WorldWideScience

Sample records for accident reports

  1. Accident report 1975/76

    The statistics previously published on the development of accidents were completed. It is the purpose of this accident report: 1) to present a survey of the development of the number of accidents (no radiation accidents) for the years 1960 - 1976, 2) to break down the accidents by different characteristics in order to be able to recognize the preventive measures to be taken so as to avoid further accidents, 3) to report about accidents experienced and to indicate activities performed with respect to accident prevention and health protection. (orig.)

  2. FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM (FARS)

    The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) database consist of three relational tables, containing data on automobile accidents on public U.S. roads that resulted in the death of one or more people within 30 days of the accident. Truck and trailer accidents are also included.

  3. 49 CFR 835.11 - Obtaining Board accident reports, factual accident reports, and supporting information.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Obtaining Board accident reports, factual accident... Board accident reports, factual accident reports, and supporting information. It is the responsibility... obtain Board accident reports, factual accident reports, and accompanying accident docket files....

  4. 49 CFR 845.40 - Accident report.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident report. 845.40 Section 845.40... RULES OF PRACTICE IN TRANSPORTATION; ACCIDENT/INCIDENT HEARINGS AND REPORTS Board Reports § 845.40 Accident report. (a) The Board will issue a detailed narrative accident report in connection with...

  5. 49 CFR 195.54 - Accident reports.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident reports. 195.54 Section 195.54... PIPELINE Annual, Accident, and Safety-Related Condition Reporting § 195.54 Accident reports. (a) Each operator that experiences an accident that is required to be reported under § 195.50 shall as soon...

  6. 49 CFR 801.32 - Accident reports.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident reports. 801.32 Section 801.32... PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION Accident Investigation Records § 801.32 Accident reports. (a) The NTSB....S. civil transportation accidents, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 1131(e). (b) These reports may...

  7. 49 CFR 230.22 - Accident reports.

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident reports. 230.22 Section 230.22... Requirements § 230.22 Accident reports. In the case of an accident due to failure, from any cause, of a steam... persons, the railroad on whose line the accident occurred shall immediately make a telephone report of...

  8. Internal Accident Report on EDH

    SC Department

    2006-01-01

    The A2 Safety Code requires that, the Internal Accident Report form must be filled in by the person concerned or any witness to ensure that all the relevant services are informed. Please note that an electronic version of this form has been elaborated in collaboration with SC-IE, HR-OPS-OP and IT-AIS. Whenever possible, the electronic form shall be used. The relative icon is available on the EDH Desktop, Other tasks page, under the Safety heading, or directly here: https://edh.cern.ch/Document/Accident/. If you have any questions, please contact the SC Secretariat, tel. 75097 Please notice that the Internal Accident Report is an integral part of the Safety Code A2 and does not replace the HS50.

  9. 49 CFR 229.17 - Accident reports.

    2010-10-01

    ... CFR part 225. ... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident reports. 229.17 Section 229.17..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE SAFETY STANDARDS General § 229.17 Accident reports. (a)...

  10. Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    On the evening of April 20, 2010, a well control event allowed hydrocarbons to escape from the Macondo well onto Transocean's Deepwater Horizon, resulting in explosions and fire on the rig. Eleven people lost their lives, and 17 others were injured. The fire, which was fed by hydrocarbons from the well, continued for 36 hours until the rig sank. Hydrocarbons continued to flow from the reservoir through the wellbore and the blowout preventer (BOP) for 87 days, causing a spill of national significance. BP Exploration and Production Inc. was the lease operator of Mississippi Canyon Block 252, which contains the Macondo well. BP formed an investigation team that was charged with gathering the facts surrounding the accident, analyzing available information to identify possible causes and making recommendations to enable prevention of similar accidents in the future. The BP investigation team began its work immediately in the aftermath of the accident, working independently from other BP spill response activities and organizations. The ability to gather information was limited by a scarcity of physical evidence and restricted access to potentially relevant witnesses. The team had access to partial real-time data from the rig, documents from various aspects of the Macondo well's development and construction, witness interviews and testimony from public hearings. The team used the information that was made available by other companies, including Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron. Over the course of the investigation, the team involved over 50 internal and external specialists from a variety of fields: safety, operations, subsea, drilling, well control, cementing, well flow dynamic modeling, BOP systems and process hazard analysis. This report presents an analysis of the events leading up to the accident, eight key findings related to the causal chain of events and recommendations to enable the prevention of a similar accident. The investigation team worked

  11. Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report

    On the evening of April 20, 2010, a well control event allowed hydrocarbons to escape from the Macondo well onto Transocean's Deepwater Horizon, resulting in explosions and fire on the rig. Eleven people lost their lives, and 17 others were injured. The fire, which was fed by hydrocarbons from the well, continued for 36 hours until the rig sank. Hydrocarbons continued to flow from the reservoir through the wellbore and the blowout preventer (BOP) for 87 days, causing a spill of national significance. BP Exploration and Production Inc. was the lease operator of Mississippi Canyon Block 252, which contains the Macondo well. BP formed an investigation team that was charged with gathering the facts surrounding the accident, analyzing available information to identify possible causes and making recommendations to enable prevention of similar accidents in the future. The BP investigation team began its work immediately in the aftermath of the accident, working independently from other BP spill response activities and organizations. The ability to gather information was limited by a scarcity of physical evidence and restricted access to potentially relevant witnesses. The team had access to partial real-time data from the rig, documents from various aspects of the Macondo well's development and construction, witness interviews and testimony from public hearings. The team used the information that was made available by other companies, including Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron. Over the course of the investigation, the team involved over 50 internal and external specialists from a variety of fields: safety, operations, subsea, drilling, well control, cementing, well flow dynamic modeling, BOP systems and process hazard analysis. This report presents an analysis of the events leading up to the accident, eight key findings related to the causal chain of events and recommendations to enable the prevention of a similar accident. The investigation team worked separately

  12. 76 FR 55079 - Recreational Vessel Accident Reporting

    2011-09-06

    ... notice regarding our public dockets in the January 17, 2008 issue of the Federal Register (73 FR 3316... SECURITY Coast Guard Recreational Vessel Accident Reporting AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION: Notice of... to improve the recreational boating accident reporting process. NBSAC recommended that the...

  13. 22 CFR 102.17 - Reports on accident.

    2010-04-01

    ... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Reports on accident. 102.17 Section 102.17... Accidents Abroad Foreign Aircraft Accidents Involving United States Persons Or Property § 102.17 Reports on accident. When an accident occurs to a foreign aircraft in the district of a Foreign Service post...

  14. 33 CFR 173.55 - Report of casualty or accident.

    2010-07-01

    ... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Report of casualty or accident... (CONTINUED) BOATING SAFETY VESSEL NUMBERING AND CASUALTY AND ACCIDENT REPORTING Casualty and Accident Reporting § 173.55 Report of casualty or accident. (a) The operator of a vessel shall submit the casualty...

  15. Internal Accident Report: fill it out!

    2012-01-01

    It is important to report all accidents, near-misses and dangerous situations so that they can be avoided in the future.   Reporting these events allows the relevant services to take appropriate action and implement corrective and preventive measures. It should be noted that the routing of the internal accident report was recently changed to make sure that the people who need to know are informed. Without information, corrective action is not possible. Without corrective action, there is a risk that the events will recur. As soon as you experience or see something amiss, fill out an internal accident report! If you have any questions the HSE Unit will be happy to answer them. Contact us at safety-general@cern.ch. The HSE Unit

  16. 33 CFR 401.81 - Reporting an accident.

    2010-07-01

    ... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Reporting an accident. 401.81... an accident. (a) Where a vessel on the Seaway is involved in an accident or a dangerous occurrence, the master of the vessel shall report the accident or occurrence, pursuant to the requirements of...

  17. 36 CFR 1004.4 - Report of motor vehicle accident.

    2010-07-01

    ... accident. 1004.4 Section 1004.4 Parks, Forests, and Public Property PRESIDIO TRUST VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC SAFETY § 1004.4 Report of motor vehicle accident. (a) The operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in property damage, personal injury or death shall report the accident to the...

  18. 76 FR 30855 - Accident/Incident Reporting Requirements

    2011-05-27

    ... accident/incident report (NTSB Recommendation Number RAR-05/02). See 75 FR 68891. However, upon further... NTSB Railroad Accident Report Number 05/02 (RAR 05/02). See 75 FR 68891. To clarify, FRA added Train... Equipment Accident/Incident Report.'' See 75 FR 68897. The codes represent the type of territory...

  19. Severe Accident Test Station Activity Report

    Pint, Bruce A [ORNL; Terrani, Kurt A [ORNL

    2015-06-01

    Enhancing safety margins in light water reactor (LWR) severe accidents is currently the focus of a number of international R&D programs. The current UO2/Zr-based alloy fuel system is particularly susceptible since the Zr-based cladding experiences rapid oxidation kinetics in steam at elevated temperatures. Therefore, alternative cladding materials that offer slower oxidation kinetics and a smaller enthalpy of oxidation can significantly reduce the rate of heat and hydrogen generation in the core during a coolant-limited severe accident. In the U.S. program, the high temperature steam oxidation performance of accident tolerant fuel (ATF) cladding solutions has been evaluated in the Severe Accident Test Station (SATS) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) since 2012. This report summarizes the capabilities of the SATS and provides an overview of the oxidation kinetics of several candidate cladding materials. A suggested baseline for evaluating ATF candidates is a two order of magnitude reduction in the steam oxidation resistance above 1000ºC compared to Zr-based alloys. The ATF candidates are categorized based on the protective external oxide or scale that forms during exposure to steam at high temperature: chromia, alumina, and silica. Comparisons are made to literature and SATS data for Zr-based alloys and other less-protective materials.

  20. Report on the radiological accident in Goiania, Goias, Brazil

    The report describes the radiological accident occured in Goiania, Brazil, in september 1987. The following aspects concerning the accident are presented in specific chapters: 1- evaluation of the accident and the first aids, 2- attendance to the victims of Goiania radiological accident, 3- decontamination, 4- radioactive wastes arising from the accident, 5- working personnel and technical cooperation, 6- equipments and 7- radiation protection: limits and recommendations

  1. Latest report about health effects of the chernobyl accident

    After twenty years of Chernobyl accident, the international conference was hold in Kyiv, Ukraine, 24-26, April in 2006. During the conference WHO declares the paper named health effects of the Chernobyl accident. The report look back the nuclear accident in the history, and then recite conclusion about health effects of the Chernobyl accident, which from doses received from the Chernobyl accident, thyroid cancer, non-thyroid solid cancer, leukemia, mortality, cataract and cardiovascular disease. The report is considered as milestone events in the studying of health effects of Chernobyl accident. (authors)

  2. 36 CFR 4.4 - Report of motor vehicle accident.

    2010-07-01

    ... accident. 4.4 Section 4.4 Parks, Forests, and Public Property NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC SAFETY § 4.4 Report of motor vehicle accident. (a) The operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in property damage, personal injury or death shall report...

  3. Research investigation report on Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident

    This report was issued in February 2012 by Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation's Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, which consisted of six members from the private sector in independent positions and with no direct interest in the business of promoting nuclear power. Commission aimed to determine the truth behind the accident by clarifying the various problems and reveal systematic problems behind these issues so as to create a new starting point by identifying clear lessons learned. Report composed of four chapters; (1) progression of Fukushima accident and resulting damage (accident management after Fukushima accident, and effects and countermeasure of radioactive materials discharged into the environment), (2) response against Fukushima accident (emergency response of cabinet office against nuclear disaster, risk communication and on-site response against nuclear disaster), (3) analysis of historical and structural factors (technical philosophy of nuclear safety, problems of nuclear safety regulation of Fukushima accident, safety regulatory governance and social background of 'Safety Myth'), (4) Global Context (implication in nuclear security, Japan in nuclear safety regime, U.S.-Japan relations for response against Fukushima accident, lessons learned from Fukushima accident - aiming at creation of resilience). Report could identify causes of Fukushima accident and factors related to resulting damages, show the realities behind failure to prevent the spread of damage, and analyze the overall structural and historical background behind the accidents. (T. Tanaka)

  4. National Differences in Reporting of Work Accidents at Sea

    Grøn, Sisse; Knudsen, Fabienne

    National Differences in Reporting of Work Accidents at Sea Grøn, S and Knudsen, F Centre for Maritime Health and Safety, University of Southern Denmark Filipinos working on Danish ships experience less work accidents than their Danish colleagues if we are to believe the various statistics available....... There are indications suggesting that this is due to differences in reporting and safety culture alike. In a new project, Safety Culture and Reporting Practice on Danish ships in the Danish International Ship Register (SADIS), we will therefore seek answers to what factors act as incentives or barriers...... about national differences in work accident reporting....

  5. Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Chernobyl Accident

    The accident, which occurred on April 26 of 1986 at the fourth unit of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union, was the unprecedented accident in terms of, among other things, structural damages given to the reactor, an amount of radioactive materials released to the environment, and a number of casualties resulting from the accident. Investigation and analysis of the accident were conducted at JAERI by forming the Ad hoc Committee on the Chernobyl Accident within the organization under which Task Group A was responsible for the design and characteristics of the reactor and the accident sequence and Task Group B was responsible for behavior of radioactive materials and radiological consequences to the environment. The present report is the summary of the investigations and analyses which were carried out by the committee. (author)

  6. 78 FR 6732 - Changes to Standard Numbering System, Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report...

    2013-01-31

    ..., Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report Database AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION: Rule... to numbering undocumented vessels and reporting boating accidents. The amendment affects three... agencies involved in issuing vessel registration and reporting boating accidents. This notice...

  7. Accidents in the construction industry in the Netherlands: An analysis of accident reports using Storybuilder

    As part of an ongoing effort by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands, a research project is being undertaken to construct a causal model for occupational risk. This model should provide quantitative insight into the causes and consequences of occupational accidents. One of the components of the model is a tool to systematically classify and analyse reports of past accidents. This tool 'Storybuilder' was described in earlier papers. In this paper, Storybuilder is used to analyse the causes of accidents reported in the database of the Dutch Labour Inspectorate involving people working in the construction industry. Conclusions are drawn on measures to reduce the accident probability. Some of these conclusions are contrary to common beliefs in the industry

  8. Group unified accident reporting database (GUARD)

    Significant advances have been made in recent years in enhancing the standard of safety within Shell Companies, such that safety has now been raised to a status equal to other primary business objectives. It is widely accepted that accident prevention is part of good business practice, and that a safe operation is normally an efficient operation. Safety programmes are being widely implemented which involve all employees from top management right down to the workforce including the contract staff, and the benefits are being realized. The effectiveness of any safety programme, however, must be continuously monitored, and in this respect injury and accident statistics play an important role as a prime indicator of safety performance. Statistics form part of the safety management process indicating the success of the safety programmes being implemented, and highlighting areas of weakness. Statistical information relating to the number and frequency of accidents, significant as it is, tells us little about how the accidents occur, or about how to improve the intrinsic safety of the operations. More detailed information on accident causes and lessons derived from the investigation of non-injurious accidents and near-misses is required for this, and for the setting of appropriate remedial actions. This paper concentrates on the feedback from accidents which have already occurred. This feedback plays a vital role as an indicator of safety performance upon which to judge the effectiveness of safety programmes, and also to provide important information relating to the immediate and underlying causes of accidents. To meet these requirements, however, a system for recording analyzing and communicating safety data is essential

  9. Report on the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station

    This report presents the compilation of information obtained by various organizations regarding the accident (and the consequences of the accident) that occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl in the USSR on April 26, 1986. The various authors are identified in a footnote to each chapter. An overview of the report is provided. Very briefly the other chapters cover: the design of the Chernobyl nuclear station Unit 4; safety analyses for Unit 4; the accident scenario; the role of the operator; an assessment of the radioactive release, dispersion, and transport; the activities associated with emergency actions; and information on the health and environmental consequences from the accident. These subjects cover the major aspects of the accident that have the potential to present new information and lessons for the nuclear industry in general

  10. Severe accident approach - final report. Evaluation of design measures for severe accident prevention and consequence mitigation.

    Tentner, A. M.; Parma, E.; Wei, T.; Wigeland, R.; Nuclear Engineering Division; SNL; INL

    2010-03-01

    An important goal of the US DOE reactor development program is to conceptualize advanced safety design features for a demonstration Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR). The treatment of severe accidents is one of the key safety issues in the design approach for advanced SFR systems. It is necessary to develop an in-depth understanding of the risk of severe accidents for the SFR so that appropriate risk management measures can be implemented early in the design process. This report presents the results of a review of the SFR features and phenomena that directly influence the sequence of events during a postulated severe accident. The report identifies the safety features used or proposed for various SFR designs in the US and worldwide for the prevention and/or mitigation of Core Disruptive Accidents (CDA). The report provides an overview of the current SFR safety approaches and the role of severe accidents. Mutual understanding of these design features and safety approaches is necessary for future collaborations between the US and its international partners as part of the GEN IV program. The report also reviews the basis for an integrated safety approach to severe accidents for the SFR that reflects the safety design knowledge gained in the US during the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) and Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) programs. This approach relies on inherent reactor and plant safety performance characteristics to provide additional safety margins. The goal of this approach is to prevent development of severe accident conditions, even in the event of initiators with safety system failures previously recognized to lead directly to reactor damage.

  11. Preliminary report about Goiania radiological accident, Brazil

    The events that originate the Goiania radiological accident involving the rupture of Cesium 137 source, the source characteristics, the medical aspects related to the triage of victims, the medical attendance, and the special measurements of decontamination in the Goiania General Hospital (HGG), are described. (M.C.K.)

  12. Summary report on the post-accident review meeting on the Chernobyl accident

    After an Executive Summary which gives an overview of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor, the first section of the main INSAG report presents the understanding of INSAG members of the causes of the accident, concluding that it was the result of a remarkable range of human errors and violation of operating rules, in combination with specific reactor features which compounded and amplified the effects of the errors and led to the reactivity excursion. The second section presents the problem of radionuclide release from the damaged reactor, showing that there was an initial intense release associated with the destructive events in the accident, then the release rates fell over the next few days up to 7x1016 Bq/d five days after the accident initiation, and at that point the release rates began to increase and reached about 3x1017 Bq/d nine days after the accident initiation. There was then a drop in the radionuclide release to 4x1013 Bq/d and the release rates have continued to decline since that time. The next section describes the accident management at the site, fire-fighting, cleanup of the site and the entombment of the damaged unit. In the fourth section the radiation protection aspects of the accident, the radionuclide transfer through the environment, the exposure of members of the public pointing to the radionuclides iodine-131 and cesium-137 which entered the food-chains, the on-site and off-site emergency response, the decontamination and the health effects including both the early non-stochastic effects and the late stochastic ones are presented. Safety issues to be pursued in order to derive whatever safety lessons can be learned from the Chernobyl accident are considered in Section V. The next two sections present INSAG's observations, conclusions and recommendations based on the lessons learned so far from the accident and ranging from reactor operation to radiation protection and international co-operation in nuclear safety. Finally the

  13. 29 CFR 1960.70 - Reporting of serious accidents.

    2010-07-01

    ... multiple hospitalization incidents to OSHA under 29 CFR 1904.39. ... 29 Labor 9 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Reporting of serious accidents. 1960.70 Section 1960.70... PROGRAMS AND RELATED MATTERS Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements § 1960.70 Reporting of...

  14. Preliminary report about nuclear accident of Chernobylsk reactor

    The preliminary report of nuclear accident at Chernobyl, in URSS is presented. The Chernobyl site is located geographically and the RBMK type reactors - initials of russian words which mean high power pressure tube reactors are described. The conditions of reactor operation in beginning of accident, the events which lead to reactor destruction, the means to finish the fire, the measurements adopted by Russian in the accident location, the estimative of radioactive wastes, the meteorological conditions during the accident, the victims and medical assistence, the sanitary aspects and consequences for population, the evaluation of radiation doses received at small and medium distance and the estimative of reffered doses by population attained are presented. The official communication of Russian Minister Council and the declaration of IAEA general manager during a collective interview in Moscou are annexed. (M.C.K.)

  15. Radiographers and trainee radiologists reporting accident radiographs

    Buskov, L; Abild, A; Christensen, A;

    2013-01-01

    To compare the diagnostic accuracy and clinical validity of reporting radiographers with that of trainee radiologists whom they have recently joined in reporting emergency room radiographs at Bispebjerg University Hospital.......To compare the diagnostic accuracy and clinical validity of reporting radiographers with that of trainee radiologists whom they have recently joined in reporting emergency room radiographs at Bispebjerg University Hospital....

  16. Report on the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station

    This report presents the compilation of information obtained by various organizations regarding the accident (and the consequences of the accident) that occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl in the USSR on April 26, 1986. Each organization has independently accepted responsibility for one or more chapters. The specific responsibility of each organization is indicated. The various authors are identified in a footnote to each chapter. Very briefly the other chapters cover: the design of the Chernobyl nuclear station Unit 4; safety analyses for Unit 4; the accident scenario; the role of the operator; an assessment of the radioactive release, dispersion, and transport; the activities associated with emergency actions; and information on the health and environmental consequences from the accident. These subjects cover the major aspects of the accident that have the potential to present new information and lessons for the nuclear industry in general. The task of evaluating the information obtained in these various areas and the assessment of the potential implications has been left to each organization to pursue according to the relevance of the subject to their organization. Those findings will be issued separately by the cognizant organizations. The basic purpose of this report is to provide the information upon which such assessments can be made

  17. 46 CFR 326.4 - Reports of accidents and occurrences.

    2010-10-01

    ... MARINE PROTECTION AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE UNDER AGREEMENTS WITH AGENTS § 326.4 Reports of accidents and... obtained P&I insurance through a marine insurance underwriter, the Agent also shall concurrently file a..., Office of Trade Analysis and Insurance, Maritime Administration, 500 Seventh Street, SW., Room...

  18. 33 CFR 174.121 - Forwarding of casualty or accident reports.

    2010-07-01

    ... accident reports. 174.121 Section 174.121 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF... § 174.121 Forwarding of casualty or accident reports. Within 30 days of the receipt of a casualty or accident report, each State that has an approved numbering system must forward a copy of that report to...

  19. HOMICIDE BY A ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT : A CASE REPORT

    Yandra

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available Deaths from road traffic accidents need a meticulous autopsy examination and a proper interpretation of injuries, as they can be a source of potential homicide among them. We report a case of homicide which was brought as a death in a ‘hit and run’ case to our mortuary. After our post mortem examination and issuing of our report, the investigative authorities were able to nab the actual culprit involved in the murder.

  20. Harrisburg report. Evaluation of the accident at Harrisburg nuclear power plant

    Interim report on the Harrisburg accident, containing all information received by the Federal Minister of the Interior until May 10, 1979. Subjects: 1) Description of the Harrisburg accident; 2) safety check on German nuclear power plants on the basis of the accident analysis; 3) the Harrisburg accident in view of risk assessments and society; 4) consequences of Harrisburg. (GL)

  1. 49 CFR 837.3 - Published reports, material contained in the public accident investigation dockets, and accident...

    2010-10-01

    .... For information regarding the types of documents routinely issued by the Board, see 49 CFR part 801... public accident investigation dockets, and accident database data. 837.3 Section 837.3 Transportation... OF RECORDS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS § 837.3 Published reports, material contained in the public...

  2. Incorporation of advanced accident analysis methodology into safety analysis reports

    The IAEA Safety Guide on Safety Assessment and Verification defines that the aim of the safety analysis should be by means of appropriate analytical tools to establish and confirm the design basis for the items important to safety, and to ensure that the overall plant design is capable of meeting the prescribed and acceptable limits for radiation doses and releases for each plant condition category. Practical guidance on how to perform accident analyses of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is provided by the IAEA Safety Report on Accident Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. The safety analyses are performed both in the form of deterministic and probabilistic analyses for NPPs. It is customary to refer to deterministic safety analyses as accident analyses. This report discusses the aspects of using the advanced accident analysis methods to carry out accident analyses in order to introduce them into the Safety Analysis Reports (SARs). In relation to the SAR, purposes of deterministic safety analysis can be further specified as (1) to demonstrate compliance with specific regulatory acceptance criteria; (2) to complement other analyses and evaluations in defining a complete set of design and operating requirements; (3) to identify and quantify limiting safety system set points and limiting conditions for operation to be used in the NPP limits and conditions; (4) to justify appropriateness of the technical solutions employed in the fulfillment of predetermined safety requirements. The essential parts of accident analyses are performed by applying sophisticated computer code packages, which have been specifically developed for this purpose. These code packages include mainly thermal-hydraulic system codes and reactor dynamics codes meant for the transient and accident analyses. There are also specific codes such as those for the containment thermal-hydraulics, for the radiological consequences and for severe accident analyses. In some cases, codes of a more general nature such

  3. Safety against releases in severe accidents. Final report

    The work scope of the RAK-2 project has involved research on quantification of the effects of selected severe accident phenomena for Nordic nuclear power plants, development and testing of a computerised accident management support system and data collection and description of various mobile reactors and of different reactor types existing in the UK. The investigations of severe accident phenomena focused mainly on in-vessel melt progression, covering a numerical assessment of coolability of a degraded BWR core, the possibility and consequences of a BWR reactor to become critical during reflooding and the core melt behavior in the reactor vessel lower plenum. Simulant experiments were carried out to investigate lower head hole ablation induced by debris discharge. In addition to the in-vessel phenomena, a limited study on containment response to high pressure melt ejection in a BWR and a comparative study on fission product source term behaviour in a Swedish PWR were performed. An existing computerised accident management support system (CAMS) was further developed in the area of tracking and predictive simulation, signal validation, state identification and user interface. The first version of a probabilistic safety analysis module was developed and implemented in the system. CAMS was tested in practice with Barsebaeck data in a safety exercise with the Swedish nuclear authority. The descriptions of the key features of British reactor types, AGR, Magnox, FBR and PWR were published as data reports. Separate reports were issued also on accidents in nuclear ships and on description of key features of satellite reactors. The collected data were implemented in a common Nordic database. (au)

  4. Safety against releases in severe accidents. Final report

    Lindholm, I.; Berg, Oe.; Nonboel, E. [eds.

    1997-12-01

    The work scope of the RAK-2 project has involved research on quantification of the effects of selected severe accident phenomena for Nordic nuclear power plants, development and testing of a computerised accident management support system and data collection and description of various mobile reactors and of different reactor types existing in the UK. The investigations of severe accident phenomena focused mainly on in-vessel melt progression, covering a numerical assessment of coolability of a degraded BWR core, the possibility and consequences of a BWR reactor to become critical during reflooding and the core melt behavior in the reactor vessel lower plenum. Simulant experiments were carried out to investigate lower head hole ablation induced by debris discharge. In addition to the in-vessel phenomena, a limited study on containment response to high pressure melt ejection in a BWR and a comparative study on fission product source term behaviour in a Swedish PWR were performed. An existing computerised accident management support system (CAMS) was further developed in the area of tracking and predictive simulation, signal validation, state identification and user interface. The first version of a probabilistic safety analysis module was developed and implemented in the system. CAMS was tested in practice with Barsebaeck data in a safety exercise with the Swedish nuclear authority. The descriptions of the key features of British reactor types, AGR, Magnox, FBR and PWR were published as data reports. Separate reports were issued also on accidents in nuclear ships and on description of key features of satellite reactors. The collected data were implemented in a common Nordic database. (au) 39 refs.

  5. Report from the Special Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    The Special Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident was established in April 2011 under the Heat Transfer Society of Japan (HTSJ) and discussed (1) how had evolved heat transfer research in progress of nuclear technology, (2) role of expert group in the area of heat transfer academy and technology and (3) energy prospect in Japan after the Fukushima nuclear accident. This report was described by the chairman of the special committee summarizing one year discussions as (1) background of heat transfer research progress, (2) progression of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, (3) energy problem in Japan after the Fukushima accident and (4) social role of the HTSJ. This HTSJ was a unique, nonprofit association in Japan of the people engaged in heat transfers research or in various engineering aspects related to heat transfer, which meant interdisciplinary or common platform of heat transfer as elementary technologies. Such actual complex problems could be discussed in the HTSJ from an overlooking viewpoint in order for the HTSJ to play a social role. (T. Tanaka)

  6. Empirical Study of the Use and Exploitation of TAPE- Accident Reporting and Monitoring Program in Elder Care in Kouvola (accident project)

    Baez, Nina

    2013-01-01

    Elder people accident prevention starts from systematic collection of accident information. Health care still lacks behind industries in accident reporting. Accident prevention is part of quality care which is expected by health care law (2010/1326). The thesis aimed to assess the views of health care workers at home care, assisted living, higher-level care, and nursing homes about the usability, usefulness, and exploitation of TAPE-accident reporting and monitoring system. The purpose is...

  7. Reports of the Chernobyl accident consequences in Brazilian newspapers

    The public perception of the risks associated with nuclear power plants was profoundly influenced by the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl Power Plants which also served to exacerbate in the last decades the growing mistrust on the 'nuclear industry'. Part of the mistrust had its origin in the arrogance of nuclear spokesmen and in the secretiveness of nuclear programs. However, press agencies have an important role in shaping and upsizing the public awareness against nuclear energy. In this paper we present the results of a survey in reports of some Brazilian popular newspapers on Chernobyl consequences, as measured by the total death toll of the accident, to show the up and down dance of large numbers without any serious judgment. (author)

  8. 33 CFR 174.107 - Contents of casualty or accident report form.

    2010-07-01

    ... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Contents of casualty or accident... System Requirements § 174.107 Contents of casualty or accident report form. Each form for reporting a vessel casualty or accident must contain the information required in § 173.57 of this chapter....

  9. Enhanced Accident Tolerant LWR Fuels National Metrics Workshop Report

    Lori Braase

    2013-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), in collaboration with the nuclear industry, has been conducting research and development (R&D) activities on advanced Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuels for the last few years. The emphasis for these activities was on improving the fuel performance in terms of increased burnup for waste minimization and increased power density for power upgrades, as well as collaborating with industry on fuel reliability. After the events at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in Japan in March 2011, enhancing the accident tolerance of LWRs became a topic of serious discussion. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Conference Report 112-75, the U.S. Congress directed DOE-NE to: • Give “priority to developing enhanced fuels and cladding for light water reactors to improve safety in the event of accidents in the reactor or spent fuel pools.” • Give “special technical emphasis and funding priority…to activities aimed at the development and near-term qualification of meltdown-resistant, accident-tolerant nuclear fuels that would enhance the safety of present and future generations of light water reactors.” • Report “to the Committee, within 90 days of enactment of this act, on its plan for development of meltdown-resistant fuels leading to reactor testing and utilization by 2020.” Fuels with enhanced accident tolerance are those that, in comparison with the standard UO2-zirconium alloy system currently used by the nuclear industry, can tolerate loss of active cooling in the reactor core for a considerably longer time period (depending on the LWR system and accident scenario) while maintaining or improving the fuel performance during normal operations, and operational transients, as well as design-basis and beyond design-basis events. The overall draft strategy for development and demonstration is comprised of three phases: Feasibility Assessment and Down-selection; Development and Qualification; and

  10. Lessons learned from accidents in radiotherapy. An IAEA Safety Report

    Radiotherapy is a very special application from the view point of protection because humans are deliberately exposed to high doses of radiation, and no physical barrier can be placed between the source and the patient. It deserves, therefore, special considerations from the point of view of potential exposure. An IAEA's Safety Report (in preparation) reviews a large collection of accident information, their initiating events and contributing factors, followed by a set of lessons learned and measures for prevention. The most important causes were: deficiencies in education and training, lack of procedures and protocols for essential tasks (such as commissioning, calibration, commissioning and treatment delivery), deficient communication and information transfer, absence of defence in depth and deficiencies in design, manufacture, testing and maintenance of equipment. Often a combination of more than one of these causes was present in an accident, thus pointing to a problem of management. Arrangements for a comprehensive quality assurance and accident prevention should be required by regulations and compliance be monitored by a Regulatory Authority. (author)

  11. 48 CFR 3052.223-90 - Accident and fire reporting (USCG).

    2010-10-01

    ... PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT CLAUSES Text of Provisions and Clauses 3052.223-90 Accident and fire reporting (USCG). As prescribed in USCG guidance at (HSAR) 48 CFR 3023.9000(a), insert the following clause: Accident... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accident and...

  12. 19 CFR 125.35 - Report of loss, detention, or accident.

    2010-04-01

    ... 19 Customs Duties 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Report of loss, detention, or accident. 125.35 Section 125.35 Customs Duties U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY..., detention, or accident. Any loss or detention of bonded merchandise, or any accident happening to a...

  13. 14 CFR 91.1021 - Internal safety reporting and incident/accident response.

    2010-01-01

    .../accident response. 91.1021 Section 91.1021 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... incident/accident response. (a) Each program manager must establish an internal anonymous safety reporting.... (b) Each program manager must establish procedures to respond to an aviation incident/accident....

  14. Nuclear Reactor RA Safety Report, Vol. 16, Maximum hypothetical accident

    Fault tree analysis of the maximum hypothetical accident covers the basic elements: accident initiation, phase development phases - scheme of possible accident flow. Cause of the accident initiation is the break of primary cooling pipe, heavy water system. Loss of primary coolant causes loss of pressure in the primary circuit at the coolant input in the reactor vessel. This initiates safety protection system which should automatically shutdown the reactor. Separate chapters are devoted to: after-heat removal, coolant and moderator loss; accident effects on the reactor core, effects in the reactor building, and release of radioactive wastes

  15. Accident under-reporting among employees: testing the moderating influence of psychological safety climate and supervisor enforcement of safety practices.

    Probst, Tahira M; Estrada, Armando X

    2010-09-01

    We examined accident under-reporting with data from 425 employees employed in 5 industries with above average risk for employee injuries. We expected that rates for unreported accidents would be higher than rates for reported accidents; and that organizational safety climate and perceptions of supervisor enforcement of safety policies would moderate the relationship between unreported accidents and reported accidents. Results showed that the number of unreported accidents was significantly higher than the number of reported accidents. There was an average of 2.48 unreported accidents for every accident reported to the organization. Further, under-reporting was higher in working environments with poorer organizational safety climate or where supervisor safety enforcement was inconsistent. We discuss the implications of these findings for improving accident under-reporting and occupational safety in the workplace. PMID:20538099

  16. Accidents - Chernobyl accident; Accidents - accident de Tchernobyl

    NONE

    2004-07-01

    This file is devoted to the Chernobyl accident. It is divided in four parts. The first part concerns the accident itself and its technical management. The second part is relative to the radiation doses and the different contaminations. The third part reports the sanitary effects, the determinists ones and the stochastic ones. The fourth and last part relates the consequences for the other European countries with the case of France. Through the different parts a point is tackled with the measures taken after the accident by the other countries to manage an accident, the cooperation between the different countries and the groups of research and studies about the reactors safety, and also with the international medical cooperation, specially for the children, everything in relation with the Chernobyl accident. (N.C.)

  17. Accidents associated with oil and gas operations: Outer continental shelf, 1956-1990. Final report

    The report is a compilation of descriptions of all blowouts, explosions and fires, pipeline breaks or leaks, significant pollution incidents, and major accidents that occurred on federally leased offshore lands from 1956 through 1990. The report identifies accidents by area, block number, lease number, platform number, well number, and operator. It describes the type of accident, corrective action taken, and the amount of pollution. It provides figures on fatalities, injuries, and property and environmental damage

  18. Wireless Reporting System for Accident Detection at Higher Speeds u

    Peddi Anudeep

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available Speed is one of the basic reasons for vehicle accident. Many lives could have been saved if emergency service could get accident information and reach in time. Nowadays, GPS has become an integral part of a vehicle system. This paper proposes to utilize the capability of a GPS receiver to monitor speed of a vehicle and detect accident basing on monitored speed and send accident location to an Alert Service Center. The GPS will monitor speed of a vehicle and compare with the previous speed in every second through a Microcontroller Unit. Whenever the speed will be below the specified speed, it will assume that an accident has occurred. The system will then send the accident location acquired from the GPS along with the time and the speed by utilizing the GSM network. This will help to reach the rescue service in time and save the valuable human life.

  19. Severe accident research and management in Nordic Countries - A status report

    The report describes the status of severe accident research and accident management development in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The emphasis is on severe accident phenomena and issues of special importance for the severe accident management strategies implemented in Sweden and in Finland. The main objective of the research has been to verify the protection provided by the accident mitigation measures and to reduce the uncertainties in risk dominant accident phenomena. Another objective has been to support validation and improvements of accident management strategies and procedures as well as to contribute to the development of level 2 PSA, computerised operator aids for accident management and certain aspects of emergency preparedness. Severe accident research addresses both the in-vessel and the ex-vessel accident progression phenomena and issues. Even though there are differences between Sweden and Finland as to the scope and content of the research programs, the focus of the research in both countries is on in-vessel coolability, integrity of the reactor vessel lower head and core melt behaviour in the containment, in particular the issues of core debris coolability and steam explosions. Notwithstanding that our understanding of these issues has significantly improved, and that experimental data base has been largely expanded, there are still important uncertainties which motivate continued research. Other important areas are thermal-hydraulic phenomena during reflooding of an overheated partially degraded core, fission product chemistry, in particular formation of organic iodine, and hydrogen transport and combustion phenomena. The development of severe accident management has embraced, among other things, improvements of accident mitigating procedures and strategies, further work at IFE Halden on Computerised Accident Management Support (CAMS) system, as well as plant modifications, including new instrumentation. Recent efforts in Sweden in this area

  20. Severe accident research and management in Nordic Countries - A status report

    Frid, W. [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, SKI (Sweden)] (ed.)

    2002-01-01

    The report describes the status of severe accident research and accident management development in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The emphasis is on severe accident phenomena and issues of special importance for the severe accident management strategies implemented in Sweden and in Finland. The main objective of the research has been to verify the protection provided by the accident mitigation measures and to reduce the uncertainties in risk dominant accident phenomena. Another objective has been to support validation and improvements of accident management strategies and procedures as well as to contribute to the development of level 2 PSA, computerised operator aids for accident management and certain aspects of emergency preparedness. Severe accident research addresses both the in-vessel and the ex-vessel accident progression phenomena and issues. Even though there are differences between Sweden and Finland as to the scope and content of the research programs, the focus of the research in both countries is on in-vessel coolability, integrity of the reactor vessel lower head and core melt behaviour in the containment, in particular the issues of core debris coolability and steam explosions. Notwithstanding that our understanding of these issues has significantly improved, and that experimental data base has been largely expanded, there are still important uncertainties which motivate continued research. Other important areas are thermal-hydraulic phenomena during reflooding of an overheated partially degraded core, fission product chemistry, in particular formation of organic iodine, and hydrogen transport and combustion phenomena. The development of severe accident management has embraced, among other things, improvements of accident mitigating procedures and strategies, further work at IFE Halden on Computerised Accident Management Support (CAMS) system, as well as plant modifications, including new instrumentation. Recent efforts in Sweden in this area

  1. Wireless Reporting System for Accident Detection at Higher Speeds u

    Peddi Anudeep; K. Hari Bab

    2014-01-01

    Speed is one of the basic reasons for vehicle accident. Many lives could have been saved if emergency service could get accident information and reach in time. Nowadays, GPS has become an integral part of a vehicle system. This paper proposes to utilize the capability of a GPS receiver to monitor speed of a vehicle and detect accident basing on monitored speed and send accident location to an Alert Service Center. The GPS will monitor speed of a vehicle and compare with the pr...

  2. 46 CFR 122.230 - Report of accident to aid to navigation.

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Report of accident to aid to navigation. 122.230 Section... Marine Casualties and Voyage Records § 122.230 Report of accident to aid to navigation. Whenever a vessel collides with a buoy, or other aid to navigation under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard, or is...

  3. 75 FR 25137 - Changes to Standard Numbering System, Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report...

    2010-05-07

    ... Boating Accident Report Database CFR Code of Federal Regulations DHS Department of Homeland Security FR... notice regarding our public dockets in the January 17, 2008 issue of the Federal Register (73 FR 3316). D..., Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report Database AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS....

  4. Reporter at large: Three Mile Island. I. Class nine accident

    A thorough discussion is presented of the background to the March 28, 1979 accident at Three Mile Island-2 Reactor. Among the factors involved in the accident include improper maintenance, sloppy operating and testing procedures, valve problems, written procedures instead of built-in design features to prevent human errors, reliance on the utilities to write these procedures, etc

  5. Accident Avoidance Skill Training and Performance Testing. Final Report.

    Hatterick, G. Richard; Barthurst, James R.

    A two-phased study was conducted to determine the feasibility of training drivers to acquire skills needed to avoid critical conflict motor vehicle accidents, and to develop the procedures and materials necessary for such training. Basic data were derived from indepth accident investigations and task analyses of driver behavior. Principal…

  6. Storybuilder-A tool for the analysis of accident reports

    As part of an ongoing effort by the ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of The Netherlands a research project is being undertaken to construct a causal model for the most commonly occurring scenarios related to occupational risk. This model should provide quantitative insight in the causes and consequences of occupational accidents. The results should be used to help selecting optimal strategies to reduce these risks taking the costs of accidents and of measures into account. The research is undertaken by an international consortium under the name of Workgroup Occupational Risk Model. One of the components of the model is a tool to systematically classify and analyse past accidents. This tool: 'Storybuilder' and its place in the Occupational Risk Model (ORM) are described in the paper. The paper gives some illustrations of the application of the Storybuilder, drawn from the study of ladder accidents, which forms one of the biggest single accident categories in the Dutch data

  7. Data Mining of Causal Relations from Text: Analysing Maritime Accident Investigation Reports

    Tirunagari, Santosh

    2015-01-01

    Text mining is a process of extracting information of interest from text. Such a method includes techniques from various areas such as Information Retrieval (IR), Natural Language Processing (NLP), and Information Extraction (IE). In this study, text mining methods are applied to extract causal relations from maritime accident investigation reports collected from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB). These causal relations provide information on various mechanisms behind accidents,...

  8. The consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Greece - Report No. 2

    In this report a realistic estimate of the radioactive fallout on Greece from the Chernobyl nuclear accident is described. The measurements performed on environmental samples and samples of the food chain, as well as some realistic estimations for the population doses and the expected consequences of the accident are presented. The analysis has shown that the radiological impact of the accident in Greece can be considered minor. (J.K.)

  9. Regulatory impact of nuclear reactor accident source term assumptions. Technical report

    This report addresses the reactor accident source term implications on accident evaluations, regulations and regulatory requirements, engineered safety features, emergency planning, probabilistic risk assessment, and licensing practice. Assessment of the impact of source term modifications and evaluation of the effects in Design Basis Accident analyses, assuming a change of the chemical form of iodine from elemental to cesium iodide, has been provided. Engineered safety features used in current LWR designs are found to be effective for all postulated combinations of iodine source terms under DBA conditions. In terms of potential accident consequences, it is not expected that the difference in chemical form between elemental iodine and cesium iodide would be significant. In order to account for the current information on source terms, a spectrum of accident scenerios is discussed to realistically estimate the source terms resulting from a range of potential accident conditions

  10. Technical bases for estimating fission product behavior during LWR accidents. Technical report

    The objective of this report is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the public with a description of the best technical information currently available for estimating the release of radioactive material during postulated reactor accidents, and to identify where gaps exist in our knowledge. This report focuses on those low probability-high consequence accidents involving severe damage to the reactor core and core meltdown that dominate the risk to the public. Furthermore, in this report particular emphasis is placed on the accident behavior of radioactive iodine, as (1) radioiodine is predicted to be a major contributor to public exposure, (2) current regulatory accident analysis procedures focus on iodine, and (3) several technical issues have been raised recently about the magnitude of iodine release. The generation, transport, and attenuation of aerosols were also investigated in some detail to assess their effect on fission product release estimates and to determine the performance of engineered safety features under accident conditions exceeding their design bases

  11. 46 CFR 4.05-20 - Report of accident to aid to navigation.

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Report of accident to aid to navigation. 4.05-20 Section 4.05-20 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE PUBLIC... accident to aid to navigation. Whenever a vessel collides with a buoy, or other aid to navigation under...

  12. Status Report on Spent Fuel Pools under Loss-of-Cooling and Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions - Final Report

    Following the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the Nuclear Energy Agency Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations decided to launch several high-priority activities to address certain technical issues. Among other things, it was decided to prepare a status report on spent fuel pools (SFPs) under loss of cooling accident conditions. This activity was proposed jointly by the CSNI Working Group on Analysis and Management of Accidents (WGAMA) and the Working Group on Fuel Safety (WGFS). The main objectives, as defined by these working groups, were to: - Produce a brief summary of the status of SFP accident and mitigation strategies, to better contribute to the post-Fukushima accident decision making process; - Provide a brief assessment of current experimental and analytical knowledge about loss of cooling accidents in SFPs and their associated mitigation strategies; - Briefly describe the strengths and weaknesses of analytical methods used in codes to predict SFP accident evolution and assess the efficiency of different cooling mechanisms for mitigation of such accidents; - Identify and list additional research activities required to address gaps in the understanding of relevant phenomenological processes, to identify where analytical tool deficiencies exist, and to reduce the uncertainties in this understanding. The proposed activity was agreed and approved by CSNI in December 2012, and the first of four meetings of the appointed writing group was held in March 2013. The writing group consisted of members of the WGAMA and the WGFS, representing the European Commission and the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA. This report mostly covers the information provided by these countries. The report is organised into 8 Chapters and 4 Appendices: Chapter 1: Introduction; Chapter 2: Spent fuel pools; Chapter 3: Possible accident

  13. Investigation report on criticality accident at the Uranium Processing Plant of the JCO, Ltd

    This report is a summarized one of investigation results on a criticality accident at the Uranium Processing Plant of the JCO, Ltd., carried out by the Nuclear Safety Investigation Special Group (SISG) of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ). AESJ published a statement of the president on this accident on October 8, 1999, and decided to perform its investigation under SISG. SISG carried out some questionnaires for new trials together with conventional lectures of the well-informed. This report contains six chapters on critical safety and accident, process of the accident and elucidation of its facts, cause analysis and picking-out on problems, questionnaires on improvement proposal', questionnaires on 'duty of AESJ7, and future efforts on nuclear safety culture. At the last chapter, SISG discussed about some items on re-occurrence protection of the nuclear accident. (G.K.)

  14. Shipping container response to severe highway and railway accident conditions: Main report

    This report describes a study performed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to evaluate the level of safety provided under severe accident conditions during the shipment of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors. The evaluation is performed using data from real accident histories and using representative truck and rail cask models that likely meet 10 CFR 71 regulations. The responses of the representative casks are calculated for structural and thermal loads generated by severe highway and railway accident conditions. The cask responses are compared with those responses calculated for the 10 CFR 71 hypothetical accident conditions. By comparing the responses it is determined that most highway and railway accident conditions fall within the 10 CFR 71 hypothetical accident conditions. For those accidents that have higher responses, the probabilities anf potential radiation exposures of the accidents are compared with those identified by the assessments made in the ''Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and other Modes,'' NUREG-0170. Based on this comparison, it is concluded that the radiological risks from spent fuel under severe highway and railway accident conditions as derived in this study are less than risks previously estimated in the NUREG-0170 document

  15. The Columbia Accident: Synopsis of CAIB Report Regarding the Physical Cause of the Accident and and Personal Thoughts

    Arnold, James O.

    2011-01-01

    This seminar describes the process of determining the physical cause of The Shuttle Columbia Accident. The presentation is based on the published CIAB Report, and is based mainly on Appendix F2, Vol IV of the CIAB report by J. O. Arnold, H. E. Goldstein and D. J. Rigalli. As a part of the seminar, I would also indicate how my education in Engineering Physics at the University of Kansas helped prepare me to accept the assignment to serve as an investigator for the CAIB. A similar presentation was given at Purdue in 2005. Presentation charts are attached.

