form for operation. During the following years it was a strong political pressure on Kazakhstan to sign the NPT and to put its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. Ulba nuclear fuel fabrication plant had a long and successful history of fuel fabrication to the Soviet nuclear program but the nuclear accountancy was based strictly on economic criteria. The existing requirement of the Soviet times was reflected in plant layout and system design. For example the possibility to make an accurate physical inventory taking was not considered. To be able to conform to IAEA requirements a modern system for material accountancy and control had to be established. Ulba personnel, who got support in these activities chiefly by DOE (US) and SKI, Sweden, developed such a system in a remarkably short time. The Swedish activities consisted of, Training course in NMA and C at a fuel fabrication plant in Sweden Seminar on physical inventory taking and support to develop a plan for Ulba for the initial inventory taking. Assistance during the initial physical inventory taking at Ulba. Support to develop a 'Safeguards manual'. The safeguards agreement with IAEA entered into force in 1995 and since then annually physical inventory verifications (PIV) have taken place. An experience from these PIVs is that there is room for improvements in measurement accuracy especially concerning uranium contents in the large number of tanks in the plant. An EU project to provide Ulba with sophisticated equipment for mass/volume measurement in tanks of arbitrary shape is in progress under the leadership of JRC, Ispra. SKI also takes part in this project. SKI have also plans for the future to provide support to Ulba to reduce the material unaccounted for (MUF) at the PIVs

  9. Material control in nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. Part II. Accountability, instrumntation, and measurement techniques in fuel fabrication facilities, P.O.1236909. Final report

    This report describes the measurement techniques, the instrumentation, and the procedures used in accountability and control of nuclear materials, as they apply to fuel fabrication facilities. Some of the material included has appeared elswhere and it has been summarized. An extensive bibliography is included. A spcific example of application of the accountability methods to a model fuel fabrication facility which is based on the Westinghouse Anderson design

  10. Role of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the Laboratory to Laboratory Nuclear Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program

    Blasy, J.A.; Koncher, T.R.; Ruhter, W.D.

    1995-05-02

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is participating in a US Department of Energy sponsored multi-laboratory cooperative effort with the Russian Federation nuclear institutes to reduce risks of nuclear weapons proliferation by strengthening systems of nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting in both countries. This program is called the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program and it is designed to complement other US-Russian MPC&A programs such as the government-to-govermment (NunnLugar) programs. LLNL`s role in this program has been to collaborate with various Russian institutes in several areas. One of these is integrated safeguards and security planning and analysis, including the performing of vulnerability assessments. In the area of radiation measurements LLNL is cooperating with various institutes on gamma-ray measurement and analysis techniques for plutonium and uranium accounting. LLNL is also participating in physical security upgrades including entry control and portals.

  11. Materials accounting at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    The materials accounting system at Los Alamos has evolved from an ''80-column'' card system to a very sophisticated near-real-time computerized nuclear material accountability and safeguards system (MASS). The present hardware was designed and acquired in the late 70's and is scheduled for a major upgrade in fiscal year 1986. The history of the system from 1950 through the DYMAC of the late 70's up to the present will be discussed. The philosophy of the system along with the details of the system will be covered. This system has addressed the integrated problems of management, control, and accounting of nuclear material successfully. 8 refs., 3 figs., 1 tab

  12. Procedures for the accounting and control of nuclear materials in large research centres, as related to the needs of international safeguards

    In signatory states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear material is subject to the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA safeguards concept intended for nuclear material has, so far, been predominantly applied to nuclear facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is the aim of this report to consider the applicability of these control measures to a nuclear research centre. The report refers to the concrete example of the Juelich Nuclear Research Centre (KFA). The particular features of a nuclear research centre and the handling of nuclear material in the KFA are described. A review is given of the various licence areas and permitted handling quantities as well as of the inventories and flow of nuclear material. The concept of a control system for a nuclear research centre satisfying the operator's requirements, national requirement and international obligations at the same time is developed along these lines. The essential characteristic of the concept is a far-reaching clarity of the distribution of nuclear material items within the Nuclear Research Centre. The clarity desired will be achieved by means of an integrated accountancy system processing all necessary data with the aid of a central computer and remote terminals. The availability of information is based on differentiated material acountancy in conjunction with adequate measurement of nuclear material data. In the case of the KFA two groups are formed by research reactors and critical assemblies. Research institutes and central departments the permitted handling quantities of which do not exceed 5 eff.kg constitute a further group. Two further groups are formed for cases where the permitted handling quantities are above or below 1 eff.kg. The report shows the safeguards measures that can be applied in certain circumstances and conditions in a nuclear research centre

  13. Nuclear material operations manuals

    This manual is intended to provide a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations-management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of playscripts in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion

  14. Nuclear material operations manual

    Tyler, R.P.

