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Sample records for abacc

  1. ABACC's nuclear accounting area

    The functions and activities of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) accounting area is outlined together with a detailed description of the nuclear accounting system used by the bilateral organization

  2. Bilateral system. The ABACC system

    After relating the antecedents of the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the paper describes the common system of accounting and control set up by Argentina and Brazil. The organization of ABACC is also outlined

  3. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  4. ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

    Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

  5. Twenty years of ABACC: Accomplishments, lessons learnt and future perspectives

    From the inception of the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement (INFCIRC/435), in 1991, ABACC has had an important role at the non-proliferation agenda and has also been an active player in the international safeguards. It was necessary for ABACC to develop a technical capacity to face the challenges to be a safeguards agency and to gain credibility in the nuclear safeguards world. This capacity means to develop and implement safeguards systems in the technical area, in the inspection framework, in the conceptual analysis of processes and approaches and in the political scenario. These tasks conducted the strategic plan of ABACC on the last 20 years. Among the accomplishments, ABACC has been involved in the application of safeguards to sensitive and complex installations, in developing safeguards instrumentation, in establishing a technical and trained inspectorate, in constructing a cooperative and coordinate environment with IAEA for safeguards application. Other challenges as R and D of equipment and quality assurance systems were also managed during all these years. ESARDA is one forum that ABACC is involved and always shares experience and ideas. On July 18th, 2011 ABACC will formally complete 20 years. This paper summarizes the accomplishments, lessons learnt and future actions for strengthen the ABACC safeguards role. It also addresses the collaboration of ABACC with other organizations in the non-proliferation and international safeguards arena.

  6. ABACC laboratories quality assurance through Secondary Standards Exchange Program

    In September 1999, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), with assistance from the New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) of the U.S. Department of Energy, started a new cooperative activity with, among other objectives, the production and characterization of a traceable uranium secondary standard and the performance of the Third Round Robin for ABACC's laboratory network. Brazil and Argentina have fabricated UO2 pellets for use as a secondary standard. Samples from the two batches were sent to NBL for the determination of the reference values for both uranium concentration (%U) and isotopic composition for each batch. ABACC and NBL then organized the Third ABACC Round Robin for Brazilian and Argentine laboratories that are part of the ABACC network. The laboratories comprising the network can be used to analyze real samples collected during the ABACC inspections. The Brazilian and Argentine pellets were distributed to all the laboratories together with the protocol to be followed for the uranium concentration analysis, the forms for reporting the measurement results, and natural UO2 pellets (CETAMA OU1) to be used as reference material. For the laboratories with capability of measuring isotopics, NBL reference material CRM 125-A was provided. Several laboratories from each country provided results. As soon as the measurement results were sent to the organizers, they were statistically evaluated by NBL. During a meeting held at ABACC headquarters with the participation of NBL representatives, the ABACC technical support officer, and representatives of all the participant laboratories, the results were discussed and compared with the reference values. All the laboratories had the occasion, in an open discussion, to explain and show the difficulties and problems they faced during the exercise. ABACC had the opportunity not only to judge the quality of the measurements these laboratories performed, but also to determine

  7. Annual report 2013 - ABACC - Brazilian-Argentina agency for accounting and control of nuclear materials

    The document reports the activities of the commission and all technical activities. Shows the presence of ABACC at events; the strengthening technical capability; technical cooperation, institutional and administrative and financial activities; an outlook for 2014. Gives a list of the ABACC inspectors and presents the facilities under the Quadripartite Agreement

  8. Annual Report ABACC 2003 - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

    This Report describes the actions of the Brazil-Argentine of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), during the year of 2003. The developed work allowed to concluded that there is no event indicating that any nuclear material non-accounted for were deviated for non permitted activities by the Agreement for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy between Argentine and Brazil and by the Four Parties Agreement among these countries, the ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

  9. The experience of ABACC after ten years applying safeguards

    During the second half of this century, Argentina and Brazil shared a common ambition: to gain knowledge on and develop the technology required for attaining a full command of the nuclear fuel cycle. Until mid-1990's, neither of these countries had fully adhered to the Tlatelolco Treaty, nor had they signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as a way to protect themselves towards the development of such technology. The discriminatory nature of the NPT was the argument used to resist the international pressure for its signature. On the other hand, the text of the Tlatelolco Treaty involved special inspections to non-declared facilities that meant a threat of industrial espionage which Argentina and Brazil wanted to avoid. This position - maintained for almost two decades - led the international community to view these countries as competing for nuclear supremacy. As of 1985, both Argentina and Brazil, by means of joint declarations, expressed their decision to provide transparency to their nuclear programs. Consequently, they undertook several commitments concerning the exclusively peaceful purposes in their use of nuclear energy and in their respective nuclear programs. This process of joint declarations led to the signature of a Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in July 1991. Through this agreement, they formally established their Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) and created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in order to implement the established verification system. Also at that time, the decision was made to start negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) towards a joint agreement on safeguards based on the SCCC. In March 1994, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the IAEA entered into force. The experience in the application of SCCC during its first ten years and the improvements in

  10. The experience of ABACC after ten years applying safeguards

    Full text: During the second half of this century, Argentina and Brazil shared a common ambition: to gain knowledge on and develop the technology required for attaining a full command of the nuclear fuel cycle. Until mid-1990's, neither of these countries had fully adhered to the Tlatelolco Treaty, nor had they signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as a way to protect themselves towards the development of such technology. The discriminatory nature of the NPT was the argument used to resist the international pressure for its signature. On the other hand, the text of the Tlatelolco Treaty involved special inspections to non-declared facilities that meant a threat of industrial espionage which Argentina and Brazil wanted to avoid. This position -maintained for almost two decades - led the international community to view these countries as competing for nuclear supremacy. As of 1985, both Argentina and Brazil, by means of joint declarations, expressed their decision to provide transparency to their nuclear programs. Consequently, they undertook several commitments concerning the exclusively peaceful purposes in their use of nuclear energy and in their respective nuclear programs. This process of joint declarations led to the signature of a Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in July 1991. Through this agreement, they formally established their Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) and created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in order to implement the established verification system. Also at that time, the decision was made to start negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) towards a joint agreement on safeguards based on the SCCC. In March 1994, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the IAEA entered into force. The experience in the application of SCCC during its first ten years and the

  11. Annual report 2013 - ABACC - Brazilian-Argentina agency for accounting and control of nuclear materials; Relatorio anual 2013 - ABACC - Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares

    NONE

    2013-07-01

    The document reports the activities of the commission and all technical activities. Shows the presence of ABACC at events; the strengthening technical capability; technical cooperation, institutional and administrative and financial activities; an outlook for 2014. Gives a list of the ABACC inspectors and presents the facilities under the Quadripartite Agreement.

  12. Twenty Years of Regional Safeguards: the ABACC System and the Synergy with the National Nuclear Material Control Systems

    As result of the nuclear integration between Brazil and Argentina, in July 1991 the Agreement for Peaceful Uses of the Nuclear Energy (Bilateral Agreement) was signed and the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accountancy and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) was created [1]. The main role assigned to ABACC was the implementation and administration of the regional control system and the coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in all nuclear activities of Argentina and Brazil. In December 1991 the IAEA, ABACC, Argentina and Brazil signed the Quadripartite Agreement (INFCIRC/435) [2]. The agreement establishes obligations similar to those established by model INFCIRC/153 comprehensive agreements. The Bilateral Agreement establishes that the Parties should make available financial and technical capabilities to support ABACC activities. In order to accomplish this challenge, the National Systems had to improve their structure and capabilities. Through the close interaction with the IAEA and ABACC, the national systems have been enriched by adopting new methodologies, implementing innovative safeguards approaches and providing specialized training to the regional inspectors. All of this also resulted in relevant technical improvements to the regional system as a whole. The approach of both neighborhoods controlling each other increased the confidence between the partners and permitted a better knowledge of their potentialities. The recognized performance of the regional system in the implementation of innovative, efficient and credible safeguards measures increased the confidence of the international community on the implementation of nuclear safeguards in Argentina and Brazil. In this paper, after twenty years of the creation of the ABACC System, the view of the Brazilian and Argentine National Authorities is presented. (authors)

  13. ABACC: annual report 2012 - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; ABACC: informe annual 2012 - Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares

    NONE

    2012-07-01

    This document reports the actives during the year 2012 related to: technical activities as safeguards application and advances in application of safeguards; main activities conducted in Brazil and main activities developed at ABACC headquarters; management of the Quadripartite Agreement and of the SCCC - Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; training; technical cooperation; institutional, administrative and financial activities; perspectives for 2013; list of inspectors; list of Brazilian and Argentine facilities subject to the Quadripartite Agreement.