  16. Accidents - Chernobyl accident

    This file is devoted to the Chernobyl accident. It is divided in four parts. The first part concerns the accident itself and its technical management. The second part is relative to the radiation doses and the different contaminations. The third part reports the sanitary effects, the determinists ones and the stochastic ones. The fourth and last part relates the consequences for the other European countries with the case of France. Through the different parts a point is tackled with the measures taken after the accident by the other countries to manage an accident, the cooperation between the different countries and the groups of research and studies about the reactors safety, and also with the international medical cooperation, specially for the children, everything in relation with the Chernobyl accident. (N.C.)

  17. Incidents/accidents classification and reporting in Statoil

    Based on requirements in the new petroleum regulations from Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the realisation of a need to improve and rationalise the routines for reporting and follow up of incidents, Statoil Exploration and Production Norway (Statoil E and P Norway) has formulated a new strategy and process for handling of incidents/accidents. The following past experiences serve as basis for the changes made to incident reporting in Statoil E and P Norway: - Too much resources were spent on a comprehensive handling and analysis of a vast amount of incidents with less importance for the safety level, taking the focus away from the more severe and important issues at hand. - The assessment of 'Risk Factor', i.e. the combination of recurrence frequency and consequence, was difficult to use. The high degree of subjectivity involved in the determination of the 'Risk Factor' (in particular the estimation of the recurrence frequency) resulted in poor data quality and lack of consistency in the data material. The new system for categorisation and handling of undesirable incidents was established in January 2002. The intention was to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), with a thorough handling and follow-up. This is reflected throughout the handling of the serious incidents, all the way from immediate notification of the incident, through investigation and follow-up of corrective and preventive actions. Simultaneously, it was also an objective to rationalise/simplify the handling of less serious incidents. These incidents are, however, subjected to analyses twice a year in order to utilize the learning opportunity that they also provide. A year after the introduction of this new system for categorisation and follow-up of undesirable incidents, Statoil's experiences are predominantly good: - The intention to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), has been

  18. Incidents/accidents classification and reporting in Statoil.

    Berentsen, Rune; Holmboe, Rolf H

    2004-07-26

    Based on requirements in the new petroleum regulations from Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the realisation of a need to improve and rationalise the routines for reporting and follow up of incidents, Statoil Exploration & Production Norway (Statoil E&P Norway) has formulated a new strategy and process for handling of incidents/accidents. The following past experiences serve as basis for the changes made to incident reporting in Statoil E&P Norway; too much resources were spent on a comprehensive handling and analysis of a vast amount of incidents with less importance for the safety level, taking the focus away from the more severe and important issues at hand, the assessment of "Risk Factor", i.e. the combination of recurrence frequency and consequence, was difficult to use. The high degree of subjectivity involved in the determination of the "Risk Factor" (in particular the estimation of the recurrence frequency) resulted in poor data quality and lack of consistency in the data material. The new system for categorisation and handling of undesirable incidents was established in January 2002. The intention was to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), with a thorough handling and follow-up. This is reflected throughout the handling of the serious incidents, all the way from immediate notification of the incident, through investigation and follow-up of corrective and preventive actions. Simultaneously, it was also an objective to rationalise/simplify the handling of less serious incidents. These incidents are, however, subjected to analyses twice a year in order to utilize the learning opportunity that they also provide. A year after the introduction of this new system for categorisation and follow-up of undesirable incidents, Statoil's experiences are predominantly good; the intention to get a higher degree of focus on serious incidents (injuries, damages, loss and near misses), has been met, the data

  19. Review of five investigation committees' reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant severe accident. Focusing on accident progression and causes

    On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku District-off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the subsequent tsunami resulted in the severe core damage at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1-3, involving hydrogen explosions at Units 1, 3, and 4 and the large release of radioactive materials to the environment. Four independent committees were established by the Japanese government, the Diet of Japan, the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, and TEPCO to investigate the accident and published their respective reports. Also, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carried out an analysis of accident causes to obtain the lessons learned from the accident and made its report public. This article reviews the reports and clarifies the differences in their positions, from the technological point of view, focusing on the accident progression and causes. Moreover, the undiscussed issues are identified to provide insights useful for the near-term regulatory activities including accident investigation by the Nuclear Regulation Authority. (author)

  20. NIRS report of the criticality accident in a uranium conversion test plant in Tokai-mura

    This report is a detailed account of the roles that National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) played at the criticality accident in the title, which occurred at around 10:35, on Sep. 30, 1999 and resulted in death of two workers after all, and is published to discharge NIRS responsibilities in regards to the accident. The accident caused many residents concern on their health and rumors had both social and economic consequences. The report involves chapters of detailed outline of the accident; demand for acceptance of the victims and communications until the identification of the criticality'' accident; the acceptance and initial treatment; the exposure dose estimation (based on acute symptoms, on physics, on chromosomal analyses and on neutron-activated dental metals, and detailed analyses for dose distribution); decision made for therapeutic strategies; cooperation with the Network Council for Radiation Emergency and with other medical facilities; the urgent import of medicine; treatment and processes (patients, nursing system and radiation injuries); radiation protection in medical facilities; response to nearby residents of the Plant; international response; press release; Uranium Processing Plant Criticality Accident Investigation Committee and the Health Management Committee organized by the Nuclear Safety Commission; handling of information; and radiation emergency medical preparedness at the NIRS (future issues and prospect). The report is hopefully useful in preventing the occurrence of future accidents. (N.I.)

  1. Baia Mare accident--brief ecotoxicological report of Czech experts.

    Soldán, P; Pavonic, M; Boucek, J; Kokes, J

    2001-07-01

    On 30 January 2000, following the breach in the tailing dam of the Aurul SA Baia Mare Co., a major spill of about 100,000 m(3) of cyanide and metal-rich liquid waste was released into the river system near Baia Mare in northwest Romania. The pollutants flowed via different tributaries into the Tizsa (Tisa) river and finally through the Danube river into the Black Sea. Along the way pollutants (especially cyanides) caused rapid death of aquatic organisms and animals living close to the poisoned rivers. Following request from the governments of Romania, Hungary, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, United Nations sent international mission experts to the area of accident. The Czech team of four experts took very active part in this mission. Samples of surface water collected by this team 3 weeks after the accident showed high toxicity in the rivers on the Romanian territory. Due to this impact, water from the Szamos river and a large area of the Tisza river in Hungarian territory was still medially toxic. Improvement of this situation was detected only in downstream areas of the Tisza/Tisa river. The high toxicity of surface water from the locality of the Lapos river upstream of the accident indicated the possibility of toxic pollution from other sources in the area. Aquatic sediments were highly toxic only in the Aurul reservoir and its surrounding area. Rapid decline of their toxicity indicated more limited adverse impact of the "Aurul pollution" in comparison with surface water. From ecotoxicological results it is evident that there is an urgent need to start abatement activities in the Baia Mare area because the possibility of future accidents still exists (this hypothesis was proved by further accidents on 10.3.2000 and the beginning of May 2000). PMID:11440479

  2. Introduction of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident, Investigation Details, Findings and Crew Survival Investigation Report

    Chandler, Michael

    2010-01-01

    As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the

  3. Report by the 'Fukushima Dai-Ichi major accident' nuclear subgroup

    This report comprises a description of the succession of events in the Fukushima-Dai-Ichi power plant, a discussion of the situation of the nuclear industry and energy in France after this accident (French nuclear stock, security organisation), and a discussion on the fuel cycle and on future opportunities (comparison with EPR - Gen II safety measures, perspectives beyond the EPR). Numerous appendices are proposed, made of documents from different bodies involved in nuclear industry, energy and safety. They deal with the Fukushima accident, with light water and pressurized water reactors, with severe accidents in PWRs, and so on

  4. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Report by the Director General [Spanish Version

    This report presents an assessment of the causes and consequences of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, which began on 11 March 2011. Caused by a huge tsunami that followed a massive earthquake, it was the worst accident at a nuclear power plant since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The report considers human, organizational and technical factors, and aims to provide an understanding of what happened, and why, so that the necessary lessons learned can be acted upon by governments, regulators and nuclear power plant operators throughout the world. Measures taken in response to the accident, both in Japan and internationally, are also examined. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident consists of a Report by the IAEA Director General and five technical volumes. It is the result of an extensive international collaborative effort involving five working groups with about 180 experts from 42 Member States with and without nuclear power programmes and several international bodies. It provides a description of the accident and its causes, evolution and consequences, based on the evaluation of data and information from a large number of sources available at the time of writing. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident will be of use to national authorities, international organizations, nuclear regulatory bodies, nuclear power plant operating organizations, designers of nuclear facilities and other experts in matters relating to nuclear power, as well as the wider public. The set contains six printed parts and five supplementary CD-ROMs. Contents: Report by the Director General; Technical Volume 1/5, Description and Context of the Accident; Technical Volume 2/5, Safety Assessment; Technical Volume 3/5, Emergency Preparedness and Response; Technical Volume 4/5, Radiological Consequences; Technical Volume 5/5, Post-accident Recovery; Annexes. The Report by the Director General is also available separately in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish and

  5. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Report by the Director General [Arabic Version

    This report presents an assessment of the causes and consequences of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, which began on 11 March 2011. Caused by a huge tsunami that followed a massive earthquake, it was the worst accident at a nuclear power plant since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The report considers human, organizational and technical factors, and aims to provide an understanding of what happened, and why, so that the necessary lessons learned can be acted upon by governments, regulators and nuclear power plant operators throughout the world. Measures taken in response to the accident, both in Japan and internationally, are also examined. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident consists of a Report by the IAEA Director General and five technical volumes. It is the result of an extensive international collaborative effort involving five working groups with about 180 experts from 42 Member States with and without nuclear power programmes and several international bodies. It provides a description of the accident and its causes, evolution and consequences, based on the evaluation of data and information from a large number of sources available at the time of writing. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident will be of use to national authorities, international organizations, nuclear regulatory bodies, nuclear power plant operating organizations, designers of nuclear facilities and other experts in matters relating to nuclear power, as well as the wider public. The set contains six printed parts and five supplementary CD-ROMs. Contents: Report by the Director General; Technical Volume 1/5, Description and Context of the Accident; Technical Volume 2/5, Safety Assessment; Technical Volume 3/5, Emergency Preparedness and Response; Technical Volume 4/5, Radiological Consequences; Technical Volume 5/5, Post-accident Recovery; Annexes. The Report by the Director General is also available separately in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish and

  6. Extracting decision rules from police accident reports through decision trees.

    de Oña, Juan; López, Griselda; Abellán, Joaquín

    2013-01-01

    Given the current number of road accidents, the aim of many road safety analysts is to identify the main factors that contribute to crash severity. To pinpoint those factors, this paper shows an application that applies some of the methods most commonly used to build decision trees (DTs), which have not been applied to the road safety field before. An analysis of accidents on rural highways in the province of Granada (Spain) between 2003 and 2009 (both inclusive) showed that the methods used to build DTs serve our purpose and may even be complementary. Applying these methods has enabled potentially useful decision rules to be extracted that could be used by road safety analysts. For instance, some of the rules may indicate that women, contrary to men, increase their risk of severity under bad lighting conditions. The rules could be used in road safety campaigns to mitigate specific problems. This would enable managers to implement priority actions based on a classification of accidents by types (depending on their severity). However, the primary importance of this proposal is that other databases not used here (i.e. other infrastructure, roads and countries) could be used to identify unconventional problems in a manner easy for road safety managers to understand, as decision rules. PMID:23021419

  7. Report on recent over-exposure accidents with a medical linac in Japan

    On December 21, 2001, at a hospital in Tokyo, an engineer setting a medical-linac was over-exposed by the equipment due to lack of communication between workers. The exposed dose was initially reported as 1000 mSv (1 Sv), but later revised to 200 mSv at most. The outline of the accident and the statistical data on radiation exposure accidents in Japan and the world are briefly overlooked. (author)

  8. The report of the criticality accident in a uranium conversion test plant in Tokai-mura

    The criticality accident in the title occurred at around 10:35, on Sep. 30, 1999, cost the lives of two workers and caused many residents concern on their health. Moreover, rumors had both social and economic consequences. This report is a detailed account of the roles that many individuals and groups in the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) performed in a range of the areas, and is published to discharge NIRS responsibilities in regards to the accident. The report involves chapters of detailed outline of the accident; acceptance of the victims and communications until the identification of the ''criticality'' accident; initial treatment; dose estimation (medical, hematological, physical and biological ones and that by dental metals activated by the neutron); decision making for therapeutic strategies; cooperation with the Network Council for Radiation Emergency Medicine and other medical facilities; emergency importation of medical supplies; treatment and progress (nursing system and radiation injuries); protection from radiation in medical facilities; response to nearby residents of the Plant; international response; press release; Uranium Processing Plant Criticality Accident Investigation Committee and the Health Management Committee organized by the Nuclear Safety Commission; handling of information; and radiation emergency medical preparedness at the NIRS (future issues and prospect). The report is hoped to be useful in preventing the occurrence of future accidents. (K.H.)

  9. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident final report of the AESJ investigation committee

    Atomic Energy Society of Japan

    2015-01-01

    The Magnitude 9 Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, followed by a massive tsunami struck  TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and triggered an unprecedented core melt/severe accident in Units 1 – 3. The radioactivity release led to the evacuation of local residents, many of whom still have not been able to return to their homes. As a group of nuclear experts, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan established the Investigation Committee on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, to investigate and analyze the accident from scientific and technical perspectives for clarifying the underlying and fundamental causes, and to make recommendations. The results of the investigation by the AESJ Investigation Committee has been compiled herewith as the Final Report. Direct contributing factors of the catastrophic nuclear incident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP initiated by an unprecedented massive earthquake/ tsunami – inadequacies in tsunami measures, severe accident ma...

  10. Technical Advisory Team (TAT) report on the rocket sled test accident of October 9, 2008.

    Stofleth, Jerome H.; Dinallo, Michael Anthony; Medina, Anthony J.

    2009-01-01

    This report summarizes probable causes and contributing factors that led to a rocket motor initiating prematurely while employees were preparing instrumentation for an AIII rocket sled test at SNL/NM, resulting in a Type-B Accident. Originally prepared by the Technical Advisory Team that provided technical assistance to the NNSA's Accident Investigation Board, the report includes analyses of several proposed causes and concludes that the most probable source of power for premature initiation of the rocket motor was the independent battery contained in the HiCap recorder package. The report includes data, evidence, and proposed scenarios to substantiate the analyses.

  11. Hydrogen-control systems for severe LWR accident conditions - a state-of-technology report

    This report reviews the current state of technology regarding hydrogen safety issues in light water reactor plants. Topics considered in this report relate to control systems and include combustion prevention, controlled combustion, minimization of combustion effects, combination of control concepts, and post-accident disposal. A companion report addresses hydrogen generation, distribution, and combustion. The objectives of the study were to identify the key safety issues related to hydrogen produced under severe accident conditions, to describe the state of technology for each issue, and to point out ongoing programs aimed at resolving the open issues

  12. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1992, a status report

    This document is part of a report which documents 1992 operational events selected as accident sequence precursors. This report describes the 27 precursors identified from the 1992 licensee event reports. It also describe containment-related events; open-quote interesting close-quote events; potentially significant events that were considered impractical to analyze; copies of the licensee event reports which were cited in the cases above; and comments from the licensee and NRC in response to the preliminary reports

  13. Nuclear accidents

    On 27 May 1986 the Norwegian government appointed an inter-ministerial committee of senior officials to prepare a report on experiences in connection with the Chernobyl accident. The present second part of the committee's report describes proposals for measures to prevent and deal with similar accidents in the future. The committee's evaluations and proposals are grouped into four main sections: Safety and risk at nuclear power plants; the Norwegian contingency organization for dealing with nuclear accidents; compensation issues; and international cooperation

  14. 75 FR 922 - Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue Aircraft, and...

    2010-01-07

    ... of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), published in the Federal Register (FR), is available for inspection...'' in 73 FR 58520. This NPRM proposed and the final rule herein codifies the addition of five reportable... SAFETY BOARD 49 CFR Part 830 Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and...

  15. The accident in Fukushima. Preliminary report on the accident progress in the nuclear power plants as a consequence of the earth quake on 11th March 2011

    The preliminary report on the accident progress in the nuclear power plants as a consequence of the earth quake on 11th March 2011 describes the chronologic sequence of the accident in the different units of the power plant. The measures for mitigation of the accident impact at the site of Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini included the efforts to reach and maintain stable plant conditions. The issue radiological situation includes an estimation of the air-borne radionuclide release, the contamination of the environment and the sea water, measures for protection of the public. The lessons learned following the NISA and IAEA fact finding missions and the open questions are summarized.

  16. Ruthenium behaviour in severe nuclear accident conditions. Final report

    During routine nuclear reactor operations, ruthenium will accumulate in the fuel in relatively high concentrations. In a steam atmosphere, ruthenium is not volatile, and it is not likely to be released from the fuel. However, in an air ingress accident during reactor power operation or during maintenance, ruthenium may form volatile species, which may be released into the containment. Oxide forms of ruthenium are more volatile than the metallic form. Radiotoxicity of ruthenium is high both in the short and the long term. The results of this project imply that in oxidising conditions during nuclear reactor core degradation, ruthenium release increases as oxidised gaseous species Ru03 and Ru04 are formed. A significant part of the released ruthenium is then deposited on reactor coolant system piping. However, in the presence of steam and aerosol particles, a substantial amount of ruthenium may be released as gaseous Ru04 into the containment atmosphere. (au)

  17. Ruthenium behaviour in severe nuclear accident conditions. Final report

    Backman, U.; Lipponen, M.; Auvinen, A.; Jokiniemi, J.; Zilliacus, R. [VVT Processes (Finland)

    2004-08-01

    During routine nuclear reactor operations, ruthenium will accumulate in the fuel in relatively high concentrations. In a steam atmosphere, ruthenium is not volatile, and it is not likely to be released from the fuel. However, in an air ingress accident during reactor power operation or during maintenance, ruthenium may form volatile species, which may be released into the containment. Oxide forms of ruthenium are more volatile than the metallic form. Radiotoxicity of ruthenium is high both in the short and the long term. The results of this project imply that in oxidising conditions during nuclear reactor core degradation, ruthenium release increases as oxidised gaseous species Ru03 and Ru04 are formed. A significant part of the released ruthenium is then deposited on reactor coolant system piping. However, in the presence of steam and aerosol particles, a substantial amount of ruthenium may be released as gaseous Ru04 into the containment atmosphere. (au)

  18. The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

    In October 2011, the Act regarding Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission was enacted to investigate the Fukushima accident with the authority to request documents and request the legislative branch to use its investigative powers to obtain any necessary documents or evidence required. In December 2011, chairman and nine other members were appointed. After a six-month investigation, Commission had concluded. 'In order to prevent future disasters, fundamental reforms must take place covering both the structure of electric power industry and the structure of related government and regulatory agencies as well as operation processes, for both normal and emergency situations'. Main parts of report consisted of overview, conclusions and recommendations, and six findings; (1) was the accident preventable?, (2) Escalation of the accident, (3) Emergency response to the accident, (4) Spread of the damage, (5) Organizational issues in accident prevention and response and (6) the legal system. Based on the above findings, Commission made seven recommendations regarding (1) Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National Diet, (2) Reform the crisis management system, (3) Government responsibility for public health and welfare, (4) Monitoring the operators, (5) Criteria for the new regulatory body, (6) Reforming laws related to nuclear energy and (7) Develop a system of independent investigation commissions. National Diet's thorough debate and deliberate on these recommendation was highly encouraged for the future. (T. Tanaka)

  19. Thermal and hydraulic behaviour of CANDU cores under severe accident conditions - final report. Vol. 1

    This report gives the results of a study of the thermo-hydraulic aspects of severe accident sequences in CANDU reactors. The accident sequences considered are the loss of the moderator cooling system and the loss of the moderator heat sink, each following a large loss-of-coolant accident accompanied by loss of emergency coolant injection. Factors considered include expulsion and boil-off of the moderator, uncovery, overheating and disintegration of the fuel channels, quenching of channel debris, re-heating of channel debris following complete moderator expulsion, formation and possible boiling of a molten pool of core debris and the effectiveness of the cooling of the calandria wall by the shield tank water during the accident sequences. The effects of these accident sequences on the reactor containment are also considered. Results show that there would be no gross melting of fuel during moderator expulsion from the calandria, and for a considerable time thereafter, as quenched core debris re-heats. Core melting would not begin until about 135 minutes after accident initiation in a loss of the moderator cooling system and until about 30 minutes in a loss of the moderator heat sink. Eventually, a pool of molten material would form in the bottom of the calandria, which may or may not boil, depending on property values. In all cases, the molten core would be contained within the calandria, as long as the shield tank water cooling system remains operational. Finally, in the period from 8 to 50 hours after the initiation of the accident, the molten core would re-solidify within the calandria. There would be no consequent damage to containment resulting from these accident sequences, nor would there be a significant increase in fission product releases from containment above those that would otherwise occur in a dual failure LOCA plus LOECI

  20. North Wales Group report on the effects of the Chernobyl accident

    A report is presented by the North Wales Group concerning the sequence of events affecting North Wales and the identification of the residual problems following contamination from the Chernobyl accident. The first part of the report attempts to establish a time scale for radiation restrictions applicable in North Wales and the size of the areas which are involved. Part two deals with national arrangements to handle incidents like Chernobyl and examines the wider field of international arrangements. A review is given of events as seen by the affected community following the Chernobyl accident. (U.K.)

  1. Report of investigation regarding accident in Tomsk reprocessing facilities in Russia

    At 1258 on April 6, 1993, the explosion accident of a welded tank occurred in the military reprocessing facilities in Tomsk, Siberia District, Russia. Japan carried out the investigation of the effect on the environmental radiation in Japan, dispatched the investigation mission to Russia, and explained the way of thinking on securing the safety of Japanese reprocessing plants to local communities. Science and Technology Agency organized the working group for investigating the accident, which exerted efforts to collect the information, analyze and examine it. This report is the summary of its results. The explosion occurred in the tank for adjusting the acid concentration of the solution to be supplied to the solvent extraction shop, and the building was destructed. No one died or was injured. The results of the radioactivity examination are reported. The process of the accident was inferred, and described. The factors that caused the accident were the mixing of organic impurities the use of the diluting liquid containing aromatic hydrocarbon, the contact of nitric acid with organic substances at high temperature, in sufficient agitation at the time of pouring nitric acid and so on. The safety countermeasures in Japanese reprocessing plants and the response by Japan based on the accident are described. (K.I.)

  2. Reporting and recording of accidents and incidents involving the transport of radioactive materials in the UK

    Accidents and incidents involving the transport of radioactive materials are rare. However, there is always a potential for such an event, which could lead to a release of the contents of a package or an increase in radiation level caused by damaged shielding. These events could result in radiological consequences for transport workers and members of the public. The UK legislation on the transport of radioactive materials requires significant events to be reported to the competent authority. This allows for investigations to be carried out which may result in corrective actions to be implemented and wider lessons to be learned. The Department for Transport (DfT), together with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) have supported, for almost twenty years, work to compile analyse and report on accidents and incidents that occur during the transport of radioactive materials. The details of these events are recorded in the Radioactive Materials Transport Event Database (RAMTED) maintained by NRPB on behalf of the DfT and HSE. Information on accidents and incidents date back to 1958. RAMTED currently includes information of 747 accidents and incidents, covering the period 1958 to 2001. Annual reports on these events have been produced for twelve years. Also, information on these events is provided annually to the IAEA's EVTRAM database, for wider circulation. This paper presents a summary of the reporting requirements in the UK. Also, summary data on accidents and incidents are presented, identifying trends and lessons learned together with a discussion of some examples. It was found that, historically, the most significant exposures were received as a result of accidents involving the transport of industrial radiography sources. However, the frequency and severity of these events has decreased considerably in the later years of this study due to improvements in training, awareness and equipment. (author)

  3. Report of the Fukushima nuclear accident by the National Academy of Science. Lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving safety of U.S. nuclear plants

    U.S. National Academy of Science investigated the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant initiated by the Great East Japan Earthquake for two years and published a draft report in July 24, 2014. Investigation results were summarized in nine new findings and made ten recommendations in a wide horizon; (1) hardware countermeasures against severe accidents and training of operators, (2) upgrade of risk assessment capability for beyond design basis accident, (3) incorporation of new information about hazards in safety regulations, (4) needed improvement of off-site emergency preparedness, and (5) improvements of nuclear safety culture. New information about hazards related with tsunami assessment, new risk assessment for beyond design basis accident, advice of foreigner resident evacuations, regulatory capture, and safety culture and regulator's specialty were discussed as Japanese issues. (T. Tanaka)

  4. Final report on the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company

    On March 11, 2011, the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (hereafter, 'Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS') and Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station (hereafter, 'Fukushima Dai-ni NPS') of Tokyo Electric Power Company (hereafter, 'TEPCO') were damaged in the Tohoku District - off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the ensuing tsunami. In particular, an extremely severe accident measuring Level 7 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) occurred at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. The Investigation Committee was established on May 24, 2011 by a Cabinet decision. Its mission is to make policy recommendations, by investigating and verifying the causes of the accident and ensuing damage, on measures to prevent the further spread of damage caused by the accident and a recurrence of similar accidents in the future. The Investigation Committee inspected the accident sites including the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, and interviewed individuals concerned, including the mayors and residents of relevant municipalities. The number of interviewees reached 772 in total. The Investigation Committee published its Interim Report on December 26, 2011 and its Final Report on July 23, 2012. The Final Report, with the Interim Report as its complementary piece, describes mainly the results of investigations after the Interim Report. This Executive Summary is a condensed version of the Final Report, mainly Chapter VI of the main text which analyzes the problems and provides recommendations. The contents of the parenthesis [ ] that follow the title indicate the relevant corresponding locations in the Final Report (Main text). Recommendations are indicated in bold. (author)

  5. The Chernobyl accident and the Spanish nuclear power plants. Technical report

    On the morning of April 26, 1986, Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Ukraine, USSR) suffered an accident of the greatest magnitude among those which have taken place in nuclear energy installations employed for peaceful uses. The accident reached a degree of severity unknown up to now in nuclear energy generating plants, both with respect to the loss of human lives and the effects caused to the neighboring population (as well as to other nations within a wide radius of radioactivity dispersal), and also with respect to the damage caused in the nuclear plant itself. In the light of the anxiety created internationally, the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy prepared a report (1), based on the conclusions of the Governmental Commission entrusted to study the causes of the accident, which was presented at the international meeting of experts held at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna from August 25 to 29, 1986. The present technical report has been prepared by the Spanish nuclear power plants within the framework of UNIDAD ELECTRICA, S.A. (UNESA) - the Association of Spanish electric utilities - in collaboration with EMPRESARIOS AGRUPADOS, S.A. The report reflects the utilities' analyses of the causes and consequences of the accident and, based on similarities and differences with Spanish plants under construction and in operation, intends to: a. Evaluate the possibility of an accident with similar consequences occurring in a Spanish plant b. Identify possible design and operation modifications indicated by the lessons learned from this accident

  6. 32 CFR 634.30 - Use of traffic accident investigation report data.

    2010-07-01

    ... data will be used to inform and educate drivers and to conduct traffic engineering studies. (e) Army... 32 National Defense 4 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Use of traffic accident investigation report data... (CONTINUED) LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC SUPERVISION Traffic...

  7. 75 FR 51953 - Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue Aircraft, and...

    2010-08-24

    ... applicability of these regulations to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The proposed definition stated... unmanned aircraft system that takes place between the time that the system is activated with the purpose of... notification and reporting of aircraft accidents or incidents by adding a definition of ``unmanned......

  8. 46 CFR 185.230 - Report of accident to aid to navigation.

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Report of accident to aid to navigation. 185.230 Section 185.230 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) SMALL PASSENGER VESSELS... aid to navigation. Whenever a vessel collides with a buoy, or other aid to navigation under...

  9. 77 FR 18689 - Changes to Standard Numbering System, Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report...

    2012-03-28

    .... Abbreviations BARD Boating Accident Report Database DHS Department of Homeland Security FR Federal Register HIN... rulemaking (NPRM) bearing the same title as this final rule in the Federal Register (75 FR 25137). We... reopened the comment period to accept comments until October 15, 2010 (75 FR 49869, Aug. 16, 2010)....

  10. 75 FR 49869 - Changes to Standard Numbering System, Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report...

    2010-08-16

    ... in the January 17, 2008, issue of the Federal Register (73 FR 3316). Reopening of Comment Period On May 7, 2010, we published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register (75 FR 25137..., Vessel Identification System, and Boating Accident Report Database AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS....

  11. Evaluation of severe accident risks, Peach Bottom, Unit 2: Main report

    In support of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) assessment of the risk from severe accidents at commercial nuclear power plants in the US reported NUREG-1150, the Severe Accident Risk Reduction Program (SARRP) has completed a revised calculation of the risk to the general public from severe accidents at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2. This power plant, located in southeastern Pennsylvania, is operated by the Philadelphia Electric Company. The emphasis in this risk analysis was not on determining a ''so-called'' point estimate of risk. Rather, it was to determine the distribution of risk, and to discover the uncertainties that account for the breadth of this distribution. Off-site risk initiated by events both internal and external to the power station were assessed. 39 refs., 174 figs., 133 tabs

  12. Final safety analysis report for the Galileo Mission: Volume 2, Book 2: Accident model document: Appendices

    1988-12-15

    This section of the Accident Model Document (AMD) presents the appendices which describe the various analyses that have been conducted for use in the Galileo Final Safety Analysis Report II, Volume II. Included in these appendices are the approaches, techniques, conditions and assumptions used in the development of the analytical models plus the detailed results of the analyses. Also included in these appendices are summaries of the accidents and their associated probabilities and environment models taken from the Shuttle Data Book (NSTS-08116), plus summaries of the several segments of the recent GPHS safety test program. The information presented in these appendices is used in Section 3.0 of the AMD to develop the Failure/Abort Sequence Trees (FASTs) and to determine the fuel releases (source terms) resulting from the potential Space Shuttle/IUS accidents throughout the missions.

  13. Assessment of Loads and Performance of a Containment in a Hypothetical Accident (ALPHA). Facility design report

    Yamano, Norihiro; Maruyama, Yu; Kudo, Tamotsu; Moriyama, Kiyofumi; Ito, Hideo; Komori, Keiichi; Sonobe, Hisao; Sugimoto, Jun [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment

    1998-06-01

    In the ALPHA (Assessment of Loads and Performance of Containment in Hypothetical Accident) program, several tests have been performed to quantitatively evaluate loads to and performance of a containment vessel during a severe accident of a light water reactor. The ALPHA program focuses on investigating leak behavior through the containment vessel, fuel-coolant interaction, molten core-concrete interaction and FP aerosol behavior, which are generally recognized as significant phenomena considered to occur in the containment. In designing the experimental facility, it was considered to simulate appropriately the phenomena mentioned above, and to cover experimental conditions not covered by previous works involving high pressure and temperature. Experiments from the viewpoint of accident management were also included in the scope. The present report describes design specifications, dimensions, instrumentation of the ALPHA facility based on the specific test objectives and procedures. (author)

  14. Studies of radiological consequences on the reports of Chernobyl accident

    1) Relation of radiation related quantities such as radioactivity, exposure, absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent and radiation protection standards were explained as easy as a beginner could understand. 2) Using published data including IAEA data in the report 'One Decade After Chernobyl (Summary of the Conference Results, 1996)' and some reports, outline of explosion, exposure dose and radiation effects which gave to the human body were briefly described and some rational ways for understanding the data were shown. (author)

  15. History of aid provision during radiation accidents in the Czech Republic and of radiation emergency reporting

    The history of radiation accidents and reported elevated exposures divided into the 1954-1978, 1979-1994 and 1995-2012 periods is described in detail. The spectrum of reported radiation events has changed during the years, now including e.g. retrieval of orphan sources, illicit traffic, etc. Since 1995 the agenda of radiation protection has been dealt with by the State Office of Nuclear Safety, where an Emergency Coordination Centre was established.

  16. Studies of radiological consequences on the reports of Chernobyl accident

    Asano, Takeyoshi [Research Institute for Advanced Science and Technology, Osaka Prefecture Univ., Sakai, Osaka (Japan)

    1999-09-01

    1) Relation of radiation related quantities such as radioactivity, exposure, absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent and radiation protection standards were explained as easy as a beginner could understand. 2) Using published data including IAEA data in the report 'One Decade After Chernobyl (Summary of the Conference Results, 1996)' and some reports, outline of explosion, exposure dose and radiation effects which gave to the human body were briefly described and some rational ways for understanding the data were shown. (author)

  17. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Computerized Accident/Incident Reporting System (CAIRS)

    The Department of Energy's (DOE) Computerized Accident/Incident Reporting System (CAIRS) is a comprehensive data base containing more than 50,000 investigation reports of injury/illness, property damage and vehicle accident cases representing safety data from 1975 to the present for more than 150 DOE contractor organizations. A special feature is that the text of each accident report is translated using a controlled dictionary and rigid sentence structure called Factor Relationship and Sequence of Events (FRASE) that enhances the ability to retrieve specific types of information and to perform detailed analyses. DOE summary and individual contractor reports are prepared quarterly and annually. In addition, ''Safety Performance Profile'' reports for individual organizations are prepared to provide advance information to appraisal teams, and special topical reports are prepared for areas of concern such as an increase in the number of security injuries or environmental releases. The data base is open to all DOE and Contractor registered users with no access restrictions other than that required by the Privacy Act

  18. A2 Code - Internal Accident Report. Does it ring a bell?

    HSE Unit

    2015-01-01

    A2 Code* - It is under this designation (used by the CERN community) that the form for internal accident reports is hidden. More specifically it refers to the CERN Safety Code A2 “Reporting of Accidents and Near Misses” (EDMS: 335502 or here via the official Safety Rules website).   Which events should be declared? All accidental events, which cause or could have caused injuries or damage to property or the environment, must be reported especially if they involve: a) a member of the personnel, visitor, temporary labourer or contractor if it occurred on the CERN site or between sites. b) a member of the personnel if it occurred while commuting or during duty travel. Who can fill in the report? The reporting of occurred accidents or near misses should be made by the person involved or by any direct or indirect witness of the event as soon as possible after the event. Contribute to the improvement of Safety within the Organizatio...

  19. Occupational Radiation Protection in Severe Accident Management. EG-SAM Interim Report

    As an early response to the Fukushima NPP accident, the ISOE Bureau decided to focus on the following issues as an initial response of the joint program after having direct communications with the Japanese official participants in April 2011; - Management of high radiation area worker doses: It has been decided to make available the experience and information from the Chernobyl accident in terms of how emergency worker / responder doses were legally and practically managed, - Personal protective equipment for highly-contaminated areas: It was agreed to collect information about the types of personnel protective equipment and other equipment (e.g. air bottles, respirators, air-hoods or plastic suits, etc.), as well as high-radiation area worker dosimetry use (e.g. type, number and placement of dosimetry) for different types of emergency and high-radiation work situations. Detailed information was collected on dose criteria which are used for emergency workers/responders and their basis, dose management criteria for high dose/dose rate areas, protective equipment which is recommended for emergency workers / responders, recommended individual monitoring procedures, and any special requirement for assessment from the ISOE participating nuclear utilities and regulatory authorities and made available for Japanese utilities. With this positive response of the ISOE actors and interest in the situation in Fukushima, the Expert Group on Occupational Radiation Protection in Severe Accident Management (EG-SAM) was established by the ISOE Management Board in May 2011. The overall objective of the EG-SAM is to contribute to occupational exposure management (providing a view on management of high radiation area worker doses) within the Fukushima plant boundary with the ISOE participants and to develop a state-of-the- art ISOE report on best radiation protection management practices for proper radiation protection job coverage during severe accident initial response and recovery

  20. Can we use near-miss reports for accident prevention? A study in the oil and gas industry in Denmark

    Rasmussen, H.B.; Drupsteen, L.; Dyreborg, J.

    2013-01-01

    Background: The oil and gas industry in the Danish sector of the North Sea has always focused on reducing work-related accidents. Over the years, accident rates have been reduced, and near-miss reporting has gained in importance, because it allows the industry to learn from experience and prevent fu

  1. Report of the activities carried out by the Psychological Support Group in the Goiania radiological accident in Brazil

    The report analyzes the characteristics and attitudes of the population directly involved in the Goiania radiological accident. The inhabitants of the affected area were interviewed in their residence. Factual information about the accidents were given and specific psychological support were received whenever necessary

  2. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME III. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  3. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME II. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  4. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME VI. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  5. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME V. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  6. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME I. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  7. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: VOLUME IV. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  8. THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT OF MARCH 1979. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DATA: UPDATE. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

    This report contains a listing of environmental radiation monitoring data collected in the vicinity of Three Mile Island (TMI) following the March 28, 1979 accident. These data were collected by the EPA, NRC, DOE, HHS, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or the Bethlehem Steel Corp...

  9. Accident Statistics

    Department of Homeland Security — Accident statistics available on the Coast Guard’s website by state, year, and one variable to obtain tables and/or graphs. Data from reports has been loaded for...

  10. Report of the Land Berlin: The Chernobyl reactor accident and its effects on Berlin

    This report presents in detail the activities of the Berlin Senate administrations for the protection of the population after the reactor accident and outlines the consequences that have already resulted or are still to be expected for the people and the environment in Berlin. The radiation control guidelines and the provided instruments enabled the Berlin Senate to encounter the sudden accident with a fast and unbureaucratic crisis management. The special geopolitical situation of Berlin made it possible to set up a comprehensive control and measuring program for imported food. This report shows that all the measures required in connection with Chernobyl were taken by the Berlin Senate and that there is an effective precautionary program. (orig./HSCH)

  11. Interim report on the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company

    The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (the Investigation Committee) of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) was established by the Cabinet decision on May 24, 2011. Its objectives are: to conduct investigation for finding out the causes of accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS) and Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS) of TEPCO as well as the causes of accident damage; and to make policy recommendations for limiting the expansion of damage and preventing reoccurrence of similar accidents. The Investigation Committee has conducted its investigation and evaluation since its first meeting on June 7, 2011. Its activities included: site visits to the Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni NPSs, as well as to other facilities; hearing of heads of local governments around the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS; and hearing of people concerned through interviews mainly arranged by the Secretariat. As of December 16, 2011, the number of interviewees reached 456. The investigation and evaluation by the Investigation Committee are still ongoing and the Interim Report does not cover every item that the Committee aims at investigating and evaluating. Fact-finding of even some of those items discussed in the Interim Report are not yet completed. The Investigation Committee continues to conduct its investigation and evaluation and will issue its Final Report in the summer of 2012. This brief executive summary covers mainly considerations and evaluation of the issues in Chapter VII of the Interim Report, with brief reference to Chapters I to VI. The Investigation Committee recommendations are printed in bold. (author)

  12. Surgical correction of buried penis after traffic accident – a case report

    Masuda Hiroshi; Azuma Haruhito; Segawa Naoki; Iwamoto Yusaku; Inamoto Teruo; Takasaki Noboru; Katsuoka Yoji

    2004-01-01

    Abstract Background Buried penis, most commonly seen in children, is particularly debilitating in adults, resulting in inability to void while standing and it also affects vaginal penetration. We report a case of buried penis due to a traffic accident, which caused dislocation of the fractured pubic bone that shifted inside and pulled the penis by its suspensory ligament. Case presentation A 55-year-old man was admitted to our hospital with a chief complaint of hidden penis while in the sitti...

  13. Report of a human accident caused by Conus regius (Gastropoda, Conidae).

    Haddad, Vidal; Coltro, Marcus; Simone, Luiz Ricardo L

    2009-01-01

    Conus regius is a venomous mollusc in the Conidae family, which includes species responsible for severe or even fatal accidents affecting human beings. This is the first report on a clinical case involving this species. It consisted a puncture in the right hand of a diver who presented paresthesia and movement difficulty in the whole limb. The manifestations disappeared after around twelve hours, without sequelae. PMID:19802483

  14. Fukushima: the Japanese report in French - 'Official report of the independent inquiry Commission on the nuclear accident in Fukushima'

    In its first part, this report describes the (Japanese) Inquiry Commission's mandate, its expectations, what it did, what it did not do, and then describes the accident, gives a chronology of events after the earthquake and the tsunami occurred, and states and comments the following conclusions: a catastrophe with a human origin, earthquake-induced damages, an assessment of operational problems, problems met during emergency intervention, evacuation problems, unresolved public health and welfare problems, need to reform the regulators as well as the operator, laws and rules. Seven recommendations are proposed; they address the control of the nuclear regulation body, the reform of the crisis management system, the government responsibility for public health and welfare, the control of operators, criteria for a new regulator, a reform of laws related to nuclear energy, and the implementation of a system of independent inquiry commissions. Then the report comments and discusses in detail the results of the inquiry which first tried to assess whether the accident was avoidable, and studied various elements: the accident, the emergency response, the damage extent, the organisational problems in the prevention of the accident, the legal system. Results of inquiries on evacuated people and on personnel are given in appendix, as well as the content of all the Commission meetings

  15. Severe accident phenomena

    Severe accidents are nuclear reactor accidents in which the reactor core is substantially damaged. The report describes severe reactor accident phenomena and their significance for the safety of nuclear power plants. A comprehensive set of phenomena ranging from accident initiation to containment behaviour and containment integrity questions are covered. The report is based on expertise gained in the severe accident assessment projects conducted at the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). (49 refs., 32 figs., 12 tabs.)

  16. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis: Food chain uncertainty assessment. Volume 1: Main report

    This volume is the first of a two-volume document that summarizes a joint project conducted by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the European Commission to assess uncertainties in the MACCS and COSYMA probabilistic accident consequence codes. These codes were developed primarily for estimating the risks presented by nuclear reactors based on postulated frequencies and magnitudes of potential accidents. This document reports on an ongoing project to assess uncertainty in the MACCS and COSYMA calculations for the offsite consequences of radionuclide releases by hypothetical nuclear power plant accidents. A panel of sixteen experts was formed to compile credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for food chain variables that affect calculations of offsite consequences. The expert judgment elicitation procedure and its outcomes are described in these volumes. Other panels were formed to consider uncertainty in other aspects of the codes. Their results are described in companion reports. Volume 1 contains background information and a complete description of the joint consequence uncertainty study. Volume 2 contains appendices that include (1) a summary of the MACCS and COSYMA consequence codes, (2) the elicitation questionnaires and case structures for both panels, (3) the rationales and results for the panels on soil and plant transfer and animal transfer, (4) short biographies of the experts, and (5) the aggregated results of their responses

  17. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis: Food chain uncertainty assessment. Volume 1: Main report

    Brown, J. [National Radiological Protection Board (United Kingdom); Goossens, L.H.J.; Kraan, B.C.P. [Delft Univ. of Technology (Netherlands)] [and others

    1997-06-01

    This volume is the first of a two-volume document that summarizes a joint project conducted by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the European Commission to assess uncertainties in the MACCS and COSYMA probabilistic accident consequence codes. These codes were developed primarily for estimating the risks presented by nuclear reactors based on postulated frequencies and magnitudes of potential accidents. This document reports on an ongoing project to assess uncertainty in the MACCS and COSYMA calculations for the offsite consequences of radionuclide releases by hypothetical nuclear power plant accidents. A panel of sixteen experts was formed to compile credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for food chain variables that affect calculations of offsite consequences. The expert judgment elicitation procedure and its outcomes are described in these volumes. Other panels were formed to consider uncertainty in other aspects of the codes. Their results are described in companion reports. Volume 1 contains background information and a complete description of the joint consequence uncertainty study. Volume 2 contains appendices that include (1) a summary of the MACCS and COSYMA consequence codes, (2) the elicitation questionnaires and case structures for both panels, (3) the rationales and results for the panels on soil and plant transfer and animal transfer, (4) short biographies of the experts, and (5) the aggregated results of their responses.

  18. HTGR accident initiation and progression analysis status report. Phase II risk assessment

    The primary purpose of this report is to document AIPA studies performed on the HTGR since issuance of the eight volumes. Implementation of the R and D recommendations is discussed, which includes consideration of new initiating events and accident sequences, modeling of fission product release from fuel particles, factors affecting PCRV plateout during core heatup, and the effect of earthquakes on plant operation. The Phase II risk assessment of core heatup events is presented. The major elements of the study include event trees and probability assessments, physical process evaluations, and evaluation of fission product transport and the associated radiological consequences. A risk assessment of accidents initiated by failures of the steam generators, including economizer-evaporator-superheater sections and the reheaters, is presented and the impact of various plant design options is quantified

  19. Final report of the accident phenomenology and consequence (APAC) methodology evaluation. Spills Working Group

    Brereton, S.; Shinn, J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Hesse, D [Battelle Columbus Labs., OH (United States); Kaninich, D. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Lazaro, M. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Mubayi, V. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

    1997-08-01

    The Spills Working Group was one of six working groups established under the Accident Phenomenology and Consequence (APAC) methodology evaluation program. The objectives of APAC were to assess methodologies available in the accident phenomenology and consequence analysis area and to evaluate their adequacy for use in preparing DOE facility safety basis documentation, such as Basis for Interim Operation (BIO), Justification for Continued Operation (JCO), Hazard Analysis Documents, and Safety Analysis Reports (SARs). Additional objectives of APAC were to identify development needs and to define standard practices to be followed in the analyses supporting facility safety basis documentation. The Spills Working Group focused on methodologies for estimating four types of spill source terms: liquid chemical spills and evaporation, pressurized liquid/gas releases, solid spills and resuspension/sublimation, and resuspension of particulate matter from liquid spills.

  20. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis -- Early health effects uncertainty assessment. Volume 1: Main report

    Haskin, F.E. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States); Harper, F.T. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Goossens, L.H.J.; Kraan, B.C.P. [Delft Univ. of Technology (Netherlands); Grupa, J.B. [Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (Netherlands)

    1997-12-01

    The development of two new probabilistic accident consequence codes, MACCS and COSYMA, was completed in 1990. These codes estimate the consequence from the accidental releases of radiological material from hypothesized accidents at nuclear installations. In 1991, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Commission of the European Communities began cosponsoring a joint uncertainty analysis of the two codes. The ultimate objective of this joint effort was to systematically develop credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for the respective code input variables. A formal expert judgment elicitation and evaluation process was identified as the best technology available for developing a library of uncertainty distributions for these consequence parameters. This report focuses on the results of the study to develop distribution for variables related to the MACCS and COSYMA early health effects models.

  1. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis -- Late health effects uncertainty assessment. Volume 1: Main report

    Little, M.P.; Muirhead, C.R. [National Radiological Protection Board (United Kingdom); Goossens, L.H.J.; Kraan, B.C.P.; Cooke, R.M. [Delft Univ. of Technology (Netherlands); Harper, F.T. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hora, S.C. [Univ. of Hawaii, Hilo, HI (United States)

    1997-12-01

    The development of two new probabilistic accident consequence codes, MACCS and COSYMA, was completed in 1990. These codes estimate the consequence from the accidental releases of radiological material from hypothesized accidents at nuclear installations. In 1991, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Commission of the European Communities began cosponsoring a joint uncertainty analysis of the two codes. The ultimate objective of this joint effort was to systematically develop credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for the respective code input variables. A formal expert judgment elicitation and evaluation process was identified as the best technology available for developing a library of uncertainty distributions for these consequence parameters. This report focuses on the results of the study to develop distribution for variables related to the MACCS and COSYMA late health effects models.