    1981-02-01

    This manual provides a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia National Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations-management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of playscripts in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion.

  15. Nuclear material operations manual

    This manual provides a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia National Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations-management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of playscripts in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion

  16. Auditing nuclear materials statements

    A standard that may be used as a guide for persons making independent examinations of nuclear materials statements or reports regarding inventory quantities on hand, receipts, production, shipment, losses, etc. is presented. The objective of the examination of nuclear materials statements by the independent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which the statements present the nuclear materials position of a nuclear materials facility and the movement of such inventory materials for the period under review. The opinion is based upon an examination made in accordance with auditing criteria, including an evaluation of internal control, a test of recorded transactions, and a review of measured discards and materials unaccounted for (MUF). The standard draws heavily upon financial auditing standards and procedures published by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

  17. Guideline for Evaluating Analytical Chemistry Capabilities and Recommending Upgraded Methods and Instrumentation for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability at Russian Nuclear Facilities

    Russ, G.P.

    1999-10-21

    Analytical chemistry plays a key role in nuclear material control and accounting (MC and A). A large part of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) inventories and virtually all of the highly attractive SNM inventories are based on sampling bulk materials followed by destructive assay (DA) of these materials. These measurements support MC and A in process control, physical inventory verification, evaluation of the effects of process changes, detecting and resolving shipper-receiver differences, and the resolution of inspector-facility differences. When evaluating these important functions, US Project Teams need to carefully assess the existing Russian analytical chemistry capabilities and to specify appropriate upgrades where needed. This evaluation and the specification of upgrades have proven difficult, in part, because of the highly specialized and technical nature of DA and because of the wide variety of methods and applications. In addition, providing a DA capability to a Russian analytical laboratory requires much more than simply supplying new instrumentation. Experience has shown that DA upgrades at Russian analytical facilities require more support equipment than was originally anticipated by US Teams. The purpose of this guidance document is to: (1) recommend criteria for US Projects Teams to use in their evaluation of Russian DA capabilities; (2) provide a basis for selection of appropriate upgrades where capabilities are inadequate to support MC and A goals; and (3) to provide a list of Da methods suitable for MC and A with the following information: performance and applications information, strengths and limitations, and references and information on cost. Criteria for evaluating existing capabilities and determining appropriate upgrades are difficult to define. However, this is the basic information needed by the US project Teams. Section IV addresses these criteria.

  18. Guideline for Evaluating Analytical Chemistry Capabilities and Recommending Upgraded Methods and Instrumentation for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability at Russian Nuclear Facilities

    Analytical chemistry plays a key role in nuclear material control and accounting (MC and A). A large part of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) inventories and virtually all of the highly attractive SNM inventories are based on sampling bulk materials followed by destructive assay (DA) of these materials. These measurements support MC and A in process control, physical inventory verification, evaluation of the effects of process changes, detecting and resolving shipper-receiver differences, and the resolution of inspector-facility differences. When evaluating these important functions, US Project Teams need to carefully assess the existing Russian analytical chemistry capabilities and to specify appropriate upgrades where needed. This evaluation and the specification of upgrades have proven difficult, in part, because of the highly specialized and technical nature of DA and because of the wide variety of methods and applications. In addition, providing a DA capability to a Russian analytical laboratory requires much more than simply supplying new instrumentation. Experience has shown that DA upgrades at Russian analytical facilities require more support equipment than was originally anticipated by US Teams. The purpose of this guidance document is to: (1) recommend criteria for US Projects Teams to use in their evaluation of Russian DA capabilities; (2) provide a basis for selection of appropriate upgrades where capabilities are inadequate to support MC and A goals; and (3) to provide a list of Da methods suitable for MC and A with the following information: performance and applications information, strengths and limitations, and references and information on cost. Criteria for evaluating existing capabilities and determining appropriate upgrades are difficult to define. However, this is the basic information needed by the US project Teams. Section IV addresses these criteria

  19. System of accounting and control of nuclear materials (MCA) relative to IAEA safeguards and improvement of radioecological situation of the Joint Stock Company ULBA Metallurgical Plant

