WorldWideScience

Sample records for accident reports

  1. Accident report 1975/76

    The statistics previously published on the development of accidents were completed. It is the purpose of this accident report: 1) to present a survey of the development of the number of accidents (no radiation accidents) for the years 1960 - 1976, 2) to break down the accidents by different characteristics in order to be able to recognize the preventive measures to be taken so as to avoid further accidents, 3) to report about accidents experienced and to indicate activities performed with respect to accident prevention and health protection. (orig.)

  2. FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM (FARS)

    The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) database consist of three relational tables, containing data on automobile accidents on public U.S. roads that resulted in the death of one or more people within 30 days of the accident. Truck and trailer accidents are also included.

  3. 49 CFR 835.11 - Obtaining Board accident reports, factual accident reports, and supporting information.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Obtaining Board accident reports, factual accident... Board accident reports, factual accident reports, and supporting information. It is the responsibility... obtain Board accident reports, factual accident reports, and accompanying accident docket files....

  4. 49 CFR 845.40 - Accident report.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident report. 845.40 Section 845.40... RULES OF PRACTICE IN TRANSPORTATION; ACCIDENT/INCIDENT HEARINGS AND REPORTS Board Reports § 845.40 Accident report. (a) The Board will issue a detailed narrative accident report in connection with...

  5. 49 CFR 195.54 - Accident reports.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident reports. 195.54 Section 195.54... PIPELINE Annual, Accident, and Safety-Related Condition Reporting § 195.54 Accident reports. (a) Each operator that experiences an accident that is required to be reported under § 195.50 shall as soon...

  6. 49 CFR 801.32 - Accident reports.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident reports. 801.32 Section 801.32... PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION Accident Investigation Records § 801.32 Accident reports. (a) The NTSB....S. civil transportation accidents, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 1131(e). (b) These reports may...

  7. 49 CFR 230.22 - Accident reports.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident reports. 230.22 Section 230.22... Requirements § 230.22 Accident reports. In the case of an accident due to failure, from any cause, of a steam... persons, the railroad on whose line the accident occurred shall immediately make a telephone report of...

  8. Internal Accident Report on EDH

    SC Department

    2006-01-01

    The A2 Safety Code requires that, the Internal Accident Report form must be filled in by the person concerned or any witness to ensure that all the relevant services are informed. Please note that an electronic version of this form has been elaborated in collaboration with SC-IE, HR-OPS-OP and IT-AIS. Whenever possible, the electronic form shall be used. The relative icon is available on the EDH Desktop, Other tasks page, under the Safety heading, or directly here: https://edh.cern.ch/Document/Accident/. If you have any questions, please contact the SC Secretariat, tel. 75097 Please notice that the Internal Accident Report is an integral part of the Safety Code A2 and does not replace the HS50.

  9. 49 CFR 229.17 - Accident reports.

    2010-10-01

    ... CFR part 225. ... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident reports. 229.17 Section 229.17..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE SAFETY STANDARDS General § 229.17 Accident reports. (a)...

  10. Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    On the evening of April 20, 2010, a well control event allowed hydrocarbons to escape from the Macondo well onto Transocean's Deepwater Horizon, resulting in explosions and fire on the rig. Eleven people lost their lives, and 17 others were injured. The fire, which was fed by hydrocarbons from the well, continued for 36 hours until the rig sank. Hydrocarbons continued to flow from the reservoir through the wellbore and the blowout preventer (BOP) for 87 days, causing a spill of national significance. BP Exploration and Production Inc. was the lease operator of Mississippi Canyon Block 252, which contains the Macondo well. BP formed an investigation team that was charged with gathering the facts surrounding the accident, analyzing available information to identify possible causes and making recommendations to enable prevention of similar accidents in the future. The BP investigation team began its work immediately in the aftermath of the accident, working independently from other BP spill response activities and organizations. The ability to gather information was limited by a scarcity of physical evidence and restricted access to potentially relevant witnesses. The team had access to partial real-time data from the rig, documents from various aspects of the Macondo well's development and construction, witness interviews and testimony from public hearings. The team used the information that was made available by other companies, including Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron. Over the course of the investigation, the team involved over 50 internal and external specialists from a variety of fields: safety, operations, subsea, drilling, well control, cementing, well flow dynamic modeling, BOP systems and process hazard analysis. This report presents an analysis of the events leading up to the accident, eight key findings related to the causal chain of events and recommendations to enable the prevention of a similar accident. The investigation team worked

  11. Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report

    On the evening of April 20, 2010, a well control event allowed hydrocarbons to escape from the Macondo well onto Transocean's Deepwater Horizon, resulting in explosions and fire on the rig. Eleven people lost their lives, and 17 others were injured. The fire, which was fed by hydrocarbons from the well, continued for 36 hours until the rig sank. Hydrocarbons continued to flow from the reservoir through the wellbore and the blowout preventer (BOP) for 87 days, causing a spill of national significance. BP Exploration and Production Inc. was the lease operator of Mississippi Canyon Block 252, which contains the Macondo well. BP formed an investigation team that was charged with gathering the facts surrounding the accident, analyzing available information to identify possible causes and making recommendations to enable prevention of similar accidents in the future. The BP investigation team began its work immediately in the aftermath of the accident, working independently from other BP spill response activities and organizations. The ability to gather information was limited by a scarcity of physical evidence and restricted access to potentially relevant witnesses. The team had access to partial real-time data from the rig, documents from various aspects of the Macondo well's development and construction, witness interviews and testimony from public hearings. The team used the information that was made available by other companies, including Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron. Over the course of the investigation, the team involved over 50 internal and external specialists from a variety of fields: safety, operations, subsea, drilling, well control, cementing, well flow dynamic modeling, BOP systems and process hazard analysis. This report presents an analysis of the events leading up to the accident, eight key findings related to the causal chain of events and recommendations to enable the prevention of a similar accident. The investigation team worked separately

  12. 76 FR 55079 - Recreational Vessel Accident Reporting

    2011-09-06

    ... notice regarding our public dockets in the January 17, 2008 issue of the Federal Register (73 FR 3316... SECURITY Coast Guard Recreational Vessel Accident Reporting AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION: Notice of... to improve the recreational boating accident reporting process. NBSAC recommended that the...

  13. 22 CFR 102.17 - Reports on accident.

    2010-04-01

    ... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Reports on accident. 102.17 Section 102.17... Accidents Abroad Foreign Aircraft Accidents Involving United States Persons Or Property § 102.17 Reports on accident. When an accident occurs to a foreign aircraft in the district of a Foreign Service post...

  14. 33 CFR 173.55 - Report of casualty or accident.

    2010-07-01

    ... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Report of casualty or accident... (CONTINUED) BOATING SAFETY VESSEL NUMBERING AND CASUALTY AND ACCIDENT REPORTING Casualty and Accident Reporting § 173.55 Report of casualty or accident. (a) The operator of a vessel shall submit the casualty...

  15. Internal Accident Report: fill it out!

    2012-01-01

    It is important to report all accidents, near-misses and dangerous situations so that they can be avoided in the future.   Reporting these events allows the relevant services to take appropriate action and implement corrective and preventive measures. It should be noted that the routing of the internal accident report was recently changed to make sure that the people who need to know are informed. Without information, corrective action is not possible. Without corrective action, there is a risk that the events will recur. As soon as you experience or see something amiss, fill out an internal accident report! If you have any questions the HSE Unit will be happy to answer them. Contact us at safety-general@cern.ch. The HSE Unit

  16. 33 CFR 401.81 - Reporting an accident.

    2010-07-01

    ... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Reporting an accident. 401.81... an accident. (a) Where a vessel on the Seaway is involved in an accident or a dangerous occurrence, the master of the vessel shall report the accident or occurrence, pursuant to the requirements of...

  17. 36 CFR 1004.4 - Report of motor vehicle accident.

    2010-07-01

    ... accident. 1004.4 Section 1004.4 Parks, Forests, and Public Property PRESIDIO TRUST VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC SAFETY § 1004.4 Report of motor vehicle accident. (a) The operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in property damage, personal injury or death shall report the accident to the...

  18. 76 FR 30855 - Accident/Incident Reporting Requirements

    2011-05-27

    ... accident/incident report (NTSB Recommendation Number RAR-05/02). See 75 FR 68891. However, upon further... NTSB Railroad Accident Report Number 05/02 (RAR 05/02). See 75 FR 68891. To clarify, FRA added Train... Equipment Accident/Incident Report.'' See 75 FR 68897. The codes represent the type of territory...

  19. Severe Accident Test Station Activity Report

    Pint, Bruce A [ORNL; Terrani, Kurt A [ORNL

    2015-06-01

    Enhancing safety margins in light water reactor (LWR) severe accidents is currently the focus of a number of international R&D programs. The current UO2/Zr-based alloy fuel system is particularly susceptible since the Zr-based cladding experiences rapid oxidation kinetics in steam at elevated temperatures. Therefore, alternative cladding materials that offer slower oxidation kinetics and a smaller enthalpy of oxidation can significantly reduce the rate of heat and hydrogen generation in the core during a coolant-limited severe accident. In the U.S. program, the high temperature steam oxidation performance of accident tolerant fuel (ATF) cladding solutions has been evaluated in the Severe Accident Test Station (SATS) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) since 2012. This report summarizes the capabilities of the SATS and provides an overview of the oxidation kinetics of several candidate cladding materials. A suggested baseline for evaluating ATF candidates is a two order of magnitude reduction in the steam oxidation resistance above 1000ºC compared to Zr-based alloys. The ATF candidates are categorized based on the protective external oxide or scale that forms during exposure to steam at high temperature: chromia, alumina, and silica. Comparisons are made to literature and SATS data for Zr-based alloys and other less-protective materials.

  20. Report on the radiological accident in Goiania, Goias, Brazil

    The report describes the radiological accident occured in Goiania, Brazil, in september 1987. The following aspects concerning the accident are presented in specific chapters: 1- evaluation of the accident and the first aids, 2- attendance to the victims of Goiania radiological accident, 3- decontamination, 4- radioactive wastes arising from the accident, 5- working personnel and technical cooperation, 6- equipments and 7- radiation protection: limits and recommendations

  1. Latest report about health effects of the chernobyl accident

    After twenty years of Chernobyl accident, the international conference was hold in Kyiv, Ukraine, 24-26, April in 2006. During the conference WHO declares the paper named health effects of the Chernobyl accident. The report look back the nuclear accident in the history, and then recite conclusion about health effects of the Chernobyl accident, which from doses received from the Chernobyl accident, thyroid cancer, non-thyroid solid cancer, leukemia, mortality, cataract and cardiovascular disease. The report is considered as milestone events in the studying of health effects of Chernobyl accident. (authors)

  2. 36 CFR 4.4 - Report of motor vehicle accident.

    2010-07-01

    ... accident. 4.4 Section 4.4 Parks, Forests, and Public Property NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC SAFETY § 4.4 Report of motor vehicle accident. (a) The operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in property damage, personal injury or death shall report...

  3. Research investigation report on Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident

    This report was issued in February 2012 by Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation's Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, which consisted of six members from the private sector in independent positions and with no direct interest in the business of promoting nuclear power. Commission aimed to determine the truth behind the accident by clarifying the various problems and reveal systematic problems behind these issues so as to create a new starting point by identifying clear lessons learned. Report composed of four chapters; (1) progression of Fukushima accident and resulting damage (accident management after Fukushima accident, and effects and countermeasure of radioactive materials discharged into the environment), (2) response against Fukushima accident (emergency response of cabinet office against nuclear disaster, risk communication and on-site response against nuclear disaster), (3) analysis of historical and structural factors (technical philosophy of nuclear safety, problems of nuclear safety regulation of Fukushima accident, safety regulatory governance and social background of 'Safety Myth'), (4) Global Context (implication in nuclear security, Japan in nuclear safety regime, U.S.-Japan relations for response against Fukushima accident, lessons learned from Fukushima accident - aiming at creation of resilience). Report could identify causes of Fukushima accident and factors related to resulting damages, show the realities behind failure to prevent the spread of damage, and analyze the overall structural and historical background behind the accidents. (T. Tanaka)

  4. National Differences in Reporting of Work Accidents at Sea

    Grøn, Sisse; Knudsen, Fabienne

    National Differences in Reporting of Work Accidents at Sea Grøn, S and Knudsen, F Centre for Maritime Health and Safety, University of Southern Denmark Filipinos working on Danish ships experience less work accidents than their Danish colleagues if we are to believe the various statistics available....... There are indications suggesting that this is due to differences in reporting and safety culture alike. In a new project, Safety Culture and Reporting Practice on Danish ships in the Danish International Ship Register (SADIS), we will therefore seek answers to what factors act as incentives or barriers...... about national differences in work accident reporting....

  5. Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Chernobyl Accident

    The accident, which occurred on April 26 of 1986 at the fourth unit of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union, was the unprecedented accident in terms of, among other things, structural damages given to the reactor, an amount of radioactive materials released to the environment, and a number of casualties resulting from the accident. Investigation and analysis of the accident were conducted at JAERI by forming the Ad hoc Committee on the Chernobyl Accident within the organization under which Task Group A was responsible for the design and characteristics of the reactor and the accident sequence and Task Group B was responsible for behavior of radioactive materials and radiological consequences to the environment. The present report is the summary of the investigations and analyses which were carried out by the committee. (author)

  6. 78 FR 6732 - Changes to Standard Numbering System, Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report...

    2013-01-31

    ..., Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report Database AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION: Rule... to numbering undocumented vessels and reporting boating accidents. The amendment affects three... agencies involved in issuing vessel registration and reporting boating accidents. This notice...

  7. Accidents in the construction industry in the Netherlands: An analysis of accident reports using Storybuilder

    As part of an ongoing effort by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands, a research project is being undertaken to construct a causal model for occupational risk. This model should provide quantitative insight into the causes and consequences of occupational accidents. One of the components of the model is a tool to systematically classify and analyse reports of past accidents. This tool 'Storybuilder' was described in earlier papers. In this paper, Storybuilder is used to analyse the causes of accidents reported in the database of the Dutch Labour Inspectorate involving people working in the construction industry. Conclusions are drawn on measures to reduce the accident probability. Some of these conclusions are contrary to common beliefs in the industry

  8. Group unified accident reporting database (GUARD)

    Significant advances have been made in recent years in enhancing the standard of safety within Shell Companies, such that safety has now been raised to a status equal to other primary business objectives. It is widely accepted that accident prevention is part of good business practice, and that a safe operation is normally an efficient operation. Safety programmes are being widely implemented which involve all employees from top management right down to the workforce including the contract staff, and the benefits are being realized. The effectiveness of any safety programme, however, must be continuously monitored, and in this respect injury and accident statistics play an important role as a prime indicator of safety performance. Statistics form part of the safety management process indicating the success of the safety programmes being implemented, and highlighting areas of weakness. Statistical information relating to the number and frequency of accidents, significant as it is, tells us little about how the accidents occur, or about how to improve the intrinsic safety of the operations. More detailed information on accident causes and lessons derived from the investigation of non-injurious accidents and near-misses is required for this, and for the setting of appropriate remedial actions. This paper concentrates on the feedback from accidents which have already occurred. This feedback plays a vital role as an indicator of safety performance upon which to judge the effectiveness of safety programmes, and also to provide important information relating to the immediate and underlying causes of accidents. To meet these requirements, however, a system for recording analyzing and communicating safety data is essential

  9. Report on the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station

    This report presents the compilation of information obtained by various organizations regarding the accident (and the consequences of the accident) that occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl in the USSR on April 26, 1986. The various authors are identified in a footnote to each chapter. An overview of the report is provided. Very briefly the other chapters cover: the design of the Chernobyl nuclear station Unit 4; safety analyses for Unit 4; the accident scenario; the role of the operator; an assessment of the radioactive release, dispersion, and transport; the activities associated with emergency actions; and information on the health and environmental consequences from the accident. These subjects cover the major aspects of the accident that have the potential to present new information and lessons for the nuclear industry in general

  10. Severe accident approach - final report. Evaluation of design measures for severe accident prevention and consequence mitigation.

    Tentner, A. M.; Parma, E.; Wei, T.; Wigeland, R.; Nuclear Engineering Division; SNL; INL

    2010-03-01

    An important goal of the US DOE reactor development program is to conceptualize advanced safety design features for a demonstration Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR). The treatment of severe accidents is one of the key safety issues in the design approach for advanced SFR systems. It is necessary to develop an in-depth understanding of the risk of severe accidents for the SFR so that appropriate risk management measures can be implemented early in the design process. This report presents the results of a review of the SFR features and phenomena that directly influence the sequence of events during a postulated severe accident. The report identifies the safety features used or proposed for various SFR designs in the US and worldwide for the prevention and/or mitigation of Core Disruptive Accidents (CDA). The report provides an overview of the current SFR safety approaches and the role of severe accidents. Mutual understanding of these design features and safety approaches is necessary for future collaborations between the US and its international partners as part of the GEN IV program. The report also reviews the basis for an integrated safety approach to severe accidents for the SFR that reflects the safety design knowledge gained in the US during the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) and Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) programs. This approach relies on inherent reactor and plant safety performance characteristics to provide additional safety margins. The goal of this approach is to prevent development of severe accident conditions, even in the event of initiators with safety system failures previously recognized to lead directly to reactor damage.

  11. Preliminary report about Goiania radiological accident, Brazil

    The events that originate the Goiania radiological accident involving the rupture of Cesium 137 source, the source characteristics, the medical aspects related to the triage of victims, the medical attendance, and the special measurements of decontamination in the Goiania General Hospital (HGG), are described. (M.C.K.)

  12. Summary report on the post-accident review meeting on the Chernobyl accident

    After an Executive Summary which gives an overview of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor, the first section of the main INSAG report presents the understanding of INSAG members of the causes of the accident, concluding that it was the result of a remarkable range of human errors and violation of operating rules, in combination with specific reactor features which compounded and amplified the effects of the errors and led to the reactivity excursion. The second section presents the problem of radionuclide release from the damaged reactor, showing that there was an initial intense release associated with the destructive events in the accident, then the release rates fell over the next few days up to 7x1016 Bq/d five days after the accident initiation, and at that point the release rates began to increase and reached about 3x1017 Bq/d nine days after the accident initiation. There was then a drop in the radionuclide release to 4x1013 Bq/d and the release rates have continued to decline since that time. The next section describes the accident management at the site, fire-fighting, cleanup of the site and the entombment of the damaged unit. In the fourth section the radiation protection aspects of the accident, the radionuclide transfer through the environment, the exposure of members of the public pointing to the radionuclides iodine-131 and cesium-137 which entered the food-chains, the on-site and off-site emergency response, the decontamination and the health effects including both the early non-stochastic effects and the late stochastic ones are presented. Safety issues to be pursued in order to derive whatever safety lessons can be learned from the Chernobyl accident are considered in Section V. The next two sections present INSAG's observations, conclusions and recommendations based on the lessons learned so far from the accident and ranging from reactor operation to radiation protection and international co-operation in nuclear safety. Finally the

  13. 29 CFR 1960.70 - Reporting of serious accidents.

    2010-07-01

    ... multiple hospitalization incidents to OSHA under 29 CFR 1904.39. ... 29 Labor 9 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Reporting of serious accidents. 1960.70 Section 1960.70... PROGRAMS AND RELATED MATTERS Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements § 1960.70 Reporting of...

  14. Preliminary report about nuclear accident of Chernobylsk reactor

    The preliminary report of nuclear accident at Chernobyl, in URSS is presented. The Chernobyl site is located geographically and the RBMK type reactors - initials of russian words which mean high power pressure tube reactors are described. The conditions of reactor operation in beginning of accident, the events which lead to reactor destruction, the means to finish the fire, the measurements adopted by Russian in the accident location, the estimative of radioactive wastes, the meteorological conditions during the accident, the victims and medical assistence, the sanitary aspects and consequences for population, the evaluation of radiation doses received at small and medium distance and the estimative of reffered doses by population attained are presented. The official communication of Russian Minister Council and the declaration of IAEA general manager during a collective interview in Moscou are annexed. (M.C.K.)

  15. Radiographers and trainee radiologists reporting accident radiographs

    Buskov, L; Abild, A; Christensen, A;

    2013-01-01

    To compare the diagnostic accuracy and clinical validity of reporting radiographers with that of trainee radiologists whom they have recently joined in reporting emergency room radiographs at Bispebjerg University Hospital.......To compare the diagnostic accuracy and clinical validity of reporting radiographers with that of trainee radiologists whom they have recently joined in reporting emergency room radiographs at Bispebjerg University Hospital....

  16. Report on the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station

    This report presents the compilation of information obtained by various organizations regarding the accident (and the consequences of the accident) that occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl in the USSR on April 26, 1986. Each organization has independently accepted responsibility for one or more chapters. The specific responsibility of each organization is indicated. The various authors are identified in a footnote to each chapter. Very briefly the other chapters cover: the design of the Chernobyl nuclear station Unit 4; safety analyses for Unit 4; the accident scenario; the role of the operator; an assessment of the radioactive release, dispersion, and transport; the activities associated with emergency actions; and information on the health and environmental consequences from the accident. These subjects cover the major aspects of the accident that have the potential to present new information and lessons for the nuclear industry in general. The task of evaluating the information obtained in these various areas and the assessment of the potential implications has been left to each organization to pursue according to the relevance of the subject to their organization. Those findings will be issued separately by the cognizant organizations. The basic purpose of this report is to provide the information upon which such assessments can be made

  17. 46 CFR 326.4 - Reports of accidents and occurrences.

    2010-10-01

    ... MARINE PROTECTION AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE UNDER AGREEMENTS WITH AGENTS § 326.4 Reports of accidents and... obtained P&I insurance through a marine insurance underwriter, the Agent also shall concurrently file a..., Office of Trade Analysis and Insurance, Maritime Administration, 500 Seventh Street, SW., Room...

  18. 33 CFR 174.121 - Forwarding of casualty or accident reports.

    2010-07-01

    ... accident reports. 174.121 Section 174.121 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF... § 174.121 Forwarding of casualty or accident reports. Within 30 days of the receipt of a casualty or accident report, each State that has an approved numbering system must forward a copy of that report to...