  2. 20 years after Chernobyl Accident. Future outlook. National Report of Ukraine

    The scale of the Chernobyl catastrophe - the most severe man made nuclear accident in the history of mankind - is well known to both scientists and politicians worldwide. The basic causes of the catastrophe were as follows: Conduction an incompletely and incorrectly prepared electrical experiment; The low professional level of operators, and of the NPP management and the officials of the Ministry of Electrification as a whole in the area of NPP safety; Insufficient safety level of the graphite-uranium reactor RBMK-1000; Constructive faults RBMK-1000; Personnel mistakes. The report describes and reviews the actions of the governments of the USSR, Ukraine, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; the activities of scientists in elimination of the accident consequences; and elimination of the additional experience gained over the past years. Mistakes made during these activities are highlighted

  3. Final report on Risoe measuring program in connection with Chernobyl accident

    The present report deals with the measurements of Chernobyl debris carried out in Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland in the perioed May-Sept. 1986. The results are presented in details in appendix II, but summarized in tables and figures in the main report, which is in Danish. Appendix I is the samples programme, also in Danish. It is concluded that the dose equivalent commitment to an adult Dane from consumption of foodstuffs in the first year after the accident (May 1986-April 1987) is 17 μ Sv, corresponding to approximately 1% of a years background radiation. (author)

  4. Safety against releases in severe accidents. Annual report 1996. Project plan 1997

    The work scope of the RAK-2 project is divided into three sub-projects: RAK-2.1 Severe Accident Phenomenology; RAK-2.2 Computerised Accident Management; RAK-2.3 Reactors In Nordic Surroundings. The work in subproject 1 progresses roughly according to budget and time schedule. Some adjustments in the technical work scope were made during 1996. Main tasks of RAK-2.1 in 1996: Complete recriticality studies for Nordic BWRs; Investigate phenomena related to late phase melt progression; Issue and NKS Final Technical Report on KTH experiments. Main tasks of RAK-2.2 in 1996: CAMS would be further developed with signal validation, tracking simulation, state identification and PSA and risk monitoring applications; Carry out a feasibility study for development of a PWR version of CAMS in collaboration with EdF, France; Use CAMS in the Halden Man-Machine laboratory to perform human factor studies. Main tasks of RAK-2.3 in 1996: Collect and report data from the British reactor types AGR, MAGNOX and PWR; Make a report on accidents in nuclear ships; Put the collected data together in a common data base covering neighbour reactors treated in SIK-3 and RAK-2.3; Update the data in the former SIK-3 report if needed. The work in project 2 progresses according to plans. The data collection of British reactors with in sub-project 3 has been delayed significantly due to difficulty of obtaining information from some of the British utilities, but the problems are expected to be solved by the end of 1997. (EG)

  5. Special committee review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's severe accident risks report (NUREG--1150)

    In April 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) published a draft report ''Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five US Nuclear Power Plants,'' NUREG-1150. This report updated, extended and improved upon the information presented in the 1974 ''Reactor Safety Study,'' WASH-1400. Because the information in NUREG-1150 will play a significant role in implementing the NRC's Severe Accident Policy, its quality and credibility are of critical importance. Accordingly, the Commission requested that the RES conduct a peer review of NUREG-1150 to ensure that the methods, safety insights and conclusions presented are appropriate and adequately reflect the current state of knowledge with respect to reactor safety. To this end, RES formed a special committee in June of 1989 under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Committee, composed of a group of recognized national and international experts in nuclear reactor safety, was charged with preparing a report reflecting their review of NUREG-1150 with respect to the adequacy of the methods, data, analysis and conclusions it set forth. The report which precedes reflects the results of this peer review

  6. Report of the US Department of Energy's team analyses of the Chernobyl-4 Atomic Energy Station accident sequence

    In an effort to better understand the Chernobyl-4 accident of April 26, 1986, the US Department of Energy (DOE) formed a team of experts from the National Laboratories including Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest Laboratory. The DOE Team provided the analytical support to the US delegation for the August meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to subsequent international meetings. The DOE Team has analyzed the accident in detail, assessed the plausibility and completeness of the information provided by the Soviets, and performed studies relevant to understanding the accident. The results of these studies are presented in this report

  7. The Chernobyl reactor accident and its consequences. Informative report prepared on behalf of the IAEA meeting, Vienna, August 25-29, 1986. Pt. 1

    GRS has revised the German translation of part 1 of the report on the Chernobyl reactor accident. The translation is technically clear and intelligible and contains the current technical terms. The report comprises a description of RBMK-1000, a chronological description of the accident, the analysis of the accident, the causes of the accident, measures preventing the further development of the accident as well as measures controlling the radioactive contamination of the environment and the population. The report discusses immediate emergency measures improving the safety of RBMK-type nuclear power plants and deals with recommendations for nuclear safety engineering. (DG)

  8. Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents

    Preliminary designs are described for models of hydrogen and oxygen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents. Calculation of the uptake involves the modeling of seven processes: (1) diffusion of oxygen from the bulk gas into the boundary layer at the external cladding surface, (2) diffusion from the boundary layer into the oxide layer, (3) diffusion from the inner surface of the oxide layer into the metallic part of the cladding, (4) uptake of hydrogen in the event that the cladding oxide layer is dissolved in a steam-starved region, (5) embrittlement of cladding due to hydrogen uptake, (6) cracking of cladding during quenching due to its embrittlement and (7) release of hydrogen from the cladding after cracking of the cladding. An integral diffusion method is described for calculating the diffusion processes in the cladding. Experimental results are presented that show a rapid uptake of hydrogen in the event of dissolution of the oxide layer and a rapid release of hydrogen in the event of cracking of the oxide layer. These experimental results are used as a basis for calculating the rate of hydrogen uptake and the rate of hydrogen release. The uptake of hydrogen is limited to the equilibrium solubility calculated by applying Sievert's law. The uptake of hydrogen is an exothermic reaction that accelerates the heatup of a fuel rod. An embrittlement criteria is described that accounts for hydrogen and oxygen concentration and the extent of oxidation. A design is described for implementing the models for hydrogen and oxygen uptake and cladding embrittlement into the programming framework of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code. A test matrix is described for assessing the impact of the proposed models on the calculated behavior of fuel rods in severe accident conditions. This report is a revision and reissue of the report entitled; ''Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents''

  9. Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents

    Siefken, Larry James

    1999-02-01

    Preliminary designs are described for models of hydrogen and oxygen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents. Calculation of the uptake involves the modeling of seven processes: (1) diffusion of oxygen from the bulk gas into the boundary layer at the external cladding surface, (2) diffusion from the boundary layer into the oxide layer, (3) diffusion from the inner surface of the oxide layer into the metallic part of the cladding, (4) uptake of hydrogen in the event that the clad-ding oxide layer is dissolved in a steam-starved region, (5) embrittlement of cladding due to hydrogen uptake, (6) cracking of cladding during quenching due to its embrittlement and (7) release of hydrogen from the cladding after cracking of the cladding. An integral diffusion method is described for calculating the diffusion processes in the cladding. Experimental results are presented that show a rapid uptake of hydrogen in the event of dissolution of the oxide layer and a rapid release of hydrogen in the event of cracking of the oxide layer. These experimental results are used as a basis for calculating the rate of hydrogen uptake and the rate of hydrogen release. The uptake of hydrogen is limited to the equilibrium solubility calculated by applying Sievert's law. The uptake of hydrogen is an exothermic reaction that accelerates the heatup of a fuel rod. An embrittlement criteria is described that accounts for hydrogen and oxygen concentration and the extent of oxidation. A design is described for implementing the models for hydrogen and oxygen uptake and cladding embrittlement into the programming framework of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code. A test matrix is described for assessing the impact of the proposed models on the calculated behavior of fuel rods in severe accident conditions. This report is a revision and reissue of the report entitled; "Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents."

  10. Report on a radiological accident in the southern Urals on 29 September 1957

    In response to concern expressed by the international community about the possible consequences of a radiological accident which occurred at a military installation in the southern Urals in 1957, Soviet specialists have prepared this report containing information on this event. Owing to a fault in the cooling system used for the concrete tanks containing highly active nitrate acetate wastes, a chemical explosion occurred in these materials on 29 September 1957 and radioactive fission products were released into the atmosphere and subsequently scattered and deposited in parts of the Chelyabinsk, Svendlovsk and Tyumensk provinces. 9 tabs

  11. Report on a workshop on transportation-accident scenarios involving spent fuel

    Much confusion and skepticism resulted from the scenarios for transportation accidents involving spent fuel that have been presented in environmental impact statements because the supporting assumptions and conclusions from the scenarios did not always appear to be consistent. As a result, the Transportation Technology Center gathered a group whose participants were experts in disciplines related to the transport of spent fuel to consider the scenarios. The group made a number of recommendations about scenario development and about areas in need of further study. This report documents the discussions held and the recommendations and conclusions of the group

  12. Report on a workshop on transportation-accident scenarios involving spent fuel

    Wilmot, E L; McClure, J D; Luna, R E

    1981-02-01

    Much confusion and skepticism resulted from the scenarios for transportation accidents involving spent fuel that have been presented in environmental impact statements because the supporting assumptions and conclusions from the scenarios did not always appear to be consistent. As a result, the Transportation Technology Center gathered a group whose participants were experts in disciplines related to the transport of spent fuel to consider the scenarios. The group made a number of recommendations about scenario development and about areas in need of further study. This report documents the discussions held and the recommendations and conclusions of the group.

  13. Inroads into Equestrian Safety: Rider-Reported Factors Contributing to Horse-Related Accidents and Near Misses on Australian Roads

    Kirrilly Thompson; Chelsea Matthews

    2015-01-01

    Simple Summary Riding horses on roads can be dangerous, but little is known about accidents and near misses. To explore road safety issues amongst Australian equestrians, we conducted an online survey. More than half of all riders (52%) reported having experienced at least one accident or near miss in the 12 months prior to the survey, mostly attributed to speed. Whilst our findings confirmed factors identified overseas, we also identified issues around road rules, hand signals and road rage....

  14. An outline of the interim report of the investigation committee on the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

    Interim report of the Investigation Committee of the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (NPSs) was published in December 26, 2011. The Japanese cabinet approved ten committee members including the author in May 2011. The committee interviewed more than 400 people over a total of 900 hours of hearings with about 40 staffs consisting of administrative team and three investigation teams of social system, root causes of the accident and countermeasures to prevent damage expansion of the accident. Interim report concluded 'the accident at Fukushima NPSs was caused by failures of every provision against reactor severe accident'. The failures appeared on (1) function of supervisory system for emergency response, (2) Fukushima Daiichi NPSs on-site disaster response especially related with operation of isolation condenser of unit 1 and high-pressure coolant injection system of unit 3, (3) Fukushima Daiichi NPSs off-site disaster response such the government failed to make use of data on the radioactive plumes released from the plant for evacuations, and (4) preparedness against tsunami and severe accident management. Possible worst or best simulation cases were also discussed. With no human support available on-site, workers might not have been able to prevent the meltdowns. Final report was due at the end of July 2012. (T. Tanaka)

  15. Report on the preliminary fact finding mission following the accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokaimura, Japan

    Following the accident on 30 September 1999 at the nuclear fuel processing facility at Tokaimura, Japan, the IAEA Emergency Response Centre received numerous requests for information about the event's causes and consequences from Contact Points under the Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Although the lack of transboundary consequences of the accident meant that action under the Early Notification Convention was not triggered, the Emergency Response Centre issued several advisories to Member States which drew on official reports received from Japan. After discussions with the Government of Japan, the IAEA dispatched a team of three experts from the Secretariat on a fact finding mission to Tokaimura from 13 to 17 October 1999. The present preliminary report by that team documents key technical information obtained during the mission. At this stage, the report can in no way provide conclusive judgements on the causes and consequences of the accident. Investigations are proceeding in Japan and more information is expected to be made available after access has been gained to the building where the accident occurred. Moreover, much of the information already made available will be revised as more accurate assessments are made, for example of the radiation doses to the three individuals who received the highest exposures. Notwithstanding the preliminary nature of this report, it is clear that the accident was not one involving widespread contamination of the environment as in the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Although there was little risk off the site once the accident had been brought under control, the authorities evacuated the population living within a few hundred metres and advised people within about 10 km of the facility to take shelter for a period of about one day. The event at Tokaimura was nevertheless a serious industrial accident. The results of the detailed

  16. Analysis of credible accidents for Argonaut reactors. Report for October 1980-April 1981

    Five areas of potential accidents have been evaluated for the Argonaut-UTR reactors. They are: insertion of excess reactivity, catastrophic rearrangement of the core, explosive chemical reaction, graphite fire, and a fuel-handling accident

  17. Safety-critical human factors issues derived from analysis of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident investigation reports

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident on March 11, 2011 had a large impact both in and outside Japan, and is not yet concluded. After Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s (TEPCO's) Fukushima accident, electric power suppliers have taken measures to respond in the event that the same state of emergency occurs - deploying mobile generators, temporary pumps and hoses, and training employees in the use of this equipment. However, it is not only the 'hard' problems including the design of equipment, but the 'soft' problems such as organization and safety culture that have been highlighted as key contributors in this accident. Although a number of organizations have undertaken factor analysis of the accident and proposed issues to be reviewed and measures to be taken, a systematic overview about electric power suppliers' organization and safety culture has not yet been undertaken. This study is based on three major reports: the report by the national Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (the Diet report), the report by the Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company (Government report), and the report by the non-government committee supported by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (Non-government report). From these reports, the sections relevant to electric power suppliers' organization and safety culture were extracted. These sections were arranged to correspond with the prerequisites for the ideal organization, and 30 issues to be reviewed by electric power suppliers were extracted using brainstorming methods. It is expected that the identified issues will become a reference for every organization concerned to work on preventive measures hereafter. (author)

  18. Safety-critical human factors issues derived from analysis of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident investigation reports

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident on March 11, 2011 had a large impact both in and outside Japan, and is not yet concluded. After Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s (TEPCO's) Fukushima accident, electric power suppliers have taken measures to respond in the event that the same state of emergency occurs - deploying mobile generators, temporary pumps and hoses, and training employees in the use of this equipment. However, it is not only the “hard” problems including the design of equipment, but the “soft” problems such as organization and safety culture that have been highlighted as key contributors in this accident. Although a number of organizations have undertaken factor analysis of the accident and proposed issues to be reviewed and measures to be taken, a systematic overview about electric power suppliers' organization and safety culture has not yet been undertaken. This study is based on three major reports: the report by the national Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (the Diet report), the report by the Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company (Government report), and the report by the non-government committee supported by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (Non-government report). From these reports, the sections relevant to electric power suppliers' organization and safety culture were extracted. These sections were arranged to correspond with the prerequisites for the ideal organization, and 30 issues to be reviewed by electric power suppliers were extracted using brainstorming methods. It is expected that the identified issues will become a reference for every organization concerned to work on preventive measures hereafter. (author)

  19. HTGR accident initiation and progression analysis status report. Volume VIII. Responses to comments on AIPA status report

    The first seven volumes of the report series provide formal documentation of the status of the ERDA-sponsored Accident Initiation and Progression Analysis (AIPA) study as of the end of FY75. That portion of the report was given broad distribution to government agencies, industrial organizations, and academic institutions. Comments on the Status Report have been actively solicited from these and other organizations. The volume presented (the eighth in the AIPA Status Report) documents all of the formal written comments that have been received as of September 30, 1976, together with the responses to those comments. The comments as presented are direct quotations from the manuscripts as submitted by the reviewers; none have been paraphrased. The comments are presented in the same order as submitted by the reviewers and are generally addressed individually

  20. Implications of the accident at Chernobyl for safety regulation of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States: Volume 1, Main report: Final report

    This report was prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to assess the implications of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as they relate to reactor safety regulation for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. The facts used in this assessment have been drawn from the US fact-finding report (NUREG-1250) and its sources. The general conclusions of the document are that there are generic lessons to be learned but that no changes in regulations are needed due to the substantial differences in the design, safety features and operation of US plants as compared to those in the USSR. Given these general conclusions, further consideration of certain specific areas is recommended by the report. These include: administrative controls over reactor regulation, reactivity accidents, accidents at low or zero power, multi-unit protection, fires, containment, emergency planning, severe accident phenomena, and graphite-moderated reactors

  1. Surgical correction of buried penis after traffic accident – a case report

    Masuda Hiroshi

    2004-06-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Buried penis, most commonly seen in children, is particularly debilitating in adults, resulting in inability to void while standing and it also affects vaginal penetration. We report a case of buried penis due to a traffic accident, which caused dislocation of the fractured pubic bone that shifted inside and pulled the penis by its suspensory ligament. Case presentation A 55-year-old man was admitted to our hospital with a chief complaint of hidden penis while in the sitting position. He had suffered a pelvic fracture in a traffic accident four years previously, and his penis was covered with suprapubic fat when he was in a sitting position. He was unable to have sexual intercourse. We performed a penile lengthening procedure, including inverse V-Y-plasty of the dorsal skin of the penile root, suspensory desmotomy and fat removal, under general anesthesia. There was a good cosmetic result with satisfactory penile erection, which allowed successful sexual intercourse after surgery. Conculsion We performed penile elongation surgery with inverse V-Y-plasty of the dorsal skin of the penile root, suspensory desmotomy, and fat removal. Surgical treatment of buried penis achieves marked aesthetic and functional improvement, and benefits the majority of patients, resulting in satisfactory erection and successful sexual intercourse.

  2. Advanced computational methods for the assessment of reactor core behaviour during reactivity initiated accidents. Final report

    The document at hand serves as the final report for the reactor safety research project RS1183 ''Advanced Computational Methods for the Assessment of Reactor Core Behavior During Reactivity-Initiated Accidents''. The work performed in the framework of this project was dedicated to the development, validation and application of advanced computational methods for the simulation of transients and accidents of nuclear installations. These simulation tools describe in particular the behavior of the reactor core (with respect to neutronics, thermal-hydraulics and thermal mechanics) at a very high level of detail. The overall goal of this project was the deployment of a modern nuclear computational chain which provides, besides advanced 3D tools for coupled neutronics/ thermal-hydraulics full core calculations, also appropriate tools for the generation of multi-group cross sections and Monte Carlo models for the verification of the individual calculational steps. This computational chain shall primarily be deployed for light water reactors (LWR), but should beyond that also be applicable for innovative reactor concepts. Thus, validation on computational benchmarks and critical experiments was of paramount importance. Finally, appropriate methods for uncertainty and sensitivity analysis were to be integrated into the computational framework, in order to assess and quantify the uncertainties due to insufficient knowledge of data, as well as due to methodological aspects.

  3. Radiation and health effects. A report on the TMI-2 accident and related health studies

    On March 28, 1979, the Unit 2 reactor at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station was severely damaged by an accident. Radioactivity was discharged to the environment resulting in a small amount of radiation exposure to the public. Continuing concerns by some members of the communities around TMI about the potential radiation-induced health effects prompted GPU Nuclear Corporation to examine the information gathered from the accident investigation in the context of our current knowledge of radiation and its effects on human health. Although this report deals with technical matters, the information is presented in a manner that can be understood by those who do not have scientific backgrounds. This report is divided into three major sections. The first section provides an overview of the past 80 years of relevant research on the subject of radiation and its effects on human health. During that time, scientists and physicians throughout the world have studied hundreds of thousands of individuals exposed to radiation from medical and occupational sources and from nuclear weapons explosions. Epidemiologic studies of humans, such as the Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb, have established that following exposure to large doses of radiation, certain health effects, including cancer, can be observed. Radiation-induced health effects from low doses of radiation, such as those associated with the TMI-2 accident, appear infrequently, if at all, and are identical and, therefore, indistinguishable from similar health effects which occur normally. For example, cancers induced by radiation are indistinguishable from those occurring spontaneously or normally. It is not possible, therefore, for scientists to determine directly whether radiation-induced health effects at low doses occur at all; such observations can only be inferred by statistical methods. The second section of this report provides a brief description of the TMI-2 accident. Most of the radioactivity from the

  4. Electrical equipment performance under severe accident conditions (BWR/Mark 1 plant analysis): Summary report

    The purpose of the Performance Evaluation of Electrical Equipment during Severe Accident States Program is to determine the performance of electrical equipment, important to safety, under severe accident conditions. In FY85, a method was devised to identify important electrical equipment and the severe accident environments in which the equipment was likely to fail. This method was used to evaluate the equipment and severe accident environments for Browns Ferry Unit 1, a BWR/Mark I. Following this work, a test plan was written in FY86 to experimentally determine the performance of one selected component to two severe accident environments

  5. An overview of severe accident modeling and analysis work for the ANS reactor conceptual safety analysis report

    ORNL's Advanced Neutron Source (ANS) will be a new user facility for all kinds of neutron research, centered around a research reactor of unprecedented neutron beam flux. A defense-in-depth philosophy has been adopted. In response to this commitment, ANS Project management has initiated severe accident analysis and related technology development efforts early-on in the design phase itself. Early consideration of severe accident issues will aid in designing a sufficiently robust containment for retention and controlled release of radionuclides in the event of such an accident. It will also provide a means for satisfying on- and off-site regulatory requirements and provide containment response and source term analyses for level-2 and -3 Probabilistic Risk Analyses (PRAs) that will be produced. Moreover, it will provide the best possible understanding of the ANS under severe accident conditions, and consequently provide insights for the development of strategies and design philosophies for accident management, mitigation, and emergency preparedness. This paper presents a perspective overview of the severe accident modeling and analysis work for the ANS Conceptual Safety Analysis Report (CSAR)

  6. Radiographers and radiologists reporting plain radiograph requests from accident and emergency and general practice

    AIM: To assess selectively trained radiographers and consultant radiologists reporting plain radiographs for the Accident and Emergency Department (A and E) and general practitioners (GPs) within a typical hospital setting. METHODS: Two radiographers, a group of eight consultant radiologists, and a reference standard radiologist independently reported under controlled conditions a retrospectively selected, random, stratified sample of 400 A and E and 400 GP plain radiographs. An independent consultant radiologist judged whether the radiographer and radiologist reports agreed with the reference standard report. Clinicians then assessed whether radiographer and radiologist incorrect reports affected confidence in their diagnosis and treatment plans, and patient outcome. RESULTS: For A and E and GP plain radiographs, respectively, there was a 1% (95% confidence interval (CI) -2 to 5) and 4% (95% CI -1 to 8) difference in reporting accuracy between the two professional groups. For both A and E and GP cases there was an 8% difference in the clinicians' confidence in their diagnosis based on radiographer or radiologist incorrect reports. For A and E and GP cases, respectively, there was a 2% and 8% difference in the clinicians' confidence in their management plans based on radiographer or radiologist incorrect reports. For A and E and GP cases, respectively, there was a 1% and 11% difference in effect on patient outcome of radiographer or radiologist incorrect reports. CONCLUSION: There is the potential to extend the reporting role of selectively trained radiographers to include plain radiographs for all A and E and GP patients. Further research conducted during clinical practice at a number of sites is recommended

  7. Facial baroparesis: a critical differential diagnosis for scuba diving accidents--case report.

    Iakovlev, E V; Iakovlev, V V

    2014-01-01

    Facial nerve baroparesis is a rare and potentially under-reported complication of scuba diving. A diver, after surfacing from a shallow dive, developed isolated left-sided facial palsy accompanied by pain and decreased hearing in the left ear. No other signs or symptoms attributable to a scuba diving accident were detected. Forty minutes later, he heard a "pop" in the affected ear, after which all symptoms quickly resolved. Repeat neurological and ear examinations were normal. He showed no residual or new symptoms 24 hours later. The differential diagnosis of facial neurological deficit after diving includes decompression sickness, cerebral air embolism due to pulmonary barotrauma, facial nerve barotrauma and common conditions such as stroke and Bell's palsy. It is important to recognize the condition since recompression treatment can further damage the facial nerve. PMID:25558550

  8. The way of the report in the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear plant accident

    Nearly four years pass from the Great East Japan Earthquake. Fukushima has a big influence of the nuclear plant accident, and more than 120,000 citizens of the prefecture are still forced to refuge. The citizens of Fukushima feel that the present conditions do not come outside a prefecture and have dissatisfaction for media. A gap occurs in what media convey and thinking that inhabitants want you to tell. One of the causes is a news value point of reference. The other is that the news is carried out in a viewpoint of Tokyo. Is there not the cancellation method? I consider it from the viewpoint of a reporter living in Fukushima city. (author)

  9. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - summary report

    This report is a summary of the Accident Investigation Board Report on the May 14, 1997, Chemical Explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/RL-97-59). The referenced report provides a greater level of detail and includes a complete discussion of the facts identified, analysis of those facts, conclusions derived from the analysis, identification of the accident's causal factors, and recommendations that should be addressed through follow-up action by the U.S. Department of Energy and its contractors. This companion document provides a concise summary of that report, with emphasis on management issues. Evaluation of emergency and occupational health response to, and radiological and chemical releases from, this accident was not within the scope of this investigation, but is the subject of a separate investigation and report (see DOE/RL-97-62)

  10. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1997 - A status report. Volume 26

    This report describes the five operational events in 1997 that affected five commercial light-water reactors (LWRs) and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage accidents. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 x 10-6. These events were identified by first computer-screening the 1997 licensee event reports from commercial LWRs to identify those events that could be precursors. Candidate precursors were selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters to ensure that the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969--1996 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for the events

  11. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1996. A status report. Volume 25

    This report describes the 14 operational events in 1996 that affected 13 commercial light-water reactors and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage accidents. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 x 10-6. These events were identified by first computer-screening the 1996 licensee event reports from commercial light-water reactors to identify those events that could potentially be precursors. Candidate precursors were selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters and regional offices to ensure the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969--1995 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for the events

  12. First Annual Report: NASA-ONERA Collaboration on Human Factors in Aviation Accidents and Incidents

    Srivastava, Ashok; Fabiani, Patrick

    2012-01-01

    This is the first annual report jointly prepared by NASA and ONERA on the work performed under the agreement to collaborate on a study of the human factors entailed in aviation accidents and incidents particularly focused on consequences of decreases in human performance associated with fatigue. The objective of this Agreement is to generate reliable, automated procedures that improve understanding of the levels and characteristics of flight-crew fatigue factors whose confluence will likely result in unacceptable crew performance. This study entails the analyses of numerical and textual data collected during operational flights. NASA and ONERA are collaborating on the development and assessment of automated capabilities for extracting operationally significant information from very large, diverse (textual and numerical) databases much larger than can be handled practically by human experts. This report presents the approach that is currently expected to be used in processing and analyzing the data for identifying decrements in aircraft performance and examining their relationships to decrements in crewmember performance due to fatigue. The decisions on the approach were based on samples of both the numerical and textual data that will be collected during the four studies planned under the Human Factors Monitoring Program (HFMP). Results of preliminary analyses of these sample data are presented in this report.

  13. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1997 -- A status report. Volume 26

    Belles, R.J.; Cletcher, J.W.; Copinger, D.A.; Muhlheim, M.D. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Dolan, B.W.; Minarick, J.W. [Science Applications International Corp., Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    1998-11-01

    This report describes the five operational events in 1997 that affected five commercial light-water reactors (LWRs) and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage accidents. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 {times} 10{sup {minus}6}. These events were identified by first computer-screening the 1997 licensee event reports from commercial LWRs to identify those events that could be precursors. Candidate precursors were selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters to ensure that the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969--1996 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for the events.

  14. Carbon monoxide - hydrogen combustion characteristics in severe accident containment conditions. Final report

    Carbon monoxide can be produced in severe accidents from interaction of ex-vessel molten core with concrete. Depending on the particular core-melt scenario, the type of concrete and geometric factors affecting the interaction, the quantities of carbon monoxide produced can vary widely, up to several volume percent in the containment. Carbon monoxide is a combustible gas. The carbon monoxide thus produced is in addition to the hydrogen produced by metal-water reactions and by radiolysis, and represents a possibly significant contribution to the combustible gas inventory in the containment. Assessment of possible accident loads to containment thus requires knowledge of the combustion properties of both CO and H2 in the containment atmosphere. Extensive studies have been carried out and are still continuing in the nuclear industry to assess the threat of hydrogen in a severe reactor accident. However the contribution of carbon monoxide to the combustion threat has received less attention. Assessment of scenarios involving ex-vessel interactions require additional attention to the potential contribution of carbon monoxide to combustion loads in containment, as well as the effectiveness of mitigation measures designed for hydrogen to effectively deal with particular aspects of carbon monoxide. The topic of core-concrete interactions has been extensively studied; for more complete background on the issue and on the physical/thermal-hydraulics phenomena involved, the reader is referred to Proceedings of CSNI Specialists Meetings (Ritzman, 1987; Alsmeyer, 1992) and a State-of-Art Report (European Commission, 1995). The exact amount of carbon monoxide present in a reactor pit or in various compartments (or rooms) in a containment building is specific to the type of concrete and the accident scenario considered. Generally, concrete containing limestone and sand have a high percentage of CaCO3. Appendix A provides an example of results of estimates of CO and CO2 production

  15. Accident of Chernobyl nuclear power plant. From rumors to the reports of international organizations. WHO, IAEA and others summary reports of one and two decades after and UNSCEAR 2008 of 25 years after Chernobyl accident

    False rumor was circulating at a disaster, Nuclear disaster was not an exception. The author could visit the spot in 1990 after Chernobyl accident when the old USSR started international exchange, take part in various research projects with countless visits till ten years after and attend international organization's summary report conference of one and two decades after. Scientific investigation on radiation hazards became possible and results of various investigations had been reported. Evaluation of scientific credibility of reports came to a big job, which required the author's great effort to give an international scientific consent such that thyroid cancer in childhood was caused by the consequences of the accident with chronological and geographical strong circumstantial evidence. This article reviewed chronological definite information and experiences of radiation hazards that the author got from initial false rumor age to the publication of summary reports of international organizations, and presented problems for emergency response at nuclear disaster. (T. Tanaka)

  16. Tricastin plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Tricastin plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  17. Saint-Alban plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Saint-Alban plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  18. Cruas-Meysse plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Cruas-Meysse plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  19. Chinon plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Chinon B plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  20. Blayais plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Blayais plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  1. Fessenheim plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Fessenheim plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  2. Bugey plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Bugey plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  3. Chooz plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Chooz plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  4. Civaux plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Civaux plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  5. Paluel plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Paluel plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  6. Golfech plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Golfech plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  7. Cattenom plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Cattenom plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  8. Summary report on the environmental monitoring around Tokai area following the accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant

    An accident took place at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in USSR in the early hours of 26 April 1986. The plant caught fire and some degree of reactor inventry was released to the environment. Following the accident, debris of the radioactivity from Chernobyl was detected in all the European countries and countermeasures were taken in some countries. In Japan, many kinds of radionuclides were detected in rain, airbone dust and other environmental samples from 3 May and ''Headquaters for Radioactivity Countermeasure'' was organized in the Japanese Government. Health and Safety Division at the Tokai Works, PNC, performed the environmental monitoring for the Chernobyl accident in addition to the statutory monitoring program. This report presents results of the environmental monitoring performed at Tokai Works. Furthermore, study on the environmental transfer parameters and preliminary estimation of the committed dose equivalent to the public around Tokai area are discussed. (author)

  9. Lack of safety culture as a contributing factor in major radiation accidents reported in Latin and South America

    In the last decades, the issue of improving safety culture to reduce the upward trend of radiation accidents have received considerable attention from scientific organizations. After the Chernobyl accident, IAEA invited worldwide experts in nuclear safety and formed a working group called 'International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group'. The Safety Culture concept has been developed by the Working Group and published in the Safety Series collection of IAEA in 1986 as No 75-INSAG-4 which provided a logical framework for establishing safety culture policy at individual and organisational level. The aim of this paper is to review the role of insufficient safety culture in the occurrence of 5 major radiation accidents reported in Latin and South America and the remedial action taken by competent authority and oriented towards improvement of basic principle of safety culture. (author)

  10. The investigation on the mass media reports on the JCO accident in the major atomic energy countries and Asian countries

    The JCO (Japan Conversion Organization) accident is the worst one in the history of the atomic energy developments in Japan. The many reports about the accident appeared in the 44 mass media in the world from Sep. 30 to Oct. 14, 1999. Chronological statistics of issued 522 articles are listed under particular criteria. Some of them were based on wrong knowledge and/or overestimations about the accident based on delivered articles by the news agency. Some of others gave critics over the total atomic energy industries of Japan, especially on safety managements and so-called similar Japan syndromes. This investigation gives emphasis on the articles based on wrong knowledge. We identified the countries and the newspaper publishers and the news agencies those gave wrong descriptions. Total 25 articles used the words [explosion] and [fire], which were delivered from the Kyodo News Service. Some of the Asian newspaper wrote that a large quantity of radioactivity, radioactive material and/or nuclear fuels was released. Some other news publishers said the accident was happened at fuel reprocessing facilities, when the waste fuel rods were under cutting. Critics delivered in the individual countries were summarized, i.e. USA, Canada, France, UK, German, Russia, Australia, China, Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan and the news agencies. One of the key issues is the exact information release for the press corps on the early stage of the accidents. The second point is to recognize the different status on atomic energy in the individual countries, when Japan want to explain their domestic situations. Accidents of atomic energy gave many impacts on various aspects to other countries. Japan should understand the neighborhood by collecting world information on atomic energy and analyzing them. Summaries of 522 articles appeared in the mass media were attached in this investigation among the report of 180 pages. (Tanaka, Y.)

  11. Health effects of the Chernobyl accident and special health care programmes. Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group 'Health'

    Twenty years have passed since the worst nuclear reactor accident in the world occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine. The radioactive contamination which resulted from the explosion and fire in the first few days spread over large areas of neighbouring Belarus and the Russian Federation, with most of the fallout in Belarus. While national and local authorities did not immediately disclose the scale of the accident, the mitigation measures, such as distribution of potassium iodine pills, food restriction, and mass evacuation from areas where the radioactive contamination was greatest, undoubtedly reduced the health impact of the radiation exposure and saved many lives. The accident caused severe social and economic disruption and had significant environmental and health impact. This was aggravated by the political and economical changes in the three affected states related to the break-down of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the accident the international scientific and medical community collaborated closely with national experts dealing with health effects of the accident in the affected countries. There is a substantial body of international collaborative projects on the situation, which should lead to advancement in radiation sciences. However, considerable speculation and disinformation remains about the possible health impact of the accident for the millions of affected people. To address the health, environmental and socioeconomic consequences of the Chernobyl accident, the United Nations in 2003 launched an Inter-Agency initiative, the Chernobyl Forum. The Forum's Secretariat, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and several other international organizations collaborated with the governments of the affected countries. The purpose of the Chernobyl Forum was to review the consequences of the accident, issue technical reports and, based

  12. Cyclical Fluctuations in Workplace Accidents

    Boone, J.; van Ours, J.C.

    2002-01-01

    This Paper presents a theory and an empirical investigation on cyclical fluctuations in workplace accidents. The theory is based on the idea that reporting an accident dents the reputation of a worker and raises the probability that he is fired. Therefore a country with a high or an increasing unemployment rate has a low (reported) workplace accident rate. The empirical investigation concerns workplace accidents in OECD countries. The analysis confirms that workplace accident rates are invers...

  13. Experiments on the behaviour of ruthenium in air ingress accidents - Progress report

    During routine nuclear reactor operation, ruthenium will accumulate in the fuel in relatively high concentrations. In an accident in a nuclear power plant it is possible that air gets into contact with the reactor core. In this case ruthenium can oxidise and form volatile ruthenium species, RuO3 and RuO4, which can be transported into the containment. In order to estimate the amount of gaseous ruthenium species it is of interest to know, how it is formed and how it behaves. In our experiments RuO2 is exposed to diverse oxidising atmospheres at a relatively high temperature. In this report, the experimental system for the ruthenium behaviour study is presented. Also preliminary results from experiments carried out during year 2005 are reported. In the experiments gaseous ruthenium oxides were produced in a furnace. Upon cooling RuO2 aerosol particles were formed in the system. They were removed with plane filters from the gas stream. Gaseous ruthenium species were trapped in 1M NaOH-water solution, which is capable of trapping RuO4 totally. Ruthenium in the solution was filtered for analysis. The determination of ruthenium both in aerosol and in liquid filters was made using instrumental neutron activation analysis (INAA). In order to close mass balance and achieve better time resolution three experiment using radioactive tracer were carried out. (au)

  14. Questionnaire survey report about the criticality accident at a nuclear fuel processing facility

    The Radiation Protection Section of the Japanese Society of Radiological Technology conducted a questionnaire survey on the criticality accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokai village on September 30, 1999 in order to identify factors related to the accident and consider countermeasures to deal with such accidents. The questionnaire was distributed to 347 members (122 facilities) of the Japanese Society of Radiological Technology who were working or living in Ibaraki Prefecture, and replies were obtained from 104 members (75 facilities). Questions to elicit the opinions of individuals were as following: method of obtaining information about the accident, knowledge about radiation, opinions about the accident, and requests directed to the Society. Questions regarding facilities concerned the following: communication after the accident, requests for dispatch to the accident site, and possession of radiometry devices. In regard to acquisition of information, 91 of the 104 members (87.5%) answered 'television or radios' followed by newspapers. Forty-five of 101 members were questioned about radiation exposure and radiation effects by the public. There were many opinions that accurate news should be provided rapidly, by the mass media. Many members (75%) felt that they lacked knowledge about radiation, reconfirming the importance of education and instruction concerning radiation. Dispatch was requested of 36 of the 75 facilities (48%), and 44 of 83 facilities (53%) owned radiometry instruments. (K.H.)

  15. On report of natrium flowing out accident in the high speed breeding reactor 'Monju', the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation

    On December 8th, 1995, a natrium flowing out accident of the 2nd cooling system was occurred in the high speed breeding reactor 'Monju' of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. The Science and Technology Agency determined to set 'A task force to survey and investigate the natrium flowing out accident of Monju' in the Atomic Energy Safety Bureau to promote at first thorough following its cause at joining some specialists on December 10th, to set it on December 11th. The Atomic Energy Safety Bureau conducted an in-situ inspection and survey after December 20th according to Act 68, Item 1, of Law on Regulation of the Nuclear Raw Materials, the Nuclear Fuels and the Reactor. This report shows results of surveys and investigations till then, points to be reconsidered in the Science and Technology Agency, and some response and improvemental methods on a base of teachings of this accident as well as contents of 'A surveying report of the natrium flowing out accident' dated on February 9th, since considerable understanding of cause elucidation of thermometer breakdown formed this accident and other items. This book contains the following contents as outline of this accident, reason of the accident, protection of enlargement after flowing out, effect of natrium flowing out, response to the outsiders at accident occurring by the Corporation, response to outsiders at accident occurring by the Bureau, and so forth. (G.K.)

  16. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - final report

    On May 14, 1997, at 7:53 p.m. (PDT), a chemical explosion occur-red in Tank A- 109 in Room 40 of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (Facility) located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site, approximately 30 miles north of Richland, Washington. The inactive processing Facility is part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). On May 16, 1997, Lloyd L. Piper, Deputy Manager, acting for John D. Wagoner, Manager, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), formally established an Accident Investigation Board (Board) to investigate the explosion in accordance with DOE Order 225. 1, Accident Investigations. The Board commenced its investigation on May 15, 1997, completed the investigation on July 2, 1997, and submitted its findings to the RL Manager on July 26, 1997. The scope of the Board's investigation was to review and analyze the circumstances of the events that led to the explosion; to analyze facts and to determine the causes of the accident; and to develop conclusions and judgments of need that may help prevent a recurrence of the accident. The scope also included the application of lessons learned from similar accidents within DOE. In addition to this detailed report, a companion document has also been prepared that provides a concise summary of the facts and conclusions of this report, with an emphasis on management issues (DOE/RL-97-63)

  17. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - final report

    Gerton, R.E.

    1997-07-25

    On May 14, 1997, at 7:53 p.m. (PDT), a chemical explosion occur-red in Tank A- 109 in Room 40 of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (Facility) located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site, approximately 30 miles north of Richland, Washington. The inactive processing Facility is part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). On May 16, 1997, Lloyd L. Piper, Deputy Manager, acting for John D. Wagoner, Manager, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), formally established an Accident Investigation Board (Board) to investigate the explosion in accordance with DOE Order 225. 1, Accident Investigations. The Board commenced its investigation on May 15, 1997, completed the investigation on July 2, 1997, and submitted its findings to the RL Manager on July 26, 1997. The scope of the Board`s investigation was to review and analyze the circumstances of the events that led to the explosion; to analyze facts and to determine the causes of the accident; and to develop conclusions and judgments of need that may help prevent a recurrence of the accident. The scope also included the application of lessons learned from similar accidents within DOE. In addition to this detailed report, a companion document has also been prepared that provides a concise summary of the facts and conclusions of this report, with an emphasis on management issues (DOE/RL-97-63).

  18. Nuclear Reactor RA Safety Report, Vol. 15, Analysis of significant accidents

    Power excursions of the RA reactor a mathematical model of reactor kinetic behaviour was formulated to describe power and temperature coefficients for both reactor fuel and moderator. Computer code TM-1 was written for analysis of possible reactor accidents. Power excursions caused by uncontrolled control rod removal and heavy water flow into the central vertical experimental channel were analyzed. Accidents caused by fuel elements handling were discussed including possible fuel element damage. Although the probability for uncontrolled radioactive materials release into the environment is very low, this type of accidents are analyzed as well including the impact on the personnel and the environment. A separate chapter describes analysis of the loss of flow accident. Safety analysis covers the possible damage of the outer steel Ra reactor vessel and the water screens which are part of the water biological shield

  19. Report on the fire accident at Uranium Enrichment Laboratory, Tokai, JAERI

    For the fire accident on November 20 1997 at Uranium Enrichment Research Laboratory, Tokai, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, the Internal Investigation Committee on the accident has investigated its cause, the first contact with local authorities on the information and the fire fighting through an individual interview of the people concerned, fire spot inspection and chemical and theoretical analysis of the materials obtained at the spot. From these results, it has been shown that the accident was caused by the explosive burning of wet uranium in a metal can and successive burning of cartons placed near the cans. For prevention of the accident and the confusion of information exchanges, the committee recommended improvement of the methods for treating chemically active materials and information exchange systems. (author)

  20. LOA-1: prevent accidents. Quarterly technical progress report, FRSP program - July through September 1981

    Information related to LMFBR reactor safety is presented concerning common cause failures; shutdown by self-activated system; shutdown heat removal system operation; sodium burning; core catcher material interactions; accident release of sodium oxide aerosol; and LMFBR risk assessment

  1. Report of the psychological support given to victims of the Goiania radiological accident in Brazil

    The psychological support given to the victims of the Goiania accident are described. The assistance lasted two months on the average and was given while the victims were in the hospital and later on in the recuperation center

  2. Estimates of early containment loads from core melt accidents. Draft report for comment

    The thermal-hydraulic processes and corium debris-material interactions that can result from core melting in a severe accident have been studied to evaluate the potential effect of such phenomena on containment integrity. Pressure and temperature loads associated with representative accident sequences have been estimated for the six various LWR containment types used within the United States. Summaries distilling the analyses are presented and an interpretation of the results provided. 13 refs., 68 figs., 39 tabs

  3. Content analysis of the media reporting on the Fukushima nuclear accident in three European countries

    Cantone, Marie Claire; Prezelj, Iztok

    2015-01-01

    The nuclear accident in Japan induced enormous media coverage. In general, mass media play a dominant role in communication on nuclear emergency issues. It is the prominent information channel for the general public, acting as the "watchdog" of the society. Analysing the media content allows gaining a better insight into the way that a nuclear accident is reflected in nowadays society. It also provides useful lessons to be learned for risk communication in nuclear emergencies. In this study m...

  4. Estimates of early containment loads from core melt accidents. Draft report for comment

    None

    1985-12-01

    The thermal-hydraulic processes and corium debris-material interactions that can result from core melting in a severe accident have been studied to evaluate the potential effect of such phenomena on containment integrity. Pressure and temperature loads associated with representative accident sequences have been estimated for the six various LWR containment types used within the United States. Summaries distilling the analyses are presented and an interpretation of the results provided. 13 refs., 68 figs., 39 tabs.

  5. Phase 1A Final Report for the AREVA Team Enhanced Accident Tolerant Fuels Concepts

    Morrell, Mike E. [AREVA Federal Services LLC, Charlotte, NC (United States)

    2015-03-19

    In response to the Department of Energy (DOE) funded initiative to develop and deploy lead fuel assemblies (LFAs) of Enhanced Accident Tolerant Fuel (EATF) into a US reactor within 10 years, AREVA put together a team to develop promising technologies for improved fuel performance during off normal operations. This team consisted of the University of Florida (UF) and the University of Wisconsin (UW), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Duke Energy and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). This team brought broad experience and expertise to bear on EATF development. AREVA has been designing; manufacturing and testing nuclear fuel for over 50 years and is one of the 3 large international companies supplying fuel to the nuclear industry. The university and National Laboratory team members brought expertise in nuclear fuel concepts and materials development. Duke and TVA brought practical utility operating experience. This report documents the results from the initial “discovery phase” where the team explored options for EATF concepts that provide enhanced accident tolerance for both Design Basis (DB) and Beyond Design Basis Events (BDB). The main driver for the concepts under development were that they could be implemented in a 10 year time frame and be economically viable and acceptable to the nuclear fuel marketplace. The economics of fuel design make this DOE funded project very important to the nuclear industry. Even incremental changes to an existing fuel design can cost in the range of $100M to implement through to LFAs. If this money is invested evenly over 10 years then it can take the fuel vendor several decades after the start of the project to recover their initial investment and reach a breakeven point on the initial investment. Step or radical changes to a fuel assembly design can cost upwards of $500M and will take even longer for the fuel vendor to recover their investment. With the projected lifetimes of the current generation of nuclear power

  6. Synthesis of the IRSN report on the issue of severe accidents which may occur on operating pressurised water nuclear reactors

    While containing other related documents (expert report, mail), this synthetic report analyses and comments some aspects of the assessment and treatment of severe accidents by EDF in its operating PWRs (pressurised water nuclear reactors). These aspects are: the EDF referential related to severe accidents (objectives of consequence limitation and prevention, long term management, probabilistic objectives, radiological objectives, expected performance of equipment and systems), the re-assessment of the 'S3 reference source term' which corresponds to a typical discharge (selection of representative scenarios, new approach based on waste categorization, the taking into account of various species, components and systems), the water management in the reactor tank (risks of explosion, of critical corium level, etc.), the strategy of an anticipated opening of the containment envelope venting-filtration device in order to avoid a core fusion, and the risk associated by a cesspool filling-in by debris

  7. Direction Committee for the management of the post-accident phase of a nuclear accident or of a radiological event (CODIRPA). Work group nr 3: 'Assessment of radiological and dose consequences in a post-accident situation'. Final report

    This report first describes how radioactive contamination occurs after a nuclear accident, whether it concerns plants, animals, people, and buildings, how people can be exposed, and how a post-accidental zoning is implemented either to protect population or to control territories. It describes principles and methods for the assessment of the contamination of the environment (radiological values, characterization of radioactive deposits, of agriculture products, and of wastes, materials and manufactured products). It describes how to organise radioactivity measurements in the environment (principles and objectives of measurement programmes, sampling organisation and management, laboratory radioactivity measurements, identification and preparation of radioactivity measurement operators, results management). It describes how to assess doses received by exposed people (measurement techniques, retrospective assessment, proposition of a dose assessment strategy for exposed population)

  8. Safety and risk questions following the nuclear incidents and accidents in Japan. Summary final report

    After the nuclear accidents in Japan, GRS has carried out in-depth investigations of the events. On the one hand, the accident sequences in the affected units have been analysed from various viewpoints. On the other hand, the transferability of the findings to German plants has been examined to possibly make recommendations for safety improvements. The accident sequences at Fukushima Daiichi have been traced with as much detail as possible based on all available information. Additional insights have been drawn from thermohydraulic analyses with the GRS code system ATHLET-CD/COCOSYS focusing on the events in units 2 and 3, e.g. with regard to core damage and the state of the containments in the first days of the accident sequence. In-depth investigations have also been carried out on topics such as natural external hazards, electrical power supply or organizational measures. In addition, methodological studies on further topics related with the accidents have been performed. Through a detailed analysis of the relevant data from the events in Japan, the basis for an in-depth examination of the transferability to German plants was created. It was found that an implementation of most of the insights gained from the investigations had already been initiated as part of the GRS information notice 2012/02. Further findings have been communicated to the federal government and introduced into other relevant bodies, e.g. the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (KTA) or the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK).