    Following goals must be accomplished following this Project : - Develop computerized and automated MCA data system; - Provide up-to-date and reliable accounting and control of availability and transfer of nuclear materials, detect loss or theft of nuclear materials; - Improve book keeping of nuclear materials, provide paperwork for raw materials and finished products sales and purchase control, process nuclear materials shipment data; - Reduce sampling error and to obtain precise measure of nuclear materials to obtain ESADRA target values; - Thorium concentrates transfer preliminary released from raw Beryllium to the new storage to prevent environment radiation pollution and obvious fire accidents; - Improve radioecological situation of the territory caused by old storage dismantling and decontamination of site; - Improve accounting, storing and Physical Protection of Thorium Following is the proposal to obtain goals of the Project : - Develop accounting and control systems - Develop basic standards and procedures for MCA system - Develop users specifications of MCA data system - Develop software of MCA data system - Assembly and adjustment of local network at the production facilities - Automated MCA data system personnel training - Develop measurement system - Determination of the mistakes in sampling and measurement of Uranium and isotopes content - Develop the procedures of sampling and measurement of Uranium and isotopes content providing ESADRA target values - Develop measure control program covering scales and analytical equipment and measuring methods - Develop software for measure control program support - Thorium shipment, decontamination and improvement of Physical Protection of Thorium storage - Accounting of Thorium containing materials when transferring to the new storage - Arrange storage decontamination - Develop new systems of Thorium Containment/Surveillance and Physical Protection

  20. On systematic error considering at measuring in the system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials

    The problems of metrological provisions in control over nuclear materials retaining which assure the required measurement accuracy at all stages of technological processes are discussed. The role of the so-called uneliminated component of the systematic error which characterizes its measurement uncertainty and error is estimated. It is shown that uneliminated component of systematic error should be regarded as a determinate value when estimating errors of concrete measuring means. The conclusion is made that treatment of uneliminated component of the systematic error for concrete measuring device as a random value creates potentialities for increase of unaccounted materials volume in some cases connected with nuclear materials retaining if the true value of this component becomes certain

  1. Collaborative Russian-US work in nuclear material protection, control and accounting at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. 3: Emphasis on site-wide issues

    During 1997, collaborative Russian-US nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) tasks at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk, Russia are focusing increasingly on site-wide issues, though there is continued work at several major facilities: the Fast Critical Facility, the Technological Laboratory for Fuel Fabrication, and the (new and existing) Central Storage Facility. The collaborative work is being done with US Department of Energy National Laboratories. IPPE's emphasis on site-wide issues has resulted in the formation of a separate division for MPC and A. This new division reports directly to the IPPE Chief Engineer. It is a separate scientific and engineering operating division responsible for coordination and harmonization of MPC and A at IPPE, as well as for audit, assessment and inspection. By virtue of the organizational independence of this new division, IPPE has significantly strengthened the role of MPC and A. Two specific site-wide accomplishments are the consolidation of nuclear material from many buildings to a smaller number, and, as a major part of this strategy, the construction of a nuclear island surrounding the Fast Critical Facility and the new Central Storage Facility. Most of IPPE's weapons-grade nuclear materials will be concentrated within the nuclear island. The paper summarizes the following technical elements: computerized accounting, bar coding, weight measurements, gamma-ray measurements, tamper indicating devices, procedures for physical inventory taking and material balance closure, and video monitoring systems for storage and critical assembly areas

  2. Annual Report 2007 - ABACC - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; Relatorio anual 2007 - ABACC - Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares

    NONE

    2007-07-01

    This document reports activities during the year 2007 related to: technical activities as application of safeguards; management of the Quadripartite Agreement and the SCCC - Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; training; technical cooperation; outlook for 2008 and; institutional, administrative and financial activities; technical glossary; list of brazilian facilities; list of argentine facilities and a list of institution of nuclear area.

  3. Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States to enhance the existing nuclear-material protection, control, and accounting systems at Mayak Production Association

    The Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) are engaged in joint, cooperative efforts to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation by enhancing Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC ampersand A) systems in both countries. Mayak Production Association (MPA) is a major Russian nuclear enterprise within the nuclear complex that is operated by MINATOM. This paper describes the nature, scope, and status of the joint, cooperative efforts to enhance existing MPC ampersand A systems at MPA. Current cooperative efforts are focused on enhancements to the existing MPC ampersand A systems at four plants that are operated by MPA and that produce, process, handle and/or store proliferation-sensitive nuclear materials

  4. Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States to enhance the existing nuclear-material protection, control, and accounting systems at Mayak Production Association

    The Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) are engaged in joint, cooperative efforts to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation by enhancing Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) systems in both countries. Mayak Production Association (Mayak) is a major Russian nuclear enterprise within the nuclear complex that is operated by MINATOM. This paper describes the nature, scope, and status of the joint, cooperative efforts to enhance existing MPC and A systems at Mayak. Current cooperative efforts are focused on enhancements to the existing MPC and A systems at two plants that are operated by Mayak and that produce, process, handle and/or store proliferation-sensitive nuclear materials

  5. Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the United States to Enhance the Existing Nuclear-Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Systems at Mayak Production Association