  14. ABACC'S Experience in Implementing Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI) Regime at Fuel Fabrication Plants in Brazil and Argentina

    As a result of discussions initiated in 2006 among the IAEA, ABACC and the respective states parties, the new inspection scheme was designed to be jointly applied by ABACC and IAEA to the commercial fuel fabrication plants in Brazil and Argentina, to fulfill with the new safeguards evaluation criteria for domestic and international receipts into and shipments from fuel fabrication/conversion facilities with inventories or throughput higher than 2 SQ, in effect since 2007, in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement (INFCIRC/435). Taking into account each plant specific operational and administrative requirements, particular SNRI procedures applicable to each facility were discussed. Several issues were agreed, such as: i) channels of communication between the operator/national authorities and the agencies for E-mailbox operational declarations and notifications to support SNRI; and ii) improvements in the coordination arrangements between the agencies for triggering and carrying out the joint inspections, in order to guarantee that 100% of domestic receipts or shipments are randomly verified by both agencies in a way to avoid duplication of verification efforts and additional burden to the operators and national authorities. Following the field trials completed early in 2008, the new regime started being implemented in the middle of 2008 in both countries. This paper will briefly describe the progress attained since the field trials period of SNRI at the two fuel fabrication plants, the current situation of the coordination of activities within ABACC and among the IAEA, ABACC and the operator/national authorities, and the expected challenges for future. (author)

  15. Development of low-level environmental sampling capabilities for uranium at Brazilian and Argentine laboratories by ABACC

    The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) with assistance from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) began a program to evaluate environmental sampling capabilities at laboratories in Argentina and Brazil in June 1998. The program included staff training conducted in South America and the United States. Several laboratory evaluation exercises were also conducted using standard swipe samples prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a National Institute of Standards and Technology Standard Reference Material 1547, Peach Leaves. The results of these exercises demonstrated that several laboratories were capable of accurately determining the total uranium and uranium isotopic distribution in the peach leaves. To build on these successes, another exercise using standard swipe samples prepared by the IAEA was conducted. A total of 8 sets of 15 swipe samples were prepared and distributed to the six ABACC support laboratories and to two of DOE's Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) that support IAEA's environmental sampling program Throughout this project, the ABACC laboratories have shown steady progress in contamination control and improvements to the accuracy and precision of their measurements. The results of the latest exercises demonstrate that ABACC now has support laboratories in both Argentina and Brazil that have the capability to measure both the amount and isotopic composition of uranium at levels expected in typical environmental samples (i.e., sub-microgram quantities). This presentation will discuss the final results for the exercise with uranium swipe samples and discuss future activities to develop measurement capabilities for total and isotopic plutonium in environmental samples. (author)

  16. ABACC - Brazil-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, a model of integration and transparence; ABACC - Agencia Brasileno-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares, un ejemplo de integracion y transparencia

    Oliveira, Antonio A.; Do Canto, Odilon Marcusso, E-mail: oliveira@abacc.org.br, E-mail: odilon@abacc.org.br [Agencia Brasileno Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2013-07-01

    Argentina and Brazil began its activities in the nuclear area about the same time, in the 50 century past. The existence of an international nuclear nonproliferation treaty-TNP-seen by Brazil and Argentina as discriminatory and prejudicial to the interests of the countries without nuclear weapons, led to the need for a common system of control of nuclear material between the two countries to somehow provide assurances to the international community of the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programs. The creation of a common system, assured the establishment of uniform procedures to implement safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, so the same requirements and safeguards procedures took effect in both countries, and the operators of nuclear facilities began to follow the same rules of control of nuclear materials and subjected to the same type of verification and control. On July 18, 1991, the Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy created a binational body, the Argentina-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials-ABACC-to implement the so-called Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear materials - SCCC. The deal provided, permanently, a clear commitment to use exclusively for peaceful purposes all material and nuclear facilities under the jurisdiction or control of the two countries. The Quadripartite Agreement, signed in December of that year, between the two countries, ABACC and IAEA completed the legal framework for the implementation of comprehensive safeguards system. The 'model ABACC' now represents a paradigmatic framework in the long process of economic, political, technological and cultural integration of the two countries. Argentina and Brazil were able to establish a guarantee system that is unique in the world today and that consolidated and matured over more than twenty years, has earned the respect of the international community.

  17. ABACC - Brazil-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, a model of integration and transparence

    Argentina and Brazil began its activities in the nuclear area about the same time, in the 50 century past. The existence of an international nuclear nonproliferation treaty-TNP-seen by Brazil and Argentina as discriminatory and prejudicial to the interests of the countries without nuclear weapons, led to the need for a common system of control of nuclear material between the two countries to somehow provide assurances to the international community of the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programs. The creation of a common system, assured the establishment of uniform procedures to implement safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, so the same requirements and safeguards procedures took effect in both countries, and the operators of nuclear facilities began to follow the same rules of control of nuclear materials and subjected to the same type of verification and control. On July 18, 1991, the Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy created a binational body, the Argentina-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials-ABACC-to implement the so-called Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear materials - SCCC. The deal provided, permanently, a clear commitment to use exclusively for peaceful purposes all material and nuclear facilities under the jurisdiction or control of the two countries. The Quadripartite Agreement, signed in December of that year, between the two countries, ABACC and IAEA completed the legal framework for the implementation of comprehensive safeguards system. The 'model ABACC' now represents a paradigmatic framework in the long process of economic, political, technological and cultural integration of the two countries. Argentina and Brazil were able to establish a guarantee system that is unique in the world today and that consolidated and matured over more than twenty years, has earned the respect of the international community

  18. The Development of Low-Level Measurement Capabilities for Total and Isotopic Uranium in Environmental Samples at Brazilian and Argentine Laboratories by ABACC

    In June 1998, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), with assistance from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), began a program to assess environmental sampling and analysis capabilities at laboratories in Argentina and Brazil. The program began with staff training conducted in South America and the United States by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Both laboratories are participating members of DOE's Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) that support IAEA's environmental sampling program. During the initial planning meeting, representatives from ABACC and all the participating analytical laboratories supporting ABACC were briefed on how the first exercise would be managed and on key aspects necessary to analyze low-level environmental samples for uranium. Subsequent to this training, a laboratory evaluation exercise (Exercise 1) was conducted using standard swipe samples prepared for this exercise by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The results of Exercise 1 determined that sample contamination was a major factor in the analysis, and a thorough review of laboratory procedures was required to reduce the level of contamination to acceptable levels. Following modification of sample preparation procedures, the laboratories performed Exercise 2, an analysis of a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Standard Reference Material (SRM) 1547, Peach Leaves. The results of Exercise 2 demonstrated that several laboratories were capable of accurately determining the total uranium and uranium isotopic distribution in the peach leaves. To build on these successes, Exercise 3 was performed using a series of standard swipe samples prepared by the IAEA and distributed to laboratories supporting ABACC and to PNNL and ORNL. The results of Exercise 3 demonstrate that ABACC now has support laboratories in both Argentina and Brazil, which are capable of

  19. The SSAC (State System of Accounting and Control) of Argentina: possible areas to increase co-operation with ABACC and IAEA