  9. Ten years after the Chernobyl accident: reporting on nuclear and other hazards in six Swedish newspapers

    A European Commission sponsored study (RISKPERCOM) involving France, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, is concerned with surveying public perceptions of radiation related and other risks. This was partly done by distributing a questionnaire in each country at three different times in 1996: before, during and after the expected media attention given to the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. A selection of print media were analyzed, during a period of eight weeks - four weeks before the anniversary, and four weeks after - making it possible to contrast any changes between the three waves of the questionnaire with the results of the media study. The present report aims at providing a picture of the Swedish media coverage of different kinds of risks during the period referred to above. The purpose of the analysis is thus primarily of a descriptive nature; explanatory factors are only considered in an ad hoc manner while discussing the results and their possible implications. Naturally, the findings arising from this study cannot alone serve as a basis for making statements about the effects of risk related content on the Swedish newspaper readers. The risk stories included in the analysis were those dealing with one or more of the twenty different hazard items referred to in several of the questions in the RISKPERCOM questionnaire. Radiation and nuclear power energy were not the only issues of concern. The selection covered a wide range of other hazards as well, in order to provide for a wide risk panorama, thus making it possible to compare specific risk qualities etc., as these were presented in the media

  10. Ten years after the Chernobyl accident: reporting on nuclear and other hazards in six Swedish newspapers

    Nilsson, Aasa; Sjoeberg, L.; Waahlberg, A. af

    1997-07-01

    A European Commission sponsored study (RISKPERCOM) involving France, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, is concerned with surveying public perceptions of radiation related and other risks. This was partly done by distributing a questionnaire in each country at three different times in 1996: before, during and after the expected media attention given to the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. A selection of print media were analyzed, during a period of eight weeks - four weeks before the anniversary, and four weeks after - making it possible to contrast any changes between the three waves of the questionnaire with the results of the media study. The present report aims at providing a picture of the Swedish media coverage of different kinds of risks during the period referred to above. The purpose of the analysis is thus primarily of a descriptive nature; explanatory factors are only considered in an ad hoc manner while discussing the results and their possible implications. Naturally, the findings arising from this study cannot alone serve as a basis for making statements about the effects of risk related content on the Swedish newspaper readers. The risk stories included in the analysis were those dealing with one or more of the twenty different hazard items referred to in several of the questions in the RISKPERCOM questionnaire. Radiation and nuclear power energy were not the only issues of concern. The selection covered a wide range of other hazards as well, in order to provide for a wide risk panorama, thus making it possible to compare specific risk qualities etc., as these were presented in the media 70 refs, 40 refs

  11. Analysis and discussion on reports of additional safety assessment of nuclear installations with respect to the Fukushima accident

    This document proposes an analysis of the reports made by the different operators of nuclear installations within the frame of a safety audit of the French nuclear installations with respect to the Fukushima accident. Operators (mainly AREVA, the CEA and EDF) were asked to perform additional safety assessments. In a first part, the conclusions of EDF reports are analysed regarding the seismic risk, the flooding risk, the situation of some specific sites (Fessenheim, Tricastin), other phenomena (rains, winds), loss of electricity supplies and of cooling systems, severe accidents, hydrogen issue, chemical hazards, subcontractors, crisis management. Conclusions of AREVA reports are analysed for the different sites (Tricastin, La Hague, MELOX factory, Romans factory). Conclusions of CEA reports are analysed for the different concerned installations (ATPu, Masurca, Osiris, Phenix, Jules Horowitz reactor). A second part proposes a global analysis of EDF's additional safety assessment reports regarding earthquake, flooding, other extreme natural phenomena, loss of electricity supplies and cooling system, subcontracting conditions, crisis management, and radiation protection organisation. AREVA's and CEA's reports are then analysed in terms of report structure and content, and for the different concerned sites

  12. An Unusual Os Trigonum Syndrome Case Secondary to Car Accident: A Case Report

    Safer

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available Introduction The os trigonum syndrome is a common cause of posterior ankle pain, often affecting ballet dancers, soccer players, runners and gymnasts who frequently force the ankle into plantar flexion. In rare cases, onset of the os trigonum syndrome followed an acute injury. Case Presentation A 62-year-old female patient was admitted with load depended ankle pain and swelling, lasting for five years which promptly started after a car accident. We incidentally discovered os trigonum on plain radiography on a lateral view of the right ankle. Conclusions The os trigonum syndrome should take in consideration in elderly subject who had posterior ankle pain starting after a car accident.

  13. National report: United Kingdom. Chernobyl - the aftermath. What can the industry learn from the accident

    The author points out that the nuclear industry has suffered a serious blow by the Chernobyl accident and asks the questions: Will nuclear power recover, and how, and when will it recover. The author states why in his opinion nuclear power will recover essentially, and reasons in terms of the future energy scene, national attitudes, and public opinion. The technical lessons from the Chernobyl accident are also evaluated. The conclusion is that the biggest single task facing the nuclear industry is that which concerns public perception. Effective communication is therefore very important

  14. Final report on the Risoe monitoring programme after the Chernobyl accident for the period Oct 1, 1986 - Sept 30, 1987

    In cooperation with the National Agency of Environmental Protection in Denmark, Risoe National Laboratory has examined the radioactive contamination from the Chernobyl accident. The programme for these investigations was an expansion of the countrywide monitoring programme operated since 1962 by Risoe National Laboratory. The present report cover the period Oct 1, 1986 to Sept. 30, 1987. All types of environmental samples relevant for radioactive contamination has been analysed. Most samples were collected countrywide and all samples were analysed for radiocaesium (134Cs and 137Cs). Many samples were furthermore anlaysed for 90Sr and in a few samples transuranic elements (29,240Pu, 241Am and 242Cm) were determined. On the basis of the diet and wholebody measurements of radiocaesium the individual mean dose equivalent commitment from Danish diet consumed in the first two years after the Chernobyl accident was calculated to 27 μ Sv. (author)

  15. State-of-the-art report on accident analysis and risk analysis of reprocessing plants in European countries

    This report summarizes informations obtained from America, England, France and FRG concerning methodology, computer code, fundamental data and calculational model on accident/risk analyses of spent fuel reprocessing plants. As a result, the followings are revealed. (1) The system analysis codes developed for reactor plants can be used for reprocessing plants with some code modification. (2) Calculational models and programs have been developed for accidental phenomenological analyses in FRG, but with insufficient data to prove them. (3) The release tree analysis codes developed in FRG are available to estimate radioactivity release amount/probability via off-gas/exhaustair lines in the case of accidents. (4) The computer codes developed in America for reactor-plant environmental transport/safety analyses of released radioactivity can be applied to reprocessing facilities. (author)

  16. LMFBR fuel analysis. Task B. Post-accident heat removal. Final report, July 1, 1975--September 30, 1976

    The report deals with the behavior of molten core debris following a hypothetical core disruptive accident in the proposed Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant. Heat dissipating characteristics of an ex-vessel sacrificial bed have been analyzed. A novel form of heat transfer, analogous to film boiling, has been proposed to describe heat transfer from a heat generating pool to surrounding steel walls. Bounding type heat transfer calculations are also made to quantify such hypothetical accident characteristics as debris bed remelting, debris bed dryout in sodium, and failure of the reactor cavity steel liner. Several documents that have been submitted to the NRC for its review of the CRBRP are discussed with attention being drawn to heat transfer related issues

  17. Visualization of Traffic Accidents

    Wang, Jie; Shen, Yuzhong; Khattak, Asad

    2010-01-01

    Traffic accidents have tremendous impact on society. Annually approximately 6.4 million vehicle accidents are reported by police in the US and nearly half of them result in catastrophic injuries. Visualizations of traffic accidents using geographic information systems (GIS) greatly facilitate handling and analysis of traffic accidents in many aspects. Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), Inc. is the world leader in GIS research and development. ArcGIS, a software package developed by ESRI, has the capabilities to display events associated with a road network, such as accident locations, and pavement quality. But when event locations related to a road network are processed, the existing algorithm used by ArcGIS does not utilize all the information related to the routes of the road network and produces erroneous visualization results of event locations. This software bug causes serious problems for applications in which accurate location information is critical for emergency responses, such as traffic accidents. This paper aims to address this problem and proposes an improved method that utilizes all relevant information of traffic accidents, namely, route number, direction, and mile post, and extracts correct event locations for accurate traffic accident visualization and analysis. The proposed method generates a new shape file for traffic accidents and displays them on top of the existing road network in ArcGIS. Visualization of traffic accidents along Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel is included to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

  18. Nuclear accidents and epidemiology

    A consultation on epidemiology related to the Chernobyl accident was held in Copenhagen in May 1987 as a basis for concerted action. This was followed by a joint IAEA/WHO workshop in Vienna, which reviewed appropriate methodologies for possible long-term effects of radiation following nuclear accidents. The reports of these two meetings are included in this volume, and cover the subjects: 1) Epidemiology related to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. 2) Appropriate methodologies for studying possible long-term effects of radiation on individuals exposed in a nuclear accident. Figs and tabs

  19. Implications of the accident at Chernobyl for safety regulation of commercial nuclear power plants in the United Sates: Volume 2, Appendix - Public comments and their disposition: Final report

    This report was prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to assess the implications of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as they relate to reactor safety regulation for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. The facts used in this assessment have been drawn from the US fact-finding report(NUREG-1250) and its sources. The general conclusions of the document are that there are generic lessons to be learned but that no changes in regulations are needed due to the substantial differences in the design, safety features and operation of US plants as compared to those in the USSR. Given these general conclusions, further consideration of certain specific areas is recommended by the report. These include: administrative controls over reactor regulation, reactivity accidents, accidents at low or zero power, multi-unit protection, fires, containment, emergency planning, severe accident phenomena, and graphite-moderated reactors

  20. Chernobyl accident and Danmark

    The report describes the Chernobyl accident and its consequences for Denmark in particular. It was commissioned by the Secretary of State for the Environment. Volume 1 contains copies of original documents issued by Danish authorities during the first accident phase and afterwards. Evaluations, monitoring data, press releases, legislation acts etc. are included. (author)

  1. Chernobyl accident and Denmark

    The report describes the Chernobyl accident and its consequences for Denmark in particular. It was commissioned by The Secretary of State for the Environment. Volume 2 contains copies of original documents issued by Danish authorities during the first accident phase and afterwards. Evaluations, monitoring data, press releases, legislation acts etc. are included. (author)

  2. Risk reduction category (RRC-A) accident studies in the safety analysis report of the EPR trademark reactor

    Poehlmann, M.; Bleher, G.; Ismaier, A.; Knoll, A.; Levi, P.; Garcia, E. Vera; Schels, A.; Seitz, H.; Lima Campos, L. [AREVA GmbH, Erlangen (Germany)

    2013-07-01

    The Risk Reduction Category (RRC-A) is considered in the safety demonstration of nuclear reactors in addition to design basis operating conditions (Plant Condition Category, PCC), in order to analyze with a risk reduction approach any operating conditions with multiple failures. As extending the operating conditions of the plant 'beyond design basis', the Risk Reduction Category (RRC-A) is also denoted as Design Extension Condition (DEC-A). In the German licensing framework, the RRCA (or DEC-A) transients correspond to safety assessment level '4b' of the 'Sicherheitsanforderungen an Kernkraftwerke' (Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants), Az. RS I 5 - 13303/01 of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. These RRC-A (or DEC-A) operating conditions require specific design provisions (implemented by manual or automatic action), known as RRC-A measures, intended to render consequences of accumulated failures admissible. In contrast, RRC-B constitute severe accidents that lead to core melt. Identification of RRC-A operating conditions and corresponding RRC-A measures is based on the use of results of probabilistic safety assessments. After the Fukushima accident the RRC-A accidents like Station Black Out (SBO) or Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS) are of particular interest in the safety assessment of nuclear new builds. In several chapters of the Safety Analysis Report it is demonstrated that the AREVA EPRTM design is resistant at RRC-A accident conditions. (orig.)

  3. Fessenheim plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident; Fessenheim - Rapport d'evaluation complementaire de la surete des installations nucleaires au regard de l'accident de Fukushima

    NONE

    2011-09-15

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Fessenheim plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  4. Nuclear Reactor RA Safety Report, Vol. 12, Accidents during reactor operation

    This volume includes description and analysis of typical accidents occurred during operation of RA reactor in chronological order, as follows: contamination of primary coolant circuit; leakage of heavy water from the primary coolant loop; contamination of vertical experimental channel; air contamination in the reactor building and loss of circulation of the primary coolant; failures of the vacuum pump and spent fuel packaging device; rupture of the spent fuel element cladding; dethronement's of capsule for irradiation of fuel element; rupture of the vertical experimental channel and contamination of the surroundings; swelling of a fuel element; appearance of deposits on the surface of the fuel elements cladding. The last chapter describes similar accidents occurred on nuclear reactors in the world

  5. Report of the US Department of Energy's team analyses of the Chernobyl-4 Atomic Energy Station accident sequence

    1986-11-01

    In an effort to better understand the Chernobyl-4 accident of April 26, 1986, the US Department of Energy (DOE) formed a team of experts from the National Laboratories including Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest Laboratory. The DOE Team provided the analytical support to the US delegation for the August meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to subsequent international meetings. The DOE Team has analyzed the accident in detail, assessed the plausibility and completeness of the information provided by the Soviets, and performed studies relevant to understanding the accident. The results of these studies are presented in this report.

  6. Finger injuries by fast rotating blades: A case report of an accident with a blender and the intervention of the fire brigade

    Hillenbrand, Matthias

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available [english] We present a case report of a 27-year-old female who had an accident with a blender. She was brought to the Emergency Department having pinched her left forefinger between the blades. Previous attempts by the local fire brigade to free the finger initially failed. After several attempts it finally succeeded by turning it carefully away from the blade. Although first impressions of the accident might have expected a worse injury, fortunately it just showed a nail bed cut. Most accidents of this type cause serious injuries with the involvement of vessels, nerves, tendons, muscles or bones.

  7. Report of the working group 'Regulatory requirements on AM - Concept of nuclear and radiation safety during beyond-design-basis accidents'

    The developed working group report contains the following main paragraphs: legal basis and basis for regulatory requirements for on-site and off-site Accident Management (AM), regulatory requirements or recommendations for on-site AM and for emergency preparedness, background information concerning the implementation and review of an AM program as a basis for an AM guideline. Overview about AM/SAM implementation in member countries of the SAMINE project; measure and candidates for high level actions based upon US SAMG; interactions of severe accident research and the regulatory positions, relationship between different components of an accident management programme are also given

  8. Finger injuries by fast rotating blades: A case report of an accident with a blender and the intervention of the fire brigade

    Hillenbrand, Matthias; Horch, Raymund E.

    2014-01-01

    [english] We present a case report of a 27-year-old female who had an accident with a blender. She was brought to the Emergency Department having pinched her left forefinger between the blades. Previous attempts by the local fire brigade to free the finger initially failed. After several attempts it finally succeeded by turning it carefully away from the blade. Although first impressions of the accident might have expected a worse injury, fortunately it just showed a nail bed cut. Most accide...

  9. Report of an audit of nurse triage in an accident and emergency department.

    Wong, T W; Tseng, G; Lee, L W

    1994-01-01

    The nurse triage process in an accident and emergency (A&E) department was audited as part of the nursing quality assurance programme. It was found that in most cases documentation was adequate and guidelines had been adhered to. Triage decisions were accurate in most cases using the discharge diagnosis as a bench-mark. Waiting time improvements were also seen. Triage audit was a useful tool in the continuous quality improvement effort.

  10. Estimate of radionuclide release characteristics into containment under severe accident conditions. Final report

    Nourbakhsh, H.P. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

    1993-11-01

    A detailed review of the available light water reactor source term information is presented as a technical basis for development of updated source terms into the containment under severe accident conditions. Simplified estimates of radionuclide release and transport characteristics are specified for each unique combination of the reactor coolant and containment system combinations. A quantitative uncertainty analysis in the release to the containment using NUREG-1150 methodology is also presented.

  11. Accident source terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants. Final report

    In 1962 tile US Atomic Energy Commission published TID-14844, ''Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactors'' which specified a release of fission products from the core to the reactor containment for a postulated accident involving ''substantial meltdown of the core''. This ''source term'', tile basis for tile NRC's Regulatory Guides 1.3 and 1.4, has been used to determine compliance with tile NRC's reactor site criteria, 10 CFR Part 100, and to evaluate other important plant performance requirements. During the past 30 years substantial additional information on fission product releases has been developed based on significant severe accident research. This document utilizes this research by providing more realistic estimates of the ''source term'' release into containment, in terms of timing, nuclide types, quantities and chemical form, given a severe core-melt accident. This revised ''source term'' is to be applied to the design of future light water reactors (LWRs). Current LWR licensees may voluntarily propose applications based upon it

  12. Status report of advanced cladding modeling work to assess cladding performance under accident conditions

    B.J. Merrill; Shannon M. Bragg-Sitton

    2013-09-01

    Scoping simulations performed using a severe accident code can be applied to investigate the influence of advanced materials on beyond design basis accident progression and to identify any existing code limitations. In 2012 an effort was initiated to develop a numerical capability for understanding the potential safety advantages that might be realized during severe accident conditions by replacing Zircaloy components in light water reactors (LWRs) with silicon carbide (SiC) components. To this end, a version of the MELCOR code, under development at the Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico (SNL/NM), was modified by replacing Zircaloy for SiC in the MELCOR reactor core oxidation and material properties routines. The modified version of MELCOR was benchmarked against available experimental data to ensure that present SiC oxidation theory in air and steam were correctly implemented in the code. Additional modifications have been implemented in the code in 2013 to improve the specificity in defining components fabricated from non-standard materials. An overview of these modifications and the status of their implementation are summarized below.

  13. Report on three accidents that occurred in a cobalt therapy centre in Italy

    In one of the main hospitals in a large province of Italy some accidents occurred in a cobalt therapy unit, after a new source had been installed. The first accident occurred one month later, at the end of a patient treatment. At the control desk a signal indicated that the source was not in the storage position. The operator first pushed unsuccessfully the emergency button, then entered the bunker to help the patient. Ten minutes later, pushing again the emergency button, the source went in the storage position, was not significant. The same day of the accident the technicians of the cobalt equipment were called for a control. About ten days later the same situation occurred and the operator, that had been in charge for the Radiotherapy Division for 30 years, did not follow the emergency radiation protection rules. He did not use the manual device (the wheel) to recall the source in the storage position. When he entered the bunker, the head of the equipment was set on 310 deg C to irradiate the left breast of the patient. To help the aged patient get off the bunker he lifted the patient off the cot thus exposing the right side of his breast to the direct beam. His intervention lasted about 45 seconds. In this case the personal dosimeter measured a dose of 54 mSv. (Author)

  14. Retrieval system for emplaced spent unreprocessed fuel (SURF) in salt bed depository: accident event analysis and mechanical failure probabilities. Final report

    This report provides support in developing an accident prediction event tree diagram, with an analysis of the baseline design concept for the retrieval of emplaced spent unreprocessed fuel (SURF) contained in a degraded Canister. The report contains an evaluation check list, accident logic diagrams, accident event tables, fault trees/event trees and discussions of failure probabilities for the following subsystems as potential contributors to a failure: (a) Canister extraction, including the core and ram units; (b) Canister transfer at the hoist area; and (c) Canister hoisting. This report is the second volume of a series. It continues and expands upon the report Retrieval System for Emplaced Spent Unreprocessed Fuel (SURF) in Salt Bed Depository: Baseline Concept Criteria Specifications and Mechanical Failure Probabilities. This report draws upon the baseline conceptual specifications contained in the first report

  15. Optimal management routes for the restoration of territories contaminated during and after the Chernobyl accident: Final report

    This report identifies optimised restoration strategies for contaminated territories (actually private agricultural lands and forests) in Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation resulting from the Chernobyl accident. The evaluation of restoration strategies is based on economic and radiological criteria. For this purpose a methodology involving the subdivision of the territories into categories based on doses was developed. Remediation strategies for agricultural lands involves many options; for example, extensive resettlement, supply of clean milk, radical improvement of land, etc. For contaminated forests the potential radiological impact resulting from a selection of countermeasures like incineration of contaminated wood has been thoroughly evaluated

  16. Experimental Report for Safety Relevant Design Basis Accident Tests by using the High Temperature/High Pressure Test Facility(VISTA)

    Choi, Ki Yong; Park, Hyun Sik; Cho, Seok; Lee, Sung Jae; Choi, Nam Hyun; Min, Kyong Ho; Song, Chul Hwa; Park, Chun Kyong; Chung, Moon Ki

    2005-07-15

    The VISTA (Experimental Verification by Integral Simulation of Transients and Accidents) is an experimental facility to verify the performance and safety issues of the SMART-P (Pilot plant of the System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor). The basic design of the SMART-P has been completed by KAERI. The present report describes experimental test results for safety relevant design basis accidents by using the VISTA facility.

  17. In-vessel core degradation in LWR severe accidents: a state of the art report to CSNI january 1991

    This state of the art report on in-vessel core degradation has been produced at the request of CSNI Principal Working Group 2. The objective of the report is to present to CSNI member countries the status of research and related information on in-vessel degraded core behaviour in both Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWR). Information on experiments, codes and comparisons of calculations with experiments up to january 1991 is summarised and reviewed. Integrated codes, which are wider in scope than just in-vessel degradation are covered as well as specialist, degraded core codes. Implications for PWR and BWR plant calculations are considered. Conclusions and recommendations for research, plant calculations and further CSNI activity in this area are the subject of the final chapter. A major conclusion of the report is that early phase core degradation is relatively well understood. However, codes need further development to bring them up to date with the experimental database, particularly to include low temperature liquefaction processes. These processes significantly affect early phase core degradation and their neglect could affect assessments of accident management actions (including recriticality in BWR severe accidents)

  18. Severe accident management. Prevention and Mitigation

    Effective planning for the management of severe accidents at nuclear power plants can produce both a reduction in the frequency of such accidents as well as the ability to mitigate their consequences if and when they should occur. This report provides an overview of accident management activities in OECD countries. It also presents the conclusions of a group of international experts regarding the development of accident management methods, the integration of accident management planning into reactor operations, and the benefits of accident management

  19. Report from the results of measurements of radioactive contaminations after Chernobyl accident

    The results of measurements of radioactive contamination carried out in Cracow during the first days after Chernobyl accident are presented. The particular radioisotopes were determined by gamma spectroscopy. In the period from April 28th to morning hours of May 1st 1986 radiation measurements concerned above all air. After rains considerable contamination of earth's surface was detected and measurements were concentrated on soil contamination. There were also examined water and food samples. The concentration of strontium radioisotopes was determined too. (M. F. W.)

  20. Environmental radioiodine monitoring to control exposure expected from containment release accidents. Final report

    Reactor accidents may cause releases of radionuclides from containment. The active material would cause exposure to man through inhalation of gases or aerosols or through consumption of food products containing deposited radioactive particles. Certain aspects of internal exposure are considered. They are field assessment of the exposure potential of milk, and predictions of human thyroid dose commitment based on direct measurements of radioiodine incorporated within the human thyroid. Radioiodine in milk may be inferred by measurements of radioiodine in cow thyroids, and by measuring deposited radioiodine on pasture grasses consumed by cows. Direct radioiodine measurements on milk were also considered

  1. APRI-7 Accident Phenomena of Risk Importance. A progress report on research in the field of severe accidents in 2009-2011

    Knowledge of the phenomena that may occur during severe accidents in a nuclear power plant is an important prerequisite for being able to predict the plant behavior, in order to formulate procedures and instructions for incident handling, for contingency planning, and to get good quality at the accident analysis and risk studies. Since the early 80's nuclear power companies and authorities in Sweden has collaborated in research on severe reactor accidents. Cooperation in the beginning was mostly linked to strengthening the protection against environmental impacts after a severe reactor accident, in particular to develop systems for filtered depressurization of the reactor containment. Since the early 90's the cooperation has partially changed and shifted to the phenomenological questions of risk dominance. During the years 2009-2011, cooperation continued in the research-program APRI-7. The aim was to show whether the solutions adopted in the Swedish strategy for accident management provides reasonable protection for the environment. This was done by gaining detailed knowledge of both important phenomena in the hearth melting behavior, and the amount of radioactivity that can be discharged to the surroundings during a severe accident. To achieve this aim, the research program has included a follow-up of international research in severe accidents and evaluation of results, and continued to support research at KTH and Chalmers Univ. of severe accidents. The follow-up of international research has promoted the exchange of knowledge and experience and has provided access to a wealth of information about various phenomena relevant to the events at severe accidents. This was important to obtain a good basis for assessment of abatement measures in the Swedish nuclear reactors. Continuing support to the Royal Inst. of Technology has provided increased knowledge about the ability to cool the molten core of the reactor vessel and the processes associated with cooling the

  2. Boating Accident Statistics

    Department of Homeland Security — Accident statistics available on the Coast Guard’s website by state, year, and one variable to obtain tables and/or graphs. Data from reports has been loaded for...

  3. Important severe accident research issues after Fukushima accident

    After the Fukushima accident several investigation committees issued reports with lessons learned from the accident in Japan. Among those lessons, several recommendations have been made on severe accident research. Similar to the EURSAFE efforts under EU Program, review of specific severe accident research items was started before Fukushima accident in working group of Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) in terms of significance of consequences, uncertainties of phenomena and maturity of assessment methodology. Re-investigation has been started since the Fukushima accident. Additional effects of Fukushima accident, such as core degradation behaviors, sea water injection, containment failure/leakage and re-criticality have been covered. The review results are categorized in ten major fields; core degradation behavior, core melt coolability/retention in containment vessel, function of containment vessel, source term, hydrogen behavior, fuel-coolant interaction, molten core concrete interaction, direct containment heating, recriticality and instrumentation in severe accident conditions. Based on these activities and also author's personal view, the present paper describes the perspective of important severe accident research issues after Fukushima accident. Those are specifically investigation of damaged core and components, advanced severe accident analysis capabilities and associated experimental investigations, development of reliable passive cooling system for core/containment, analysis of hydrogen behavior and investigation of hydrogen measures, enhancement of removal function of radioactive materials of containment venting, advanced instrumentation for the diagnosis of severe accident and assessment of advanced containment design which excludes long-term evacuation in any severe accident situations. (author)

  4. Compendium of ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling Systems] research for realistic LOCA [loss-of-coolant accidents] analysis: Final report

    In the United States, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) are required for light water reactors (LWRs) to provide cooling of the reactor core in the event of a break or leak in the reactor piping or an inadvertent opening of a valve. These accidents are called loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA), and they range from small leaks up to a postulated full break of the largest pipe in the reactor cooling system. Federal government regulations provide that LOCA analysis be performed to show that the ECCS will maintain fuel rod cladding temperatures, cladding oxidation, and hydrogen production within certain limits. The NRC and others have completed a large body of research which investigated fuel rod behavior and LOCA/ECCS performance. It is now possible to make a realistic estimate of the ECCS performance during a LOCA and to quantify the uncertainty of this calculation. The purpose of this report is to summarize this research and to serve as a general reference for the extensive research effort that has been performed. The report: (1) summarizes the understanding of LOCA phenomena in 1974; (2) reviews experimental and analytical programs developed to address the phenomena; (3) describes the best-estimate computer codes developed by the NRC; (4) discusses the salient technical aspects of the physical phenomena and our current understanding of them; (5) discusses probabilistic risk assessment results and perspectives, and (6) evaluates the impact of research results on the ECCS regulations. 736 refs., 412 figs., 66 tabs

  5. Inroads into Equestrian Safety: Rider-Reported Factors Contributing to Horse-Related Accidents and Near Misses on Australian Roads.

    Thompson, Kirrilly; Matthews, Chelsea

    2015-01-01

    Horse riding and horse-related interactions are inherently dangerous. When they occur on public roads, the risk profile of equestrian activities is complicated by interactions with other road users. Research has identified speed, proximity, visibility, conspicuity and mutual misunderstanding as factors contributing to accidents and near misses. However, little is known about their significance or incidence in Australia. To explore road safety issues amongst Australian equestrians, we conducted an online survey. More than half of all riders (52%) reported having experienced at least one accident or near miss in the 12 months prior to the survey. Whilst our findings confirm the factors identified overseas, we also identified issues around rider misunderstanding of road rules and driver misunderstanding of rider hand signals. Of particular concern, we also found reports of potentially dangerous rider-directed road rage. We identify several areas for potential safety intervention including (1) identifying equestrians as vulnerable road users and horses as sentient decision-making vehicles (2) harmonising laws regarding passing horses, (3) mandating personal protective equipment, (4) improving road signage, (5) comprehensive data collection, (6) developing mutual understanding amongst road-users, (7) safer road design and alternative riding spaces; and (8) increasing investment in horse-related safety initiatives. PMID:26479376

  6. Inroads into Equestrian Safety: Rider-Reported Factors Contributing to Horse-Related Accidents and Near Misses on Australian Roads

    Kirrilly Thompson

    2015-07-01

    Full Text Available Horse riding and horse-related interactions are inherently dangerous. When they occur on public roads, the risk profile of equestrian activities is complicated by interactions with other road users. Research has identified speed, proximity, visibility, conspicuity and mutual misunderstanding as factors contributing to accidents and near misses. However, little is known about their significance or incidence in Australia. To explore road safety issues amongst Australian equestrians, we conducted an online survey. More than half of all riders (52% reported having experienced at least one accident or near miss in the 12 months prior to the survey. Whilst our findings confirm the factors identified overseas, we also identified issues around rider misunderstanding of road rules and driver misunderstanding of rider hand signals. Of particular concern, we also found reports of potentially dangerous rider-directed road rage. We identify several areas for potential safety intervention including (1 identifying equestrians as vulnerable road users and horses as sentient decision-making vehicles (2 harmonising laws regarding passing horses, (3 mandating personal protective equipment, (4 improving road signage, (5 comprehensive data collection, (6 developing mutual understanding amongst road-users, (7 safer road design and alternative riding spaces; and (8 increasing investment in horse-related safety initiatives.

  7. Source term assessment, containment atmosphere control systems, and accident consequences. Report to CSNI by an OECD/NEA Group of experts

    CSNI Report 135 summarizes the results of the work performed by CSNI's Principal Working Group No. 4 on the Source Term and Environmental Consequences (PWG4) during the period extending from 1983 to 1986. This document contains the latest information on some important topics relating to source terms, accident consequence assessment, and containment atmospheric control systems. It consists of five parts: (1) a Foreword and Executive Summary prepared by PWG4's Chairman; (2) a Report on the Technical Status of the Source Term; (3) a Report on the Technical Status of Filtration and Containment Atmosphere Control Systems for Nuclear Reactors in the Event of a Severe Accident; (4) a Report on the Technical Status of Reactor Accident Consequence Assessment; (5) a list of members of PWG4

  8. Economic Burden of Road Traffic Accidents; Report from a Single Center from South Eastern Iran

    Aliyeh Sargazi

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Objective: To determine the economic burden of road traffic accidents (RTAs in patients admitted to a single center in south eastern Iran. Methods: This cross-sectional study was conducted in Amir-Al-Momenin hospital of Zabol affiliated with Zabol University of Medical Sciences during a 12-month period from April 2012 to April 2013. All the RTAs patients who were admitted to our emergency department were included. The direct expenses of hospital care were recorded according to their medical charts and the accountant registration information. Data are presented according to different RTAs characteristics. Results: Overall 1155 patients were included in the current study with mean age of 36.7 ± 5.14 years among whom there were 673(58.3% men and 482 (41.7% women. The annual incidence of RTAs were calculated to be 288 per 100,000 population. The RTAs economic burden in our center was 589,448.49 USD which accounted for 10.4% of total hospital expenses during the study period. The money spend on RTAs in our center was 130 times more than gross national income per capita. Cost of each patient in road traffic was 15 times more than cost of an average patient of the hospital in other sections. Conclusion: With considerable high ratio of accidents in Zabol, proper intervention is needed for controlling and preventing RTAs in order to decrease its injuries, impact and the associated economic burden.

  9. Early mortality estimates for different nuclear accidents. Final Phase I report, October 1977-April 1979

    Several studies have previously been made of the number of early deaths which might be expected in a population exposed to a cloud of radionuclides which could result from a nuclear accident. These analyses, however, have been limited to one accident scenario or to exposures involving limited numbers of radionuclides. The purpose of this Phase I study was to examine the existing data on the early health effects of inhaled radioactive materials and determined what, if any, new studies were needed to make reasonable estimates of early mortality after exposure of a population to a cloud of radionuclides of any type. The approach used in the Phase I project was to analyze the data bases available on the health effects of inhaled radioactive materials and document those which were adequate and useful. Using these data, a computer based simulation model was developed depicting exposure to a radioactive aerosol, the dose to an individual exposed to the aerosol and the probability of dying from early effects

  10. Early mortality estimates for different nuclear accidents. Final Phase I report, October 1977-April 1979

    Hahn, F.F.

    1979-08-01

    Several studies have previously been made of the number of early deaths which might be expected in a population exposed to a cloud of radionuclides which could result from a nuclear accident. These analyses, however, have been limited to one accident scenario or to exposures involving limited numbers of radionuclides. The purpose of this Phase I study was to examine the existing data on the early health effects of inhaled radioactive materials and determined what, if any, new studies were needed to make reasonable estimates of early mortality after exposure of a population to a cloud of radionuclides of any type. The approach used in the Phase I project was to analyze the data bases available on the health effects of inhaled radioactive materials and document those which were adequate and useful. Using these data, a computer based simulation model was developed depicting exposure to a radioactive aerosol, the dose to an individual exposed to the aerosol and the probability of dying from early effects.

  11. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1992, a status report; Volume 18: Appendices B, C, D, E, F, and G

    NONE

    1993-12-01

    This document is part of a report which documents 1992 operational events selected as accident sequence precursors. This report describes the 27 precursors identified from the 1992 licensee event reports. It also describe containment-related events; {open_quote}interesting{close_quote} events; potentially significant events that were considered impractical to analyze; copies of the licensee event reports which were cited in the cases above; and comments from the licensee and NRC in response to the preliminary reports.

  12. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Grand Gulf, Unit 1: Evaluation of severe accident risks for plant operational state 5 during a refueling outage. Main report and appendices, Volume 6, Part 1

    Traditionally, probabilistic risk assessments (PRAS) of severe accidents in nuclear power plants have considered initiating events potentially occurring only during full power operation. Recent studies and operational experience have, however, implied that accidents during low power and shutdown could be significant contributors to risk. In response to this concern, in 1989 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The program consists of two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (Surry) and Sandia National Laboratories (Grand Gulf). The program objectives include assessing the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than full power operation and comparing the estimated risks with the risk associated with accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The scope of the program is that of a Level-3 PRA. The subject of this report is the PRA of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1. The Grand Gulf plant utilizes a 3833 MWt BUR-6 boiling water reactor housed in a Mark III containment. The Grand Gulf plant is located near Port Gibson, Mississippi. The regime of shutdown analyzed in this study was plant operational state (POS) 5 during a refueling outage, which is approximately Cold Shutdown as defined by Grand Gulf Technical Specifications. The entire PRA of POS 5 is documented in a multi-volume NUREG report (NUREG/CR-6143). The internal events accident sequence analysis (Level 1) is documented in Volume 2. The Level 1 internal fire and internal flood analyses are documented in Vols 3 and 4, respectively

  13. Radiocaesium in Swedish reindeer after the Chernobyl accident. Progress report to the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute

    The level of 137CS in freely grazing reindeer, and thus in reindeer pasture, continue to decrease, with an average Tef at 3.9 years from 1986/87 (the first year after the Chernobyl fallout) to 1996/97. The decline was more rapid during the first five years after the fallout than during the following five years. This, together with a tendency to a relatively slow decline in areas with mainly old fallout (from the nuclear weapon tests) indicate that radiocesium become more fixed in reindeer pasture with time. As a combined effect of the general decline and of different countermeasures, the transfer of radiocaesium via reindeer meat and the corresponding radiation dose to humans has been reduced with time. By different countermeasures, the total collective dose to the Swedish population, over a 10-year period following the Chernobyl accident, has been reduced with 676 manSv at a cost of 489 million SEK

  14. Radiation protection survey of research and development activities initiated after the Chernobyl accident. Review report

    The compilation of research and development activities in the various fields of radiation protection in OECD Member countries which have been undertaken or planned specifically to address open questions arising from the Chernobyl reactor accident experience shows a potential for international cooperative arrangements and/or coordination between national programmes. Both the preliminary review of the answers, which only cover a part of the relevant activities in OECD Member countries, and a computerized literature search indicate that the multidisciplinarity of the research area under consideration will call for special efforts to efficiently implement new models and new quantitative findings from the different fields of activity to provide an improved basis for emergency management and risk assessment. Further improvements could also be achieved by efforts to initiate new activities to close gaps in the programmes under way, to enhance international cooperation, and to coordinate the evaluation of the results. This preliminary review of the answers of 17 Member countries to the questionnaire on research and development activities initiated after the Chernobyl accident is not sufficient as a basis for a balanced decision on those research areas most in need for international cooperation and coordination. It may however serve as a guide for the exploration of the potential for international cooperative arrangements and/or coordination between national programmes by the CRPPH. Even at this preliminary stage, several specific activities are proposed to the NEA/OECD by Member countries. Whole body counting and the intercomparison of national data bases on the behaviour of radionuclides in the environment did attract most calls for international cooperation sponsored by the NEA

  15. Preliminary design report for modeling of hydrogen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents

    Preliminary designs are described for models of the interaction of Zircaloy and hydrogen and the consequences of this interaction on the behavior of fuel rod cladding during severe accidents. The modeling of this interaction and its consequences involves the modeling of seven processes: (1) diffusion of oxygen from the bulk gas into the boundary layer at the external cladding surface, (2) diffusion from the boundary layer into the oxide layer at the cladding external surface, (3) diffusion from the inner surface of the oxide layer into the metallic part of the cladding, (4) uptake of hydrogen in the event that the cladding oxide layer is dissolved in a steam-starved region, (5) embrittlement of cladding due to hydrogen uptake, (6) cracking of cladding during quenching due to its embrittlement and (7) release of hydrogen from the cladding after cracking of the cladding. An integral diffusion method is described for calculating the diffusion processes in the cladding. Experimental and theoretical results are presented that show the uptake of hydrogen in the event of dissolution of the oxide layer occurs rapidly and that show the release of hydrogen in the event of cracking of the cladding occurs rapidly. These experimental results are used as a basis for calculating the rate of hydrogen uptake and the rate of hydrogen release. The uptake of hydrogen is limited to the equilibrium solubility calculated by applying Sievert's law. The uptake of hydrogen is an exothermic reaction that accelerates the heatup of a fuel rod. An embrittlement criteria is described that accounts for hydrogen and oxygen concentration and the extent of oxidation. A design is described for implementing the models for Zr-H interaction into the programming framework of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code. A test matrix is described for assessing the impact of the Zr-H interaction models on the calculated behavior of fuel rods in severe accident conditions

  16. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis: Dispersion and deposition uncertainty assessment, main report

    Harper, F.T.; Young, M.L.; Miller, L.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hora, S.C. [Univ. of Hawaii, Hilo, HI (United States); Lui, C.H. [Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (United States); Goossens, L.H.J.; Cooke, R.M. [Delft Univ. of Technology (Netherlands); Paesler-Sauer, J. [Research Center, Karlsruhe (Germany); Helton, J.C. [and others

    1995-01-01

    The development of two new probabilistic accident consequence codes, MACCS and COSYMA, was completed in 1990. These codes estimate the risks presented by nuclear installations based on postulated frequencies and magnitudes of potential accidents. In 1991, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) began a joint uncertainty analysis of the two codes. The ultimate objective of the joint effort was to develop credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for the input variables of the codes. Expert elicitation was identified as the best technology available for developing a library of uncertainty distributions for the selected consequence parameters. The study was formulated jointly and was limited to the current code models and to physical quantities that could be measured in experiments. Experts developed their distributions independently. To validate the distributions generated for the wet deposition input variables, samples were taken from these distributions and propagated through the wet deposition code model. Resulting distributions closely replicated the aggregated elicited wet deposition distributions. To validate the distributions generated for the dispersion code input variables, samples from the distributions and propagated through the Gaussian plume model (GPM) implemented in the MACCS and COSYMA codes. Project teams from the NRC and CEC cooperated successfully to develop and implement a unified process for the elaboration of uncertainty distributions on consequence code input parameters. Formal expert judgment elicitation proved valuable for synthesizing the best available information. Distributions on measurable atmospheric dispersion and deposition parameters were successfully elicited from experts involved in the many phenomenological areas of consequence analysis. This volume is the first of a three-volume document describing the project.

  17. Preliminary design report for modeling of hydrogen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents

    Siefken, L.J.

    1998-08-01

    Preliminary designs are described for models of the interaction of Zircaloy and hydrogen and the consequences of this interaction on the behavior of fuel rod cladding during severe accidents. The modeling of this interaction and its consequences involves the modeling of seven processes: (1) diffusion of oxygen from the bulk gas into the boundary layer at the external cladding surface, (2) diffusion from the boundary layer into the oxide layer at the cladding external surface, (3) diffusion from the inner surface of the oxide layer into the metallic part of the cladding, (4) uptake of hydrogen in the event that the cladding oxide layer is dissolved in a steam-starved region, (5) embrittlement of cladding due to hydrogen uptake, (6) cracking of cladding during quenching due to its embrittlement and (7) release of hydrogen from the cladding after cracking of the cladding. An integral diffusion method is described for calculating the diffusion processes in the cladding. Experimental and theoretical results are presented that show the uptake of hydrogen in the event of dissolution of the oxide layer occurs rapidly and that show the release of hydrogen in the event of cracking of the cladding occurs rapidly. These experimental results are used as a basis for calculating the rate of hydrogen uptake and the rate of hydrogen release. The uptake of hydrogen is limited to the equilibrium solubility calculated by applying Sievert`s law. The uptake of hydrogen is an exothermic reaction that accelerates the heatup of a fuel rod. An embrittlement criteria is described that accounts for hydrogen and oxygen concentration and the extent of oxidation. A design is described for implementing the models for Zr-H interaction into the programming framework of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code. A test matrix is described for assessing the impact of the Zr-H interaction models on the calculated behavior of fuel rods in severe accident conditions.

  18. Probabilistic accident consequence uncertainty analysis: Dispersion and deposition uncertainty assessment, main report

    The development of two new probabilistic accident consequence codes, MACCS and COSYMA, was completed in 1990. These codes estimate the risks presented by nuclear installations based on postulated frequencies and magnitudes of potential accidents. In 1991, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) began a joint uncertainty analysis of the two codes. The ultimate objective of the joint effort was to develop credible and traceable uncertainty distributions for the input variables of the codes. Expert elicitation was identified as the best technology available for developing a library of uncertainty distributions for the selected consequence parameters. The study was formulated jointly and was limited to the current code models and to physical quantities that could be measured in experiments. Experts developed their distributions independently. To validate the distributions generated for the wet deposition input variables, samples were taken from these distributions and propagated through the wet deposition code model. Resulting distributions closely replicated the aggregated elicited wet deposition distributions. To validate the distributions generated for the dispersion code input variables, samples from the distributions and propagated through the Gaussian plume model (GPM) implemented in the MACCS and COSYMA codes. Project teams from the NRC and CEC cooperated successfully to develop and implement a unified process for the elaboration of uncertainty distributions on consequence code input parameters. Formal expert judgment elicitation proved valuable for synthesizing the best available information. Distributions on measurable atmospheric dispersion and deposition parameters were successfully elicited from experts involved in the many phenomenological areas of consequence analysis. This volume is the first of a three-volume document describing the project

  19. Radiation accidents

    Radiation accidents may be viewed as unusual exposure event which provide possible high exposure to a few people and, in the case of nuclear plants events, low exposure to large population. A number of radiation accidents have occurred over the past 50 years, involving radiation machines, radioactive materials and uncontrolled nuclear reactors. These accidents have resulted in number of people have been exposed to a range of internal and external radiation doses and those involving radioactive materials have involved multiple routs of exposure. Some of the more important accidents involving significant radiation doses or releases of radioactive materials, including any known health effects involves in it. An analysis of the common characteristics of accidents is useful resolving overarching issues, as has been done following nuclear power, industrial radiography and medical accidents. Success in avoiding accidents and responding when they do occur requires planning in order to have adequately trained and prepared health physics organization; well defined and developed instrument program; close cooperation among radiation protection experts, local and state authorities. Focus is given to the successful avoidance of accidents and response in the events they do occur. Palomares, spain in late 1960, Goiania, Brazil in 1987, Thule, Greenland in 1968, Rocky flats, Colorado in 1957 and 1969, Three mile island, Pennsylvania in 1979, Chernobyl Ukraine in april 1986, Kyshtym, former Soviet Union in 1957, Windscale, UK in Oct. 1957 Tomsk, Russian Federation in 1993, and many others are the important examples of major radiation accidents. (author)

  20. Database on aircraft accidents

    The Reactor Safety Subcommittee in the Nuclear Safety and Preservation Committee published the report 'The criteria on assessment of probability of aircraft crash into light water reactor facilities' as the standard method for evaluating probability of aircraft crash into nuclear reactor facilities in July 2002. In response to the report, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization has been collecting open information on aircraft accidents of commercial airplanes, self-defense force (SDF) airplanes and US force airplanes every year since 2003, sorting out them and developing the database of aircraft accidents for latest 20 years to evaluate probability of aircraft crash into nuclear reactor facilities. This year, the database was revised by adding aircraft accidents in 2010 to the existing database and deleting aircraft accidents in 1991 from it, resulting in development of the revised 2011 database for latest 20 years from 1991 to 2010. Furthermore, the flight information on commercial aircrafts was also collected to develop the flight database for latest 20 years from 1991 to 2010 to evaluate probability of aircraft crash into reactor facilities. The method for developing the database of aircraft accidents to evaluate probability of aircraft crash into reactor facilities is based on the report 'The criteria on assessment of probability of aircraft crash into light water reactor facilities' described above. The 2011 revised database for latest 20 years from 1991 to 2010 shows the followings. The trend of the 2011 database changes little as compared to the last year's one. (1) The data of commercial aircraft accidents is based on 'Aircraft accident investigation reports of Japan transport safety board' of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. 4 large fixed-wing aircraft accidents, 58 small fixed-wing aircraft accidents, 5 large bladed aircraft accidents and 114 small bladed aircraft accidents occurred. The relevant accidents for evaluating

  1. The Chernobyl accident

    In connection with the Chernobyl accident the report gives a description of the technical features of importance to the accident, the course of events, and the estimated health hazards in the local environment. Dissimilarities in western and Sovjet reactor safety philosophy are dealt with, as well as conceivable concequences in relation to technology and research in western nuclear power programmes. Results of activity level measurements of air and foodstuff, made in Norway by Institute for Energy Technology, are given

  2. Management of severe accidents

    The definition and the multidimensionality aspects of accident management have been reviewed. The suggested elements in the development of a programme for severe accident management have been identified and discussed. The strategies concentrate on the two tiered approaches. Operative management utilizes the plant's equipment and operators capabilities. The recovery managment concevtrates on preserving the containment, or delaying its failure, inhibiting the release, and on strategies once there has been a release. The inspiration for this paper was an excellent overview report on perspectives on managing severe accidents in commercial nuclear power plants and extending plant operating procedures into the severe accident regime; and by the most recent publication of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) considering the question of risk reduction and source term reduction through accident prevention, management and mitigation. The latter document concludes that 'active development of accident management measures by plant personnel can lead to very large reductions in source terms and risk', and goes further in considering and formulating the key issue: 'The most fruitful path to follow in reducing risk even further is through the planning of accident management.' (author)

  3. ACCIDENT AT «FUKUSHIMA-I» NPP: FIRST RESULTS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE. REPORT 1: GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACCIDENT AND RADIATION SITUATION

    G. G. Onischenko

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available The article presents preliminary assessment of the accident scale, level of its radiation effect on the population and response of national authorities of various countries for the population radiation protection provisions. High levels of the environmental radioactive contamination demanded the application of complex measures for the radiation protection of the population from adjacent territories of Japan. Radionuclides from the region of damaged NPP can get to the other countries by means of the long-distant air and sea water mass transfer. Specific activity of cesium radionuclides in the sea biota can reach the level recommended by the Codex Alimentarius Commission as the safe level for the international trade or exceed it. Significant radioactive contamination of the territories of other countries resulting from the «Fukushima-I» NPP accident did not occur. Many world countries applied measures of the Japanese food products import control on the base of the radiation monitoring data. These prohibitions are consequently remitted following the radiation situation improvement.