    The Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) are engaged in joint, cooperative efforts to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation by enhancing Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) systems in both countries. Mayak Production Association (Mayak) is a major Russian nuclear enterprise within the nuclear complex that is operated by lylINATOM. This paper describes the nature, scope, and status of the joint, cooperative efforts to enhance existing MPC and A systems at Mayak. Current cooperative efforts are focused on enhancements to the existing MPC and A systems at two of the plants operated by Mayak that work with proliferation-sensitive nuclear materials

  6. U.S. and Russian cooperative efforts to enhance nuclear material protection, control, and accountability at the Siberian Chemical Combine at Tomsk-7

    The US partners in the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Program in Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accountability (MPC and A) have reached signed agreements with the Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) to rapidly enhance the protection, control, and accountability of nuclear material at all of its facilities. SKhK is the largest multi-function production center of the Russian nuclear complex and, until recently, its facilities produced and processed special nuclear materials for the Russian Defense Ministry. SKhK produces heat and electricity, enriches uranium for commercial reactor fuel, reprocesses irradiated fuel, and converts highly enriched uranium metal into oxide for blending into low-enriched reactor-grade uranium, and manufactures civilian products. SKhK is aggressively pursuing a program to enhance MPC and A which includes the installation of pedestrian and vehicle radiation monitors, rapid inventory methods, tamper-indicating devices, computerized accounting systems, and physical protection measures. This work is a collaboration between technical experts from Brookhaven, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, pacific Northwest, and Sandia National Laboratories and their Russian counterparts at SKhK. This paper reviews the status of this initial effort and outlines plans for continuing the work in 1996

  7. Creating a comprehensive, efficient, and sustainable nuclear regulatory structure. A Process Report from the U.S. Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program

    This paper describes the strategies and process used by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) Regulatory Development Project (RDP) to restructure its support for MPC and A regulations in the Russian Federation. The RDP adopted a project management approach to defining, implementing, and managing an effective nuclear regulatory structure. This approach included defining and developing the regulatory documents necessary to provide the Russian Federation with a comprehensive regulatory structure that supports an effective and sustainable MPC and A Program in Russia. This effort began in February 2005, included a series of three multi-agency meetings in April, June, and July, and culminated in August 2005 in a mutually agreed-upon plan to define and populate the nuclear regulatory system in the Russian Federation for non-military, weapons-usable material. This nuclear regulatory system will address all non-military Category I and II nuclear material at the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), the Russian Agency for Industry (Rosprom), and the Federal Agency for Marine and River Transport (FAMRT) facilities; nuclear material in transport and storage; and nuclear material under the oversight of the Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervisory Service of Russia (Rostechnadzor). The Russian and U.S. MPC and A management teams approved the plan, and the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) NA-255, Office of Infrastructure and Sustainability (ONIS), is providing funding. The Regulatory Development Project is managed by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) NNSA

  8. Structure and experience of the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) in the German Democratic Republic

    The legislative basis, structure, functions, records and experience of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) are reviewed. The GDR's nuclear activities are characterized by research establishments and power reactors and by the absence of industrial bulk handling facilities such as fuel fabrication, reprocessing and enrichment plants. As a consequence both the national and the international safeguards approach can be based on the principles of item accountability which does not require the establishment of an elaborate measurement system. Right from the beginning the safeguards implemented were of the NPT type as the GDR was among the early parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The national rules and procedures of safeguards were thus established in harmony with the international requirements and have closely followed their development. The SSAC in the GDR is part of the comprehensive set-up of protective measures against the potential hazards in the use of nuclear energy under the National Board for Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection which has established a number of inspectorates, among them the inspection group for nuclear material control -the Nuclear Material Inspectorate. 5 figs., 2 tabs

  9. Cuban experiences in the establishment of a legal support to set up a national system of accounting for an control of nuclear materials

    It is described the legal support existing in Cuba for the establishment of the National System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear materials (SSAC). The current functional structure fits the particularities of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The new legal instruments in the subject of accounting for and control (a Decree and a Guide), in force since 1996, enhance the capabilities of before existing legal support for the establishment and functioning of the SSAC. It is described the general aspects of both new legal instruments. The peaceful character of the Cuban nuclear program has been demonstrated since their beginning. Then the most capital importance was given to aspects related with the accomplishment of the compromises of the signed safeguards agreements between Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). All the achievements had reached such level that our legal basis suits the compromises of comprehensive safeguards agreements. (author)

  10. Guidelines for implementation of the Decree of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission No. 28/1977 on the accountancy and inspection of nuclear materials

    The Guidelines provide a framework for the accountancy and inspection of nuclear materials and ensure realization of commitments following from the agreement between the Czechoslovak government and the IAEA concerning safeguards in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is stipulated that any organization that permanently or temporarily manufactures, uses or keeps nuclear materials covered by the Decree is obliged to keep records and take stock of nuclear materials and to submit periodical reports as defined by the Guidelines. The Guidelines set the beginning and end of record-keeping and define the record-keeping system. Conditions for obtaining a nuclear materials acquisition license are specified, and the responsibilities for implementation of the Guidelines are defined. Details of the nuclear materials record-keeping system and procedures are prescribed, including requirements put on physical stock taking. An overview of reports required from the organizations involved is given. Compliance with the requirements of the Guidelines is supervised by the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission and by IAEA Inspectors. The Guidelines entered into force on 1 April 1982. (J.B.)