  19. Harrisburg report. Evaluation of the accident at Harrisburg nuclear power plant

    Interim report on the Harrisburg accident, containing all information received by the Federal Minister of the Interior until May 10, 1979. Subjects: 1) Description of the Harrisburg accident; 2) safety check on German nuclear power plants on the basis of the accident analysis; 3) the Harrisburg accident in view of risk assessments and society; 4) consequences of Harrisburg. (GL)

  20. HOMICIDE BY A ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT : A CASE REPORT

    Yandra

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available Deaths from road traffic accidents need a meticulous autopsy examination and a proper interpretation of injuries, as they can be a source of potential homicide among them. We report a case of homicide which was brought as a death in a ‘hit and run’ case to our mortuary. After our post mortem examination and issuing of our report, the investigative authorities were able to nab the actual culprit involved in the murder.

  1. 49 CFR 837.3 - Published reports, material contained in the public accident investigation dockets, and accident...

    2010-10-01

    .... For information regarding the types of documents routinely issued by the Board, see 49 CFR part 801... public accident investigation dockets, and accident database data. 837.3 Section 837.3 Transportation... OF RECORDS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS § 837.3 Published reports, material contained in the public...

  2. Incorporation of advanced accident analysis methodology into safety analysis reports

    The IAEA Safety Guide on Safety Assessment and Verification defines that the aim of the safety analysis should be by means of appropriate analytical tools to establish and confirm the design basis for the items important to safety, and to ensure that the overall plant design is capable of meeting the prescribed and acceptable limits for radiation doses and releases for each plant condition category. Practical guidance on how to perform accident analyses of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is provided by the IAEA Safety Report on Accident Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. The safety analyses are performed both in the form of deterministic and probabilistic analyses for NPPs. It is customary to refer to deterministic safety analyses as accident analyses. This report discusses the aspects of using the advanced accident analysis methods to carry out accident analyses in order to introduce them into the Safety Analysis Reports (SARs). In relation to the SAR, purposes of deterministic safety analysis can be further specified as (1) to demonstrate compliance with specific regulatory acceptance criteria; (2) to complement other analyses and evaluations in defining a complete set of design and operating requirements; (3) to identify and quantify limiting safety system set points and limiting conditions for operation to be used in the NPP limits and conditions; (4) to justify appropriateness of the technical solutions employed in the fulfillment of predetermined safety requirements. The essential parts of accident analyses are performed by applying sophisticated computer code packages, which have been specifically developed for this purpose. These code packages include mainly thermal-hydraulic system codes and reactor dynamics codes meant for the transient and accident analyses. There are also specific codes such as those for the containment thermal-hydraulics, for the radiological consequences and for severe accident analyses. In some cases, codes of a more general nature such

  3. Safety against releases in severe accidents. Final report

    The work scope of the RAK-2 project has involved research on quantification of the effects of selected severe accident phenomena for Nordic nuclear power plants, development and testing of a computerised accident management support system and data collection and description of various mobile reactors and of different reactor types existing in the UK. The investigations of severe accident phenomena focused mainly on in-vessel melt progression, covering a numerical assessment of coolability of a degraded BWR core, the possibility and consequences of a BWR reactor to become critical during reflooding and the core melt behavior in the reactor vessel lower plenum. Simulant experiments were carried out to investigate lower head hole ablation induced by debris discharge. In addition to the in-vessel phenomena, a limited study on containment response to high pressure melt ejection in a BWR and a comparative study on fission product source term behaviour in a Swedish PWR were performed. An existing computerised accident management support system (CAMS) was further developed in the area of tracking and predictive simulation, signal validation, state identification and user interface. The first version of a probabilistic safety analysis module was developed and implemented in the system. CAMS was tested in practice with Barsebaeck data in a safety exercise with the Swedish nuclear authority. The descriptions of the key features of British reactor types, AGR, Magnox, FBR and PWR were published as data reports. Separate reports were issued also on accidents in nuclear ships and on description of key features of satellite reactors. The collected data were implemented in a common Nordic database. (au)

  4. Safety against releases in severe accidents. Final report

    Lindholm, I.; Berg, Oe.; Nonboel, E. [eds.

    1997-12-01

    The work scope of the RAK-2 project has involved research on quantification of the effects of selected severe accident phenomena for Nordic nuclear power plants, development and testing of a computerised accident management support system and data collection and description of various mobile reactors and of different reactor types existing in the UK. The investigations of severe accident phenomena focused mainly on in-vessel melt progression, covering a numerical assessment of coolability of a degraded BWR core, the possibility and consequences of a BWR reactor to become critical during reflooding and the core melt behavior in the reactor vessel lower plenum. Simulant experiments were carried out to investigate lower head hole ablation induced by debris discharge. In addition to the in-vessel phenomena, a limited study on containment response to high pressure melt ejection in a BWR and a comparative study on fission product source term behaviour in a Swedish PWR were performed. An existing computerised accident management support system (CAMS) was further developed in the area of tracking and predictive simulation, signal validation, state identification and user interface. The first version of a probabilistic safety analysis module was developed and implemented in the system. CAMS was tested in practice with Barsebaeck data in a safety exercise with the Swedish nuclear authority. The descriptions of the key features of British reactor types, AGR, Magnox, FBR and PWR were published as data reports. Separate reports were issued also on accidents in nuclear ships and on description of key features of satellite reactors. The collected data were implemented in a common Nordic database. (au) 39 refs.

  5. Report from the Special Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    The Special Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident was established in April 2011 under the Heat Transfer Society of Japan (HTSJ) and discussed (1) how had evolved heat transfer research in progress of nuclear technology, (2) role of expert group in the area of heat transfer academy and technology and (3) energy prospect in Japan after the Fukushima nuclear accident. This report was described by the chairman of the special committee summarizing one year discussions as (1) background of heat transfer research progress, (2) progression of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, (3) energy problem in Japan after the Fukushima accident and (4) social role of the HTSJ. This HTSJ was a unique, nonprofit association in Japan of the people engaged in heat transfers research or in various engineering aspects related to heat transfer, which meant interdisciplinary or common platform of heat transfer as elementary technologies. Such actual complex problems could be discussed in the HTSJ from an overlooking viewpoint in order for the HTSJ to play a social role. (T. Tanaka)

  6. Empirical Study of the Use and Exploitation of TAPE- Accident Reporting and Monitoring Program in Elder Care in Kouvola (accident project)

    Baez, Nina

    2013-01-01

    Elder people accident prevention starts from systematic collection of accident information. Health care still lacks behind industries in accident reporting. Accident prevention is part of quality care which is expected by health care law (2010/1326). The thesis aimed to assess the views of health care workers at home care, assisted living, higher-level care, and nursing homes about the usability, usefulness, and exploitation of TAPE-accident reporting and monitoring system. The purpose is...

  7. 33 CFR 174.107 - Contents of casualty or accident report form.

    2010-07-01

    ... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Contents of casualty or accident... System Requirements § 174.107 Contents of casualty or accident report form. Each form for reporting a vessel casualty or accident must contain the information required in § 173.57 of this chapter....

  8. Reports of the Chernobyl accident consequences in Brazilian newspapers

    The public perception of the risks associated with nuclear power plants was profoundly influenced by the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl Power Plants which also served to exacerbate in the last decades the growing mistrust on the 'nuclear industry'. Part of the mistrust had its origin in the arrogance of nuclear spokesmen and in the secretiveness of nuclear programs. However, press agencies have an important role in shaping and upsizing the public awareness against nuclear energy. In this paper we present the results of a survey in reports of some Brazilian popular newspapers on Chernobyl consequences, as measured by the total death toll of the accident, to show the up and down dance of large numbers without any serious judgment. (author)

  9. Enhanced Accident Tolerant LWR Fuels National Metrics Workshop Report

    Lori Braase

    2013-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), in collaboration with the nuclear industry, has been conducting research and development (R&D) activities on advanced Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuels for the last few years. The emphasis for these activities was on improving the fuel performance in terms of increased burnup for waste minimization and increased power density for power upgrades, as well as collaborating with industry on fuel reliability. After the events at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in Japan in March 2011, enhancing the accident tolerance of LWRs became a topic of serious discussion. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Conference Report 112-75, the U.S. Congress directed DOE-NE to: • Give “priority to developing enhanced fuels and cladding for light water reactors to improve safety in the event of accidents in the reactor or spent fuel pools.” • Give “special technical emphasis and funding priority…to activities aimed at the development and near-term qualification of meltdown-resistant, accident-tolerant nuclear fuels that would enhance the safety of present and future generations of light water reactors.” • Report “to the Committee, within 90 days of enactment of this act, on its plan for development of meltdown-resistant fuels leading to reactor testing and utilization by 2020.” Fuels with enhanced accident tolerance are those that, in comparison with the standard UO2-zirconium alloy system currently used by the nuclear industry, can tolerate loss of active cooling in the reactor core for a considerably longer time period (depending on the LWR system and accident scenario) while maintaining or improving the fuel performance during normal operations, and operational transients, as well as design-basis and beyond design-basis events. The overall draft strategy for development and demonstration is comprised of three phases: Feasibility Assessment and Down-selection; Development and Qualification; and

  10. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy. An IAEA Safety Report

    Radiotherapy is a very special application from the view point of protection because humans are deliberately exposed to high doses of radiation, and no physical barrier can be placed between the source and the patient. It deserves, therefore, special considerations from the point of view of potential exposure. An IAEA's Safety Report (in preparation) reviews a large collection of accident information, their initiating events and contributing factors, followed by a set of lessons learned and measures for prevention. The most important causes were: deficiencies in education and training, lack of procedures and protocols for essential tasks (such as commissioning, calibration, commissioning and treatment delivery), deficient communication and information transfer, absence of defence in depth and deficiencies in design, manufacture, testing and maintenance of equipment. Often a combination of more than one of these causes was present in an accident, thus pointing to a problem of management. Arrangements for a comprehensive quality assurance and accident prevention should be required by regulations and compliance be monitored by a Regulatory Authority. (author)

  11. 48 CFR 3052.223-90 - Accident and fire reporting (USCG).

    2010-10-01

    ... PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT CLAUSES Text of Provisions and Clauses 3052.223-90 Accident and fire reporting (USCG). As prescribed in USCG guidance at (HSAR) 48 CFR 3023.9000(a), insert the following clause: Accident... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident and...

  12. 19 CFR 125.35 - Report of loss, detention, or accident.

    2010-04-01

    ... 19 Customs Duties 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Report of loss, detention, or accident. 125.35 Section 125.35 Customs Duties U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY..., detention, or accident. Any loss or detention of bonded merchandise, or any accident happening to a...

  13. 14 CFR 91.1021 - Internal safety reporting and incident/accident response.

    2010-01-01

    .../accident response. 91.1021 Section 91.1021 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... incident/accident response. (a) Each program manager must establish an internal anonymous safety reporting.... (b) Each program manager must establish procedures to respond to an aviation incident/accident....

  14. Nuclear Reactor RA Safety Report, Vol. 16, Maximum hypothetical accident

    Fault tree analysis of the maximum hypothetical accident covers the basic elements: accident initiation, phase development phases - scheme of possible accident flow. Cause of the accident initiation is the break of primary cooling pipe, heavy water system. Loss of primary coolant causes loss of pressure in the primary circuit at the coolant input in the reactor vessel. This initiates safety protection system which should automatically shutdown the reactor. Separate chapters are devoted to: after-heat removal, coolant and moderator loss; accident effects on the reactor core, effects in the reactor building, and release of radioactive wastes

  15. Accident under-reporting among employees: testing the moderating influence of psychological safety climate and supervisor enforcement of safety practices.

    Probst, Tahira M; Estrada, Armando X

    2010-09-01

    We examined accident under-reporting with data from 425 employees employed in 5 industries with above average risk for employee injuries. We expected that rates for unreported accidents would be higher than rates for reported accidents; and that organizational safety climate and perceptions of supervisor enforcement of safety policies would moderate the relationship between unreported accidents and reported accidents. Results showed that the number of unreported accidents was significantly higher than the number of reported accidents. There was an average of 2.48 unreported accidents for every accident reported to the organization. Further, under-reporting was higher in working environments with poorer organizational safety climate or where supervisor safety enforcement was inconsistent. We discuss the implications of these findings for improving accident under-reporting and occupational safety in the workplace. PMID:20538099

  16. Accidents - Chernobyl accident; Accidents - accident de Tchernobyl

    NONE

    2004-07-01

    This file is devoted to the Chernobyl accident. It is divided in four parts. The first part concerns the accident itself and its technical management. The second part is relative to the radiation doses and the different contaminations. The third part reports the sanitary effects, the determinists ones and the stochastic ones. The fourth and last part relates the consequences for the other European countries with the case of France. Through the different parts a point is tackled with the measures taken after the accident by the other countries to manage an accident, the cooperation between the different countries and the groups of research and studies about the reactors safety, and also with the international medical cooperation, specially for the children, everything in relation with the Chernobyl accident. (N.C.)

  17. Accidents associated with oil and gas operations: Outer continental shelf, 1956-1990. Final report

    The report is a compilation of descriptions of all blowouts, explosions and fires, pipeline breaks or leaks, significant pollution incidents, and major accidents that occurred on federally leased offshore lands from 1956 through 1990. The report identifies accidents by area, block number, lease number, platform number, well number, and operator. It describes the type of accident, corrective action taken, and the amount of pollution. It provides figures on fatalities, injuries, and property and environmental damage

  18. Wireless Reporting System for Accident Detection at Higher Speeds u

    Peddi Anudeep

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available Speed is one of the basic reasons for vehicle accident. Many lives could have been saved if emergency service could get accident information and reach in time. Nowadays, GPS has become an integral part of a vehicle system. This paper proposes to utilize the capability of a GPS receiver to monitor speed of a vehicle and detect accident basing on monitored speed and send accident location to an Alert Service Center. The GPS will monitor speed of a vehicle and compare with the previous speed in every second through a Microcontroller Unit. Whenever the speed will be below the specified speed, it will assume that an accident has occurred. The system will then send the accident location acquired from the GPS along with the time and the speed by utilizing the GSM network. This will help to reach the rescue service in time and save the valuable human life.

  19. Severe accident research and management in Nordic Countries - A status report

    The report describes the status of severe accident research and accident management development in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The emphasis is on severe accident phenomena and issues of special importance for the severe accident management strategies implemented in Sweden and in Finland. The main objective of the research has been to verify the protection provided by the accident mitigation measures and to reduce the uncertainties in risk dominant accident phenomena. Another objective has been to support validation and improvements of accident management strategies and procedures as well as to contribute to the development of level 2 PSA, computerised operator aids for accident management and certain aspects of emergency preparedness. Severe accident research addresses both the in-vessel and the ex-vessel accident progression phenomena and issues. Even though there are differences between Sweden and Finland as to the scope and content of the research programs, the focus of the research in both countries is on in-vessel coolability, integrity of the reactor vessel lower head and core melt behaviour in the containment, in particular the issues of core debris coolability and steam explosions. Notwithstanding that our understanding of these issues has significantly improved, and that experimental data base has been largely expanded, there are still important uncertainties which motivate continued research. Other important areas are thermal-hydraulic phenomena during reflooding of an overheated partially degraded core, fission product chemistry, in particular formation of organic iodine, and hydrogen transport and combustion phenomena. The development of severe accident management has embraced, among other things, improvements of accident mitigating procedures and strategies, further work at IFE Halden on Computerised Accident Management Support (CAMS) system, as well as plant modifications, including new instrumentation. Recent efforts in Sweden in this area

  20. Severe accident research and management in Nordic Countries - A status report

    Frid, W. [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, SKI (Sweden)] (ed.)

    2002-01-01

    The report describes the status of severe accident research and accident management development in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The emphasis is on severe accident phenomena and issues of special importance for the severe accident management strategies implemented in Sweden and in Finland. The main objective of the research has been to verify the protection provided by the accident mitigation measures and to reduce the uncertainties in risk dominant accident phenomena. Another objective has been to support validation and improvements of accident management strategies and procedures as well as to contribute to the development of level 2 PSA, computerised operator aids for accident management and certain aspects of emergency preparedness. Severe accident research addresses both the in-vessel and the ex-vessel accident progression phenomena and issues. Even though there are differences between Sweden and Finland as to the scope and content of the research programs, the focus of the research in both countries is on in-vessel coolability, integrity of the reactor vessel lower head and core melt behaviour in the containment, in particular the issues of core debris coolability and steam explosions. Notwithstanding that our understanding of these issues has significantly improved, and that experimental data base has been largely expanded, there are still important uncertainties which motivate continued research. Other important areas are thermal-hydraulic phenomena during reflooding of an overheated partially degraded core, fission product chemistry, in particular formation of organic iodine, and hydrogen transport and combustion phenomena. The development of severe accident management has embraced, among other things, improvements of accident mitigating procedures and strategies, further work at IFE Halden on Computerised Accident Management Support (CAMS) system, as well as plant modifications, including new instrumentation. Recent efforts in Sweden in this area

  1. Wireless Reporting System for Accident Detection at Higher Speeds u

    Peddi Anudeep; K. Hari Bab

    2014-01-01

    Speed is one of the basic reasons for vehicle accident. Many lives could have been saved if emergency service could get accident information and reach in time. Nowadays, GPS has become an integral part of a vehicle system. This paper proposes to utilize the capability of a GPS receiver to monitor speed of a vehicle and detect accident basing on monitored speed and send accident location to an Alert Service Center. The GPS will monitor speed of a vehicle and compare with the pr...

  2. 46 CFR 122.230 - Report of accident to aid to navigation.

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Report of accident to aid to navigation. 122.230 Section... Marine Casualties and Voyage Records § 122.230 Report of accident to aid to navigation. Whenever a vessel collides with a buoy, or other aid to navigation under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard, or is...

  3. 75 FR 25137 - Changes to Standard Numbering System, Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report...

    2010-05-07

    ... Boating Accident Report Database CFR Code of Federal Regulations DHS Department of Homeland Security FR... notice regarding our public dockets in the January 17, 2008 issue of the Federal Register (73 FR 3316). D..., Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report Database AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS....

  4. Accident Avoidance Skill Training and Performance Testing. Final Report.

    Hatterick, G. Richard; Barthurst, James R.

    A two-phased study was conducted to determine the feasibility of training drivers to acquire skills needed to avoid critical conflict motor vehicle accidents, and to develop the procedures and materials necessary for such training. Basic data were derived from indepth accident investigations and task analyses of driver behavior. Principal…

  5. Reporter at large: Three Mile Island. I. Class nine accident

    A thorough discussion is presented of the background to the March 28, 1979 accident at Three Mile Island-2 Reactor. Among the factors involved in the accident include improper maintenance, sloppy operating and testing procedures, valve problems, written procedures instead of built-in design features to prevent human errors, reliance on the utilities to write these procedures, etc

  6. Storybuilder-A tool for the analysis of accident reports

    As part of an ongoing effort by the ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of The Netherlands a research project is being undertaken to construct a causal model for the most commonly occurring scenarios related to occupational risk. This model should provide quantitative insight in the causes and consequences of occupational accidents. The results should be used to help selecting optimal strategies to reduce these risks taking the costs of accidents and of measures into account. The research is undertaken by an international consortium under the name of Workgroup Occupational Risk Model. One of the components of the model is a tool to systematically classify and analyse past accidents. This tool: 'Storybuilder' and its place in the Occupational Risk Model (ORM) are described in the paper. The paper gives some illustrations of the application of the Storybuilder, drawn from the study of ladder accidents, which forms one of the biggest single accident categories in the Dutch data

  7. Data Mining of Causal Relations from Text: Analysing Maritime Accident Investigation Reports

    Tirunagari, Santosh

    2015-01-01

    Text mining is a process of extracting information of interest from text. Such a method includes techniques from various areas such as Information Retrieval (IR), Natural Language Processing (NLP), and Information Extraction (IE). In this study, text mining methods are applied to extract causal relations from maritime accident investigation reports collected from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB). These causal relations provide information on various mechanisms behind accidents,...

  8. The consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Greece - Report No. 2

    In this report a realistic estimate of the radioactive fallout on Greece from the Chernobyl nuclear accident is described. The measurements performed on environmental samples and samples of the food chain, as well as some realistic estimations for the population doses and the expected consequences of the accident are presented. The analysis has shown that the radiological impact of the accident in Greece can be considered minor. (J.K.)

  9. Regulatory impact of nuclear reactor accident source term assumptions. Technical report

    This report addresses the reactor accident source term implications on accident evaluations, regulations and regulatory requirements, engineered safety features, emergency planning, probabilistic risk assessment, and licensing practice. Assessment of the impact of source term modifications and evaluation of the effects in Design Basis Accident analyses, assuming a change of the chemical form of iodine from elemental to cesium iodide, has been provided. Engineered safety features used in current LWR designs are found to be effective for all postulated combinations of iodine source terms under DBA conditions. In terms of potential accident consequences, it is not expected that the difference in chemical form between elemental iodine and cesium iodide would be significant. In order to account for the current information on source terms, a spectrum of accident scenerios is discussed to realistically estimate the source terms resulting from a range of potential accident conditions

  10. Technical bases for estimating fission product behavior during LWR accidents. Technical report

    The objective of this report is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the public with a description of the best technical information currently available for estimating the release of radioactive material during postulated reactor accidents, and to identify where gaps exist in our knowledge. This report focuses on those low probability-high consequence accidents involving severe damage to the reactor core and core meltdown that dominate the risk to the public. Furthermore, in this report particular emphasis is placed on the accident behavior of radioactive iodine, as (1) radioiodine is predicted to be a major contributor to public exposure, (2) current regulatory accident analysis procedures focus on iodine, and (3) several technical issues have been raised recently about the magnitude of iodine release. The generation, transport, and attenuation of aerosols were also investigated in some detail to assess their effect on fission product release estimates and to determine the performance of engineered safety features under accident conditions exceeding their design bases

  11. 46 CFR 4.05-20 - Report of accident to aid to navigation.

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Report of accident to aid to navigation. 4.05-20 Section 4.05-20 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE PUBLIC... accident to aid to navigation. Whenever a vessel collides with a buoy, or other aid to navigation under...