  4. A methodology for supporting decisions on the establishment of protective measures after severe nuclear accidents. Final report

    Full text: The objective of this report is to demonstrate the use of a methodology supporting decisions on protective measures following severe nuclear accidents. A multicriteria decision analysis approach is recommended where value tradeoffs are postponed until the very last stage of the decision process. Use of efficient frontiers is made to exclude all technically inferior solutions and present the decision maker with all non-dominated solutions. A choice among these solutions implies a value trade-off among the multiple criteria. An interactive computer package has been developed where the decision maker can choose a point on the efficient frontier in the consequence space and immediately see the alternative in the decision space resulting in the chosen consequences. The methodology is demonstrated through an application on the choice among possible protective measures in contaminated areas of the former USSR after the Chernobyl accident. Two distinct cases are considered: First a decision is to be made only on the basis of the level of soil contamination with Cs-137 and the total cost of the chosen protective policy; Next the decision is based on the geographic dimension of the contamination and the total cost. Three alternative countermeasure actions are considered for population segments living on soil contaminated at a certain level or in a specific geographic region: (a) relocation of the population; (b) improvement of the living conditions; and, (c) no countermeasures at all. This is the final deliverable of the CEC-CIS Joint Study Project 2, Task 5: Decision-Aiding-System for Establishing Intervention Levels, performed under Contracts COSU-CT91-0007 and COSU-CT92-0021 with the Commission of European Communities through CEPN. (author)

  5. Thyroid cancer in children living near Chernobyl. Expert panel report on the consequences of the Chernobyl accident

    In January 1992, the Radiation Protection Research Action formed a panel of thyroid experts in order to evaluate the current situation concerning reported increased rates of thyroid cancer in children living in the neighbourhood of Chernobyl, where the reactor accident occurred on April 26 1986 and resulted in widespread radioactive contamination over large areas of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine. Studies of the Atom Bomb survivors in Japan have revealed that the incidence of leukemia starts to increase some five years after exposure. For Chernobyl accident health consequences are now becoming evident. Thyroid cancer has already been observed in children. Iodine 131 was seen to pose a specific hazard because it is taken up by the body and concentrated in the thyroid gland. At a dose of 5 Gy to the childhood thyroid about 4000 thyroid cancers per 100000 children exposed can be anticipated. An essential component of the verification of this observation is the study of the pathology of the lesions, which derived from four cell types: follicular cells, C cells, lymphoid cells and connective tumor cells. All distant metastases are lung metastases. Measures to be considered for the prevention of the development of thyroid cancer in a radiation-exposed population include correction of iodine deficiency by iodine prophylaxis and suppression of TSH. There are three methods of diagnosis: ultrasound imaging, thyroid scanning, fine needle aspiration performed by skilled personnel. For the therapy total or near-total thyroidectomy is regarded as the treatment of choice. Radioactive iodine can be used to treat lymph node and distant metastases which take up iodine after a total thyroidectomy. Thyroid hormone replacement should be carried out with TSH suppressive doses of L-Thyroxine. 45 refs., 1 annexe

  6. Dampierre-en-Burly plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Dampierre-en-Burly plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  7. Nogent-sur-Seine plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Nogent-sur-Seine plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  8. Belleville-sur-Loire plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Belleville-sur-Loire plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  9. Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux plant - Report on the complementary safety assessment of nuclear facilities in the light of the Fukushima accident

    This CSA (Complementary Safety Assessment) analyses the robustness of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux plant to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident and proposes a series of improvements. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond the level for which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequence. Safety is not only a matter of design or of engineered systems, it is also a matter of organization. So issues like EDF's crisis organization, the organization of radiation protection, and work organization via subcontracting are also taken into consideration. The creation of a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) is proposed: this will be a national emergency force made up of specialized teams equipped to intervene in less than 24 hours on a nuclear site hit by an accident. This report is divided into 8 main chapters: 1) features of the site, 2) earthquake risk, 3) flooding risk, 4) risks due to other extreme natural disasters, 5) the loss of electrical power supplies and of heat sink, 6) management of severe accidents (accidents with core melt), 7) task subcontracting policy, 8) synthesis and list of improvements. 4 following appendices review: EDF's crisis organization, the FARN, radiation protection organization and accidental event trees. (A.C.)

  10. Report of the radiological protection procedures adapted in the Goiania General Hospital for assistance to the victims of the radiological accident with Cesium 137

    A caesium-137 capsule, illegal removed from a desactivated health center of the Instituto Goiano de Radioterapia, was disrupted causing a serious radiological accident. The dimensions of the accident were worsened due to some facts such as: the caesium-137 was in the chloride from, which is a very soluble compound the accident was notify to the competent authorities only several days after the capsule was removal and during this period of time some people handled the souce directly, without knowing its potential danger. This paper descibes the measures adopted in the Goiania General Hospital to restrict the exposure of workers and members of the public and to minimize the consequences of unavoidable exposures in such a way to assure that the annual dose limits were not exceeded. An efficiency evaluation of the methods adopted for the decontamination of the victims was made and its described in the report. (author)

  11. Safety analysis of fusion reactors pertaining to nuclear incidents and accidents. Final report

    The BfS gave the projekt partners IPP, KIT, Oeko-Institut e. V., and GRS the order to carry out a literature study on the topic of safety of fusion power plants regarding nuclear incidents and accidents. In the framework of this study the actual status of science and technology of the safety concept of fusion power plants should be determined and the applicability of the nuclear safety regulations hitherto developed for nuclear power plants checked. For future commercial fusion power plants today only conceptional designs exist. The most advanced conceptual study for a future fusion power plant is the European Power Plant Conceptual Study (PPCS) from the year 2005, which is based on the tokamak principle. In this study also fundamental aspects of the safety concept of nuclear fusion are treated. Hereby several different conceptual approaches are discussed, which differ among others also in the lay-out approaches relevant for the safety of a facility like for instance the choice of the breeding concept or the materials for the blanket/divertor structure and the coolants. The safety concept of nuclear fusion is oriented on safety concepts for facilities with radioactive inventory. It is based on the concept of tiered safety levels. In order to check whether for the nuclear fusion a safety concept comparable with the nuclear fission at all is necessary, in a first step it was considered, which consequences are possible at a postulated release o large parts of the radioactive inventory of a fusion power plant. Such a worst-case scenario was compared with a corresponding, postulated release of large parts of the radioactive inventory of a nuclear power plant. As scale hereby served the radiological criterion, at the transgression of which in the environment of the facility an evacuation would be necessary. In a next step the transferability of the safety concept of the tiered safety levels of nuclear technology to the fusion was checked. Beside events transferable from

  12. 46 CFR 167.65-70 - Reports of accidents, repairs, and unsafe boilers and machinery by engineers.

    2010-10-01

    ... machinery by engineers. 167.65-70 Section 167.65-70 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY... of accidents, repairs, and unsafe boilers and machinery by engineers. (a) Before making repairs to a... shall be the duty of all engineers when an accident occurs to the boilers or machinery in their...

  13. Accidents in nuclear ships

    Oelgaard, P.L. [Risoe National Lab., Roskilde (Denmark)]|[Technical Univ. of Denmark, Lyngby (Denmark)

    1996-12-01

    This report starts with a discussion of the types of nuclear vessels accidents, in particular accidents which involve the nuclear propulsion systems. Next available information on 61 reported nuclear ship events in considered. Of these 6 deals with U.S. ships, 54 with USSR ships and 1 with a French ship. The ships are in almost all cases nuclear submarines. Only events that involve the sinking of vessels, the nuclear propulsion plants, radiation exposures, fires/explosions, sea-water leaks into the submarines and sinking of vessels are considered. For each event a summary of available information is presented, and comments are added. In some cases the available information is not credible, and these events are neglected. This reduces the number of events to 5 U.S. events, 35 USSR/Russian events and 1 French event. A comparison is made between the reported Soviet accidents and information available on dumped and damaged Soviet naval reactors. It seems possible to obtain good correlation between the two types of events. An analysis is made of the accident and estimates are made of the accident probabilities which are found to be of the order of 10{sup -3} per ship reactor years. It if finally pointed out that the consequences of nuclear ship accidents are fairly local and does in no way not approach the magnitude of the Chernobyl accident. It is emphasized that some of the information on which this report is based, may not be correct. Consequently some of the results of the assessments made may not be correct. (au).

  14. Accidents in nuclear ships

    This report starts with a discussion of the types of nuclear vessels accidents, in particular accidents which involve the nuclear propulsion systems. Next available information on 61 reported nuclear ship events in considered. Of these 6 deals with U.S. ships, 54 with USSR ships and 1 with a French ship. The ships are in almost all cases nuclear submarines. Only events that involve the sinking of vessels, the nuclear propulsion plants, radiation exposures, fires/explosions, sea-water leaks into the submarines and sinking of vessels are considered. For each event a summary of available information is presented, and comments are added. In some cases the available information is not credible, and these events are neglected. This reduces the number of events to 5 U.S. events, 35 USSR/Russian events and 1 French event. A comparison is made between the reported Soviet accidents and information available on dumped and damaged Soviet naval reactors. It seems possible to obtain good correlation between the two types of events. An analysis is made of the accident and estimates are made of the accident probabilities which are found to be of the order of 10-3 per ship reactor years. It if finally pointed out that the consequences of nuclear ship accidents are fairly local and does in no way not approach the magnitude of the Chernobyl accident. It is emphasized that some of the information on which this report is based, may not be correct. Consequently some of the results of the assessments made may not be correct. (au)

  15. Systematic register of nuclear accidents

    The Systematic Register of Nuclear Accidents is a consolidation of important accidents occurred in the world during the period 1945-1984. Important accidents can be defined as those involving high radiation doses, which require the exposed individuals to undergo medical treatment. The organization and structuring of this register rests on the necessity for the availability of a database specifically oriented to researchers interested in studying the different nuclear accidents reported. Approximately 150 accidents in that period are presented in a summary form; these accidents had been described or reported in the scientific literature or made known through informal communications of Brazilian and foreign institutions and researchers. This register can be of interest particularly to all professionals who either directly of indirectly work in the area of nuclear or radioactive installations safety. In order to facilitate analysis by the researcher, that casuistic system was divided into 3 groups: criticality accidents (table I), fall-out on Marshall Islands (table II) and external irradiation accidents (table III). It is also included an overview of accidents in that period, indicating the total number of victims, fatal cases, and number of survivors. The author offers to the reader an extensive bibliography on the accidents described. (Author)

  16. Chernobyl: The true scale of the accident. 20 years later a UN report provides definitive answers and ways to repair lives

    Authoritative figures regarding the effect of the Chernobyl accident presented in a landmark digest report, 'Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts', just released by the Chernobyl Forum. The digest, based on a three-volume, 600-page report and incorporating the work of hundreds of scientists, economists and health experts, assesses the 20-year impact of the largest nuclear accident in history. The Forum is made up of 8 UN specialized agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), and the World Bank, as well as the governments of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The Forum's report aims to help the affected countries understand the true scale of the accident consequences and also suggest ways the governments of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia might address major economic and social problems stemming from the accident. Members of the Forum, including representatives of the three governments, will meet September 6 and 7 in Vienna at an unprecedented gathering of the world's experts on Chernobyl, radiation effects and protection, to consider these findings and recommendations

  17. Experimental data report for Test TS-1 Reactivity Initiated Accident Test in NSRR with pre-irradiated BWR fuel rod

    This report presents experimental data for Test TS-1 which was the first in a series of tests, simulating Reactivity Initiated Accident (RIA) conditions using pre-irradiated BWR fuel rods, performed in the Nuclear Safety Research Reactor (NSRR) in October, 1989. Test fuel rod used in the Test TS-1 was a short-sized BWR (7 x 7) type rod which was fabricated from a commercial rod provided from Tsuruga Unit 1 power reactor. The fuel had an initial enrichment of 2.79 % and burnup of 21.3 GWd/t (bundle average). Pulse irradiation was performed at a condition of stagnant water cooling, atmospheric pressure and ambient temperature using a newly developed double container-type capsule. Energy deposition of the rod in this test was evaluated to be about 61 cal/g·fuel (55 cal/g·fuel in peak fuel enthalpy) and no fuel failure was observed. Descriptions on test conditions, test procedures, fuel burnup measurements, transient behavior of the test rod during pulse irradiation and results of post pulse irradiation examinations are contained in this report. (author)

  18. Bubble behavior in LMFBR core disruptive accidents. Annual report, June 1, 1975--June 30, 1976

    The work reported here is part of the Aerosol Release and Transport program for LMFBR safety assessment for the Reactor Safety Research Division of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Six areas were at various stages of investigation during this reporting period. A study of nonequilibrium mass transfer during fuel expansion and a study of the dynamics of fuel expansion into the sodium pool were completed. Studies are underway on condensation on above-core structures and on generation of aerosols from condensation. Studies were initiated on small-particle generation from hydrodynamic fragmentation, on particle kinematics and on particle-surface interaction

  19. Distribution of hydrogen within the HDR-containment under severe accident conditions. OECD standard problem. Final comparison report

    The present report summarizes the results of the International Standard Problem Exercise ISP-29, based on the HDR Hydrogen Distribution Experiment E11.2. Post-test analyses are compared to experimentally measured parameters, well-known to the analysis. This report has been prepared by the Institute for Reactor Dynamics and Reactor Safety of the Technical University Munich under contract with the Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) which received funding for this activity from the German Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT) under the research contract RS 792. The HDR experiment E11.2 has been performed by the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KfK) in the frame of the project 'Projekt HDR-Sicherheitsprogramm' sponsored by the BMFT. Ten institutions from eight countries participated in the post-test analysis exercise which was focussing on the long-lasting gas distribution processes expected inside a PWR containment under severe accident conditions. The gas release experiment was coupled to a long-lasting steam release into the containment typical for an unmitigated small break loss-of-coolant accident. In lieu of pure hydrogen a gas mixture consisting of 15% hydrogen and 85% helium has been applied in order to avoid reaching flammability during the experiment. Of central importance are common overlay plots comparing calculated transients with measurements of the global pressure, the local temperature-, steam- and gas concentration distributions throughout the entire HDR containment. The comparisons indicate relatively large margins between most calculations and the experiment. Having in mind that this exercise was specified as an 'open post-test' analysis of well-known measured data the reasons for discrepancies between measurements and simulations were extensively discussed during a final workshop. It was concluded that analytical shortcomings as well as some uncertainties of experimental boundary conditions may be responsible for deviations

  20. Accident management information needs

    In support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Accident Management Research Program, a methodology has been developed for identifying the plant information needs necessary for personnel involved in the management of an accident to diagnose that an accident is in progress, select and implement strategies to prevent or mitigate the accident, and monitor the effectiveness of these strategies. This report describes the methodology and presents an application of this methodology to a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) with a large dry containment. A risk-important severe accident sequence for a PWR is used to examine the capability of the existing measurements to supply the necessary information. The method includes an assessment of the effects of the sequence on the measurement availability including the effects of environmental conditions. The information needs and capabilities identified using this approach are also intended to form the basis for more comprehensive information needs assessment performed during the analyses and development of specific strategies for use in accident management prevention and mitigation. 3 refs., 16 figs., 7 tabs

  1. Nursering assistance to the radiological accident patients in Goiania-an experience report

    In september, 1987, a caesium-137 source was disrupted and caused a serious radiological acident. The victims were hospitalized in the General Hospital in city of Goiania, Goias state, Brazil. This is a report of a personal experience, during the two months of nursering care. (author)

  2. Industrial accidents in nuclear power plants

    In 12 nuclear power plants in the Federal Republic of Germany with a total of 3678 employees, 25 notifiable company personnel accidents and 46 notifiable outside personnel accidents were reported for an 18-month period. (orig./HP)

  3. Chernobyl: The true scale of the accident. 20 years later a UN report provides definitive answers and ways to repair lives

    A total of up to four thousand people could eventually die of radiation exposure from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP) accident nearly 20 years ago, an international team of more than 100 scientists has concluded. As of mid-2005, however, fewer than 50 deaths had been directly attributed to radiation from the disaster, almost all being highly exposed rescue workers, many who died within months of the accident but others who died as late as 2004. The new numbers are presented in a landmark digest report, 'Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts', just released by the Chernobyl Forum. The digest, based on a three-volume, 600-page report and incorporating the work of hundreds of scientists, economists and health experts, assesses the 20-year impact of the largest nuclear accident in history. The Forum is made up of 8 UN specialized agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), and the World Bank, as well as the governments of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The Forum's report aims to help the affected countries understand the true scale of the accident consequences and also suggest ways the governments of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia might address major economic and social problems stemming from the accident. Members of the Forum, including representatives of the three governments, will meet September 6 and 7 in Vienna at an unprecedented gathering of the world's experts on Chernobyl, radiation effects and protection, to consider these findings and recommendations

  4. Type A Accident Investigation Board report on the January 17, 1996, electrical accident with injury in Technical Area 21 Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility Los Alamos National Laboratory. Final report

    An electrical accident was investigated in which a crafts person received serious injuries as a result of coming into contact with a 13.2 kilovolt (kV) electrical cable in the basement of Building 209 in Technical Area 21 (TA-21-209) in the Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility (TSFF) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In conducting its investigation, the Accident Investigation Board used various analytical techniques, including events and causal factor analysis, barrier analysis, change analysis, fault tree analysis, materials analysis, and root cause analysis. The board inspected the accident site, reviewed events surrounding the accident, conducted extensive interviews and document reviews, and performed causation analyses to determine the factors that contributed to the accident, including any management system deficiencies. Relevant management systems and factors that could have contributed to the accident were evaluated in accordance with the guiding principles of safety management identified by the Secretary of Energy in an October 1994 letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and subsequently to Congress

  5. Type A Accident Investigation Board report on the January 17, 1996, electrical accident with injury in Technical Area 21 Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility Los Alamos National Laboratory. Final report

    NONE

    1996-04-01

    An electrical accident was investigated in which a crafts person received serious injuries as a result of coming into contact with a 13.2 kilovolt (kV) electrical cable in the basement of Building 209 in Technical Area 21 (TA-21-209) in the Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility (TSFF) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In conducting its investigation, the Accident Investigation Board used various analytical techniques, including events and causal factor analysis, barrier analysis, change analysis, fault tree analysis, materials analysis, and root cause analysis. The board inspected the accident site, reviewed events surrounding the accident, conducted extensive interviews and document reviews, and performed causation analyses to determine the factors that contributed to the accident, including any management system deficiencies. Relevant management systems and factors that could have contributed to the accident were evaluated in accordance with the guiding principles of safety management identified by the Secretary of Energy in an October 1994 letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and subsequently to Congress.

  6. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents. A status report, 1982--1983

    Forester, J.A.; Mitchell, D.B.; Whitehead, D.W. [and others

    1997-04-01

    This study is a continuation of earlier work that evaluated 1969-1981 and 1984-1994 events affecting commercial light-water reactors. One-hundred nine operational events that affected 51 reactors during 1982 and 1983 and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage are described. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 x 10{sup {minus}6}. These events were identified by first computer screening the 1982-83 licensee event reports from commercial light-water reactors to select events that could be precursors to core damage. Candidates underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. This report discusses the general rationale for the study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for the events.

  7. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents. A status report, 1982--1983

    This study is a continuation of earlier work that evaluated 1969-1981 and 1984-1994 events affecting commercial light-water reactors. One-hundred nine operational events that affected 51 reactors during 1982 and 1983 and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage are described. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 x 10-6. These events were identified by first computer screening the 1982-83 licensee event reports from commercial light-water reactors to select events that could be precursors to core damage. Candidates underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. This report discusses the general rationale for the study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for the events

  8. Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit final safety analysis report (LWRHU-FSAR): Volume 2: Accident Model Document (AMD)

    Johnson, E.W.

    1988-10-01

    The purpose of this volume of the LWRHU SAR, the Accident Model Document (AMD), are to: Identify all malfunctions, both singular and multiple, which can occur during the complete mission profile that could lead to release outside the clad of the radioisotopic material contained therein; Provide estimates of occurrence probabilities associated with these various accidents; Evaluate the response of the LWRHU (or its components) to the resultant accident environments; and Associate the potential event history with test data or analysis to determine the potential interaction of the released radionuclides with the biosphere.

  9. Report on Reactor Physics Assessment of Candidate Accident Tolerant Fuel Cladding Materials in LWRs

    Powers, Jeffrey J. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); George, Nathan [Univ. of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN (United States); Maldonado, G. Ivan [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Worrall, Andrew [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-08-28

    This work focuses on ATF concepts being researched at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), expanding on previous studies of using alternate cladding materials in pressurized water reactors (PWRs). The neutronic performance of two leading alternate cladding materials were assessed in boiling water reactors (BWRs): iron-chromium-aluminum (FeCrAl) cladding, and silicon carbide (SiC)-based composite cladding. This report fulfills ORNL Milestone M3FT-15OR0202332 within the fiscal year 2015 (FY15)

  10. Injuries Following Segway Personal Transporter Accidents: Case Report and Review of the Literature

    John Ashurst; Benjamin Wagner

    2015-01-01

    The Segway® self-balancing personal transporter has been used as a means of transport for sightseeing tourists, military, police and emergency medical personnel. Only recently have reports been published about serious injuries that have been sustained while operating this device. This case describes a 67-year-old male who sustained an oblique fracture of the shaft of the femur while using the Segway® for transportation around his community. We also present a review of the liter...

  11. Cerebrovascular Accident Following Unprescribed Use of Sildenafil: Is it Underestimated? - Case Report

    Murat Zinnuroğlu; Bijen Nazlıel; Gülçin Kaymak Karataş; Nurdan Araçoğlu; Belgin Koçer

    2010-01-01

    Sildenafil citrate is a commonly used agent in the treatment of erectile dysfunction. Cardiovascular and cerebrovascular complications have been reported associated with sildenafil use. Despite the well-described cardiovascular side effects, little is known about the development of cerebrovascular diseases. We present a 46-year-old patient with stroke and global aphasia due to the combined use of sildenafil and alcohol. Patients may be reluctant to mention sildenafil use, and drugs like silde...

  12. Remediation strategies for contaminated territories resulting from Chernobyl accident. Final report

    The present report realizes a settlement specific approach to derive remediation strategies and generalizes the results to the whole affected area. The ultimate aim of the study is to prepare possible investment projects on remediation activities in the contaminated territories. Its current aim was to identify the areas and the remedial actions that should be primarily supported and their corresponding cost. The present report starts with an outline of the methodology of deriving remediation strategies, a description of data for 70 representative settlements and of parameters of the remedial actions considered, and a classification of the contaminated territory according to radiological criteria. After summarising aspects of the contamination situation and applications of remedial actions in the past, dose calculations and derived remediation strategies for the representative settlements are described. These are generalized to the total contaminated territory. Within the contaminated territory private produce is of main importance for the radionuclide intake. At the end of the report, radiological aspects of the produce of collective farms are described. (orig.)

  13. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1994, a status report. Volume 22: Appendix I

    Nine operational events that affected eleven commercial light-water reactors (LWRs) during 1994 and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage are described. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 x 10-6. These events were identified by computer-screening the 1994 licensee event reports from commercial LWRs to identify those that could be potential precursors. Candidate precursors were then selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters and regional offices to ensure that the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969--1981 and 1984--1993 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for events. This document is bound in two volumes: Vol. 21 contains the main report and Appendices A--H; Vol. 22 contains Appendix 1

  14. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1994, a status report. Volume 22: Appendix I

    Belles, R.J.; Cletcher, J.W.; Copinger, D.A.; Vanden Heuvel, L.N. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Dolan, B.W.; Minarick, J.W. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States)]|[Science Applications International Corp., Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    1995-12-01

    Nine operational events that affected eleven commercial light-water reactors (LWRs) during 1994 and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage are described. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 {times} 10{sup {minus}6}. These events were identified by computer-screening the 1994 licensee event reports from commercial LWRs to identify those that could be potential precursors. Candidate precursors were then selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters and regional offices to ensure that the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969--1981 and 1984--1993 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for events. This document is bound in two volumes: Vol. 21 contains the main report and Appendices A--H; Vol. 22 contains Appendix 1.

  15. Sodium hypochlorite accident resulting in life-threatening airway obstruction during root canal treatment: a case report

    Al-Sebaei MO

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available Maisa O Al-Sebaei,1 Omar A Halabi,2 Ibrahim E El-Hakim3 1Department of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, King Abdulaziz University – Faculty of Dentistry, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; 2Saudi Board of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, Al-Noor Specialist Hospital, Makkah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; 3Department of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, Riyadh Colleges of Dentistry and Pharmacy, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Aim: This case report describes a serious and life-threatening complication of the use of sodium hypochlorite as an irrigation solution in root canal therapy. Summary: This case report describes a hypochlorite accident that occurred in a healthy 42-year-old female who was undergoing routine root canal therapy for the lower right central incisor (tooth #41. After approximately 1 hour of irrigation with 3% sodium hypochlorite (for a total of 12 cc, the patient complained of severe pain and burning in the lip. The swelling progressed over the next 8 hours to involve the sublingual and submental fascial spaces with elevation of the tongue and resultant upper airway obstruction. The patient was intubated and remained on mechanical ventilation for 3 days. She recovered without any skin necrosis or nerve deficits. Key learning points: This case report highlights the importance of carefully performing root canal irrigation with sodium hypochlorite to avoid complications. Careful injection without pressure, the use of proper rubber dam isolation, and the use of the endodontic needle are necessary to avoid this type of complication. Although it is a safe root canal irrigation solution, its use may lead to life-threatening complications. Early recognition and management of the untoward effects of sodium hypochlorite are vital for the patient's safety. Keywords: complications of root canal, facial edema, root canal irrigation, root canal therapy, sodium hypochlorite, upper airway obstruction

  16. Trismus: An unusual presentation following road accident

    Thakur Jagdeep

    2007-01-01

    Full Text Available Trismus due to trauma usually follows road accidents leading to massive faciomaxillary injury. In the literature there is no report of a foreign body causing trismus following a road accident, this rare case is an exception. We present a case of isolated presentation of trismus following a road accident. This case report stresses on the thorough evaluation of patients presenting with trismus following a road accident.

  17. Accident management insights from IPE's

    In response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Generic Letter 88-20, each utility in the U.S.A. has undertaken a probabilistic severe accident study of each plant. This paper provides a high level summary of the generic PWR accident management insights that have been obtained from the IPE reports. More importantly, the paper details some of the limitations of the IPE studies with respect to accident management. The IPE studies and the methodology used was designed to provide a best estimate of the potential for a severe accident and/or for severe consequences from a core damage accident. The accepted methodology employs a number of assumptions to make the objective attainable with a reasonable expenditure of resources. However, some of the assumptions represent limitations with respect to developing an accident management program based solely on the IPE and its results. (author)

  18. Injuries Following Segway Personal Transporter Accidents: Case Report and Review of the Literature.

    Ashurst, John; Wagner, Benjamin

    2015-09-01

    The Segway® self-balancing personal transporter has been used as a means of transport for sightseeing tourists, military, police and emergency medical personnel. Only recently have reports been published about serious injuries that have been sustained while operating this device. This case describes a 67-year-old male who sustained an oblique fracture of the shaft of the femur while using the Segway® for transportation around his community. We also present a review of the literature. PMID:26587093

  19. Early phase clean-up actions after nuclear accidents. Guidelines for the planner. Final report

    The work reported has been performed with the purpose of working out a guide for planners of early clean-up actions in nuclear fallout situations and for decision makers in the Nordic countries. The actions considered are hosing of roofs, walls and paved areas, lawn mowing, removal of snow, pruning of trees and bushes and vacuum cleaning of streets. The expected effects, mainly as life time dose reduction, and consequences regarding practicability, waste produced, staffing and protection are presented for urban, suburban and rural living environments. The work has been performed within the fram work of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Program 1994-97 (Statens Raeddningsverk). (au)

  20. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1992, A status report

    Twenty-seven operational events with conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage of 1.0 x 10E-06 or higher occurring at commercial light-water reactors during 1992 are considered to be precursors to potential core damage. These are described along with associated significance estimates, categorization, and subsequent analyses. The report discusses (1) the general rationale for this study, (2) the selection and documentation of events as precursors, (3) the estimation and use of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage to rank precursor events, and (4) the plant models used in the analysis process

  1. Early phase clean-up actions after nuclear accidents. Guidelines for the planner. Final report

    Ulvsand, T

    1997-06-01

    The work reported has been performed with the purpose of working out a guide for planners of early clean-up actions in nuclear fallout situations and for decision makers in the Nordic countries. The actions considered are hosing of roofs, walls and paved areas, lawn mowing, removal of snow, pruning of trees and bushes and vacuum cleaning of streets. The expected effects, mainly as life time dose reduction, and consequences regarding practicability, waste produced, staffing and protection are presented for urban, suburban and rural living environments. The work has been performed within the fram work of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Program 1994-97 (Statens Raeddningsverk). (au)

  2. Injuries Following Segway Personal Transporter Accidents: Case Report and Review of the Literature

    John Ashurst

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available The Segway® self-balancing personal transporter has been used as a means of transport for sightseeing tourists, military, police and emergency medical personnel. Only recently have reports been published about serious injuries that have been sustained while operating this device. This case describes a 67-year-old male who sustained an oblique fracture of the shaft of the femur while using the Segway® for transportation around his community. We also present a review of the literature.

  3. Strategies for reactor safety: Preventing loss of coolant accidents. Final report

    This final report on the NKS/RAK-1.2 summarizes the main features of the PIFRAP PC-program and its intended implementation. Regardless of the preferred technical approach to LOCA frequency estimation, the analysis approach must include recognition of the following technical issues: a) Degradation and failure mechanisms potentially affecting piping systems within the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) and the potential consequences; b) In-service inspection practices and how they influence piping reliability; and c) The service experience with piping systems. The report consists of six sections and one appendix. A Nordic perspective on LOCA and nuclear safety is given. It includes summaries of results from research in material sciences and current regulatory philosophies regarding piping reliability. A summary of the LOCA concept is applied in Nordic PSA studies. It includes a discussion on deterministic and probabilistic views on LOCA. The R and D on piping reliability by SKI and the PIFRAP model is summarized. Next, Section 6 presents conclusion and recommendations. Finally, Appendix A contains a list of abbreviations and acronyms, together with a glossary of technical terms. (EG)

  4. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1995 A status report

    Ten operational events that affected 10 commercial light-water reactors during 1995 and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage are described. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 x 10-6. These events were identified by first computer-screening the 1995 licensee event reports from commercial light-water reactors to identify those events that could potentially be precursors. Candidate precursors were selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters and regional offices to ensure the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969-1981 and 1984-1994 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for the events

  5. Strategies for reactor safety: Preventing loss of coolant accidents. Final report

    Lydell, B.O.Y. [RSA Technoligies, Vista (United States)

    1997-12-01

    This final report on the NKS/RAK-1.2 summarizes the main features of the PIFRAP PC-program and its intended implementation. Regardless of the preferred technical approach to LOCA frequency estimation, the analysis approach must include recognition of the following technical issues: (a) Degradation and failure mechanisms potentially affecting piping systems within the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) and the potential consequences; (b) In-service inspection practices and how they influence piping reliability; and (c) The service experience with piping systems. The report consists of six sections and one appendix. A Nordic perspective on LOCA and nuclear safety is given. It includes summaries of results from research in material sciences and current regulatory philosophies regarding piping reliability. A summary of the LOCA concept is applied in Nordic PSA studies. It includes a discussion on deterministic and probabilistic views on LOCA. The R and D on piping reliability by SKI and the PIFRAP model is summarized. Next, Section 6 presents conclusion and recommendations. Finally, Appendix A contains a list of abbreviations and acronyms, together with a glossary of technical terms. (EG) 16 refs.

  6. Report of the activities carried out by the Psychological Support Group in the Goiania radiological accident in Brazil; Relatorio de atividades desenvolvidas pelo Nucleo de Apoio Psicologico da Rua 57

    NONE

    1988-01-01

    The report analyzes the characteristics and attitudes of the population directly involved in the Goiania radiological accident. The inhabitants of the affected area were interviewed in their residence. Factual information about the accidents were given and specific psychological support were received whenever necessary 11 tabs.

  7. Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit Safety Analysis Report (LWRHU-SAR). Volume II. Accident model document

    Purposes of this volume (AMD), are to: Identify all malfunctions, both singular and multiple, which can occur during the complete mission profile that could lead to release outside the clad of the radioisotopic material contained therein; provide estimates of occurrence probabilities associated with these various accidents; evaluate the response of the LWRHU (or its components) to the resultant accident environments; and associate the potential event history with test data or analysis to determine the potential interaction of the released radionuclides with the biosphere

  8. Calculated in-air leakage spectra and power levels for the ANSI standard minimum accident of concern. Final report

    This document represents Phase I of a two-phase project. The entire project consists of determining a series of minimum accidents of concern and their associated neutron and photon leakage spectra that may be used to determine Criticality Accident Alarm compliance with ANSI/ANS-8.3. The inadvertent assembly of a critical mass of material presents a multitude of unknown quantities. Depending on the particular process, one can make an educated guess as to fissile material. In a gaseous diffusion cascade, this material is assumed to be uranyl fluoride. However, educated assumptions cannot be readily made for the other variables. Phase I of this project is determining a bounding minimum accident of concern and its associated neutron and photon leakage spectra. To determine the composition of the bounding minimum accident of concern, work was done to determine the effects of geometry, moderation level, and enrichment on the leakage spectra of a critical assembly. The minimum accident of concern is defined as the accident that may be assumed to deliver the equivalent of an absorbed dose in free air of 20 rad at a distance of 2 meters from the reacting material within 60 seconds. To determine this dose, an analyst makes an assumption and choose an appropriate flux to dose response function. The power level required of a critical assembly to constitute a minimum accident of concern depends heavily on the response function chosen. The first step in determining the leakage spectra was to attempt to isolate the effects of geometry, after which all calculations were conducted on critical spheres. The moderation level and enrichment of the spheres were varied and their leakage spectra calculated. These spectra were then multiplied by three different response functions: the Henderson Flux to Dose conversion factors, the ICRU 44 Kerma in Air, and the MCNP Heating Detector. The power level required to produce a minimum accident of concern was then calculated for each combination

  9. Impact of short-term severe accident management actions in a long-term perspective. Final Report

    The present systems for severe accident management are focused on mitigating the consequences of special severe accident phenomena and to reach a safe plant state. However, in the development of strategies and procedures for severe accident management, it is also important to consider the long-term perspective of accident management and especially to secure the safe state of the plant. The main reason for this is that certain short-term actions have an impact on the long-term scenario. Both positive and negative effects from short-term actions on the accident management in the long-term perspective have been included in this paper. Short-term actions are accident management measures taken within about 24 hours after the initiating event. The purpose of short-term actions is to reach a stable status of the plant. The main goal in the long-term perspective is to maintain the reactor in a stable state and prevent uncontrolled releases of activity. The purpose of this short Technical Note, deliberately limited in scope, is to draw attention to potential long-term problems, important to utilities and regulatory authorities, arising from the way a severe accident would be managed during the first hours. Its objective is to encourage discussions on the safest - and maybe also most economical - way to manage a severe accident in the long term by not making the situation worse through inappropriate short-term actions, and on the identification of short-term actions likely to make long-term management easier and safer. The Note is intended as a contribution to the knowledge base put at the disposal of Member countries through international collaboration. The scope of the work has been limited to a literature search. Useful further activities have been identified. However, there is no proposal, at this stage, for more detailed work to be undertaken under the auspices of the CSNI. Plant-specific applications would need to be developed by utilities

  10. Containment severe accident thermohydraulic phenomena

    This report describes and discusses the containment accident progression and the important severe accident containment thermohydraulic phenomena. The overall objective of the report is to provide a rather detailed presentation of the present status of phenomenological knowledge, including an account of relevant experimental investigations and to discuss, to some extent, the modelling approach used in the MAAP 3.0 computer code. The MAAP code has been used in Sweden as the main tool in the analysis of severe accidents. The dependence of the containment accident progression and containment phenomena on the initial conditions, which in turn are heavily dependent on the in-vessel accident progression and phenomena as well as associated uncertainties, is emphasized. The report is in three parts dealing with: * Swedish reactor containments, the severe accident mitigation programme in Sweden and containment accident progression in Swedish PWRs and BWRs as predicted by the MAAP 3.0 code. * Key non-energetic ex-vessel phenomena (melt fragmentation in water, melt quenching and coolability, core-concrete interaction and high temperature in containment). * Early containment threats due to energetic events (hydrogen combustion, high pressure melt ejection and direct containment heating, and ex-vessel steam explosions). The report concludes that our understanding of the containment severe accident progression and phenomena has improved very significantly over the parts ten years and, thereby, our ability to assess containment threats, to quantify uncertainties, and to interpret the results of experiments and computer code calculations have also increased. (au)

  11. Phenomenological Studies on Melt-Structure-Water Interactions (MSWI) during Postulated Severe Accidents: Year 2004 Activity. APRI 5 report

    This report presents descriptions of the major results obtained in the research program 'Melt-Structure-Water Interaction (MSWI)' at NPS/RIT during the year 2004. The primary objectives of the MSWI Project in year 2004 were to study (1) the in-vessel and exvessel melt/debris bed coolability process when melt is flooded with water, and (2) the energetics and characteristics of steam explosions. Our general approaches are to establish scaling relationships so that the data obtained in the experiments could be extended to prototypical accident geometries and conditions, develop phenomenological or computational models for the processes under investigation and validate the existing and newly developed models against data obtained at RIT and at other laboratories. In 2004, several experimental programs, such as the COMECO (Corium MElt COolability), POMECO (POrous MEdia COolability) and MISTEE (Micro-Interactions in STeam Explosion Experiments) programs were continued. The SIMECO (Simulation of MElt Coolability) program was restarted in 2004. The construction of the POMECO-GRAND (POrous MEdia COolability) facility was delayed due to lack of finances. However, existing POMECO facility was modified to study 3-D effects on debris coolability. In this report, the results from the COMECO experiment with high temperature oxidic melt, from the POMECO experiments for the multi-dimensional effects on debris bed coolability, from the SIMECO experiment for three-layer pool configuration and from the MISTEE experiments for steam explosion characteristics and loads are described. For analytical efforts, results from the COMETA code for the entire process of the steam explosions are discussed

  12. Phenomenological Studies on Melt-Structure-Water Interactions (MSWI) during Postulated Severe Accidents: Year 2004 Activity. APRI 5 report

    Sehgal, B.R.; Park, H.S.; Nayak, A.K.; Hansson, R.C.; Chiferaw, D.; Stepanyan, A.; Rao, R.S.; Karbojian, A. [Royal Inst. of Technology, Stockholm (Sweden). Div. of Nuclear Power Safety

    2005-04-01

    This report presents descriptions of the major results obtained in the research program 'Melt-Structure-Water Interaction (MSWI)' at NPS/RIT during the year 2004. The primary objectives of the MSWI Project in year 2004 were to study (1) the in-vessel and exvessel melt/debris bed coolability process when melt is flooded with water, and (2) the energetics and characteristics of steam explosions. Our general approaches are to establish scaling relationships so that the data obtained in the experiments could be extended to prototypical accident geometries and conditions, develop phenomenological or computational models for the processes under investigation and validate the existing and newly developed models against data obtained at RIT and at other laboratories. In 2004, several experimental programs, such as the COMECO (Corium MElt COolability), POMECO (POrous MEdia COolability) and MISTEE (Micro-Interactions in STeam Explosion Experiments) programs were continued. The SIMECO (Simulation of MElt Coolability) program was restarted in 2004. The construction of the POMECO-GRAND (POrous MEdia COolability) facility was delayed due to lack of finances. However, existing POMECO facility was modified to study 3-D effects on debris coolability. In this report, the results from the COMECO experiment with high temperature oxidic melt, from the POMECO experiments for the multi-dimensional effects on debris bed coolability, from the SIMECO experiment for three-layer pool configuration and from the MISTEE experiments for steam explosion characteristics and loads are described. For analytical efforts, results from the COMETA code for the entire process of the steam explosions are discussed.

  13. Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island accident by Office of Inspection and Enforcement (Investigative Report No. 50-320/79-10)

    On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant experienced the most severe accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history. This report sets forth the facts concerning the events of the accident determined as a result of an investigation by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement. The IE investigation is limited to two aspects of the accident: (1) Those related operational actions by the licensee during the period from before the initiating event until approximately 8:00 p.m., March 28, when primary coolant flow was re-established by starting a reactor coolant pump, and (2) Those steps taken by the licensee to control the release of radioactive material to the off-site environs, and to implement his emergency plan during the period from the initiation of the event to midnight, March 30. These investigation periods were selected because they include the licensee actions which most significantly affected the accident sequence and its results

  14. Fungal infection after a tragedy: a report of three cases of candidosis in a fire accident

    PAN Wei-hua; XIA Zhao-fan; SHAN Hong-wei; CHEN Min; LIAO Wan-qing

    2012-01-01

    Patients who suffer severe bums are at increased risk for local and systemic infections.The incidence of fungal infections has increased in recent years,and these infections represent a major issue in bum intensive care units.Herein,we report three cases of fungal infection due to Candida species occurring in patients undergoing supportive therapy and antibiotic treatment during their hospitalization.Two of these patients were infected with Candida parapsilosis,and one was infected with Candida albicans.The risk factors for these patients' Candida infections were multiple and prolonged courses of antimicrobial treatment,steroid treatment,tracheal intubation and smoke inhalation.Susceptibility testing of nine antifungal compounds was performed,and the minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) values of all isolated strains were lower than the breakpoint MIC value for resistance of the relevant drug.All three patients were cured by treatment with antifungal agents.Candida infection may occur 1-3 weeks after thermal injury,and the prompt recognition and treatment of such infections with antifungal therapies may result in decreased morbidity and mortality associated with these infections in burn patients.

  15. Health consequences of the Chernobyl accident. Results of the IPHECA pilot projects and related national programmes. Scientific report. International Programme on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPHECA)

    Since the Chernobyl accident, massive efforts have been made by the governmental authorities to mitigate the effects, to provide diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation to those affected and to investigate the effects on health which had occurred. Vast amounts of resources have and continue to be expended in supporting these efforts. In 1991, WHO officially joined this effort through the establishment by the World Health Assembly of the International Programme on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPHECA). The objectives of this Programme were: to contribute to the efforts to alleviate the health consequences of the accident by assisting health authorities in Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine; to consolidate the experience gained from treatment of over-exposure and from various practical interventions and thereby improve medical preparedness for the future; and to acquire data in the fields of radiation epidemiology and medical response to disasters. IPHECA initially concentrated on five priority areas, and pilot projects were developed for implementation in Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine for each: thyroid, haematology, brain damage in-utero, epidemiological registry and oral health (only in Belarus). This publication is intended to fulfil a number of purposes. It provides an account of what was accomplished during the pilot phase of IPHECA. It discusses the protocols which were developed and used, summarizes the investigations which were carried out and reports on the instrumentation, supplies and training programmes which were provided. The publication also describes and discusses the results which have been obtained to date and identifies the still existing gaps in knowledge

  16. Measures against nuclear accidents

    A select committee appointed by the Norwegian Ministry of Social Affairs put forward proposals concerning measures for the improvement of radiation protection preparedness in Norway. On the basis on an assessment of the potential radiation accident threat, the report examines the process of response, and identifies the organizational and management factors that influence that process

  17. Intervention principles and levels in the event of a nuclear accident. Final report on the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Project BER-3

    The aim of the Nordic BER-3 project has been to harmonize the Nordic intervention levels after a nuclear accident. The paper deals with the findings and recommendations to be presented to the Nordic authorities as background material for common decisions on the most likely protective actions. In the report sheltering, evaluation and relocation are treated in detail. Iodine prophylaxis and foodstuff restrictions are briefly commented on. The basis for this work is the internationally accepted basic principles for interventions

  18. Accident management insights after the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident, that took place on 11 March 2011, initiated a significant number of activities at the national and international levels to reassess the safety of existing NPPs, evaluate the sufficiency of technical means and administrative measures available for emergency response, and develop recommendations for increasing the robustness of NPPs to withstand extreme external events and beyond design basis accidents. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is working closely with its member and partner countries to examine the causes of the accident and to identify lessons learnt with a view to the appropriate follow-up actions to be taken by the nuclear safety community. Accident management is a priority area of work for the NEA to address lessons being learnt from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP following the recommendations of Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI), and Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH). Considering the importance of these issues, the CNRA authorised the formation of a task group on accident management (TGAM) in June 2012 to review the regulatory framework for accident management following the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. The task group was requested to assess the NEA member countries needs and challenges in light of the accident from a regulatory point of view. The general objectives of the TGAM review were to consider: - enhancements of on-site accident management procedures and guidelines based on lessons learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident; - decision-making and guiding principles in emergency situations; - guidance for instrumentation, equipment and supplies for addressing long-term aspects of accident management; - guidance and implementation when taking extreme measures for accident management. The report is built on the existing bases for capabilities to respond to design basis

  19. How to reduce the number of accidents

    2012-01-01

    Among the safety objectives that the Director-General has established for CERN in 2012 is a reduction in the number of workplace accidents.   The best way to prevent workplace accidents is to learn from experience. This is why any accident, fire, instance of pollution, or even a near-miss, should be reported using the EDH form that can be found here. All accident reports are followed up. The departments investigate all accidents that result in sick leave, as well as all the more common categories of accidents at CERN, essentially falls (slipping, falling on stairs, etc.), regardless of whether or not they lead to sick leave. By studying the accident causes that come to light in this way, it is possible to take preventive action to avoid such accidents in the future. If you have any questions, the HSE Unit will be happy to answer them. Contact us at safety-general@cern.ch. HSE Unit

  20. Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1994, a status report. Volume 21: Main report and appendices A--H

    Nine operational events that affected eleven commercial light-water reactors (LWRs) during 1994 and that are considered to be precursors to potential severe core damage are described. All these events had conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage greater than or equal to 1.0 x 10-6. These events were identified by computer-screening the 1994 licensee event reports from commercial LWRs to identify those that could be potential precursors. Candidate precursors were then selected and evaluated in a process similar to that used in previous assessments. Selected events underwent engineering evaluation that identified, analyzed, and documented the precursors. Other events designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also underwent a similar evaluation. Finally, documented precursors were submitted for review by licensees and NRC headquarters and regional offices to ensure that the plant design and its response to the precursor were correctly characterized. This study is a continuation of earlier work, which evaluated 1969--1981 and 1984--1993 events. The report discusses the general rationale for this study, the selection and documentation of events as precursors, and the estimation of conditional probabilities of subsequent severe core damage for events. This document is bound in two volumes: Vol. 21 contains the main report and Appendices A--H; Vol. 22 contains Appendix 1

  1. Scoping accident(s) for emergency planning

    At the request of the Conference of State Radiation Control Program Director's (CRCPD), in November 1976 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission formed a joint Task Force with representatives of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to answer a number of questions posed by the States regarding emergency planning. This Task Force held monthly meetings through November 1977. In December 1977 a draft report was prepared for limited distribution for review and comment by selected State and local organizations. The NRC/EPA Task Force deliberations centered on the CRCPD request for '... a determination of the most severe accident basis for which radiological emergency response plans should be developed by offsite agencies...' in the vicinity of nuclear power plants. Federal Interagency guidance to the States in this regard has been that the scoping accident should be the most serious conservatively analyzed accident considered for siting purposes, as exemplified in the Commission's Regulations at 10 CFR Part 100 and the NRC staffs Regulatory Guides 1.3 and 1.4, and as presented in license applicant's Safety Analysis Reports and the USNRC Staffs Safety Evaluation Reports. The draft report of the Task Force amplifies on this recommendation: to present a clearer picture of its import and introduces the concept of protective action zones (PAZs) within which detailed emergency plans should be developed; one zone for the plume exposure pathway and a second, larger zone for contamination pathways. The time dependence of potential releases and atmospheric transport, and important radionuclide groups of possible import are also discussed in the draft Task Force report. A status report regarding this effort, as of June 1978, will be presented. (author)

  2. Report on the consequences of Chernobylsk accident in France Minister missions from the 25. february to 6. august 2002

    Actually, we have not any map that gives reliable quantitative data of Chernobylsk accident fallout on soils. The maps proposed for these deposits give order of magnitude; they find east-west gradient conform to the origin of the accident and confirm the importance of the rain. But the quantitative value is only an approximation where the precision is not known (error interval). It does not allow to know the radiation doses to the thyroid because the food contamination does not increase like the soils contamination. It could be possible to improve the models but the scientific council of I.R.S.N. proposes to realize a periodic ground state of soils contamination in cesium. It would be a better step of a more reliable mapping of Chernobylsk accident fallout. (N.C.)