  11. Professional Nuclear Materials Management

    This paper describes the scope of nuclear materials management for a typical power reactor in the United States of America. Since this power reactor is financed by private capital, one of the principal obligations of the reactor operator is to ensure that the investment is protected and will furnish an adequate financial return. Because of the high intrinsic value of nuclear materials, appropriate security and accountability must be continually exercised to minimize losses beyond security and accountability for the nuclear materials. Intelligent forethought and planning must be employed to ensure that additional capital is not lost as avoidable additional costs or loss of revenue in a number of areas. The nuclear materials manager must therefore provide in advance against the following contingencies and maintain constant control or liaison against deviations from planning during (a) pre-reactor acquisition of fuel and fuel elements, (b) in-reactor utilization of the fuel elements, and (c) post-reactor recovery of fuel values. During pre-reactor planning and operations, it is important that the fuel element be designed for economy in manufacture, handling, shipping, and replaceability. The time schedule for manufacturing operations must minimize losses of revenue from unproductive dead storage of high cost materials. For in-reactor operations, the maximum achievable burn-up of the fissionable material must be obtained by means of appropriate fuel rearrangement schemes. Concurrently the unproductive down-time of the reactor for fuel rearrangement, inspections, and the like must be minimized. In the post-reactor period, when the fuel has reached a predetermined depletion of fissionable material, the nuclear materials manager must provide for the most economical reprocessing and recovery of fissionable values and by-products. Nuclear materials management is consequently an essential factor in achieving competitive fuel cycle and unit energy costs with power reactors

  12. Evaluation Execution of Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials in MBA RI-E in Year 2002/2003

    This activity at the Development Center of Nuclear Fuel and Recycle Technology (P2TBDU) is carried out to obtain and existing problems of nuclear materials accounting. The evaluation is based on the available data and inspection result conducted by BAPETEN and IAEA. In accordance with duty and obligation as the director of nuclear installation, the director of Experimental Fuel Element Installation (EFEI) performed SSAC based on MBA RI-E structure. During this period, routine activities are carried out, with are recording, execution of PIT and report making. Recording is done by filling 2 (two) General Ledgers/Gls for natural uranium and depleted uranium, 14 (four teen) Subsidiary Ledgers/Sls for natural uranium and depleted uranium and also 2 (two) support documents (ICD) for transfer between MBAs and 2 ( two) support documents (IMT) for the transfer between KMPs. Reports made during this period are 2 (two) Inventory Change Report/ICRs, 1 (one) Physical Inventory Listing/PIL and 1 (one) Material Balance Report/MBR. In the execution of SSAC in this period, there are problems between recording which must be done by report maker and that of consumer, that is administrative mistake in document number of Internal Material Transfer (IMT), problems in management of SSAC in which fluent communications system in data transfer from operating data to accounting data have not been established, and problems due to weight difference in each interval of measurements, because of the water content in the material. These problems have resulted in the frequent finding by inspectors during the execution of nuclear material physical of inventory taking which should have been anticipated. For that reason good cooperation is required with the nuclear material consumer in MBA RI-E and supported by knowledge of SSAC improvements in the future. (author)

  13. Proposals for the Future Development of the Russian Automated Federal Information System for Nuclear Material Control and Accounting: The Universal Reporting Concept

    Development of the automated Russian Federation Federal Information System for Nuclear Material Control and Accounting (FIS) started in 1996. From the beginning, the creation of the FIS was based on the concept of obtaining data from the material balance areas of the organizations, which would enable the system to collect detailed information on nuclear material. In December 2000, the organization-level summarized reporting method was mandated by the Russian Federation and subsequently implemented for all organizations. Analysis of long-term FIS objectives, reporting by all the MBAs in Russia, showed that the present summarized reporting approach decreed by regulations posed a fair number of problems. We need alternative methods that allow the FIS to obtain more detailed information on nuclear material but which accurately reflect the technical and economic resources available to Russian organizations. One possible solution is the universal reporting method. In August 2003, the proposals of the FIS working group to transition to the universal reporting method were approved at the fourth meeting of the Joint Coordinating Committee for Implementation of the Russian Federation and U.S. Government-to-Government Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Material Physical Protection, Control and Accounting (JCC). One of the important elements of universal reporting is that organizations handling nuclear material will establish 'reporting areas' in cooperation with MinAtom of Russia. A reporting area may consist of one MBA, several MBAs, or even an entire organization. This paper will discuss the universal reporting concept and its major objectives and methods for the FIS.