    This paper deals with one of the measures identified in the program 93+2 to enhance international safeguards effectiveness and efficiency. This measure is related to increase co-operation between the IAEA and the SSAC in the implementation of safeguards. It is recognized that an effective SSAC could contribute to better safeguards. During the discussion to strengthen the safeguards system different levels of co-operation between the IAEA and SSAC were identified, depending on their features and capabilities. To start assessing the possibility of increasing this co-operation, a 'SSAC Questionnaire' was submitted by the IAEA to Member States, EURATOM and ABACC. At present, those questionnaires are being assessed by the IAEA in order to identify areas for further co-operation. One important aspect is the increased co-operation level that might be achieved when the Additional Protocol becomes an integral part of the safeguard agreements. Another one refers to the methodology that IAEA might employ to audit the quality and performance of the SSAC regarding the different levels of such co-operation. This paper will also describe the features of the SSAC of Argentina emphasizing its capabilities and the various areas that might be considered to increase further co-operation with ABACC and the IAEA. (author)

  20. ABACC ten years applying safeguards

    The Argentinian-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of nuclear special materials has been in operations for ten years. The rational behind the creation and the work performed by the Agency during the last decade is described. (author)

  1. Annual report - ABACC (accounting and nuclear materials control Brazil-Argentina agency) - 1998

    The annual activities report of 1998 of accounting and nuclear materials control Brazil-Argentina agency introduces the next main topics: institutional activities - safeguards agreements implementation and administration; technical activities - planning and evaluation, operation, technical support, information accounting and treatment, technical cooperation, technical capacity invigoration; administrative and financial activities

  2. Annual Report 2007 - ABACC - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

    This document reports activities during the year 2007 related to: technical activities as application of safeguards; management of the Quadripartite Agreement and the SCCC - Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; training; technical cooperation; outlook for 2008 and; institutional, administrative and financial activities; technical glossary; list of brazilian facilities; list of argentine facilities and a list of institution of nuclear area

  3. Annual Report ABACC 2009 - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; Relatorio anual 2009 - Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares (ABACC)

    NONE

    2009-07-01

    This document reports the actives during the year 2009 related to: technical activities as application of safeguards; management of the Quadripartite Agreement and the SCCC - Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; training; technical cooperation; institutional, administrative and financial activities; perspectives for 2010; list of inspectors; list of Brazilian and Argentine facilities subject to the Quadripartite Agreement

  4. Annual Report 2007 - ABACC - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; Relatorio anual 2007 - ABACC - Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares

    NONE

    2007-07-01

    This document reports activities during the year 2007 related to: technical activities as application of safeguards; management of the Quadripartite Agreement and the SCCC - Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; training; technical cooperation; outlook for 2008 and; institutional, administrative and financial activities; technical glossary; list of brazilian facilities; list of argentine facilities and a list of institution of nuclear area.

  5. Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections

    The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains

  6. Communication received from the Resident Representatives of Argentina and Brazil

    The document reproduces the communication received by the Director General from the Resident Representatives of Argentina and Brazil to the Agency to inform him about the official inauguration on 9 December 1992 of the headquarters of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in Rio de Janeiro

  7. Using a Whole-Class Token Economy and Coaching of Teacher Skills in a Preschool Classroom to Manage Disruptive Behavior

    Filcheck, Holly A.; McNeil, Cheryl B.; Greco, Laurie A.; Bernard, Rebecca S.

    2004-01-01

    The Level System is a whole-classroom approach for managing disruptive behavior that utilizes behavioral management strategies such as a token economy, response cost, stimulating rewards, and strategic attention. Using an ABACC' treatment comparison design with follow-up, this study evaluated the effectiveness of the Level System in a preschool…

  8. Regional training course on state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material

    The publication is an outline of the subjects that are included in a regional training course organized in Buenos Aires (Argentina) by the IAEA with the cooperation of the Argentine Government and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) from September 24 to October 5, 2001

  9. Implementation of a Strengthened International Safeguards System ABBAC 15 years

    The purpose of the paper is to explain how the system of a regional safeguard has been operating and developing in the framework of the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and how the international recommendation of radiological protection must be taken into account in the safeguards implementation and its impact in the international context. The ABACC has been a dynamic system, which contributes worldwide in the application of the regional and international safeguard. In 2006, the ABACC celebrated its 15th anniversary. The ABBAC was created in 1991 in the framework of a Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy, the ABBAC was created in order to apply the aforementioned system called 'Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials' (SCCC). During this time, the ABBAC has grown in its implementation and has become a model in the application of regional safeguards that is recognized internationally. The ABBAC was the pillar to signed an Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABBAC and the International Atomic Energy Agency, called 'Quadripartite Agreement', committed themselves to accept the application of safeguards to all nuclear materials in all the nuclear activities performed in both countries. The ABACC and the relevant implementing and supplementary agreements, set forth the conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the exchange of technical staff, the transfer of knowledge and international cooperation in a strong commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This introduction provides an overview of political, legal and technical aspects implemented in the ABACC, which will be developed later in the paper. (author)

  10. Measurement methods training and software developed for inspection of small gaseous diffusion plants

    A suite of measurement method and software was developed to verify uranium inventory at small gaseous diffusion plants and to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to perform inspections at the gaseous diffusion plant at Pilcaniyeu, Argentina. In addition, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) will use the software to support its inspections at the facility. In November 2000, training was conducted on these measurement methods and software, and inspectors from the IAEA, ABACC, and other agencies participated. The training sessions were held in the Mock-Up Facility at the Pilcaniyeu plant. Inspectors received classroom training, used the measurement methods and software to calibrate instrumentation, performed quantitative measurements of process equipment and waste, located and quantified measurable deposits in process piping, performed enrichment measurements, and compared measurement results with operator declarations. Measurement results compared well with previous measurements on this equipment and with operator declarations. (author)

  11. Strengthening regional safeguards

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  12. Strengthening regional safeguards

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O. [Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)] [and others

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  13. Politics and the bomb: exploring the Role of epistemic communities in nuclear non-proliferation outcomes

    Kutchesfahani, S. Z.

    2010-01-01

    The role of epistemic communities in influencing policy formulation is underexplored in International Relations theory in general and in nuclear non-proliferation studies in particular. This thesis explores how epistemic communities – groups of experts knowledgeable in niche issue areas – have affected nuclear non-proliferation policy formulation in two important and under-studied cases: the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the Nunn-Lugar ...

  14. Preserving technological secrets vs. proliferation risks; Preservar secretos tecnologicos vs. riesgo de proliferacion

    Palacios, E. [Agencia Brasileno-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares, ABACC, Av. Rio Branco, 123, G 515, Centro, 20040-005 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)

    2004-07-01

    In July of 1991 Argentina and Brazil assume the commitment exclusively for the pacific use of the nuclear energy and of their respective nuclear programs through a Bilateral agreement. This Agreement also believes the ABACC, for monitoring the execution of the assumed commitments. From their beginnings, the Agency was involved in the application of safeguards in plants of ultra-centrifugation being this a so much topic of relevance for ABACC like for the IAEA. To preserve technological secrets, for demand of the operator, the cascades of centrifuges find hidden behind of panels. ABACC understanding this necessity, it has explored alternatives that allow to reconcile the interests of all the involved parts. A focus of safeguards based on the control of the perimeter one has come using in the plants of small installed capacity and in the first two cascades of a commercial plant in construction. In the work the efficiency of this focus is discussed as increases the capacity of the plant and with it concludes that it will be necessary to begin a dialogue on the future implementation of methods more standardized of control in the commercial plant, giving time so that the designs are adapted to the new reality. (Author)

  15. Preserving technological secrets vs. proliferation risks

    In July of 1991 Argentina and Brazil assume the commitment exclusively for the pacific use of the nuclear energy and of their respective nuclear programs through a Bilateral agreement. This Agreement also believes the ABACC, for monitoring the execution of the assumed commitments. From their beginnings, the Agency was involved in the application of safeguards in plants of ultra-centrifugation being this a so much topic of relevance for ABACC like for the IAEA. To preserve technological secrets, for demand of the operator, the cascades of centrifuges find hidden behind of panels. ABACC understanding this necessity, it has explored alternatives that allow to reconcile the interests of all the involved parts. A focus of safeguards based on the control of the perimeter one has come using in the plants of small installed capacity and in the first two cascades of a commercial plant in construction. In the work the efficiency of this focus is discussed as increases the capacity of the plant and with it concludes that it will be necessary to begin a dialogue on the future implementation of methods more standardized of control in the commercial plant, giving time so that the designs are adapted to the new reality. (Author)