  12. Investigation report on criticality accident at the Uranium Processing Plant of the JCO, Ltd

    This report is a summarized one of investigation results on a criticality accident at the Uranium Processing Plant of the JCO, Ltd., carried out by the Nuclear Safety Investigation Special Group (SISG) of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ). AESJ published a statement of the president on this accident on October 8, 1999, and decided to perform its investigation under SISG. SISG carried out some questionnaires for new trials together with conventional lectures of the well-informed. This report contains six chapters on critical safety and accident, process of the accident and elucidation of its facts, cause analysis and picking-out on problems, questionnaires on improvement proposal', questionnaires on 'duty of AESJ7, and future efforts on nuclear safety culture. At the last chapter, SISG discussed about some items on re-occurrence protection of the nuclear accident. (G.K.)

  13. Status Report on Spent Fuel Pools under Loss-of-Cooling and Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions - Final Report

    Following the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the Nuclear Energy Agency Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations decided to launch several high-priority activities to address certain technical issues. Among other things, it was decided to prepare a status report on spent fuel pools (SFPs) under loss of cooling accident conditions. This activity was proposed jointly by the CSNI Working Group on Analysis and Management of Accidents (WGAMA) and the Working Group on Fuel Safety (WGFS). The main objectives, as defined by these working groups, were to: - Produce a brief summary of the status of SFP accident and mitigation strategies, to better contribute to the post-Fukushima accident decision making process; - Provide a brief assessment of current experimental and analytical knowledge about loss of cooling accidents in SFPs and their associated mitigation strategies; - Briefly describe the strengths and weaknesses of analytical methods used in codes to predict SFP accident evolution and assess the efficiency of different cooling mechanisms for mitigation of such accidents; - Identify and list additional research activities required to address gaps in the understanding of relevant phenomenological processes, to identify where analytical tool deficiencies exist, and to reduce the uncertainties in this understanding. The proposed activity was agreed and approved by CSNI in December 2012, and the first of four meetings of the appointed writing group was held in March 2013. The writing group consisted of members of the WGAMA and the WGFS, representing the European Commission and the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA. This report mostly covers the information provided by these countries. The report is organised into 8 Chapters and 4 Appendices: Chapter 1: Introduction; Chapter 2: Spent fuel pools; Chapter 3: Possible accident

  14. Shipping container response to severe highway and railway accident conditions: Main report

    This report describes a study performed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to evaluate the level of safety provided under severe accident conditions during the shipment of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors. The evaluation is performed using data from real accident histories and using representative truck and rail cask models that likely meet 10 CFR 71 regulations. The responses of the representative casks are calculated for structural and thermal loads generated by severe highway and railway accident conditions. The cask responses are compared with those responses calculated for the 10 CFR 71 hypothetical accident conditions. By comparing the responses it is determined that most highway and railway accident conditions fall within the 10 CFR 71 hypothetical accident conditions. For those accidents that have higher responses, the probabilities anf potential radiation exposures of the accidents are compared with those identified by the assessments made in the ''Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and other Modes,'' NUREG-0170. Based on this comparison, it is concluded that the radiological risks from spent fuel under severe highway and railway accident conditions as derived in this study are less than risks previously estimated in the NUREG-0170 document

  15. Accidents - Chernobyl accident

    This file is devoted to the Chernobyl accident. It is divided in four parts. The first part concerns the accident itself and its technical management. The second part is relative to the radiation doses and the different contaminations. The third part reports the sanitary effects, the determinists ones and the stochastic ones. The fourth and last part relates the consequences for the other European countries with the case of France. Through the different parts a point is tackled with the measures taken after the accident by the other countries to manage an accident, the cooperation between the different countries and the groups of research and studies about the reactors safety, and also with the international medical cooperation, specially for the children, everything in relation with the Chernobyl accident. (N.C.)

  16. The Columbia Accident: Synopsis of CAIB Report Regarding the Physical Cause of the Accident and and Personal Thoughts

    Arnold, James O.

    2011-01-01

    This seminar describes the process of determining the physical cause of The Shuttle Columbia Accident. The presentation is based on the published CIAB Report, and is based mainly on Appendix F2, Vol IV of the CIAB report by J. O. Arnold, H. E. Goldstein and D. J. Rigalli. As a part of the seminar, I would also indicate how my education in Engineering Physics at the University of Kansas helped prepare me to accept the assignment to serve as an investigator for the CAIB. A similar presentation was given at Purdue in 2005. Presentation charts are attached.

  17. Incidents/accidents classification and reporting in Statoil

    Based on requirements in the new petroleum regulations from Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the realisation of a need to improve and rationalise the routines for reporting and follow up of incidents, Statoil Exploration and Production Norway (Statoil E and P Norway) has formulated a new strategy and process for handling of incidents/accidents. The following past experiences serve as basis for the changes made to incident reporting in Statoil E and P Norway: - Too much resources were spent on a comprehensive handling and analysis of a vast amount of incidents with less importance for the safety level, taking the focus away from the more severe and important issues at hand. - The assessment of 'Risk Factor', i.e. the combination of recurrence frequency and consequence, was difficult to use. The high degree of subjectivity involved in the determination of the 'Risk Factor' (in particular the estimation of the recurrence frequency) resulted in poor data quality and lack of consistency in the data material. The new system for categorisation and handling of undesirable incidents was established in January 2002. The intention was to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), with a thorough handling and follow-up. This is reflected throughout the handling of the serious incidents, all the way from immediate notification of the incident, through investigation and follow-up of corrective and preventive actions. Simultaneously, it was also an objective to rationalise/simplify the handling of less serious incidents. These incidents are, however, subjected to analyses twice a year in order to utilize the learning opportunity that they also provide. A year after the introduction of this new system for categorisation and follow-up of undesirable incidents, Statoil's experiences are predominantly good: - The intention to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), has been

  18. Incidents/accidents classification and reporting in Statoil.

    Berentsen, Rune; Holmboe, Rolf H

    2004-07-26

    Based on requirements in the new petroleum regulations from Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the realisation of a need to improve and rationalise the routines for reporting and follow up of incidents, Statoil Exploration & Production Norway (Statoil E&P Norway) has formulated a new strategy and process for handling of incidents/accidents. The following past experiences serve as basis for the changes made to incident reporting in Statoil E&P Norway; too much resources were spent on a comprehensive handling and analysis of a vast amount of incidents with less importance for the safety level, taking the focus away from the more severe and important issues at hand, the assessment of "Risk Factor", i.e. the combination of recurrence frequency and consequence, was difficult to use. The high degree of subjectivity involved in the determination of the "Risk Factor" (in particular the estimation of the recurrence frequency) resulted in poor data quality and lack of consistency in the data material. The new system for categorisation and handling of undesirable incidents was established in January 2002. The intention was to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), with a thorough handling and follow-up. This is reflected throughout the handling of the serious incidents, all the way from immediate notification of the incident, through investigation and follow-up of corrective and preventive actions. Simultaneously, it was also an objective to rationalise/simplify the handling of less serious incidents. These incidents are, however, subjected to analyses twice a year in order to utilize the learning opportunity that they also provide. A year after the introduction of this new system for categorisation and follow-up of undesirable incidents, Statoil's experiences are predominantly good; the intention to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), has been met, the data

  19. Review of five investigation committees' reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant severe accident. Focusing on accident progression and causes

    On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku District-off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the subsequent tsunami resulted in the severe core damage at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1-3, involving hydrogen explosions at Units 1, 3, and 4 and the large release of radioactive materials to the environment. Four independent committees were established by the Japanese government, the Diet of Japan, the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, and TEPCO to investigate the accident and published their respective reports. Also, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carried out an analysis of accident causes to obtain the lessons learned from the accident and made its report public. This article reviews the reports and clarifies the differences in their positions, from the technological point of view, focusing on the accident progression and causes. Moreover, the undiscussed issues are identified to provide insights useful for the near-term regulatory activities including accident investigation by the Nuclear Regulation Authority. (author)

  20. NIRS report of the criticality accident in a uranium conversion test plant in Tokai-mura

    This report is a detailed account of the roles that National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) played at the criticality accident in the title, which occurred at around 10:35, on Sep. 30, 1999 and resulted in death of two workers after all, and is published to discharge NIRS responsibilities in regards to the accident. The accident caused many residents concern on their health and rumors had both social and economic consequences. The report involves chapters of detailed outline of the accident; demand for acceptance of the victims and communications until the identification of the criticality'' accident; the acceptance and initial treatment; the exposure dose estimation (based on acute symptoms, on physics, on chromosomal analyses and on neutron-activated dental metals, and detailed analyses for dose distribution); decision made for therapeutic strategies; cooperation with the Network Council for Radiation Emergency and with other medical facilities; the urgent import of medicine; treatment and processes (patients, nursing system and radiation injuries); radiation protection in medical facilities; response to nearby residents of the Plant; international response; press release; Uranium Processing Plant Criticality Accident Investigation Committee and the Health Management Committee organized by the Nuclear Safety Commission; handling of information; and radiation emergency medical preparedness at the NIRS (future issues and prospect). The report is hopefully useful in preventing the occurrence of future accidents. (N.I.)

  1. Baia Mare accident--brief ecotoxicological report of Czech experts.

    Soldán, P; Pavonic, M; Boucek, J; Kokes, J

    2001-07-01

    On 30 January 2000, following the breach in the tailing dam of the Aurul SA Baia Mare Co., a major spill of about 100,000 m(3) of cyanide and metal-rich liquid waste was released into the river system near Baia Mare in northwest Romania. The pollutants flowed via different tributaries into the Tizsa (Tisa) river and finally through the Danube river into the Black Sea. Along the way pollutants (especially cyanides) caused rapid death of aquatic organisms and animals living close to the poisoned rivers. Following request from the governments of Romania, Hungary, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, United Nations sent international mission experts to the area of accident. The Czech team of four experts took very active part in this mission. Samples of surface water collected by this team 3 weeks after the accident showed high toxicity in the rivers on the Romanian territory. Due to this impact, water from the Szamos river and a large area of the Tisza river in Hungarian territory was still medially toxic. Improvement of this situation was detected only in downstream areas of the Tisza/Tisa river. The high toxicity of surface water from the locality of the Lapos river upstream of the accident indicated the possibility of toxic pollution from other sources in the area. Aquatic sediments were highly toxic only in the Aurul reservoir and its surrounding area. Rapid decline of their toxicity indicated more limited adverse impact of the "Aurul pollution" in comparison with surface water. From ecotoxicological results it is evident that there is an urgent need to start abatement activities in the Baia Mare area because the possibility of future accidents still exists (this hypothesis was proved by further accidents on 10.3.2000 and the beginning of May 2000). PMID:11440479

  2. Introduction of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident, Investigation Details, Findings and Crew Survival Investigation Report

    Chandler, Michael

    2010-01-01

    As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the

  3. Report by the 'Fukushima Dai-Ichi major accident' nuclear subgroup

    This report comprises a description of the succession of events in the Fukushima-Dai-Ichi power plant, a discussion of the situation of the nuclear industry and energy in France after this accident (French nuclear stock, security organisation), and a discussion on the fuel cycle and on future opportunities (comparison with EPR - Gen II safety measures, perspectives beyond the EPR). Numerous appendices are proposed, made of documents from different bodies involved in nuclear industry, energy and safety. They deal with the Fukushima accident, with light water and pressurized water reactors, with severe accidents in PWRs, and so on

  4. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Report by the Director General [Spanish Version

    This report presents an assessment of the causes and consequences of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, which began on 11 March 2011. Caused by a huge tsunami that followed a massive earthquake, it was the worst accident at a nuclear power plant since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The report considers human, organizational and technical factors, and aims to provide an understanding of what happened, and why, so that the necessary lessons learned can be acted upon by governments, regulators and nuclear power plant operators throughout the world. Measures taken in response to the accident, both in Japan and internationally, are also examined. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident consists of a Report by the IAEA Director General and five technical volumes. It is the result of an extensive international collaborative effort involving five working groups with about 180 experts from 42 Member States with and without nuclear power programmes and several international bodies. It provides a description of the accident and its causes, evolution and consequences, based on the evaluation of data and information from a large number of sources available at the time of writing. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident will be of use to national authorities, international organizations, nuclear regulatory bodies, nuclear power plant operating organizations, designers of nuclear facilities and other experts in matters relating to nuclear power, as well as the wider public. The set contains six printed parts and five supplementary CD-ROMs. Contents: Report by the Director General; Technical Volume 1/5, Description and Context of the Accident; Technical Volume 2/5, Safety Assessment; Technical Volume 3/5, Emergency Preparedness and Response; Technical Volume 4/5, Radiological Consequences; Technical Volume 5/5, Post-accident Recovery; Annexes. The Report by the Director General is also available separately in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish and

  5. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Report by the Director General [Arabic Version

    This report presents an assessment of the causes and consequences of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, which began on 11 March 2011. Caused by a huge tsunami that followed a massive earthquake, it was the worst accident at a nuclear power plant since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The report considers human, organizational and technical factors, and aims to provide an understanding of what happened, and why, so that the necessary lessons learned can be acted upon by governments, regulators and nuclear power plant operators throughout the world. Measures taken in response to the accident, both in Japan and internationally, are also examined. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident consists of a Report by the IAEA Director General and five technical volumes. It is the result of an extensive international collaborative effort involving five working groups with about 180 experts from 42 Member States with and without nuclear power programmes and several international bodies. It provides a description of the accident and its causes, evolution and consequences, based on the evaluation of data and information from a large number of sources available at the time of writing. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident will be of use to national authorities, international organizations, nuclear regulatory bodies, nuclear power plant operating organizations, designers of nuclear facilities and other experts in matters relating to nuclear power, as well as the wider public. The set contains six printed parts and five supplementary CD-ROMs. Contents: Report by the Director General; Technical Volume 1/5, Description and Context of the Accident; Technical Volume 2/5, Safety Assessment; Technical Volume 3/5, Emergency Preparedness and Response; Technical Volume 4/5, Radiological Consequences; Technical Volume 5/5, Post-accident Recovery; Annexes. The Report by the Director General is also available separately in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish and

  6. Extracting decision rules from police accident reports through decision trees.

    de Oña, Juan; López, Griselda; Abellán, Joaquín

    2013-01-01

    Given the current number of road accidents, the aim of many road safety analysts is to identify the main factors that contribute to crash severity. To pinpoint those factors, this paper shows an application that applies some of the methods most commonly used to build decision trees (DTs), which have not been applied to the road safety field before. An analysis of accidents on rural highways in the province of Granada (Spain) between 2003 and 2009 (both inclusive) showed that the methods used to build DTs serve our purpose and may even be complementary. Applying these methods has enabled potentially useful decision rules to be extracted that could be used by road safety analysts. For instance, some of the rules may indicate that women, contrary to men, increase their risk of severity under bad lighting conditions. The rules could be used in road safety campaigns to mitigate specific problems. This would enable managers to implement priority actions based on a classification of accidents by types (depending on their severity). However, the primary importance of this proposal is that other databases not used here (i.e. other infrastructure, roads and countries) could be used to identify unconventional problems in a manner easy for road safety managers to understand, as decision rules. PMID:23021419

  7. Report on recent over-exposure accidents with a medical linac in Japan

    On December 21, 2001, at a hospital in Tokyo, an engineer setting a medical-linac was over-exposed by the equipment due to lack of communication between workers. The exposed dose was initially reported as 1000 mSv (1 Sv), but later revised to 200 mSv at most. The outline of the accident and the statistical data on radiation exposure accidents in Japan and the world are briefly overlooked. (author)

  8. The report of the criticality accident in a uranium conversion test plant in Tokai-mura

    The criticality accident in the title occurred at around 10:35, on Sep. 30, 1999, cost the lives of two workers and caused many residents concern on their health. Moreover, rumors had both social and economic consequences. This report is a detailed account of the roles that many individuals and groups in the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) performed in a range of the areas, and is published to discharge NIRS responsibilities in regards to the accident. The report involves chapters of detailed outline of the accident; acceptance of the victims and communications until the identification of the ''criticality'' accident; initial treatment; dose estimation (medical, hematological, physical and biological ones and that by dental metals activated by the neutron); decision making for therapeutic strategies; cooperation with the Network Council for Radiation Emergency Medicine and other medical facilities; emergency importation of medical supplies; treatment and progress (nursing system and radiation injuries); protection from radiation in medical facilities; response to nearby residents of the Plant; international response; press release; Uranium Processing Plant Criticality Accident Investigation Committee and the Health Management Committee organized by the Nuclear Safety Commission; handling of information; and radiation emergency medical preparedness at the NIRS (future issues and prospect). The report is hoped to be useful in preventing the occurrence of future accidents. (K.H.)

  9. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident final report of the AESJ investigation committee

    Atomic Energy Society of Japan

    2015-01-01

    The Magnitude 9 Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, followed by a massive tsunami struck  TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and triggered an unprecedented core melt/severe accident in Units 1 – 3. The radioactivity release led to the evacuation of local residents, many of whom still have not been able to return to their homes. As a group of nuclear experts, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan established the Investigation Committee on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, to investigate and analyze the accident from scientific and technical perspectives for clarifying the underlying and fundamental causes, and to make recommendations. The results of the investigation by the AESJ Investigation Committee has been compiled herewith as the Final Report. Direct contributing factors of the catastrophic nuclear incident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP initiated by an unprecedented massive earthquake/ tsunami – inadequacies in tsunami measures, severe accident ma...

  10. Technical Advisory Team (TAT) report on the rocket sled test accident of October 9, 2008.

    Stofleth, Jerome H.; Dinallo, Michael Anthony; Medina, Anthony J.

    2009-01-01

    This report summarizes probable causes and contributing factors that led to a rocket motor initiating prematurely while employees were preparing instrumentation for an AIII rocket sled test at SNL/NM, resulting in a Type-B Accident. Originally prepared by the Technical Advisory Team that provided technical assistance to the NNSA's Accident Investigation Board, the report includes analyses of several proposed causes and concludes that the most probable source of power for premature initiation of the rocket motor was the independent battery contained in the HiCap recorder package. The report includes data, evidence, and proposed scenarios to substantiate the analyses.

  11. Hydrogen-control systems for severe LWR accident conditions - a state-of-technology report

    This report reviews the current state of technology regarding hydrogen safety issues in light water reactor plants. Topics considered in this report relate to control systems and include combustion prevention, controlled combustion, minimization of combustion effects, combination of control concepts, and post-accident disposal. A companion report addresses hydrogen generation, distribution, and combustion. The objectives of the study were to identify the key safety issues related to hydrogen produced under severe accident conditions, to describe the state of technology for each issue, and to point out ongoing programs aimed at resolving the open issues

  12. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1992, a status report

    This document is part of a report which documents 1992 operational events selected as accident sequence precursors. This report describes the 27 precursors identified from the 1992 licensee event reports. It also describe containment-related events; open-quote interesting close-quote events; potentially significant events that were considered impractical to analyze; copies of the licensee event reports which were cited in the cases above; and comments from the licensee and NRC in response to the preliminary reports

  13. Nuclear accidents

    On 27 May 1986 the Norwegian government appointed an inter-ministerial committee of senior officials to prepare a report on experiences in connection with the Chernobyl accident. The present second part of the committee's report describes proposals for measures to prevent and deal with similar accidents in the future. The committee's evaluations and proposals are grouped into four main sections: Safety and risk at nuclear power plants; the Norwegian contingency organization for dealing with nuclear accidents; compensation issues; and international cooperation

  14. The accident in Fukushima. Preliminary report on the accident progress in the nuclear power plants as a consequence of the earth quake on 11th March 2011

    The preliminary report on the accident progress in the nuclear power plants as a consequence of the earth quake on 11th March 2011 describes the chronologic sequence of the accident in the different units of the power plant. The measures for mitigation of the accident impact at the site of Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini included the efforts to reach and maintain stable plant conditions. The issue radiological situation includes an estimation of the air-borne radionuclide release, the contamination of the environment and the sea water, measures for protection of the public. The lessons learned following the NISA and IAEA fact finding missions and the open questions are summarized.

  15. 75 FR 922 - Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue Aircraft, and...

    2010-01-07

    ... of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), published in the Federal Register (FR), is available for inspection...'' in 73 FR 58520. This NPRM proposed and the final rule herein codifies the addition of five reportable... SAFETY BOARD 49 CFR Part 830 Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and...