  3. The accident in Fukushima. Preliminary report on the accident progress in the nuclear power plants as a consequence of the earth quake on 11th March 2011; Der Unfall in Fukushima. Zwischenbericht zu den Ablaeufen in den Kernkraftwerken nach dem Erdbeben vom 11. Maerz 2011

    Borghoff, Stefan; Brueck, Benjamin; Kilian-Huelsmeyer, Yvonne; Maqua, Michael; Mildenberger, Oliver; Quester, Claudia; Stahl, Thorsten; Thuma, Gernot; Wetzel, Norbert; Wild, Volker

    2011-08-15

    The preliminary report on the accident progress in the nuclear power plants as a consequence of the earth quake on 11th March 2011 describes the chronologic sequence of the accident in the different units of the power plant. The measures for mitigation of the accident impact at the site of Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini included the efforts to reach and maintain stable plant conditions. The issue radiological situation includes an estimation of the air-borne radionuclide release, the contamination of the environment and the sea water, measures for protection of the public. The lessons learned following the NISA and IAEA fact finding missions and the open questions are summarized.

  4. Reactor safety study. An assessment of accident risks in U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Appendix XI. Analysis of comments on the draft WASH-1400 report

    Information is presented concerning comments on reactor safety by governmental agencies and civilian organizations; reactor safety study methodology; consequence model; probability of accident sequences; and various accident conditions

  5. Major issues on dose assessment and radiological protection after the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. Overview of the reports from domestic and international professional bodies

    The Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident, which happened at March 2011, caused meltdowns and tremendous release of large amount of radioactive substances. Many countermeasures have been carried out by the government and the operator, but eventually public and workers were exposed to radiation. During and after the accident, many disruptions related to radiation exposure, dose, and interpretation of risk were raised among the society and are still lasting. For these, some national and international organizations and expert groups, such as World Health Organization: WHO, United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: UNSCEAR, International Commission on Radiological Protection: ICRP, and Japan Health Physics Society, etc. have published comprehensive reports regarding the estimation of doses and risks for public and workers including just after the accident, and issues on radiological protection or radiation emergency management. In this research we reviewed those reports which were available as of January 2015, and identified major issues for improving the future system of the radiological protection. (author)

  6. Investigation of a fatal airplane crash: autopsy, computed tomography, and injury pattern analysis used to determine who was steering the plane at time of accident. A case report

    Høyer, Christian Bjerre; Nielsen, Trine Skov; Nagel, Lise Loft;

    2012-01-01

    A fatal accident is reported in which a small single-engine light airplane crashed. The airplane carried two persons in the front seats, both of whom possessed valid pilot certificates. Both victims were subject to autopsy, including post-mortem computed tomography scanning (PMCT) prior to the...... autopsy. The autopsies showed massive destruction to the bodies of the two victims but did not identify any signs of acute or chronic medical conditions that could explain loss of control of the airplane. PMCT, histological examination, and forensic chemical analysis also failed to identify an explanation...... for the crash. A detailed review of an airplane identical to the crashed airplane was performed in collaboration with the Danish Accident Investigation Board and the Danish National Police, National Centre of Forensic Services. The injuries were described using the abbreviated injury scale, the injury...

  7. Environmental consequences of the Chernobyl accident and their remediation: Twenty years of experience. Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group 'Environment' (EGE). Working material

    The purpose of this report is to provide an up-to-date evaluation of the environmental effects of the 26 April 1986 accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Even though it is now nearly 20 years after the accident and substantial monies have been spent on such evaluations, there are still many conflicting reports and rumours. This joint report has been developed with the full cooperation of the United Nations (UN) family of relevant organisations and with political representatives from the three more affected countries: Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation. In addition, recognised scientific experts from the three countries and additional international experts provided the basis for the preparation of reports for review by the actual members of the Chernobyl Forum. The - Chernobyl Forum - is a high-level political forum whose suggestion for existence was initiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the World Health Organisation (WHO), and the World Bank, as well as the competent authorities of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. The organisational meeting of the Chernobyl Forum was held on 3-5 February 2003, at which time the decision was reached to establish the Forum as an ongoing entity of the above named organisations. Thus, the organisational meeting of the Forum decided to establish the Chernobyl Forum as a series of managerial, expert and public meetings in order to generate authoritative consensual statements on the health effects attributable to radiation exposure arising from the accident and the environmental consequences induced by the released radioactive materials, to provide advice on

  8. Tchernobyl accident

    First, R.M.B.K type reactors are described. Then, safety problems are dealt with reactor control, behavior during transients, normal loss of power and behavior of the reactor in case of leak. A possible scenario of the accident of Tchernobyl is proposed: events before the explosion, possible initiators, possible scenario and events subsequent to the core meltdown (corium-concrete interaction, interaction with the groundwater table). An estimation of the source term is proposed first from the installation characteristics and the supposed scenario of the accident, and from the measurements in Europe; radiological consequences are also estimated. Radioactivity measurements (Europe, Scandinavia, Western Europe, France) are given in tables (meteorological maps and fallouts in Europe). Finally, a description of the site is given

  9. Accident: Reminder

    2003-01-01

    There is no left turn to Point 1 from the customs, direction CERN. A terrible accident happened last week on the Route de Meyrin just outside Entrance B because traffic regulations were not respected. You are reminded that when travelling from the customs, direction CERN, turning left to Point 1 is forbidden. Access to Point 1 from the customs is only via entering CERN, going down to the roundabout and coming back up to the traffic lights at Entrance B

  10. International programme on the health effects of the Chernobyl accident (IPHECA). Report of the management committee meeting Geneva 16-17 March 1994

    The International Programme on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPHECA) have been initiated in mid-1991 following its endorsement by the Forty-fourth World Health Assembly in resolution WHA44.36. The report of the Management Committee Meeting outlines the progress made in the implementation of the Programme, and summarises the scientific information obtained to date on the health effects and planned future activities. Status reports were provided by the representatives of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and the WHO Secretariat. The major projects under the programme include Thyroid project, Hematology project, Dosimetry and Communication Support Services, Brain Damage in utero project and Epidemiological Registry project. 4 tabs

  11. Containment event analysis for postulated severe accidents: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2. Draft report for comment

    A study has been performed as part of the Severe Accident Risk Reduction Program (SARRP) to investigate the response of a particular boiling water reactor with a Mark I containment (Peach Bottom Unit 2) to postulated severe accidents. A detailed containment event tree for the Peach Bottom plant has been developed to describe the various possible accident pathways that can lead to radioactive releases from containment. Data and analyses from a large number of NRC and industry-sponsored programs have been reviewed and used as a basis for quantifying the event tree, i.e., determining the likelihood of the pathways at each branch point for a variety of accident sequence initiators. A generalized containment event tree code, called EVNTRE, has been developed to facilitate the quantification. The uncertainty in the results has been examined by performing the quantification three times, using a different set of input each time to represent the variation of opinion in the reactor safety community. In the so-called 'central' estimate, the likelihood of early containment failure (occurring before or within a short time after reactor vessel breach) was found to be significant because of the possible occurrence of the following phenomena that can threaten containment integrity: (1) meltthrough of the drywell shell caused by thermal attack from core debris, and (2) drywell overpressurization caused by rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel in combination with other events such as direct heating. However, uncertainties surrounding these issues could cause the early failure likelihood to be significantly lower than in the central estimate. This work supports NRC's assessment of severe accident risks to be published in NUREG-1150. (author)

  12. NKS-R ExCoolSe mid-term report KTH severe accidents research relevant to the NKS-ExCoolSe project

    The present mid-term progress report is prepared on the recent results from the KTH severe accident research program relevant to the objective of the ExCoolSe project sponsored by the NKS-R program. The previous PRE-MELT-DEL project at KTH sponsored by NKS provided an extensive assessment on the remaining issues of severe accidents in general and suggested the key issues to be resolved such as coolability and steam explosion energetics in ex-vessel which became a backbone of the ExCoolSe project in NKS. The EXCOOLSE project has been integrated with, and leveraged on, parallel research program at KTH on severe accident phenomena the MSWI project which is funded by the APRI program, SKI in Sweden and HSK in Switzerland and produced more understanding of the key remaining issues. During last year, the critical assessment of the existing knowledge and current SAMG and designs of Nordic BWRs identified the research focus and initiated the new series of research activities toward the resolution of the key remaining issues specifically pertaining to the Nordic BWRs.(au)

  13. Assessment of the accident in the Harrisburg Nuclear Power Station. 2nd interim report to the Committee of the Interior of the German Federal Parliament

    The report falls under the following headings: summary and main points of interest; introduction; description of the events at Harrisburg (description of the power station; sequence of events; safety assessment of the course of the accident; release of radioactive substances into the surroundings; monitoring of the surroundings; disaster protection planning); re-examination of the safety of German nuclear power stations based on current analyses of the Harrisburg accident (re-examination of nuclear power stations already in operation; results of the examinations carried out so far; re-examination of nuclear power stations for which no operating licences have yet been granted; conclusions for monitoring of the surroundings; conclusions for emergency protection planning); classification of the Harrisburg events in risk considerations and the wider social context (considerations on risk; the risk of nuclear power stations in the wider social context; optimization of technology and the wider social context; the possibilities of further reduction in the residual risk of nuclear power stations and for improving the consensus of opinion both nationally and internationally on the subject of nuclear power station safety); the repercussions of the Harrisburg accident in other countries up to the time of writing (Belgium, Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, USSR). (U.K.)

  14. Safety against releases in severe accidents. Annual report 1996. Project plan 1997; Saekerhet mot utslaepp vid reaktorhaverier. Aarsrapport 1996. Plans 1997

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    The work scope of the RAK-2 project is divided into three sub-projects: RAK-2.1 Severe Accident Phenomenology; RAK-2.2 Computerised Accident Management; RAK-2.3 Reactors In Nordic Surroundings. The work in subproject 1 progresses roughly according to budget and time schedule. Some adjustments in the technical work scope were made during 1996. Main tasks of RAK-2.1 in 1996: Complete recriticality studies for Nordic BWRs; Investigate phenomena related to late phase melt progression; Issue and NKS Final Technical Report on KTH experiments. Main tasks of RAK-2.2 in 1996: CAMS would be further developed with signal validation, tracking simulation, state identification and PSA and risk monitoring applications; Carry out a feasibility study for development of a PWR version of CAMS in collaboration with EdF, France; Use CAMS in the Halden Man-Machine laboratory to perform human factor studies. Main tasks of RAK-2.3 in 1996: Collect and report data from the British reactor types AGR, MAGNOX and PWR; Make a report on accidents in nuclear ships; Put the collected data together in a common data base covering neighbour reactors treated in SIK-3 and RAK-2.3; Update the data in the former SIK-3 report if needed. The work in project 2 progresses according to plans. The data collection of British reactors with in sub-project 3 has been delayed significantly due to difficulty of obtaining information from some of the British utilities, but the problems are expected to be solved by the end of 1997. (EG).

  15. Transportation accidents

    Predicting the possible consequences of transportation accidents provides a severe challenge to an analyst who must make a judgment of the likely consequences of a release event at an unpredictable time and place. Since it is impractical to try to obtain detailed knowledge of the meteorology and terrain for every potential accident location on a route or to obtain accurate descriptions of population distributions or sensitive property to be protected (data which are more likely to be more readily available when one deals with fixed-site problems), he is constrained to make conservative assumptions in response to a demanding public audience. These conservative assumptions are frequently offset by very small source terms (relative to a fixed site) created when a transport vehicle is involved in an accident. For radioactive materials, which are the principal interest of the authors, only the most elementary models have been used for assessing the consequences of release of these materials in the transportation setting. Risk analysis and environmental impact statements frequently have used the Pasquill-Gifford/gaussian techniques for releases of short duration, which are both simple and easy to apply and require a minimum amount of detailed information. However, after deciding to use such a model, the problem of selecting what specific parameters to use in specific transportation situations still presents itself. Additional complications arise because source terms are not well characterized, release rates can be variable over short and long time periods, and mechanisms by which source aerosols become entrained in air are not always obvious. Some approaches that have been used to address these problems will be reviewed with emphasis on guidelines to avoid the Worst-Case Scenario Syndrome

  16. 46 CFR 97.30-5 - Accidents to machinery.

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accidents to machinery. 97.30-5 Section 97.30-5 Shipping... Reports of Accidents, Repairs, and Unsafe Equipment § 97.30-5 Accidents to machinery. (a) In the event of an accident to a boiler, unfired pressure vessel, or machinery tending to render the further use...

  17. 46 CFR 196.30-5 - Accidents to machinery.

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Accidents to machinery. 196.30-5 Section 196.30-5... Reports of Accidents, Repairs, and Unsafe Equipment § 196.30-5 Accidents to machinery. (a) In the event of an accident to a boiler, unfired pressure vessel, or machinery tending to render the further use...

  18. 14 CFR 415.41 - Accident investigation plan.

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Accident investigation plan. 415.41 Section... Launch Range § 415.41 Accident investigation plan. An applicant must file an accident investigation plan... reporting and responding to launch accidents, launch incidents, or other mishaps, as defined by § 401.5...

  19. Evaluation of severe accident risks and the potential for risk reduction: Surry Power Station, Unit 1: Draft report for comment

    The Severe Accident Risk Reduction Program (SARRP) has completed a rebaselining of the risks to the public from a particular pressurized water reactor with a subatmospheric containment (Surry, Unit 1). Emphasis was placed on determining the magnitude and character of the uncertainties, rather than focusing on a point estimate. The risk-reduction potential of a set of proposed safety option backfits was also studied, and their costs and benefits were also evaluated. It was found that the risks from internal events are generally lower than previously evaluated in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS). However, certain unresolved issues (such as direct containment heating) caused the top of the uncertainty band to appear at a level that is comparable with the RSS point estimate. None of the postulated safety options appears to be cost effective for the Surry power plant. This work supports the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's assessment of severe accidents in NUREG-1150

  20. Evaluation of severe accident risks and the potential for risk reduction: Surry Power Station, Unit 1: Draft report for comment

    Benjamin, A.S.; Boyd, G.J.; Kunsman, D.M.; Murfin, W.B.; Williams, D.C.

    1987-02-01

    The Severe Accident Risk Reduction Program (SARRP) has completed a rebaselining of the risks to the public from a particular pressurized water reactor with a subatmospheric containment (Surry, Unit 1). Emphasis was placed on determining the magnitude and character of the uncertainties, rather than focusing on a point estimate. The risk-reduction potential of a set of proposed safety option backfits was also studied, and their costs and benefits were also evaluated. It was found that the risks from internal events are generally lower than previously evaluated in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS). However, certain unresolved issues (such as direct containment heating) caused the top of the uncertainty band to appear at a level that is comparable with the RSS point estimate. None of the postulated safety options appears to be cost effective for the Surry power plant. This work supports the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's assessment of severe accidents in NUREG-1150.

  1. The public whole body counting program following the Three Mile Island accident. Technical report, April-September 1979

    In early April, 1979 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory instituted a program to determine whether any radioactivity released as a result of the March 28, 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island Unit-2 was accumulating in members of the general public living near Unit-2. The program used a device called a whole body counter which has the capability of measuring very small quantities of radioactivity in people. There were 753 men, women and children successfully counted; nine of these people were counted a second time, leading to a total of 762 whole body counts. There was no radioactivity identified in any member of the public which could have originated from the radioactive materials released following the accident. Several people with higher than average levels of naturally occurring radioactivity were identified. The counting systems used are briefly described. Technical problems encountered, results and conclusions are discussed

  2. Nuclear ship accidents

    In this report available information on 28 nuclear ship accident and incidents is considered. Of these 5 deals with U.S. ships and 23 with USSR ships. The ships are in almost all cases nuclear submarines. Only events that involve the nuclear propulsion plants, radiation exposures, fires/explosions and sea water leaks into the submarines are considered. Comments are made on each of the events, and at the end of the report an attempt is made to point out the weaknesses of the submarine designs which have resulted in the accidents. It is emphasized that much of the available information is of a rather dubious nature. consequently some of the assessments made may not be correct. (au)

  3. Calculation of hydrogen and oxygen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents using the integral diffusion method -- Preliminary design report

    Preliminary designs are described for models of hydrogen and oxygen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents. Calculation of the uptake involves the modeling of seven processes: (1) diffusion of oxygen from the bulk gas into the boundary layer at the external cladding surface, (2) diffusion from the boundary layer into the oxide layer, (3) diffusion from the inner surface of the oxide layer into the metallic part of the cladding, (4) uptake of hydrogen in the event that the cladding oxide layer is dissolved in a steam-starved region, (5) embrittlement of cladding due to hydrogen uptake, (6) cracking of cladding during quenching due to its embrittlement and (7) release of hydrogen from the cladding after cracking of the cladding. An integral diffusion method is described for calculating the diffusion processes in the cladding. Experimental results are presented that show a rapid uptake of hydrogen in the event of dissolution of the oxide layer and a rapid release of hydrogen in the event of cracking of the oxide layer. These experimental results are used as a basis for calculating the rate of hydrogen uptake and the rate of hydrogen release. The uptake of hydrogen is limited to the equilibrium solubility calculated by applying Sievert's law. The uptake of hydrogen is an exothermic reaction that accelerates the heatup of a fuel rod. An embrittlement criteria is described that accounts for hydrogen and oxygen concentration and the extent of oxidation. A design is described for implementing the models for hydrogen and oxygen uptake and cladding embrittlement into the programming framework of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code. A test matrix is described for assessing the impact of the proposed models on the calculated behavior of fuel rods in severe accident conditions. This report is a revision and reissue of the report entitled; ''Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents.''

  4. Calculation of hydrogen and oxygen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents using the integral diffusion method -- Preliminary design report

    Siefken, L.J.

    1999-02-01

    Preliminary designs are described for models of hydrogen and oxygen uptake in fuel rod cladding during severe accidents. Calculation of the uptake involves the modeling of seven processes: (1) diffusion of oxygen from the bulk gas into the boundary layer at the external cladding surface, (2) diffusion from the boundary layer into the oxide layer, (3) diffusion from the inner surface of the oxide layer into the metallic part of the cladding, (4) uptake of hydrogen in the event that the cladding oxide layer is dissolved in a steam-starved region, (5) embrittlement of cladding due to hydrogen uptake, (6) cracking of cladding during quenching due to its embrittlement and (7) release of hydrogen from the cladding after cracking of the cladding. An integral diffusion method is described for calculating the diffusion processes in the cladding. Experimental results are presented that show a rapid uptake of hydrogen in the event of dissolution of the oxide layer and a rapid release of hydrogen in the event of cracking of the oxide layer. These experimental results are used as a basis for calculating the rate of hydrogen uptake and the rate of hydrogen release. The uptake of hydrogen is limited to the equilibrium solubility calculated by applying Sievert's law. The uptake of hydrogen is an exothermic reaction that accelerates the heatup of a fuel rod. An embrittlement criteria is described that accounts for hydrogen and oxygen concentration and the extent of oxidation. A design is described for implementing the models for hydrogen and oxygen uptake and cladding embrittlement into the programming framework of the SCDAP/RELAP5 code. A test matrix is described for assessing the impact of the proposed models on the calculated behavior of fuel rods in severe accident conditions. This report is a revision and reissue of the report entitled; ``Preliminary Design Report for Modeling of Hydrogen Uptake in Fuel Rod Cladding During Severe Accidents.''

  5. Preliminary assessment of core melt accidents at the Zion and Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants and strategies for mitigating their effects. Analysis of containment building failure modes. Preliminary report

    This is volume 1 of a 2-volume preliminary report to determine whether practical features for mitigating the consequences of core-melt accidents would significantly contribute to plant safety at Zion and Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants. This volume provides background information on consequences of core-melt accidents and includes suggested requirements which, if implemented, would prevent containment building failure from the following dominant failure modes: (1) hydrogen and carbon monoxide burning or detonation; (2) gradual overpressurization of the containment building from steam and noncondensable gases; and (3) core-melt penetration of the basemat if cooling is not provided to the reactor cavity. Instead of focusing on the means for preventing a core-melt accident, this report concentrates on requirements for features that would mitigate the consequences of a core-melt accident should it occur. (author)

  6. The Chernobylsk reactor accident

    The construction, the safety philosophy, the major reactor physical parameters of RBMK-1000 type reactor units and the detailed description of the Chernobylsk-4 reactor accident, its causes and conclusions, the efforts to reduce the consequences on the reactor site and in the surroundings are discussed based on different types of Soviet documents including the report presented to the IAEA by the Soviet Atomic Energy Agency in August 1986. (V.N.)

  7. Report of the investigation of the accident at the MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO Trailer Park on Rainier Mesa at Nevada Test Site on February 15, 1984

    Fourteen persons were injured, one fatally, when the ground upon which they were working collapsed, forming a subsidence crater in the recording trailer park of the MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO nuclear weapons effects test on Rainier Mesa at the US Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site on February 15, 1984. Those persons injured were contractor and laboratory employees from Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc. (REECo), Pan American World Services, Inc. (PANAM), and the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This report presents the results of an investigation into the causes, effects, and response to the accident. 42 figures

  8. Report of the investigation of the accident at the MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO Trailer Park on Rainier Mesa at Nevada Test Site on February 15, 1984

    1984-04-09

    Fourteen persons were injured, one fatally, when the ground upon which they were working collapsed, forming a subsidence crater in the recording trailer park of the MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO nuclear weapons effects test on Rainier Mesa at the US Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site on February 15, 1984. Those persons injured were contractor and laboratory employees from Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc. (REECo), Pan American World Services, Inc. (PANAM), and the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This report presents the results of an investigation into the causes, effects, and response to the accident. 42 figures.

  9. Synthesis of the IRSN report on the topic of water way answers to implement in case of accident with core meltdown occurring on operating pressurized water nuclear reactors

    This report briefly discusses the efficiency of technical measures adopted for the implementation of water ways as answers to an accident with core meltdown in operating pressurized water nuclear reactors. While mentioning the importance of the hydro-geological characteristics of the various sites, the IRSN asks EDF to plan and implement means to prevent any rejection through water ways for some of these sites, to investigate the possibility of building a geotechnical enclosure, to define a storing-control-treatment-rejection chain which would guarantee an efficient management of the water to be pumped, to study retention phenomena for strontium and caesium isotopes in sands and gravels

  10. Report of a human accident caused by Conus regius (Gastropoda, Conidae) Relato de um acidente em ser humano causado por Conus regius (Gastropoda, Conidae)

    Vidal Haddad Junior; Marcus Coltro; Luiz Ricardo L. Simone

    2009-01-01

    Conus regius is a venomous mollusc in the Conidae family, which includes species responsible for severe or even fatal accidents affecting human beings. This is the first report on a clinical case involving this species. It consisted a puncture in the right hand of a diver who presented paresthesia and movement difficulty in the whole limb. The manifestations disappeared after around twelve hours, without sequelae.Conus regius é um molusco venenoso da família Conidae, que inclui espécies respo...

  11. International programme on the health effects of the Chernobyl accident. Report by the Director-General. Executive Board 95. session, provisional agenda item 12

    The International Programme on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPHECA) have been initiated in mid-1991 following its endorsement by the Forty-fourth World Health Assembly in resolution WHA44.36. This report by the Director General outlines the progress made in the implementation of the Programme, and summarises the scientific information obtained to date on the health effects and planned future activities. The major projects under the programme include Thyroid project, Hematology project, Dosimetry and Communication Support Services, Brain Damage in utero project and Epidemiological Registry project

  12. Nuclear laws and radiologic accidents

    Some aspects of the nuclear activities in Brazil, specially concerning the Goiania s accident are demonstrated using concepts from environmental and nuclear law. Nuclear and environmental competence, the impossibility of the states of making regional laws, as the lack of regulation about the nuclear waste, are discussed. The situation of Goiania when the accident happened, the present situation of the victims and the nuclear waste provisionally stored in Abadia de Goias is reported

  13. Nuclear accident countermeasures: iodine prophylaxis

    In January 1989 the Department of Health convened a working group to consider and advise on the indications for the use of stable iodine, in the United Kingdom, in the event of nuclear accident. In formulating its advice the working group was to consider the International Guidelines for Iodine Prophylaxis following Nuclear Accidents, drawn by the World Health Organisation, and their applicability to the UK. This report summarises the findings of the working group and gives its conclusions and recommendations. (author)

  14. Radiation Accident Experience: Causes and Lessons Learned

    Since inception of the nuclear energy program in the United States of America, the Atomic. Energy Commission (USAEC) has maintained an extensive system for the reporting and review of radiation accidents in USAEC federal and licensing activities. Accidents required to be reported fall-into two main categories: (1) Accidents causing or threatening to cause radiation exposure to industrial workers or to the general public; (2) Accidents causing damage to or shutdown of facilities, or damage to public property. While many of the reported accidents carry with them the potential for exposure of persons to radioactivity, the cases reported, in this analysis are limited to those where certain prescribed levels of exposure have been exceeded or where significant uptake by the critical organ has occurred. This paper presents detailed analyses of the accident experience encountered in USAEC programs over the past nine years, including: (1) A breakdown of the types of work activities in the nuclear industry under which radiation accidents have occurred; (2) Characterization of the causes of such accidents as related to the types of work activities; (3) Lessons to be learned both in avoiding such accidents and in emergency planning, should such accidents occur. (author)

  15. Systematics of Reconstructed Process Facility Criticality Accidents

    Pruvost, N.L.; McLaughlin, T.P.; Monahan, S.P.

    1999-09-19

    The systematics of the characteristics of twenty-one criticality accidents occurring in nuclear processing facilities of the Russian Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom are examined. By systematics the authors mean the degree of consistency or agreement between the factual parameters reported for the accidents and the experimentally known conditions for criticality. The twenty-one reported process criticality accidents are not sufficiently well described to justify attempting detailed neutronic modeling. However, results of classic hand calculations confirm the credibility of the reported accident conditions.

  16. Report on summary results of the inspection of issues regarding the scope of the accident investigation of the TRISTAN Fire at the Brookhaven National Laboratory

    NONE

    1996-03-01

    The subject final report is provided to inform you of our findings and recommendations concerning our review of issues regarding the scope of the accident investigation of a March 31, 1994, fire at the Terrific Reactor Isotope Separator To Analyze Nuclides (TRISTAN) experiment at the Department of Energy (DOE) Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Upton, New York. The Chicago Operations Office (CH) Manager appointed a Type B Accident Investigation Board (Board) to investigate the fire. In a June 16, 1994, letter to the Inspector General, DOE, the CH Manager requested the Inspector General to look into an allegation by a former Board member that senior Chicago management consciously violated the requirements of DOE Order 5484.1, {open_quotes}Environmental Protection, Safety, And Health Protection Information Reporting Requirements,{close_quotes} in attempting to control the investigation. The former Board member alleged that there was not a clear verbal agreement among the Board members regarding the focus of the scope of the investigation. He said that the Board Chairman wanted to focus on the physical causes of the fire, while he (the former Board member) believed that the Board should focus on the apparent management deficiencies that allowed TRISTAN to operate without a proper safety analysis and in violation of DOE orders for so many years.

  17. Chernobyl reactor accident

    On April 26, 1986, an explosion occurred at the newest of four operating nuclear reactors at the Chernobyl site in the USSR. The accident initiated an international technical exchange of almost unprecedented magnitude; this exchange was climaxed with a meeting at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna during the week of August 25, 1986. The meeting was attended by more than 540 official representatives from 51 countries and 20 international organizations. Information gleaned from that technical exchange is presented in this report. A description of the Chernobyl reactor, which differs significantly from commercial US reactors, is presented, the accident scenario advanced by the Russian delegation is discussed, and observations that have been made concerning fission product release are described

  18. Short report on an accident during sodium cleanup with ethyl carbitol in a storage tank of a research facility

    A brief description is given of an accident which happened on 8 March 1996 during cleanup of a small amount of sodium (about 3 kg) within a 500 l storage tank of an FZK research facility, using ethyl carbitol (EC) as a reactant. An unexpected rapid decomposition of the compounds into ignitable gases which were then released through a safety valve into the building caused a deflagration event and, as a consequence, some damage to the building walls and to the research facility. The personnel were evacuated from the building before the event happened, and so nobody was injured. Sodium cleanup with ethyl carbitol was a well-established method, and cleaning procedures of the research facility were carried out since 1991 for more than twenty times without any problem. The advantage of heavy alcohol is low vapour pressure, high ignition point and mild reaction with sodium. In the paper, a short description is given of the main features of the research facility, of the usual cleanup procedure, and of the accident including its conditions. An analysis of the event (which is incomplete of course) is presented with regard to pressure, temperature and chemical composition. Finally, the consequences are addressed. The most important one is that sodium decommissioning with EC as reactant should be avoided until possible runaway reactions are sufficiently understood. (author)

  19. Emergency Management and Radiation Monitoring in Nuclear and Radiological Accidents. Summary Report on the NKS Project EMARAD

    In order to manage various nuclear or radiological emergencies the authorities must have pre-prepared plans. The purpose of the NKS project EMARAD (Emergency Management and Radiation Monitoring in Nuclear and Radiological Accidents) was to produce and gather various data and information that could be useful in drawing up emergency plans and radiation monitoring strategies. One of the specific objectives of the project was to establish a www site that would contain various radiation-threat and radiation-monitoring related data and documents and that could be accessed by all Nordic countries. Other important objectives were discussing various factors affecting measurements in an emergency, efficient use of communication technology and disseminating relevant information on such topics as urban dispersion and illicit use of radiation. The web server is hosted by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) of Finland. The data stored include pre-calculated consequence data for nuclear power plant accidents as well as documents and presentations describing e.g. general features of monitoring strategies, the testing of the British urban dispersion model UDM and the scenarios and aspects related to malicious use of radiation sources and radioactive material. As regards the last item mentioned, a special workshop dealing with the subject was arranged in Sweden in 2005 within the framework of the project. (au)

  20. U.S./Belarus/Ukraine joint research on the biomedical effects of the Chernobyl Reactor Accident. Final report

    The National Cancer Institute has negotiated with the governments of Belarus and Ukraine (Ministers/Ministries of Health, institutions and scientists) to develop scientific research protocols to study the effects of radioactive iodine released by the Chernobyl accident upon thyroid anatomy and function in defined cohorts of persons under the age of 19 years at the time of the accident. These studies include prospective long term medical follow-up of the cohort and the reconstruction of the radiation dose to each cohort subject's thyroid. The protocol for the study in Belarus was signed by the US and Belorussian governments in May 1994 and the protocol for the study in Ukraine was signed by the US and Ukraine in May 1995. A second scientific research protocol also was negotiated with Ukraine to study the feasibility of a long term study to follow the development of leukemia and lymphoma among Ukrainian cleanup workers; this protocol was signed by the US and Ukraine in October 1996

  1. Reactor safety study. An assessment of accident risks in U. S. commercial nuclear power plants. Executive summary: main report. [PWR and BWR

    1975-10-01

    Information is presented concerning the objectives and organization of the reactor safety study; the basic concepts of risk; the nature of nuclear power plant accidents; risk assessment methodology; reactor accident risk; and comparison of nuclear risks to other societal risks.

  2. Medical consequences of a nuclear plant accident

    The report gives background information concerning radiation and the biological medical effects and damages caused by radiation. The report also discusses nuclear power plant accidents and efforts from the medical service in the case of a nuclear power plant accident. (L.F.)

  3. Biological effects of radiation accidents on humans. September 1970-February 1990 (a Bibliography from the NTIS data base). Report for September 1970-February 1990

    This bibliography contains citations concerning the impact of radiation accidents on humans. Radiation exposure assessment for determining appropriate medical treatment is discussed. The effects of ingesting food or inhaling air irradiated by accident fallout are considered. Follow-up studies of the survivors of specific nuclear accidents are included in an attempt to evaluate long and short term health effects of accidents. (This updated bibliography contains 224 citations, 62 of which are new entries to the previous edition.)

  4. A digest of the nuclear safety division report on the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident seminar (5). Lessons learned on emergency preparedness and response and related issues

    In the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant Accident, the lessons learned on the correspondence to emergency are explained from the view point of the radiation protection. The lessons on the INES evaluation, the cooperation and connection in the accident, and the renewal of accident information are mentioned. (M.H.)

  5. Survey report on personal dose equivalent and indoor and outdoor staying time for children in the southern Miyagi Prefecture after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident

    A survey of personal dose equivalent for children using optically stimulated luminescent dosemeters has been carried out in the southern Miyagi Prefecture from 1 September 2011, about a half year after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. The survey results until November 2013 are summarized in this paper. This is the only survey report in Miyagi Prefecture as any survey of personal dose equivalent was not carried out in this area. Findings of indoor and outdoor staying time (home and school) for children were also reported. It was found that the most time (14 - 15 hours a day) was spent at the inside of their houses for all ages. Children stay at the inside of their houses and school about 21 hours a day in a total. These results are quite important to explain individual dose for children and to take measures to reduce exposure dose as well. (author)

  6. Correction and supplement of the first report 'On fire and explosion accidents in asphalt solidification processing facility of fuel reprocessing plant in Tokai Works, Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation'

    The report of the accidents by the Corporation to the Director of Science and Technology Agency dated April 30, 1997 was made in the form of the tables of comparison of the points of correction and supplement with the modified first report. The reason is the correction of the time of the accidents and the correct description of the activities at the time of the accidents. The modified first report is attached as the material for reference. In the first report, it was described that fire occurred on March 11, 1997 in the asphalt solidification processing facility, and it seemed to be extinguished, explosion occurred in the same facility about 10 hours later, the activities of environmental monitoring and the preparation for restoration were carried out, the state of radiation exposure dose equivalent, the cause and countermeasures. The materials on the main circumstances just after the accidents, the asphalt solidification processing facility and its state of operation on the day of accidents, the building and cell ventilation system, the state of damage, environmental monitoring and the countermeasures after the explosion are attached. (K.I.)

  7. Synthesis of the IRSN report on severe accidents and level 2 probabilistic safety studies within the frame of the safety re-examination associated with the third decennial inspection of 1300 MW reactors

    The objective of this report is to analyze studies related to severe accidents and performed within the framework of the third decennial safety re-examination of the French 1300 We nuclear reactors. It also reports the main conclusions of a detailed analysis of level-2 probabilistic safety studies performed according to another procedure. The report first addresses the 'severe accident' system of reference. It presents the general approach and the safety objectives, discusses the management of a site with a unit in severe accident (this encompasses the management of neighbouring units, the conditions of intervention in terms of habitability of the control room and of manoeuvrability of the venting-filtration system), discusses the expected equipment performance (concerned equipment, safety requirements for equipment needed in case of severe accident, loadings). A second part addresses and comments the results of level 2 probabilistic studies. The report then addresses the water management in the vessel sink with two main objectives (to keep corium in the vessel while promoting its cooling, to cool corium fallen in the vessel sink). The next part addresses modifications planned by EDF in terms of instrumentation associated with a severe accident situation, of improvement of confinement and reduction of risks of important and early releases, of enclosure depressurization in case of unavailability of the enclosure sprinkling system, and of strategy of opening the venting-filtration device in case of total loss of electricity supplies

  8. Criticality Accident

    At a meeting of electric utility presidents in October, 1999, the Federation Power Companies (FEPCO) officially decided to establish a Japanese version of WANO, following the JCO criticality accident. The Japanese WANO is expected to be launched by the end of the year: initially, with some 30 private sector companies concerned with nuclear fuel. It is said that the private sector had to make efforts to ensure that safety was the most important value in management policy throughout the industry, and that comprehensive inspections would be implemented. In anything related to nuclear energy, sufficient safety checks are required even for the most seemingly trivial matters. Therefore, the All-Japan Council of Local Governments with Atomic Power Stations has already proposed to the Japanese government that it should enact the special law for nuclear emergency, providing that the unified responsibility for nuclear disaster prevention should be shifted to the national government, since the nuclear disaster was quite special from the viewpoint of its safety regulation and technical aspects. (G.K.)

  9. Persistence on airline accidents.

    L. A. GIL-ALANA; Barros, C.P. (Carlos P.); J.R. Faria

    2009-01-01

    This paper analyses airline accidents data from 1927-2006. The fractional integration methodology is adopted. It is shown that airline accidents are persistent and (fractionally) cointegrated with airline traffic. Thus, there exists an equilibrium relation between air accidents and airline traffic, with the effect of the shocks to that relationship disappearing in the long run. Policy implications are derived for countering accidents events.

  10. Persistence in Airline Accidents

    Carlos Pestana Barros; João Ricardo Faria; Luis A. Gil-Alana

    2008-01-01

    This paper analyses airline accident data from 1927-2006, through fractional integration. It is shown that airline accidents are persistent and (fractionally) cointegrated with airline traffic. There exists a negative relation between air accidents and airline traffic, with the effect of the shocks to that relationship disappearing in the long run. Policy implications are derived for countering accident events.

  11. Incidental detection of a small solid pseudopapillary neoplasm of the pancreas after a traffic accident in a 12-year-old girl: a case report

    Kim Y

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available Younglim Kim, Suk-Bae MoonDepartment of Surgery, Kangwon National University Hospital, Kangwon National University School of Medicine, Chuncheon, South KoreaAbstract: Solid pseudopapillary neoplasm (SPN is a rare tumor of the pancreas that tends to grow silently in patients at a young age, to a large size and mass. We report here a case of a small-sized SPN detected incidentally in a 12-year-old girl following a traffic accident. The tumor was 3.5 cm in maximal diameter and was found to have hemorrhagic necrosis without a solid component. Laparoscopic spleen-preserving distal pancreatectomy was performed which cured the patient. SPN is generally accepted to be a low grade malignant tumor, but its clinical behavior is sometimes unpredictable. Tumor size and the proportion of solid portion of the tumor have both recently been identified as predictors of malignancy. Although the initial presentation in this case was that of the traffic accident, the subsequent detection of a small, totally cystic SPN, and then the complete eradication of the lesion, led to a favorable outcome for the patient. Long-term monitoring should prevent any chance of recurrence.Keywords: pancreatic neoplasm, children, distal pancreatectomy

  12. Advanced computational methods for the assessment of reactor core behaviour during reactivity initiated accidents. Final report; Fortschrittliche Rechenmethoden zum Kernverhalten bei Reaktivitaetsstoerfaellen. Abschlussbericht

    Pautz, A.; Perin, Y.; Pasichnyk, I.; Velkov, K.; Zwermann, W.; Seubert, A.; Klein, M.; Gallner, L.; Krzycacz-Hausmann, B.

    2012-05-15

    The document at hand serves as the final report for the reactor safety research project RS1183 ''Advanced Computational Methods for the Assessment of Reactor Core Behavior During Reactivity-Initiated Accidents''. The work performed in the framework of this project was dedicated to the development, validation and application of advanced computational methods for the simulation of transients and accidents of nuclear installations. These simulation tools describe in particular the behavior of the reactor core (with respect to neutronics, thermal-hydraulics and thermal mechanics) at a very high level of detail. The overall goal of this project was the deployment of a modern nuclear computational chain which provides, besides advanced 3D tools for coupled neutronics/ thermal-hydraulics full core calculations, also appropriate tools for the generation of multi-group cross sections and Monte Carlo models for the verification of the individual calculational steps. This computational chain shall primarily be deployed for light water reactors (LWR), but should beyond that also be applicable for innovative reactor concepts. Thus, validation on computational benchmarks and critical experiments was of paramount importance. Finally, appropriate methods for uncertainty and sensitivity analysis were to be integrated into the computational framework, in order to assess and quantify the uncertainties due to insufficient knowledge of data, as well as due to methodological aspects.

  13. Accident and safety analyses for the HTR-modul. Partial project 1: Computer codes for system behaviour calculation. Final report. Pt. 2

    The project encompasses the following project tasks and problems: (1) Studies relating to complete failure of the main heat transfer system; (2) Pebble flow; (3) Development of computer codes for detailed calculation of hypothetical accidents; (a) the THERMIX/RZKRIT temperature buildup code (covering a.o. a variation to include exothermal heat sources); (b) the REACT/THERMIX corrosion code (variation taking into account extremely severe air ingress into the primary loop); (c) the GRECO corrosion code (variation for treating extremely severe water ingress into the primary loop); (d) the KIND transients code (for treating extremely fast transients during reactivity incidents. (4) Limiting devices for safety-relevant quantities. (5) Analyses relating to hypothetical accidents. (a) hypothetical air ingress; (b) effects on the fuel particles induced by fast transients. The problems of the various tasks are defined in detail and the main results obtained are explained. The contributions reporting the various project tasks and activities have been prepared for separate retrieval from the database. (orig./HP)

  14. Accidents with biological material in workers

    Cleonice Andréa Alves Cavalcante; Elisângela Franco de Oliveira Cavalcante; Maria Lúcia Azevedo Ferreira de Macêdo; Eliane Cavalcante dos Santos; Soraya Maria de Medeiros

    2013-01-01

    The objective was to describe the accidents with biological material occurred among workers of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil, between 2007 and 2009. Secondary data were collected in the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System by exporting data to Excel using Tabwin. Among the types of occupational accidents reported in the state, the biological accidents (no. = 1,170) accounted for 58.3% with a predominance of cases among nurses (48.6%). The percutaneous exposure was the most frequent ...

  15. Direction Committee for the management of the post-accident phase of a nuclear accident or of a radiological event (CODIRPA). Work group 'Hypotheses'. Contextual data and hypotheses to perform predictive assessments of radiological and dose consequences at the beginning of a post-accidental transition phase. 2007-2009 work report

    This report first describes how to examine the various exposure ways of a person present on a contaminated territory and formulates hypotheses for the calculation of radioactive doses received by ingestion of contaminated food products, by external irradiation, or by involuntary inhalation of radioactive particles. It identifies factors which may influence the contamination of food products, and gives recommendations for the predictive calculation of their contamination during the first month following the accident. It indicates available methods for the predictive assessment of radioactive deposits at the beginning of the transition phase. It proposes an expertise method to assess the post-accident consequences

  16. Health effects of the Chernobyl accident and special health care programmes. Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group 'Health' (EGH). Working draft

    This report has been prepared by three WHO expert committees convened under auspices of the Chernobyl Forum's Expert Group 'Health' (EGH), and by WHO staff. It provides an updated assessment of the health consequences of the Chernobyl accident, and follows a detailed report on this topic published by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation in 2000 (UNSCEAR, 2000). The accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in northern Ukraine on April 26, 1986 and released large amounts of radioactivity, primarily radioactive isotopes of caesium and iodine. These releases contaminated large areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine and other countries to a lesser extent, These releases exposed sizable populations to internal and external radiation doses. The Chernobyl accident caused the deaths of 30 power plant employees and firemen within a few days or weeks (including 28 deaths that were due to radiation exposure). In addition, about 240,000 recovery operation workers (also called 'liquidators' or 'clean-up workers') were called upon in 1986 and 1987 to take part in major mitigation activities at the reactor and within the 30-km zone surrounding the reactor. Residual mitigation activities continued on a relatively large scale until 1990. All together, about 600,000 persons (civilian and military) have received special certificates confirming their status as liquidators, according to laws promulgated in Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine (UNSCEAR, 2000). In addition, massive releases of radioactive materials into the atmosphere brought about the evacuation of about 116,000 people from areas surrounding the reactor during 1986, and the relocation, after 1986, of about 220,000 people from what are at this time three independent republics of the former Soviet Union: Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Vast territories of those three republics were contaminated to a substantial level. The population of

  17. JAERI's activities in JCO accident

    The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) was actively involved in a variety of technical supports and cooperative activities, such as advice on terminating the criticality condition, contamination checks of the residents and consultation services for the residents, as emergency response actions to the criticality accident at the uranium processing facility operated by the JCO Co. Ltd., which occurred on September 30, 1999. These activities were carried out in collaborative ways by the JAERI staff from the Tokai Research Establishment, Naka Fusion Research Establishment, Oarai Research Establishment, and Headquarter Office in Tokyo. As well, the JAERI was engaged in the post-accident activities such as identification of accident causes, analyses of the criticality accident, and dose assessment of exposed residents, to support the Headquarter for Accident Countermeasures of the Science and Technology Agency (STA), the Accident Investigation Committee and the Health Control Committee of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC). This report compiles the activities, that the JAERI has conducted to date, including the discussions on measures for terminating the criticality condition, evaluation of the fission number, radiation monitoring in the environment, dose assessment, analyses of criticality dynamics. (author)

  18. Report on the ANSTO application for a licence to construct a Replacement Research Reactor, addressing seismic analysis and seismic design accident analysis, spent fuel and radioactive wastes

    The Report of the Nuclear Safety Committee (NSC) covers specific terms of reference as requested by the Chief Executive Officer of ARPANSA. The primary issue for the Working Group(WG) consideration was whether ANSTO had demonstrated: (i) that the overall approach to seismic analysis and its implementation in the design is both conservative and consistent with the international best practice; (ii) whether the full accident analysis in the Probabilistic Safety Assesment Report (PSAR) satisfies the radiation dose/frequency criteria specified in ARPANSA's regulatory assessment principle 28 and the assumptions used in the Reference Accident for the siting assessment have been accounted for in the PSAR; and (iii) the adequacy of the strategies for managing the spent fuel as proposed to be used in the Replacement Research Reactor and other radioactive waste (including emissions, taking into account the ALARA criterion) arising from the operation of the proposed replacement reactor and radioisotope production. The report includes a series of questions that were asked of the Applicant in the course of working group deliberations, to illustrate the breadth of inquiries that were made. The Committee noted that replies to some questions remain outstanding at the date of this document. The NSC makes a number of recommendations that appear in each section of the document, which has been compiled in three parts representing the work of each group. The NSC notes some lack of clarity in what was needed to be considered at this approval stage of the project, as against information that would be required at a later stage. While not in the original work plan, recent events of September 11, 2001 also necessitated some exploration of issues relating to construction security. Copyright (2002) Commonwealth of Australia

  19. Summary of major accidents with radiation sources and lessons learned

    The paper reviews some of the major radiological accidents that have occurred around the world and identifies key lessons to be learned from them. It emphasizes the value of feedback from the reporting of accidents, the need for effective reporting mechanisms and, most important, the importance of acting on the lessons learned to ensure accident prevention. (author)

  20. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Surry, Unit 1: Analysis of core damage frequency from internal events during mid-loop operations, Main report (Chapters 1--6). Volume 2, Part 1A

    During 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. The program includes two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The objectives of the program are to assess the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than full power operation and to compare the estimated core damage frequencies, important accident sequences and other qualitative and quantitative results with those accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The objective of this report is to document the approach utilized in the Surry plant and discuss the results obtained. A parallel report for the Grand Gulf plant is prepared by SNL. This study shows that the core-damage frequency during mid-loop operation at the Surry plant is comparable to that of power operation. We recognize that there is very large uncertainty in the human error probabilities in this study. This study identified that only a few procedures are available for mitigating accidents that may occur during shutdown written specifically for shutdown accidents would be useful. This document presents Chapters 1--6 of the report

  1. JCO criticality accident termination operation

    In 2001, we summarized the circumstances surrounding termination of the JCO criticality accident based on testimony in the Mito District Court on December 17, 2001. JCO was the company for uranium fuels production in Japan. That document was assembled based on actual testimony in the belief that a description of the work involved in termination of the accident would be useful in some way for preventing nuclear disasters in the future. The description focuses on the witness' own behavior, and what he saw and heard, and thus is written from the perspective of action by one individual. This was done simply because it was easier for the witness to write down his memories as he remembers them. Description of the activities of other organizations and people is provided only as necessary, to ensure that consistency in the descriptive approach is not lost. The essentials of this report were rewritten as a third-person objective description in the summary of the report by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ). Since then, comments have been received from sources such as former members of the Nuclear Safety Commission (Dr. Kenji Sumita and Dr. Akira Kanagawa), concerned parties from the former Science and Technology Agency, and reports from the JCO Criticality Accident Investigation Committee of the AESJ, and thus this report was rewritten to correct incorrect information, and add material where that was felt to be necessary. This year is the tenth year of the JCO criticality accident. To mark this occasion we have decided to translate the record of what occurred at the accident site into English so that more people can draw lessons from this accident. This report is an English version of JAEA-Technology 2009-073. (author)

  2. Thyroid exposure in Belorussian and Ukrainian children after the Chernobyl accident and resulting risk of thyroid cancer. Final report

    Main objectives of the BfS Project StSch4240 Thyroid Exposure of Belarusian and Ukrainian Children due to the Chernobyl Accident and Resulting Thyroid Cancer Risk were: - to establish improved estimates of average thyroid dose for both genders and for each birth-year cohort of the period 1968-1985 in Ukrainian and Belarusian settlements, in which more than 10 measurements of the 131I activity in the human thyroid have been performed in May/June 1986 - to explore, whether this dosimetric database can be extended to neighboring settlements - to establish improved estimates of average thyroid dose for both genders and for each birth-year cohort of the period 1968-1985 in Ukrainian and Belarusian oblasts (regions) and larger cities - to document the thyroid cancer incidence for the period 1986-2001 in Ukraine and Belarus and describe morphological characteristics of the cancer cases - to assess the contribution of the baseline incidence to the total thyroid cancer incidence in the two countries and identify regional and temporal dependencies - to perform analyses of excess risks in settlements with more than 10 measurements of the 131I activity in the human thyroid. The project has been accompanied by the BFS project StSch 4299 Range of applicability of epidemiological studies with aggregate data for risk factor determination. The purpose of that project is to explore by simulation calculations to which degree there is an ecologic bias in the risk studies performed in the frame of the present project. The results of project StSch 4299 indicate that the ecologic bias of excess absolute risk estimates is small because: - radiation is the dominating cause of thyroid cancer among those who were children or adolescents in the highly contaminated areas at the time of the accident - there is no indication that the dose-response for thyroid cancer after exposures during childhood is non-linear in the dose range of 0.05-1.0 Gy - the variability of average doses in the age

  3. The accident of Chernobyl

    RBMK reactors (reactor control, protection systems, containment) and the nuclear power plant of Chernobyl are first presented. The scenario of the accident is given with a detailed chronology. The actions and consequences on the site are reviewed. This report then give the results of the source term estimation (fision product release, core inventory, trajectories, meteorological data...), the radioactivity measurements obtained in France. Health consequences for the French population are evoked. The medical consequences for the population who have received a high level of doses are reviewed

  4. A comparison of two criticality accident alarm system detector locations for the X-700 building at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Final report

    A previous analysis of the X-700 Building Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) showed that some of the building may not adequately be covered by the one building CAAS detector in its current location. This report compares the results of that analysis with a new analysis where the detector is in a different location. The new detector location (outside of the storage area in the center of the building--near column B-7) showed coverage for all points previously analyzed. The new centralized detector location reduces the distance and shielding between the source points and the detector. This explains the difference in the level of response when compared to the original (actual) detector location in the new annex west of the building

  5. A feasibility study of the use of incidents and accidents reports to evaluate effects of team resource management in air traffic control

    Andersen, V.; Bove, T.