  14. Measuring the safeguards value of material accountability

    Material accountability (MA) activities focus on providing after-the-fact indication of diversion or theft of special nuclear material (SNM). MA activities include maintaining records for tracking nuclear material and conducting periodic inventories and audits to ensure that loss has not occurred. This paper presents a value model concept for assessing the safeguards benefits of MA activities and for comparing these benefits to those provided by physical protection (PP) and material control (MC) components. The model considers various benefits of MA, which include: 1) providing information to assist in recovery of missing material, 2) providing assurance that physical protection and material control systems have been working, 3) defeating protracted theft attempts, and 4) properly resolving causes of and responding appropriately to anomalies of missing material and external alarms (e.g., hoax). Such a value model can aid decision-makers in allocating safeguards resources among PP, MC, and MA systems

  15. Analysis of a nuclear material accounting uncertainty for ACP spent fuel standards. MCNPX and ORIGEN-S code simulations

    The target nuclide to be measured by using a neutron coincidence counter is Cm-244 for the PWR spent fuel since the dominant neutron-emitting source is Cm-244 for the spent fuel. Spent fuel standards (SFS) are usually used to calibrate the neutron coincidence counter for nuclear material measurements of spent fuel. To make the best selection and minimize the measurement uncertainty of neutron coincidence counter for the SFS, expected measurement errors for several kinds of burnups were obtained by using the ORIGEN-S code and the expected singles and doubles count rates were also acquired by using MCNPX code. The expected doubles count errors for 1 pellet of spent fuel are less than 4% for a burnup from 27 to 40 GWD/MtU. Considering everything, a higher burnup of the spent fuel seems to be better to obtain more accurate data from a nuclear material measurement by using a neutron coincidence counter than that of a lower burnup. (author)

  16. Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation

    Powell, Danny H [ORNL; Elwood Jr, Robert H [ORNL; Roche, Charles T [ORNL

    2011-01-01

    The technical objectives of nuclear safeguards are (1) the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown and (2) the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards and security program must address both outsider threats and insider threats. Outsider threats are primarily addressed by the physical protection system. Insider threats can be any level of personnel at the site including passive or active insiders that could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion. This could occur by an individual acting alone or by collusion between an individual with material control and accountability (MC&A) responsibilities and another individual who has responsibility or control within both the physical protection and the MC&A systems. The insider threat is one that must be understood and incorporated into the safeguards posture. There have been more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The insider has access, authority, and knowledge, as well as a set of attributes, that make him/her difficult to detect. An integrated safeguards program is designed as a defense-in-depth system that seeks to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, to provide early detection of any unauthorized attempt to remove nuclear material, and to rapidly respond to any attempted removal of nuclear material. The program is also designed to support protection against sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, program continuity, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. Nuclear MC&A play an essential role in the capabilities of an integrated safeguards system to deter and detect theft or diversion of nuclear material. An integrated safeguards system with

  17. ABACC - Brazil-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, a model of integration and transparence; ABACC - Agencia Brasileno-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares, un ejemplo de integracion y transparencia

    Oliveira, Antonio A.; Do Canto, Odilon Marcusso, E-mail: oliveira@abacc.org.br, E-mail: odilon@abacc.org.br [Agencia Brasileno Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2013-07-01

    Argentina and Brazil began its activities in the nuclear area about the same time, in the 50 century past. The existence of an international nuclear nonproliferation treaty-TNP-seen by Brazil and Argentina as discriminatory and prejudicial to the interests of the countries without nuclear weapons, led to the need for a common system of control of nuclear material between the two countries to somehow provide assurances to the international community of the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programs. The creation of a common system, assured the establishment of uniform procedures to implement safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, so the same requirements and safeguards procedures took effect in both countries, and the operators of nuclear facilities began to follow the same rules of control of nuclear materials and subjected to the same type of verification and control. On July 18, 1991, the Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy created a binational body, the Argentina-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials-ABACC-to implement the so-called Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear materials - SCCC. The deal provided, permanently, a clear commitment to use exclusively for peaceful purposes all material and nuclear facilities under the jurisdiction or control of the two countries. The Quadripartite Agreement, signed in December of that year, between the two countries, ABACC and IAEA completed the legal framework for the implementation of comprehensive safeguards system. The 'model ABACC' now represents a paradigmatic framework in the long process of economic, political, technological and cultural integration of the two countries. Argentina and Brazil were able to establish a guarantee system that is unique in the world today and that consolidated and matured over more than twenty years, has earned the respect of the international community.