  16. Ruthenium behaviour in severe nuclear accident conditions. Final report

    Backman, U.; Lipponen, M.; Auvinen, A.; Jokiniemi, J.; Zilliacus, R. [VVT Processes (Finland)

    2004-08-01

    During routine nuclear reactor operations, ruthenium will accumulate in the fuel in relatively high concentrations. In a steam atmosphere, ruthenium is not volatile, and it is not likely to be released from the fuel. However, in an air ingress accident during reactor power operation or during maintenance, ruthenium may form volatile species, which may be released into the containment. Oxide forms of ruthenium are more volatile than the metallic form. Radiotoxicity of ruthenium is high both in the short and the long term. The results of this project imply that in oxidising conditions during nuclear reactor core degradation, ruthenium release increases as oxidised gaseous species Ru03 and Ru04 are formed. A significant part of the released ruthenium is then deposited on reactor coolant system piping. However, in the presence of steam and aerosol particles, a substantial amount of ruthenium may be released as gaseous Ru04 into the containment atmosphere. (au)

  17. Ruthenium behaviour in severe nuclear accident conditions. Final report

    During routine nuclear reactor operations, ruthenium will accumulate in the fuel in relatively high concentrations. In a steam atmosphere, ruthenium is not volatile, and it is not likely to be released from the fuel. However, in an air ingress accident during reactor power operation or during maintenance, ruthenium may form volatile species, which may be released into the containment. Oxide forms of ruthenium are more volatile than the metallic form. Radiotoxicity of ruthenium is high both in the short and the long term. The results of this project imply that in oxidising conditions during nuclear reactor core degradation, ruthenium release increases as oxidised gaseous species Ru03 and Ru04 are formed. A significant part of the released ruthenium is then deposited on reactor coolant system piping. However, in the presence of steam and aerosol particles, a substantial amount of ruthenium may be released as gaseous Ru04 into the containment atmosphere. (au)

  18. The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

    In October 2011, the Act regarding Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission was enacted to investigate the Fukushima accident with the authority to request documents and request the legislative branch to use its investigative powers to obtain any necessary documents or evidence required. In December 2011, chairman and nine other members were appointed. After a six-month investigation, Commission had concluded. 'In order to prevent future disasters, fundamental reforms must take place covering both the structure of electric power industry and the structure of related government and regulatory agencies as well as operation processes, for both normal and emergency situations'. Main parts of report consisted of overview, conclusions and recommendations, and six findings; (1) was the accident preventable?, (2) Escalation of the accident, (3) Emergency response to the accident, (4) Spread of the damage, (5) Organizational issues in accident prevention and response and (6) the legal system. Based on the above findings, Commission made seven recommendations regarding (1) Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National Diet, (2) Reform the crisis management system, (3) Government responsibility for public health and welfare, (4) Monitoring the operators, (5) Criteria for the new regulatory body, (6) Reforming laws related to nuclear energy and (7) Develop a system of independent investigation commissions. National Diet's thorough debate and deliberate on these recommendation was highly encouraged for the future. (T. Tanaka)

  19. Thermal and hydraulic behaviour of CANDU cores under severe accident conditions - final report. Vol. 1

    This report gives the results of a study of the thermo-hydraulic aspects of severe accident sequences in CANDU reactors. The accident sequences considered are the loss of the moderator cooling system and the loss of the moderator heat sink, each following a large loss-of-coolant accident accompanied by loss of emergency coolant injection. Factors considered include expulsion and boil-off of the moderator, uncovery, overheating and disintegration of the fuel channels, quenching of channel debris, re-heating of channel debris following complete moderator expulsion, formation and possible boiling of a molten pool of core debris and the effectiveness of the cooling of the calandria wall by the shield tank water during the accident sequences. The effects of these accident sequences on the reactor containment are also considered. Results show that there would be no gross melting of fuel during moderator expulsion from the calandria, and for a considerable time thereafter, as quenched core debris re-heats. Core melting would not begin until about 135 minutes after accident initiation in a loss of the moderator cooling system and until about 30 minutes in a loss of the moderator heat sink. Eventually, a pool of molten material would form in the bottom of the calandria, which may or may not boil, depending on property values. In all cases, the molten core would be contained within the calandria, as long as the shield tank water cooling system remains operational. Finally, in the period from 8 to 50 hours after the initiation of the accident, the molten core would re-solidify within the calandria. There would be no consequent damage to containment resulting from these accident sequences, nor would there be a significant increase in fission product releases from containment above those that would otherwise occur in a dual failure LOCA plus LOECI

  20. North Wales Group report on the effects of the Chernobyl accident

    A report is presented by the North Wales Group concerning the sequence of events affecting North Wales and the identification of the residual problems following contamination from the Chernobyl accident. The first part of the report attempts to establish a time scale for radiation restrictions applicable in North Wales and the size of the areas which are involved. Part two deals with national arrangements to handle incidents like Chernobyl and examines the wider field of international arrangements. A review is given of events as seen by the affected community following the Chernobyl accident. (U.K.)

  1. Report of investigation regarding accident in Tomsk reprocessing facilities in Russia

    At 1258 on April 6, 1993, the explosion accident of a welded tank occurred in the military reprocessing facilities in Tomsk, Siberia District, Russia. Japan carried out the investigation of the effect on the environmental radiation in Japan, dispatched the investigation mission to Russia, and explained the way of thinking on securing the safety of Japanese reprocessing plants to local communities. Science and Technology Agency organized the working group for investigating the accident, which exerted efforts to collect the information, analyze and examine it. This report is the summary of its results. The explosion occurred in the tank for adjusting the acid concentration of the solution to be supplied to the solvent extraction shop, and the building was destructed. No one died or was injured. The results of the radioactivity examination are reported. The process of the accident was inferred, and described. The factors that caused the accident were the mixing of organic impurities the use of the diluting liquid containing aromatic hydrocarbon, the contact of nitric acid with organic substances at high temperature, in sufficient agitation at the time of pouring nitric acid and so on. The safety countermeasures in Japanese reprocessing plants and the response by Japan based on the accident are described. (K.I.)

  2. Reporting and recording of accidents and incidents involving the transport of radioactive materials in the UK

    Accidents and incidents involving the transport of radioactive materials are rare. However, there is always a potential for such an event, which could lead to a release of the contents of a package or an increase in radiation level caused by damaged shielding. These events could result in radiological consequences for transport workers and members of the public. The UK legislation on the transport of radioactive materials requires significant events to be reported to the competent authority. This allows for investigations to be carried out which may result in corrective actions to be implemented and wider lessons to be learned. The Department for Transport (DfT), together with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) have supported, for almost twenty years, work to compile analyse and report on accidents and incidents that occur during the transport of radioactive materials. The details of these events are recorded in the Radioactive Materials Transport Event Database (RAMTED) maintained by NRPB on behalf of the DfT and HSE. Information on accidents and incidents date back to 1958. RAMTED currently includes information of 747 accidents and incidents, covering the period 1958 to 2001. Annual reports on these events have been produced for twelve years. Also, information on these events is provided annually to the IAEA's EVTRAM database, for wider circulation. This paper presents a summary of the reporting requirements in the UK. Also, summary data on accidents and incidents are presented, identifying trends and lessons learned together with a discussion of some examples. It was found that, historically, the most significant exposures were received as a result of accidents involving the transport of industrial radiography sources. However, the frequency and severity of these events has decreased considerably in the later years of this study due to improvements in training, awareness and equipment. (author)

  3. Report of the Fukushima nuclear accident by the National Academy of Science. Lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving safety of U.S. nuclear plants

    U.S. National Academy of Science investigated the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant initiated by the Great East Japan Earthquake for two years and published a draft report in July 24, 2014. Investigation results were summarized in nine new findings and made ten recommendations in a wide horizon; (1) hardware countermeasures against severe accidents and training of operators, (2) upgrade of risk assessment capability for beyond design basis accident, (3) incorporation of new information about hazards in safety regulations, (4) needed improvement of off-site emergency preparedness, and (5) improvements of nuclear safety culture. New information about hazards related with tsunami assessment, new risk assessment for beyond design basis accident, advice of foreigner resident evacuations, regulatory capture, and safety culture and regulator's specialty were discussed as Japanese issues. (T. Tanaka)

  4. Final report on the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company

    On March 11, 2011, the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (hereafter, 'Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS') and Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station (hereafter, 'Fukushima Dai-ni NPS') of Tokyo Electric Power Company (hereafter, 'TEPCO') were damaged in the Tohoku District - off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the ensuing tsunami. In particular, an extremely severe accident measuring Level 7 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) occurred at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. The Investigation Committee was established on May 24, 2011 by a Cabinet decision. Its mission is to make policy recommendations, by investigating and verifying the causes of the accident and ensuing damage, on measures to prevent the further spread of damage caused by the accident and a recurrence of similar accidents in the future. The Investigation Committee inspected the accident sites including the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, and interviewed individuals concerned, including the mayors and residents of relevant municipalities. The number of interviewees reached 772 in total. The Investigation Committee published its Interim Report on December 26, 2011 and its Final Report on July 23, 2012. The Final Report, with the Interim Report as its complementary piece, describes mainly the results of investigations after the Interim Report. This Executive Summary is a condensed version of the Final Report, mainly Chapter VI of the main text which analyzes the problems and provides recommendations. The contents of the parenthesis [ ] that follow the title indicate the relevant corresponding locations in the Final Report (Main text). Recommendations are indicated in bold. (author)

  5. The Chernobyl accident and the Spanish nuclear power plants. Technical report

    On the morning of April 26, 1986, Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Ukraine, USSR) suffered an accident of the greatest magnitude among those which have taken place in nuclear energy installations employed for peaceful uses. The accident reached a degree of severity unknown up to now in nuclear energy generating plants, both with respect to the loss of human lives and the effects caused to the neighboring population (as well as to other nations within a wide radius of radioactivity dispersal), and also with respect to the damage caused in the nuclear plant itself. In the light of the anxiety created internationally, the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy prepared a report (1), based on the conclusions of the Governmental Commission entrusted to study the causes of the accident, which was presented at the international meeting of experts held at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna from August 25 to 29, 1986. The present technical report has been prepared by the Spanish nuclear power plants within the framework of UNIDAD ELECTRICA, S.A. (UNESA) - the Association of Spanish electric utilities - in collaboration with EMPRESARIOS AGRUPADOS, S.A. The report reflects the utilities' analyses of the causes and consequences of the accident and, based on similarities and differences with Spanish plants under construction and in operation, intends to: a. Evaluate the possibility of an accident with similar consequences occurring in a Spanish plant b. Identify possible design and operation modifications indicated by the lessons learned from this accident

  6. 32 CFR 634.30 - Use of traffic accident investigation report data.

    2010-07-01

    ... data will be used to inform and educate drivers and to conduct traffic engineering studies. (e) Army... 32 National Defense 4 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Use of traffic accident investigation report data... (CONTINUED) LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC SUPERVISION Traffic...

  7. 75 FR 51953 - Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue Aircraft, and...

    2010-08-24

    ... applicability of these regulations to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The proposed definition stated... unmanned aircraft system that takes place between the time that the system is activated with the purpose of... notification and reporting of aircraft accidents or incidents by adding a definition of ``unmanned......

  8. 46 CFR 185.230 - Report of accident to aid to navigation.

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Report of accident to aid to navigation. 185.230 Section 185.230 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) SMALL PASSENGER VESSELS... aid to navigation. Whenever a vessel collides with a buoy, or other aid to navigation under...

  9. 77 FR 18689 - Changes to Standard Numbering System, Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report...

    2012-03-28

    .... Abbreviations BARD Boating Accident Report Database DHS Department of Homeland Security FR Federal Register HIN... rulemaking (NPRM) bearing the same title as this final rule in the Federal Register (75 FR 25137). We... reopened the comment period to accept comments until October 15, 2010 (75 FR 49869, Aug. 16, 2010)....

  10. 75 FR 49869 - Changes to Standard Numbering System, Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report...

    2010-08-16

    ... in the January 17, 2008, issue of the Federal Register (73 FR 3316). Reopening of Comment Period On May 7, 2010, we published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register (75 FR 25137..., Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report Database AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS....

  11. Assessment of Loads and Performance of a Containment in a Hypothetical Accident (ALPHA). Facility design report

    Yamano, Norihiro; Maruyama, Yu; Kudo, Tamotsu; Moriyama, Kiyofumi; Ito, Hideo; Komori, Keiichi; Sonobe, Hisao; Sugimoto, Jun [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment

    1998-06-01

    In the ALPHA (Assessment of Loads and Performance of Containment in Hypothetical Accident) program, several tests have been performed to quantitatively evaluate loads to and performance of a containment vessel during a severe accident of a light water reactor. The ALPHA program focuses on investigating leak behavior through the containment vessel, fuel-coolant interaction, molten core-concrete interaction and FP aerosol behavior, which are generally recognized as significant phenomena considered to occur in the containment. In designing the experimental facility, it was considered to simulate appropriately the phenomena mentioned above, and to cover experimental conditions not covered by previous works involving high pressure and temperature. Experiments from the viewpoint of accident management were also included in the scope. The present report describes design specifications, dimensions, instrumentation of the ALPHA facility based on the specific test objectives and procedures. (author)

  12. Final safety analysis report for the Galileo Mission: Volume 2, Book 2: Accident model document: Appendices

    1988-12-15

    This section of the Accident Model Document (AMD) presents the appendices which describe the various analyses that have been conducted for use in the Galileo Final Safety Analysis Report II, Volume II. Included in these appendices are the approaches, techniques, conditions and assumptions used in the development of the analytical models plus the detailed results of the analyses. Also included in these appendices are summaries of the accidents and their associated probabilities and environment models taken from the Shuttle Data Book (NSTS-08116), plus summaries of the several segments of the recent GPHS safety test program. The information presented in these appendices is used in Section 3.0 of the AMD to develop the Failure/Abort Sequence Trees (FASTs) and to determine the fuel releases (source terms) resulting from the potential Space Shuttle/IUS accidents throughout the missions.

  13. Evaluation of severe accident risks, Peach Bottom, Unit 2: Main report

    In support of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) assessment of the risk from severe accidents at commercial nuclear power plants in the US reported NUREG-1150, the Severe Accident Risk Reduction Program (SARRP) has completed a revised calculation of the risk to the general public from severe accidents at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2. This power plant, located in southeastern Pennsylvania, is operated by the Philadelphia Electric Company. The emphasis in this risk analysis was not on determining a ''so-called'' point estimate of risk. Rather, it was to determine the distribution of risk, and to discover the uncertainties that account for the breadth of this distribution. Off-site risk initiated by events both internal and external to the power station were assessed. 39 refs., 174 figs., 133 tabs

  14. Studies of radiological consequences on the reports of Chernobyl accident

    1) Relation of radiation related quantities such as radioactivity, exposure, absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent and radiation protection standards were explained as easy as a beginner could understand. 2) Using published data including IAEA data in the report 'One Decade After Chernobyl (Summary of the Conference Results, 1996)' and some reports, outline of explosion, exposure dose and radiation effects which gave to the human body were briefly described and some rational ways for understanding the data were shown. (author)

  15. History of aid provision during radiation accidents in the Czech Republic and of radiation emergency reporting

    The history of radiation accidents and reported elevated exposures divided into the 1954-1978, 1979-1994 and 1995-2012 periods is described in detail. The spectrum of reported radiation events has changed during the years, now including e.g. retrieval of orphan sources, illicit traffic, etc. Since 1995 the agenda of radiation protection has been dealt with by the State Office of Nuclear Safety, where an Emergency Coordination Centre was established.

  16. Studies of radiological consequences on the reports of Chernobyl accident

    Asano, Takeyoshi [Research Institute for Advanced Science and Technology, Osaka Prefecture Univ., Sakai, Osaka (Japan)

    1999-09-01

    1) Relation of radiation related quantities such as radioactivity, exposure, absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent and radiation protection standards were explained as easy as a beginner could understand. 2) Using published data including IAEA data in the report 'One Decade After Chernobyl (Summary of the Conference Results, 1996)' and some reports, outline of explosion, exposure dose and radiation effects which gave to the human body were briefly described and some rational ways for understanding the data were shown. (author)

  17. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Computerized Accident/Incident Reporting System (CAIRS)

    The Department of Energy's (DOE) Computerized Accident/Incident Reporting System (CAIRS) is a comprehensive data base containing more than 50,000 investigation reports of injury/illness, property damage and vehicle accident cases representing safety data from 1975 to the present for more than 150 DOE contractor organizations. A special feature is that the text of each accident report is translated using a controlled dictionary and rigid sentence structure called Factor Relationship and Sequence of Events (FRASE) that enhances the ability to retrieve specific types of information and to perform detailed analyses. DOE summary and individual contractor reports are prepared quarterly and annually. In addition, ''Safety Performance Profile'' reports for individual organizations are prepared to provide advance information to appraisal teams, and special topical reports are prepared for areas of concern such as an increase in the number of security injuries or environmental releases. The data base is open to all DOE and Contractor registered users with no access restrictions other than that required by the Privacy Act

  18. A2 Code - Internal Accident Report. Does it ring a bell?

    HSE Unit

    2015-01-01

    A2 Code* - It is under this designation (used by the CERN community) that the form for internal accident reports is hidden. More specifically it refers to the CERN Safety Code A2 “Reporting of Accidents and Near Misses” (EDMS: 335502 or here via the official Safety Rules website).   Which events should be declared? All accidental events, which cause or could have caused injuries or damage to property or the environment, must be reported especially if they involve: a) a member of the personnel, visitor, temporary labourer or contractor if it occurred on the CERN site or between sites. b) a member of the personnel if it occurred while commuting or during duty travel. Who can fill in the report? The reporting of occurred accidents or near misses should be made by the person involved or by any direct or indirect witness of the event as soon as possible after the event. Contribute to the improvement of Safety within the Organizatio...

  19. Occupational Radiation Protection in Severe Accident Management. EG-SAM Interim Report

    As an early response to the Fukushima NPP accident, the ISOE Bureau decided to focus on the following issues as an initial response of the joint program after having direct communications with the Japanese official participants in April 2011; - Management of high radiation area worker doses: It has been decided to make available the experience and information from the Chernobyl accident in terms of how emergency worker / responder doses were legally and practically managed, - Personal protective equipment for highly-contaminated areas: It was agreed to collect information about the types of personnel protective equipment and other equipment (e.g. air bottles, respirators, air-hoods or plastic suits, etc.), as well as high-radiation area worker dosimetry use (e.g. type, number and placement of dosimetry) for different types of emergency and high-radiation work situations. Detailed information was collected on dose criteria which are used for emergency workers/responders and their basis, dose management criteria for high dose/dose rate areas, protective equipment which is recommended for emergency workers / responders, recommended individual monitoring procedures, and any special requirement for assessment from the ISOE participating nuclear utilities and regulatory authorities and made available for Japanese utilities. With this positive response of the ISOE actors and interest in the situation in Fukushima, the Expert Group on Occupational Radiation Protection in Severe Accident Management (EG-SAM) was established by the ISOE Management Board in May 2011. The overall objective of the EG-SAM is to contribute to occupational exposure management (providing a view on management of high radiation area worker doses) within the Fukushima plant boundary with the ISOE participants and to develop a state-of-the- art ISOE report on best radiation protection management practices for proper radiation protection job coverage during severe accident initial response and recovery

  20. Can we use near-miss reports for accident prevention? A study in the oil and gas industry in Denmark

    Rasmussen, H.B.; Drupsteen, L.; Dyreborg, J.

    2013-01-01

    Background: The oil and gas industry in the Danish sector of the North Sea has always focused on reducing work-related accidents. Over the years, accident rates have been reduced, and near-miss reporting has gained in importance, because it allows the industry to learn from experience and prevent fu

  1. Report of the activities carried out by the Psychological Support Group in the Goiania radiological accident in Brazil

    The report analyzes the characteristics and attitudes of the population directly involved in the Goiania radiological accident. The inhabitants of the affected area were interviewed in their residence. Factual information about the accidents were given and specific psychological support were received whenever necessary

  2. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME III. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  3. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME II. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  4. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME VI. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  5. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME V. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  6. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME I. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  7. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME IV. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  8. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: UPDATE. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  9. Accident Statistics

    Department of Homeland Security — Accident statistics available on the Coast Guard’s website by state, year, and one variable to obtain tables and/or graphs. Data from reports has been loaded for...

  10. Report of the Land Berlin: The Chernobyl reactor accident and its effects on Berlin

    This report presents in detail the activities of the Berlin Senate administrations for the protection of the population after the reactor accident and outlines the consequences that have already resulted or are still to be expected for the people and the environment in Berlin. The radiation control guidelines and the provided instruments enabled the Berlin Senate to encounter the sudden accident with a fast and unbureaucratic crisis management. The special geopolitical situation of Berlin made it possible to set up a comprehensive control and measuring program for imported food. This report shows that all the measures required in connection with Chernobyl were taken by the Berlin Senate and that there is an effective precautionary program. (orig./HSCH)

  11. Interim report on the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company

    The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (the Investigation Committee) of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) was established by the Cabinet decision on May 24, 2011. Its objectives are: to conduct investigation for finding out the causes of accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS) and Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS) of TEPCO as well as the causes of accident damage; and to make policy recommendations for limiting the expansion of damage and preventing reoccurrence of similar accidents. The Investigation Committee has conducted its investigation and evaluation since its first meeting on June 7, 2011. Its activities included: site visits to the Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni NPSs, as well as to other facilities; hearing of heads of local governments around the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS; and hearing of people concerned through interviews mainly arranged by the Secretariat. As of December 16, 2011, the number of interviewees reached 456. The investigation and evaluation by the Investigation Committee are still ongoing and the Interim Report does not cover every item that the Committee aims at investigating and evaluating. Fact-finding of even some of those items discussed in the Interim Report are not yet completed. The Investigation Committee continues to conduct its investigation and evaluation and will issue its Final Report in the summer of 2012. This brief executive summary covers mainly considerations and evaluation of the issues in Chapter VII of the Interim Report, with brief reference to Chapters I to VI. The Investigation Committee recommendations are printed in bold. (author)

  12. Report of a human accident caused by Conus regius (Gastropoda, Conidae).

    Haddad, Vidal; Coltro, Marcus; Simone, Luiz Ricardo L

    2009-01-01

    Conus regius is a venomous mollusc in the Conidae family, which includes species responsible for severe or even fatal accidents affecting human beings. This is the first report on a clinical case involving this species. It consisted a puncture in the right hand of a diver who presented paresthesia and movement difficulty in the whole limb. The manifestations disappeared after around twelve hours, without sequelae. PMID:19802483

  13. Surgical correction of buried penis after traffic accident – a case report

    Masuda Hiroshi; Azuma Haruhito; Segawa Naoki; Iwamoto Yusaku; Inamoto Teruo; Takasaki Noboru; Katsuoka Yoji

    2004-01-01

    Abstract Background Buried penis, most commonly seen in children, is particularly debilitating in adults, resulting in inability to void while standing and it also affects vaginal penetration. We report a case of buried penis due to a traffic accident, which caused dislocation of the fractured pubic bone that shifted inside and pulled the penis by its suspensory ligament. Case presentation A 55-year-old man was admitted to our hospital with a chief complaint of hidden penis while in the sitti...

  14. Fukushima: the Japanese report in French - 'Official report of the independent inquiry Commission on the nuclear accident in Fukushima'

    In its first part, this report describes the (Japanese) Inquiry Commission's mandate, its expectations, what it did, what it did not do, and then describes the accident, gives a chronology of events after the earthquake and the tsunami occurred, and states and comments the following conclusions: a catastrophe with a human origin, earthquake-induced damages, an assessment of operational problems, problems met during emergency intervention, evacuation problems, unresolved public health and welfare problems, need to reform the regulators as well as the operator, laws and rules. Seven recommendations are proposed; they address the control of the nuclear regulation body, the reform of the crisis management system, the government responsibility for public health and welfare, the control of operators, criteria for a new regulator, a reform of laws related to nuclear energy, and the implementation of a system of independent inquiry commissions. Then the report comments and discusses in detail the results of the inquiry which first tried to assess whether the accident was avoidable, and studied various elements: the accident, the emergency response, the damage extent, the organisational problems in the prevention of the accident, the legal system. Results of inquiries on evacuated people and on personnel are given in appendix, as well as the content of all the Commission meetings

  15. Severe accident phenomena

    Severe accidents are nuclear reactor accidents in which the reactor core is substantially damaged. The report describes severe reactor accident phenomena and their significance for the safety of nuclear power plants. A comprehensive set of phenomena ranging from accident initiation to containment behaviour and containment integrity questions are covered. The report is based on expertise gained in the severe accident assessment projects conducted at the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). (49 refs., 32 figs., 12 tabs.)