  16. Remote monitoring in safeguards: Security of information and enhanced cooperation

    Unattended systems with remote transmission capabilities (RM) have the potential to improve safeguards efficiency. Moreover, the evolution of technology and the steady growing of nuclear materials subject to control, lead modern safeguards increasingly utilizing unattended equipment with the capability to store relevant data for long periods of time coupled with the option of being remotely accessed and checked. Remote inspection is still a concept under development, but it may end to be a powerful more efficient verification modality in medium term future. An important part of drawing meaningful safeguards conclusions rests on authenticity and reliability of the information on nuclear material and facilities acquired through the various verification activities and measures applied by IAEA and regional safeguards organizations, like ABACC. The increasing utilization of such technology to further optimize safeguards responds to a multifaceted environment where security of information for all relevant parties is of utmost importance. From the point of view of the IAEA and ABACC, the use of any technology for safeguards application, and specially the use of RM, requires to ensure the security of data collected to guarantee the validity and veracity of such information throughout the whole process (e.g., from collecting to reviewing). This is also valid to the SSAC involved in the process. Information security is also relevant for States and Operators. Assurance should be given that the information could not be withdrawn by non-authorized entities and that facility data is also fully secured. Another important aspect related to RM that may also fall in the security aspect of safeguards relevant information that merits further consideration, is the sharing of information between organizations like ABACC and the IAEA as well as the possibility to make this data available for States authorities purposes. This paper discusses three main themes related to RM: (i) the extent

  17. Regional safeguards arrangements: The Argentina-Brazil experience

    A Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC) was established by Argentina and Brazil in July 1992. It is a full scope safeguard's system in both countries. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created to apply the SCCC. The main elements of the SCCC are presented. The main safeguards' procedures are described. A brief discussion of the inspection methodology and its impact for facility operators is performed. The safeguard's implementation from the operator's point of view is commented, taking as example a fuel fabrication plant in Argentina and a uranium enrichment plant in Brazil. (author)

  18. Experience of Brazilian Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in DA analysis

    The Brazilian Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, inaugurated in September 1983, performs uranium analysis in samples of nuclear materials taken during safeguards inspections as well as in samples taken during ABACC's inspections performed in Argentina. The Laboratory analyzes intercomparison samples provided by IAEA, NBL, ABACC, CEN and EQRAIN. The method used to perform uranium analysis is the Davis and Gray/NBL. All the steps of the analytical procedures, such as chemical kinetics of the reactions and instrumental parameters, are rigorously controlled. An internal Quality Control of the Measurements is made by means of analysis of Certified Reference Materials and the performance of the results meets the ESARDA's Target Values for Random and Systematic components both in intercomparison samples and in samples taken during inspections. The typical precision, expressed as relative standard deviation, and the accuracy obtained in a routine basis for nuclear grade materials is 0.1% and 0.14% respectively. The performance of the results obtained are comparable to the best international laboratories which perform uranium analysis in nuclear material for safeguards purposes. (author)

  19. Experience of Brazilian safeguards analytical laboratory in DA analysis

    Full text: The Brazilian Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, inaugurated in September 1983, performs uranium analysis in samples of nuclear materials taken during national safeguards inspections as well as in samples taken during ABACC's inspections performed in Argentina. The Laboratory analyzes Intercomparison samples provided by IAEA, NBL, ABACC, CEN and EQRAIN. The method used to perform uranium analysis is the Davies and Gray/NBL. All the steps of the analytical procedures, such as chemical kinetics of the reactions and instrumental parameters, are rigorously controlled. An internal Quality Control of the measurements is made by means of analysis of Certified Reference Materials and the performance of the results meets the ESARDA's Target Values for Random and Systematic Components both in Intercomparison Samples and in samples taken during inspections. The typical precision, expressed as relative standard deviation, and accuracy obtained in a routine basis for nuclear grade materials is 0.1% and 0.14% respectively. The performance of the results obtained are comparable to the best international laboratories which perform uranium analysis in nuclear materials for safeguards purposes. (author)

  20. Sustainability of gamma-ray isotopics evaluation codes

    Vo, Duc [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Koskelo, Markku [AQUILA TECHNOLOGIES; Mcginnis, Brent [ORNL; Wang, Tzu - Feng [LLNL; Peerani, Paolo [IPSC, ISPRA, ITALY; Renha, Geraldo [ABACC, BRAZIL; Dias, Fabio C [NECB, BRAZIL

    2010-01-01

    In November 2005, the international workshop 'Gamma Evaluation Codes for Plutonium and Uranium Isotope Abundance Measurements by High-Resolution Gamma Spectrometry: Current Status and Future Challenges' was held in Karlsruhe, Germany. Some of the main issues discussed during the November 2005 meeting were related to concerns voiced by international inspectorate authorities such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) about the standardization and sustainability of gamma-ray isotopic analysis codes that are commonly used during safeguards inspections. A follow-up international workshop was conducted in Oak Ridge, TN in 2008. This workshop was in response to needs expressed by the international safeguards community during the Karlsruhe meeting and recommendations made under Action Sheet 14; a cooperative effort between the U. S. Department of Energy and ABACC. The purpose of the Oak Ridge workshop was to bring code developers and end users together to better understand the capabilities and limitations of the codes; to discuss mechanisms to ensure these codes are sustained and quality tested; and to ensure updates or revisions are performed in a controlled manner. During an Action Sheet 14 meeting held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in which the IAEA and EURATOM participated as observers, and in subsequent meetings of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), all parties agreed that the regional working group initially established under the DOE/ABACC cooperation should be expanded to an international working group. The purpose of the international working group is to provide a forum to exchange information, discuss technical developments, and validate and test the various codes. However, progress to formally establish the working has been slowed by a lack of dedicated funding and

  1. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    Xavier, Roberto Salles, E-mail: xavier@cnen.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Coordenacao Geral de Planejamento e Avaliacao

    2011-07-01

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  2. Atucha I nuclear power plant achieving a full safeguards approach

    At Atucha I nuclear power plant (NPP) it has recently been fully attained technical safeguards inspection goals. This is an important accomplishment since the facility had partially attained the safeguards technical goals for some years. Moreover, this situation implied in one occasion that the criterion was not met for the entire State. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the IAEA, ABACC and ARN have always been able to draw positive safeguards conclusions. According to IAEA Safeguards Criteria issued in 1991 and in particular since 1995, the facility has attained, only partially, one of the technical inspection goals due to the requirement of having a fuel flow monitor to count and verify by gross defect the fuels discharged from the reactor core before being placed under IAEA and ABACC surveillance at the storage ponds. Argentina repeatedly stated in different IAEA instances, including its policy-making organs, its opinion that criteria mainly based on one type of Ol, could not be easily extrapolated to other Ols, in particular those already constructed and in operation. Our country nevertheless engaged fully, since the issuing of such criteria, in finding an integral solution to this technical issue. From ARN viewpoint, the goal has been to find a suitable method to fulfil this requirement without implying substantive construction modifications to the facility, together with having in place appropriate Nda techniques to verify the spent fuel inventory at the ponds of Atucha I before the Vim were left working. Besides, this Nda method is appropriate in case of a C and S failure. The paper describes the various attempts for solving this issue that would imply a convenient design, a testing period and the final implementation for safeguards purposes of the selected technical solutions. It is also shown a comparison between the inspection activities performed before the installation of the Vim (V Irradiated Fuel Monitor) and the ones expected with this system