    2000-01-01

    domain of Air Traffic Control under the heading of 'Team Resource Management'. In this adaptation phase, it is important to obtain knowledge concerning the effectiveness of such training programmes in relation to enhancing human factors awareness and knowledge. This requires a methodology for detecting...... training effects. For this purpose a feasibility study has been conducted concerning the use of paper cases - short written reports on real or fictitious incidents or accidents - to discriminate air traffic controllers with regard to their ability to identify 'human factors' determinants involved in such......Valuable improvements in performance have been obtained by 'Crew Resource Management' (CRM) courses performed in the domain of aviation related to the crew in a cockpit, and in the maritime domain related to the crew on the bridge of large ships. CRM courses are currently being adapted to the...

  6. Report of a human accident caused by Conus regius (Gastropoda, Conidae Relato de um acidente em ser humano causado por Conus regius (Gastropoda, Conidae

    Vidal Haddad Junior

    2009-08-01

    Full Text Available Conus regius is a venomous mollusc in the Conidae family, which includes species responsible for severe or even fatal accidents affecting human beings. This is the first report on a clinical case involving this species. It consisted a puncture in the right hand of a diver who presented paresthesia and movement difficulty in the whole limb. The manifestations disappeared after around twelve hours, without sequelae.Conus regius é um molusco venenoso da família Conidae, que inclui espécies responsáveis por acidentes graves ou mesmo fatais em humanos. Os autores relatam pela primeira vez um caso clínico envolvendo a espécie, que inclui uma punctura na mão direita de um mergulhador submarino, que apresentou parestesias e dificuldade de movimentação do membro todo. O quadro desapareceu em cerca de doze horas, sem seqüelas.

  7. Radiation accident/disaster

    Described are the course of medical measures following Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP) Accident after the quake and tsunami (Mar. 11, 2011) and the future task for radiation accident/disaster. By the first hydrogen explosion in FNPP (Mar. 12), evacuation of residents within 20 km zone was instructed, and the primary base for measures of nuclear disaster (Off-site Center) 5 km afar from FNPP had to work as a front base because of damage of communicating ways, of saving of injured persons and of elevation of dose. On Mar. 13, the medical arrangement council consisting from stuff of Fukushima Medical University (FMU), National Institute of Radiological Sciences, Nuclear Safety Research Association and Prefectural officers was setup in residents' hall of Fukushima City, and worked for correspondence to persons injured or exposed, where communication about radiation and between related organizations was still poor. The Off-site Center's head section moved to Prefectural Office on Mar. 15 as headquarters. Early in the period, all residents evacuated from the 20 km zone, and in-hospital patients and nursed elderly were transported with vehicles, >50 persons of whom reportedly died mainly by their base diseases. The nation system of medicare for emergent exposure had consisted from the network of the primary to third facilities; there were 5 facilities in the Prefecture, 3 of which were localized at 4-9 km distance from FNPP and closed early after the Accident; and the secondary facility of FMU became responsible to all exposed persons. There was no death of workers of FNPP. Medical stuff also measured the ambient dose at various places near FNPP, having had risk of exposure. At the Accident, the important system of command, control and communication was found fragile and measures hereafter should be planned on assumption of the worst scenario of complete damage of the infrastructure and communication. It is desirable for Disaster Medical Assistance Team which

  8. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Surry, Unit 1: Analysis of core damage frequency from internal fires during mid-loop operations. Volume 3, Part 1, Main report

    During l989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. The program includes two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The objectives of the program are to assess the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than fun power operation and to compare the estimated core damage frequencies, important accident sequences and other qualitative and quantitative results with those accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The objective of this report is to document the approach utilized in ' the Surry plant and discuss the results obtained. A parallel report for the Grand Gulf plant is prepared by SNL. This study shows that the core-damage frequency during mid-loop operation at the Surry plant is comparable to that of power operation. We recognize that there is very large uncertainty in the human error probabilities in this study. This study identified that only a few. procedures are available for mitigating accidents that may occur during shutdown. Procedures written specifically for shutdown accidents would be useful

  9. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Surry, Unit 1: Analysis of core damage frequency from internal events during mid-loop operations, Main report (Chapters 7--12). Volume 2, Part 1B

    During 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. The program includes two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The objectives of the program are to assess the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than full power operation and to compare the estimated core damage frequencies, important accident sequences and other qualitative and quantitative results with those accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The objective of this report is to document the approach utilized in the Surry plant and discuss the results obtained. A parallel report for the Grand Gulf plant is prepared by SNL. This study shows that the core-damage frequency during mid-loop operation at the Surry plant is comparable to that of power operation. We recognize that there is very large uncertainty in the human error probabilities in this study. This study identified that only a few procedures are available for mitigating accidents that may occur during shutdown. Procedures written specific shutdown accidents would be useful

  10. Chernobyl reactor accident

    Following the accident at Chernobyl nuclear reactor, WHO organized on 6 May 1986 in Copenhagen a one day consultation of experts with knowledge in the fields of meteorology, radiation protection, biological effects, reactor technology, emergency procedures, public health and psychology in order to analyse the development of events and their consequences and to provide guidance as to the needs for immediate public health action. The present report provides detailed information on the transportation and dispersion of the radioactive material in the atmosphere, especially volatile elements, during the release period 26 April - 5 May. Presented are the calculated directions and locations of the radioactive plume over Europe in the first 5 days after the accident, submitted by the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute. The calculations have been made for two heights, 1500m and 750m and the plume directions are grouped into five periods, covering five European areas. The consequences of the accident inside the USSR and the radiological consequences outside the USSR are presented including the exposure routes and the biological effects, paying particular attention to iodine-131 effects. Summarized are the first reported measured exposure rates above background, iodine-131 deposition and concentrations in milk and the remedial actions taken in various European countries. Concerning the cesium-137 problem, based on the UNSCEAR assessment of the consequences of the nuclear fallout, one concludes that the cesium contamination outside the USSR is not likely to cause any serious problems. Finally, the conclusions and the recommendations of the meeting, taking into account both the short-term and longer term considerations are presented

  11. Public opinion on atomic energy after JCO accident

    JCO accident happened on September 30, 1999. This book deals with the public opinion of atomic energy after JCO accident in Japan and comparison with that of USA and France. The analysis of public opinion structure is also shown. The important chapter is the eighth chapter an opinion survey after the accident, of which sampling areas consisted of three areas such as JCO accident area, the nuclear power plants and the general cities. The analytical results of data showed that the public opinion in Tokai-mura and Naka-machi, the JCO accident area, indicated moderate opinions. It is the interesting results were obtained that the moderate tendency of opinion was in order JCO accident area, the nuclear power plants and the general cities. People's attitude toward nuclear energy related to their social values. Abstract of JCO accident, JCO structure, the effects of accident on the environment and news stories about the accident are reported. (S.Y.)

  12. Bursitis por mercurio tras accidente laboral: a propósito de un caso Bursitis due to Mercury after a work accident: a case report

    Susana Lastras González

    2010-06-01

    Full Text Available Auxiliar de enfermería de 28 años que acude al Servicio de Urgencias porque refiere dolor y dificultad para la movilización en rodilla derecha, tras accidente laboral, hace dos días. Refiere que se resbaló mientras transportaba 32 termómetros de mercurio, rompiéndose éstos sobre su rodilla, creando una pequeña herida, siendo la puerta de entrada del metal. En la radiografía, se objetiva el cuerpo extraño metálico, correspondiente a mercurio, en bursa rotuliana. Tras el diagnóstico, se realizó la extracción de la bursa, recuperándose la trabajadora totalmente tras la intervención. Con este caso clínico que aportamos, queremos conocer los efectos del mercurio en la salud de las personas expuestas a dicho metal, estudiar los errores acontecidos en este accidente laboral, valorando cuáles hubieran sido las medidas de actuación preventiva adecuadas para evitar la repetición de este tipo de accidentes y, por último, reflexionar acerca de la relación beneficio-riesgo del uso del mercurio en aparatos de medición en el ámbito sanitario.A 28-year-old woman, nursing assistant, who attends to emergency service, referring pain and difficulty mobilizing right knee after a work accident two days ago. She relates that slipped while carrying 32 mercury thermometers, breaking them on her knee, creating a small wound, being the gateway to the metal. In the radiograph, we objective a metallic foreign body, corresponding to mercury, in patellar bursa. After the diagnosis, the bursa was extracted, and the worker recovered completely, after surgery. With this case report we bring, we want to know the health effects of mercury in people exposed to this metal, studying the errors occurred in this accident, assessing measures of preventive action that would have been neccesary to preclude recurrence of this type accidents and, finally, think about the risk-benefit balance the use of mercury in measuring devices in healthcare.

  13. FINAL REPORT on Experimental Validation of Stratified Flow Phenomena, Graphite Oxidation, and Mitigation Strategies of Air Ingress Accidents

    Chang H. Oh; Eung S. Kim; Hee C. NO; Nam Z. Cho

    2011-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy is performing research and development that focuses on key phenomena that are important during challenging scenarios that may occur in the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)/Generation IV very high temperature reactor (VHTR). Phenomena Identification and Ranking studies to date have identified the air ingress event, following on the heels of a VHTR depressurization, as very important. Consequently, the development of advanced air ingress-related models and verification & validation are of very high priority for the NGNP Project. Following a loss of coolant and system depressurization incident, air ingress will occur through the break, leading to oxidation of the in-core graphite structure and fuel. This study indicates that depending on the location and the size of the pipe break, the air ingress phenomena are different. In an effort to estimate the proper safety margin, experimental data and tools, including accurate multidimensional thermal-hydraulic and reactor physics models, a burn-off model, and a fracture model are required. It will also require effective strategies to mitigate the effects of oxidation, eventually. This 3-year project (FY 2008–FY 2010) is focused on various issues related to the VHTR air-ingress accident, including (a) analytical and experimental study of air ingress caused by density-driven, stratified, countercurrent flow, (b) advanced graphite oxidation experiments, (c) experimental study of burn-off in the core bottom structures, (d) structural tests of the oxidized core bottom structures, (e) implementation of advanced models developed during the previous tasks into the GAMMA code, (f) full air ingress and oxidation mitigation analyses, (g) development of core neutronic models, (h) coupling of the core neutronic and thermal hydraulic models, and (i) verification and validation of the coupled models.

  14. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Surry, Unit 1: Evaluation of severe accident risk during mid-loop operations. Main report. Volume 6. Part 1

    During 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. The program includes two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The objectives of the program are to assess the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than full power operation and to compare the estimated core damage frequencies, important accident sequences and other qualitative and quantitative results with those accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The scope of the program includes that of a level-3 PRA. A phased approach was used in the level-1 program. In phase 1 which was completed in Fall 1991, a coarse screening analysis including internal fire and flood was performed for all plant operational states (POSs). The objective of the phase 1 study was to identify potential vulnerable plant configurations, to characterize (on a high, medium, or low basis) the potential core damage accident scenarios, and to provide a foundation for a detailed phase 2 analysis. In phase 2, mid-loop operation was selected as the plant configuration to be analyzed based on the results of the phase 1 study. The objective of the phase 2 study is to perform a detailed analysis of the potential accident scenarios that may occur during mid-loop operation, and compare the results with those of NUREG-1150. The results of the phase 2 level 2/3 study are the subject of this volume of NUREG/CR-6144, Volume 6

  15. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Surry, Unit 1: Evaluation of severe accident risk during mid-loop operations. Main report. Volume 6. Part 1

    Jo, J.; Lin, C.C.; Neymotin, L. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)] [and others

    1995-05-01

    During 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. The program includes two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The objectives of the program are to assess the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than full power operation and to compare the estimated core damage frequencies, important accident sequences and other qualitative and quantitative results with those accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The scope of the program includes that of a level-3 PRA. A phased approach was used in the level-1 program. In phase 1 which was completed in Fall 1991, a coarse screening analysis including internal fire and flood was performed for all plant operational states (POSs). The objective of the phase 1 study was to identify potential vulnerable plant configurations, to characterize (on a high, medium, or low basis) the potential core damage accident scenarios, and to provide a foundation for a detailed phase 2 analysis. In phase 2, mid-loop operation was selected as the plant configuration to be analyzed based on the results of the phase 1 study. The objective of the phase 2 study is to perform a detailed analysis of the potential accident scenarios that may occur during mid-loop operation, and compare the results with those of NUREG-1150. The results of the phase 2 level 2/3 study are the subject of this volume of NUREG/CR-6144, Volume 6.

  16. Evaluation of severe accident risks and the potential for risk reduction: Peach Bottom, Unit 2. Main report. Draft for comment, February 1987

    The Severe Accident Risk Reduction Program (SARRP) has completed a rebaselining of the risks to the public from a boiling water reactor with a Mark I containment (Peach Bottom, Unit 2). Emphasis was placed on determining the magnitude and character of the uncertainties, rather than focusing on a point estimate. The risk-reduction potential of a set of proposed safety option backfits was also studied, and their costs and benefits were also evaluated. It was found that the risks from internal events are generally low relative to previous studies; for example, most of the uncertainty range is lower than the point estimate of risk for the Peach Bottom plant in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS). However, certain unresolved issues cause the top of the uncertainty band to appear at a level that is comparable with the RSS point estimate. These issues include the modeling of the common-mode failures for the dc power system, the likelihood of offsite power recovery versus time during a station blackout, the probability of drywell failure resulting from meltthrough of the drywell shell, the magnitude of the fission product releases during core-concrete interactions, and the decontamination effectiveness of the reactor enclosure building. Most of the postulated safety options do not appear to be cost effective, although some based on changes to procedures or inexpensive hardware additions may be marginally cost effective. This draft for comment of the SARRP report for Peach Bottom does not include detailed technical appendices, which are still in preparation. The appendices will be issued under separate cover when completed. This work supports the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's assessment of severe accidents in NUREG-1150. (author)

  17. Standby after the Chernobyl accident

    The report is an investigation concerning strandby and actions by SKI (Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate) and SSI (National Institute of Radiation Protection) due to the Chernobyl reactor accident. It consists of a final report and two appendices. The final report is divided into two parts: 'I: Facts' and 'II: Analyzes'. 'Facts': The Swedish model for information: radio, press. Basic knowledge about ionizing radiation in the society. Resources for information. Need for information. Message forms for information. Announcements from the authorities in TV, radio, press, meeting, advertisements. Statements concerning the reactor accident and its consequences in Swedish mass media. How did the public recieve the information? 'Analyzis': Information responsibilities and policies. SSI information activities concerning radiologic accidents, conditions, methods and resources. Ditto for SKI, Swedish National Food Administration and the National Board of Agriculture. Appendix I: Information from authorities in the press three weeks after the Chernobyl accident: The material and the methods. The acute phase, the adoptation phase, the extension of the persective. What is said about the authorities in connection with Chernobyl? Appendix II: The fallout from Chernobyl, the authorities and the media coverage: The nationwide, regional and local coverage from radio and television. Ditto from the press. Topic and problem areas in reporting. Instructions from the authorities in media. Contribution in the media from people representing the authorities. Fallout in a chronologic perspective. (L.F.)

  18. Models and criteria for prediction of Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition (DDT) in hydrogen-air-steam systems under severe accident conditions. Final report

    The European Commission in Brussels supported a joint project on Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition (DDT) studies for hydrogen safety within the framework programme on nuclear fission safety. The project was initiated by the Forschungszentrum Juelich based on the results of a pilot project. The following main project was coordinated by the Freie Universitaet Berlin involving seven european partners. The partners came from universities, research centers and industry, as follows: FU-Berlin, RWTH-Aachen, CNRS-Marseille, IPSN-Saclay, FZ-Juelich, FZ-Karlsruhe, and NNC-Knutsford, which worked closely together. The working period was two years (1997-1998). The aim of the project was to develop models and criteria for prediction of deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) in hydrogen-air-steam systems under severe accident conditions. The results obtained are documented in this final report, which was finished in 1999. The report consists of seven chapters, concerning: - Introduction - Experimental Investigations - Modelling and Numerics - Validation - Mitigation - Further Deliverables - Summary and Conclusion. The final report presents special experimental, theoretical, and computational aspects of the complex DDT phenomena for hydrogen safety studies, and it should be a solid basis for end user applications and further developments. (orig.)

  19. SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TRAINING

    The purpose of this paper is (a) to define the International Atomic Energy Agency's role in the area of severe accident management training, (b) to briefly describe the status of representative severe accident analysis tools designed to support development and validation of accident management guidelines, and more recently, simulate the accident with sufficient accuracy to support the training of technical support and reactor operator staff, and (c) provide an overview of representative design-specific accident management guidelines and training. Since accident management and the development of accident management validation and training software is a rapidly evolving area, this paper is also intended to evolve as accident management guidelines and training programs are developed to meet different reactor design requirements and individual national requirements

  20. General Aspects of the JCO Criticality Accident

    A criticality accident occurred on September 30, 1999, at a uranium processing plant of JCO Company in Tokaimura. Delayed criticality continued for approximately 20 hours after the first few prompt critical peaks. Two employees subsequently died. Nearby residents were evacuated or told to remain indoors. This accident was at Level 4 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. A table of radiation exposures resulting from the accident is given. Besides dealing with health physics, the investigation committee's final report covered technical observations and the nature of the accident. The direct causes of the accident were found to be violation of rules and technical specifications and deviation from licensing conditions; some of these were permitted by the company itself, and fatal mistakes were made by employees on the job without consulting with authorized persons. Many recommendations to revise government regulations on licensing of nuclear fuel handling were discussed in the report

  1. Accident selection methodology for TA-55 FSAR

    In the past, the selection of representative accidents for refined analysis from the numerous scenarios identified in hazards analyses (HAs) has involved significant judgment and has been difficult to defend. As part of upgrading the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the TA-55 plutonium facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, an accident selection process was developed that is mostly mechanical and reproducible in nature and fulfills the requirements of the Department of Energy (DOE) Standard 3009 and DOE Order 5480.23. Among the objectives specified by this guidance are the requirements that accident screening (1) consider accidents during normal and abnormal operating conditions, (2) consider both design basis and beyond design basis accidents, (3) characterize accidents by category (operational, natural phenomena, etc.) and by type (spill, explosion, fire, etc.), and (4) identify accidents that bound all foreseeable accident types. The accident selection process described here in the context of the TA-55 FSAR is applicable to all types of DOE facilities

  2. Traffic Congestion and Accidents

    Schrage, Andrea

    2006-01-01

    Obstructions caused by accidents can trigger or exacerbate traffic congestion. This paper derives the efficient traffic pattern for a rush hour with congestion and accidents and the corresponding road toll. Compared to the model without accidents, where the toll equals external costs imposed on drivers using the road at the same time, a new insight arises: An optimal toll also internalizes the expected increase in future congestion costs. Since accidents affect more drivers if traffic volumes...

  3. FY-09 Report: Experimental Validation of Stratified Flow Phenomena, Graphite Oxidation, and Mitigation Strategies of Air Ingress Accidents

    Chang H. Oh; Eung S. Kim

    2009-12-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL), under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy, is performing research and development that focuses on key phenomena important during potential scenarios that may occur in the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)/Gen-IV very high temperature reactor (VHTR). Phenomena Identification and Ranking Studies to date have identified that an air ingress event following on the heels of a VHTR depressurization is a very important incident. Consequently, the development of advanced air ingress-related models and verification and validation data are a very high priority for the NGNP Project. Following a loss of coolant and system depressurization incident, air will enter the core through the break, leading to oxidation of the in-core graphite structure and fuel. If this accident occurs, the oxidation will accelerate heat-up of the bottom reflector and the reactor core and will eventually cause the release of fission products. The potential collapse of the core bottom structures causing the release of CO and fission products is one of the concerns. Therefore, experimental validation with the analytical model and computational fluid dynamic (CFD) model developed in this study is very important. Estimating the proper safety margin will require experimental data and tools, including accurate multidimensional thermal-hydraulic and reactor physics models, a burn-off model, and a fracture model. It will also require effective strategies to mitigate the effects of oxidation. The results from this research will provide crucial inputs to the INL NGNP/VHTR Methods Research and Development project. The second year of this three-year project (FY-08 to FY-10) was focused on (a) the analytical, CFD, and experimental study of air ingress caused by density-driven, stratified, countercurrent flow; (b) advanced graphite oxidation experiments and modeling; (c) experimental study of burn-off in the core bottom structures, (d) implementation of advanced

  4. The radiological accident in Gilan

    The use of radioactive materials continues to offer a wide range of benefits throughout the world in medicine, research and industry. Precautions are, however, necessary in order to protect people from the detrimental effects of the radiation. Where the amount of radioactive material is substantial, e.g. with sources used in radiotherapy or industrial radiography, extreme care is necessary to prevent accidents that may have severe consequences for the individuals affected. Nevertheless, in spite of all precautions, accidents with radiation sources continue to occur. As part of its activities dealing with the safety of radiation sources, the IAEA follows up severe accidents in order to provide an account of their circumstances and medical aspects from which those organizations with responsibilities for radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources may learn. On 24 July 1996 a serious accident occurred at the Gilan combined cycle fossil fuel power plant in the Islamic Republic of Iran, when a worker who was moving thermal insulation materials around the plant noticed a shiny, pencil sized metal object lying in a trench and put it in his pocket. He was unaware that the metal object was an unshielded 185 GBq 192Ir source used for industrial radiography. This report compiles information about the medical and other aspects of the accident. As a result of exposure to the iridium source, the worker suffered from severe haematopoietic syndrome (bone marrow depression) and an unusually extended localized radiation injury requiring plastic surgery

  5. The radiological accident in Cochabamba

    In April 2002 an accident involving an industrial radiography source containing 192Ir occurred in Cochabamba, Bolivia, some 400 km from the capital, La Paz. A faulty radiography source container had been sent back to the headquarters of the company concerned in La Paz together with other equipment as cargo on a passenger bus. This gave rise to a potential for serious exposure for the bus passengers as well as for the company employees who were using and transporting the source. The Government of Bolivia requested the assistance of the IAEA under the terms of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The IAEA in response assembled and sent to Bolivia a team composed of senior radiation safety experts and radiation pathology experts from Brazil, the United Kingdom and the IAEA to investigate the accident. The IAEA is grateful to the Government of Bolivia for the opportunity to report on this accident in order to disseminate the valuable lessons learned and help prevent similar accidents in the future

  6. Accident knowledge and emergency management

    Rasmussen, B.; Groenberg, C.D.

    1997-03-01

    The report contains an overall frame for transformation of knowledge and experience from risk analysis to emergency education. An accident model has been developed to describe the emergency situation. A key concept of this model is uncontrolled flow of energy (UFOE), essential elements are the state, location and movement of the energy (and mass). A UFOE can be considered as the driving force of an accident, e.g., an explosion, a fire, a release of heavy gases. As long as the energy is confined, i.e. the location and movement of the energy are under control, the situation is safe, but loss of confinement will create a hazardous situation that may develop into an accident. A domain model has been developed for representing accident and emergency scenarios occurring in society. The domain model uses three main categories: status, context and objectives. A domain is a group of activities with allied goals and elements and ten specific domains have been investigated: process plant, storage, nuclear power plant, energy distribution, marine transport of goods, marine transport of people, aviation, transport by road, transport by rail and natural disasters. Totally 25 accident cases were consulted and information was extracted for filling into the schematic representations with two to four cases pr. specific domain. (au) 41 tabs., 8 ills.; 79 refs.

  7. Accident knowledge and emergency management

    The report contains an overall frame for transformation of knowledge and experience from risk analysis to emergency education. An accident model has been developed to describe the emergency situation. A key concept of this model is uncontrolled flow of energy (UFOE), essential elements are the state, location and movement of the energy (and mass). A UFOE can be considered as the driving force of an accident, e.g., an explosion, a fire, a release of heavy gases. As long as the energy is confined, i.e. the location and movement of the energy are under control, the situation is safe, but loss of confinement will create a hazardous situation that may develop into an accident. A domain model has been developed for representing accident and emergency scenarios occurring in society. The domain model uses three main categories: status, context and objectives. A domain is a group of activities with allied goals and elements and ten specific domains have been investigated: process plant, storage, nuclear power plant, energy distribution, marine transport of goods, marine transport of people, aviation, transport by road, transport by rail and natural disasters. Totally 25 accident cases were consulted and information was extracted for filling into the schematic representations with two to four cases pr. specific domain. (au) 41 tabs., 8 ills.; 79 refs

  8. Fukushima accident study using MELCOR

    Randall O Gauntt

    2013-01-01

    The accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station stunned the world as the sequences played out over severals days and videos of hydrogen explosions were televised as they took place.The accidents all resulted in severe damage to the reactor cores and releases of radioactivity to the environment despite heroic measures had taken by the operating personnel.The following paper provides some background into the development of these accidents and their root causes,chief among them,the prolonged station blackout conditions that isolated the reactors from their ultimate heat sink — the ocean.The interpretations given in this paper are summarized from a recently completed report funded by the United States Department of Energy (USDOE).

  9. Air cleaning in accident situations

    The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) through its subsidiaries the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) established in 1979 a Group of Experts or Air Cleaning in Accident Situations. This group met seven times to establish a draft report based on its Terms of Reference which were to: 1) review the performance of off-gas cleaning systems in accident conditions; 2) collect information about operating experience with these systems; 3) seek to establish common principles for the design of off-gas systems; 4) review methods used in the different countries for testing filters from the standpoint of accident conditions; and 5) suggest specific mechanisms for improving cooperation, with regard, for example, to filter testing. The conclusions and recommendations of the Group are summarized

  10. Psychology of nuclear accidents

    Tysoe, M.

    1983-03-31

    Incidents involving nuclear weapons are described, as well as the accident to the Three Mile Island-2 reactor. Methods of assessment of risks are discussed, with particular reference to subjective judgements and the possible role of human error in civil nuclear accidents. Accidents or misunderstandings in communication or human actions which might lead to nuclear war are also discussed.

  11. Cosyma a new programme package for accident consequence assessment

    This report gives details of a new programme package for accident consequence assessment, prepared under the CEC's Maria programme (Methods for assessing the radiological impact of accidents) initiated in 1982 to review and build on the nuclear accident consequence assessment methods in use within the European Community

  12. Health consequences of the Chernobyl accident. Results from the IPHECA pilot projects and related national programmes. Summary report from WHO 1995

    The main conclusions drawn from the investigations are that the Chernobyl accident caused psychosocial problems due to poor information just after the accident, and stresses and traumas inter alia due to forced relocation. A marked increase of thyroid cancer among children has been demonstrated. However, no significant increase in the frequency of leukemia has been observed., 2 figs, 3 tabs

  13. Severe Accident Research Program plan update

    In August 1989, the staff published NUREG-1365, ''Revised Severe Accident Research Program Plan.'' Since 1989, significant progress has been made in severe accident research to warrant an update to NUREG-1365. The staff has prepared this SARP Plan Update to: (1) Identify those issues that have been closed or are near completion, (2) Describe the progress in our understanding of important severe accident phenomena, (3) Define the long-term research that is directed at improving our understanding of severe accident phenomena and developing improved methods for assessing core melt progression, direct containment heating, and fuel-coolant interactions, and (4) Reflect the growing emphasis in two additional areas--advanced light water reactors, and support for the assessment of criteria for containment performance during severe accidents. The report describes recent major accomplishments in understanding the underlying phenomena that can occur during a severe accident. These include Mark I liner failure, severe accident scaling methodology, source term issues, core-concrete interactions, hydrogen transport and combustion, TMI-2 Vessel Investigation Project, and direct containment heating. The report also describes the major planned activities under the SARP over the next several years. These activities will focus on two phenomenological issues (core melt progression, and fuel-coolant interactions and debris coolability) that have significant uncertainties that impact our understanding and ability to predict severe accident phenomena and their effect on containment performance SARP will also focus on severe accident code development, assessment and validation. As the staff completes the research on severe accident issues that relate to current generation reactors, continued research will focus on efforts to independently evaluate the capability of new advanced light water reactor designs to withstand severe accidents

  14. ACCIDENT AT «FUKUSHIMA-»I NPP: FIRST RESULTS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE REPORT 2: ACTIVITIES OF THE ROSPOTREBNADZOR AUTHORITIES FOR THE RADIATION PROTECTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION POPULATION ON THE EARLY STAGE OF ACCIDENT

    G. G. Onischenko

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available Basic measures of the Rospotrebnadzor emergency response during the early stage of the «Fukushima-I» NPP radiation accident are being analyzed in the article. Radiation monitoring of the environmental objects of the territories of the Russian Federation Far East Federal District, radiation control of arriving from Japan vehicles, freights and passengers as well as imported from Japan food products were promptly organized. This allowed to get reliable evaluations of the levels of radioactive contamination at the Russian Federation territory and population exposure doses due to the «Fukushima-I» NPP accident, timely exclude the possibility of import to the Russian territory for the freights, vehicles, food products having contamination exceeding established in the Russian Federation standards.

  15. The case book of safety accident by electricity

    This book consist of four parts, which report general electric safety with handing electric accident, cardiac massage and carrying and transport of patients, the cases of domestic accident in power substation, fires of building, ignition from edge of metallic conduit, the cases of foreign countries like electric shock accident, death from electric shock on the process of making and death from an bad working method, litigation precedent of electric accident ; death from misjudgement in shifting construction of entrance cable.

  16. Experimental data report for test TS-3 Reactivity Initiated Accident test in the NSRR with pre-irradiated BWR fuel rod

    This report presents experimental data for Test TS-3 which was the third test in a series of Reactivity Initiated Accident (RIA) tests using pre-irradiated BWR fuel rods, performed in the Nuclear Safety Research Reactor (NSRR) in September, 1990. Test fuel rod used in the Test TS-3 was a short-sized BWR (7 x 7) type rod which was re-fabricated from a commercial rod irradiated in the Tsuruga Unit 1 power reactor of Japan Atomic Power Co. The fuel had an initial enrichment of 2.79 % and a burnup of 26 Gwd/tU. A pulse irradiation of the test fuel rod was performed under a cooling condition of stagnant water at atmospheric pressure and at ambient temperature which simulated a BWR's cold start-up RIA event. The energy deposition of the fuel rod in this test was evaluated to be 94 ± 4 cal/g · fuel (88 ± 4 cal/g · fuel in peak fuel enthalpy) and no fuel failure was observed. Descriptions on test conditions, test procedures, transient behavior of the test rod during the pulse irradiation, and results of pre-pulse and post-pulse irradiation examinations are described in this report. (author)

  17. Experimental data report for test TS-5 Reactivity Initiated Accident test in the NSRR with pre-irradiated BWR fuel rod

    This report presents experimental data for Test TS-5 which was the fifth test in a series of Reactivity Initiated Accident (RIA) tests using pre-irradiated BWR fuel rods, performed in the Nuclear Safety Research Reactor (NSRR) in January, 1993. Test fuel rod used in the Test TS-5 was a short-sized BWR (7x7) type rod which was re-fabricated from a commercial rod irradiated in the Tsuruga Unit 1 power reactor of Japan Atomic Power Co. The fuel had an initial enrichment of 2.79% and a burnup of 26GWd/tU. A pulse irradiation of the test fuel rod was performed under a cooling condition of stagnant water at atmospheric pressure and at ambient temperature which simulated a BWR's cold start-up RIA event. The nominal energy deposition of 117±5cal/g·fuel (98±4cal/g·fuel in peak fuel enthalpy) was subjected to the test fuel rod and no fuel failure was observed in the test. The test fuel was pulse irradiated in a flow shroud which simulates fuel/water ratio in the commercial assembly. Descriptions on test conditions, test procedures, transient behavior of the test rod during the pulse irradiation, and results of pre-pulse and post-pulse irradiation examinations are described in this report. (author)

  18. Radiation accident grips Goiania

    On 13 September two young scavengers in Goiania, Brazil, removed a stainless steel cylinder from a cancer therapy machine in an abandoned clinic, touching off a radiation accident second only to Chernobyl in its severity. On 18 September they sold the cylinder, the size of a 1-gallon paint can, to a scrap dealer for $25. At the junk yard an employee dismantled the cylinder and pried open the platinum capsule inside to reveal a glowing blue salt-like substance - 1400 curies of cesium-137. Fascinated by the luminescent powder, several people took it home with them. Some children reportedly rubbed in on their bodies like carnival glitter - an eerie image of how wrong things can go when vigilance over radioactive materials lapses. In all, 244 people in Goiania, a city of 1 million in central Brazil, were contaminated. The eventual toll, in terms of cancer or genetic defects, cannot yet be estimated. Parts of the city are cordoned off as radiation teams continue washing down buildings and scooping up radioactive soil. The government is also grappling with the political fallout from the accident

  19. Chernobyl accident

    The examination of the radioelements in macromicetae taken in the area of Como's Groane and in other areas near Lakes of Como and Maggiore and a few samples in Pine' di Trento are reported. A number of samples has been collected and analyzed at Joint Research Center, Ispra. A sampling of many pieces has been picked up by the Circolo Micologico Plinio il Vecchio and by the Unita' Sanitarie of Como and Varese. The various samples are subdivided for specie and the denomination for each one of them is given. The foundamental sampling is dated atumn 1986, a second sampling is made in autumn 1987. Gamma spectrometry has revealed the presence of many radiosotopes due to the Chernobyl fall-out. as Cs137, Cs134 and Ag110 (metastable); levels of Potassium 40, a natural radioactive element have been also measured. A discussion of results is presented and the comparison among data of the 1986 season and the 1987 one

  20. Supervisor's accident investigation handbook

    This pamphlet was prepared by the Environmental Health and Safety Department (EH and S) of Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) to provide LBL supervisors with a handy reference to LBL's accident investigation program. The publication supplements the Accident and Emergencies section of LBL's Regulations and Procedures Manual, Pub. 201. The present guide discusses only accidents that are to be investigated by the supervisor. These accidents are classified as Type C by the Department of Energy (DOE) and include most occupational injuries and illnesses, government motor-vehicle accidents, and property damages of less than $50,000

  1. Learning lessons from Natech accidents - the eNATECH accident database

    Krausmann, Elisabeth; Girgin, Serkan

    2016-04-01

    When natural hazards impact industrial facilities that house or process hazardous materials, fires, explosions and toxic releases can occur. This type of accident is commonly referred to as Natech accident. In order to prevent the recurrence of accidents or to better mitigate their consequences, lessons-learned type studies using available accident data are usually carried out. Through post-accident analysis, conclusions can be drawn on the most common damage and failure modes and hazmat release paths, particularly vulnerable storage and process equipment, and the hazardous materials most commonly involved in these types of accidents. These analyses also lend themselves to identifying technical and organisational risk-reduction measures that require improvement or are missing. Industrial accident databases are commonly used for retrieving sets of Natech accident case histories for further analysis. These databases contain accident data from the open literature, government authorities or in-company sources. The quality of reported information is not uniform and exhibits different levels of detail and accuracy. This is due to the difficulty of finding qualified information sources, especially in situations where accident reporting by the industry or by authorities is not compulsory, e.g. when spill quantities are below the reporting threshold. Data collection has then to rely on voluntary record keeping often by non-experts. The level of detail is particularly non-uniform for Natech accident data depending on whether the consequences of the Natech event were major or minor, and whether comprehensive information was available for reporting. In addition to the reporting bias towards high-consequence events, industrial accident databases frequently lack information on the severity of the triggering natural hazard, as well as on failure modes that led to the hazmat release. This makes it difficult to reconstruct the dynamics of the accident and renders the development of

  2. Accident on the gas transfer system

    An accident has happened on the Vivitron gas transfer system on the 7 th August 1991. This report presents the context, facts and inquiries, analyses the reasons and explains also how the repairing has been effected

  3. More Children Accidently Poisoned by 'Essential Oils'

    ... fullstory_158837.html More Children Accidently Poisoned by 'Essential Oils' Tennessee poison center reports doubling of dangerous exposures ... HealthDay News) -- Children are increasingly at risk from essential oils that are often used in natural remedies, a ...

  4. Framework for accident management

    Accident management is an essential element of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Integration Plan for the closure of severe accident issues. This element will consolidate the results from other key elements; such as the Individual Plant Examination (IPE), the Containment Performance Improvement, and the Severe Accident Research Programs, in a form that can be used to enhance the safety programs for nuclear power plants. The NRC is currently conducting an Accident Management Program that is intended to aid in defining the scope and attributes of an accident management program for nuclear power plants. The accident management plan will ensure that a plant specific program is developed and implemented to promote the most effective use of available utility resources (people and hardware) to prevent and mitigate severe accidents. Hardware changes or other plant modifications to reduce the frequency of severe accidents are not a central aim of this program. To accomplish the outlined objectives, the NRC has developed an accident management framework that is comprised of five elements: (1) accident management strategies, (2) training, (3) guidance and computational aids, (4) instrumentation, and (5) delineation of decision making responsibilities. A process for the development of an accident management program has been identified using these NRC framework elements

  5. Analysis of surface powered haulage accidents, January 1990--July 1996

    Fesak, G.M.; Breland, R.M.; Spadaro, J. [Dept. of Labor, Arlington, VA (United States)

    1996-12-31

    This report addresses surface haulage accidents that occurred between January 1990 and July 1996 involving haulage trucks (including over-the-road trucks), front-end-loaders, scrapers, utility trucks, water trucks, and other mobile haulage equipment. The study includes quarries, open pits and surface coal mines utilizing self-propelled mobile equipment to transport personnel, supplies, rock, overburden material, ore, mine waste, or coal for processing. A total of 4,397 accidents were considered. This report summarizes the major factors that led to the accidents and recommends accident prevention methods to reduce the frequency of these accidents.

  6. Accident evolution and barrier function and accident evolution management modeling of nuclear power plant incidents

    Every analysis of an accident or an incident is founded on a more or less explicit model of what an accident is. On a general level, the current approach models an incident or accident in a nuclear power plant as a failure to maintain a stable state with all variables within their ranges of stability. There are two main sets of subsystems in continuous interaction making up the analyzed system, namely the human-organizational and the technical subsystems. Several different but related approaches can be chosen to model an accident. However, two important difficulties accompany such modeling: the high level of system complexity and the very infrequent occurrence of accidents. The current approach acknowledges these problems and focuses on modeling reported incidents/accidents or scenarios selected in probabilistic risk assessment analyses to be of critical importance for the safety of a plant

  7. Note on the stock market's reaction to the accident at Three Mile Island

    This note provides new information regarding the market reaction toward electric utility stocks that resulted both from the accident at Three Mile Island, and the events predating and postdating the accident. The results suggest that some of the market reaction heretofore ascribed to the accident resulted instead from regulatory activity occurring before the accident. We also provide results suggesting that regulatory activity by the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission in the wake of the accident served to offset a majority of the increased systematic risk resulting from the accident. Our results imply that previously reported lingering effects of the accident at Three Mile Island may be regulatory effects from events predating the accident

  8. Framework for accident management

    A program is being conducted to establish those attributes of a severe accident management plan which are necessary to assure effective response to all credible severe accidents and to develop guidance for their incorporation in a plant's Accident Management Plan. This program is one part of the Accident Management Research Program being conducted by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The approach used in establishing attributes and developing guidance includes three steps. In the first step the general attributes of an accident management plan were identified based on: (1) the objectives established for the NRC accident management program, (2) the elements of an accident management framework identified by the NRC, and (3) a review of the processes used in developing the currently used approach for classifying and analyzing accidents. For the second step, a process was defined that uses the general attributes identified from the first step to develop an accident management plan. The third step applied the process defined in the second step at a nuclear power plant to refine and develop it into a benchmark accident management plan. Step one is completed, step two is underway and step three has not yet begun

  9. Analysis and discussion on reports of additional safety assessment of nuclear installations with respect to the Fukushima accident; Analyse et commentaire des rapports d'evaluation complementaire de la surete des installations nucleaires au regard de l'accident de Fukushima

    Sene, Monique; Sene, Raymond

    2011-11-15

    This document proposes an analysis of the reports made by the different operators of nuclear installations within the frame of a safety audit of the French nuclear installations with respect to the Fukushima accident. Operators (mainly AREVA, the CEA and EDF) were asked to perform additional safety assessments. In a first part, the conclusions of EDF reports are analysed regarding the seismic risk, the flooding risk, the situation of some specific sites (Fessenheim, Tricastin), other phenomena (rains, winds), loss of electricity supplies and of cooling systems, severe accidents, hydrogen issue, chemical hazards, subcontractors, crisis management. Conclusions of AREVA reports are analysed for the different sites (Tricastin, La Hague, MELOX factory, Romans factory). Conclusions of CEA reports are analysed for the different concerned installations (ATPu, Masurca, Osiris, Phenix, Jules Horowitz reactor). A second part proposes a global analysis of EDF's additional safety assessment reports regarding earthquake, flooding, other extreme natural phenomena, loss of electricity supplies and cooling system, subcontracting conditions, crisis management, and radiation protection organisation. AREVA's and CEA's reports are then analysed in terms of report structure and content, and for the different concerned sites

  10. Evaluation of station blackout accidents at nuclear power plants: Technical findings related to unresolved safety issue A-44: Final report

    1988-06-01

    ''Station Blackout,'' which is the complete loss of alternating current (AC) electrical power in a nuclear power plant, has been designated as Unresolved Safety Issue A-44. Because many safety systems required for reactor core decay heat removal and containment heat removal depend on AC power, the consequences of a station blackout could be severe. This report documents the findings of technical studies performed as part of the program to resolve this issue. The important factors analyzed include: the fequency of loss of offsite power; the probability that emergency or onsite AC power supplies would be unavailable; the capability and reliability of decay heat removal systems independent of AC power; and the likelihood that offsite power would be restored before systems that cannot operate for extended periods without AC power fail, thus resulting in core damage. This report also addresses effects of different designs, locations, and operational features on the estimated frequency of core damage resulting from station blackout events.

  11. Documents, used for drawing up the CCRX-report 'Radioactive contamination in the Netherlands caused by the reactor accident at Chernobyl'. Part 1

    In these documents the results are summarized of a large number of measurements and calculations performed by various Dutch organizations in consequence of the nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl. refs.; figs.; tabs

  12. Investigations on the safety of radioactive materials transport. Pt. 2. Modeling of the radiological consequences in the vicinity of an accident. Final report on the working package 2

    One aim of this project 3611R03300 was to analyse methods and procedures accord-ing to state-of-the-art technology concerning their applicability to assess the radiologi-cal consequences in the near vicinity of a transport accident. The analysis focusses on the dispersion models used for the airborne radionuclides released during an accident. In view of the large amount of simulations needed for a probabilistic assessment of the accident's radiological impact, simplified methods to calculate nuclide concentrations and deposition rates for the near vicinity were searched. Additionally, conservative fac-tors were determined to convert the results valid for 150 m distance to the accident, which was the shortest distance examined in the Transportstudie Konrad 2009, to the near vicinity (20 m distance).

  13. Statistical modelling of the frequency and severity of road accidents

    Janstrup, Kira Hyldekær

    reporting traffic accidents. The second questionnaire was administered to stakeholders in the transportation field and was made to detect strengths, threats and opportunities for reporting traffic accidents within the police. This Ph.D. study contributes significantly to the literature about under......Under-reporting of traffic accidents is a well-discussed subject in traffic safety and it is well-known that the degree of under-reporting of traffic accidents is quite high in many countries. Nevertheless, very little literature has been made to investigate what causes the high degree of under......-reporting. The problem of under-reporting is not unique for traffic accidents as severe under-reporting is a challenge in many other fields of incident reporting. In other incidents fields with intended or unintended harm, research has investigated the behavioural reasons for why people choose to report an...