  16. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis: Food chain uncertainty assessment. Volume 1: Main report

    Brown, J. [National Radiological Protection Board (United Kingdom); Goossens, L.H.J.; Kraan, B.C.P. [Delft Univ. of Technology (Netherlands)] [and others

    1997-06-01

    This volume is the first of a two-volume document that summarizes a joint project conducted by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the European Commission to assess uncertainties in the MACCS and COSYMA probabilistic accident consequence codes. These codes were developed primarily for estimating the risks presented by nuclear reactors based on postulated frequencies and magnitudes of potential accidents. This document reports on an ongoing project to assess uncertainty in the MACCS and COSYMA calculations for the offsite consequences of radionuclide releases by hypothetical nuclear power plant accidents. A panel of sixteen experts was formed to compile credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for food chain variables that affect calculations of offsite consequences. The expert judgment elicitation procedure and its outcomes are described in these volumes. Other panels were formed to consider uncertainty in other aspects of the codes. Their results are described in companion reports. Volume 1 contains background information and a complete description of the joint consequence uncertainty study. Volume 2 contains appendices that include (1) a summary of the MACCS and COSYMA consequence codes, (2) the elicitation questionnaires and case structures for both panels, (3) the rationales and results for the panels on soil and plant transfer and animal transfer, (4) short biographies of the experts, and (5) the aggregated results of their responses.

  17. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis: Food chain uncertainty assessment. Volume 1: Main report

    This volume is the first of a two-volume document that summarizes a joint project conducted by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the European Commission to assess uncertainties in the MACCS and COSYMA probabilistic accident consequence codes. These codes were developed primarily for estimating the risks presented by nuclear reactors based on postulated frequencies and magnitudes of potential accidents. This document reports on an ongoing project to assess uncertainty in the MACCS and COSYMA calculations for the offsite consequences of radionuclide releases by hypothetical nuclear power plant accidents. A panel of sixteen experts was formed to compile credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for food chain variables that affect calculations of offsite consequences. The expert judgment elicitation procedure and its outcomes are described in these volumes. Other panels were formed to consider uncertainty in other aspects of the codes. Their results are described in companion reports. Volume 1 contains background information and a complete description of the joint consequence uncertainty study. Volume 2 contains appendices that include (1) a summary of the MACCS and COSYMA consequence codes, (2) the elicitation questionnaires and case structures for both panels, (3) the rationales and results for the panels on soil and plant transfer and animal transfer, (4) short biographies of the experts, and (5) the aggregated results of their responses

  18. Final report of the accident phenomenology and consequence (APAC) methodology evaluation. Spills Working Group

    Brereton, S.; Shinn, J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Hesse, D [Battelle Columbus Labs., OH (United States); Kaninich, D. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Lazaro, M. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Mubayi, V. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

    1997-08-01

    The Spills Working Group was one of six working groups established under the Accident Phenomenology and Consequence (APAC) methodology evaluation program. The objectives of APAC were to assess methodologies available in the accident phenomenology and consequence analysis area and to evaluate their adequacy for use in preparing DOE facility safety basis documentation, such as Basis for Interim Operation (BIO), Justification for Continued Operation (JCO), Hazard Analysis Documents, and Safety Analysis Reports (SARs). Additional objectives of APAC were to identify development needs and to define standard practices to be followed in the analyses supporting facility safety basis documentation. The Spills Working Group focused on methodologies for estimating four types of spill source terms: liquid chemical spills and evaporation, pressurized liquid/gas releases, solid spills and resuspension/sublimation, and resuspension of particulate matter from liquid spills.

  19. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis -- Early health effects uncertainty assessment. Volume 1: Main report

    Haskin, F.E. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States); Harper, F.T. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Goossens, L.H.J.; Kraan, B.C.P. [Delft Univ. of Technology (Netherlands); Grupa, J.B. [Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (Netherlands)

    1997-12-01

    The development of two new probabilistic accident consequence codes, MACCS and COSYMA, was completed in 1990. These codes estimate the consequence from the accidental releases of radiological material from hypothesized accidents at nuclear installations. In 1991, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Commission of the European Communities began cosponsoring a joint uncertainty analysis of the two codes. The ultimate objective of this joint effort was to systematically develop credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for the respective code input variables. A formal expert judgment elicitation and evaluation process was identified as the best technology available for developing a library of uncertainty distributions for these consequence parameters. This report focuses on the results of the study to develop distribution for variables related to the MACCS and COSYMA early health effects models.

  20. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis -- Late health effects uncertainty assessment. Volume 1: Main report

    Little, M.P.; Muirhead, C.R. [National Radiological Protection Board (United Kingdom); Goossens, L.H.J.; Kraan, B.C.P.; Cooke, R.M. [Delft Univ. of Technology (Netherlands); Harper, F.T. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hora, S.C. [Univ. of Hawaii, Hilo, HI (United States)

    1997-12-01

    The development of two new probabilistic accident consequence codes, MACCS and COSYMA, was completed in 1990. These codes estimate the consequence from the accidental releases of radiological material from hypothesized accidents at nuclear installations. In 1991, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Commission of the European Communities began cosponsoring a joint uncertainty analysis of the two codes. The ultimate objective of this joint effort was to systematically develop credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for the respective code input variables. A formal expert judgment elicitation and evaluation process was identified as the best technology available for developing a library of uncertainty distributions for these consequence parameters. This report focuses on the results of the study to develop distribution for variables related to the MACCS and COSYMA late health effects models.

  1. HTGR accident initiation and progression analysis status report. Phase II risk assessment

    The primary purpose of this report is to document AIPA studies performed on the HTGR since issuance of the eight volumes. Implementation of the R and D recommendations is discussed, which includes consideration of new initiating events and accident sequences, modeling of fission product release from fuel particles, factors affecting PCRV plateout during core heatup, and the effect of earthquakes on plant operation. The Phase II risk assessment of core heatup events is presented. The major elements of the study include event trees and probability assessments, physical process evaluations, and evaluation of fission product transport and the associated radiological consequences. A risk assessment of accidents initiated by failures of the steam generators, including economizer-evaporator-superheater sections and the reheaters, is presented and the impact of various plant design options is quantified

  2. 20 years after Chernobyl Accident. Future outlook. National Report of Ukraine

    The scale of the Chernobyl catastrophe - the most severe man made nuclear accident in the history of mankind - is well known to both scientists and politicians worldwide. The basic causes of the catastrophe were as follows: Conduction an incompletely and incorrectly prepared electrical experiment; The low professional level of operators, and of the NPP management and the officials of the Ministry of Electrification as a whole in the area of NPP safety; Insufficient safety level of the graphite-uranium reactor RBMK-1000; Constructive faults RBMK-1000; Personnel mistakes. The report describes and reviews the actions of the governments of the USSR, Ukraine, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; the activities of scientists in elimination of the accident consequences; and elimination of the additional experience gained over the past years. Mistakes made during these activities are highlighted

  3. Final report on Risoe measuring program in connection with Chernobyl accident

    The present report deals with the measurements of Chernobyl debris carried out in Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland in the perioed May-Sept. 1986. The results are presented in details in appendix II, but summarized in tables and figures in the main report, which is in Danish. Appendix I is the samples programme, also in Danish. It is concluded that the dose equivalent commitment to an adult Dane from consumption of foodstuffs in the first year after the accident (May 1986-April 1987) is 17 μ Sv, corresponding to approximately 1% of a years background radiation. (author)

  4. Safety against releases in severe accidents. Annual report 1996. Project plan 1997

    The work scope of the RAK-2 project is divided into three sub-projects: RAK-2.1 Severe Accident Phenomenology; RAK-2.2 Computerised Accident Management; RAK-2.3 Reactors In Nordic Surroundings. The work in subproject 1 progresses roughly according to budget and time schedule. Some adjustments in the technical work scope were made during 1996. Main tasks of RAK-2.1 in 1996: Complete recriticality studies for Nordic BWRs; Investigate phenomena related to late phase melt progression; Issue and NKS Final Technical Report on KTH experiments. Main tasks of RAK-2.2 in 1996: CAMS would be further developed with signal validation, tracking simulation, state identification and PSA and risk monitoring applications; Carry out a feasibility study for development of a PWR version of CAMS in collaboration with EdF, France; Use CAMS in the Halden Man-Machine laboratory to perform human factor studies. Main tasks of RAK-2.3 in 1996: Collect and report data from the British reactor types AGR, MAGNOX and PWR; Make a report on accidents in nuclear ships; Put the collected data together in a common data base covering neighbour reactors treated in SIK-3 and RAK-2.3; Update the data in the former SIK-3 report if needed. The work in project 2 progresses according to plans. The data collection of British reactors with in sub-project 3 has been delayed significantly due to difficulty of obtaining information from some of the British utilities, but the problems are expected to be solved by the end of 1997. (EG)

  5. Special committee review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's severe accident risks report (NUREG--1150)

    In April 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) published a draft report ''Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five US Nuclear Power Plants,'' NUREG-1150. This report updated, extended and improved upon the information presented in the 1974 ''Reactor Safety Study,'' WASH-1400. Because the information in NUREG-1150 will play a significant role in implementing the NRC's Severe Accident Policy, its quality and credibility are of critical importance. Accordingly, the Commission requested that the RES conduct a peer review of NUREG-1150 to ensure that the methods, safety insights and conclusions presented are appropriate and adequately reflect the current state of knowledge with respect to reactor safety. To this end, RES formed a special committee in June of 1989 under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Committee, composed of a group of recognized national and international experts in nuclear reactor safety, was charged with preparing a report reflecting their review of NUREG-1150 with respect to the adequacy of the methods, data, analysis and conclusions it set forth. The report which precedes reflects the results of this peer review

  6. Report of the US Department of Energy's team analyses of the Chernobyl-4 Atomic Energy Station accident sequence

    In an effort to better understand the Chernobyl-4 accident of April 26, 1986, the US Department of Energy (DOE) formed a team of experts from the National Laboratories including Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest Laboratory. The DOE Team provided the analytical support to the US delegation for the August meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to subsequent international meetings. The DOE Team has analyzed the accident in detail, assessed the plausibility and completeness of the information provided by the Soviets, and performed studies relevant to understanding the accident. The results of these studies are presented in this report

  7. The Chernobyl reactor accident and its consequences. Informative report prepared on behalf of the IAEA meeting, Vienna, August 25-29, 1986. Pt. 1

    GRS has revised the German translation of part 1 of the report on the Chernobyl reactor accident. The translation is technically clear and intelligible and contains the current technical terms. The report comprises a description of RBMK-1000, a chronological description of the accident, the analysis of the accident, the causes of the accident, measures preventing the further development of the accident as well as measures controlling the radioactive contamination of the environment and the population. The report discusses immediate emergency measures improving the safety of RBMK-type nuclear power plants and deals with recommendations for nuclear safety engineering. (DG)

  8. Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents

    Siefken, Larry James

    1999-02-01

    Preliminary designs are described for models of hydrogen and oxygen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents. Calculation of the uptake involves the modeling of seven processes: (1) diffusion of oxygen from the bulk gas into the boundary layer at the external cladding surface, (2) diffusion from the boundary layer into the oxide layer, (3) diffusion from the inner surface of the oxide layer into the metallic part of the cladding, (4) uptake of hydrogen in the event that the clad-ding oxide layer is dissolved in a steam-starved region, (5) embrittlement of cladding due to hydrogen uptake, (6) cracking of cladding during quenching due to its embrittlement and (7) release of hydrogen from the cladding after cracking of the cladding. An integral diffusion method is described for calculating the diffusion processes in the cladding. Experimental results are presented that show a rapid uptake of hydrogen in the event of dissolution of the oxide layer and a rapid release of hydrogen in the event of cracking of the oxide layer. These experimental results are used as a basis for calculating the rate of hydrogen uptake and the rate of hydrogen release. The uptake of hydrogen is limited to the equilibrium solubility calculated by applying Sievert's law. The uptake of hydrogen is an exothermic reaction that accelerates the heatup of a fuel rod. An embrittlement criteria is described that accounts for hydrogen and oxygen concentration and the extent of oxidation. A design is described for implementing the models for hydrogen and oxygen uptake and cladding embrittlement into the programming framework of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code. A test matrix is described for assessing the impact of the proposed models on the calculated behavior of fuel rods in severe accident conditions. This report is a revision and reissue of the report entitled; "Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents."

  9. Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents

    Preliminary designs are described for models of hydrogen and oxygen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents. Calculation of the uptake involves the modeling of seven processes: (1) diffusion of oxygen from the bulk gas into the boundary layer at the external cladding surface, (2) diffusion from the boundary layer into the oxide layer, (3) diffusion from the inner surface of the oxide layer into the metallic part of the cladding, (4) uptake of hydrogen in the event that the cladding oxide layer is dissolved in a steam-starved region, (5) embrittlement of cladding due to hydrogen uptake, (6) cracking of cladding during quenching due to its embrittlement and (7) release of hydrogen from the cladding after cracking of the cladding. An integral diffusion method is described for calculating the diffusion processes in the cladding. Experimental results are presented that show a rapid uptake of hydrogen in the event of dissolution of the oxide layer and a rapid release of hydrogen in the event of cracking of the oxide layer. These experimental results are used as a basis for calculating the rate of hydrogen uptake and the rate of hydrogen release. The uptake of hydrogen is limited to the equilibrium solubility calculated by applying Sievert's law. The uptake of hydrogen is an exothermic reaction that accelerates the heatup of a fuel rod. An embrittlement criteria is described that accounts for hydrogen and oxygen concentration and the extent of oxidation. A design is described for implementing the models for hydrogen and oxygen uptake and cladding embrittlement into the programming framework of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code. A test matrix is described for assessing the impact of the proposed models on the calculated behavior of fuel rods in severe accident conditions. This report is a revision and reissue of the report entitled; ''Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents''

  10. Report on a radiological accident in the southern Urals on 29 September 1957

    In response to concern expressed by the international community about the possible consequences of a radiological accident which occurred at a military installation in the southern Urals in 1957, Soviet specialists have prepared this report containing information on this event. Owing to a fault in the cooling system used for the concrete tanks containing highly active nitrate acetate wastes, a chemical explosion occurred in these materials on 29 September 1957 and radioactive fission products were released into the atmosphere and subsequently scattered and deposited in parts of the Chelyabinsk, Svendlovsk and Tyumensk provinces. 9 tabs

  11. Report on a workshop on transportation-accident scenarios involving spent fuel

    Much confusion and skepticism resulted from the scenarios for transportation accidents involving spent fuel that have been presented in environmental impact statements because the supporting assumptions and conclusions from the scenarios did not always appear to be consistent. As a result, the Transportation Technology Center gathered a group whose participants were experts in disciplines related to the transport of spent fuel to consider the scenarios. The group made a number of recommendations about scenario development and about areas in need of further study. This report documents the discussions held and the recommendations and conclusions of the group

  12. Report on a workshop on transportation-accident scenarios involving spent fuel

    Wilmot, E L; McClure, J D; Luna, R E

    1981-02-01

    Much confusion and skepticism resulted from the scenarios for transportation accidents involving spent fuel that have been presented in environmental impact statements because the supporting assumptions and conclusions from the scenarios did not always appear to be consistent. As a result, the Transportation Technology Center gathered a group whose participants were experts in disciplines related to the transport of spent fuel to consider the scenarios. The group made a number of recommendations about scenario development and about areas in need of further study. This report documents the discussions held and the recommendations and conclusions of the group.

  13. Inroads into Equestrian Safety: Rider-Reported Factors Contributing to Horse-Related Accidents and Near Misses on Australian Roads

    Kirrilly Thompson; Chelsea Matthews

    2015-01-01

    Simple Summary Riding horses on roads can be dangerous, but little is known about accidents and near misses. To explore road safety issues amongst Australian equestrians, we conducted an online survey. More than half of all riders (52%) reported having experienced at least one accident or near miss in the 12 months prior to the survey, mostly attributed to speed. Whilst our findings confirmed factors identified overseas, we also identified issues around road rules, hand signals and road rage....

  14. An outline of the interim report of the investigation committee on the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

    Interim report of the Investigation Committee of the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (NPSs) was published in December 26, 2011. The Japanese cabinet approved ten committee members including the author in May 2011. The committee interviewed more than 400 people over a total of 900 hours of hearings with about 40 staffs consisting of administrative team and three investigation teams of social system, root causes of the accident and countermeasures to prevent damage expansion of the accident. Interim report concluded 'the accident at Fukushima NPSs was caused by failures of every provision against reactor severe accident'. The failures appeared on (1) function of supervisory system for emergency response, (2) Fukushima Daiichi NPSs on-site disaster response especially related with operation of isolation condenser of unit 1 and high-pressure coolant injection system of unit 3, (3) Fukushima Daiichi NPSs off-site disaster response such the government failed to make use of data on the radioactive plumes released from the plant for evacuations, and (4) preparedness against tsunami and severe accident management. Possible worst or best simulation cases were also discussed. With no human support available on-site, workers might not have been able to prevent the meltdowns. Final report was due at the end of July 2012. (T. Tanaka)

  15. Report on the preliminary fact finding mission following the accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokaimura, Japan

    Following the accident on 30 September 1999 at the nuclear fuel processing facility at Tokaimura, Japan, the IAEA Emergency Response Centre received numerous requests for information about the event's causes and consequences from Contact Points under the Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Although the lack of transboundary consequences of the accident meant that action under the Early Notification Convention was not triggered, the Emergency Response Centre issued several advisories to Member States which drew on official reports received from Japan. After discussions with the Government of Japan, the IAEA dispatched a team of three experts from the Secretariat on a fact finding mission to Tokaimura from 13 to 17 October 1999. The present preliminary report by that team documents key technical information obtained during the mission. At this stage, the report can in no way provide conclusive judgements on the causes and consequences of the accident. Investigations are proceeding in Japan and more information is expected to be made available after access has been gained to the building where the accident occurred. Moreover, much of the information already made available will be revised as more accurate assessments are made, for example of the radiation doses to the three individuals who received the highest exposures. Notwithstanding the preliminary nature of this report, it is clear that the accident was not one involving widespread contamination of the environment as in the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Although there was little risk off the site once the accident had been brought under control, the authorities evacuated the population living within a few hundred metres and advised people within about 10 km of the facility to take shelter for a period of about one day. The event at Tokaimura was nevertheless a serious industrial accident. The results of the detailed

  16. Analysis of credible accidents for Argonaut reactors. Report for October 1980-April 1981

    Five areas of potential accidents have been evaluated for the Argonaut-UTR reactors. They are: insertion of excess reactivity, catastrophic rearrangement of the core, explosive chemical reaction, graphite fire, and a fuel-handling accident

  17. Safety-critical human factors issues derived from analysis of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident investigation reports

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident on March 11, 2011 had a large impact both in and outside Japan, and is not yet concluded. After Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s (TEPCO's) Fukushima accident, electric power suppliers have taken measures to respond in the event that the same state of emergency occurs - deploying mobile generators, temporary pumps and hoses, and training employees in the use of this equipment. However, it is not only the 'hard' problems including the design of equipment, but the 'soft' problems such as organization and safety culture that have been highlighted as key contributors in this accident. Although a number of organizations have undertaken factor analysis of the accident and proposed issues to be reviewed and measures to be taken, a systematic overview about electric power suppliers' organization and safety culture has not yet been undertaken. This study is based on three major reports: the report by the national Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (the Diet report), the report by the Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company (Government report), and the report by the non-government committee supported by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (Non-government report). From these reports, the sections relevant to electric power suppliers' organization and safety culture were extracted. These sections were arranged to correspond with the prerequisites for the ideal organization, and 30 issues to be reviewed by electric power suppliers were extracted using brainstorming methods. It is expected that the identified issues will become a reference for every organization concerned to work on preventive measures hereafter. (author)

  18. Safety-critical human factors issues derived from analysis of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident investigation reports

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident on March 11, 2011 had a large impact both in and outside Japan, and is not yet concluded. After Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s (TEPCO's) Fukushima accident, electric power suppliers have taken measures to respond in the event that the same state of emergency occurs - deploying mobile generators, temporary pumps and hoses, and training employees in the use of this equipment. However, it is not only the “hard” problems including the design of equipment, but the “soft” problems such as organization and safety culture that have been highlighted as key contributors in this accident. Although a number of organizations have undertaken factor analysis of the accident and proposed issues to be reviewed and measures to be taken, a systematic overview about electric power suppliers' organization and safety culture has not yet been undertaken. This study is based on three major reports: the report by the national Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (the Diet report), the report by the Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company (Government report), and the report by the non-government committee supported by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (Non-government report). From these reports, the sections relevant to electric power suppliers' organization and safety culture were extracted. These sections were arranged to correspond with the prerequisites for the ideal organization, and 30 issues to be reviewed by electric power suppliers were extracted using brainstorming methods. It is expected that the identified issues will become a reference for every organization concerned to work on preventive measures hereafter. (author)

  19. HTGR accident initiation and progression analysis status report. Volume VIII. Responses to comments on AIPA status report

    The first seven volumes of the report series provide formal documentation of the status of the ERDA-sponsored Accident Initiation and Progression Analysis (AIPA) study as of the end of FY75. That portion of the report was given broad distribution to government agencies, industrial organizations, and academic institutions. Comments on the Status Report have been actively solicited from these and other organizations. The volume presented (the eighth in the AIPA Status Report) documents all of the formal written comments that have been received as of September 30, 1976, together with the responses to those comments. The comments as presented are direct quotations from the manuscripts as submitted by the reviewers; none have been paraphrased. The comments are presented in the same order as submitted by the reviewers and are generally addressed individually

  20. Implications of the accident at Chernobyl for safety regulation of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States: Volume 1, Main report: Final report

    This report was prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to assess the implications of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as they relate to reactor safety regulation for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. The facts used in this assessment have been drawn from the US fact-finding report (NUREG-1250) and its sources. The general conclusions of the document are that there are generic lessons to be learned but that no changes in regulations are needed due to the substantial differences in the design, safety features and operation of US plants as compared to those in the USSR. Given these general conclusions, further consideration of certain specific areas is recommended by the report. These include: administrative controls over reactor regulation, reactivity accidents, accidents at low or zero power, multi-unit protection, fires, containment, emergency planning, severe accident phenomena, and graphite-moderated reactors

  1. Advanced computational methods for the assessment of reactor core behaviour during reactivity initiated accidents. Final report

    The document at hand serves as the final report for the reactor safety research project RS1183 ''Advanced Computational Methods for the Assessment of Reactor Core Behavior During Reactivity-Initiated Accidents''. The work performed in the framework of this project was dedicated to the development, validation and application of advanced computational methods for the simulation of transients and accidents of nuclear installations. These simulation tools describe in particular the behavior of the reactor core (with respect to neutronics, thermal-hydraulics and thermal mechanics) at a very high level of detail. The overall goal of this project was the deployment of a modern nuclear computational chain which provides, besides advanced 3D tools for coupled neutronics/ thermal-hydraulics full core calculations, also appropriate tools for the generation of multi-group cross sections and Monte Carlo models for the verification of the individual calculational steps. This computational chain shall primarily be deployed for light water reactors (LWR), but should beyond that also be applicable for innovative reactor concepts. Thus, validation on computational benchmarks and critical experiments was of paramount importance. Finally, appropriate methods for uncertainty and sensitivity analysis were to be integrated into the computational framework, in order to assess and quantify the uncertainties due to insufficient knowledge of data, as well as due to methodological aspects.