  3. The use of lanthanum bromide detectors for nuclear safeguards applications

    Lanthanum Bromide (LaBr3) is a type of scintillation detector that has become commercially available recently. According to the manufacturer and studies conducted at a laboratory level, this new gamma-ray detector presents improved characteristics in comparison with traditional sodium iodine (NaI) detectors. Better energy resolution, relative efficiency and stability with temperature are some of the features that may impact positively the performance of the measurements made with this detector, which works at room temperature. Uranium enrichment measurements performed in the field is of special interest at nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Typical applications include quality control, U-235 inventory verification and nuclear safeguards. The Safeguards Laboratory of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) have initiated the evaluation of the performance of a LaBr3 probe model BrilLanceCe 380 (B380) for U-235 enrichment determination in uranium compounds typically found in nuclear facilities under safeguards. This activity is routinely performed by national and international safeguards inspectors in both Brazilian and Argentine facilities. Depending on the characteristics of the material to be verified and the conditions at the measurement location, NaI or high-purity germanium detector (HPGe) are usually selected as the standard gamma-ray spectroscopic system for enrichment determination. This paper presents the conclusions of the initial studies jointly conducted by CNEN and ABACC regarding the use of a LaBr3 detector for enrichment determination, based on the comparison with NaI and HPGe typical performances. It also discusses the possibility to use this new gamma-ray detector as a standard technique for safeguards applications, compliant with national and international performance values. (author)

  4. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  5. Alternatives to reach safeguards goals at Atucha I nuclear power plant

    Full text: This paper describes the main features of Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant and the current safeguards' approach applied to this installation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The reasons for not completely fulfilling the IAEA safeguards criteria with the current approach are also described and a conceptual proposal of an unattended system developed jointly by ABACC and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Argentina (ARN) is presented. Finally, the paper addresses an alternative proposal to the previous one aiming at fulfilling the above mentioned objectives. Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) was built in the 70's and has been under operation since 1974, This is an On Load Reactor, moderated and refrigerated with heavy water (PHWR). From its starting up to about a year ago, this NPP operated with natural uranium fuel assemblies but presently the reactor core is fed with slightly enriched uranium fuel assemblies (0,85 %). This Plant generates up to 357 Mwe. An outstanding operating characteristic of this power reactor is that low burn-up fuels assemblies already discharged into the pond may be re-used when necessary upon neutron flux requirements (re-shuffling). This installation has a pond storage capacity of about 10,000 fuel assemblies. At the highest power rate, the reactor core must be fed with a frequency of about 0,72 fuel assemblies per day. Before the application of the Agency Safeguards Criteria (IAEA-SC) in (1991), Atucha l had always satisfied the IAEA safeguards goals. Since 1991 the IAEA-SC demanded for On Load Reactors the control of the flow of irradiated fuel assemblies that leave or enter into the core (re-shuffling). By that time, Atucha I had been working for about seventeen years and there was no possibilities to install specific safeguards equipment without making significant construction modifications on this installation. Under the

  6. INIS Progress and Activity Report 2006

    Highlights of INIS Activities 2006: INIS, the International Nuclear Information System, is an established nuclear information resource operated by the IAEA on behalf of its Members. Its primary mission is to foster an open information exchange for the scientific benefit of its Members. In 2006, four new members joined INIS: the Central African Republic, Namibia, Luxembourg, and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). This brings the total number of INIS members to 140. 2006 saw a significant increase in the support provided to INIS Member States through the IAEA Technical Co-operation Department. INIS Database: With the successful completion of volume 37 of the INIS Bibliographic Database, a total of 122 412 records were added in 2006, which is the best result in INIS history and corresponds to a 100% increase compared to 1999 when INIS started the Computer-Assistance-Indexing (CAI) project. This very impressive result was achieved with the competent work of the INIS team and in cooperation with Member States. The total number of records in the INIS Database has reached 2 778 427. INIS NCL Collection: In 2006, the electronic full-text of 14 610 NCL documents were processed and added to the INIS NCL collection and a total of 47 NCL CDs were produced and distributed to designated Document Delivery Centres in INIS Member States

  7. History of nuclear power in Brazil

    Rosa, L.P.

    2006-07-15

    The 1973 energy crisis prompted the United States to suspend supplies of enriched uranium to the reactor being built in Brazil, Angra I. In 1975, the Brazil-Germany Nuclear Agreement was announced. The Programme was a failure. Today the Angra II nuclear reactor has been completed, the only reactor completed under the agreement with Germany. Brazil's last military President implemented the Parallel Nuclear Programme, which included uranium enrichment with the justification of developing the technology that had not been transferred through the Nuclear Agreement with Germany. In 1986, the existence of a deep shaft drilled by the Air Force was revealed. A Technical Report concluded that it had all the characteristics and dimensions required to test a nuclear bomb. Some years later, the Civilian Government acknowledged the existence of an underground nuclear explosion facility and symbolically sealed this shaft. The situation in Brazil has improved recently. Brazil ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco on the denuclearisation of Latin America and established ABACC, an agency handling mutual inspections of nuclear facilities in Brazil and Argentina. Brazil also signed the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. The uranium enrichment activities are being transferred to a civilian industry. More importantly, I do not believe that the uranium enrichment project is intended to endow Brazil with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. (author)

  8. New Brunswick Laboratory. Progress report, October 1995--September 1996

    Fiscal year (FY) 1996 was a very good year for New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL), whose major sponsor is the Office of Safeguards and Security (NN-51) in the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, Office of Security Affairs. Several projects pertinent to the NBL mission were completed, and NBL's interactions with partners and customers were encouraging. Among the partners with which NBL interacted in this report period were the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), NN-51. Environmental Program Group of the DOE Chicago Operations Office, International Safeguards Project Office, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), Ukraine Working Group, Fissile Materials Assurance Working Group, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) in Belgium, Brazilian/Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company, and other DOE facilities and laboratories. NBL staff publications, participation in safeguards assistance and other nuclear programs, development of new reference materials, involvement in the updating and refinement of DOE documents, service in enhancing the science education of others, and other related activities enhanced NBL's status among DOE laboratories and facilities. Noteworthy are the facts that NBL's small inventory of nuclear materials is accurately accounted for, and, as in past years, its materials and human resources were used in peaceful nuclear activities worldwide

  9. International Remote Monitoring Project Argentina nuclear power station remote monitoring system

    A remote monitoring system, designed to monitor spent fuel transfers from wet to dry storage, was installed at the Embalse Nuclear Power Station at Embalse, Argentina. The system consists of 6 gamma and one neutron radiation sensors. Five gamma sensors utilize RF transmission to communicate with Echelon nodes connected to a Local Operating Network (LON). One gamma and one neutron sensor are hardwired to the LON network. Each sensor Echelon node is bound to a single Datalogger that stores data until it receives an acquisition command to download to the Data Acquisition Software (DASW) database. The data from the Datalogger are transferred and stored in the Data Acquisition Software database, which resides on the IAEA MOS-MUX server. At a pre-determined interval, data from the DASW database are converted into Excel files and transferred to the IAEA database every 24 hours. At an predetermined interval all data are transferred to the distribution server located at the ARN laboratory at Ezeiza, Argentina. Remote access to data from the distribution server will be made from IAEA headquarters, Vienna, Austria, from ABACC in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from the IAEA field office in Buenos Aires, from ARN, and from Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

  10. Model of a Generic Natural Uranium Conversion Plant ? Suggested Measures to Strengthen International Safeguards

    Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia [ORNL; Begovich, John M [ORNL; Ferrada, Juan J [ORNL

    2009-11-01

    This is the final report that closed a joint collaboration effort between DOE and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN). In 2005, DOE and CNEN started a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of a NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. Advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was triggered by the International Atomic Energy Agency s 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Prior to this policy only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and therefore, subject to the IAEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. Two technical papers on this subject were published at the 2005 and 2008 INMM Annual Meetings.