  18. Nuclear material control in Brazil

    A general view about the safeguards activities in Brazil is presented. The national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials is described. The safeguards agreements signed by Brazil are presented, the facilities and nuclear material under these agreements are listed, and the dificulties on the pratical implementation are discussed. (E.G.)

  19. Nuclear material control in Spain

    A general view about the safeguards activities in Spain is presented. The national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials is described. The safeguards agreements signed by Spain are presented and the facilities and nuclear materials under these agreements are listed. (E.G.)

  20. Nuclear materials in Japan

    2015-03-01

    The incident at Fukushima Daiichi brought materials in the nuclear industry into the spotlight. Nature Materials talks to Tatsuo Shikama, Director of the International Research Centre for Nuclear Materials, Institute for Materials Research, Tohoku University, about the current situation.

  1. Annual Report ABACC 2009 - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; Relatorio anual 2009 - Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares (ABACC)

    NONE

    2009-07-01

    This document reports the actives during the year 2009 related to: technical activities as application of safeguards; management of the Quadripartite Agreement and the SCCC - Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; training; technical cooperation; institutional, administrative and financial activities; perspectives for 2010; list of inspectors; list of Brazilian and Argentine facilities subject to the Quadripartite Agreement

  2. IAEA Support for Building-Up a Highly Skilled Workforce Necessary for an Effective State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material

    The need for highly qualified and well trained experts in the area of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation has been emphasized at several International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conferences and Board of Governors' meetings. To meet this need, the IAEA has developed a training programme dedicated to assisting Member States in building-up knowledge, skills and attitudes required for the sustainable establishment and maintenance of an effective State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. The IAEA training programme in the area of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation is designed for experts in governmental organizations, regulatory bodies, utilities and relevant industries and is provided on a regular basis at the regional and international level and, upon request, at the national level. It is based on training needs assessed, inter alia, during relevant IAEA advisory services and is updated periodically by applying the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT). In the framework of this human resources assistance programme, the IAEA also facilitates fellowship programmes for young professionals, regularly hosts the IAEA safeguards traineeship programme and supports safeguards related outreach activities organized by donor countries, universities or other institutions. This paper provides an overview of the IAEA's efforts in the area of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation training and education, including assistance to Member States' initiatives and nuclear education networks, focusing on the development and delivery of nuclear safeguards training and academic courses. Further, it discusses the important role of IAEA advisory missions and other mechanisms that significantly contribute to the continuous improvement of the IAEA Member States training in the area of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. Finally, it outlines the forthcoming eLearning module on Safeguards that will complement the existing training

  3. On the activities in building a computerized system of nuclear materials accounting and control at the SChK radiochemical plant

    The project: Development of the nuclear materials (NM) control and accountancy system model on the example of the SCP Radiochemical Plant (RCP) has been fulfilled by the Siberian Chemical Plant in collaboration with a number of organization since October 1992 through October 1996. One of the key goals of the project was the use of new criteria and approaches to NM control and accounting, including step-by-step implementation for all the NM flows measurement principles. The work on project has resulted in the development of the model for NM control and accountancy system at RCP. When designing the model, the single RCP balance area on uranium and plutonium was broken down to four NM balance areas. The model developed within the project is being implemented in a few ways: introduction of innovative NM measurement techniques, working out regulatory documents, adaptation of computers for control and accountancy. An aim to secure safety in the most problematic area MBA-2 (plutonium dioxide production) transition to the real-time cannot be resolved without implementation of computerized system of NM control and accountancy

  4. HB-Line Material Control and Accountability Measurements at SRS

    Presently, HB-Line work at the Savannah River Site consists primarily of the stabilization and packaging of nuclear materials for storage and the characterization of materials for disposition in H-Area. In order to ensure compliance with Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) Regulations, accountability measurements are performed throughout the HB-Line processes. Accountability measurements are used to keep track of the nuclear material inventory by constantly updating the amount of material in the MBAs (Material Balance Area) and sub-MBAs. This is done by subtracting the amount of accountable material that is added to a process and by adding the amount of accountable material that is put back in storage. A Physical Inventory is taken and compared to the ''Book Value'' listed in the Nuclear Material Accounting System. The difference (BPID) in the Book Inventory minus the Physical Inventory of a sub-account for bulk material must agree within the measurement errors combined in quadrature to provide assurance that nuclear material is accounted for. This work provides an overview of HB-Line processes and accountability measurements. The Scrap Recovery Line and Neptunium-237/Plutonium-239 Oxide Line are described and sampling and analyses for Phase II are provided. Recommendations for improvements are provided to improve efficiency and cost effectiveness