  2. Surgical correction of buried penis after traffic accident – a case report

    Masuda Hiroshi

    2004-06-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Buried penis, most commonly seen in children, is particularly debilitating in adults, resulting in inability to void while standing and it also affects vaginal penetration. We report a case of buried penis due to a traffic accident, which caused dislocation of the fractured pubic bone that shifted inside and pulled the penis by its suspensory ligament. Case presentation A 55-year-old man was admitted to our hospital with a chief complaint of hidden penis while in the sitting position. He had suffered a pelvic fracture in a traffic accident four years previously, and his penis was covered with suprapubic fat when he was in a sitting position. He was unable to have sexual intercourse. We performed a penile lengthening procedure, including inverse V-Y-plasty of the dorsal skin of the penile root, suspensory desmotomy and fat removal, under general anesthesia. There was a good cosmetic result with satisfactory penile erection, which allowed successful sexual intercourse after surgery. Conculsion We performed penile elongation surgery with inverse V-Y-plasty of the dorsal skin of the penile root, suspensory desmotomy, and fat removal. Surgical treatment of buried penis achieves marked aesthetic and functional improvement, and benefits the majority of patients, resulting in satisfactory erection and successful sexual intercourse.

  3. Radiation and health effects. A report on the TMI-2 accident and related health studies

    On March 28, 1979, the Unit 2 reactor at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station was severely damaged by an accident. Radioactivity was discharged to the environment resulting in a small amount of radiation exposure to the public. Continuing concerns by some members of the communities around TMI about the potential radiation-induced health effects prompted GPU Nuclear Corporation to examine the information gathered from the accident investigation in the context of our current knowledge of radiation and its effects on human health. Although this report deals with technical matters, the information is presented in a manner that can be understood by those who do not have scientific backgrounds. This report is divided into three major sections. The first section provides an overview of the past 80 years of relevant research on the subject of radiation and its effects on human health. During that time, scientists and physicians throughout the world have studied hundreds of thousands of individuals exposed to radiation from medical and occupational sources and from nuclear weapons explosions. Epidemiologic studies of humans, such as the Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb, have established that following exposure to large doses of radiation, certain health effects, including cancer, can be observed. Radiation-induced health effects from low doses of radiation, such as those associated with the TMI-2 accident, appear infrequently, if at all, and are identical and, therefore, indistinguishable from similar health effects which occur normally. For example, cancers induced by radiation are indistinguishable from those occurring spontaneously or normally. It is not possible, therefore, for scientists to determine directly whether radiation-induced health effects at low doses occur at all; such observations can only be inferred by statistical methods. The second section of this report provides a brief description of the TMI-2 accident. Most of the radioactivity from the

  4. Electrical equipment performance under severe accident conditions (BWR/Mark 1 plant analysis): Summary report

    The purpose of the Performance Evaluation of Electrical Equipment during Severe Accident States Program is to determine the performance of electrical equipment, important to safety, under severe accident conditions. In FY85, a method was devised to identify important electrical equipment and the severe accident environments in which the equipment was likely to fail. This method was used to evaluate the equipment and severe accident environments for Browns Ferry Unit 1, a BWR/Mark I. Following this work, a test plan was written in FY86 to experimentally determine the performance of one selected component to two severe accident environments

  5. An overview of severe accident modeling and analysis work for the ANS reactor conceptual safety analysis report

    ORNL's Advanced Neutron Source (ANS) will be a new user facility for all kinds of neutron research, centered around a research reactor of unprecedented neutron beam flux. A defense-in-depth philosophy has been adopted. In response to this commitment, ANS Project management has initiated severe accident analysis and related technology development efforts early-on in the design phase itself. Early consideration of severe accident issues will aid in designing a sufficiently robust containment for retention and controlled release of radionuclides in the event of such an accident. It will also provide a means for satisfying on- and off-site regulatory requirements and provide containment response and source term analyses for level-2 and -3 Probabilistic Risk Analyses (PRAs) that will be produced. Moreover, it will provide the best possible understanding of the ANS under severe accident conditions, and consequently provide insights for the development of strategies and design philosophies for accident management, mitigation, and emergency preparedness. This paper presents a perspective overview of the severe accident modeling and analysis work for the ANS Conceptual Safety Analysis Report (CSAR)

  6. Radiographers and radiologists reporting plain radiograph requests from accident and emergency and general practice

    AIM: To assess selectively trained radiographers and consultant radiologists reporting plain radiographs for the Accident and Emergency Department (A and E) and general practitioners (GPs) within a typical hospital setting. METHODS: Two radiographers, a group of eight consultant radiologists, and a reference standard radiologist independently reported under controlled conditions a retrospectively selected, random, stratified sample of 400 A and E and 400 GP plain radiographs. An independent consultant radiologist judged whether the radiographer and radiologist reports agreed with the reference standard report. Clinicians then assessed whether radiographer and radiologist incorrect reports affected confidence in their diagnosis and treatment plans, and patient outcome. RESULTS: For A and E and GP plain radiographs, respectively, there was a 1% (95% confidence interval (CI) -2 to 5) and 4% (95% CI -1 to 8) difference in reporting accuracy between the two professional groups. For both A and E and GP cases there was an 8% difference in the clinicians' confidence in their diagnosis based on radiographer or radiologist incorrect reports. For A and E and GP cases, respectively, there was a 2% and 8% difference in the clinicians' confidence in their management plans based on radiographer or radiologist incorrect reports. For A and E and GP cases, respectively, there was a 1% and 11% difference in effect on patient outcome of radiographer or radiologist incorrect reports. CONCLUSION: There is the potential to extend the reporting role of selectively trained radiographers to include plain radiographs for all A and E and GP patients. Further research conducted during clinical practice at a number of sites is recommended

  7. Facial baroparesis: a critical differential diagnosis for scuba diving accidents--case report.

    Iakovlev, E V; Iakovlev, V V

    2014-01-01

    Facial nerve baroparesis is a rare and potentially under-reported complication of scuba diving. A diver, after surfacing from a shallow dive, developed isolated left-sided facial palsy accompanied by pain and decreased hearing in the left ear. No other signs or symptoms attributable to a scuba diving accident were detected. Forty minutes later, he heard a "pop" in the affected ear, after which all symptoms quickly resolved. Repeat neurological and ear examinations were normal. He showed no residual or new symptoms 24 hours later. The differential diagnosis of facial neurological deficit after diving includes decompression sickness, cerebral air embolism due to pulmonary barotrauma, facial nerve barotrauma and common conditions such as stroke and Bell's palsy. It is important to recognize the condition since recompression treatment can further damage the facial nerve. PMID:25558550

  8. The way of the report in the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear plant accident

    Nearly four years pass from the Great East Japan Earthquake. Fukushima has a big influence of the nuclear plant accident, and more than 120,000 citizens of the prefecture are still forced to refuge. The citizens of Fukushima feel that the present conditions do not come outside a prefecture and have dissatisfaction for media. A gap occurs in what media convey and thinking that inhabitants want you to tell. One of the causes is a news value point of reference. The other is that the news is carried out in a viewpoint of Tokyo. Is there not the cancellation method? I consider it from the viewpoint of a reporter living in Fukushima city. (author)

  9. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - summary report

    This report is a summary of the Accident Investigation Board Report on the May 14, 1997, Chemical Explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/RL-97-59). The referenced report provides a greater level of detail and includes a complete discussion of the facts identified, analysis of those facts, conclusions derived from the analysis, identification of the accident's causal factors, and recommendations that should be addressed through follow-up action by the U.S. Department of Energy and its contractors. This companion document provides a concise summary of that report, with emphasis on management issues. Evaluation of emergency and occupational health response to, and radiological and chemical releases from, this accident was not within the scope of this investigation, but is the subject of a separate investigation and report (see DOE/RL-97-62)

  10. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1997 - A status report. Volume 26

    This report describes the five operational events in 1997 that affected five commercial light-water reactors (LWRs) and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage accidents. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 x 10-6. These events were identified by first computer-screening the 1997 licensee event reports from commercial LWRs to identify those events that could be precursors. Candidate precursors were selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters to ensure that the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969--1996 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for the events

  11. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1996. A status report. Volume 25

    This report describes the 14 operational events in 1996 that affected 13 commercial light-water reactors and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage accidents. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 x 10-6. These events were identified by first computer-screening the 1996 licensee event reports from commercial light-water reactors to identify those events that could potentially be precursors. Candidate precursors were selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters and regional offices to ensure the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969--1995 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for the events

  12. First Annual Report: NASA-ONERA Collaboration on Human Factors in Aviation Accidents and Incidents

    Srivastava, Ashok; Fabiani, Patrick

    2012-01-01

    This is the first annual report jointly prepared by NASA and ONERA on the work performed under the agreement to collaborate on a study of the human factors entailed in aviation accidents and incidents particularly focused on consequences of decreases in human performance associated with fatigue. The objective of this Agreement is to generate reliable, automated procedures that improve understanding of the levels and characteristics of flight-crew fatigue factors whose confluence will likely result in unacceptable crew performance. This study entails the analyses of numerical and textual data collected during operational flights. NASA and ONERA are collaborating on the development and assessment of automated capabilities for extracting operationally significant information from very large, diverse (textual and numerical) databases much larger than can be handled practically by human experts. This report presents the approach that is currently expected to be used in processing and analyzing the data for identifying decrements in aircraft performance and examining their relationships to decrements in crewmember performance due to fatigue. The decisions on the approach were based on samples of both the numerical and textual data that will be collected during the four studies planned under the Human Factors Monitoring Program (HFMP). Results of preliminary analyses of these sample data are presented in this report.

  13. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1997 -- A status report. Volume 26

    Belles, R.J.; Cletcher, J.W.; Copinger, D.A.; Muhlheim, M.D. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Dolan, B.W.; Minarick, J.W. [Science Applications International Corp., Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    1998-11-01

    This report describes the five operational events in 1997 that affected five commercial light-water reactors (LWRs) and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage accidents. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 {times} 10{sup {minus}6}. These events were identified by first computer-screening the 1997 licensee event reports from commercial LWRs to identify those events that could be precursors. Candidate precursors were selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters to ensure that the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969--1996 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for the events.

  14. Carbon monoxide - hydrogen combustion characteristics in severe accident containment conditions. Final report

    Carbon monoxide can be produced in severe accidents from interaction of ex-vessel molten core with concrete. Depending on the particular core-melt scenario, the type of concrete and geometric factors affecting the interaction, the quantities of carbon monoxide produced can vary widely, up to several volume percent in the containment. Carbon monoxide is a combustible gas. The carbon monoxide thus produced is in addition to the hydrogen produced by metal-water reactions and by radiolysis, and represents a possibly significant contribution to the combustible gas inventory in the containment. Assessment of possible accident loads to containment thus requires knowledge of the combustion properties of both CO and H2 in the containment atmosphere. Extensive studies have been carried out and are still continuing in the nuclear industry to assess the threat of hydrogen in a severe reactor accident. However the contribution of carbon monoxide to the combustion threat has received less attention. Assessment of scenarios involving ex-vessel interactions require additional attention to the potential contribution of carbon monoxide to combustion loads in containment, as well as the effectiveness of mitigation measures designed for hydrogen to effectively deal with particular aspects of carbon monoxide. The topic of core-concrete interactions has been extensively studied; for more complete background on the issue and on the physical/thermal-hydraulics phenomena involved, the reader is referred to Proceedings of CSNI Specialists Meetings (Ritzman, 1987; Alsmeyer, 1992) and a State-of-Art Report (European Commission, 1995). The exact amount of carbon monoxide present in a reactor pit or in various compartments (or rooms) in a containment building is specific to the type of concrete and the accident scenario considered. Generally, concrete containing limestone and sand have a high percentage of CaCO3. Appendix A provides an example of results of estimates of CO and CO2 production

  15. Accident of Chernobyl nuclear power plant. From rumors to the reports of international organizations. WHO, IAEA and others summary reports of one and two decades after and UNSCEAR 2008 of 25 years after Chernobyl accident

    False rumor was circulating at a disaster, Nuclear disaster was not an exception. The author could visit the spot in 1990 after Chernobyl accident when the old USSR started international exchange, take part in various research projects with countless visits till ten years after and attend international organization's summary report conference of one and two decades after. Scientific investigation on radiation hazards became possible and results of various investigations had been reported. Evaluation of scientific credibility of reports came to a big job, which required the author's great effort to give an international scientific consent such that thyroid cancer in childhood was caused by the consequences of the accident with chronological and geographical strong circumstantial evidence. This article reviewed chronological definite information and experiences of radiation hazards that the author got from initial false rumor age to the publication of summary reports of international organizations, and presented problems for emergency response at nuclear disaster. (T. Tanaka)

  16. Tricastin plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Tricastin plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  17. Saint-Alban plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Saint-Alban plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  18. Cruas-Meysse plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Cruas-Meysse plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  19. Chinon plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Chinon B plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  20. Blayais plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Blayais plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  1. Fessenheim plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Fessenheim plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  2. Bugey plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Bugey plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  3. Chooz plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Chooz plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  4. Civaux plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Civaux plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  5. Paluel plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Paluel plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  6. Golfech plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Golfech plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  7. Cattenom plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Cattenom plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  8. Summary report on the environmental monitoring around Tokai area following the accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant

    An accident took place at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in USSR in the early hours of 26 April 1986. The plant caught fire and some degree of reactor inventry was released to the environment. Following the accident, debris of the radioactivity from Chernobyl was detected in all the European countries and countermeasures were taken in some countries. In Japan, many kinds of radionuclides were detected in rain, airbone dust and other environmental samples from 3 May and ''Headquaters for Radioactivity Countermeasure'' was organized in the Japanese Government. Health and Safety Division at the Tokai Works, PNC, performed the environmental monitoring for the Chernobyl accident in addition to the statutory monitoring program. This report presents results of the environmental monitoring performed at Tokai Works. Furthermore, study on the environmental transfer parameters and preliminary estimation of the committed dose equivalent to the public around Tokai area are discussed. (author)

  9. Lack of safety culture as a contributing factor in major radiation accidents reported in Latin and South America

    In the last decades, the issue of improving safety culture to reduce the upward trend of radiation accidents have received considerable attention from scientific organizations. After the Chernobyl accident, IAEA invited worldwide experts in nuclear safety and formed a working group called 'International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group'. The Safety Culture concept has been developed by the Working Group and published in the Safety Series collection of IAEA in 1986 as No 75-INSAG-4 which provided a logical framework for establishing safety culture policy at individual and organisational level. The aim of this paper is to review the role of insufficient safety culture in the occurrence of 5 major radiation accidents reported in Latin and South America and the remedial action taken by competent authority and oriented towards improvement of basic principle of safety culture. (author)

  10. The investigation on the mass media reports on the JCO accident in the major atomic energy countries and Asian countries

    The JCO (Japan Conversion Organization) accident is the worst one in the history of the atomic energy developments in Japan. The many reports about the accident appeared in the 44 mass media in the world from Sep. 30 to Oct. 14, 1999. Chronological statistics of issued 522 articles are listed under particular criteria. Some of them were based on wrong knowledge and/or overestimations about the accident based on delivered articles by the news agency. Some of others gave critics over the total atomic energy industries of Japan, especially on safety managements and so-called similar Japan syndromes. This investigation gives emphasis on the articles based on wrong knowledge. We identified the countries and the newspaper publishers and the news agencies those gave wrong descriptions. Total 25 articles used the words [explosion] and [fire], which were delivered from the Kyodo News Service. Some of the Asian newspaper wrote that a large quantity of radioactivity, radioactive material and/or nuclear fuels was released. Some other news publishers said the accident was happened at fuel reprocessing facilities, when the waste fuel rods were under cutting. Critics delivered in the individual countries were summarized, i.e. USA, Canada, France, UK, German, Russia, Australia, China, Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan and the news agencies. One of the key issues is the exact information release for the press corps on the early stage of the accidents. The second point is to recognize the different status on atomic energy in the individual countries, when Japan want to explain their domestic situations. Accidents of atomic energy gave many impacts on various aspects to other countries. Japan should understand the neighborhood by collecting world information on atomic energy and analyzing them. Summaries of 522 articles appeared in the mass media were attached in this investigation among the report of 180 pages. (Tanaka, Y.)

  11. Health effects of the Chernobyl accident and special health care programmes. Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group 'Health'

    Twenty years have passed since the worst nuclear reactor accident in the world occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine. The radioactive contamination which resulted from the explosion and fire in the first few days spread over large areas of neighbouring Belarus and the Russian Federation, with most of the fallout in Belarus. While national and local authorities did not immediately disclose the scale of the accident, the mitigation measures, such as distribution of potassium iodine pills, food restriction, and mass evacuation from areas where the radioactive contamination was greatest, undoubtedly reduced the health impact of the radiation exposure and saved many lives. The accident caused severe social and economic disruption and had significant environmental and health impact. This was aggravated by the political and economical changes in the three affected states related to the break-down of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the accident the international scientific and medical community collaborated closely with national experts dealing with health effects of the accident in the affected countries. There is a substantial body of international collaborative projects on the situation, which should lead to advancement in radiation sciences. However, considerable speculation and disinformation remains about the possible health impact of the accident for the millions of affected people. To address the health, environmental and socioeconomic consequences of the Chernobyl accident, the United Nations in 2003 launched an Inter-Agency initiative, the Chernobyl Forum. The Forum's Secretariat, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and several other international organizations collaborated with the governments of the affected countries. The purpose of the Chernobyl Forum was to review the consequences of the accident, issue technical reports and, based

  12. Cyclical Fluctuations in Workplace Accidents

    Boone, J.; van Ours, J.C.

    2002-01-01

    This Paper presents a theory and an empirical investigation on cyclical fluctuations in workplace accidents. The theory is based on the idea that reporting an accident dents the reputation of a worker and raises the probability that he is fired. Therefore a country with a high or an increasing unemployment rate has a low (reported) workplace accident rate. The empirical investigation concerns workplace accidents in OECD countries. The analysis confirms that workplace accident rates are invers...

  13. Experiments on the behaviour of ruthenium in air ingress accidents - Progress report

    During routine nuclear reactor operation, ruthenium will accumulate in the fuel in relatively high concentrations. In an accident in a nuclear power plant it is possible that air gets into contact with the reactor core. In this case ruthenium can oxidise and form volatile ruthenium species, RuO3 and RuO4, which can be transported into the containment. In order to estimate the amount of gaseous ruthenium species it is of interest to know, how it is formed and how it behaves. In our experiments RuO2 is exposed to diverse oxidising atmospheres at a relatively high temperature. In this report, the experimental system for the ruthenium behaviour study is presented. Also preliminary results from experiments carried out during year 2005 are reported. In the experiments gaseous ruthenium oxides were produced in a furnace. Upon cooling RuO2 aerosol particles were formed in the system. They were removed with plane filters from the gas stream. Gaseous ruthenium species were trapped in 1M NaOH-water solution, which is capable of trapping RuO4 totally. Ruthenium in the solution was filtered for analysis. The determination of ruthenium both in aerosol and in liquid filters was made using instrumental neutron activation analysis (INAA). In order to close mass balance and achieve better time resolution three experiment using radioactive tracer were carried out. (au)

  14. Questionnaire survey report about the criticality accident at a nuclear fuel processing facility

    The Radiation Protection Section of the Japanese Society of Radiological Technology conducted a questionnaire survey on the criticality accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokai village on September 30, 1999 in order to identify factors related to the accident and consider countermeasures to deal with such accidents. The questionnaire was distributed to 347 members (122 facilities) of the Japanese Society of Radiological Technology who were working or living in Ibaraki Prefecture, and replies were obtained from 104 members (75 facilities). Questions to elicit the opinions of individuals were as following: method of obtaining information about the accident, knowledge about radiation, opinions about the accident, and requests directed to the Society. Questions regarding facilities concerned the following: communication after the accident, requests for dispatch to the accident site, and possession of radiometry devices. In regard to acquisition of information, 91 of the 104 members (87.5%) answered 'television or radios' followed by newspapers. Forty-five of 101 members were questioned about radiation exposure and radiation effects by the public. There were many opinions that accurate news should be provided rapidly, by the mass media. Many members (75%) felt that they lacked knowledge about radiation, reconfirming the importance of education and instruction concerning radiation. Dispatch was requested of 36 of the 75 facilities (48%), and 44 of 83 facilities (53%) owned radiometry instruments. (K.H.)