  11. Nuclear safety

    The Program on Nuclear Safety comprehends Radioprotection, Radioactive Waste Management and Nuclear Material Control. These activities are developed at the Nuclear Safety Directory. The Radioactive Waste Management Department (GRR) was formally created in 1983, to promote research and development, teaching and service activities in the field of radioactive waste. Its mission is to develop and employ technologies to manage safely the radioactive wastes generated at IPEN and at its customer’s facilities all over the country, in order to protect the health and the environment of today's and future generations. The Radioprotection Service (GRP) aims primarily to establish requirements for the protection of people, as workers, contractors, students, members of the general public and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. Furthermore, it also aims to establish the primary criteria for the safety of radiation sources at IPEN and planning and preparing for response to nuclear and radiological emergencies. The procedures about the management and the control of exposures to ionizing radiation are in compliance with national standards and international recommendations. Research related to the main activities is also performed. The Nuclear Material Control has been performed by the Safeguard Service team, which manages the accountability and the control of nuclear material at IPEN facilities and provides information related to these activities to ABACC and IAEA. (author)

  12. Considerations on safeguards approach for small centrifuge enrichment facilities

    The safeguards' objectives for enrichment facilities encompass the detection of the diversion of declared nuclear material and of facility misuse. The safeguard's approach presently applied for commercial centrifuge enrichment facilities is based on the Hexa partite Project and seems not to be directly applicable to cases of small plants. Since ABACC started its operation one of the main problems faced was the application of safeguards to small centrifuge enrichment plants for testing centrifuges in cascade mode or for small LEU production. These plants consist of a few fully independent cascades, does not operate in a routine basis and panels prevent visual access to the centrifuges and their surroundings for preserving sensitive information. For such plants misuse scenarios seems to dominate, particularly those associated with feeding the plant with undeclared LEU. This paper presents a concise analysis of misuse strategies in small centrifuge facility and alternative safeguard's approach, describing the main control elements to be applied. The particularities arising from the existence of panels or boxes covering the centrifuges are specifically addressed. Two alternatives approaches based on the application of a transitory perimeter control to increase the effectiveness of unannounced inspection and on the application of permanent perimeter control are presented. (author)

  13. Implementing a new reporting system to improve the security and the processing of accounting information

    With the objective of improving the security and speed up the processing of the accounting information received at the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, it was established that the accounting reports must be made in text files (ASCII format) and must be sent using secure e-mail. This new procedure enters into force for all Argentine facilities in May 2006. Besides, during the ABACC/IAEA joint inspection, some accounting information (inventories changes updating and itemized list) is required by the agencies in text files in a format previously established to be used in its auditing software. Consequently also from May 2006, it is mandatory for the operators to prepare these files and give them to the international agency inspectors. In order to help the operators with these tasks, a software was developed to automate the generation of the mentioned files and, at the same time, to diminish the quantity of errors contained in them. The software was installed in all Argentina's installation last February with satisfactory results. (author)

  14. The European Commission Cooperative Support Programme: Activities and Cooperation

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) bases its technical and scientific programme on voluntary contributions from Member States, constituting the Member States Support Programme (MSSP). The European Commission Cooperative Support Programme (EC-SP) started in 1981 to support IAEA activities in the field of nuclear safeguards. Since its beginning, the EC-SP has been operated by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre in close collaboration and coordination with the European Commission's Directorate General for Energy-Directorate Nuclear Safeguards implementing the Euratom treaty. EC-SP tasks provide technology and expertise in technical areas related to the effective implementation of safeguards verification measures including the detection of undeclared materials, activities, and facilities. The EC-SP fosters cooperation with Support Programmes from European Union Member States, as well as with non-EU states with which the European Commission has specific research and development agreements, e.g., the United States Department of Energy, ABACC. Information on the research and development activities under these frameworks is shared with the IAEA and complements core EC-SP work. The paper describes the EC-SP, its modus operandi, collaborations, and main activities, namely, (a) the specific R&D work as part of tasks with well-defined milestones and deadlines, (b) training activities; (c) the technical support in establishing Safeguards guidelines and approaches and (d) the technical consultancy support to IAEA meetings and expert groups. (author)

  15. New Brunswick Laboratory. Progress report, October 1995--September 1996

    NONE

    1997-04-01

    Fiscal year (FY) 1996 was a very good year for New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL), whose major sponsor is the Office of Safeguards and Security (NN-51) in the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, Office of Security Affairs. Several projects pertinent to the NBL mission were completed, and NBL`s interactions with partners and customers were encouraging. Among the partners with which NBL interacted in this report period were the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), NN-51. Environmental Program Group of the DOE Chicago Operations Office, International Safeguards Project Office, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), Ukraine Working Group, Fissile Materials Assurance Working Group, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) in Belgium, Brazilian/Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company, and other DOE facilities and laboratories. NBL staff publications, participation in safeguards assistance and other nuclear programs, development of new reference materials, involvement in the updating and refinement of DOE documents, service in enhancing the science education of others, and other related activities enhanced NBL`s status among DOE laboratories and facilities. Noteworthy are the facts that NBL`s small inventory of nuclear materials is accurately accounted for, and, as in past years, its materials and human resources were used in peaceful nuclear activities worldwide.

  16. International nuclear safeguards 1994: Vision for the future. V.1

    Since the last IAEA symposium on this subject, held eight years ego in 1986, the world of safeguards has experienced a number of momentous changes which have opened a new period of intensive development in safeguards. The important events were: The discoveries in Iraq during activities under United Nations Security Council resolutions, South Africa's decision to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the IAEA-Argentina-Brazil-ABACC Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement, the break-up of the former USSR into newly independent States, and the problems encountered in the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The consequences for international safeguards of these events were presented in papers at this symposium, with special emphasis on verification of a State's declaration as well as on detection of undeclared activities. Other fundamental changes stem from converging relationships between nuclear arms reductions and the civil use of plutonium, and the international debate on the associated issues. Furthermore, the review and extension of the NPT is due in 1995. Events have opened the possibility for ambitious new concepts for verification regimes. These matters were addressed at the symposium in the opening session and in the closing panel discussion. Refs, figs and tabs

  17. National system of accounting and control and co-operation with international safeguards

    This paper offers a description of the National System of Accounting and Control applied in Argentina. Besides, the importance of having a National System is also highlighted as a way of supplying effective and efficiency to assure reasonably that the nuclear materials, materials, equipment and installations of nuclear interest are used according to the stated in the licenses and authorisations emitted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), complying with the international compromises assumed by the country. The role of the National System referring to the co-operation with the International Agencies of safeguards applications, ABACC and IAEA, is also explained. This co-operation must be understood as the one tending to strengthen and improve safeguards. The existence of a National System of Accounting and Control contributes to widen guarantees on the compliment of compromises of non proliferation, facilitates the application of international safeguards by the agencies and improves the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards through the development of new techniques and methods. (author)

  18. Dealing with the regional challenge of physical protection of nuclear materials

    ) methodologies, technologies and guides for detection of and response to illegal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. In addition there were projects on provision of consolidated information an illicit trafficking, and an international cooperation on the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Voluntary contributions by member states were required to implement most of those activities. However, despite the generous contributions of some countries, the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) has experienced serious limitation of funds to advise a number of countries. One possible avenue to be followed to make the IPPAS more effective is to take advantage of the expertise already developed by regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials, for example, ABACC in the Latin American region. Of course, changes would have to be made in the ABACC's chart in order to expand its role, and face today's challenge concerning potential nuclear terrorism. (author)

  19. O Brasil, a AIEA e o Regime de Não Proliferação Nuclear (1957-2014: entre a cooperação e a desconfiança.

    Edson José Perosa

    2014-10-01

    Full Text Available A AIEA foi criada em 1957 após a proposta ‘‘átomos para paz’’ do presidente estadunidense Eisenhower, apresentada na ONU em 1953. A Agência deveria promover o uso pacífico da energia nuclear e coibir seu uso militar. O Tratado de Não Proliferação Nuclear (TNP, por sua vez, foi aprovado em 1968 e entrou em vigor em 1970. Os países que aderissem a esse tratado se comprometiam em não desenvolver armas nucleares e, por sua vez, os que já dispunham desses armamentos se comprometiam em reduzir seus arsenais. Esses são dois dos principais instrumentos do regime de não proliferação nuclear. O Brasil adotou uma postura crítica em relação ao TNP, criticando-o como sendo discriminatório. Com relação à AIEA, o governo brasileiro manteve contatos com a Agência e firmou tratados com ela – como o tratado tripartite Brasil-RFA-AIEA e o tratado quadripartite Brasil-Argentina-AIEA-ABACC.  Diferentemente de outros atores do regime de não proliferação, o Brasil pareceu mais disposto a aceitar a tutela da AIEA, ainda que não aderisse integralmente às salvaguardas da Agência. Ademais, a Agência – por meio dos tratados assinados com ela – pode ter sido um meio para o Brasil tentar legitimar seu programa nuclear como pacífico.