  5. Global nuclear material control model

    The nuclear danger can be reduced by a system for global management, protection, control, and accounting as part of a disposition program for special nuclear materials. The development of an international fissile material management and control regime requires conceptual research supported by an analytical and modeling tool that treats the nuclear fuel cycle as a complete system. Such a tool must represent the fundamental data, information, and capabilities of the fuel cycle including an assessment of the global distribution of military and civilian fissile material inventories, a representation of the proliferation pertinent physical processes, and a framework supportive of national or international perspective. They have developed a prototype global nuclear material management and control systems analysis capability, the Global Nuclear Material Control (GNMC) model. The GNMC model establishes the framework for evaluating the global production, disposition, and safeguards and security requirements for fissile nuclear material

  6. Co-operation agreement. The text of the agreement of 25 May 1998 between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for accounting and control of nuclear materials

    The document reproduces the text of the Co-operation Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials which entered into force on 25 May 1998

  7. Code HEX-Z-DMG for support of accounting for and control of nuclear material software system as part of international safeguards system at BN-350 site

    A code for the computation of the global neutron distribution in the three-dimensional hexagonal-z geometry and multi-group diffusion approximation was developed at BN-350 as the main part of the BN-350 accounting for and control of nuclear material software system. This software system includes: the model for stationary distributions of neutrons; the model to calculate isotope compositions changing; the model of refueling operations; To develop this system next two principal problems were solved: to make a micro cross sections library for all nuclides for the BN-350 reactor core; to develop the code for the computation of the global neutron distribution. To solve first task the twenty-six-energy-groups micro cross sections library for more than seventy nuclides was produced. To solve second task the three-dimensional hexagonal-z geometry and multi-group diffusion approximation code was developed. This code (HEX-Z-DMG) was based on the solution of the multi groups diffusion equation using the standard net approach. The series of calculations was performed in the twenty-six-energy-groups representation using this code. We compared eigenvalues (keff), a worth added during refueling operations, spatial and energy-group-dependent neutron flux distributions with results of calculation using other code (DIF3D). After the series of these calculations we can say that the HEX-Z-DMG code is well established to use as the part of the BN-350 accounting for and control of nuclear material software system. (author)

  8. Materials control and accountability auditor training

    As the Department of Energy (DOE) works to standardize the training for individuals performing materials control and accountability (MC and A) functions, the need for a definition of the appropriate training for MC and A auditors has become apparent. In order to meet the DOE requirement for individual training plans for all staff performing MC and A functions, the following set of guidelines was developed for consideration as applicable to MC and A auditors. The application of these guidelines to specific operating environments at individual DOE sites may require modification to some of the tables. The paper presents one method of developing individual training programs for an MC and A auditor or for an MC and A audit group based on the requirements for internal audits and assessments included in DOE Order 5633.3, Control and Accountability for Nuclear Materials

  9. Creating a Comprehensive, Efficient, and Sustainable Nuclear Regulatory Structure: A Process Report from the U.S. Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program

    With the congressionally mandated January 1, 2013 deadline for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) program to complete its transition of MPC and A responsibility to the Russian Federation, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) management directed its MPC and A program managers and team leaders to demonstrate that work in ongoing programs would lead to successful and timely achievement of these milestones. In the spirit of planning for successful project completion, the NNSA review of the Russian regulatory development process confirmed the critical importance of an effective regulatory system to a sustainable nuclear protection regime and called for an analysis of the existing Russian regulatory structure and the identification of a plan to ensure a complete MPC and A regulatory foundation. This paper describes the systematic process used by DOE's MPC and A Regulatory Development Project (RDP) to develop an effective and sustainable MPC and A regulatory structure in the Russian Federation. This nuclear regulatory system will address all non-military Category I and II nuclear materials at State Corporation for Atomic Energy 'Rosatom,' the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight (Rostechnadzor), the Federal Agency for Marine and River Transport (FAMRT, within the Ministry of Transportation), and the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg). The approach to ensuring a complete and comprehensive nuclear regulatory structure includes five sequential steps. The approach was adopted from DOE's project management guidelines and was adapted to the regulatory development task by the RDP. The five steps in the Regulatory Development Process are: (1) Define MPC and A Structural Elements; (2) Analyze the existing regulatory documents using the identified Structural Elements; (3) Validate the analysis with Russian colleagues and define the list of documents to be

  10. ABACC: annual report 2012 - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; ABACC: informe annual 2012 - Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares

    NONE

    2012-07-01

    This document reports the actives during the year 2012 related to: technical activities as safeguards application and advances in application of safeguards; main activities conducted in Brazil and main activities developed at ABACC headquarters; management of the Quadripartite Agreement and of the SCCC - Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; training; technical cooperation; institutional, administrative and financial activities; perspectives for 2013; list of inspectors; list of Brazilian and Argentine facilities subject to the Quadripartite Agreement.