  15. On report of natrium flowing out accident in the high speed breeding reactor 'Monju', the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation

    On December 8th, 1995, a natrium flowing out accident of the 2nd cooling system was occurred in the high speed breeding reactor 'Monju' of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. The Science and Technology Agency determined to set 'A task force to survey and investigate the natrium flowing out accident of Monju' in the Atomic Energy Safety Bureau to promote at first thorough following its cause at joining some specialists on December 10th, to set it on December 11th. The Atomic Energy Safety Bureau conducted an in-situ inspection and survey after December 20th according to Act 68, Item 1, of Law on Regulation of the Nuclear Raw Materials, the Nuclear Fuels and the Reactor. This report shows results of surveys and investigations till then, points to be reconsidered in the Science and Technology Agency, and some response and improvemental methods on a base of teachings of this accident as well as contents of 'A surveying report of the natrium flowing out accident' dated on February 9th, since considerable understanding of cause elucidation of thermometer breakdown formed this accident and other items. This book contains the following contents as outline of this accident, reason of the accident, protection of enlargement after flowing out, effect of natrium flowing out, response to the outsiders at accident occurring by the Corporation, response to outsiders at accident occurring by the Bureau, and so forth. (G.K.)

  16. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - final report

    On May 14, 1997, at 7:53 p.m. (PDT), a chemical explosion occur-red in Tank A- 109 in Room 40 of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (Facility) located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site, approximately 30 miles north of Richland, Washington. The inactive processing Facility is part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). On May 16, 1997, Lloyd L. Piper, Deputy Manager, acting for John D. Wagoner, Manager, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), formally established an Accident Investigation Board (Board) to investigate the explosion in accordance with DOE Order 225. 1, Accident Investigations. The Board commenced its investigation on May 15, 1997, completed the investigation on July 2, 1997, and submitted its findings to the RL Manager on July 26, 1997. The scope of the Board's investigation was to review and analyze the circumstances of the events that led to the explosion; to analyze facts and to determine the causes of the accident; and to develop conclusions and judgments of need that may help prevent a recurrence of the accident. The scope also included the application of lessons learned from similar accidents within DOE. In addition to this detailed report, a companion document has also been prepared that provides a concise summary of the facts and conclusions of this report, with an emphasis on management issues (DOE/RL-97-63)

  17. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - final report

    Gerton, R.E.

    1997-07-25

    On May 14, 1997, at 7:53 p.m. (PDT), a chemical explosion occur-red in Tank A- 109 in Room 40 of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (Facility) located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site, approximately 30 miles north of Richland, Washington. The inactive processing Facility is part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). On May 16, 1997, Lloyd L. Piper, Deputy Manager, acting for John D. Wagoner, Manager, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), formally established an Accident Investigation Board (Board) to investigate the explosion in accordance with DOE Order 225. 1, Accident Investigations. The Board commenced its investigation on May 15, 1997, completed the investigation on July 2, 1997, and submitted its findings to the RL Manager on July 26, 1997. The scope of the Board`s investigation was to review and analyze the circumstances of the events that led to the explosion; to analyze facts and to determine the causes of the accident; and to develop conclusions and judgments of need that may help prevent a recurrence of the accident. The scope also included the application of lessons learned from similar accidents within DOE. In addition to this detailed report, a companion document has also been prepared that provides a concise summary of the facts and conclusions of this report, with an emphasis on management issues (DOE/RL-97-63).

  18. Nuclear Reactor RA Safety Report, Vol. 15, Analysis of significant accidents

    Power excursions of the RA reactor a mathematical model of reactor kinetic behaviour was formulated to describe power and temperature coefficients for both reactor fuel and moderator. Computer code TM-1 was written for analysis of possible reactor accidents. Power excursions caused by uncontrolled control rod removal and heavy water flow into the central vertical experimental channel were analyzed. Accidents caused by fuel elements handling were discussed including possible fuel element damage. Although the probability for uncontrolled radioactive materials release into the environment is very low, this type of accidents are analyzed as well including the impact on the personnel and the environment. A separate chapter describes analysis of the loss of flow accident. Safety analysis covers the possible damage of the outer steel Ra reactor vessel and the water screens which are part of the water biological shield

  19. Report on the fire accident at Uranium Enrichment Laboratory, Tokai, JAERI

    For the fire accident on November 20 1997 at Uranium Enrichment Research Laboratory, Tokai, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, the Internal Investigation Committee on the accident has investigated its cause, the first contact with local authorities on the information and the fire fighting through an individual interview of the people concerned, fire spot inspection and chemical and theoretical analysis of the materials obtained at the spot. From these results, it has been shown that the accident was caused by the explosive burning of wet uranium in a metal can and successive burning of cartons placed near the cans. For prevention of the accident and the confusion of information exchanges, the committee recommended improvement of the methods for treating chemically active materials and information exchange systems. (author)

  20. LOA-1: prevent accidents. Quarterly technical progress report, FRSP program - July through September 1981

    Information related to LMFBR reactor safety is presented concerning common cause failures; shutdown by self-activated system; shutdown heat removal system operation; sodium burning; core catcher material interactions; accident release of sodium oxide aerosol; and LMFBR risk assessment

  1. Report of the psychological support given to victims of the Goiania radiological accident in Brazil

    The psychological support given to the victims of the Goiania accident are described. The assistance lasted two months on the average and was given while the victims were in the hospital and later on in the recuperation center

  2. Content analysis of the media reporting on the Fukushima nuclear accident in three European countries

    Cantone, Marie Claire; Prezelj, Iztok

    2015-01-01

    The nuclear accident in Japan induced enormous media coverage. In general, mass media play a dominant role in communication on nuclear emergency issues. It is the prominent information channel for the general public, acting as the "watchdog" of the society. Analysing the media content allows gaining a better insight into the way that a nuclear accident is reflected in nowadays society. It also provides useful lessons to be learned for risk communication in nuclear emergencies. In this study m...

  3. Estimates of early containment loads from core melt accidents. Draft report for comment

    The thermal-hydraulic processes and corium debris-material interactions that can result from core melting in a severe accident have been studied to evaluate the potential effect of such phenomena on containment integrity. Pressure and temperature loads associated with representative accident sequences have been estimated for the six various LWR containment types used within the United States. Summaries distilling the analyses are presented and an interpretation of the results provided. 13 refs., 68 figs., 39 tabs

  4. Estimates of early containment loads from core melt accidents. Draft report for comment

    None

    1985-12-01

    The thermal-hydraulic processes and corium debris-material interactions that can result from core melting in a severe accident have been studied to evaluate the potential effect of such phenomena on containment integrity. Pressure and temperature loads associated with representative accident sequences have been estimated for the six various LWR containment types used within the United States. Summaries distilling the analyses are presented and an interpretation of the results provided. 13 refs., 68 figs., 39 tabs.

  5. Phase 1A Final Report for the AREVA Team Enhanced Accident Tolerant Fuels Concepts

    Morrell, Mike E. [AREVA Federal Services LLC, Charlotte, NC (United States)

    2015-03-19

    In response to the Department of Energy (DOE) funded initiative to develop and deploy lead fuel assemblies (LFAs) of Enhanced Accident Tolerant Fuel (EATF) into a US reactor within 10 years, AREVA put together a team to develop promising technologies for improved fuel performance during off normal operations. This team consisted of the University of Florida (UF) and the University of Wisconsin (UW), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Duke Energy and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). This team brought broad experience and expertise to bear on EATF development. AREVA has been designing; manufacturing and testing nuclear fuel for over 50 years and is one of the 3 large international companies supplying fuel to the nuclear industry. The university and National Laboratory team members brought expertise in nuclear fuel concepts and materials development. Duke and TVA brought practical utility operating experience. This report documents the results from the initial “discovery phase” where the team explored options for EATF concepts that provide enhanced accident tolerance for both Design Basis (DB) and Beyond Design Basis Events (BDB). The main driver for the concepts under development were that they could be implemented in a 10 year time frame and be economically viable and acceptable to the nuclear fuel marketplace. The economics of fuel design make this DOE funded project very important to the nuclear industry. Even incremental changes to an existing fuel design can cost in the range of $100M to implement through to LFAs. If this money is invested evenly over 10 years then it can take the fuel vendor several decades after the start of the project to recover their initial investment and reach a breakeven point on the initial investment. Step or radical changes to a fuel assembly design can cost upwards of $500M and will take even longer for the fuel vendor to recover their investment. With the projected lifetimes of the current generation of nuclear power

  6. Synthesis of the IRSN report on the issue of severe accidents which may occur on operating pressurised water nuclear reactors

    While containing other related documents (expert report, mail), this synthetic report analyses and comments some aspects of the assessment and treatment of severe accidents by EDF in its operating PWRs (pressurised water nuclear reactors). These aspects are: the EDF referential related to severe accidents (objectives of consequence limitation and prevention, long term management, probabilistic objectives, radiological objectives, expected performance of equipment and systems), the re-assessment of the 'S3 reference source term' which corresponds to a typical discharge (selection of representative scenarios, new approach based on waste categorization, the taking into account of various species, components and systems), the water management in the reactor tank (risks of explosion, of critical corium level, etc.), the strategy of an anticipated opening of the containment envelope venting-filtration device in order to avoid a core fusion, and the risk associated by a cesspool filling-in by debris

  7. Direction Committee for the management of the post-accident phase of a nuclear accident or of a radiological event (CODIRPA). Work group nr 3: 'Assessment of radiological and dose consequences in a post-accident situation'. Final report

    This report first describes how radioactive contamination occurs after a nuclear accident, whether it concerns plants, animals, people, and buildings, how people can be exposed, and how a post-accidental zoning is implemented either to protect population or to control territories. It describes principles and methods for the assessment of the contamination of the environment (radiological values, characterization of radioactive deposits, of agriculture products, and of wastes, materials and manufactured products). It describes how to organise radioactivity measurements in the environment (principles and objectives of measurement programmes, sampling organisation and management, laboratory radioactivity measurements, identification and preparation of radioactivity measurement operators, results management). It describes how to assess doses received by exposed people (measurement techniques, retrospective assessment, proposition of a dose assessment strategy for exposed population)

  8. Safety and risk questions following the nuclear incidents and accidents in Japan. Summary final report

    After the nuclear accidents in Japan, GRS has carried out in-depth investigations of the events. On the one hand, the accident sequences in the affected units have been analysed from various viewpoints. On the other hand, the transferability of the findings to German plants has been examined to possibly make recommendations for safety improvements. The accident sequences at Fukushima Daiichi have been traced with as much detail as possible based on all available information. Additional insights have been drawn from thermohydraulic analyses with the GRS code system ATHLET-CD/COCOSYS focusing on the events in units 2 and 3, e.g. with regard to core damage and the state of the containments in the first days of the accident sequence. In-depth investigations have also been carried out on topics such as natural external hazards, electrical power supply or organizational measures. In addition, methodological studies on further topics related with the accidents have been performed. Through a detailed analysis of the relevant data from the events in Japan, the basis for an in-depth examination of the transferability to German plants was created. It was found that an implementation of most of the insights gained from the investigations had already been initiated as part of the GRS information notice 2012/02. Further findings have been communicated to the federal government and introduced into other relevant bodies, e.g. the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (KTA) or the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK).

  9. Ten years after the Chernobyl accident: reporting on nuclear and other hazards in six Swedish newspapers

    Nilsson, Aasa; Sjoeberg, L.; Waahlberg, A. af

    1997-07-01

    A European Commission sponsored study (RISKPERCOM) involving France, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, is concerned with surveying public perceptions of radiation related and other risks. This was partly done by distributing a questionnaire in each country at three different times in 1996: before, during and after the expected media attention given to the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. A selection of print media were analyzed, during a period of eight weeks - four weeks before the anniversary, and four weeks after - making it possible to contrast any changes between the three waves of the questionnaire with the results of the media study. The present report aims at providing a picture of the Swedish media coverage of different kinds of risks during the period referred to above. The purpose of the analysis is thus primarily of a descriptive nature; explanatory factors are only considered in an ad hoc manner while discussing the results and their possible implications. Naturally, the findings arising from this study cannot alone serve as a basis for making statements about the effects of risk related content on the Swedish newspaper readers. The risk stories included in the analysis were those dealing with one or more of the twenty different hazard items referred to in several of the questions in the RISKPERCOM questionnaire. Radiation and nuclear power energy were not the only issues of concern. The selection covered a wide range of other hazards as well, in order to provide for a wide risk panorama, thus making it possible to compare specific risk qualities etc., as these were presented in the media 70 refs, 40 refs

  10. Ten years after the Chernobyl accident: reporting on nuclear and other hazards in six Swedish newspapers

    A European Commission sponsored study (RISKPERCOM) involving France, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, is concerned with surveying public perceptions of radiation related and other risks. This was partly done by distributing a questionnaire in each country at three different times in 1996: before, during and after the expected media attention given to the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. A selection of print media were analyzed, during a period of eight weeks - four weeks before the anniversary, and four weeks after - making it possible to contrast any changes between the three waves of the questionnaire with the results of the media study. The present report aims at providing a picture of the Swedish media coverage of different kinds of risks during the period referred to above. The purpose of the analysis is thus primarily of a descriptive nature; explanatory factors are only considered in an ad hoc manner while discussing the results and their possible implications. Naturally, the findings arising from this study cannot alone serve as a basis for making statements about the effects of risk related content on the Swedish newspaper readers. The risk stories included in the analysis were those dealing with one or more of the twenty different hazard items referred to in several of the questions in the RISKPERCOM questionnaire. Radiation and nuclear power energy were not the only issues of concern. The selection covered a wide range of other hazards as well, in order to provide for a wide risk panorama, thus making it possible to compare specific risk qualities etc., as these were presented in the media

  11. Analysis and discussion on reports of additional safety assessment of nuclear installations with respect to the Fukushima accident

    This document proposes an analysis of the reports made by the different operators of nuclear installations within the frame of a safety audit of the French nuclear installations with respect to the Fukushima accident. Operators (mainly AREVA, the CEA and EDF) were asked to perform additional safety assessments. In a first part, the conclusions of EDF reports are analysed regarding the seismic risk, the flooding risk, the situation of some specific sites (Fessenheim, Tricastin), other phenomena (rains, winds), loss of electricity supplies and of cooling systems, severe accidents, hydrogen issue, chemical hazards, subcontractors, crisis management. Conclusions of AREVA reports are analysed for the different sites (Tricastin, La Hague, MELOX factory, Romans factory). Conclusions of CEA reports are analysed for the different concerned installations (ATPu, Masurca, Osiris, Phenix, Jules Horowitz reactor). A second part proposes a global analysis of EDF's additional safety assessment reports regarding earthquake, flooding, other extreme natural phenomena, loss of electricity supplies and cooling system, subcontracting conditions, crisis management, and radiation protection organisation. AREVA's and CEA's reports are then analysed in terms of report structure and content, and for the different concerned sites

  12. An Unusual Os Trigonum Syndrome Case Secondary to Car Accident: A Case Report

    Safer

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available Introduction The os trigonum syndrome is a common cause of posterior ankle pain, often affecting ballet dancers, soccer players, runners and gymnasts who frequently force the ankle into plantar flexion. In rare cases, onset of the os trigonum syndrome followed an acute injury. Case Presentation A 62-year-old female patient was admitted with load depended ankle pain and swelling, lasting for five years which promptly started after a car accident. We incidentally discovered os trigonum on plain radiography on a lateral view of the right ankle. Conclusions The os trigonum syndrome should take in consideration in elderly subject who had posterior ankle pain starting after a car accident.

  13. National report: United Kingdom. Chernobyl - the aftermath. What can the industry learn from the accident

    The author points out that the nuclear industry has suffered a serious blow by the Chernobyl accident and asks the questions: Will nuclear power recover, and how, and when will it recover. The author states why in his opinion nuclear power will recover essentially, and reasons in terms of the future energy scene, national attitudes, and public opinion. The technical lessons from the Chernobyl accident are also evaluated. The conclusion is that the biggest single task facing the nuclear industry is that which concerns public perception. Effective communication is therefore very important

  14. State-of-the-art report on accident analysis and risk analysis of reprocessing plants in European countries

    This report summarizes informations obtained from America, England, France and FRG concerning methodology, computer code, fundamental data and calculational model on accident/risk analyses of spent fuel reprocessing plants. As a result, the followings are revealed. (1) The system analysis codes developed for reactor plants can be used for reprocessing plants with some code modification. (2) Calculational models and programs have been developed for accidental phenomenological analyses in FRG, but with insufficient data to prove them. (3) The release tree analysis codes developed in FRG are available to estimate radioactivity release amount/probability via off-gas/exhaustair lines in the case of accidents. (4) The computer codes developed in America for reactor-plant environmental transport/safety analyses of released radioactivity can be applied to reprocessing facilities. (author)

  15. LMFBR fuel analysis. Task B. Post-accident heat removal. Final report, July 1, 1975--September 30, 1976

    The report deals with the behavior of molten core debris following a hypothetical core disruptive accident in the proposed Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant. Heat dissipating characteristics of an ex-vessel sacrificial bed have been analyzed. A novel form of heat transfer, analogous to film boiling, has been proposed to describe heat transfer from a heat generating pool to surrounding steel walls. Bounding type heat transfer calculations are also made to quantify such hypothetical accident characteristics as debris bed remelting, debris bed dryout in sodium, and failure of the reactor cavity steel liner. Several documents that have been submitted to the NRC for its review of the CRBRP are discussed with attention being drawn to heat transfer related issues

  16. Final report on the Risoe monitoring programme after the Chernobyl accident for the period Oct 1, 1986 - Sept 30, 1987

    In cooperation with the National Agency of Environmental Protection in Denmark, Risoe National Laboratory has examined the radioactive contamination from the Chernobyl accident. The programme for these investigations was an expansion of the countrywide monitoring programme operated since 1962 by Risoe National Laboratory. The present report cover the period Oct 1, 1986 to Sept. 30, 1987. All types of environmental samples relevant for radioactive contamination has been analysed. Most samples were collected countrywide and all samples were analysed for radiocaesium (134Cs and 137Cs). Many samples were furthermore anlaysed for 90Sr and in a few samples transuranic elements (29,240Pu, 241Am and 242Cm) were determined. On the basis of the diet and wholebody measurements of radiocaesium the individual mean dose equivalent commitment from Danish diet consumed in the first two years after the Chernobyl accident was calculated to 27 μ Sv. (author)

  17. Visualization of Traffic Accidents

    Wang, Jie; Shen, Yuzhong; Khattak, Asad

    2010-01-01

    Traffic accidents have tremendous impact on society. Annually approximately 6.4 million vehicle accidents are reported by police in the US and nearly half of them result in catastrophic injuries. Visualizations of traffic accidents using geographic information systems (GIS) greatly facilitate handling and analysis of traffic accidents in many aspects. Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), Inc. is the world leader in GIS research and development. ArcGIS, a software package developed by ESRI, has the capabilities to display events associated with a road network, such as accident locations, and pavement quality. But when event locations related to a road network are processed, the existing algorithm used by ArcGIS does not utilize all the information related to the routes of the road network and produces erroneous visualization results of event locations. This software bug causes serious problems for applications in which accurate location information is critical for emergency responses, such as traffic accidents. This paper aims to address this problem and proposes an improved method that utilizes all relevant information of traffic accidents, namely, route number, direction, and mile post, and extracts correct event locations for accurate traffic accident visualization and analysis. The proposed method generates a new shape file for traffic accidents and displays them on top of the existing road network in ArcGIS. Visualization of traffic accidents along Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel is included to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

  18. Nuclear accidents and epidemiology

    A consultation on epidemiology related to the Chernobyl accident was held in Copenhagen in May 1987 as a basis for concerted action. This was followed by a joint IAEA/WHO workshop in Vienna, which reviewed appropriate methodologies for possible long-term effects of radiation following nuclear accidents. The reports of these two meetings are included in this volume, and cover the subjects: 1) Epidemiology related to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. 2) Appropriate methodologies for studying possible long-term effects of radiation on individuals exposed in a nuclear accident. Figs and tabs

  19. Implications of the accident at Chernobyl for safety regulation of commercial nuclear power plants in the United Sates: Volume 2, Appendix - Public comments and their disposition: Final report

    This report was prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to assess the implications of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as they relate to reactor safety regulation for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. The facts used in this assessment have been drawn from the US fact-finding report(NUREG-1250) and its sources. The general conclusions of the document are that there are generic lessons to be learned but that no changes in regulations are needed due to the substantial differences in the design, safety features and operation of US plants as compared to those in the USSR. Given these general conclusions, further consideration of certain specific areas is recommended by the report. These include: administrative controls over reactor regulation, reactivity accidents, accidents at low or zero power, multi-unit protection, fires, containment, emergency planning, severe accident phenomena, and graphite-moderated reactors

  20. Chernobyl accident and Danmark

    The report describes the Chernobyl accident and its consequences for Denmark in particular. It was commissioned by the Secretary of State for the Environment. Volume 1 contains copies of original documents issued by Danish authorities during the first accident phase and afterwards. Evaluations, monitoring data, press releases, legislation acts etc. are included. (author)

  1. Chernobyl accident and Denmark

    The report describes the Chernobyl accident and its consequences for Denmark in particular. It was commissioned by The Secretary of State for the Environment. Volume 2 contains copies of original documents issued by Danish authorities during the first accident phase and afterwards. Evaluations, monitoring data, press releases, legislation acts etc. are included. (author)

  2. Risk reduction category (RRC-A) accident studies in the safety analysis report of the EPR trademark reactor

    Poehlmann, M.; Bleher, G.; Ismaier, A.; Knoll, A.; Levi, P.; Garcia, E. Vera; Schels, A.; Seitz, H.; Lima Campos, L. [AREVA GmbH, Erlangen (Germany)

    2013-07-01

    The Risk Reduction Category (RRC-A) is considered in the safety demonstration of nuclear reactors in addition to design basis operating conditions (Plant Condition Category, PCC), in order to analyze with a risk reduction approach any operating conditions with multiple failures. As extending the operating conditions of the plant 'beyond design basis', the Risk Reduction Category (RRC-A) is also denoted as Design Extension Condition (DEC-A). In the German licensing framework, the RRCA (or DEC-A) transients correspond to safety assessment level '4b' of the 'Sicherheitsanforderungen an Kernkraftwerke' (Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants), Az. RS I 5 - 13303/01 of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. These RRC-A (or DEC-A) operating conditions require specific design provisions (implemented by manual or automatic action), known as RRC-A measures, intended to render consequences of accumulated failures admissible. In contrast, RRC-B constitute severe accidents that lead to core melt. Identification of RRC-A operating conditions and corresponding RRC-A measures is based on the use of results of probabilistic safety assessments. After the Fukushima accident the RRC-A accidents like Station Black Out (SBO) or Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS) are of particular interest in the safety assessment of nuclear new builds. In several chapters of the Safety Analysis Report it is demonstrated that the AREVA EPRTM design is resistant at RRC-A accident conditions. (orig.)