  20. The emergence of internet-based virtual private networks in international safeguards

    Full text: The costs associated with secure data transmission can be an obstacle to International Safeguards. Typical communication methods are priced by distance and may include telephone lines, frame relay, and ISDN. It is therefore costly to communicate globally. The growth of the Internet has provided an extensive backbone for global communications; however, the Internet does not provide intrinsic security measures. Combining the Internet with Virtual Private Network technology, which encrypts and authenticates data, creates a secure and potentially cost-effective data transmission path, as well as achieving other benefits such as reliability and scalability. Access to the Internet can be achieved by connecting to a local Internet Service Provider, which can be preferable to installing a static link between two distant points. The cost-effectiveness of the Internet-based Virtual Private Network is dependent on such factors as data amount, current operational costs, and the specifics of the Internet connection, such as user proximity to an Internet Service Provider or existing access to the Internet. This paper will introduce Virtual Private Network technology, the benefits of Internet communication, and the emergence of Internet-based Virtual Private Networks throughout the International Safeguards community. Specific projects to be discussed include: the completed demonstration of secure remote monitoring data transfer via the Internet between STUK in Helsinki, Finland, and the IAEA in Vienna, Austria; the demonstration of secure remote access to IAEA resources by traveling inspectors with Virtual Private Network software loaded on laptops; the proposed Action Sheets between ABACC/DOE and ARN/DOE, which will provide a link between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires; the proposed use at the HIFAR research reactor, located in Australia, to provide remote monitoring data to the IAEA; the use of Virtual Private Networks by JRC, Ispra, Italy. (author)

  1. The emergence of internet-based virtual private networks in international safeguards

    Full text: The costs associated with secure data transmission can be an obstacle to International Safeguards. Typical communication methods are priced by distance and may include telephone lines, frame relay, and ISDN. It is therefore costly to communicate globally. The growth of the Internet has provided an extensive backbone for global communications; however, the Internet does not provide intrinsic security measures. Combining the Internet with Virtual Private Network technology, which encrypts and authenticates data, creates a secure and potentially cost-effective data transmission path, as well as achieving other benefits such as reliability and scalability. Access to the Internet can be achieved by connecting to a local Internet Service Provider, which can be preferable to installing a static link between two distant points. The cost-effectiveness of the Internet-based Virtual Private Network is dependent on such factors as data amount, current operational costs, and the specifics of the Internet connection, such as user proximity to an Internet Service Provider or existing access to the Internet. This paper will introduce Virtual Private Network technology, the benefits of Internet communication, and the emergence of Internet-based Virtual Private Networks throughout the International Safeguards community. Specific projects to be discussed include: The completed demonstration of secure remote monitoring data transfer via the Internet between STUK in Helsinki, Finland, and the IAEA in Vienna, Austria; The demonstration of secure remote access to IAEA resources by traveling inspectors with Virtual Private Network software loaded on laptops; The proposed Action Sheets between ABACC/DOE and ARN/DOE, which will provide a link between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires; The proposed use at the HIFAR research reactor, located in Australia, to provide remote monitoring data to the IAEA; The use of Virtual Private Networks by JRC, Ispra, Italy. (author)

  2. Indigenous pedestrian portal monitor radiation detector design for safeguard applications in Brazilian fuel cycle facilities

    Brazilian Navy Fuel Cycle facilities manipulate radioactive materials safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Non-proliferation measures are needed to avoid any risks that could jeopardize the credibility of security practices at these facilities. Efforts to nationalize equipment used worldwide in safeguard and security applications, a radiation pedestrian portal monitor detector (RPPMD), contribute to the development of new applied research and respond to current concerns regarding adequate storage of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). In this work, preliminary studies were performed based on our indigenous design to estimate initial geometries, materials and performance of our initial design according to criteria suggested by ANSI N42.38-2006 standard. Numerical simulations were conducted using GEANT4 code, an open source Monte Carlo toolkit simulation package, to track particle interactions in matter. The RPPMD was initially modeled with PVT-based plastic scintillators with density of 1.032 g/cm3. Project constraints limit acquisition costs, detection volume, dimensions and maintenance costs. In PVT-based plastic scintillators, due to its low averaged atomic number, density and poor energy resolution, probabilities of having well defined full energy peaks are negligible, so spectroscopic information needed to identify radioisotopes is severely limited. Thus, the design considers all available information, limited spectroscopy in addition to pulse counting information. The activity of the nuclear material to be safeguarded is significantly lower than the activity of suggested test sources used in ANSI N42.38-2006 standard (1000 γ/s with energy of 1001 keV and 20 000 γ/s with energy of 186 keV, for a commercial UO2 PWR fuel pellet disregarding self-absorption). Thus, in order to correctly statistically model this problem, it was necessary to consider

  3. Material integrity verification radar

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the need for verification of 'as-built' spent fuel-dry storage containers and other concrete structures. The IAEA has tasked the Special Technologies Laboratory (STL) to fabricate, test, and deploy a stepped-frequency Material Integrity Verification Radar (MIVR) system to nondestructively verify the internal construction of these containers. The MIVR system is based on previously deployed high-frequency, ground penetrating radar (GPR) systems that have been developed by STL for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Whereas GPR technology utilizes microwave radio frequency energy to create subsurface images, MTVR is a variation for which the medium is concrete instead of soil. The purpose is to nondestructively verify the placement of concrete-reinforcing materials, pipes, inner liners, and other attributes of the internal construction. The MIVR system underwent an initial field test on CANDU reactor spent fuel storage canisters at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Chalk River Laboratories, Ontario, Canada, in October 1995. A second field test at the Embalse Nuclear Power Plant in Embalse, Argentina, was completed in May 1996. The DOE GPR also was demonstrated at the site. Data collection and analysis were performed for the Argentine National Board of Nuclear Regulation (ENREN). IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material (ABACC) personnel were present as observers during the test. Reinforcing materials were evident in the color, two-dimensional images produced by the MIVR system. A continuous pattern of reinforcing bars was evident and accurate estimates on the spacing, depth, and size were made. The potential uses for safeguard applications were jointly discussed. The MIVR system, as successfully demonstrated in the two field tests, can be used as a design verification tool for IAEA safeguards. A deployment of MIVR for Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ

  4. The national law on nuclear activity: some consequences

    This article describes the contents of the new National Law on Nuclear Activities of the Argentine Republic, analysing the functions of the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) (former National Board of Nuclear Regulation -ENREN) and the privatisation of the nuclear power generation performed by the enterprise Nucleoelectrica Argentina S.A. (NASA). It also includes some comments about political and legislative records of the Law in the framework of the Nation's reorganization undertaken by the National Government for the privatisation of the rendering of public services, such as the production of energy and related activities. The Law was approved by Law 24.804 of April 2, 1997, and published in the Official Bulletin of the Argentine Republic on April 25, 1997. In accordance with the provisions of this Law, the National Government, through the above mentioned organisations, will fix the nuclear policy and the functions of research, development, surveillance and control of the nuclear activity. Also, as part of the execution of the nuclear policy, all the obligations accepted by Argentina as signatory party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty), the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (TNP), the Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil through the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to enforce Safeguards, in addition to the commitments signed by Argentina as a member of the Suppliers Group and the National Control System for Sensitive Exports, shall be met