  14. Laser accidents: Being Prepared

    Barat, K

    2003-01-24

    The goal of the Laser Safety Officer and any laser safety program is to prevent a laser accident from occurring, in particular an injury to a person's eyes. Most laser safety courses talk about laser accidents, causes, and types of injury. The purpose of this presentation is to present a plan for safety offices and users to follow in case of accident or injury from laser radiation.

  15. The Chernobyl accident consequences

    Five teen years later, Tchernobyl remains the symbol of the greater industrial nuclear accident. To take stock on this accident, this paper proposes a chronology of the events and presents the opinion of many international and national organizations. It provides also web sites references concerning the environmental and sanitary consequences of the Tchernobyl accident, the economic actions and propositions for the nuclear safety improvement in the East Europe. (A.L.B.)

  16. Communication and industrial accidents

    As, Sicco van

    2001-01-01

    This paper deals with the influence of organizational communication on safety. Accidents are actually caused by individual mistakes. However the underlying causes of accidents are often organizational. As a link between these two levels - the organizational failures and mistakes - I suggest the concept of role distance, which emphasizes the organizational characteristics. The general hypothesis is that communication failures are a main cause of role distance and accident-proneness within orga...

  17. Experimental studies of the early effects of inhaled beta-emitting radionuclides for nuclear accident risk assessment: Phase 2 report

    Scott, B.R.; Hahn, F.F.; Newton, G.J.; Snipes, M.B.; Damon, E.G.; Mauderly, J.L.; Boecker, B.B.; Gray, D.H.

    1987-11-01

    This report summarizes a series of experiments concerning the effect of linear energy transfer and temporal radiation dose pattern to the lung from inhaled beta-emitting radionuclides. The results were used to test the validity of a hazard-function mathematical model for predicting death from radiation pneumonitis. Both morbidity and mortality within 18 months after exposure were examined in rats exposed to beta-emitting radionuclides, giving brief or protracted irradiation of the lung or having weak or strong beta emissions. Protraction of the radiation dose to the lung from a half-time in the lung of less than three days to a half-time with a long-term component of about 150 days has a sparing effect. The median lethal dose for the protracted irradiation is about 1.7 times the median lethal dose for the brief irradiation. Low energy beta emissions from /sup 147/Pm have a similar effectiveness in producing lethal injury as high energy beta emissions from /sup 90/Sr. Changes in three parameters of morbidity were measured: body weight, hematology and pulmonary function; only changes in pulmonary function correlated well with pulmonary radiation injury. The doses of radiation required to produce impaired function, however, were not significantly different from those that produced death. The hazard-function model for predicting death from radiation pneumonitis, which was developed from previously obtained data for inhalation exposures of dogs to beta-emitting radionuclides, adequately predicted the median lethal doses for rats receiving one of several different beta dose rate patterns to the lung, thus strengthening the validity of the mathematical model. 23 refs., 41 figs., 12 tabs.

  18. Experimental studies of the early effects of inhaled beta-emitting radionuclides for nuclear accident risk assessment: Phase 2 report

    This report summarizes a series of experiments concerning the effect of linear energy transfer and temporal radiation dose pattern to the lung from inhaled beta-emitting radionuclides. The results were used to test the validity of a hazard-function mathematical model for predicting death from radiation pneumonitis. Both morbidity and mortality within 18 months after exposure were examined in rats exposed to beta-emitting radionuclides, giving brief or protracted irradiation of the lung or having weak or strong beta emissions. Protraction of the radiation dose to the lung from a half-time in the lung of less than three days to a half-time with a long-term component of about 150 days has a sparing effect. The median lethal dose for the protracted irradiation is about 1.7 times the median lethal dose for the brief irradiation. Low energy beta emissions from 147Pm have a similar effectiveness in producing lethal injury as high energy beta emissions from 90Sr. Changes in three parameters of morbidity were measured: body weight, hematology and pulmonary function; only changes in pulmonary function correlated well with pulmonary radiation injury. The doses of radiation required to produce impaired function, however, were not significantly different from those that produced death. The hazard-function model for predicting death from radiation pneumonitis, which was developed from previously obtained data for inhalation exposures of dogs to beta-emitting radionuclides, adequately predicted the median lethal doses for rats receiving one of several different beta dose rate patterns to the lung, thus strengthening the validity of the mathematical model. 23 refs., 41 figs., 12 tabs

  19. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support ''HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety, Analysis Report, Annex A,'' ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  20. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    CROWE, R.D.; PIEPHO, M.G.

    2000-03-23

    This document provided the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report''. All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  1. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    This document provided the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report''. All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  2. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    KOPELIC, S.D.

    1999-02-25

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  3. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  4. Comparative Assessment of Severe Accidents in the Chinese Energy Sector

    Hirschberg, S.; Burgherr, P.; Spiekerman, G.; Cazzoli, E.; Vitazek, J.; Cheng, L

    2003-03-01

    This report deals with the comparative assessment of accidents risks characteristic for the various electricity supply options. A reasonably complete picture of the wide spectrum of health, environmental and economic effects associated with various energy systems can only be obtained by considering damages due to normal operation as well as due to accidents. The focus of the present work is on severe accidents, as these are considered controversial. By severe accidents we understand potential or actual accidents that represent a significant risk to people, property and the environment and may lead to large consequences. (author)

  5. Comparative Assessment of Severe Accidents in the Chinese Energy Sector

    This report deals with the comparative assessment of accidents risks characteristic for the various electricity supply options. A reasonably complete picture of the wide spectrum of health, environmental and economic effects associated with various energy systems can only be obtained by considering damages due to normal operation as well as due to accidents. The focus of the present work is on severe accidents, as these are considered controversial. By severe accidents we understand potential or actual accidents that represent a significant risk to people, property and the environment and may lead to large consequences. (author)

  6. The reactor accident of Chernobyl

    The contamination, caused by the radioactivity released during the reactor accident of Chernobyl was measured in samples taken in the environment of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center. The radioactivity was determined in air, fodder, milk, vegetables, other plants, foodstuffs, soil, precipitations, drinking water, sludge and other samples. Results of measurements are reported which were received with considerably more than 1000 samples. The evaluation of the data will be presented in KfK 4140. (orig.)

  7. Perspective on post-Fukushima severe accident research

    After the Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 2011 several investigation committees issued reports with lessons learned from the accident, in which some recommendations on severe accident research are included. The review of specific severe accident research items had already started before Fukushima accident in working group of Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) in terms of significance of consequences, uncertainties of phenomena and maturity of assessment methodology. Re-investigation started after the Fukushima accident in this working group to cover additional effects of Fukushima accident, such as core degradation behaviors, sea water injection, containment failure/leakage and re-criticality. The review results are categorized in nine major fields; core degradation behavior, core melt coolability/retention in containment vessel, function of containment vessel, source term, hydrogen behavior, fuel-coolant interaction, molten core concrete interaction, recriticality and instrumentation in severe accident conditions. In January 2012, in collaboration with this working group, Research Expert Committee on Evaluation of Severe Accident was established in AESJ in order to investigate severe accident related issues for future LWR development. Based on these activities and also author's personal view, the present paper describes the seven important severe accident research issues after Fukushima accident. They are (1) investigation of damaged core and components, (2) advanced severe accident analysis capabilities and associated experimental investigations, (3) development of reliable passive cooling system for core/containment, (4) analysis of hydrogen behavior and investigation of hydrogen measures, (5) enhancement of removal function of radioactive materials of containment venting, (6) advanced instrumentation for the diagnosis of severe accident and (7) assessment of advanced containment design which exchides long-term evacuation in any severe accident situations

  8. Review, analysis and report on the radiological consequences resulting from accidents and incidents involving radioactive materials during transport in the period 1975-1986 by and within member states of the european communities

    Radioactive materials are routinely transported throughout the European Communities, by all modes of transport. These shipments occur in accordance with comprehensive regulations and the vast majority of these shipments are made without incident. Occasionally however accidents and other incidents have occurred at various stages of transport operations and the purpose of this study was to examine the available information on events that occurred within the Communities during the years 1975 to 1986. The information was gathered from Member States' Competent Authorities and other organisations, using a questionnaire. Most of the detailed information came from the two countries carrying out the study, the UK and France. The information gathered covered many different types of event involving a wide range of materials: it is concluded that under-reporting is a major source of uncertainty in the results. Therefore, it is emphasised that care should be used in comparisons between the results for different types of transport operations, since accidents and incidents involving certain types of transport are more fully reported than others. Consequently, the authors stress the need for improved reporting and recording procedures. No evidence was found of any major health consequences resulting from the accidents and incidents studied. However, there were instances of high doses having been received by workers, mainly as a result of inadequate preparation of packages prior to despatch. These events point to the need to maintain high standards of quality assurance at all stages of transport operations

  9. Models for describing the behaviour of light water reactors in serious accidents for the programs SCDAP/RELAP5, ATHLET/SA, CATHARE/ICARE, MELCOR etc.. First technical report on BMFT-sponsored research project 1500 831 7: Comparative assessment of different computer codes for severe accident analysis, contribution to the ATHLET/CD code development

    Within the scope of the project BMFT No. 15008317 entitled ''Comparative Assessment of Different Computer Codws for Severe Accident Analysis, Contribution to the ATHLET/SA-Code Development'' the codes ATHLET/SA, CATHARE/ICARE, MELCOR and SCDAP/RELAP5 are investigated. Emphasis is put on a comparison and an assessment of the governing modelling features implemented and operating in the codes under consideration. The codes are evaluated and compared on the base of selected experiments (especially the CORA experimental program of the Karlsruhe Research Center) and relevant severe accident scenarios. The present report is a reference study dealing with the governing models implemented in the severe accident codes SCDAP/RELAP5, ATHLET/SA, CATHARE/ICARE, MELCOR, KESS-III, MAAP and MELPROG/TRAC. Emphaisis is laid on the following models (molstly implemented in form of modules in the respective codes) dealing with: - thermal hydraulics; - heat generation and heat structures; - Radiation heat transfer; - mechanical (rod) behaviour; - core heatup, meltdown and relocation; - chemical reaction; - fission product release and transport; - material properties; - specific components. (orig.)

  10. Status Report on Activities of the Systems Assessment Task Force, OECD-NEA Expert Group on Accident Tolerant Fuels for LWRs

    Bragg-Sitton, Shannon Michelle [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-09-01

    The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development /Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) Nuclear Science Committee approved the formation of an Expert Group on Accident Tolerant Fuel (ATF) for LWRs (EGATFL) in 2014. Chaired by Kemal Pasamehmetoglu, INL Associate Laboratory Director for Nuclear Science and Technology, the mandate for the EGATFL defines work under three task forces: (1) Systems Assessment, (2) Cladding and Core Materials, and (3) Fuel Concepts. Scope for the Systems Assessment task force includes definition of evaluation metrics for ATF, technology readiness level definition, definition of illustrative scenarios for ATF evaluation, parametric studies, and selection of system codes. The Cladding and Core Materials and Fuel Concepts task forces will identify gaps and needs for modeling and experimental demonstration; define key properties of interest; identify the data necessary to perform concept evaluation under normal conditions and illustrative scenarios; identify available infrastructure (internationally) to support experimental needs; and make recommendations on priorities. Where possible, considering proprietary and other export restrictions (e.g., International Traffic in Arms Regulations), the Expert Group will facilitate the sharing of data and lessons learned across the international group membership. The Systems Assessment Task Force is chaired by Shannon Bragg-Sitton (INL), while the Cladding Task Force will be chaired by a representative from France (Marie Moatti, Electricite de France [EdF]) and the Fuels Task Force will be chaired by a representative from Japan (Masaki Kurata, Japan Atomic Energy Agency [JAEA]). This report provides an overview of the Systems Assessment Task Force charter and status of work accomplishment.

  11. Criticality accident in Argentina

    A recent criticality type accident, ocurred in Argetina, is commented. Considerations about the nature of the facility where this accident took place, its genesis, type of operation carried out on the day of the event, and the medical aspects involved are done. (Author)

  12. Radiation accidents in hospitals

    Some of the radiation accidents that have occurred in Indian hospitals and causes that led to them are reviewed. Proper organization of radiation safety minimizes such accidents. It has been pointed out that there must be technical competence and mental preparedness to tackle emergencies when they do infrequently occur. (M.G.B.)

  13. Communication and industrial accidents

    As, Sicco van

    2001-01-01

    This paper deals with the influence of organizational communication on safety. Accidents are actually caused by individual mistakes. However the underlying causes of accidents are often organizational. As a link between these two levels - the organizational failures and mistakes - I suggest the conc

  14. Accidents with orphan sources

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has specifically defined statutory functions relating to the development of standards of safety and the provision for their application. It also has responsibilities placed on it by virtue of a number of Conventions, two of which are relevant to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies - the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. An overview of the way in which these functions are being applied to prevent and respond to radiological accidents, particularly those involving orphan sources, is described in this paper. Summaries of a number of such accidents and of the Agency's Action Plan relating to the safety and security of radiation sources are given. (orig.)

  15. An exercise on clean-up actions in an urban environment after a nuclear accident. Report of the NKS EKO 4 programme

    The EKO 4/c working group of the environmental effects and emergency preparedness programme (EKO) of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS) organised a decision conference on August 30th and 31st, 1995 in Stockholm, Sweden. The meeting was designed to be attended by those responsible for planning and deciding on protective actions in the Nordic countries after a nuclear accident. Issues concerning clean-up strategies in an urban environment after a hypothetical and very severe reactor accident were discussed at the meeting. The objectives of the meeting were to provide a shared understanding between the decision makers and the radiation protection community on concerns and issues related to decision on protective actions after a nuclear accident. (6 refs., 2 figs., 3 tabs.)

  16. WHO updating report on the WHO conference on ''Health consequences of the Chernobyl and other radiological accidents'', including results of the IPHECA Programme

    A wide range of health issues resulting from the Chernobyl accident and other radiation accidents was discussed at the Conference. Acute and delayed radiation effects (thyroid diseases, primary thyroid cancer, haemoblastosis, solid malignancies of various sites, etc.) were of high priority among the questions discussed. In addition to the plenary and main sessions there were parallel sessions, which included important subjects such ast the set-up of epidemiological and other registries, techniques of epidemiological registries, techniques of epidemiological studies, estimates of individual and population doses, specificity of the health status of the population and liquidators, as well as treatment and rehabilitation of those affected. Special attention was paid to the psycho-social effects of the accident. 3 figs, 4 tabs

  17. Reactor safety study. An assessment of accident risks in U. S. commercial nuclear power plants. Appendix XI. Analysis of comments on the draft WASH-1400 report. [PWR and BWR

    1975-10-01

    Information is presented concerning comments on reactor safety by governmental agencies and civilian organizations; reactor safety study methodology; consequence model; probability of accident sequences; and various accident conditions.

  18. iWitness pollution map: crowdsourcing petrochemical accident research.

    Bera, Risha; Hrybyk, Anna

    2013-01-01

    Community members living near any one of Louisiana's 160 chemical plants or refineries have always said that accidents occurring in these petrochemical facilities significantly impact their health and safety. This article reviews the iWitness Pollution Map tool and Rapid Response Team (RRT) approach led by the Louisiana Bucket Brigade, an environmental nonprofit group, and their effectiveness in documenting these health and safety impacts during petrochemical accidents. Analysis of a January 2013 RRT deployment in Chalmette, LA, showed increased documentation of current petrochemical accidents and suggested increased preparedness to report future accidents. The RRT model encourages government response and enforcement agencies to integrate with organized community groups to fully document the impacts during ongoing accidents, lead a more timely response to the accident, and prevent future accidents from occurring. PMID:24135064

  19. Scientists help children victims of the Chernobyl reactor accident. Report on project phase 1 and annex to the report on phase 1: 1.4.1993 - 31.3.1996

    The bilateral project of Belarus and Germany was commissioned on 1.04.1993 and is placed under the scientific guidance of the Gemeinschaftsausschuss Strahlenforschung. In the framework of the project part devoted to ''therapy and medical training'', covering the period from 1.04.1993 until 31.03.1996, all in all 99 children from Belarus suffering from advanced-stage tumors of the thyroid received a special radio-iodine therapy in Germany. In about 60% of the children complete removal of the tumor was achieved. Another task of the project was to train over the reporting period 41 doctors and physicists from Belarus in the fields of nuclear medical diagnostic evaluation and therapy of thyroid tumors. The project part ''biological dosimetry'' was to investigate the role of micronuclei in peripheral lymphocytes, and whether their presence in the lymphocytes permits to derive information on the radiation dose received even several years after the reactor accident. The scientists also examained the role of the micronuclei in follow-up examinations of the radio-iodine therapy. Further studies used the relatively large number of tumors in the children, as compared to the literature available until the accident, to examine whether there are specific mutation patterns to be found in tumot suppressor genes (p-53) in thyroid tumors which might be used as indicators revealing radiation-induced onset of tumor growth. The project part ''retrospective dosimetry and risk analysis'' was in charge of detecting information answering the question of whether the release of I-131, suspected to be critical nuclide, really was the cause of enhanced incidence of thyroid tumors in the children. The project part ''coordination and examination center at Minsk'' was to establish and hold available the support required by the GAST project participants. (orig./CB)

  20. Persistence of airline accidents.

    Barros, Carlos Pestana; Faria, Joao Ricardo; Gil-Alana, Luis Alberiko

    2010-10-01

    This paper expands on air travel accident research by examining the relationship between air travel accidents and airline traffic or volume in the period from 1927-2006. The theoretical model is based on a representative airline company that aims to maximise its profits, and it utilises a fractional integration approach in order to determine whether there is a persistent pattern over time with respect to air accidents and air traffic. Furthermore, the paper analyses how airline accidents are related to traffic using a fractional cointegration approach. It finds that airline accidents are persistent and that a (non-stationary) fractional cointegration relationship exists between total airline accidents and airline passengers, airline miles and airline revenues, with shocks that affect the long-run equilibrium disappearing in the very long term. Moreover, this relation is negative, which might be due to the fact that air travel is becoming safer and there is greater competition in the airline industry. Policy implications are derived for countering accident events, based on competition and regulation. PMID:20618386

  1. Accidents with sulfuric acid

    Rajković Miloš B.

    2006-01-01

    Full Text Available Sulfuric acid is an important industrial and strategic raw material, the production of which is developing on all continents, in many factories in the world and with an annual production of over 160 million tons. On the other hand, the production, transport and usage are very dangerous and demand measures of precaution because the consequences could be catastrophic, and not only at the local level where the accident would happen. Accidents that have been publicly recorded during the last eighteen years (from 1988 till the beginning of 2006 are analyzed in this paper. It is very alarming data that, according to all the recorded accidents, over 1.6 million tons of sulfuric acid were exuded. Although water transport is the safest (only 16.38% of the total amount of accidents in that way 98.88% of the total amount of sulfuric acid was exuded into the environment. Human factor was the common factor in all the accidents, whether there was enough control of the production process, of reservoirs or transportation tanks or the transport was done by inadequate (old tanks, or the accidents arose from human factor (inadequate speed, lock of caution etc. The fact is that huge energy, sacrifice and courage were involved in the recovery from accidents where rescue teams and fire brigades showed great courage to prevent real environmental catastrophes and very often they lost their lives during the events. So, the phrase that sulfuric acid is a real "environmental bomb" has become clearer.

  2. Accidents, risks and consequences

    Although the accident at Chernobyl can be considered as the worst accident in the world, it could have been worse. Other far worse situations are considered, such as a nuclear weapon hitting a nuclear reactor. Indeed the accident at Chernobyl is compared to a nuclear weapon. The consequences of Chernobyl in terms of radiation levels are discussed. Although it is believed that a similar accident could not occur in the United Kingdom, that possibility is considered. It is suggested that emergency plans should be made for just such an eventuality. Even if Chernobyl could not happen in the UK, the effects of accidents are international. The way in which nuclear reactor accidents happen is explored, taking the 1957 Windscale fire, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl as examples. Reactor designs and accident scenarios are considered. The different reactor designs are listed. As well as the Chernobyl RBMK design it is suggested that the light water reactors also have undesirable features from the point of view of safety. (U.K.)

  3. Legal intervention against medical accidents in Japan

    Hideo Yasunaga

    2008-12-01

    Full Text Available Hideo YasunagaDepartment of Health Management and Policy, Graduate School of Medicine, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, JapanAbstract: The number of civil lawsuits in Japan concerning medical accidents has been increasing gradually. Emotional reports in the media about medical accidents have amplified people’s distrust of physicians. Since 2002, the police have been more actively involved, and the number of criminal prosecutions against physicians as a result of medical accidents has increased. Fear of litigation and arrest has demoralized physicians. Communication of the risks associated with various medical practices is considered vital if physician–patient relationships are to be improved. Moreover, there needs to be a reconsideration of legal interventions into medical affairs.Keywords: physician–patient relationship, medical accidents, civil lawsuits, criminal lawsuits

  4. Containment leakage during severe accident conditions

    An alternate to the THRESHOLD model used in most severe accident risk assessments has been investigated. One reference plant for each of six containment types has been studied to determine the magnitude of containment leakage that would result from the pressures and temperatures associated with severe accident conditions. Containment penetrations having the greatest potential for early containment leakage are identified. The studies indicate that containment leakage through penetrations prior to reaching containment threshold pressures (currently reported containment shell failure pressures) should be considered in severe accident risk assessments. Failure of non-metallic seals for containment penetrations can be a significant source of containment leakage under severe accident pressure and temperature conditions. Although studies of containment types are useful in identifying sources of containment leakage, final conclusions may need to be plant specific. Recommendations concerning future studies to better develop the use of continuous leakage models are provided. 9 references, 4 figures, 2 tables

  5. Safety analysis of surface haulage accidents

    Randolph, R.F.; Boldt, C.M.K.

    1996-12-31

    Research on improving haulage truck safety, started by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, is being continued by its successors. This paper reports the orientation of the renewed research efforts, beginning with an update on accident data analysis, the role of multiple causes in these accidents, and the search for practical methods for addressing the most important causes. Fatal haulage accidents most often involve loss of control or collisions caused by a variety of factors. Lost-time injuries most often involve sprains or strains to the back or multiple body areas, which can often be attributed to rough roads and the shocks of loading and unloading. Research to reduce these accidents includes improved warning systems, shock isolation for drivers, encouraging seatbelt usage, and general improvements to system and task design.

  6. 30 years learning from radiological accidents

    The summary of the radiological accidents from 1957 to 1997 occurred in Mexico is showed, including the analysis in terms of practice, and consequences. The study tries to establish the radiological knowledge of the people involved in the accident, their attitude to the safety, and retrospective review to the light of 30 years after. Nevertheless, due to the technological developments made to the equipment allow the use in a safe manner, so that the accident number has diminished in a important in a important quantity respect to the reported period, combined to the increased the radiological culture learned by the operation personnel in addition of qualification and awareness in this matter, at present is little probable that the mentioned accidents repeat now days with the same radiological affectations as those happened in the past. (author)

  7. Review of models applicable to accident aerosols

    Estimations of potential airborne-particle releases are essential in safety assessments of nuclear-fuel facilities. This report is a review of aerosol behavior models that have potential applications for predicting aerosol characteristics in compartments containing accident-generated aerosol sources. Such characterization of the accident-generated aerosols is a necessary step toward estimating their eventual release in any accident scenario. Existing aerosol models can predict the size distribution, concentration, and composition of aerosols as they are acted on by ventilation, diffusion, gravity, coagulation, and other phenomena. Models developed in the fields of fluid mechanics, indoor air pollution, and nuclear-reactor accidents are reviewed with this nuclear fuel facility application in mind. The various capabilities of modeling aerosol behavior are tabulated and discussed, and recommendations are made for applying the models to problems of differing complexity

  8. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).'' All assumptions, parameters and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR

  9. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    PIEPHO, M.G.

    1999-10-20

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).'' All assumptions, parameters and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR.

  10. Railroad accident report - derailment of Southern Pacific Transportation Company Train no. 01-BSMFF-05 carrying radioactive material at Thermal, California, January 7, 1982

    About 9:50 p.m., P.s.t., on Thursday, January 7, 1982, Southern Pacific Transportation Company freight train No. 01-BSMFF-05, derailed 14 cars at Thermal, California, while traveling about 57 miles per hour on the tangent single main track. Four transients riding on the train were seriously injured, a fifth transient died as a result of injuries. No crewmembers were injured as a result of the accident. The presence of radioactive material in the derailed Trailer-On-Flat-Car train was discovered about 1 hour after the accident occurred, resulting in the handling of the emergency response effort as a serious radiological emergency. Accurate information regarding the precise nature of the radioactive material shipment was not available at the accident site until about 5 hours after the derailment occurred; at that time radiological emergency procedures were terminated. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate company evaluation of defect data which should have indicated that the rail in the vicinity of the derailment was approaching service life limit for main track use and the consequent failure of the company to initiate an accelerated inspection program to detect incipient fatigue fractures of the rail

  11. Chernobyl nuclear accident: Effects on food. April 1986-November 1989 (Citations from the Food Science and Technology Abstracts data base). Report for April 1986-November 1989

    This bibliography contains citations concerning studies and measurements of the radioactive contamination by the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident of food and the food chain. The studies cover meat and dairy products, vegetables, fish, food chains, and radioactive contamination of agricultural farms and lands. (This updated bibliography contains 108 citations, 43 of which are new entries to the previous edition.)

  12. Chernobyl nuclear accident: effects on foods. April 1986-October 1988 (Citations from the Food Science and Technology Abstracts data base). Report for April 1986-October 1988

    This bibliography contains citations concerning studies and measurements of the radioactive contamination of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident of food and food chains. The studies cover meat and dairy products, vegetables, fish, food chains, and radioactive contamination of agricultural farms and lands. (Contains 65 citations fully indexed and including a title list.)

  13. The Chernobyl nuclear accident and its consequences

    An AAEC Task Group was set up shortly after the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant to monitor and evaluate initial reports and to assess the implications for Australia. The Task Group issued a preliminary report on 9 May 1986. On 25-29 August 1986, the USSR released details of the accident and its consequences and further information has become available from the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD and the World Health Organisation. The Task Group now presents a revised report summarising this information and commenting on the consequences from the Australian viewpoint

  14. Report of the External Advisory Committee with respect to the report of the Task Force on Safety of Personnel in LHC underground areas following the sector 3-4 accident of 19 September 2008

    Hoppe, A; Petersen, B; Schrader, S; Tartaglia, R

    2009-01-01

    Based on the mandate given by the CERN Director‐General, the Task Force on Safety of Personnel (TFSP) in LHC underground areas following the sector 3‐4 accident of 19‐September‐2008 has carried out an assessment of the situation concerning safety of personnel after the accident.

  15. Severe accident testing of electrical penetration assemblies

    This report describes the results of tests conducted on three different designs of full-size electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) that are used in the containment buildings of nuclear power plants. The objective of the tests was to evaluate the behavior of the EPAs under simulated severe accident conditions using steam at elevated temperature and pressure. Leakage, temperature, and cable insulation resistance were monitored throughout the tests. Nuclear-qualified EPAs were produced from D. G. O'Brien, Westinghouse, and Conax. Severe-accident-sequence analysis was used to generate the severe accident conditions (SAC) for a large dry pressurized-water reactor (PWR), a boiling-water reactor (BWR) Mark I drywell, and a BWR Mark III wetwell. Based on a survey conducted by Sandia, each EPA was matched with the severe accident conditions for a specific reactor type. This included the type of containment that a particular EPA design was used in most frequently. Thus, the D. G. O'Brien EPA was chosen for the PWR SAC test, the Westinghouse was chosen for the Mark III test, and the Conax was chosen for the Mark I test. The EPAs were radiation and thermal aged to simulate the effects of a 40-year service life and loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) before the SAC tests were conducted. The design, test preparations, conduct of the severe accident test, experimental results, posttest observations, and conclusions about the integrity and electrical performance of each EPA tested in this program are described in this report. In general, the leak integrity of the EPAs tested in this program was not compromised by severe accident loads. However, there was significant degradation in the insulation resistance of the cables, which could affect the electrical performance of equipment and devices inside containment at some point during the progression of a severe accident. 10 refs., 165 figs., 16 tabs

  16. Severe accident testing of electrical penetration assemblies

    Clauss, D.B. (Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA))

    1989-11-01

    This report describes the results of tests conducted on three different designs of full-size electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) that are used in the containment buildings of nuclear power plants. The objective of the tests was to evaluate the behavior of the EPAs under simulated severe accident conditions using steam at elevated temperature and pressure. Leakage, temperature, and cable insulation resistance were monitored throughout the tests. Nuclear-qualified EPAs were produced from D. G. O'Brien, Westinghouse, and Conax. Severe-accident-sequence analysis was used to generate the severe accident conditions (SAC) for a large dry pressurized-water reactor (PWR), a boiling-water reactor (BWR) Mark I drywell, and a BWR Mark III wetwell. Based on a survey conducted by Sandia, each EPA was matched with the severe accident conditions for a specific reactor type. This included the type of containment that a particular EPA design was used in most frequently. Thus, the D. G. O'Brien EPA was chosen for the PWR SAC test, the Westinghouse was chosen for the Mark III test, and the Conax was chosen for the Mark I test. The EPAs were radiation and thermal aged to simulate the effects of a 40-year service life and loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) before the SAC tests were conducted. The design, test preparations, conduct of the severe accident test, experimental results, posttest observations, and conclusions about the integrity and electrical performance of each EPA tested in this program are described in this report. In general, the leak integrity of the EPAs tested in this program was not compromised by severe accident loads. However, there was significant degradation in the insulation resistance of the cables, which could affect the electrical performance of equipment and devices inside containment at some point during the progression of a severe accident. 10 refs., 165 figs., 16 tabs.

  17. Analysis of severe accidents in pressurized heavy water reactors

    Certain very low probability plant states that are beyond design basis accident conditions and which may arise owing to multiple failures of safety systems leading to significant core degradation may jeopardize the integrity of many or all the barriers to the release of radioactive material. Such event sequences are called severe accidents. It is required in the IAEA Safety Requirements publication on Safety of the Nuclear Power Plants: Design, that consideration be given to severe accident sequences, using a combination of engineering judgement and probabilistic methods, to determine those sequences for which reasonably practicable preventive or mitigatory measures can be identified. Acceptable measures need not involve the application of conservative engineering practices used in setting and evaluating design basis accidents, but rather should be based on realistic or best estimate assumptions, methods and analytical criteria. Recently, the IAEA developed a Safety Report on Approaches and Tools for Severe Accident Analysis. This publication provides a description of factors important to severe accident analysis, an overview of severe accident phenomena and the current status in their modelling, categorization of available computer codes, and differences in approaches for various applications of severe accident analysis. The report covers both the in- and ex-vessel phases of severe accidents. The publication is consistent with the IAEA Safety Report on Accident Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants and can be considered as a complementary report specifically devoted to the analysis of severe accidents. Although the report does not explicitly differentiate among various reactor types, it has been written essentially on the basis of available knowledge and databases developed for light water reactors. Therefore its application is mostly oriented towards PWRs and BWRs and, to a more limited extent, they can be only used as preliminary guidance for other types of reactors

  18. Accidents on ships in the Danish International Ship register

    Ádám, Balázs; Rasmussen, Hanna Barbara

    our study is to describe trend of accidents and their contributing factors, with special focus on nationality, occurring in ships under Danish flag in the period 2010-2012. The study used two independent data sources, the Danish Maritime Authority and the Danish Radio Medical. It is mandatory to...... report accidents causing at least one day off work beyond the day of accident but the first source contains several accidents not fulfilling this criterion, too. Radio Medical is an independent service where all Danish ships may seek medical advice. The data sets were merged by identification number to...... create a single database that has been studied by descriptive statistics and regression analysis. Findings show a stabilised number of accidents in the analysed period. The occurrence of accidents is influenced by nationality. There is a higher frequency of reported injuries found among Danish and other...

  19. NKS-R ExCoolSe mid-term report KTH severe accidents research relevant to the NKS-ExCoolSe project[KTH = Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden

    Hyun Sun Park; Truc-Nam Dinh [Royal Inst. of Technology (Sweden)

    2006-04-15

    The present mid-term progress report is prepared on the recent results from the KTH severe accident research program relevant to the objective of the ExCoolSe project sponsored by the NKS-R program. The previous PRE-MELT-DEL project at KTH sponsored by NKS provided an extensive assessment on the remaining issues of severe accidents in general and suggested the key issues to be resolved such as coolability and steam explosion energetics in ex-vessel which became a backbone of the ExCoolSe project in NKS. The EXCOOLSE project has been integrated with, and leveraged on, parallel research program at KTH on severe accident phenomena the MSWI project which is funded by the APRI program, SKI in Sweden and HSK in Switzerland and produced more understanding of the key remaining issues. During last year, the critical assessment of the existing knowledge and current SAMG and designs of Nordic BWRs identified the research focus and initiated the new series of research activities toward the resolution of the key remaining issues specifically pertaining to the Nordic BWRs.(au)

  20. Twenty years of the Chernobyl accident: Results and problems in eliminating its consequences in Russia 1986-2006. Russian national report

    Twenty years after the Chernobyl accident, above 1.5 million people in 14 subjects of the Russian Federation continue to live in the area of radioactive contamination. More than 180,000 of the Russians were affected by radiation, when participating in elimination of the accident and its consequences. Since the first days of the accident, the public health service faced a task to develop and implement the measures on minimization of medical effects of the accident and public provision with medical assistance, including the employees of the nuclear power plant and the participants in mitigation of the accident. The health of the liquidators and the public living in the contaminated areas is the most socially significant issue being solved in the process of elimination of the Chernobyl consequences. Radiological effects have been the focus of attention for the overall 20-year period. The radiation protection system was based on performance of the two conditions, namely: absolute prevention of acute (deterministic) effects and reduction in the risk of remote (stochastic) effects to acceptable (justified) levels. As early as in 1986, a decision was made to create the unified system of medical observation for the individuals affected by radiation as a result of the Chernobyl accident. The Russian State Medical and Dosimetry Register (RSMDR) was established on the basis of the Medical Radiological Research Center of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences. The two most suffered public groups were defined as a result of research activity of the Register. These are the children (at the moment of the accident) living in the highly contaminated areas and the liquidators who have obtained the exposure dose above 150 mGy. According to the Register's data, 122 cases (54%) out of 226 thyroid cancers revealed during the years 1991-2003 among the children (at the moment of the Chernobyl catastrophe) from the Bryansk region can be considered as radiation-stipulated. Hygienic

  1. Soviet submarine accidents

    Although the Soviet Union has more submarines than the NATO navies combined, and the technological superiority of western submarines is diminishing, there is evidence that there are more accidents with Soviet submarines than with western submarine fleets. Whether this is due to inadequate crews or lower standards of maintenance and overhaul procedures is discussed. In particular, it is suggested that since the introduction of nuclear powered submarines, the Soviet submarine safety record has deteriorated. Information on Soviet submarine accidents is difficult to come by, but a list of some 23 accidents, mostly in nuclear submarines, between 1966 and 1986, has been compiled. The approximate date, class or type of submarine, the nature and location of the accident, the casualties and damage and the source of information are tabulated. (U.K.)

  2. Accident resistant transport container

    Anderson, J.A.; Cole, K.K.

    The invention relates to a container for the safe air transport of plutonium having several intermediate wood layers and a load spreader intermediate an inner container and an outer shell for mitigation of shock during a hypothetical accident.

  3. Talking about accidents

    It is argued that the public's emotional fear of the hypothetical, very unlikely, gigantic nuclear accident is partly caused by the nuclear industry's incorrect use of language within its own professional discussions. Improved terminology is suggested. (U.K.)

  4. Comparison of selected U.S. highway and railway severe accidents to U.S. regulatory accident conditions and IAEA transport standards

    This paper discusses selected severe historical US highway and rail accidents and compares the mechanical and/or thermal environments associated with these accidents to the 10CFR71 Hypothetical Accident Conditions and the accident environments (both regulatory and extraregulatory) investigated in 'Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident Conditions', which is commonly known as the Modal Study, and in 'Re-examination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates', NUREG/CR-6672. Since the hypothetical accident conditions of 10CFR71 are similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) package tests for accident conditions of transport, the evaluation is also valid in demonstrating the adequacy of IAEA's transport safety standard. Careful examination of the reports on the severe accidents revealed the accidents were found to be bounded by the regulatory environment described in 10CFR71. (author)

  5. Analysis of National Major Work Safety Accidents in China, 2003-2012

    Yunfeng YE

    2016-02-01

    Full Text Available Background: This study provides a national profile of major work safety accidents in China, which cause more than 10 fatalities per accident, intended to provide scientific basis for prevention measures and strategies to reduce major work safety accidents and deaths.Methods: Data from 2003-2012 Census of major work safety accidents were collected from State Administration of Work Safety System (SAWS. Published literature and statistical yearbook were also included to implement information. We analyzed the frequency of accidents and deaths, trend, geographic distribution and injury types. Additionally, we discussed the severity and urgency of emergency rescue by types of accidents.Results: A total of 877 major work safety accidents were reported, resulting in 16,795 deaths and 9,183 injuries. The numbers of accidents and deaths, mortality rate and incidence of major accidents have declined in recent years. The mortality rate and incidence was 0.71 and 1.20 per 106 populations in 2012, respectively. Transportation and mining contributed to the highest number of major accidents and deaths. Major aviation and railway accidents caused more casualties per incident, while collapse, machinery, electrical shock accidents and tailing dam accidents were the most severe situation that resulted in bigger proportion of death.Conclusion: Ten years’ major work safety accident data indicate that the frequency of accidents and number of deaths was declined and several safety concerns persist in some segments. Keywords: Work safety, Major accident, Prevention

  6. The consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Greece

    In this report the radioactive fallout on Greece from the Chernobyl nuclear accident is described. The flow pattern to Greece of the radioactive materials released, the measurements performed on environmental samples and samples of the food chain, as well as some estimations of the population doses and of the expected consequences of the accident are presented. The analysis has shown that the radiological impact of the accident in Greece can be considered minor. (J.K.)

  7. The role of nuclear reactor containment in severe accidents

    The containment is a structural envelope which completely surrounds the nuclear reactor system and is designed to confine the radioactive releases in case of an accident. This report summarises the work of an NEA Senior Group of Experts who have studied the potential role of containment in accidents exceeding design specifications (so-called severe accidents). Some possibilities for enhancing the ability of plants to reduce the risk of significant off-site consequences by appropriate management of the acident have been examined

  8. Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation

    Chandler, Mike

    2011-01-01

    This slide presentation provides an update on the Columbia accident response presented in 2005 with additional information that was not available at that time. It will provide information on the following topics: (1) medical response and Search and Rescue, (2) medico-legal issues associated with the accident, (3) the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team Report published in 2008, and (4) future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training.

  9. TMI-2 accident: core heat-up analysis

    This report summarizes NSAC study of reactor core thermal conditions during the accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2. The study focuses primarily on the time period from core uncovery (approximately 113 minutes after turbine trip) through the initiation of sustained high pressure injection (after 202 minutes). The transient analysis is based upon established sequences of events; plant data; post-accident measurements; interpretation or indirect use of instrument responses to accident conditions

  10. Study of Spanish mining accidents using data mining techniques

    Sanmiquel Pera, Lluís; Rossell Garriga, Josep Maria; Vintró Sánchez, Carla

    2015-01-01

    Mining is an economic sector with a high number of accidents. Mines are hazardous places and workers can suffer a wide variety of injuries. Utilizing a database composed of almost 70,000 occupational accidents and fatality reports corresponding to the decade 2003–2012 in the Spanish mining sector, the paper analyzes the main causes of those accidents. To carry out the study, powerful statistical tools have been applied, such as Bayesian classi¿ers, decision trees or contingency t...

  11. First international workshop on severe accidents and their consequences. [Chernobyl Accident

    1989-07-01

    An international workshop on past severe nuclear accidents and their consequences was held in Dagomys region of Sochi, USSR on October 30--November 3, 1989. The plan of this meeting was approved by the USSR Academy of Sciences and by the USSR State Committee of the Utilization of Atomic Energy. The meeting was held under the umbrella of the ANS-SNS agreement of cooperation. Topics covered include analysis of the Chernobyl accident, safety measures for RBMK type reactors and consequences of the Chernobyl accident including analysis of the ecological, genetic and psycho-social factors. Separate reports are processed separately for the data bases. (CBS)

  12. Accident and emergency management

    There is an increasing potential for severe accidents as the industrial development tends towards large, centralised production units. In several industries this has led to the formation of large organisations which are prepared for accidents fighting and for emergency management. The functioning of these organisations critically depends upon efficient decision making and exchange of information. This project is aimed at securing and possibly improving the functionality and efficiency of the accident and emergency management by verifying, demonstrating, and validating the possible use of advanced information technology in the organisations mentioned above. With the nuclear industry in focus the project consists of five main activities: 1) The study and detailed analysis of accident and emergency scenarios based on records from incidents and rills in nuclear installations. 2) Development of a conceptual understanding of accident and emergency management with emphasis on distributed decision making, information flow, and control structure sthat are involved. 3) Development of a general experimental methodology for evaluating the effects of different kinds of decision aids and forms of organisation for emergency management systems with distributed decision making. 4) Development and test of a prototype system for a limited part of an accident and emergency organisation to demonstrate the potential use of computer and communication systems, data-base and knowledge base technology, and applications of expert systems and methods used in artificial intelligence. 5) Production of guidelines for the introduction of advanced information technology in the organisations based on evaluation and validation of the prototype system. (author)

  13. Accident analysis for the NCSC foil experiment

    An accident analysis has been performed for the nuclear criticality safety class (NCSC) foil experiment. The Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) performs this experiment regularly during its 2-, 3-, and 5-day nuclear criticality safety classes. This accident analysis is part of an effort to modify the NCSC foil experiment plan so that the experiment may be operated at delayed critical. Currently, the NCSC foil experiment may only be operated up to a neutron multiplication of 100. The purpose of the accident analysis is to ensure that any accidental nuclear excursion does not exceed the boundary of the safety envelope described in the LACEF safety analysis report (SAR). The experiment consists of very thin, highly enriched (93% 235U) uranium metal foils (23 X 23 X 0.008 cm) interleaved between Lucite plates (36 X 36 X 1.27 cm). The fuel foils and Lucite plates are stacked vertically to form a critical assembly. Extra Lucite plates placed at the top and bottom of the assembly act as vertical reflectors. The assembly is operated remotely with the use of a general-purpose vertical-lift platform machine. The accident scenario consists of one additional fuel foil being added to an existing critical or nearly critical stack. The reactivity insertion rate is 0.05 $/s, based on the speed of the vertical-lift platform. It is assumed that none of the safety systems will function properly during the accident and that the operating crew is unable to mitigate the accident

  14. The radiological accident in San Salvador

    On 5 February 1989, a radiological accident occurred at an industrial irradiation facility near San Salvador, the capital of the Republic of El Salvador. Prepackaged medical products are sterilized at the facility by irradiation by means of an intensely radioactive cobalt-60 source in a movable source rack. The accident happened when this source rack became stuck in the irradiation position. The operator bypassed the irradiator's already degraded safety systems and entered the radiation room with two other workers to free the source rack manually. The three workers were exposed to high radiation doses and developed the acute radiation syndrome. Their initial hospital treatment in San Salvador and subsequent more specialized treatment in Mexico City were effective in countering the acute effects. However, the legs and feet of two of the three men were so seriously injured that amputation was required. The worker who had been most exposed died six and a half months after the accident, his death being attributed to residual lung damage due to irradiation, exacerbated by injury sustained during treatment. The report details the events leading up to the accident, the circumstances of the accident itself and the response to it. From the facts established, lessons are derived for operators and suppliers of irradiators, national authorities, medical staff and international organizations. Detailed information on dosimetric and medical aspects of the accident for the specialist reader is presented in the appendices and annexes. 20 figs, 9 tabs, 24 photographs

  15. Analysis of reactivity accidents in PWR'S

    This note describes the French strategy which has consisted, firstly, in examining all the accidents presented in the PWR unit safety reports in order to determine for each parameter the impact on accident consequences of varying the parameter considered, secondly in analyzing the provisions taken into account to restrict variation of this parameter to within an acceptable range and thirdly, in checking that the reliability of these provisions is compatible with the potential consequences of transgression of the authorized limits. Taking into consideration violations of technical operating specifications and/or non-observance of operating procedures, equipment failures, and partial or total unavailability of safety systems, these studies have shown that fuel mechanical strength limits can be reached but that the probability of occurrence of the corresponding events places them in the residual risk field and that it must, in fact, be remembered that there is a wide margin between the design basis accidents and accidents resulting in fuel destruction. However, during the coming year, we still have to analyze scenarios dealing with cumulated events or incidents leading to a reactivity accident. This program will be mainly concerned with the impact of the cases examined relating to dilution incidents under normal operating conditions or accident operating conditions

  16. Severe accident management concept for LWRS

    Although the advanced built-in engineered safety features and the highly trained personnel have led to extremely low probabilities of core melt accidents, there is a common understanding that even for such very unlikely accidents the plant operators must have the ability and means to mitigate the consequences of such events. This paper outlines a concept for the management of severe accidents based on 1) Computer simulations. 2) Various strategies based on core and containment damage states. 3) Calculational Aids. 4) Procedures. 5) Technical basis report. 6) Training. 7) Drills. The major benefit of this concept is the fact that there is no dedicated operating manual for severe accidents; rather the required mitigative strategies and measures are incorporated into existing accident management manuals leading to truly integrated accident management at the plant. At present this concept is going to be implemented in the NPP Geogen. Although this approach is primarily developed for existing PWRs it is also applicable to other LWRs including new NPP designs. Specific features of the plant can be taken into account by an adaptation of the concept. (authors)

  17. Historical aspects of radiation accidents

    Radiation accidents are extremely rare events; however, the last two years have witnessed the largest radiation accidents in both the eastern and western hemispheres. It is the purpose of this chapter to review how radiation accidents are categorized, examine the temporal changes in frequency and severity, give illustrative examples of several types of radiation accidents, and finally, to describe the various registries for radiation accidents

  18. Severity, probability and risk of accidents during maritime transport of radioactive material. Final report of a co-ordinated research project 1995-1999

    The primary purpose of this CRP was to provide a co-ordinated international effort to assemble and evaluate relevant data using sound technical judgement concerning the effects that fires, explosions or breaches of hulls of ships might have on the integrity of radioactive material packages. The probability and expected consequences of such events could thereby be assessed. If it were shown that the proportion of maritime accidents with severity in excess of the IAEA regulatory requirements was expected to be higher than that for land transport, then pertinent proposals could be submitted to the forthcoming Revision Panels to amend the IAEA Regulations for Safe Transport of Radioactive Material and their supporting documents. Four main areas of research were included in the CRP. These consisted of studying the probability of ship accidents; fire; collision; and radiological consequences

  19. Report of a consultants meeting on accidents during shutdown conditions for WWER nuclear power plants. Extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER NPPs

    The main objectives of the meeting were to exchange information on the operational occurrences, studies performed and countermeasures taken for the accidents during shutdown for WWERs, and to define the necessity and directions of the further activities which may promote the improvement of WWER safety under shutdown conditions. The consultants have discussed some aspects concerning vulnerability of safety functions during shutdown conditions, several steps required to performed accident analysis and selected operational aspects for shutdown conditions. The discussion was supported by an evaluation of selected operational occurrences. The consultants have agreed that the discussion during the meeting in major parts is relevant to all the WWER designs (i.e. WWER-1000, WWER-440/213 and WWER-440/230). As for the plant conditions, the consultants have agreed to bound the discussion mainly by the cold shutdown and refuelling modes. Refs, figs, tabs

  20. Accident risks in nuclear facilities. January 1984-April 1988 (Citations from the NTIS data base). Report for January 1984-April 1988

    This bibliography contains citations concerning risk analysis and hazards evaluation of the design, construction, and operation of nuclear facilities, including the risk and hazards of transporting radioactive materials to and from these facilities. Radiological calculations for environmental effects of nuclear accidents and the utilzation of computer models in risk analysis are also included. (This updated bibliography contains 368 citations, 104 of which are new entries to the previous edition.)