  3. Fessenheim plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident; Fessenheim - Rapport d'evaluation complementaire de la surete des installations nucleaires au regard de l'accident de Fukushima

    NONE

    2011-09-15

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Fessenheim plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  4. Nuclear Reactor RA Safety Report, Vol. 12, Accidents during reactor operation

    This volume includes description and analysis of typical accidents occurred during operation of RA reactor in chronological order, as follows: contamination of primary coolant circuit; leakage of heavy water from the primary coolant loop; contamination of vertical experimental channel; air contamination in the reactor building and loss of circulation of the primary coolant; failures of the vacuum pump and spent fuel packaging device; rupture of the spent fuel element cladding; dethronement's of capsule for irradiation of fuel element; rupture of the vertical experimental channel and contamination of the surroundings; swelling of a fuel element; appearance of deposits on the surface of the fuel elements cladding. The last chapter describes similar accidents occurred on nuclear reactors in the world

  5. Finger injuries by fast rotating blades: A case report of an accident with a blender and the intervention of the fire brigade

    Hillenbrand, Matthias

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available [english] We present a case report of a 27-year-old female who had an accident with a blender. She was brought to the Emergency Department having pinched her left forefinger between the blades. Previous attempts by the local fire brigade to free the finger initially failed. After several attempts it finally succeeded by turning it carefully away from the blade. Although first impressions of the accident might have expected a worse injury, fortunately it just showed a nail bed cut. Most accidents of this type cause serious injuries with the involvement of vessels, nerves, tendons, muscles or bones.

  6. Report of the working group 'Regulatory requirements on AM - Concept of nuclear and radiation safety during beyond-design-basis accidents'

    The developed working group report contains the following main paragraphs: legal basis and basis for regulatory requirements for on-site and off-site Accident Management (AM), regulatory requirements or recommendations for on-site AM and for emergency preparedness, background information concerning the implementation and review of an AM program as a basis for an AM guideline. Overview about AM/SAM implementation in member countries of the SAMINE project; measure and candidates for high level actions based upon US SAMG; interactions of severe accident research and the regulatory positions, relationship between different components of an accident management programme are also given

  7. Report of the US Department of Energy's team analyses of the Chernobyl-4 Atomic Energy Station accident sequence

    1986-11-01

    In an effort to better understand the Chernobyl-4 accident of April 26, 1986, the US Department of Energy (DOE) formed a team of experts from the National Laboratories including Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest Laboratory. The DOE Team provided the analytical support to the US delegation for the August meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to subsequent international meetings. The DOE Team has analyzed the accident in detail, assessed the plausibility and completeness of the information provided by the Soviets, and performed studies relevant to understanding the accident. The results of these studies are presented in this report.

  8. Finger injuries by fast rotating blades: A case report of an accident with a blender and the intervention of the fire brigade

    Hillenbrand, Matthias; Horch, Raymund E.

    2014-01-01

    [english] We present a case report of a 27-year-old female who had an accident with a blender. She was brought to the Emergency Department having pinched her left forefinger between the blades. Previous attempts by the local fire brigade to free the finger initially failed. After several attempts it finally succeeded by turning it carefully away from the blade. Although first impressions of the accident might have expected a worse injury, fortunately it just showed a nail bed cut. Most accide...

  9. Estimate of radionuclide release characteristics into containment under severe accident conditions. Final report

    Nourbakhsh, H.P. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

    1993-11-01

    A detailed review of the available light water reactor source term information is presented as a technical basis for development of updated source terms into the containment under severe accident conditions. Simplified estimates of radionuclide release and transport characteristics are specified for each unique combination of the reactor coolant and containment system combinations. A quantitative uncertainty analysis in the release to the containment using NUREG-1150 methodology is also presented.

  10. Report of an audit of nurse triage in an accident and emergency department.

    Wong, T W; Tseng, G; Lee, L W

    1994-01-01

    The nurse triage process in an accident and emergency (A&E) department was audited as part of the nursing quality assurance programme. It was found that in most cases documentation was adequate and guidelines had been adhered to. Triage decisions were accurate in most cases using the discharge diagnosis as a bench-mark. Waiting time improvements were also seen. Triage audit was a useful tool in the continuous quality improvement effort.

  11. Retrieval system for emplaced spent unreprocessed fuel (SURF) in salt bed depository: accident event analysis and mechanical failure probabilities. Final report

    This report provides support in developing an accident prediction event tree diagram, with an analysis of the baseline design concept for the retrieval of emplaced spent unreprocessed fuel (SURF) contained in a degraded Canister. The report contains an evaluation check list, accident logic diagrams, accident event tables, fault trees/event trees and discussions of failure probabilities for the following subsystems as potential contributors to a failure: (a) Canister extraction, including the core and ram units; (b) Canister transfer at the hoist area; and (c) Canister hoisting. This report is the second volume of a series. It continues and expands upon the report Retrieval System for Emplaced Spent Unreprocessed Fuel (SURF) in Salt Bed Depository: Baseline Concept Criteria Specifications and Mechanical Failure Probabilities. This report draws upon the baseline conceptual specifications contained in the first report

  12. Report on three accidents that occurred in a cobalt therapy centre in Italy

    In one of the main hospitals in a large province of Italy some accidents occurred in a cobalt therapy unit, after a new source had been installed. The first accident occurred one month later, at the end of a patient treatment. At the control desk a signal indicated that the source was not in the storage position. The operator first pushed unsuccessfully the emergency button, then entered the bunker to help the patient. Ten minutes later, pushing again the emergency button, the source went in the storage position, was not significant. The same day of the accident the technicians of the cobalt equipment were called for a control. About ten days later the same situation occurred and the operator, that had been in charge for the Radiotherapy Division for 30 years, did not follow the emergency radiation protection rules. He did not use the manual device (the wheel) to recall the source in the storage position. When he entered the bunker, the head of the equipment was set on 310 deg C to irradiate the left breast of the patient. To help the aged patient get off the bunker he lifted the patient off the cot thus exposing the right side of his breast to the direct beam. His intervention lasted about 45 seconds. In this case the personal dosimeter measured a dose of 54 mSv. (Author)

  13. Status report of advanced cladding modeling work to assess cladding performance under accident conditions

    B.J. Merrill; Shannon M. Bragg-Sitton

    2013-09-01

    Scoping simulations performed using a severe accident code can be applied to investigate the influence of advanced materials on beyond design basis accident progression and to identify any existing code limitations. In 2012 an effort was initiated to develop a numerical capability for understanding the potential safety advantages that might be realized during severe accident conditions by replacing Zircaloy components in light water reactors (LWRs) with silicon carbide (SiC) components. To this end, a version of the MELCOR code, under development at the Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico (SNL/NM), was modified by replacing Zircaloy for SiC in the MELCOR reactor core oxidation and material properties routines. The modified version of MELCOR was benchmarked against available experimental data to ensure that present SiC oxidation theory in air and steam were correctly implemented in the code. Additional modifications have been implemented in the code in 2013 to improve the specificity in defining components fabricated from non-standard materials. An overview of these modifications and the status of their implementation are summarized below.

  14. Accident source terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants. Final report

    In 1962 tile US Atomic Energy Commission published TID-14844, ''Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactors'' which specified a release of fission products from the core to the reactor containment for a postulated accident involving ''substantial meltdown of the core''. This ''source term'', tile basis for tile NRC's Regulatory Guides 1.3 and 1.4, has been used to determine compliance with tile NRC's reactor site criteria, 10 CFR Part 100, and to evaluate other important plant performance requirements. During the past 30 years substantial additional information on fission product releases has been developed based on significant severe accident research. This document utilizes this research by providing more realistic estimates of the ''source term'' release into containment, in terms of timing, nuclide types, quantities and chemical form, given a severe core-melt accident. This revised ''source term'' is to be applied to the design of future light water reactors (LWRs). Current LWR licensees may voluntarily propose applications based upon it

  15. Optimal management routes for the restoration of territories contaminated during and after the Chernobyl accident: Final report

    This report identifies optimised restoration strategies for contaminated territories (actually private agricultural lands and forests) in Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation resulting from the Chernobyl accident. The evaluation of restoration strategies is based on economic and radiological criteria. For this purpose a methodology involving the subdivision of the territories into categories based on doses was developed. Remediation strategies for agricultural lands involves many options; for example, extensive resettlement, supply of clean milk, radical improvement of land, etc. For contaminated forests the potential radiological impact resulting from a selection of countermeasures like incineration of contaminated wood has been thoroughly evaluated

  16. Experimental Report for Safety Relevant Design Basis Accident Tests by using the High Temperature/High Pressure Test Facility(VISTA)

    Choi, Ki Yong; Park, Hyun Sik; Cho, Seok; Lee, Sung Jae; Choi, Nam Hyun; Min, Kyong Ho; Song, Chul Hwa; Park, Chun Kyong; Chung, Moon Ki

    2005-07-15

    The VISTA (Experimental Verification by Integral Simulation of Transients and Accidents) is an experimental facility to verify the performance and safety issues of the SMART-P (Pilot plant of the System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor). The basic design of the SMART-P has been completed by KAERI. The present report describes experimental test results for safety relevant design basis accidents by using the VISTA facility.

  17. In-vessel core degradation in LWR severe accidents: a state of the art report to CSNI january 1991

    This state of the art report on in-vessel core degradation has been produced at the request of CSNI Principal Working Group 2. The objective of the report is to present to CSNI member countries the status of research and related information on in-vessel degraded core behaviour in both Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWR). Information on experiments, codes and comparisons of calculations with experiments up to january 1991 is summarised and reviewed. Integrated codes, which are wider in scope than just in-vessel degradation are covered as well as specialist, degraded core codes. Implications for PWR and BWR plant calculations are considered. Conclusions and recommendations for research, plant calculations and further CSNI activity in this area are the subject of the final chapter. A major conclusion of the report is that early phase core degradation is relatively well understood. However, codes need further development to bring them up to date with the experimental database, particularly to include low temperature liquefaction processes. These processes significantly affect early phase core degradation and their neglect could affect assessments of accident management actions (including recriticality in BWR severe accidents)

  18. Severe accident management. Prevention and Mitigation

    Effective planning for the management of severe accidents at nuclear power plants can produce both a reduction in the frequency of such accidents as well as the ability to mitigate their consequences if and when they should occur. This report provides an overview of accident management activities in OECD countries. It also presents the conclusions of a group of international experts regarding the development of accident management methods, the integration of accident management planning into reactor operations, and the benefits of accident management

  19. Report from the results of measurements of radioactive contaminations after Chernobyl accident

    The results of measurements of radioactive contamination carried out in Cracow during the first days after Chernobyl accident are presented. The particular radioisotopes were determined by gamma spectroscopy. In the period from April 28th to morning hours of May 1st 1986 radiation measurements concerned above all air. After rains considerable contamination of earth's surface was detected and measurements were concentrated on soil contamination. There were also examined water and food samples. The concentration of strontium radioisotopes was determined too. (M. F. W.)

  20. Environmental radioiodine monitoring to control exposure expected from containment release accidents. Final report

    Reactor accidents may cause releases of radionuclides from containment. The active material would cause exposure to man through inhalation of gases or aerosols or through consumption of food products containing deposited radioactive particles. Certain aspects of internal exposure are considered. They are field assessment of the exposure potential of milk, and predictions of human thyroid dose commitment based on direct measurements of radioiodine incorporated within the human thyroid. Radioiodine in milk may be inferred by measurements of radioiodine in cow thyroids, and by measuring deposited radioiodine on pasture grasses consumed by cows. Direct radioiodine measurements on milk were also considered

  1. APRI-7 Accident Phenomena of Risk Importance. A progress report on research in the field of severe accidents in 2009-2011

    Knowledge of the phenomena that may occur during severe accidents in a nuclear power plant is an important prerequisite for being able to predict the plant behavior, in order to formulate procedures and instructions for incident handling, for contingency planning, and to get good quality at the accident analysis and risk studies. Since the early 80's nuclear power companies and authorities in Sweden has collaborated in research on severe reactor accidents. Cooperation in the beginning was mostly linked to strengthening the protection against environmental impacts after a severe reactor accident, in particular to develop systems for filtered depressurization of the reactor containment. Since the early 90's the cooperation has partially changed and shifted to the phenomenological questions of risk dominance. During the years 2009-2011, cooperation continued in the research-program APRI-7. The aim was to show whether the solutions adopted in the Swedish strategy for accident management provides reasonable protection for the environment. This was done by gaining detailed knowledge of both important phenomena in the hearth melting behavior, and the amount of radioactivity that can be discharged to the surroundings during a severe accident. To achieve this aim, the research program has included a follow-up of international research in severe accidents and evaluation of results, and continued to support research at KTH and Chalmers Univ. of severe accidents. The follow-up of international research has promoted the exchange of knowledge and experience and has provided access to a wealth of information about various phenomena relevant to the events at severe accidents. This was important to obtain a good basis for assessment of abatement measures in the Swedish nuclear reactors. Continuing support to the Royal Inst. of Technology has provided increased knowledge about the ability to cool the molten core of the reactor vessel and the processes associated with cooling the

  2. Boating Accident Statistics

    Department of Homeland Security — Accident statistics available on the Coast Guard’s website by state, year, and one variable to obtain tables and/or graphs. Data from reports has been loaded for...

  3. Important severe accident research issues after Fukushima accident

    After the Fukushima accident several investigation committees issued reports with lessons learned from the accident in Japan. Among those lessons, several recommendations have been made on severe accident research. Similar to the EURSAFE efforts under EU Program, review of specific severe accident research items was started before Fukushima accident in working group of Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) in terms of significance of consequences, uncertainties of phenomena and maturity of assessment methodology. Re-investigation has been started since the Fukushima accident. Additional effects of Fukushima accident, such as core degradation behaviors, sea water injection, containment failure/leakage and re-criticality have been covered. The review results are categorized in ten major fields; core degradation behavior, core melt coolability/retention in containment vessel, function of containment vessel, source term, hydrogen behavior, fuel-coolant interaction, molten core concrete interaction, direct containment heating, recriticality and instrumentation in severe accident conditions. Based on these activities and also author's personal view, the present paper describes the perspective of important severe accident research issues after Fukushima accident. Those are specifically investigation of damaged core and components, advanced severe accident analysis capabilities and associated experimental investigations, development of reliable passive cooling system for core/containment, analysis of hydrogen behavior and investigation of hydrogen measures, enhancement of removal function of radioactive materials of containment venting, advanced instrumentation for the diagnosis of severe accident and assessment of advanced containment design which excludes long-term evacuation in any severe accident situations. (author)

  4. Inroads into Equestrian Safety: Rider-Reported Factors Contributing to Horse-Related Accidents and Near Misses on Australian Roads

    Kirrilly Thompson

    2015-07-01

    Full Text Available Horse riding and horse-related interactions are inherently dangerous. When they occur on public roads, the risk profile of equestrian activities is complicated by interactions with other road users. Research has identified speed, proximity, visibility, conspicuity and mutual misunderstanding as factors contributing to accidents and near misses. However, little is known about their significance or incidence in Australia. To explore road safety issues amongst Australian equestrians, we conducted an online survey. More than half of all riders (52% reported having experienced at least one accident or near miss in the 12 months prior to the survey. Whilst our findings confirm the factors identified overseas, we also identified issues around rider misunderstanding of road rules and driver misunderstanding of rider hand signals. Of particular concern, we also found reports of potentially dangerous rider-directed road rage. We identify several areas for potential safety intervention including (1 identifying equestrians as vulnerable road users and horses as sentient decision-making vehicles (2 harmonising laws regarding passing horses, (3 mandating personal protective equipment, (4 improving road signage, (5 comprehensive data collection, (6 developing mutual understanding amongst road-users, (7 safer road design and alternative riding spaces; and (8 increasing investment in horse-related safety initiatives.

  5. Compendium of ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling Systems] research for realistic LOCA [loss-of-coolant accidents] analysis: Final report

    In the United States, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) are required for light water reactors (LWRs) to provide cooling of the reactor core in the event of a break or leak in the reactor piping or an inadvertent opening of a valve. These accidents are called loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA), and they range from small leaks up to a postulated full break of the largest pipe in the reactor cooling system. Federal government regulations provide that LOCA analysis be performed to show that the ECCS will maintain fuel rod cladding temperatures, cladding oxidation, and hydrogen production within certain limits. The NRC and others have completed a large body of research which investigated fuel rod behavior and LOCA/ECCS performance. It is now possible to make a realistic estimate of the ECCS performance during a LOCA and to quantify the uncertainty of this calculation. The purpose of this report is to summarize this research and to serve as a general reference for the extensive research effort that has been performed. The report: (1) summarizes the understanding of LOCA phenomena in 1974; (2) reviews experimental and analytical programs developed to address the phenomena; (3) describes the best-estimate computer codes developed by the NRC; (4) discusses the salient technical aspects of the physical phenomena and our current understanding of them; (5) discusses probabilistic risk assessment results and perspectives, and (6) evaluates the impact of research results on the ECCS regulations. 736 refs., 412 figs., 66 tabs

  6. Inroads into Equestrian Safety: Rider-Reported Factors Contributing to Horse-Related Accidents and Near Misses on Australian Roads.

    Thompson, Kirrilly; Matthews, Chelsea

    2015-01-01

    Horse riding and horse-related interactions are inherently dangerous. When they occur on public roads, the risk profile of equestrian activities is complicated by interactions with other road users. Research has identified speed, proximity, visibility, conspicuity and mutual misunderstanding as factors contributing to accidents and near misses. However, little is known about their significance or incidence in Australia. To explore road safety issues amongst Australian equestrians, we conducted an online survey. More than half of all riders (52%) reported having experienced at least one accident or near miss in the 12 months prior to the survey. Whilst our findings confirm the factors identified overseas, we also identified issues around rider misunderstanding of road rules and driver misunderstanding of rider hand signals. Of particular concern, we also found reports of potentially dangerous rider-directed road rage. We identify several areas for potential safety intervention including (1) identifying equestrians as vulnerable road users and horses as sentient decision-making vehicles (2) harmonising laws regarding passing horses, (3) mandating personal protective equipment, (4) improving road signage, (5) comprehensive data collection, (6) developing mutual understanding amongst road-users, (7) safer road design and alternative riding spaces; and (8) increasing investment in horse-related safety initiatives. PMID:26479376

  7. Source term assessment, containment atmosphere control systems, and accident consequences. Report to CSNI by an OECD/NEA Group of experts

    CSNI Report 135 summarizes the results of the work performed by CSNI's Principal Working Group No. 4 on the Source Term and Environmental Consequences (PWG4) during the period extending from 1983 to 1986. This document contains the latest information on some important topics relating to source terms, accident consequence assessment, and containment atmospheric control systems. It consists of five parts: (1) a Foreword and Executive Summary prepared by PWG4's Chairman; (2) a Report on the Technical Status of the Source Term; (3) a Report on the Technical Status of Filtration and Containment Atmosphere Control Systems for Nuclear Reactors in the Event of a Severe Accident; (4) a Report on the Technical Status of Reactor Accident Consequence Assessment; (5) a list of members of PWG4

  8. Early mortality estimates for different nuclear accidents. Final Phase I report, October 1977-April 1979

    Several studies have previously been made of the number of early deaths which might be expected in a population exposed to a cloud of radionuclides which could result from a nuclear accident. These analyses, however, have been limited to one accident scenario or to exposures involving limited numbers of radionuclides. The purpose of this Phase I study was to examine the existing data on the early health effects of inhaled radioactive materials and determined what, if any, new studies were needed to make reasonable estimates of early mortality after exposure of a population to a cloud of radionuclides of any type. The approach used in the Phase I project was to analyze the data bases available on the health effects of inhaled radioactive materials and document those which were adequate and useful. Using these data, a computer based simulation model was developed depicting exposure to a radioactive aerosol, the dose to an individual exposed to the aerosol and the probability of dying from early effects

  9. Economic Burden of Road Traffic Accidents; Report from a Single Center from South Eastern Iran

    Aliyeh Sargazi

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Objective: To determine the economic burden of road traffic accidents (RTAs in patients admitted to a single center in south eastern Iran. Methods: This cross-sectional study was conducted in Amir-Al-Momenin hospital of Zabol affiliated with Zabol University of Medical Sciences during a 12-month period from April 2012 to April 2013. All the RTAs patients who were admitted to our emergency department were included. The direct expenses of hospital care were recorded according to their medical charts and the accountant registration information. Data are presented according to different RTAs characteristics. Results: Overall 1155 patients were included in the current study with mean age of 36.7 ± 5.14 years among whom there were 673(58.3% men and 482 (41.7% women. The annual incidence of RTAs were calculated to be 288 per 100,000 population. The RTAs economic burden in our center was 589,448.49 USD which accounted for 10.4% of total hospital expenses during the study period. The money spend on RTAs in our center was 130 times more than gross national income per capita. Cost of each patient in road traffic was 15 times more than cost of an average patient of the hospital in other sections. Conclusion: With considerable high ratio of accidents in Zabol, proper intervention is needed for controlling and preventing RTAs in order to decrease its injuries, impact and the associated economic burden.

  10. Early mortality estimates for different nuclear accidents. Final Phase I report, October 1977-April 1979

    Hahn, F.F.

    1979-08-01

    Several studies have previously been made of the number of early deaths which might be expected in a population exposed to a cloud of radionuclides which could result from a nuclear accident. These analyses, however, have been limited to one accident scenario or to exposures involving limited numbers of radionuclides. The purpose of this Phase I study was to examine the existing data on the early health effects of inhaled radioactive materials and determined what, if any, new studies were needed to make reasonable estimates of early mortality after exposure of a population to a cloud of radionuclides of any type. The approach used in the Phase I project was to analyze the data bases available on the health effects of inhaled radioactive materials and document those which were adequate and useful. Using these data, a computer based simulation model was developed depicting exposure to a radioactive aerosol, the dose to an individual exposed to the aerosol and the probability of dying from early effects.