  5. Nuclear material accountancy and control system in Brazil

    Full text: The Safeguards and Physical Protection Coordination (COSAP) integrates the structure of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) that is a governmental entity in Brazil. COSAP itself is responsible for the control of nuclear materials, the physical protection of facilities handling nuclear or radioactive materials and the control of the illicit traffic of nuclear and radioactive materials. Besides this control of the nuclear material implemented by the state safeguards system, all the nuclear material after the starting point of application of safeguards is subject to a regional safeguards system (implemented by ABACC - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) and an international safeguards system (implemented by IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency). Under this scope, COSAP has to maintain the inventory knowledge of nuclear material of all nuclear facilities in the country updated, and to report inventory changes to ABACC and IAEA based on data collected from the operators of the facilities. Nowadays, this data collection is made by means of collections of MS-Excel spreadsheets for support documents, general ledgers and inventory lists which is not the best situation. The accounting reports are then prepared and submitted by encrypted e-mail to ABACC and IAEA. COSAP has recently been involved in upgrading the Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control System of Brazil. Such upgrading is based on an entirely new software system (E-GAMMA) that is being developed right now in Brazil by CNEN staff. This software will be a Web system installed in a dedicated server under a secure environment maintained at CNEN headquarters, and each facility or institution will be provided with the necessary hardware and software to access the system (Digital Clients Certificates, Smart Cards, VPN, computers, etc). Users will access the system with strong passwords with creation rules and expiration dates controlled by the

  6. International target values 2010 for achievable measurement uncertainties in nuclear material accountancy

    Dias, Fabio C., E-mail: fabio@ird.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Almeida, Silvio G. de; Renha Junior, Geraldo, E-mail: silvio@abacc.org.b, E-mail: grenha@abacc.org.b [Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares (ABACC), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2011-07-01

    The International Target Values (ITVs) are reasonable uncertainty estimates that can be used in judging the reliability of measurement techniques applied to industrial nuclear and fissile materials subject to accountancy and/or safeguards verification. In the absence of relevant experimental estimates, ITVs can also be used to select measurement techniques and calculate sample population during the planning phase of verification activities. It is important to note that ITVs represent estimates of the 'state-of-the-practice', which should be achievable under routine measurement conditions affecting both facility operators and safeguards inspectors, not only in the field, but also in laboratory. Tabulated values cover measurement methods used for the determination of volume or mass of the nuclear material, for its elemental and isotopic assays, and for its sampling. The 2010 edition represents the sixth revision of the International Target Values (ITVs), issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a Safeguards Technical Report (STR-368). The first version was released as 'Target Values' in 1979 by the Working Group on Techniques and Standards for Destructive Analysis (WGDA) of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and focused on destructive analytical methods. In the latest 2010 revision, international standards in estimating and expressing uncertainties have been considered while maintaining a format that allows comparison with the previous editions of the ITVs. Those standards have been usually applied in QC/QA programmes, as well as qualification of methods, techniques and instruments. Representatives of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) participated in previous Consultants Group Meetings since the one convened to establish the first list of ITVs released in 1993 and in subsequent revisions

  7. Implementing a new reporting system to improve the security and the processing of accounting information

    Full text: The ARN receive the accounting reports by normal mail or by fax in papers form. This procedure has 2 main problem: a) practically there is no security of the information received. b) it is necessary retyping the reports to be introduced in the processing software, with the possibility of introducing errors. With the objective of solving these inconveniences, ARN decided that the accounting reports must be made in text files (ASCII format) and these files must be sent using the secure e-mail in order to improving its security level. In order to implement these new procedure was informed to all operator's that from May 2006 the only mean to receive the accounting reports is in the appropriate format by e-mail signed and encrypted. This obligation was distributed to the operator's in January in the Requirement RQ SV 01/06. During the ABACC/IAEA joint inspection, some accounting information (updating of inventories changes and itemized list) are requiring by the agencies in text files in format previously established to use in its auditing software with the objective to reduce as the time used as the mistakes in the auditing activities. From May of 2006 its mandatory for the operators to prepare this files and deliver them to the internationals agency inspectors. Also this obligation was distributed to the operator's in January in the Requirement RQ SV 02/06. With the objective to facilitate the redaction of the reports in the new formats and the auditing text files requiring by the agencies. a software was developed to automate the generation of the mentioned files, at the same time, diminished the quantity of errors contained in them. The software was installed in all Argentina's installation last February and a test period began with satisfactory results. To implement the secure e-mail is utilized the Certificate Authority of the National Government The test period also began in February. Finally, take into account the results of the tests period it is

  8. What next for the NPT? Facing the moment of truth

    For over 30 years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the center and foundation of an interlocking network of agreements, organizations and international arrangements. They were designed to slow down, if not effectively bring to an end, the further spread of nuclear weapons. The regime was intended to include all the nations of the world - those that had nuclear weapons and those that might wish to acquire them in future. Though this goal has never been fully achieved, the NPT, over the years, has been a reasonable success. If there had been no NPT, the total number of nuclear-weapon States (NWS) might have reached 30 or 40 by now. But today we have only eight, with one or two still trying to reach nuclear-weapon status. Since the conclusion of the NPT many more countries have given up nuclear weapon programs than have started them. There are fewer nuclear weapons in the world and fewer States with nuclear weapons programs than there were twenty or thirty years ago. This unquestionable success could never have been achieved without long-term cooperation among many States, and primarily between the United States and the Russian Federation. Since then, the international treaty regime has been consistently improved, updated and extended. To name only a few additional non-proliferation measures, one should mention the IAEA comprehensive system of safeguards (INFCIRC/153); the Zangger Committee; the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba Treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions of the world; the Brazil-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC); and the IAEA additional protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements of 1997 (INFCIRC/540). Among the most recent additions to the regime are the global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction agreed among the G-8 nations in 2002; the US-led Proliferation Security

  9. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    Long, Jon D. [Y-12 National Security Complex; McGinnis, Brent R [ORNL; Morgan, James B [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA; Shipwash, Jacqueline L [ORNL

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment

  10. International target values 2000 for measurement uncertainties in safeguarding nuclear materials

    Fabrication, ISO Working Group on Analyses in MOX Fuel Fabrication, Agencia Brasileno-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC). The IAEA will continue its cooperation on the above topics with Euratom, with State authorities and with the expert groups, which were involved in the review of the ITVs 2000. The next revision of the ITVs will also be another opportunity to seek further contributions from more countries and organizations

  11. International target values 2000 for measurement uncertainties in safeguarding nuclear materials

    The IAEA has prepared a revised and updated version of International Target Values (ITVs) for uncertainty components in measurements of nuclear material. The ITVs represent uncertainties to be considered in judging the reliability of analytical techniques applied to industrial nuclear and fissile material subject to safeguards verification. The tabulated values represent estimates of the 'state of the practice' which ought to be achievable under routine conditions by adequately equipped, experienced laboratories. The ITVs 2000 are intended to be used by plant operators and safeguards organizations as a reference of the quality of measurements achievable in nuclear material accountancy, and for planning purposes. The IAEA prepared a draft of a technical report presenting the proposed ITVs 2000, and in April 2000 the chairmen or officers of the panels or organizations listed below were invited to co- author the report and to submit the draft to a discussion by their panels and organizations. Euratom Safeguards Inspectorate, ESAKDA Working Group on Destructive Analysis, ESARDA Working Group on Non Destructive Analysis, Institute of Nuclear Material Management, Japanese Expert Group on ITV-2000, ISO Working Group on Analyses in Spent Fuel Reprocessing, ISO Working Group on Analyses in Uranium Fuel Fabrication, ISO Working Group on Analyses in MOX Fuel Fabrication, Agencia Brasileno-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC). Comments from the above groups were received and incorporated into the final version of the document, completed in April 2001. The ITVs 2000 represent target standard uncertainties, expressing the precision achievable under stipulated conditions. These conditions typically fall in one of the two following categories: 'repeatability conditions' normally encountered during the measurements done within one inspection period; or 'reproducibility conditions' involving additional sources of measurement variability such as